SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

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CREST

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General CIA Records

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

CIA-RDP87T00051R000200150001-4

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RIPPUB

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December 22, 2016

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June 16, 2011

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Publication Date:

August 1, 1986

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NIE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Director of Central Intelligence MASTER FILE U"OP"Y E- T OR A ON Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Top Seeret August 1986 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also Participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/ Consultants PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to ... STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 NIE 11-17-86 SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM Information available as of 21 July 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, approved for publication on 15 August 1986 by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 CONTENTS Page SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1 KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3 CONCEPTS AND STRATEGY .......................................................... 7 The Military Utility of Chemical Weapons .................................... 7 Current Policy Regarding Employment ......................................... 9 Possible Chemical Warfare Tactics ................................................. 9 Special Operations ............................................................................ 9 Nonnuclear Warfare ......................................................................... 10 Nuclear Warfare ............................................................................... 11 Ships at Sea and Amphibious Operations ....................................... 11 Outside NATO Central Region ....................................................... 11 Proliferation of Chemical Warfare Capabilities ............................ 11 Arms Control: Negotiations and Monitoring .............................. 12 CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM ............................................... 13 Chemical Warfare Production Facilities ........................................ Storage Facilities ............................................................................... Chemical Munitions Storage ............................................................ Chemical Munitions .......................................................................... Chemical Weapon Stockpile ............................................................ Delivery Systems ............................................................................... Protective Capabilities ...................................................................... Protective Force Structure ............................................................... Soviet Air Forces ............................................................................... Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces ......................................................... Soviet Navy ....................................................................................... Offensive Force Structure ................................................................ Protective Training ........................................................................... Chemical Troop Training ................................................................ Offensive Training ............................................................................ Staff Training .................................................................................... 22 BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM ............................................ 23 III Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Page Medical .............................................................................................. 23 Protective ........................................................................................... 24 Offensive ............................................................................................ 26 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ................................................ 27 Biotechnologically Derived Agents .................................................. 29 Western Technology ......................................................................... 32 Equipment and Systems ................................................................... 33 ANNEX A: Glossary ............................................................................. 35 CW Agents ....................................................................................... 35 BW Agents ......................................................................................... 35 Toxins ................................................................................................. 35 New Agents ....................................................................................... 35 CBW Applications ............................................................................ 35 Antihuman CBW Applications ........................................................ 36 Antianimal CBW Applications ........................................................ 36 Anticrop CBW Applications ............................................................ 36 Antimateriel CBW Applications ...................................................... 36 Persistent Versus Nonpersistent ....................................................... 36 CBW Protection ................................................................................ 36 Genetic Engineering ......................................................................... 36 Recombinant DNA/Genetics ....................................................... 36 Massive Use ....................................................................................... 37 Selective Use ...................................................................................... 37 Warm-Base Production Capability ................................................. 38 ANNEX B: Soviet Chemical Warfare Agents .................................... 39 ANNEX C: Protection and Casualty Handling .................................. 41 Personal Protection ........................................................................... 41 Protective Mask ............................................................................. 41 Protective Clothing ....................................................................... 41 Decontamination ............................................................................... 41 Collective Protective Shelters .......................................................... 41 Ground Forces .............................................................................. 41 Air Forces ...................................................................................... 42 Naval Forces ................................................................................. 42 Casualty Handling ............................................................................ 42 iv Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 SCOPE NOTE This National Intelligence Estimate reviews the Soviet chemical and biological warfare program, with a view toward establishing judgments about each part of the program and its implications and defining the areas in which our knowledge is incomplete and requires improved collection. The last Estimate that covered both biological and chemical warfare was NIE 11-11-69, 13 February 1969. This Estimate updates SNIE 11/17-2-84/L, 20 November 1984, on chemical warfare and IIM 85-10009, September 1985, on new CBW agents. (s NF) 1 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 KEY JUDGMENTS The Soviets maintain the world's most comprehensive chemical and biological warfare program, and the Intelligence Community believes this capability constitutes a serious threat to NATO. We believe there is sufficient risk of Soviet use of chemical weapons that NATO must consider such use in all phases of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, even from the outset, in the central region as well as on the flanks, against ships at sea and amphibious forces. We believe chemical warfare (CW) use in any circumstances would, however, be selective rather than massive in terms of the number and type of targets attacked. In the early 1970s, the Soviets allocated almost $2 billion on a program to overcome a perceived US lead in CBW and provide a new generation of CBW weapons to be fielded in the next decade, and it ap- pears that the Soviets have maintained and expanded their BW effort. The initial use of chemical weapons requires approval by the highest Soviet political authority. Evidence of Soviet planning for the use of chemical weapons in either the nuclear or nonnuclear phases of war is open to differing interpretations. We do believe that an initial de- cision to use chemical and toxin weapons would be based on an assessment of at least these factors: whether an enemy is capable of and willing to respond with nuclear escalation; whether an enemy is able to retaliate in kind; and the degree to which an enemy can protect its forces against and recover from a chemical attack. These factors would apply to any contemplated attack on NATO, whether in northern, central, or southern Europe. The Community remains uncertain of the Soviet perception of NATO's threat to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical attacks, and, thus, cannot confidently predict how effective this would be in preventing the initiation of Soviet chemical attacks during the nonnuclear phase once war began: - One view is that, although the Soviets probably would refrain from initiating CW if their nonnuclear offensive were proceed- ing satisfactorily, the possibility of selective use of CW would increase if they calculated that the benefits of such use signifi- cantly outweighed the risk of possible NATO nuclear escalation. 