Michael Collins at CSIS

good evening and welcome to the Center

for Strategic international studies I’m

Andrew Schwartz here at CSIS so happy to

have all of you here especially Dean

Kristy button from TCU TCU and the

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to them and without further ado the

strongest name in news Bob Schieffer

well this is a big one and I think we

have one of the strongest groups of

experts that anybody has put together on

this the title as you saw in your

program is the rise of China in the West

as it is in every country we have our

creation story we have some people call

it a myth when I was back when I was in

the Air Force during the Vietnam era I

discovered that the creation myth in

Laos is that they believe they came out

of a giant pumpkin everybody has their

own myth but the the creation story of

China as Henry Kissinger has pointed out

is different than any other in that

unlike any other creation story

basically China was already here when

the world was created how China got here

is still unknown so we should not be

surprised when we talk about the rise of

China that the Chinese do not see it

exactly the way we do to them what is

happening today is China’s return to the

center stage however we see it most of

the foreign Paul

a community I think would tell you how

we manage this relationship and how they

manage this relationship is perhaps the

greatest challenge facing the leadership

of both countries we also know that in

the long history of the world when a

country rises to challenge the existing

sole superpower in most cases it has

resulted in war the so called the

clippies trap ram allison of harvard

says there have been 16 sons junctures

in the history of the world starting

with the rise of athens which rose up to

challenge sparta and in 12 of those 16

jump junctures the result was war so

that is where we’re heading today we

find ourselves in a great competition

with China but is it leading us closer

to war or is it leading us toward a more

stable world that’s what we want to talk

about and may I say as I already said

this panel is one of the best we’ve ever

assembled I really encourage you to read

their full biographies in your programs

but let me introduce each of them

briefly Michael L Collins is the deputy

assistant director the CIA’s East Asia

and Pacific mission Center he has served

in the CIA since 1996 as an analyst at

various times on the East Asia the

Middle East as well as North Africa and

the Caribbean Peninsula he is joined by

our own quince Johnson whose senior

advisor at CSIS holder of the Freeman

chair of China studies he’s a longtime

CIA analyst and China watcher Victor

chow down on the end holds the Korea

chair at CSIS he came here after leaving

the National Security Council in 2007 I

think he is acknowledged by most people

as one of the most knowledgeable Korea

scholars in America today and finally

Margaret Brennan who I must say has the

best job in Germany

she’s moderator to face the nation and

is CBS News chief foreign affairs

correspondent she was a full byte

scholar and graduated with distinction

from the University of Virginia where

she majored in Middle East Studies and

minored in Arabic and she’s a new mom so

congratulations project well let’s just

set the stage here by getting a brief

thought from each of you where are we

right now at this juncture how would

each of you describe the relationship

between China and the United States what

is the threat being posed by China or is

it a threat so michael wondering you’re

the active you’re not a former you’re

you’re you’re the active here today part

of the government how would you compare

this juncture right now well okay well

thanks Bob thanks for the question thank

thanks for your interest in the topic

more generally but let me also say

thanks to CSIS for the opportunity as

you know we don’t do these things very

often when we do I hope that affirms

just how important the issue is being

discussed so the rise of China let me

say two things about it one thing about

what concerns us and one thing that does

not concern us as to what the threat is

and what is it so the challenge we see

stemming from China’s rise is I would

say no longer of a traditional military

security or intelligence nature it is

increasingly so and more seriously so

but even more broadly it represents I

would argue the most serious challenge

to the liberal international order our

government and our like-minded partners

have stood behind for the last several

decades why do I say this I see this in

the open aspirations that the Communist

Party of China under Xi Jingping

actually enunciates in terms of defining

their aspirations as essentially a

zero-sum struggle for influence on

leadership around the world at the

expense of the norms and institutions

the liberal international order as we

currently know it

holds dear the increasing understanding

of how the Communist Party of China is

defining how they want their country

certainly governed and the norms and

institutions around the world that best

enable that are in direct conflict with

what our government and like-minded

countries actually stand behind I say

this as well because China’s clearly

increasingly proactively using its power

and more coercive and assertive ways to

establish greater influence around the

world with governments and within

countries with academia with media in

ways that are intended to advance that

objective I say this as well because

when you look at the standards that the

Communist Party of China requires in its

international engagement with countries

around the world and its assistance in

the terms it requires for trade

agreements or great arrangements they

are in direct conflict with many of the

standards we have required in the

international financial institutions

that have advocated transparency and

corruption free assistance requiring but

the last point I want to say as well is

what this threat is not so broadly it is

an honest and I’m saying this as

dispassionately as possible we we see a

a difference of view on how governments

should be governed our country should be

governed but what the threat is not the

threat is not the challenge is not

necessarily coming from China’s rise

alone China’s economy alone our

relationship with China at Chinese

people and certainly the Chinese

diaspora around the world to the

contrary those are all very positive

forces for moderation cooperation and

change the challenge is increasingly

