ROMANIA: POLITICAL DISCORD RETARDS REFORM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: EASTERN EUROPE
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005657429
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-01070
• Publication Date: July 7, 1994

Crntrzl Inlelligena Agency
willing to sacrifice political support to tackle Romania's economic problems is unlikely.
Existing Structure A Recipe for Stagnation
The current regime rests on two pillars, the PDSR, which is lukewarm toward reform, and
several anti-reform extremist parties. The PDSR, composed mainly of former Communists who
support President Iliescu, and the extremists, hold 250 out of 484 parliamentary seats. The
PDSR's plurality in the last election--based largely on support from peasants and workers--
Their reliance on the extremist parties has often embattassed Iliescu and the PDSR and
has hobbled the government's efforts to tackle Romania's many problems. The growing
influence of moderates within the PDSR also is straining relations with the party's ultranationalist
and neo-Communist allies in parliament.
The moderate PDSR faction, backed by President Iliescu, is urging the
patty to move faster on economic reform.
The ultranationalists, however, are most interested in using parliament as a
forum for anti-reform and nationalistic diatribes, while the small neo-
Communist party harps on the government's failure to shelter the
population from the pam of reform.
Democratic Opposition V1'eak, Disorganized
The opposition remains fragmented and is plagued by personality conflicts between party
leaders. The two key democratic opposition groups are the Democratic Convention--a coalition
of approximately 18 parties--and former Prime Mittister Petre Roman's Democratic Party-
National Salvation Front (DP-NSF). Together, they control 203 seats in parliament.
-- The Democratic Convention, led by Emil Constantinescu, came in a strong
second in the last election. It has a centrist orientation and advocates
democratization and a market economy.
The DP-NSF--from which PDSR members broke away in early 1992--
supports democratic reforms and advocates amixed-market economy. Its
 leaders hope to play the role of moderator and facilitator between the PDSR
and Democratic Convention, but are vested by neither.
Political Support for Reform Unsteady
The hold of the PDSR and the extremisu on parliament probably will deny Romania the
necessary political cohesion to sustain accelerated economic reform. The political ideology and
interests of old-school politicians in the PDSR--and opposition distrust of the PDSR and Iliescu-=
make sustained cooperation with the opposition utilikely.
-- Mostly members of the nomenclature under Ceausescu, PDSR hardliners
fear the opposition would take advantage of a role in the government to
sideline former Communists and overturn the republic--eliminating the
power of Iliescu--in favor of a constitutional monarchy.
-- More rapid economic reform--including the accelerated privatization and
restructuring ca]led for under a recently negotiated pact with the IMF--are
anathema to the PDSR's current partners. Furthermore, unless the PDSR is
willing to make the concessions necessary to attract the opposition into a
coalitio~nfluence of these anti-reform parties is likely to grow.
Limited Accommodation Likely
The opposition parties' distrust of the PDSR--and of each other--will make coalition talks
difficult and protracted. Nevertheless, the shared realization that Prime Minister Vacaroiu's
government has been ineffective and the need to moderate the influence of the extremists
probably will eventually force the PDSR and the democratic opposition shop to ~ upporting
a government with a limi[ed mandate to execute needed restructuring.
A reformist PDSR or technocratic government supported by the CDR to implement
austerity and close non-viable state enterprises would risk becoming an orphan of Romanian
politics.
The populist PDSR--elected on a platform of slower, less painful reform--
probably would distance itself from the government as unemployment
grew.
The centrist opposition, distrustful of the PDSR and desiring to wrest power
from the former communists, may abandon the government at the time
reforms are biting the worst in a bid to force new elections.