3 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 - Another is that, once the threat of nuclear escalation has failed to deter war, it would not deter the use of chemicals any more than it would deter the use of other nonnuclear weapons. Thus, chemical weapons would be used as necessary, limited only by normal military considerations of their utility. - A third view holds that the dominant considerations would be the certainty of NATO chemical retaliation and the risk of nuclear escalation; consequently, the Soviets are unlikely to use chemical and toxin weapons against NATO, if at all, until a decision has been reached to use nuclear weapons. We are agreed that if the war reached the nuclear phase, use of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) would be more likely because there could be situations where chemicals would be the weapon of choice. The Soviet Union has used chemical weapons in limited wars. They probably would do so in the future when it was to their military advantage against forces unable to protect their personnel, retaliate in kind, or escalate. The Soviets have a significant capability to deliver a variety of chemical agents. Chemical munitions exist for aerial delivery and for nearly all Soviet artillery and tactical rocket and missile systems. Direct evidence does not exist that naval surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) or air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) have chemical warheads. We have identified Odepots inside the USSR where large quantities of bulk chemical agent, decontamination materials, and protective equipment are stored. Storage space at these sites has consistently grown since 1970. The Soviet chemical stockpile is believed to be several times that of the United States (although there is insufficient evidence to precisely describe the types, quantities, or locations of agents.) We believe that chemical munitions are stored (with conventional ammunition) in separately secured facilities at national-level ammunition and select unit depots, Chemical munitions are stored in the forward area, The chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) protection special- ists found in the Soviet armed forces constitute the largest such group in the world, with a peacetime manning of about 30,000 to 60,000 personnel in Ground Force chemical units and 2,000 to 3,000 in Air Force chemical protection sections. The Soviets have expanded their 4 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 CBR reconnaissance and decontamination capabilities since the late 1970s by introducing new concepts, new organizations, and new equipment. Soviet units regularly train to operate in a contaminated environment. They have occassionally conducted protective training with diluted CW agents, and use all types of protective and decontami- nation equipment. They have deployed an extensive inventory of CBR reconnaissance and decontamination vehicles, having over 30,000 CBR- related vehicles deployed with chemical troops. The Soviet Union has the capability to produce CBW agents in the large amounts that would be re uired for effective military operations. To date, we have identified facilities that could manufacture chemical compounds for use as chemical agents. Only one of these facilities is suspected to have been active a few months each year, probably producing agents at levels sufficient to replenish stockpiles and conduct testing. We have identified over 100 industrial microbiological plants in the Soviet Union, most doing clearly legitimate research to provide antibiotics, serums, and vaccines.~f these facilities, however, appear uniquely designed for assembly and storage of biological weapons, and there is one site that has been identified for just storage. Since 1980 major improvements to test and support facilities and new construction at the major Soviet CBW test fa- cilities. The program for the modernization of the Soviet CBW arsenal, which has been ongoing for more than a decade, has concentrated on exploiting advances in biotechnology such as genetic engineering. This 5 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 may, in the next 10 years, result in the fielding of new agents (chemical, toxin, and biological) 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 6 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 CONCEPTS AND STRATEGY 1. Chemical weapons were used by most of the belligerents during World War I. The first large-scale use of CW was in January 1915 by Germans against the Russians at Bolimow. The Russians suffered the greatest losses from chemical weapons during the war, with total casualties of more than 500,000. Russian fatalities from CW (56,000) were considerably greater than those of all the other belligerents combined and six times larger than any other country. The Soviets made thorough preparations for the possibility of chemical operations in World War II. Despite this, chemical weapons were not used by the Soviets during World War II, nor were they used by any of the other belligerents in Europe. At the end of the war, the Soviets were estimated to have produced large quanti- ties of chemical agents in some 35 newly built and converted industrial facilities. After the war, the Sovi- ets captured German CW agent stocks, as well as technology, and two nerve agent production facilities, which were dismantled and relocated to the Soviet Union. The Military Utility of Chemical Weapons 2. Chemical weapons are wide-area-effect weapons specifically designed to reduce the combat effective- ness of the enemy by killing or incapacitating person- nel and contaminating equipment and terrain. Cir- cumstances in which the Soviets believe chemical munitions provide battlefield advantages over conven- tional munitions are: - Denying areas to potential adversaries through chemical contamination. - Causing target neutralization without physical destruction. - Enlarging the lethal area. - Effectively attacking sheltered targets. - Slowing down enemy advances and restricting enemy maneuverability. - Rendering enemy equipment unusable until decontaminated. - Causing large numbers of casualties when used against unprepared troops. - Wearing down enemy troops both physically and psychologically. CW Use During World War II Chemical weapons were used by several countries in the conflicts leading up to World War II. In the European theater, the British, French, and Germans agreed in September 1939 to refrain from the use of CW, though the available stocks of chemical weapons exceeded the total quantity of chemical weapons used in World War I. Germany had developed nerve agents during the late 1930s, though they did not have large stocks of these weapons until 1944. They refrained from using their other chemical weapons because they feared retaliation against their civilian populations. The Ger- mans also mistakenly believed the United States had developed nerve agents, though the Western Allies did not know of the German capability until 1944 when tabun-filled ammunition was captured. After that time the Allies were reluctant to consider the use of chemical weapons since they did not have nerve agents. Stocks of chemical weapons were available in every major battle area. Throughout the conflict, both the Allies and the Axis believed their enemies had equivalent capabilities to protect their forces and to retaliate in kind. Though chemical weapons could have had a significant effect on the outcome of certain battles, all sides refrained from initiating CW because, at each point where such use was considered, sufficient disincentives existed.F - Requiring fewer munitions to achieve equal le- thality 3. On the other hand, the Soviets appear to have a healthy respect for the side effects and limitations of chemical weapons. They recognize that: - Terrain and weather may reduce the effective- ness of toxic agents and break up or prevent the formation of the secondary toxic cloud. - Consideration must be given to the minimum distance from friendly troops that agents may be used. - Countermeasures can be taken on short notice and, if properly implemented, could significantly degrade chemical weapons effectiveness. - Operations in a protective posture are restrictive. 7 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 - Chemical contamination of the battlefield could slow the pace of operations for both sides, which the Soviets believe in some cases could assist a defender. - Chemical weapons employment increases the complexity of planning and executing offensive operations. 4. On balance, selective use of chemical weapons could be a significant combat multiplier causing limit- ed degradation on the effectiveness of Soviet forces. Clearly, Soviet forces would prefer not to operate in a nuclear, chemical, or biologically contaminated envi- ronment. They must consider the interference with operations that would be engendered by use of chemi- cal weapons. The Soviets would prefer weapons whose effects are more predictable, but have derived formu- las, nomograms, and tables to determine contamina- tion effects from the use of a particular agent under given meteorological conditions and terrain. Soviet writings reflect that the zones of contamination result- ing from the use of chemical weapons are smaller than those resulting from the use of nuclear or biological weapons, and, thus, are easier to bypass. However, intentional wide-aerial spraying of persistent agents may, in fact, create larger areas of contamination than use of low-yield nuclear weapons. All these are consid- erations for any military force that contemplates operating in a contaminated environment. The Soviets have trained their forces to maximize their combat capabilities and minimize the inherent difficulties of operating in a chemical or nuclear-contaminated envi- ronment. 5. The Soviets stress taking advantage of the weak- nesses of any enemy's protective capability such as exploiting known deficiencies in enemy individual protective means and capitalizing on the failure or inability of the enemy to detect contamination. The ability to achieve surprise, the status of the enemy's protective posture, and the enemy's combat restora- tion capabilities are keys to determining the potential effectiveness of a chemical strike. The Soviets believe chemical weapons are most effective against poorly trained, unprepared, and unprotected personnel. They anticipate a casualty rate of up to 60 percent with a CW attack against unwarned and unprotected person- nel and 15 to 40 percent among protected personnel (because of exposure to CW agent before masking, malfunctioning equipment, and combat damage to protective equipment). Soviet actions in using chemi- cal protective equipment indicate a potential capabili- ty to restore combat potential and minimize casualties. 6. While the Soviets consider enemy nuclear weap- ons systems to be the most important targets, concen- trations of personnel are the most vulnerable to chemi- cal attacks. The target array for chemical attacks could include any of the following: nuclear delivery systems; airfields; command, control, and communications sites; ports; air defense assets; key logistic centers; naval bases; and other key rear area facilities within the tactical and operational tactical depth of the battle area. Although the Soviet's writing before World War II emphasized that CW was intended primarily to achieve tactical battlefield advantages, their present combination of delivery systems provides the capabili- ty to deliver chemical strikes throughout the opera- tional and operational strategic depths of the enemy's defenses. 