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1. DCI'S ROLE IN WARNING AND CRISIS

   both politically (the DCI's "Pearl Harbor" responsibility) and practically (central coordination ...

2. THE TIME OF THE ANGEL THE U-2 CUBA, AND THE CIA

   the committee was charged with determining whether or not the U.S. might be facing another Pearl Harbor ...

3. THE CUBAN CRISIS: HOW CLOSE WE WERE TO WAR

   the group of Pearl Harbor. "For the United States to attack a small country without warning," ...

4. ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

   Pearl Harbor is almost certainly wrong, but short- comings in the analyses and formal esti- mates ...

5. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN COVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION BY HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

   for our failure to take advantage of it at the time of Pearl Harbor. Today, there is probably little question ...

6. SITUATION REPORT VERIFICATION- THE PROBLEMS FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

   a Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko undertook to drive home a different kind ...

7. SUMMARY OF OSS RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

   and after the attack on Pearl Harbor.,::.eel I explains the business structure of the island. Shows sugar cane ...

8. ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER 'THE CIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY' SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 NEWPORT R. I. SPEECH

   which we did not have ever before. We learned that from the unfortunate lessons of our failure to predict the attack on Pearl ... Harbor. Today we have a centralized intelligence service, and it's a good one. But after giving ...

9. INDEX

   it should reach in the Intelligence Community. I have in mind here the Pearl Harbor problem-- the problem ...

10. THIRTY BILLION DOLLARS FOR WHOM?

    did and stayed on for nearly four years. When the Japanese struck:Pearl Harbor, Stirnson phoned me to come inime- ...

11. THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

    providing it. The National Security Act of 1947 was written against the backdrop of Pearl Harbor ...

12. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CIA AND ITS DIRECTOR

    that Pearl Harbor might have been averted if we had had better coordination of raw intelligence data seems ...

13. ADDRESS TO THE FOREIGN POLICY/NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEES ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

    AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL. MORE THAN THE ALAMO, OUR AGE REMEMBERS PEARL HARBOR. NEVER BEFORE OR SINCE DECEMBER 7,1941, ...

14. REMARKS OF ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE 96TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION

    And I simply reject out of hand the likelihood that we could be surprised with a Pearl Harbor kind of attack ...

15. DIRECTOR'S PUBLIC SPEECHES

    in what your collecting because that could be responsible for another Pearl Harbor. Only centralized control can ensure ...

16. COMPARISON OF TEAM A AND TEAM B CONCLUSIONS

    that war was out of the question. The syndrome also afilic:ed American leaders on the eve of Pearl Harbor ...

17. KGB

    of the war between Japan and the United States triggered at Pearl Harbor. As John Barron pointed ...

18. RESPONSE TO PRM-11, TASK 2

    and delays that occurred prior to Pearl Harbor. The problem Approved For Release 2007/01/17: ...

19. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CIA AND ITS DIRECTOR

    of production. The very strong feeling after World War II that Pearl Harbor might have been averted ...

20. HEARINGS BEFORE CIA OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES

    investigation of Pearl Harbor was having an evident effect upon public opinion. It seems ...

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