coming from a state the Communist Party

of China and Russia Jinping that

increasingly defines its aspirations by

how it desires to define and govern its

own society at home and there and I

think is the greatest challenge for what

the United States and our partners

around the world have to wrestle with as

it pertains to a victor you’re the Korea

expert you know a lot about Japan and

also how is this situation where we find

ourselves

how is it being viewed in Asia thanks

for the question Bob I think so first I

would say with a it’s it’s viewed as the

most important question out there when

we think about the future across any

metric by which we define great power

status there’s only one actor out there

besides the United States that equates

with that great power status and that is

China and I think countries in the

region Korea Japan Vietnam Australia all

of them understand that that this is the

the next big challenge for the post-war

liberal international order that Michael

was describing and so I think this this

is the big unanswered question in

international relations today going

forward is how is China either going to

accommodate this post-war liberal order

or to what extent they’re going to try

to revise it and if they seek neither to

accommodate it nor to revise it but

actually seek simply to destroy it with

no other model to follow many would

argue that’s even worse and so I think

many allies in Asia you know they they

are transitioning now because in the

past many of them said I don’t want to

choose don’t make me choose between the

United States and China I would like to

have my cake and eat it too I would like

the security benefits from the United

States and the economic benefits from

China but increasingly because of the

things that Michael described many

countries in the region are realizing

that it’s going to be harder and harder

in the future to have your cake and eat

it too because you know whether it’s

China or the United States they are

compelling choices that countries did

not want to make before whether it’s

things like joining the AIB or not

joining it or whether it’s joining the

US missile defense system in Asia or not

joining it there are now choices that

are being that they’re being compelled

to make that they’re having a very

difficult time Chris what’s your take I

agree with most of what’s been said I

tried it maybe just sharpen the point a

little bit by saying that in my mind

really trying

resurgence on the world stage the

emerging blueprint that might kind of

referred to as to how they want to

execute the ambitions they have and

therefore the challenge that that then

presents to the rules-based global

international order is the dominant

strategic narrative for the 21st century

I mean I guess that’s about as tight a

bumper sticker as I can put on it and I

also would just emphasize as well that

the change the challenge is one like

we’ve never seen before and this is why

I don’t like the Thucydides trap model

because hey I think it’s bad history but

well bore people with that but the

technology has fundamentally changed the

game it has turned out for example to

Mike’s point technology has been a

tremendous enabler for authoritarian

regimes much to the dismay of the

Fukuyama’s of the world and you know

people like that it’s not the end of

history and it turns out if you have a

market that’s big enough and enough

determination you can use the internet

you know in a very sort of course of

coercive way I also would just highlight

that I think it’s important that we

understand and we’ll get into this I’m

sure these policies did not start with

Xi Jinping’s arrival you know on on to

the scene my sense has only spent if you

understand the Communist Party of China

as an organization and its history much

of what they’re doing now should not

surprise I think what we’re seeing is

that the underlying strategic tension

certainly between the US and China have

been building for a while and I believe

we’re in a situation now where Xi

Jinping is an accelerant for those

challenges and so is Donald Trump so

that’s making things a lot you know sort

of more robust and I think the main

thing to underscore here is that what

worked for us in the Cold War with the

Soviet Union it was so Fiat I Soviet

isolation China is not isolated and –

the ability to engage in unrestricted

competition across all domains that is

either non-existent with China or is

seriously challenged in a lot of domains

especially given the close intertwining

between our

economist Margaret well I would say two

things and these are great sort of big

picture items sketched out here I know

for everyday sort of viewers consumers

it’s always like well how does this all

affect me and two things I’d point out

one President Trump was just at a rally

in Ohio and talking again about China in

terms of this trade deal that he expects

to strike he keeps talking about it as

if it’s about to happen going to happen

we’ve seen the date for potential

meeting with Xi Jinping pushed from the

end of March possibly out till April

nothing’s on the calendar the White

House says in part because they don’t

want to be pinned down to something

because the Chinese assume that if a

meeting happens that means there’s

actually a deal and they don’t want to

walk in and have happened to them what

happened to Kim jong-un a few weeks ago

in Hanoi but the president’s language

around this is to workers in Ohio about

the money China is stealing from the US

the five hundred billion they take from

this country was how he was phrasing it

I believe he’s referring to about a five

hundred billion dollars in goods

purchased from China you know as somehow

as someone who covered Wall Street for a

long time people just kind of

short-handed referred to China as the

world’s Walmart

for a reason China had cheap labor it

made things cheaper Americans like cheap

deals right these are the things that as

consumers we like about how China has

changed markets but there are a lot of

things workers in states like Ohio don’t

like about some of these levels of

competition and things and so I think

you are gonna hear about China on the

campaign trail in 2020 in ways that

people haven’t quite figured out how

they want to articulate policy changes

yet but they most likely will have some

kind of trade agreement with China to

either complain about or praise in a few

months time because the president seems

committed to a deal what that deal looks

like is really hard to describe at this