7. Sovie po icy, as officially stated, is that it will not initiate chemical warfare. Soviet exercises often depict NATO chemical strikes, usually in conjunction with nuclear strikes. A major consideration by the Soviets in deciding whether to use chemical weapons is the risk that their enemy will retaliate in kind or, in the case of NATO or China, escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. If the Soviets calculated they could achieve significant benefits at what they considered an acceptable risk, they might use chemical weapons 8 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 9. Successful Soviet attacks (including those with chemical weapons) on high-value NATO targets would threaten NATO's capability to execute its wartime mission, and, thus, make it even more difficult for Soviet planners to identify the level of conflict below which NATO would not be provoked to respond with massive use of chemical weapons is unlikely, because the Soviets would calculate that such use would be almost certain to cause a NATO nuclear response, while other available means may have a better possi- bility of avoiding nuclear response. Once war has begun, Soviet concerns about nuclear retaliation might be lessened, and we cannot rule out selective employ- ment of chemical weapons. Current Policy Regarding Employment 10. Chemical weapons employment requires autho- rization from the highest military-political levels in the USSR. The decision to release chemical weapons for employment rests in the hands of the Politburo or, in wartime, the Supreme High Command. The decision to release chemical weapons for employment would probably be on the basis of at least the following considerations: - An assessment of the probable enemy response, either retaliation in kind or with nuclear weapons. - An assessment of the military advantage of CW against a particular enemy. - An assessment of the enemy's ability to protect its forces against chemical attack and to restore its combat capabilities following the attack. 11. Once release to employ chemical weapons has been granted, the Soviet General Staff, the executive agent of the Supreme High Command, implements the decision and determines how chemical warfare will be integrated into the overall operation. The plans developed by the General Staff are disseminated to each Theater of Military Operations (TVD). The High Command of each TVD, in turn, disseminates chemi- cal warfare plans to subordinate front, army, and division commands. At each command level, the appropriate fire plans for the employment of chemical weapons are developed by the fire planning staffs. Possible Chemical Warfare Tactics 12. To avoid a decrease in the tempo of offensive operations, the Soviets might use persistent CW agent on the flanks, in sectors that will be bypassed, or deep in the enemy's rear area. Although the Soviets do not doubt their ability to cross such regions, they would prefer to bypass areas of contamination. Nonpersistent agent attacks could be delivered along the main axis of advance without disrupting the tempo of offensive operations. Because of the short duration of their effects, Soviet forces could either wait until the agent dissipates or attempt to cross the contaminated area using vehicle protective systems, with little prepara- tion needed for protection and virtually no need to decontaminate 13. To enhance the effectiveness of chemical weap- ons, the Soviets may employ chemical weapons simul- taneously with nonlethal smoke. If CW employment can thus be disguised, enemy personnel may not have sufficient warning to don protective masks and cloth- ing. The Soviets may employ chemical weapons simul- taneously with, or immediately following, high-explo- sive or improved conventional munition barrages, to take advantage of the confusion and degradation of the enemy's protective posture. Special Operations 14. Limited evidence suggests that Warsaw Pact special-purpose (Spetsnaz) reconnaissance forces could use chemical or biological weapons in operations 9 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 15. Some types of CBW weapons are relatively easy to transport and could be effective if used without warning by Spetsnaz groups operating in the NATO rear area against targets such as command posts or special ammunition storage sites. In considering whether to authorize such operations, however, we believe Soviet leaders would be reluctant to risk opening a weapons-of-mass-destruction phase unless the payoff for chemical use was substantial. Addition- ally, the use of lethal CW by such forces presents formidable command and control problems for the Soviets, and, we judge that, on balance, the Soviets would not resort to widespread use of CW by Spetsnaz forces unless a decision had already been reached for employment of CW using other, more efficient meth- ods of delivery (such as aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles). The use of disabling, nonlethal chemical agents in isolated instances is more likely, but there is no recent, direct evidence that the Soviets plan such use for Spetsnaz forces Nonnuclear Warfare 16. Soviet military doctrine since the late 1970s appears to be that an initial period of combat with NATO, in which the Pact would seek to degrade NATO's theater nuclear capability, might be limited to the use of conventional weapons. This initial period is referred to by the Soviets as the nonnuclear phase of war. 17. In a war with NATO, the Intelligence Commu- nity cannot rule out Soviet initiation of CBW even from the start of nonnuclear hostilities. The Soviets probably believe that NATO's forces are relatively less capable than their own for operations in contaminated environments. Given their access to Western informa- tion, the Soviets must be aware that NATO's ability to retaliate in kind has diminished since 1969. Nonethe- less, they also remain concerned with a presumed US ability to rebuild an offensive chemical stockpile during the period of tension leading to war. 18. Because there is little evidence as to what specific conditions would prompt the General Staff to recommend, and the political authority to approve, the use of CBW against NATO, questions of when and under what conditions the Soviets might do so during the nonnuclear phase of war can be answered only inferentially. Since we remain uncertain of the Soviet's perception of NATO's nuclear escalatory threat, dif- fering views exist on how effective this would be in preventing Soviet first use of chemical warfare once war had began: - One view is that, although the Soviets would probably refrain from initiating chemical war- fare if the nonnuclear offensive were proceeding to their satisfaction, the possibility of selective use would increase if they calculated that bene- fits of such use significantly outweighed the risk of possible NATO nuclear escalation; for exam- ple, a serious Warsaw Pact reversal or the pros- pect of a significant effect because of weaknesses in NATO's protective and deterrent posture. - A second view is that, once the threat of nuclear escalation has failed to deter war, it would not deter the use of chemical weapons any more than it would deter the use of other nonnuclear weapons. Thus, chemical weapons would be used as necessary, limited only by normal military considerations of their utility. Chemical warfare can be separated from nuclear warfare and must be considered in that perspective. A nonnuclear scenario makes a compelling argument for the selective use of chemical weapons in the initial period, if such weapons offer significant poten- tial for achieving their objectives in a timely manner without resort to nuclear escalation at the onset. Chemical weapons would most likely be integrated into initial Soviet operations if they could be employed in ways that contributed to the immediate neutralization of NATO's retalia- tory theater nuclear capability, interrupted NA- TO's command and control network, or disrupt- ed the continuity of NATO's forward force deployment, enabling Soviet combat forces to retain the tactical and operational initiative. In a nonnuclear scenario, Soviet military strategists are more likely to view chemical weapons as offering a solution to those critical military prob- lems that reduce the risk of theater nuclear war and strategic nuclear escalation and contribute to successful conclusion of military operations in the shortest possible time. - A third view holds that the dominant consider- ation in a decision to use chemical and toxin weapons against NATO would be the certainty of NATO chemical retaliation and the risk of nucle- ar escalation. Further, the Soviets believe the risk of escalation exceeds any potential benefit that 10 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 could be derived from use of the current chemi- cal and toxin inventory. In this view, the USSR's chemical and toxin capability exists primarily to deter NATO use and further ensure that the Warsaw Pact's massive conventional superiority would be decisive. Consequently, the Soviets are unlikely to use chemical and toxin weapons against NATO, if at all, until a decision had been reached to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear Warfare 19. Limited evidence referring to chemical warfare in the context of a particular phase of war portrays Pact chemical strikes simultaneous with or subsequent to nuclear operations. This evidence indicates that they would employ chemical weapons to complement their nuclear munitions, or to neutralize certain sensi- tive targets immediately before a Soviet nuclear strike. Certainly, at this point, fear of NATO nuclear retalia- tion was not and would not be a restraining factor. Ships at Sea and Amphibious Operations 20. The Soviets have provided for chemical citadels on their ships and have emphasized washdown systems (both of which are equally applicable to nuclear fallout protection). They maintain chemical bombs with at least some of their naval aviation units and have chemical weapons storage at some naval bases. We assess that some of their terminally guided cruise missiles are capable of delivering CW agents, and naval CW gun ammunition has been reported. Chemi- cal service personnel are assigned to all Soviet combat- ants. The Soviets might perceive the selective use of chemical warfare to be advantageous against ships at sea; however, all available evidence indicates that the use of weapons of mass destruction at sea would not be independent of their use on land. Regarding amphibi- ous operations, Soviet writings have