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1. STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

   double agent, Dusko Popov, for example, purportedly brought the FBI a questionaire for Pearl Harbor ...

2. SPEECH FOR THE AIR WAR COLLEGE CLASS OF 1984

   CIA-RDP86M00886R002800110002-1 SECRETI II. Intelligence and the Policy Process?Lesson of Pearl Harbor learned. President needs ...

3. JAPAN'S POSTWAR SHIPPING POSITION

   shipbui.d- ing after 1937 tended once again to hold down merchant ship construction. On Pearl Harbor icy, ...

4. JPRS ID: 9027 USSR REPORT ENERGY

   in all of them, and they ~ supposedly went to Vietnam because Munich and Pearl Harbor had traumatized ...

5. HISTORY OF LAWRENCE RESPONSE:

   in peacetime. A primary impetus, of course, was the experi- ence of Pearl Harbor, and the determination ...

6. LAWRENCE DRAFT

   intelligence organization in centralized and the experi- rimary impetus, of course, was peacetime. A p of Pearl ... Harbor, and the determination to ensure ence The requirement against such surprises in the future. ...

7. DCI'S ROLE IN WARNING AND CRISIS

   both politically (the DCI's "Pearl Harbor" responsibility) and practically (central coordination ...

8. A PROPOSAL FOR WESTERN SURVIVAL? A PILGRIM'S PROGRESS FROM CONTAINMENT

   I agree with Mr. Kennan, is critical. But so was it after Dunkirk, Smolensk, and Pearl Harbor ...

9. VII. THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION

   on all foreign developments were essential to the national interest. This is to multiply the Pearl Harbor ...

10. A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

    of their armed forces and their, shipping, for example. FISHER! Has the Pearl Harbor Investigation brought ...

11. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    characterized by the Pearl Harbor incident, "NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the American Legion ...

12. OFFICE OF LOGISTICS PERSONNEL ATTITUDES CONCERNING CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS

    The implication that I read into that post-mortum was that you had all the information, but just like at Pearl ... Harbor you had no way to get it together in the end to make it meaningful. Approved For Release ...

13. ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS WASHINGTON, D.C. BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE APRIL 14, 1971

    Truman and the 80th Congress in 1947 was the experience of Pearl Harbor, when, in the words of President ...

14. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION TO ACCOMPANY S. CON. RES. 2 TOGETHER WITH THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN

    to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and to the postwar investigation into the part intelligence or lack ...

15. SPEECH AND SCHEDULE FOR VISIT TO AIR WAR COLLEGE, MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA 26 OCTOBER 1971

    AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE INVESTIGATIONS OF THAT BLACK DAY SHOWED THAT THE NECESSARY ...

16. DDCI ADDRESS TO AIR WAR COLLEGE 26 OCTOBER 1971

    OF 1947 WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE ~-i3,4c L ~ INVESTIGATIONS ...

17. DDCI ADDRESS TO NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

    AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE INVESTIGATIONS OF THAT BLACK DAY SHOWED THAT THE NECESSARY ...

18. NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR FROM (Sanitized)

    had been collected in time, but had not been disseminated until after the war had begun-just like the classic Pearl ... Harbor failure. We found that Henry Kissinger kept valuable information away from the CIA. ...

19. AGENDA AND SPEECH AT ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE MONDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 1970

    THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE INVESTIGATIONS ...

20. FORD AND HIS OLD CABINET TO MEET, NO BUTS ABOUT IT

    Intelligence gathering, he said, has taken on a new look since the Japanese:- bombing of Pearl Harbor ...

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