point you know you often hear the

president talk about Goods agricultural

products that is something that

politically really will resonate for him

you don’t necessarily hear the

particulars of what the trade dispute is

supposed to be about which is about

technology transfer and all of these

kind of esoteric things that may not

read

on the campaign trail but mean a heck of

a lot to people who are investing there

in terms of trying to set up businesses

so that’s something that I’m constantly

tracking the other thing I’d point out

that I haven’t quite figured out how to

digest yet is I thought it was very

notable that Secretary of State Pompeyo

in the past week and a half or so has

used much stronger language to talk

about China’s human rights abuses in a

way that a frankly as the United States

you would expect the u.s. to talk about

meaning pointing out that close to a

million people are believed to be

rounded up in parts of China Muslim

minorities the language used by the

State Department twice was saying we

haven’t seen something like this since

the 1930s

that’s pretty stark language to compare

it to didn’t really get a lot of

attention because you haven’t heard it

from the White House yet but secondly

I’d say one thing that stood out to me

about that a that he’s talking about it

at all

because this administration is often

accused of pulling its punches on human

rights so it’s a little bit of pressure

I think interestingly starting to happen

on that front that maybe if this trade

deal gets done we hear more about or

maybe we’ll hear from higher levels than

the Secretary of State about and perhaps

carrying some consequence with it

largely it has had zero consequences us

far so I guess our people are going back

to China next week aren’t they Venetian

gardens like Kaiser to start

negotiations what doe does anybody have

any thoughts on do you think they’re

going to get a trade deal I’ll take a

stab at it I think we will get one

eventually I think as Margaret was

saying the the devil is in the details

right now and I think one of the

challenges we face as we’ve kind of gone

through this process and for those who

have to watch it every day that’s very

painful is that there’s a cycle that

happens in these negotiations which is

you know the the sort of hawkish

elements which are really defined

largely by light hyzer in the

administration say we have to have a

deal that is not just transactional it

has to be meaningful it has to address

all of the u.s. very valid US and US

business community concerns about

industrial policy in China subsidies to

state-owned enterprise

the regime’s use of a coercive

regulatory toolkit to block our

companies from markets you know these

sort of issues structural issues let’s

call them versus simply buying more

stuff soybeans airplanes you know

they’re the other things that are that

are on on the table and so what we tend

to see is a cycle where the Hawks are

ascendant for a while

markets begin to become skittish that

nothing’s actually gonna get done

Trump starts to panic because he sees

the markets going down and he gets on

his people to let’s get this across the

finish line and I’ve seen it these ten

cycles of this since we take this off

you know last year and I think we’re in

another one of those cycles so for

example I think this most recent trip

that we’re seeing emerge it’s very

interesting my understanding is is the

Treasury Department that we leaked the

upcoming trip to the press because

yesterday markets were going down based

on stories over the weekend and this

might take tell me or Jim and they

wanted to you know arrest that the trip

was already planned but they wanted to

dive in so we keep seeing this over and

over again so my sense is let’s see what

comes out of this next round

I don’t think expectations are high on

either side I think it’s mainly let’s

keep up appearances and as marty was

saying we’re just gonna see this date

keep getting push because it turns out

this is really hard to do you know this

negotiation if it’s serious is far more

complex than China’s accession to the

WTO and that took a decade to negotiate

we have seen the Chinese government

evolve as I was reading to get ready for

this today as somebody I read where

someone remarked that don’t shall being

opened up China’s economy as power was

passed from mouth but the political

system was not open and this observer

said perhaps because they saw what had

happened to Gorbachev and the collapse

of the Soviet Union but how does that

affect our dealing with China Michel

well I think what’s your thought

stepping back from the day to day

on the on the bilateral negotiations

what what’s happening is a is a great

reflection of fundamental differences

into how we see economies being governed

and how they want economies being

governed I think more recently on

cheating things ascendance in particular

there’s consolidation all the more of

authoritarian control in that society

and the elimination and move moving past

the collective leadership structure they

used to have to be sure following Deng

Xiaoping the political political opening

was not necessarily the thing to have

but at the same time it still had my

brought a collective leadership

structure the most fascinating thing to

me that’s happened in China most recent

years is the consolidation of Greater

Communist Party control over all things

China all things within China and all

things Chinese outside of China as they

themselves enunciate the the idea that

political reform will follow as

international relations theory might

suggest economic engagement and open

economic openness assumes in that that

economic openness and open economic

perform is an end to be achieved itself

I would submit that the fundamental end

of the Communist Party of China under

Seiji ping is all the more to control

that society politically and

economically so the economy is being

viewed and affected and controlled to

achieve a political end vice thinking

about open up opening up the politics to

help enable what we would think are the

reforms needed to achieve an economic

end and there and I think is the

greatest challenge right here in this

particular issue we’re discussing how

this plays out I like the way Victor

framed this more broadly stepping back

how this actually plays out and in

particular not just what happens in our

relationship our bilateral relationship

but how others actually react to this

how do the other partners who are also

wrestling with China on these same