indicated that personnel engaged in heliborne and surface amphibi- ous assaults would be especially vulnerable to nuclear and chemical strikes. Outside NATO Central Region 21. The bulk of the available evidence pertains to Soviet use of CW against the central region of NATO. However, the considerations for the use of CW apply equally to NATO's flanks. As in the central region, the Soviets store chemical weapons opposite Scandinavia for possible use. Soviet forces facing NATO's flanks are equipped and trained for operations on a contami- nated battlefield. Terrain in Norway and eastern Turkey would be conducive to the use of CW. 22. In peripheral areas outside the NATO region, only China has the ability to retaliate with chemicals or escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. The USSR probably plans for the contingency of Pakistani and Iranian CW capabilities. The Soviets maintain chemi- cal depots in the regions encompassed by the wartime Southern and Far Eastern TVDs, and their forces in these areas are trained and equipped for operations on a contaminated battlefield. The inability of these countries to retaliate in kind, or escalate, and their weak protective capabilities may invite the use of CW by the USSR. While we know very little about Soviet views of using CW against the PRC, the wide-scale use of these weapons during a Sino-Soviet war for the purpose of offsetting the Chinese manpower advan- tage is a possibility. Proliferation of Chemical Warfare Capabilities 23. In the 1980s, international concern about the use and proliferation of CBW in the Third World increased. Although the Soviets are concerned about certain aspects of proliferation, there have been sever- al examples of Soviet activities related to the transfer or use of CBW over a long period of time. During the 1960s, Egypt was reported to have received Soviet CW technology. By 1962, the USSR had provided Egypt with more than 250 tons of nerve agent and chemical bombs filled with phosgene and mustard. Some of these chemical weapons may have been used against Yemeni tribesmen during the period 1963-67. Soviet involvement with the Egyptian program ceased in the early 1970s when the Soviets were expelled from that country. 24. In the early 1960s, the USSR provided Syria with extensive defensive training and protective mate- rial. Syria first obtained chemical weapons in 1973, when Egypt provided sarin-filled bombs and artillery shells and the USSR provided at least riot-control agents. In the late 1970s, the Syrians reportedly devel- oped and tested a chemical warhead for the Scud missile; however, there is no indication that the Soviets assisted in this effort. We have no evidence of Soviet assistance to Syria's offensive CW program. Moreover, Syria has attempted to conceal the existence of its program from the Soviet Union from its inception. 25. The USSR provided toxins and, possibly, other chemical weapons to the Vietnamese beginning in the 11 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 mid-1970s. Toxin agents and an unidentified incapaci- tating agent have been used by Vietnamese troops against H'mong resistance forces and civilian popula- tions in Laos. Similarly, chemical agents and toxins have been used by Vietnamese forces in their attempt to conquer Cambodia. In late 1979, a US team of medical and CW experts investigating reported use of CW by Vietnamese and Laotian forces against the H'mong concluded one type of chemical employed was probably a nerve agent. The Soviets reject US charges about toxin weapons being used in Southeast Asia. Although reporting of attacks persists, the num- ber has decreased since 1984. We have been unable to confirm these attacks. It is probable that Soviet advis- ers still assist the Vietnamese and Lao. 26. The Soviets employed chemical weapons in Afghanistan at least during the first years of the war. Reporting of attacks decreased sharply afterwards. Unconfirmed reporting suggests the Afghan Army may have used chemical agents provided by the USSR. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets provide lethal agents to the Afghan military. Soviet and Cuban advisers have reportedly trained Ethiopi- ans in offensive chemical warfare operations. Ethiopi- an forces, aided and supervised by Soviet advisers, may have used lethal chemical agents in selected attacks on Eritrean resistance forces, although we have yet to acquire proof of such attacks. 27. Recent information has indicated some Soviet views on CW proliferation: - The Soviets state they are as concerned about CW use and proliferation as Western govern- ments. - Charges of Soviet treaty violations are countered by a broad-based propaganda program accusing the United States of past uses of CBW (Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba), as well as current allega- tions of supplying CBW materials to South Afri- ca, insurgents in Afghanistan, and El Salvador. US CW modernization continues to be empha- sized in Soviet propaganda as proof that the United States is not serious about a global CW ban or stopping CW proliferation. Because of the proliferation of CW capabilities throughout the world, the Soviets may calculate that the traditional abhorrence to chemical war- fare is slowly being eroded as an increasing number of countries use or attain a capability to use CW without any major political or economic sanctions from the world at large. This percep- tion may influence Soviet CW doctrine concern- ing the proper circumstances and times for the use of CW in Third World conflicts. Arms Control: Negotiation and Monitoring 28. Presently, the Soviet Union is engaged in multi- lateral negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemi- cal weapons at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and in bilateral discussions with the United States on the margins of the CD. Problems in identify- ing CBW agent production and storage facilities, as well as calculating weaponized stocks, make monitor- ing of international agreements limiting CBW-associ- ated stocks or production extremely difficult. The security that surrounds the Soviet CW program makes monitoring of compliance even more difficult. The Soviets accept the principle of on-site inspection of destruction of stocks, but appear unwilling to declare the location of stocks until just prior to destruction. The Soviet position on CW production appears to reflect concern about where at least some of their facilities are located; for example, as part of a large chemical complex, and what specific CW equipment must be destroyed or salvaged.' ' See Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, 23 December 1985, NSC Arms Control Verification Committee. (v) 12 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 29. We believe that the Soviets maintain a warm- In addition to dual-use chemicals such as phosgene base production capability devoted to chemical agent and hydrogen cyanide, which are produced in quanti- production as part of their industrial base. This oper- ty, the Soviets have pesticide plants that can be ates in different modes and at irregular intervals to modified rapidly to produce nerve agent, binary replenish the stockpile and supply agent for munitions components, or advanced intermediates. These modi- fications are relatively simple to implement, and could be completed in a matter of weeks. Change of chemi- cal feedstock, rather than process equipment changes, would probably require the longest leadtimes. P Storage Facilities 32. We have identified chemical d used to d forces these depots pro a y are c o n t r o l l e d by the C h i e f o Chemical Troops, and some Chemical Warfare Production Facilities may be national-level installations. These depots are believed to be the principal storage centers for bulk chemical agent, as well as large quantities of CBR- related equipment vehicles, and smoke and incendi- ary materials_^ther chemical depots exist that appear to be associated with these major depots. 25X1 25X1 9 Y1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 31. The Soviet civilian chemical industry has the ability to produce chemical agents in large quantities. 33. Although small quantities of agent probably are available for training, we believe that bulk agent is not routinely stored at Ground and Air Force unit depots. Reports on chemical agent storage in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) suggest that chemical agent would normally be under Soviet control.) facilities at national-level ammunition and select uni Chemical Munitions Storage 34. We believe that chemical munitions are stored (with conventional ammunition) in separately secured 13 Top Secret ocvi 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 35. Chemical munitions exist for aerial delivery and for nearly all the Soviet artillery and tactical rocket and missile systems. Direct evidence does not exist that naval SSMs or ASMs have chemical warheads. Evi- dence suggests that CW landmines are available. We do not know the extent or amount of chemical muni- tions stored in the forward areas and under control of the NSWP forces, but believe that, except for Roma- nia, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries control chemi- cal agents sufficient only for R&D and training. On the basis of Soviet preservation technology, deficiencies do exist and Soviet conven- tional ions storage practice, stored CW bulk agent and munitions are probably in good condition; however, we cannot exclude the possibility that some pon Stockpile 'e that the Soviets maintain a stockpile of chemical ammunition sufficient to supply their forces during wartime, 14 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 tors, decontamination devices and prophylactic kits, and air filtration systems for shelters and vehicles. While not yet reported to be in the active inventory, a new protective mask resistant to the next generation of Soviet CW agents is probably in development. A new Czechoslovak airpermeable protective suit indicates continued development of protective measures. De- contamination practice seems to be driven by the concept that partial treatment is sufficient in most instances, although a new generation of agents may require new decontaminants (figure 6). New develop- ments in collective protection filtration systems in- clude the use of minimal filtration systems that would ll ow for reduced but acceptable individual protection Protective Capabilities a levels for more personnel. Past equipment develop- 39. The Soviet armed forces have a large variety of ment cycles indicate the probable appearance of these items designed to provide protection from the effects additional protective items in the 1990-95 time frame. of CBW warfare. They have protective masks and Over 30,000 CBR-related vehicles are deployed with agent-impermeable protective clothing, agent detec- chemical troops. 