issues how do the international trading

and financial institutions respond to

that I think this is going to be a you

know a key moment in to how this plays

and then and what and what Michael is

describing is a de mess

issue for China but but it’s a domestic

issue that has all sorts of

international ramifications because

precisely because China is a great power

it is or will be the next great power I

mean the sort of domestic makeup and

choices that great powers make

historically has all sorts of ripple

effects for other countries in the

system there is a reason why the United

States in its leadership role after

World War two also saw the third wave of

democratization in the world right and

we are seeing Democratic backsliding in

the world in no small part because you

have countries like Russia and China

well China Ascended Russia back in the

game and the United States sort of

receding from the scene so what what

mike describes as a domestic experiment

in China I would argue has international

repercussions for the way we think about

regime type democracy and domestic

choices around the world and it

definitely does because I think the the

two dilemmas the Chinese Communist Party

basically faces are they have a

requirement to break through the middle

income trap to keep themselves in power

they are in a performance-based

legitimacy system so they have no choice

but to succeed on that secondly as they

rise in power and prestige they have a

desire to gain international legitimacy

they need to do both of these things but

they don’t want to open the political

system yet they know that most of the

successful cases especially in Asia who

have conquered those various things have

done throw done so at least in part

through democratization so this is their

challenge they are determined not to

follow the democratization path so then

it leaves them in certain tracks

industrial policy on the economy and

making this the world safe for China’s

unique governance system and state

capitalist economy in the international

space you know market one of the things

we haven’t talked about in connection

with the economy and trade is security

national security there’s no question

that the administration clearly wants to

rein in China’s economical and

technological ambition

and to stop China from playing a role in

the next iteration of the technological

revolution the so-called 5 G’s that we

talked about which I had to go look that

I think a lot of people though even in

the government will be like yes the 5

G’s is important then you ask them what

they mean really guy you gotta talk to

somebody else it turns out what areas

5th generation right exactly this

technology which just proves what John

Connally once said when he said all jobs

in government are the same once you

learn the jargon you’re set if you have

common sense but there was a very

interesting story in the New York Times

I guess was it day before yesterday the

headline was allies are spurning

campaigned by the United States to block

Huawei the Chinese telecom giant and

clearly there is a concern about

security there what’s that all about

Margaret there there is and I think a

lot of that was based around some verbal

sparring with the the German government

in particular well why way there’s so

many levels to this story but in this

country you have heard you know it’s one

of the interesting things that’s a few

bipartisan issues done for griemann is

that China is the threat right but it’s

exactly what you do about that and how

you counter it goes you can run the

gamut Marco Rubio of Florida has been

championing for some time this effort in

the United States to specifically block

Huawei and ZTE do companies from being

able to sell products here there’s been

pressure politically to to ban certain

products with the idea that they can be

used to be a national security threat to

the United States in other words if

there’s something physiology and they

have a backdoor entry essentially yes

and which is why I think the Pentagon

has already implemented some of these

bans but in terms of everyday consumers

that’s what people like Marco Rubio are

talking about trying to block them out

of the market and it led to the

and remember if you remember the Twitter

messages that the president had posted

about a personal call from she’s in pain

a year ago about CTE that company and

how important it was all of this is is

is a long complicated story but it gets

to this bigger question of our Chinese

companies actually you know capitalist

entities within a communist system or

are they arms of the Chinese government

I mean that’s the kind of fundamental

question this comes down to and how they

view it and most certainly Republican

senators particularly Marco Rubio would

argue the PLA and these companies are

the same thing and therefore they

shouldn’t be having access to our market

we’re trying to tell our allies this is

also a risk as well but I don’t find and

I’m I’m sure Michael probably can’t

comment on this so I’d love to know what

he thinks about it but you find a

difference of opinion cuz I had asked a

light hyzer the the trade represented

when he was on my program a while ago

what he thought about bands like that

and he said when I pressed him on it

that he wasn’t in favor but it doesn’t

seem like that’s necessarily where the

administration is right I can’t

articulate for you what the

administration’s policy is on this I

don’t know what it is so Michael is

there something we ought to be worried

about so I would say there’s three

aspects to the challenge behind the

stepping back one is let me just say one

thing upfront to I think the irony and

what we’re talking about terms of

economic engagement I do find it ironic

that when you step back and you think in

this international free and liberal

economic worth that we’ve stood behind

no countries actually benefited more in

their economic ascendance than China

from that international economic order

we have maintained in the free and

liberal principles that have allowed

China to actually engage in our country

to acquire the technology they are

acquiring to achieve what they’re trying

to do in things like 5g and at the same

time no country has historically more

threatened that order than trying to

chrome he does I find that irony

noteworthy but the threat that comes

from this one is it’s on the national

security standpoint not just to us but

the countries around the world that

vital technology that innovative