17 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Figure 6 Equipment Decontamination Exercise 40. Soviet Chemical Troops, which are found in all branches of the armed forces, are dedicated to the protection and decontamination of troops and equip- ment from the effects of weapons of mass destruction. The Directorate of the Chief of Chemical Troops, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, is headed by Colonel General of Chemical Troops V. K. Pikalov. This directorate establishes force structure, training, and doctrinal requirements, and pursues research, training, and maintenance functions. Units and indi- viduals assigned at division level and below are re- ferred to as the Chemical Service, while those at army level and above are referred to as Chemical Troops. Their principal wartime tasks include: - Conducting CBR reconnaissance. - Locating nuclear bursts. - Assessing the parameters of CBR contamination. - Monitoring the level of contamination of troops, equipment, materiel, and terrain. - Decontaminating troops, equipment, buildings, and terrain. - Employing smoke generators, flame, and incen- diary devices. - Providing detection and decontamination sup- port to accidents resulting from the movement of chemical weapons 41. With the exception of the employment of smoke, flame, and incendiary devices, Chemical Troops are protective in nature and are not involved in the technical aspects of the offensive delivery of nuclear or chemical weapons. Nuclear and chemical fire-planning responsibilities rest with other staff ele- ments 42. Chemical Troops are organic to Soviet and Warsaw Pact Ground Force units at all levels from 19 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 front to regiment. The Soviet military has experiment- ed with the organization of these units several times during the past two decades, the last time beginning about 1980. At that time, division-level units were reorganized from battalions to companies, and regi- mental-level units from companies to platoons. We also have evidence that, at about the same time, army- level units underwent a reorganization. Whereas ar- mies previously had one chemical protection battalion, we now find that they have up to six specialized battalions and companies (observed in several combi- nations forcewide). We also have evidence that some front-level chemical protection brigades have been augmented by a variety of independent battalions. The introduction of aerial CBR reconnaissance units and specialized nuclear-burst locating units give the Soviets the capability to rapidly locate contaminated areas 43. According to unclassified Pact writings, the reorganization at the tactical level was designed to make more units capable of independent CBR recon- naissance and decontamination. At army level and above, we believe this reorganization and concentra- tion may provide the Soviets with greater flexibility in using their assets in wartime. It is difficult to deter- mine how successful the Soviets have been in achiev- ing the goals of this reorganization, but the extent to which it has been observed throughout the USSR and the fact that it is now being observed in NSWP forces lead us to assess that the Soviets believe it has im- proved the ability of their forces to continue opera- tions on a contaminated battlefield. Our estimate of the peacetime manning of the Ground Force Chemi- cal Troops is about 30,000 to 60,000 personnel. In wartime, the mobilization of reservists may at least double that figure. Soviet Air Forces 44. The Air Technical Battalions of Soviet airbases have chemical protection sections to perform recon- naissance and decontamination. Each section operates under the staff supervision of the Regimental Chief of Chemical Service, who is also responsible for supervis- ing the chemical protective training of airbase person- nel. The Soviet Air Force (SAF) is believed to have between 2,000 and 3,000 personnel in these units. In wartime, previously trained elements of the Air Tech- nical Battalion would augment the chemical protec- tion section to assist in decontamination. If further manpower is required, the airbase can request support from Ground Force chemical units in the area. Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) 45. indicates the existence of a Chemical Protection Company, similar in composition to those in a Ground Forces division, in SS-20 divi- sions. The unit acts as a protection unit with routine missions of CBR decontamination and reconnaissance. All or most other missile divisions of the SRF are also assessed to have a CBR protective capability Soviet Navy 46. The Soviet Navy Chemical Service Directorate is under the command of a rear admiral who is directly subordinate to the Chief of the Main Navy Staff. The Soviet Naval Chemical Service Directorate is responsible for the Naval Chemical Service organi- zations within each of the four Soviet fleets. The Fleet Chemical Service is also responsible for training and providing protective equipment for CBR operations. A smoke unit has been noted in the fleet structure and large numbers of smoke-generating vehicles are locat- ed at most Navy Chemical depots. Offensive Force Structure 47. Chemical weapons employment is a facet of fire-support planning that is executed with fire-sup- port assets. The basic command and control organiza- tion at front and army level for all fire support is the Combined-Arms Combat Control Center (CCC). In the front- and army-level CCC, the combined-arms commander and his principal advisers plan and coor- dinate the major aspects of the operation, including employment of nuclear and chemical weapons. In- cluded in the CCC is the combined-arms commander, his chief of staff, and the key members of his staff representing all major functional areas. Operational or strategic planning (depending on the level of the CCC) on a general level occurs at the CCC. Detailed fire planning, control, and coordination of fire-support assets is the responsibility of the Joint Air and Air Defense Command Post and the Command Post of the Chief of Missile Troops and Artillery 48. The chemical plan would be determined by the nuclear and fire-planning group, with the detailed computations being performed at the artillery or air Command Post, depending on the delivery system being employed. The Chief of Chemical Troops would provide information to the CCC on a chemical (radio- logical) situation map, depicting areas of contamina- tion resulting from both enemy and friendly use of chemical and nuclear weapons. 20 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Protective Training 49. CBR protection training is a fundamental as- pect of Soviet military training for all services. It involves a variety of measures for the protection of personnel in all services from the effects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This includes nuclear/chemical reconnaissance; nuclear/chemical monitoring; and the decontamination of personnel, equipment, vehicles, and terrain because of contami- nation. Field training and classroom instruction ad- dress many aspects of these measures. Individual chemical protection training occurs on a regular basis and covers the use and care of protective clothing, the effects of CW agents, detection, decontamination techniques, and emergency measures following expo- sure to chemical agents or radiation. Field training exercises and command post exercises involving all types of combat units regularly feature chemical defense. Chemical protection training is conducted in a variety of combat situations, at different times of day, year round. These exercises gauge the abilities of the commander, his staff, and subordinate units to overcome the effects of a specific CW agent. These exercises add realism to training, and prepare partici- pants for a specific type of contamination and the measures that need to be taken for protection. Certain paramilitary organizations such as the Merchant Ma- rine and Civil Defense units also regularly receive CBR training. 50. Chemical protection training is not a deception measure used by the Soviets to conceal preparations for offensive CW use; chemical protection measures are neutral in that contamination may be the result of a friendly or enemy chemical strike. Reports indicate that the defensive training occasionally uses live chem- ical warfare agents. This usually involves personnel, equipment, and units of the Chemical Troops con- ducting chemical reconnaissance; however, combat arms unit training has also reportedly involved the use of live chemical warfare agents. Fire-support elements (MRL, artillery, and SSM) are trained similarly. Per- sonnel are trained to don protective clothing, conduct partial decontamination using organic assets, and con- tinue operating their weapons in full protective cloth- ing. Protection and casualty handling information is offers a five-year program of study for chemical officers. This faculty provides the officers of the Chemical Troops with a fundamental education in the technical aspects of chemical and nuclear warfare. The five-year program emphasizes technical theories, concepts, and principles of chemical warfare, rather than tactics, specific munitions, and delivery systems. Upon graduation, Chemical Troop officers are as- signed to chemical units at division level or higher throughout the armed forces to serve as commanders and deputy commanders. 52. Personnel and units of the Chemical Troops in all services train regularly in nuclear/chemical recon- naissance (detection and identification); nuclear/che- mical monitoring and analysis; and decontamination of personnel and equipment. Chemical Troop staffs and units support operational training of combat arms units through a variety of CBR support methods. Evidence exists that Chemical Troop units have con- ducted decontamination following chemical strikes. Taken together, the combat-support functions of the Chemical Troops are applicable to supporting opera- tions in which Soviet nuclear and chemical strikes are executed, or supporting operations in which NATO nuclear and chemical strikes are employed. Offensive Training 53. training for the offensive employment of chemi- cal weapons may continue for individual officers, for some firing units, and for some staffs. Senior staff officers and commanders have been reported to re- ceive instruction regarding the use of chemical weap- ons both at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy and in a special 10-week course at the Timoshenko Chemi- cal Defense Academy. Junior- and middle-grade com- bat arms officers of all services are trained at the Chemical Defense Academy in a five-year course that covers those subjects necessary for the employment of chemical weapons provided in Annex C. Chemical Troop Training 51. The Engineering Faculty of the Red Banner Military Academy of Chemical Defense, imeni Mar- shal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, in Moscow, 21 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 `25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 55. Although the procedures used at unit level for firing guns, dropping bombs, or launching missiles for the delivery of chemical ordnance are virtually identi- cal to the delivery of conventional ordnance, some evidence indicates that artillery units in the 8th Guards Army, GSFG, were required to perform chem- ical fire missions as part of their end-of-cycle qualifi- cations in 1979. These qualifications are the culmina- tion of the semiannual training cycle and test of the unit's ability to perform all its tasks. Other evidence indicates that a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) unit of the 20th Guards Army, GSFG, was actually con- ducting chemical fire-mission training during the por- tion of its semiannual training when it had previously been reported as conducting chemical protective train- ing. Furthermore, the offensive CW training is authorized and administered by front-, army-, and division-level commanders. 