expertise and capability that gives our

country and other

country’s strengths is that risk by all

the means by which the Chinese go about

to acquire that so there is one aspect

of a threat

you know the second is how they use that

capability saying nothing specifically

about five G per se but from a you know

a military security dimension one of our

greatest concerns about Chinese military

capabilities are increasingly in those

areas that require high-end technology

areas and cyber and space an electronic

warfare where let’s say the norms of the

road have not actually been established

and in our national security process we

adhere to certain norms and rules when

we utilize such technology

the Chinese don’t second point third

point is look at how trying to use that

technology domestically look at what

happens what is happening in Shin John

look at what is happening to repress

free and open expression look at what is

happening to repress freedom of Liberty

and all those other things how they use

that technology domestically and the

laws that are on the books requiring

Chinese entities to have that technology

to have called upon to provide support

to the security services of China not

just in China but overseas that’s why

this is a risk that’s why this is a

challenge and I think before we leave

this one Bob it’s really important to

underscore the issue because it’s such a

microcosm for the China challenge that

we started off with in terms of trying

to get allies and partners to work with

us on the challenge that it faces the

reason we’re seeing I think some of the

pushback you highlighted is because the

allies are saying to our government

you’re asking us to rip all this stuff

out of our systems and our governments

are with you but our business

communities may not necessarily be with

you so how about some evidence that’s

one issue and it’s very difficult

because there’s no one questions that

Huawei rips off technology there’s that

even admitted you know there’s a long a

long-standing issue there but it’s this

issue of how do you prove a negative in

terms of backdoors and those sort of

things and then I think the allies are

also sort of saying so we’re doing this

at your request where’s the skin in the

game for you your semiconductor

companies are making huge profits

selling to Huawei you say you’re going

to do an executive order banning

while way from sales so probably but you

don’t do it you know these are things so

it creates strains I think within the

Alliance in an era where our credibility

is arguably a little less than maybe

that’s what Victor I’m going to ask you

this next question to me the most

interesting thing that I learned reading

that article it was deep in the article

about our allies are rebelling against

us telling them not to do business with

lovely deep in this story I found an

interesting paragraph saying the

president has repeatedly undercut his

own Justice Department which laid out a

sweeping criminal indictment against

Huawei and its chief financial officer

and previously he had East penalties on

another Chinese telecom firm ZTE it also

said in that article that some in the

government and Michael Collins I won’t

ask you to comment on this but some of

the government are concerned that he

might try to put some of this into a

trade deal yeah yeah yeah well I mean

it’s a it’s a it’s a great point the you

know I think what this comes down to is

as my colleagues were describing it’s

questions like wow a & ZT that raises

this issue of sort of three choices that

we have with China with regard to this

you know one of them is and perhaps some

of our allies would prefer we do this

which is just to muddle through right

and basically say as Chris said you know

let’s just get them to buy more stuff

right reduce the trip merchandise trade

that just buy more stuff and just let’s

just muddle through right

you know what light hyzer what Michael

was talking about the second way is to

say is to really try to negotiate

meaningful agreements with China their

protect technology that prevent theft

that essentially regulate the behavior

so that the United States and China can

work together in the future which is

probably the hardest path

and then the third path is the one that

allies are rebelling against which is

this idea we just disconnect let’s just

disconnect from Jack

let’s rip out all the hardware let’s

just disconnect and in many ways that is

the most dramatic path that is the

choice we’re pushing on to allies

according to that article and in many

ways that’s the hardest one for the

Allies to do for all the reasons that

Chris Chris just mentioned and the other

challenge is we don’t make this stuff in

the USA we allowed a strategic industry

to disappear here we wouldn’t let that

happen in the aerospace industry for

example or in defense or these other

areas so there’s there are a few

alternatives its Ericsson and Huawei

primarily so without some sort of

coalition and there are thoughts about

how to do that and so on a lot of people

just don’t have any choices and then

Holi is cheap there’s that too which is

attractive especially to the developing

world I’d like to ask you all we just

had the summit in hanoi with kim jungeun

Margaret was there Victor knows a lot

about it what did China want to happen

there what what does China want this how

do they want this situation to be

resolved so so Margaret can comment on

if she was there I was covering it for

NBC not CB so I would say a couple of

things the first thing is the absence of

an agreement out of Hanoi was not

something that China wanted no China I

think wanted to see some sort of

agreement I think as we all know their

bottom line is stability on the Korean

Peninsula they do not want to see crises

like we saw in 2017 so they would have

liked to see some sort of agreement

emerge out of Hanoi I think all of us

were surprised that there wasn’t one I’m

sure Margaret I mean I I was quite

surprised that there wasn’t an agreement

and I’m kind of worried about the path

forward but I think the bottom line for

China is they would like to see some

sort of agreement that ensures there no

there’s not more testing by North Korea

that compels political crises for the

United States of course they would like

to see

some practical things done with regard

to the the North Korean nuclear test

site which sits on the Chinese border I

don’t feel that they are deeply vested

in denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula like like the United States

and its allies are but I think that

there are there probably as concerned as

the South Koreans are about the absence

of an agreement hanoi and where we go

from here South Korea it’s had a

tremendous impact on the government

there am I not correct by far the

biggest the the biggest losers at of my

where the South Koreans because they had

so much invested in this engagement with

North Korea they’re the ones that are

going to have to try to pick up the

diplomatic pieces there’s clearly a gap

between the United States and North

Korea on what is a potential deal of

sanctions for denuclearization and you

know it’s going to be the ball is

effectively in North Korea’s court but

anybody who’s negotiated with North

Korea knows that when we say the ball is

in North Korea’s court that means it’s

not going anywhere and it’ll basically

and so it’ll the South Koreans I think

are now going to try to work very hard

to try to find some sort of diplomatic

halfway point and I don’t think the

Chinese would mind if those troops left

any time soon which was something that

the president said when we sat for an

interview with him that you know was

something he’d never even thought about

but in the future he would like to bring

those troops home and it is quite costly

but we’re not talking about it right now

leaning into the idea of maybe it’s not

so crazy to float the concept so I’m

sure China was hoping for a different

conclusion on that particular issue of a

peace arrangement as well you know I

thought it was interesting we had it in

Vietnam in the first place as a summon I

know there was a lot of talk about that

as the setting as look at you know

country America was at war with now a

friend and when I go to Vietnam and have

with past secretaries of state the

emphasis is always like this is a

country so stuck between the US and

China all the time and pressure on both

sides that’s what I was thinking that

that almost was more of a fitting

parallel for the summit but I mean I

think China muddling through is always

what they kind of want they don’t want

conflict what’s interesting to me when I

talk to the administration officials now

about how this played out and I think

it’s very

clear that john bolton was happy with

his position sort of winning out in

terms of taking a harder line that they

as i believe he said publicly now and in

a few interviews floating this idea that

further sanctions are possible i think

that presumes that china is going to be

on board for those sanctions i don’t

know that they are but there’s this idea

that you could see china and the rest of

the international community tighten

things up around these like ship-to-ship

transfers like cheating around the edges

on some of the sanctions and more

pressure pressure on North Korea so

that’s really where I’m not clear where

China’s going to end up and on that

question if they’re going to continue to

help us play hardball they probably

won’t I mean I think that’s the

interesting piece in all this China

itself has been on a huge roller coaster

ride in their policy toward North Korea

during this process I think the scariest

thing that happened to them was the US

president who was willing to engage

directly with the North Koreans and I

think the their game was a stabilizing

long game initially I think probably to

their detriment that’s how they describe

it now they believed that when President

Trump said to them work hard on North

Korea with me and I’ll get this trade

stuff off your back you know and which I

said explicitly yeah on to John

Dickerson if they help us right here ok

they’ve tried pretty hard actually and

gummed up the border pretty well and

actually did more than I think most

people acknowledged but they now believe

that they over they overdid it in other

words they worked hard they didn’t get

anything on the trade front of fact they

got another two hundred billion dollars

in in tariffs and so now I think their

strategy is to micromanage the North

Koreans you know for summits with Kim

Dolan in months whereas in the previous

five years of Xi Jinping’s rule they had

not so I think the Chinese feel pretty

comfortable they’ve got him reasonably

under control and the rest of it just

kind of let it play Michael do you want

to hit three points on I think it’s in

the context of what broadly we see China

trying to achieve in Northeast Asia as

well as what they’re trying to avoid in

that process so clearly trying to

achieve weakening of the US security

influence and presence in East Asia and

all of our alliances in particularly

with South Korea clearly trying to be

more influential

hunt issues that matter in the region

for issues not necessarily specific to

the United States but to the region

itself and clearly trying to avoid

instability on their borders and in

particular a conflagration right on the

border in form of North Korea I think

it’s noteworthy comments have been made

there just to sharpen it a bit in terms

of what they didn’t want to see happen I

think in this process being certainly

returned to a major increase in the

temperature that could get into a

situation where things could unfold

markedly and and they would have the

crisis on the border second is a an

accelerated resolution of the issue

whereby the importance of that issue as

Chris is referring to that issue is

important to them strategically because

it is important to the United States so

therefore it gives them leverage with us

on various issues a rapid resolution of

that issue especially one with it within

which the United States certainly

remains you know a solid provider of

security on the peninsula thereby

undermining broadly with the Chinese

strategic they’re trying to achieve is

also something that is certainly not

there China is not eager to see and the

last but not on the on the on the troop

presence the yes I think it’s noteworthy

how the narrative in China on talking

about the removal of of troops from the

peninsula is certainly on their radar

it’s on their radar screen in terms of

things they want to avoid but I don’t

know if that’s necessarily the case and

the rest of the region are certainly on

the peninsula we haven’t talked about

the artificial islands that China’s been

building out there in the Pacific what

about that are they going to are they no

longer artificial are they and why I

think you’re still pretty hard official

they’re getting more artificial by the

day I mean I think that’s that’s the the

challenge you know the u.s. in my sense

missed the boat on this one you know we

had an opportunity in a Scarborough

Shoal incident in 2012 this was a

territory that was controlled by the

Philippines

the Chinese were making an effort there

there was an agreement that was brokered

diplomatically that they would use an

approaching typhoon as the excuse for

everybody just go home the Filipinos did

the Chinese didn’t and the important

part is there were no consequences for

that decision by the Chinese and that

set the stage then for that ambitious

building program that we saw afterward

China would have done most of what it’s

done down there I think anyway but they

would have done so over a much longer

time horizon than one to two years and

so I think we face a situation where

certainly we can do and the

administration is doing this and they

deserves credit for it you know more

aggressive operations and within the 12

nautical mile zone and so on but the

only way to undo it is something we

might term rollback with a nuclear power

so that’s a very challenging situation

and in effect do those islands mean

enough to us even in the context of the

commitments to our allies and so on and

so far we’re not seeming to suggest that

it does I want to get some questions

from the audience but while you’re

thinking of a question Alan is Margaret

what’s the latest news on Mike Pompeo is

he going to run for the Senate well

asking that question will get you a heck

of an answer a sharp one the Secretary

of State does not like being asked about

that but as we know he did talk to Mitch

McConnell about it he’s saying for the

moment he’s staying in the admit

administration I would not rule it out

in the future to see him run for office

there but do you want to go from being

fourth in line to the presidency to

junior senator from Kansas I don’t know

perhaps within the next few years but he

keeps saying on the record that he’s

staying for the moment I asked the

president about this during our

interview first he told me his fake news

then when I said that no the secretaries

actually said he talked to Mitch

McConnell about it he said well I asked

him and he said no he’s not leaving well

one reporter who asked him this question

said that he told them he was going to

let the Lord decide over the weekend so

I don’t have any sources there

I don’t know how to check that out what

are any of the rest of you hearing

anything along that line yeah Michael

you’re excused

he has spent a heck of a lot of time in

the American heartland for a Secretary

of State I will say that very recently

doing a lot of speeches in a way that

typically secretaries of state speak to

local media overseas the secretary and

the State Department explain that to say

this is part of the China policy talking

to farmers in Iowa this is part of

recruiting he has said to bring in more

people from the heartland instead of all

the elites who are running our

government he has said so those are the

official explanations for why he spent

so much time in Iowa recently well he’s

waiting for the weekend I mean who has a

question here how about right here yeah

it’s coming yes here it comes

and please identify yourself as well hi

my name is Angelita my question is so

Russia and China are actually after

global supremacy and they have learned

their economic lessons from the past

administrations but I think the silent

problem is the partnership actually

between Russia and China which which the

you the United States still has to

accept to learn how to make a long term

strategy how to deal with both and then

Mike my other question is which I want

your opinion please I mean it’s really

the domestic bickering in the United

States which takes time from shaping up

global foreign policies economically

politically militarily I mean it seems

to be the leverage of ship and Jing and

and Putin is that they have they have

centralized decisions and their

administration is quite long-term unlike

the United States where we are quite

dependent on host the political party in

line and then the lawmakers are

bickering about the political situation

and investigation all that so what do

you think is the best global

curity or how to deal long-term with

both Russia and China given your

expertise thank you I think that’s a

great thanks for the question

you know there’s I have to say this is

um as I said I don’t do a lot of these

venues a lot but the ones I have done

the majority of the time is spent on

Russia

mr. Commerce say you haven’t mentioned

Russia yet but thank you for bringing up

you know for all the rightful concerns

we have about Russia’s attempt to

undermine us standing around the world

continuing for all that they’re trying

to achieve for all the reasons we just

talked about China as a source of

concern we also have to think about

China’s a source of concern Russia is

more able to get away with being

assertive and coercive and meddling

because it can sort of count on if not

legally officially formally it can count

on sort of the backing of China who has

shared sort of mutual interests in

undermining the US

standing around the world vice versa

right China also doesn’t have to get its

hands dirty as much and the Russians get

their hands dirty by doing things around

the world meddling in the affairs of

other countries and not being as

concerned about getting caught doing so

right and and that also undermines you

know to the extent undermined us

standing a credibility that also

supports at the end were you know as I

say the influence the Chinese are trying

to acquire that’s that’s that’s

noteworthy solidarity stepping back stop

solidarity with all of our partners and

friends and like-minded countries around

the globe

is the answer to a lot of these issues

the extent to which our partners Steve

stand behind us on the issues we stand

for and the extent our adversaries

actually see that as well

Chris’s point about the South China Sea

you know when we talk about an

adversaries threat to us three things

matter right intentions capability and

this third thing I call resolve that is

the ability to calculate over time what

did I learn to get away with right and

it’s in that in that reading of that

international arena if we’re successful

in moderating the behavior of not just

China but Russia what we do to achieve a

perception of resolve and pushback as

chris says was not there in the case

perhaps of the South China Sea

more effective the last point is Russia

and China they’re not allies

I think it’s noteworthy in all of this

when we talk about alliances around the

world what the United States stands for

and the principles we stand before how

that underpins mutual interests the

Russia China relationship is more of one

of sort of strategic solidarity and

convenience over mutual interests but I

wouldn’t go so far that to say that the

values that underpin what we know to

underpin the Alliance as we stand for

are necessarily there I think there’s an

important distinction to be made between

Russia and China’s efforts to achieve

hegemony versus Russia and China’s

efforts to undermine the u.s. order I

think a lot of their activities focused

on undermining the u.s. order but in

terms of achieving hegemony you know

usually the hegemony after they achieved

their power and influence actually

provide goods to the international

system because they want to maintain

their new order the concern is that

Russia and China whether their allies

are not are seeking to undermine us

hegemony and then really still take from

the system without giving anything back

the United States at the end of World

War two are going forward we took from

the international system but we also

gave back to the international system

you know there’s always this comparison

of China’s one belt one Road with the

Marshall Plan I mean one belt one road

and all these other activities by the

Chinese are it’s basically these are

loans are giving out right debt trap

diplomacy the Marshall Plan one grants

that the I that was that was money we

gave to Europe to help reconstruct

Europe so it’s a very different thing

that we’re talking about when we talk

about efforts to undermine American

hegemony in Russia and Chinese efforts

to achieve their own hegemony they’re

interested in undermining the US

influence but they’re actually not

interested in replacing the United

States which leaves us overall with a

much worse order than we could possibly

have today okay another question

how about toward the back

Warren Cowan Wilson Center

what about Taiwan yeah I have a didn’t

hear what about Taiwan oh yeah it’s a

good question that’s kind of a big topic

can you be a little more specific sure I

heard state boy the other day arguing

that we should be very careful to

protect the one China policy it’s not

screwing around with Taiwan

then I heard Cory Gardner and others on

the hill who have been arguing for

stronger ties with Taiwan to push

further for Taiwan’s independence where

do you see the pressure that Xi Jinping

and others are putting on Taiwan now and

the American response

sure okay thank you that’s much clearer

I’ll give it a shot you know I think a

lot has been made Xi Jinping made a

major speech and on Taiwan recently and

a lot has been made and of it especially

its content which seemed to suggest you

know let’s have her unification sooner

rather than later which was a sub-theme

of it there was definitely a sense of

urgency in that in that speech but a lot

of the language and content was actually

sort of old wine in new bottles you know

very similar to previous sub speeches

that had been done

two things I would just point out one

it’s very striking that the US

government through the Defense

Intelligence Agency this year decided

that they wanted to publish something in

an unclassified State that said

basically the Chinese military now

believes it can do that mission and win

so that is something that should give a

lot of us pause the second I think in

perhaps more fundamental is we see China

using a lot of the tactics of Russia to

influence Taiwan’s democracy and I think

that really is the bigger threat as

opposed to say a DJ style invasion

because it’s cheap it’s relatively

successful Taiwan’s domestic politics

can be quite polarized and we now see

even the ruling party is now about to

have a factional split between the

premier and the president over running

for president and so on and China will

be deeply involved in all

happened to be in Taiwan you know during

the run-up to their recent municipal

elections in November and a lot of this

what’s going on it’s a deep concern and

so I actually think in a lot of ways

that’s really that the larger threat has

to the role of the u.s. I think Taiwan

is learning a lot of lessons in this

process I you know certainly the phone

call with then president-elect Trump was

a huge win for Taiwan but they also then

got a lot of backlash from the mainland

which I suppose they should have seen

coming but it’s not not necessarily

clear they did and there is a risk I

think for Taiwan in some cases on this

of being in a position of sort of don’t

love us too much to the Americans right

because they are always the ones that

are sort of sort of caught in the middle

what I do think just to come back to

several comments mike has made in a way

is Xi Jinping style of governance is

making it easier shall we say for voices

to emerge to say we ought to be

supporting the democracy that’s Taiwan

not the CCP ideology driven you know

sort of socialist state so you can argue

that new forces are being unleashed in

that relationship which would then test

those who say no the one-child policy

was decided at the time of the forming

of relations and it cannot be violated

and the Spirit has to be managed very

strictly so it’s it’s very messy I think

for all three parties okay anybody over

on this side right here right here

deciding right here

a good evening I’m Jen Runyon currently

a graduate student at Georgetown given

the fact that China has recently issued

a polar strategy I was wondering your

thoughts on China’s aspirations as a

polar power you’d like to talk about ok

I’ll give a quick answer anyone else can

jump in they clearly have one and and

want to be involved in the issue and I

think there’s a sense this is another

area actually where the points that have

been made by all of us today about

alliances and the importance of

alliances you know the Nordic countries

are very worried about this they’re

seeking US assistance we are a polar

power I always have been and I think it

will be important for us to show some

leadership I think there’s certainly a

question as to whether some of the fear

of China’s ambition let’s say in this

area is slightly over rot so far they’re

talking a lot and not doing much but you

know we have situations where for

example they now have the largest fleet

I believe of icebreakers in the world

they have serious trade and economic

reasons for wanting to be involved up

there and I think in that aspect they do

seem to share the Russian philosophy of

look at all these minerals and economic

opportunity you know that’s it’s in

their say as opposed to environmental

protection in the in the Nordic area you

know things like that so again this is

an area where it’s kind of on low boil

but it’s getting getting stronger and

it’s an opportunity for the u.s. perhaps

to show leadership in managing the

process okay one more question let’s see

if we got anybody from over this area

how about right there

hi Julian Barnes from the New York Times

I was wondering if mr. Collins would

engage on the question of whether as the

panel brought up a possible ban on US

exports to not just Huawei but other

Chinese companies would that have any

effect on China’s ability to surveil

control their own society some of the

things that you pointed out in your

original comments that are concerning

about China’s rise is there any way for

the United States to hamper that sort of

ability to exercise social control over

their own people and furthermore could

that slow the rise of law way until a

Western competitor can catch up I think

it’s a great question the one of the

realities out there that is not openly

widely enough discussed it’s just how

dependent Chinese technology still is on

its access to the international arena

not just the United States but elsewhere

despite the idea that Huawei has owns

the you know the 5g system from start to

finish you know there’s there’s parts

and you know there’s dependencies they

still have on capabilities and access

they need from componentry from others

around the globe and that doesn’t apply

just 5g technologies the the priority

seating thing is putting on this 2025

this vision were China to be the leading

provider of these you know major

technologies around the world as much as

they aspire to achieve that that depends

heavily on access they still have to the

technology the expertise the data the

intellectual property they know they can

get elsewhere so I would just say

objectively there is a vulnerability in

terms of China’s ability to be dominant

in those technology spaces by the fact

that they still have to have access to

innovative capability not just

States but around the globe and I think

I would add to that because of that

dependency look at things like the

budding relationship between China and

Israel rather closely all right well on

that I know how to get off on time thank

you all for coming

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