22 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 58. By the 1950s, the 7th Main Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense had the responsibility for the BW program and established military microbiolog- ical research institutes near Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk. During the 1960s, industrial-scale production plants and storage facilities, called special storage areas or SSA were added to these institutes, giving them the ability to function as BW production plants. Also Medical 62. The adverse effects of a BW attack may be lessened by physical protection, by prior immuniza- tion to prevent a specific illness or lessen the severity of the disease, and by treatment with antibiotics or other therapeutics. The Soviet Union has continued to develop new vaccines, with more recent interest di- rected toward the exotic viruses, genetically engi- neered vaccines, and continued improvement of arbo- viruses vaccines. Among these are anthrax, smallpox, plague, cholera, tularemia, tickborne encephalitis, yel- low fever, and typhoid vaccines, and staphylococcal and botulinum antitoxins. 23 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 63. The NSWP countries frequently collaborate on basic research and production of immunopreparations through the USSR Ministry of Health. The Soviets use inhalation and intranasal (aerosol) immunization meth- odologies to increase immunity for already vaccinated personnel. During the last five years, various Soviet prophylactic inhalation experiments have been con- ducted on humans against many diseases such as typhoid and paratyphoid, botulism, gas gangrene, plague, anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, ornithosis, in- fluenza, and tuberculosis. Over 10,000 people report- edly have been vaccinated using single and combined vaccine preparations. The effectiveness of these meth- ods for primary vaccinations has not been demonstrat- ed. At present in the Soviet Union, three types of vaccines are known and widely used against infectious diseases: (1) vaccines from live attenuated or noninfec- tious agents, called live vaccines; (2) vaccines that are suspensions of nonliving, pathogenic organisms, virus- es, or rickettsiae, generally called dead vaccines, or inactivated vaccines; and (3) vaccines composed of antigens extracted from live organisms, called chemi- cal vaccines. 64. The Chemical Troops and the Medical Service assets of all the services are jointly responsible for detecting and identifying types of biological contami- nation, determining the extent of contamination and establishing procedures for the protection of personnel from the effects of biological agents. Medical Service personnel are responsible for monitoring epidemics of various types 65. Some level of protection from biological weap- ons effects on personnel is provided by the various individual and collective protection systems developed for protection against chemical agents. 24 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 cording to doctrinal requirements, protective masks and clothing are to be used for biological warfare, which indicates that they provide a degree of protec- tion. ets generally consider infectious BW agents to be a weapon for use against selected targets, usually deep in the enemy's rear area. This indicates they may not foresee the use of infectious agents against enemy forces on the tactical battlefield. Alternatively, be- cause of the lack of field detectors and the rapid onset of symptoms, toxin agents and possibly new biotechno- logically derived compounds may represent tactical battlefield agents Training for Military Operations 67. Pact CBR protective training encompasses a variety of actions taken to protect personnel from the effects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Many exercises portray specific scenarios involving nuclear or chemical contamination that results from the use of weapons of mass destruction. Other exer- cises, however, do not identify a specific type of contamination. Exercise activity in the mid-to-late 1970s portrayed Soviet units encountering a biological hazard and undergoing BW protective measures to restore combat capabilities following exposure to al- leged NATO use of BW agent. General CBR protec- tive training is considered by the Soviets to include protective measures against the effects of BW. We have no example of exercises that depict the offensive use of BW by the Soviets. 26 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 68. In the early 1970s the Soviets embarked on a multifaceted research and development program de- signed to overcome a perceived significant US lead in chemical and biological warfare. They allocated al- most $2 billion to this program to concentrate on emerging areas of science in search of significant breakthroughs that could result in a new generation of biological and chemical weapons to be fielded in the 1985-95 time frame. The program was also to improve the storage, effectiveness, deliverability, and safe han- dling of existing and emerging agents. 70. The Soviet CBW RDT&E Program is directed from the Council of Ministers. Responsibility for pro- gram direction is focused in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with continuous oversight by the Scientific and Technical Council for Biological and Chemical War- fare. The military is involved at various civilian and military institutes in directing and conducting the actual research and development. The MOD tasks military institutes and laboratories directly, and con- tracts for studies in civilian institutes. Biomedical scientists from the military are assigned throughout the complex of either military or civilian research facilities with BW interest. Although the conventional Soviet BW program is reported to have been initiated in the 1930s in response to perceived external threats, it has always included emphasis on offensive weapons. The program also directs research on protective prod- ucts such as detection systems and immunizations. 71. Responsibility for development and acquisition of offensive and protective CW systems and equip- ment is delegated to the Scientific Research Chemistry a Hetero-organic compounds contain a bond between carbon and a nontypically organic element such as silicon. Candidate agents are bicyclic phosphates, silatranes, and fentanyl derivatives. (u) Institute (NIKhI), subordinate to the Directorate for Chemical Troops (UKhV) of the Ministry of Defense. NIKhI was located in Moscow until the late 1960s, then moved Central Chemical Proving Ground ito the at Shikhany This institute is responsible for the acquisition, testing, and weapon integration of all CW equipment and materials, including chemical products used as chemical agents. Research on toxicity, CW application capabilities, and testing of toxic chem- ical products is performed at NIKhI. Work not within the institute's capabilities is contracted to appropriate organizations of the Academies of Science (basic and theoretical research) or to organizations of the chemi- cal industry (applied research, development, and pro- duction) (RD&P). NIKhI departments that have the responsibility for the entire CW R&D program, including flame, obscurants, and smoke. We believe that portions of the test range are controlled and operated by the various departments within NIKhI. 27 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Biotechnologically Derived Agents 75. Soviet research institutes believed to be engaged in the development of biotechnologically derived BW agents are the All Union Scientific Research Institute of Molecular Biology (IMB Kol'tsovo) and the All Union Scientific Research Institute for A lied Micro- biolo IAM Ser ukhov . Both institutes have large research, produc- tion, and storage facilities and each could have a work force of 5,000 personnel when completed. Although 29 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 LJ/\ I 77. We believe that the Soviet new CBW agent program has progressed from the basic research and development phase into preliminary aspects of pro- duction, testing, and weaponization. We believe fur- ther that the first set of new agents are now progress- ing under joint auspices of the Chemical and Microbiological Industries. We believe testing may be under way at Shikhany, and associate some of the at Shikhany with the new agent we a ieve that Soviet mi itary plan- ners in the early 1970s decided to shift the emphasis of their CBW programs toward biotechnologically de- rived agents. This shift was gradual in order to accommodate the RDT&E time required for this agent development program. 79. We believe that the future Soviet military threat from infectious agents will come from naturally occurring organisms that have been genetically altered to enhance weaponization potential. Technological advances in the 1970s and 1980s have significantly reduced the difficulty of producing effective biologi- cal weapons and have allowed the optimization of agents for effectiveness by deliberate genetic manipu- lation, a much more certain process than selection of natural agents that marked the period from 1940 to 1960. The Soviets report extensive research on micro- biological agents, including pathogenic bacteria, rick- ettsia, and viruses, which have potential application for BW weaponization. The Soviets have the capabili- ty to use some toxins at present, and we believe that additional toxins are being developed for offensive purposes. Toxins will not replace existing CBW weap- ons, but are part of a spectrum of threat agents. We believe that the Soviets are conducting research to expand their capability to conduct CBW operations employing toxins, and we believe that the composition and magnitude of the toxin threat will change in the future as research and development continues. The diversity of potential agents and the fluidity of the threat may require development of generic, rather than agent-specific, countermeasures. Evidence sup- ports the US charge that the Soviets supplied the Vietnamese with the toxin agents used in Laos and Cambodia. Vegetation samples from the early 1980s attack sites and biomedical samples (blood, urine, and/or tissue) have shown the presence of unusually high concentrations of trichothecene mycotoxins.F Western Technology 80. Acquisition of Western technology has been central to the rapid progress of biotechnology develop- ment in the USSR. In the last decade the United States has been increasingly supplanted by other Western nations as the principal supplier of research equip- ment and materials. Curtailment of technology trans- fer from the United States might slightly slow research progress, but would not prove a serious impediment. 25X1 25X1 25X1 LZDAI 25X1 25X1 32 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 83. Improvements in the accuracy and reliability of current and future Soviet weapon systems would further enhance their capability to deliver chemical munitions. 84. The Soviet's well-supported R&D program for protective measures has potential for significant break- throughs. The rapid advances in the fields of genetic engineering and biotechnology will have considerable impact on the development of medical protection against agents of biological origin, including antidotes and prophylactics. Recent emphasis in Soviet personal protection research has been directed to the develop- ment of oxygen generating devices. The Soviets are currently testing the duration of these devices to increase the range of oxygen generation from its current limit of 45 minutes to two hours. Also, the Soviets are conducting research in filtration techniques and methods that could provide an innovative form of CBW protection against specific agents. Extensive research is being conducted in the area of chemically active protective methods such as Petryanov fibers, ion exchange, and catalytic filtration for removal of both vapors and aerosols. Future mask and collective pro- tection filters may be smaller and more efficient, and modifications of the polymers used in the Petryanov filters are being researched to improve their thermal resistance and mechanical integrity. Impermeable im- pregnated types of protective clothing remain the mainstays of the Pact countries. This clothing is avail- able in a large variety of overgarments, boots, and gloves and is designed for diverse uses. Although impermeable clothing cannot be worn for extended periods in warm weather due to heat stress, he Warsaw Pact is attempting to develop lighter weight overgarments. 33 Top Secret - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 ANNEX A 25X1 25X1 GLOSSARY CW Agents 1. Chemical agents are nonliving toxic substances produced through industrial processes. The initial chemical agents were industrial gases, such as chlorine, phosgene, and various irritants and toxics. In the latter part of World War I, mustard was used, and presented for the first time both contact and vapor hazards. Traditional chemical agents remained practically un- changed until the development of nerve agents in the 1940s. Nerve agents act rapidly because of their primary action on the nervous system and present both a vapor and a contact hazard. During this same era, cyanogen chloride and phosgene oxime were devel- oped to improve blood and blister agent capability. The latter agent has a rapid decomposition rate. The most recently developed of the agents are the halluci- nogenic compounds (BZ and LSD derivatives) and the antiplant agents (herbicides). Common riot control agents, which are use wor wide by police forces, are not considered to be chemical agents. These agents can be developed, produced, and used in a manner whose origins would be virtually impossible to prove. BW Agents 2. Biological agents are defined as living organisms that produce their effects by reproduction in their environment. Biological agents cause illness except when used in the antimateriel role, where the effect is deterioration. Since ancient times military leaders have been concerned with the impact of natural disease on operations. In early programs, biological agents were isolated from the natural environment and grown in an industrial setting. An early specializa- tion in BW exploited active products of living organ- isms. Some micro-organisms, like some of the higher plants and animals, produce nonliving substances that affect living organisms (sometimes lethally). These products of living organisms are called either toxins, or, simply, metabolic byproducts. 3. Toxins are produced, extracted, and concentrat- ed from large quantities of living materials, or, as with exotoxins, extracted from the medium in which these organisms are grown. Toxins or venoms not normally found in humans can be derived from other organisms such as bacteria, fungi, plants, and some animals, including their altered or synthesized forms. New Agents 4. Current advances in science, particularly bio- technology, increase significantly the number and variety of potential CBW agents while making large- scale production of the different agents more feasible. The theoretical) ossible new agents are in four categories: infectious agents that are naturally occurring but ave been modified to enhance their militarily favorable characteristics; (3) naturally occurring compounds, their active fragments, or similar compounds that affect the normal physiology of the attacked organism in a predictable manner; and (4) toxin agents that are nonliving chemical substances of biological origin, or synthetic analogs or derivatives, which, in sufficient concentration, can adversely affect a living organism. Toxins or venoms not normally found in humans can be derived from other organisms such as bacteria, fungi, plants, and some animals, including their al- 25X1 25X1 tered or synthesized forms. CBW Applications 5. Chemical and biological agents and weapons demonstrate versatility and may be used against a wide variety of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Their use depends on the target as well as the characteristics of the agent to be employed. Biolog- ical agents may be employed against economic targets 35 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 or populations either prior to military action or inde- pendent of military action. Antihuman CBW Applications 6. Humans are especially vulnerable to attack by chemical and biological agents, and a wide variety of CBW agents and weapons have been developed. CBW agents can cause effects ranging from death to var in degrees of physical and mental incapacitation. Persistent Versus Nonpersistent 10. Persistent and nonpersistent are subjective terms used to describe the duration of military effec- tiveness of the chemical or biological agent. Duration is generally dependent upon physical and chemical properties of the agent, weather, method of dissemina- tion, and terrain conditions. Generally a persistent agent remains effective for a relatively long time (hours to months) while a nonpersistent agent is effec- tive for only a short time (minutes to hours). - Antianimal CBW Applications 7. Animals are also vulnerable to CBW attacks. Various animal disease organisms can be employed as BW agents that cause death, incapacitation, or failure to grow and thrive. Chemical agents such as mustard and the nerve agents affect animals in the same manner as they affect humans. Anticrop CBW Applications 8. There are both chemical and biological antiplant agents. The primary CW agents are defoliants and herbicides that kill or inhibit the growth of plants and render the soil unsuitable for plants for a variable period of time. The primary antiplant BW agents are living organisms that cause disease only in certain kinds of plants. The objective of an antiplant attack is a nation's economy and its ability to wage war through its food supplies. Defoliants, herbicides, and some biologically based growth regulators that are widely used in agricultural, forestry, and weed-control activi- ties by all developed nations are not considered as anticrop agents. US policy defines only those agents that have been purposely designed or enhanced to attack a nation's economy through its food supplies as anticrop agents Antimateriel CBW Applications 9. Various chemical and biological agents could be used against materiel, including fuel supplies. Chemi- cal agents could directly attack the structural integrity of various materials. Corrosive materials can degrade electrical components, rubber, and perhaps even some metals. The objective of antimateriel attacks is degra- dation of the materiel with which the enemy conducts war. Communication equipment, vehicles, and air- craft theoretically could be rendered inoperative or hazardous to their operators because of the use of chemical weapons or decontaminants. 11. CBW protection includes detection, protection, and recovery from the effects of the use of chemical, toxin, or biological weapons. Detection involves deter- mining that a CBW attack has occurred, and using CBR reconnaissance means to predict/plot the spread of contamination and its effect on the operations of your forces. Protection includes both individual and collective protection against the effects of CBW agents in order to enable personnel to operate in a contami- nated environment. Recovery includes the deconta- mination/disinfection of personnel, equipment, and terrain that has been contaminated in order to allow operations unencumbered by protective equipment. In order for CBW defense to be effective, units and individuals must be thoroughly trained and properly equipped Genetic Engineering 12. Capability to modify the genetic characteristics of cells or organisms at the molecular level. Recombinant DNA/Genetics 13. A specialized area of genetic engineering in which new genetic material is placed into (chemically recombined into) a host organism in order to alter that organism's properties. 36 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Figure 13 BCW Threat Spectrum r Living Viruses Rickettsiae I (ABOs) "Novel" Toxins organisms BRMs BRMs engineered I PACs PACs frenetically Native New ABO=Agents of Biologic Origin PAC=Physiologically Active Compounds BRM=Biological Response Modifiers 25X1 25X1 14. Biotechnologically derived CBW agents comprise two distinct classes or groups of agents (see figure 13): - Infectious agents and those genetically enhanced to increase their potential for weaponization, or or- ganisms into which the biological elements to produce a foreign substance have been introduced. - Bioregulators, toxins, venoms, and their biologi- cally active subfractions, produced through ge- netic engineering/biotechnical means. 15. Bioregulators are compounds that are essential for the normal psychological and physiological func- tions of a living organism. They can cause a wide range of harmful effects if introduced at higher-than- normal concentrations or following genetic or chemi- cal manipulations Massive Use 16. We believe that the Soviets earlier (in the 1950s and 1960s) planned for the large-scale employment of chemical weapons, in part as substitutes for an insuffi- cient number of nuclear weapons, and to make up for the inaccuracy of other weapons systems. Such use apparently envisioned massed strikes (using as many weapons as necessary to achieve the required levels of agent concentration) on hundreds-of targets through- out the depth and breadth of the battlefield and into the operational depth of the enemy. While chemical weapons were not necessarily the best munitions to use against many of the targets, apparently they were believed to be the best weapons available at the time. We do not know how close the Soviets came to being able to accomplish such large-scale use of CW. Selective Use 17. We believe that, with the increase in the quan- tity of battlefield nuclear weapons and the improved accuracy, range, and lethality of conventional weap- ons, the Soviets have adopted the concept of selective use (vyborochnoye primeneniye) of chemical weapons, 37 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 though we do not know how the Soviets define this in relation to CW. For the purposes of this NIE, selective use refers to employment of CW on a smaller scale and against more carefully selected targets, in conjunc- tion with other means of destruction, to achieve the desired casualty or contamination results. Chemical strikes on the selected targets will still employ the massed application of agent to achieve the levels of concentration required in Soviet norms. Warm-Base Production Capability 18. In a warm-base production capability mode, the production plant is not actually producing agent. The production equipment, however, is being constantly maintained. Active periodic equipment surveillance is performed, which may include running pumps, turn- ing valves, and purging pipes of condensation. Equip- ment repairs are performed as needed. 38 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 ANNEX B SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS In terms of tactical purpose, the Soviets divide toxic agents into groups according to the nature of their action: lethal, incapacitants, irritants, and training. In terms of physiological action on the organism, the Soviets make the following distinctions: (a) Neuroparalytic action: GA (tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), and VX. (b) Skin-blistering: H (commercial sulfur mustard), HD (distilled mustard), HT and HQ (mustard formulas), HN (nitrogen mustard), and L (Lewisite). (c) General toxic action: AC (prussic acid), CK (cyanogen chloride). (d) Suffocating: CG (phosgene). (e) Psychochemical: BZ. (f) Irritants: CN (chloracetophenone), DM (adam- site), CS, and CR. 39 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 ANNEX C PROTECTION AND CASUALTY HANDLING 1. The current Soviet standard-issue mask (ShLEM) effectively protects against known CBW agents. A new mask is replacing this mask and provides increased protection. Special versions have been made for com- munication, for accommodation of eye lenses, and for casualties with head wounds. Efforts to improve the mask are continuing, and reports persist that a secret gas mask exists to be issued only in wartime that may have a changeable, cheek-mounted filter. Protective Clothing 2. Soviet individual protective clothing is effective in providing protection against chemical agents in vapor, aerosol, and liquid form. The protection re- quires wearing an ensemble of chemically impregnat- ed underclothing, impermeable overgarments, bus- kins, and gloves, in addition to the mask. The Soviets are aware of the limitations of their impermeable clothing. It causes heat stress and reduces mobility and dexterity, as well as combat activity 3. The Soviets are conducting research in semiper- meable films, ionexchange fibers, and activated car- bon fiber technology associated with individual pro- tective clothing. They also continuously monitor similar research in non-Communist countries but have not found a film or fiber material that is better than butyl rubber to repel agents disseminated in liquid or solid form. Decontamination 4. Partial individual decontamination is conducted on an emergency basis to allow the soldier to continue to fight and use his equipment. Complete decontami- nation is conducted by specialized units of the Chemi- cal Troops when residual levels exceed minimal levels. 5. Personal decontamination kits are available to be issued to all soldiers. The unit supply includes collec- tive protection kits for individual vehicles or shelters. Chemical defense units are issued larger pieces of equipment, which are designed for complete decon- tamination. 6. The Warsaw Pact has a wide variety and large amount of decontamination equipment, which it con- tinually upgrades and improves. The Pact emphasizes speed of decontamination, accepting partial decon- tamination, because they recognize that complete decontamination is virtually impossible to achieve and is seldom necessary. Weathering for short periods is often sufficient to reduce contamination to acceptable levels. Overzealous decontamination may make an item unusable, because most decontaminants are ex- tremely corrosive. 7. Future efforts appear to be directed toward contamination avoidance. This can be accomplished through agent-resistant coatings and improved detec- tion capabilities. Some of the new agents may not be susceptible to decontamination by the available stan- dard chlorine-based compounds. Even if new agents require new decontaminants, the equipment needed to apply the decontaminants probably would not change. 25X1 25X1 assembly. The kits may also be installed in buildings. 25X1 Projected changes in protection systems include con- tinued development of filters that absorb more toxic gases per unit of activated charcoal and providing new 8. The Soviets emphasize overpressure systems that have a centrifugal dust filter to remove particulates that might contaminate. The overpressure collective protection system also has a charcoal-based particulate and vapor filter. These are installed in almost all armored vehicles, artillery and missile system vehicles, combat support vans, and in civil defense shelters. For battlefield underground shelters, the Soviets have kits that consist of a filter system and an airtight door 41 Top Secret - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 materials to resist new agents, prolonging operating life and reducing deterioration while in use. more uniform distribution of nozzles, greater portions of the superstructure covered by the resulting water barrier, and internal routing of water washdown sup- Air Forces 9. CBR collective protection shelters are located at most operating Air Force bases. The older shelters were designed for eight to 30 people and are dispersed around the airfield work areas. Bases having under- ground command posts, alternate command posts, underground base operations centers, and flight crew centers with CBR filtration and hardening have also been identified. The newest shelters have airlocks.F_ Naval Forces 10. Most current Soviet naval surface combatants are provided with CBR protective citadels. The Soviets protect all manned spaces, and especially the bridge, fire control tower, major battle stations and magazines, communications spaces, central engine room control compartments, as well as medical stations. These protective citadels are provided with an overpressure system of filtered air that is generated by dedicated ventilation systems, or, in some cases, by the normal ventilation flow redirected through filters capable of removing toxic chemicals, radioactive particulates, or biological organisms. Additionally, the Soviets have incorporated rapid closing, remotely controlled, exter- nal. hull fittings to protect many of their ships from CBR contamination .11. Soviet surface combatants have extensive, well- designed water washdown systems for the protection of ship surfaces from CBR contamination. In addition to providing a seawater barrier to isolate the super- structure and deck from CBR agents, this system would also be used to assist in the decontamination of those areas following a CW, BW, or fallout attack. Improvements in seawater washdown systems include ply piping. Casualty Handling 12. Soviet medical tactics at lower echelons include minimal first aid and stabilization procedures and the assembly of wounded at collection points. Casualty decontamination is performed at regimental and divi- sion levels. According to Soviet doctrine, contaminated casualties enter a separate treatment and evacuation chain. Equipment and nonmedical personnel are as- signed to the regiment level to provide "partial" personnel decontamination. Disinfection and decon- tamination platoons are organic to division level, and the decontamination capabilities of this level are described as "complete." A larger and more special- ized medical staff operates in a clean area at the division level but maintains the primary function of receiving and sorting casualties. Only casualties who are expected to return to duty in 10 to 12 days remain at the division level, and those who require a longer period of convalescence are moved to specialized mobile field hospitals at Army level. Definitive care for casualties expected to recover within 30 days is provided at Army-level medical support elements. Others requiring longer treatment are evacuated to front level or higher. 13. There is little evidence that the Soviets provide for decontamination of large numbers of nonambula- tory casualties or those with combined wounds. It is possible that Soviet policy is to categorize these casual- ties at regiment and division level. Such a policy, coupled with the well-defined provision for isolation of contaminated casualties, would substantially reduce the liability on the Soviet medical support system. 42 Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive information and use of the recipient only. 2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence. 3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. 4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4 Top Secret Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP87T00051 R000200150001-4

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SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM