STUDIES

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Edwin Land's Legacy
Memory Techniques
African Leaders
Intelligence in Public Media

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(U) Cover design by Doris Serrano. Image shows US Air Force C-130 capturing a descending parachute carrying a "bucket" of filmed images from a Gambit or Hexagon reconnaissance saterllite in 1984. Photo courtesy of pilot of the trailing aircraft.

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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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Letter to the Editors

As a former director of the old Office of Development and Engineering, I read with interest the recent article, "Project Management Training at CIA," by Joe Keogh and Rich Roy (*Studies in Intelligence* 68, No. 2 [June 2024]). I have contributed to the CIA program management topic in the past. Ed Nowinski and I wrote an article entitled, "The Lost Art of Program Management in the Intelligence Community" (Vol. 50, No. 2, June 2006). ODE was known throughout the community for its ability to manage programs well, delivering programs on time and within budget. I suggest that training alone, while useful, is not all that is needed to produce effective PMs.

Keogh and Roy mentioned the KENNEN reconnaissance satellite project as an example of the very large programs that we managed, but they commented that these programs were different than the many small projects for which the Directorate of Science and Technology was responsible. Although ODE's major responsibility was the management of the space programs assigned to us by the National Reconnaisance Office, we also did what I would classify as medium-sized projects. some of which required as much "tradecraft" processes in concert with the Directorate of Operations as they did technology. All of these projects also delivered on time and within budget. The interesting question is why were ODE PMs so successful when none of us received any formal PM training? Here is my view:

- We had a structured program for managing people's careers. People were identified early in their career as somebody with management potential and they were given a series of assignments aimed at developing their capabilities.
- All our PMs had demonstrated leadership capabilities in previous jobs, the willingness to take responsible risks and the ability to give clear direction to staff and contractors.
- They had been successful as a chief system engineer on one of the projects.
- The PMs had developed a competent project staff, responsibilities and accountability were clear, and people were expected to do their job.
- They worked with contractor management to ensure that the right people were on the job from a contractor perspective. Underperforming contractor personnel (including their project manager) were removed and replaced.

Nearly every article on project management says something about system engineering. But often they do not discuss what system engineering is and what system engineers do. In simple terms, "System engineering is a methodical, disciplined approach to the design, realization, technical management, operations and retirement of a system. A system is a construct or collection of different elements that together produce results not obtainable by the elements alone."

Not every person can be a system engineer. One needs to be comfortable with dealing with technologies that they may not be familiar with; deal with contentious issues; negotiate the solution to different approaches to a project problem; and balance technical, cost, and schedule issues. Perhaps most important, system engineers are risk takers and able to bring creative solutions to difficult issues the project faces. This is an important skill that is often overlooked in project management training.

Project management is often seen as a process: contract rules and acquisition procedures that must be followed, project reviews and reports that need to be submitted. It is not that process is inherently bad, but it does not, of itself, produce good PMs. In a well-run project the PM has the following skills:

- Knows how to use the talents of the people assigned to the project and ensures that the right talent is assigned to the right job.
- Organizes the system engineering function is a way that reports to the PM and that the SE function has the responsibility to influence decisions.
- If possible, all elements of the project should report to the PM. This includes all technical responsibilities, contracts, security and finance. While not always possible these support functions need to understand that the PM is on charge.
- Has a clear understanding, with the customer, what the requirements are, what performance is expected and what latitude the PM has to trade performance with cost and schedule
- Has the ability to deal with unexpected problems and crisis, the ability to make critical decisions without a lot of agonizing.
- Can develop a set of management program processes that ensure documentation reviews and reporting are appropriate for that project.

A successful project needs a competent PM but also a thought-out program plan. With a complicated project like KENNEN, such a very detailed plan was essential. In smaller S&T projects a program plan of only a few pages might be adequate, but some version of a project plan is essential. The PM must think through, at the beginning, what resources, support, facilities, people, tools, etc., are needed to execute the project and meet the performance, cost, and schedule needs. The essence of what I mean here was stated by Gen. Eisenhower when he said, "Plans are worthless, planning is essential."

When training PMs it is important to emphasize why projects fail. While all projects are different, there are some similarities about why they fail:

- The project is underfunded at the beginning. Usually this is done in the process of "selling" the project as a way to get it approved.
- Instability on the project manager and or team. This can be an issue with long-term projects.
- Insufficient back-up for critical components. Often in high tech projects a given technology or part is risky. In such cases it is wise to procure from back-up vendors or technology.
- Gold-plated requirements. There is a tendency to want more out of a system than is needed.
- Picking the wrong contractor. Often the "winning" proposal is not the contractor who can do the project successfully. When you know who the right contractor is, go sole source.
- Insufficient margin. All programs need sufficient cost and schedule margin, not having such will lead to project problems.

I have nothing against project management training, and indeed the process described by Keogh and Roy is certainly through and, I suspect, has been useful. But, training alone is not enough. There is a philosophy of project management that is also important. This philosophy admits that here are certain aspects that are absolutely needed (discipline, planning, the right people, clear responsibilities, system engineering), but the "how to" in terms of process and management techniques is let to the PMs make decisions based on their view of programs' status, risks, and challenges.

We give the leader of a project the title "project manager," but the best PMs are project *leaders* not managers. It can be summed up by a quote from Peter Drucker, who said "Managers do things right, leaders do the right things." Leadership is hard to teach. ■

Robert Kohler is the former director of the Office of Development and Engineering and former executive vice president of TRW.

Edwin Land pictured at the unveiling of the Polavision home movie system in 1971. A famed scientist and inventor, Land was also instrumental in the success of several Cold War intelligence reconnaissance programs. (Library of Congress/Bernard Gotfryd)

Edwin Land's Cold War Intelligence Legacy

Regis D. Heitchue

Regis D. Heitchue served as a senior executive in CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology. He specialized in advanced technical intelligence systems.

Intelligence Trailblazer

In his public life, Polaroid founder Edwin Land was a scientist and entrepreneur distinguished for his inventions in the fields of polarized light, photography, and color vision. He left a rich legacy of 533 patents, second only to Thomas Edison, by the time he retired in 1982. Books have been written about Land's extraordinary public achievements and the legacy he created. Yet there exists another legacy equally as rich, but less well known. This article sheds light on Land's many contributions to the US Intelligence Community.

A Triumph of Genius

Edwin Land's invention of the Polaroid camera changed picture-taking habits of millions of people around the world. In products, like the Polaroid instant camera, he sought to create an essentially aesthetic medium that inhabited the intersection of science and art. Shrouded from public view, however, Land was an adviser to presidents and a pioneer in the development of US means of gathering intelligence. It is a legacy that had not been made fully public owing to the extreme secrecy that surrounded his work at the time. Few, namely the senior officials he advised on such matters, knew of the immeasurable contributions he made.

In reading publicly available literature, one is left to admire his scientific and entrepreneurial achievements, but also unknowing of this other Edwin Land. In *A Triumph of Genius*, Ronald K. Fierstein provides only a brief account of Land's secret service

> *Perhaps most importantly, his contribution to America's defense and intelligence efforts over three decades, and in the service of seven presidents, performed mostly in secret with no public fanfare but to an inestimable amount of praise from our country's scientific elite, may be the true measure of Land's stature in the pantheon of great American minds and entrepreneurs.*[1]

That is indeed high praise, but it shows how little is publicly known of Land's role in national security. It can be said that his hidden legacy is as significant as his well-known public legacy.

The War Years

Founded by Land and George Wheelwright III in 1937, Polaroid Corporation in its early years was known for products like sunglasses and films that reduced glare by polarizing light. Land saw that Polaroid's products could be used not just in peacetime, but in war, and he sought passionately to be useful during the world war he saw looming. In December 1940, Land committed his company completely to military projects for the duration of the war. With characteristic prescience and impatience, Land launched Polaroid onto a new course, which he later called a "big change." He told the employees that one year from then, the United States would be in the war and starting at once, Polaroid's only purpose would be to win this war. Anyone who disagreed with this goal was free to leave. He told the employees that he didn't expect to make much profit. "We didn't exist for any profit, nor singly for the welfare of our employees, or to provide the consumer market with sunglasses that had been our start." "We have no purpose now except to win."

Polaroid's war work was based solidly on Land's and his company's preoccupation with polarizing apparatus and on the knowledge of plastics that Land's group had been forced to acquire to make the polarizers practical. The polarizers could be used in wartime by the military—antiaircraft gunners, machine gunners, and gunners aboard fighters and bombers—who had a frequent problem with glare. They needed goggles, polarizing and non-polarizing, and Polaroid gave them millions. Land called them "the best damn goggles in the world." Besides filters for goggles, the company made periscopes, lightweight stereoscopic rangefinders, aerial cameras, and the Norden bombsite.

The war demonstrated the strength of established scientific and technological institutions, but it also highlighted the usefulness of smaller enterprises like Polaroid in moving nimbly and rapidly to innovate. Polaroid grew explosively as a fast-turn-around innovator. Polaroid's and Land's total commitment to the war effort led to a whole range of technical advancements, and ultimately, to new innovative commercial products for the company.[2]

Polaroid's dedication to military problem solving had given the company a greatly expanded research and engineering division with very little, if any, civilian commercial business. To keep its employees and to continue

developing and growing, Polaroid needed some new product. The answer came to Land: He had taken a photograph of his young daughter Jennifer who asked why she couldn't see the picture right away. Land's answer was, why not? "Why not make a camera that gave a picture right away?" Based on the work he and Polaroid had done on the 3D vectograph technology that was primarily developed for miliary applications, he had conceptualized an instant photography system right away.[a]

One-step instant photography had been born. Land undertook nothing less than a revolutionary advance in photography, dispensing with the many steps required to develop a conventional film negative and print a positive. Slightly more than three years elapsed from "why not" to the first public demonstration early in 1947 of the Polaroid SX-70 instant camera.[3]

Penetrating the Iron Curtain

With the end of World War II Land would personally assume new responsibilies as senior advisor on intelligence matters to President Eisenhower and successive administrations. Due to his contributions during the war effort, Land was on the short list for inclusion in any intelligence activities that emerged as the postwar period evolved into the Cold War. In this new role, Land would no longer be inventing and producing products as he and his company had done during the war, but rather would advise senior American presidents and other officials on how best to understand and counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As long-time Land Panel member, Richard Garwin, said: "Land kept us on track and inspired us. Our job was not primarily to invent solutions, because there were usually plenty of those to exhaust the budget and the development resources. Rather, our job was, as quickly and surely as possible to separate the wheat from the chaff, and to encourage (even selectively breed) the wheat."[4]

Land's first Cold War involvement was Project Charles. It's 1951 report focused on air defense, a concept that was uncomfortable for the Air Force, which believed the best defense was an overwhelming offense. The need for further study led to an MIT effort initiated in late 1951 known as "Project Lincoln," codenamed Beacon Hill; the project concerned the Air Force's ability to conduct strategic reconnaissance on the closed societies of East Europe and the Soviet Union. James Killian, President of MIT, was closely involved with the Beacon Hill effort and, through it, he became acquainted with Land, who was one of the participating experts. Others were reconnaissance expert George Goddard, and astronomer and lens designer James G. Baker.

The classified *Beacon Hill Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance* was published in June 1952. Its opening chapter, which summarized the entire report opened with a section on the importance of intelligence. It declared: "In the post-war world, intelligence and reconnaissance are more important to the United States, by several orders of magnitude, than in the pre-1945 world." Land contributed a chapter, "A new approach to photo reconnaissance." The report essentially concluded that then new age of scientific warfare was producing intelligence instruments that must be used to the maximum lest an enemy use them better.[5,6]

The important role that Killian and Land played in shaping US intelligence during the next 20 years turned on the unique secret relationship that Killian had with President Eisenhower who strongly expressed his need for frank advice on technical problems. The president referred to Killian, Land, and colleagues as "one of the few groups I encountered who seemed to be there to help the

a. A vectograph is a type of stereoscopic print or transparency viewed by using polarized 3D glasses to create three-dimensional representation from a single image. The vectograph was developed by Gustav Mahler of the Polaroid Corporation, where he worked with Land. This technological breakthrough was used in the wartime effort in late 1942 in stereoscopic reconnaissance of the Guadalcanal battlefields and later in mapping the Normandy beaches for the 1944 landings. (McElheny, 132)

country and not help themselves." Land recalled almost 30 years later that the president exclaimed, "Oh, I'm so grateful to you fellows who are out of town! You can't think in Washington. You go away and think and then you tell me what you've been thinking. There's no way to think if you live here."[7]

On March 15, 1953, the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization, which included Killian and Land in its membership, warned leaders about US vulnerability to a surprise attack. President Eisenhower was equally concerned, especially of the threat from Soviet Bison long-range bombers. Killian recommended the recruitment of a task force that became officially known as the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP). In 1955 President Eisenhower commissioned the TCP to provide him with a comprehensive and extremely sensitive and highly classified study assessing the Soviet nuclear first-strike threat and the US ability to prevent or withstand it.[8]

Killian chose Land to head Project Three, the intelligence capabilities panel of TCP, to conduct a no-holds-barred review of US intelligence. At the time, Land was on leave of absence from Polaroid, living in Hollywood, California, and advising Alfred Hitchcock on the technology of making three-dimensional movies. He decided to return to the East Coast to lead Project Three.[9] The report issued by Project Three was perhaps the most important of such reports in the Cold War era, because it caused major changes in how the United States gathered intelligence on the Soviet Union. Eisenhower embraced those changes, providing presidential leadership of overhead reconnaissance programs—the U-2, OXCART, and CORONA—and protected those early efforts when their success was not assured.

U-2

It was clear to Land and his intelligence panel that there were vast uncertainties in the United States about Soviet military and industrial capability, especially concerning intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles that could attack the United States.[a] The idea of a very high-altitude aircraft that would overfly the Soviet Union to take photographs of suspect military installations had been proposed by Kelly Johnson in the famed Skunk Works at the Lockheed Corporation. The USAF had rejected the U-2 concept, but the idea was validated and given life by Land when he briefed President Eisenhower. Land convinced the president of the soundness of his plan and the wisdom that the CIA undertake overflights of the Soviet Union. Land argued, "No statesman could run the risk of provocation toward war and for the Air Force to engage in a program of that sort would seem rather dangerous."[10] CIA-led missions would lend an unaggressive and non-military nature to overflights of the Soviet Union.

In his report, *Project Three Findings to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, November 5, 1954,* Land advised, "Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think overflight [of the Soviet Union] is urgent and presently feasible…we feel there are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance…the kind of action that is right for the contemporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking to do its looking."[11]

Land had earlier told the president of his confidence that a U-2 overflying Russia could and would find and photograph the Soviet Union's Bison bomber fleet. And indeed, it did. Photography from 24 U-2 flights proved that earlier US intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber production were too high—the supposed "bomber gap" was a myth. Those same U-2 missions also provided limited, but insufficient intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile threats, paving the way for reconnaissance satellite missions that would prove that the

a. Panel members included Land, James G. Baker, Joseph W. Kennedy, Edward M. Purcell, and John W. Tukey.

highly controversial "missile gap" was also a myth.

The U-2 flew missions over the Soviet Union gathering photographic and other intelligence until May 1, 1960, when the Soviets succeeded in shooting down the U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers. After the shootdown, CIA and State Department officials attempted to conceal the U-2's true mission and the reasons for the loss of the aircraft. The cover stories that had been concocted well before the start of dangerous overflight operations were soon and easily proven by Soviet Premier Khrushchev to be lies, but not before he tricked the United States about what he actually knew about the downed aircraft and its pilot.

Land and Killian had participated in devising cover stories in the event of the loss of an aircraft over the Soviet Union. They believed that rather than elaborate cover stories intended to conceal the true purpose of U-2 missions, the United States should admit the truth—the purpose was to gather intelligence that the United States needed to guard against a surprise attack. "It is my judgement that the CIA long before [the U-2 loss] should have brought to bear hardnosed scientific and military judgement on the probabilities of the plane's being shot down and of the growing Soviet capability to attack the plane."[12]

Had their advice been accepted, the country and Eisenhower could have been spared the humiliation that followed Khrushchev's revelations. The most important consequence of the whole incident was Khrushchev's cancellation of a summit with Eisenhower following the president's refusal to apologize. Had the United States from the beginning of the loss of the aircraft simply told the truth, as Eisenhower would ultimately do and as Land and Killian had urged, possibly the summit with its peaceful aims might have been saved.

Edwin Land believed strongly in being truthful. He said in a commencement address after the U-2 incident:

> *It was not a question of the ineptitude that might be revealed by the truth, or the possible damage that the whole program of negotiation for peace may have suffered…and it was not a question of whether with foresight that particular crisis could have been avoided. The issue was this: Does an American, when he represents all Americans, have to tell the truth at any cost? The answer is yes, and the consequence of the answer is that our techniques for influencing the rest of the world cannot be rich and flexible like the techniques of our competitors. We can be dramatic, even theatrical: we can be persuasive; but the message we are telling must be true.*[13]

At the same time, Land was concealing his enormous involvement in the highly secretive U-2 project. Land chose to differentiate lies of commission from lies of omission. To him, lying outright was one thing. Hiding the truth was another, and his conscience had accepted the distinction.

Among its many achievements, a U-2 reconnaissance mission in October 1962 discovered that the Soviets had emplaced intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, a discovery that would initiate the Cuban missile crisis.

OXCART

CIA's Richard Bissell had begun to explore alternatives to the U-2 for gathering strategic intelligence because he knew the aircraft would have a limited life expectancy as Soviet air defenses improved. The President's Scientific Advisory Committee headed by Killian recommended that feasibility studies be started for a follow-on manned reconnaissance aircraft. The president approved the idea of a feasibility study and Bissell was requested to undertake action. In early 1958, Bissell formed a panel chaired by Edwin Land, who would keep Eisenhower informed on its progress.

Land and his panel members met frequently, usually in Land's Cambridge office. They were intimately involved with CIA and USAF officials in evaluating contractor proposals for a U-2

replacement that would ultimately become the A-12 aircraft, later known as OXCART, and advising government officials on designs that offered the best combination of stealth, speed, and altitude.[a] In December 1958, CIA Director Dulles and Bissell, with Land and committee member Edward Purcell present, briefed the president. Eisenhower was concerned about the U-2's vulnerability and problems with satellite reconnaissance efforts. He told them to continue work and suggested that the US Air Force "could support the project by transferring some reconnaissance money."[14]

While President Eisenhower had initiated work on the OXCART program, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were involved in key aspects of it concerning its secrecy and overflight missions. The USAF had found that variants of CIA's A-12 design would be highly suitable for its military missions and contracted with Lockheed for their production. Secretary McNamara desired to reveal publicly the existence of a USAF version of the aircraft, while CIA fought to keep the A-12 from the public eye. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) members, particularly Killian, objected strenuously to disclosing any version of OXCART on the grounds that publicity would compromise its design innovations, enable the Soviets to develop countermeasures, and destroy its value for reconnaissance.[b] DOD and CIA ultimately resolved the controversy: the White House announced the development of the A-11, an advanced experimental military aircraft, while the CIA's A-12 spy plane remained secret.

In 1965 with the United States becoming increasingly involved in Vietnam, PFIAB recommended to the president that OXCART be immediately deployed to Okinawa for photographic reconnaissance missions. The deployment became a controversial issue with State and Defense, but by 1967, DCI Helms received President Johnson's approval for immediate OXCART deployment and use. CIA flew OXCART missions over Vietnam from Kadena Air Base under the code name BLACK SHIELD for a period until it was replaced by the Air Force SR-71 Blackbird, a derivative of the A-12 that Land and his colleagues, especially Edward Purcell, had a hand in creating. Those missions produced critical tactical intelligence for US military commanders to develop safer and more effective flight routes.[15]

CORONA

Well before Powers' U-2 was shot down in 1960, President Eisenhower had become decidedly uncomfortable approving U-2 missions over the Soviet Union despite extraordinary urgency for strategic intelligence. As a result, US leaders began to consider a reconnaissance satellite as a way to gather the needed information. The US Air Force had been investigating reconnaissance satellites, and in October 1957, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) reviewed the USAF program, known as WS-117-L or SAMOS. In its report to the president, the PBCFIA expressed skepticism and frustration with the WS-117L program because it was intended to primarily support the Strategic Air Command's interest in warning of a Soviet attack.

PBCFIA emphasized the need for peacetime strategic intelligence rather than reconnaissance in support of warfighting. Eisenhower, more concerned with preventing nuclear war than waging it, agreed. The board also doubted the feasibility of the Air Force plan to

a. Panel members included Land, Edward Purcell, Allen Donovan, H. Guyford Stever, Eugene Kiefer, and Courtland Perkins, as well as USAF, US Navy, and aerospace industry officials.
b. President Eisenhower established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956; it was chaired by James Killian. In May 1961, President Kennedy reestablished the board as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Killian was again appointed as chair and Land was added as a member. Land served on the PFIAB from 1961 to 1977.

electronically transmit the reconnaissance data and instead believed that returning photographic film from orbit was the only workable approach.[16]

In November, 1957, Eisenhower named James Killian to serve as chairman of the new President's Science Advisory Committee. In his new capacity Killian conferred at the White House with Land, CIA's Richard Bissell, Eisenhower's staff assistant Army Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, and Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) commander General Bernard A. Schriever. They concluded that a film-recovery reconnaissance satellite managed through a covert program was the best near-term choice to augment U-2 missions.

Killian and Land wanted to streamline both the covert satellite program and its management, and they urged the president to assign responsibility for the new system to CIA, supported by the USAF, as had been done in the highly successful U-2 project. Their recommendation recognized CIA's ability to maintain tight security and move quickly.

In early 1958, Killian and Land met with Eisenhower, who agreed with the plan for a covert reconnaissance satellite that should be independent of the larger Air Force WS-117L program. Eisenhower emphasized that CIA should be in charge and that the newly established Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense should execute CIA's orders.

Shortly after meeting with the president, Land visited CIA headquarters to inform a surprised Richard Bissell that he would now direct a covert reconnaissance satellite project. Dulles had known of Bissell's impending assignment, but it was Land who informed Bissell. To protect its intelligence mission, the covert satellite CORONA operated under cover of an overt scientific research satellite named DISCOVERER. CORONA was intended as an interim capability until the more complex WS-117-L satellite became available, but it would provide photographic intelligence for the next decade.

On August 25, 1960, Eisenhower greeted several of his top science advisers in the Oval Office with DCI Allen Dulles. Photography from the first successful CORONA mission, number 14, had just been recovered. Land unrolled a spool of film across the floor in front of the president and said, "Here are your pictures, Mr. President."[17] CORONA had captured images of airfields and other military installations in the Soviet Union; it would be the first of many reconnaissance satellites to return pictures of the earth from space.

CORONA missions produced intelligence of immeasurable value. The earlier uncertainty and lack of confidence in intelligence estimates as typified by the "missile gap" would be a thing of the past. A new era in intelligence collection had dawned. From that point forward, photographic intelligence from reconnaissance satellites would be critical for gathering information from closed societies. The entire concept of US intelligence gathering was revolutionized because satellite imagery was now foundational intelligence, the unifying structure of intelligence collection and analysis.

National Technical Means

During the early days of CORONA operations, USAF and CIA working relationships had been extraordinarily effective. By 1963 those relationships deteriorated as the participants—DCI McCone; National Reconnaissance Office Director Brockway McMillan, and his CIA opposite Bud Wheelon—engaged in skirmishes that adversely affected US satellite reconnaissance operations. McMillan began to fight for more control of CORONA and directed that all satellite programs, including CORONA, be consolidated at the NRO offices in El Segundo, California. In response, McCone accused McMillan of wanting to take the whole project over and enjoined McMillan to leave things as they were. In early 1964, however, McMillan directed that all changes in NRO programs be

referred to him. The test of wills over CORONA management persisted into early 1965, although McCone and Wheelon had won a victory by preventing McMillan from exercising control over any important aspect of CIA's CORONA activities.[18]

Land was well aware of the CORONA management controversies and in early 1965 had warned Wheelon and McMillan that unless they started cooperating with each other, "a strong wind would come along and blow them both out of the NRO tree."[19]

CORONA had never been intended as more than an interim search system, a temporary solution until the highly ambitious Air Force WS-117L satellite became operational, but by 1961, WS-117L was in technical and financial difficulties with at most an unpromising future, leading CIA to investigate the future role of the US space reconnaissance program.

McCone and Wheelon were determined to secure for CIA an unassailable place in post-CORONA space reconnaissance, and in May1963 McCone in May 1963 to convene a space reconnaissance advisory panel under the chairmanship of Edward Purcell. The panel's findings were not to McCone's liking; in late October 1963, together with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, he formed a group of leading optical experts led by Sidney Drell to explore ways to improve satellite photography. The Drell panel supported CIA's conclusion that CORONA had been pushed to its technical limits and that a new search system was needed. In June 1964, McCone asked Land to convene yet another panel to consider the technical feasibility of a CORONA follow-on, known as FULCRUM, a search satellite with higher resolution.

In July 1965, Dr. Donald F. Hornig, special assistant for science and technology, had Land create a panel to review the National Reconnaissance Program and specifically a new search and search-surveillance system.[a] Land's panel evaluated both CIA's FULCRUM and the USAF contender for a new search system known as S-2. The panel judged that available data did not yet support the selection of either for full development. The FULCRUM and S-2 project staffs had little direct interaction, but they were bitter competitors in the fight for the development of the new search system that would become known as HEXAGON.

The HEXAGON (KH-9) satellite was ultimately developed as a joint covert effort by the USAF and CIA, but not before it was threatened with cancellation following Nixon's direction to reduce defense expenditures. On April 9, 1969, Nixon ordered the cancellation of HEXAGON and continuation of MOL-Dorian, albeit at a reduced expenditure.[b] DCI Helms immediately urged the president to delay action, and, on 21 April, Nixon reversed his earlier decision. Helms had argued that HEXAGON would provide a much better capability than MOL-Dorian for monitoring any arms-limitation agreement.

Arms control was a prominent component of US-Soviet relations after Nixon took office in 1969, and monitoring of such agreements, particularly those for strategic weapons, largely relied on satellite reconnaissance. HEXAGON was of paramount importance to US ability to confirm or deny Soviet strategic weapons developments and deployments. In both the US and the Soviet Union, space reconnaissance was considered highly sensitive, and so both sides adopted the phrase national technical means (NTM). NTM meant satellite reconnaissance—a capability so sensitive and highly classified at the time that

a. The Land Panel operated as the principal adviser for reconnaissance matters to the President's Advisory Group and the science adviser. The group first met on July 21, 1965, and met periodically until President Nixon abolished it in early 1973.
b. In the early 1960s, the US Air Force began efforts to put the Air Force into space by developing the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), whose overt objective was to determine the military utility of crewed space missions. Unknown to the public, MOL included a highly secret photographic-intelligence mission, codeword Dorian. See James D. Outzen, ed., *The Dorian Files Revealed: A Compendium of the NRO's Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents* (Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, August 2015).

neither party was willing to publicly acknowledge it.

Origin of the DS&T

Land, together with James Killian, was responsible for leading the Central intelligence Agency to embrace science and technology in the service of intelligence. A key recommendation from the TCP report urged "a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology." In response, CIA created a permanent advisory board known officially as CIA's Scientific Advisory Board, though it came to be referred to as the Land Panel because Land chaired it for almost a decade.

Richard Bissell was a brilliant manager who had successfully led CIA's U-2, CORONA, and OXCART projects, but as the director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (later the Directorate for Plans), he was also responsible for CIA espionage operations and covert action. Land and Killian explained to new DCI John McCone their strongly held belief that Bissell's technical projects should not be managed under the Plans Directorate and that the scientific and technical part of the CIA should be a completely separate unit. Land and Killian saw science and technology almost as a religion, one that was incompatible with the agency's clandestine activities.

In February 1962, McCone responded by establishing the Directorate of Research (DR), the first directorate dedicated to technological advancement. The DR struggled to be an effective force internally and externally, and those struggles came to the attention of Killian and Land who decided they should provide McCone with more specific guidance for strengthening the CIA's technical capabilities. They did so in a March 1963 paper titled "Recommendations to Intelligence Community by PFIAB." In effect, they were telling DCI McCone just how they wanted him to revamp the agency's scientific and technical efforts. Before the year was out, those recommendations would be embraced in full by McCone.[20]

In August 1963, McCone replaced the Directorate of Research with the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) and named Albert "Bud" Wheelon the director (DDS&T). Together with Wheelon, McCone permanently changed CIA, giving its science and technology mission equal standing with the two other major branches of the agency. The DS&T would become a powerful organization of incredible scientific and technical competency and was, in large part, a Land and Killian creation. After nearly nine years of urging the use of science as the handmaiden of intelligence, Killian and Land had succeeded in having a government unit created which embodied their ideas. A history of the DS&T said as much: "The existence of the Directorate of Science and Technology must ultimately be considered a monument to the wisdom of Edwin H. Land and James R. Killian, Jr."

EOI vs FROG

Space reconnaissance had provided highly significant intelligence over the years of CORONA, HEXAGON, and other systems, but being film-return systems, the intelligence was rarely timely, a major deficiency in times of crisis. That deficiency led both the Air Force and CIA to investigate timely space reconnaissance systems. CIA interest originated with Wheelon in his first six months as CIA's DDS&T.[21] The Air Force had done research on real time imagery in its WS-117L program and the concept that eventually emerged from their work was to modify their successful GAMBIT high-resolution reconnaissance satellite in what became known as FROG—Film Readout GAMBIT. CIA's concept, most often referred to as the EOI (Electro-Optical Imaging) satellite, employed a solid-state array of sensors to convert light to electrical signals for transmission to the ground. In the Air Force concept, photographic film would be developed on the satellite, then scanned for electronic transmission to earth. The Air Force lobbied FROG as simply an

Land Appeals to President Nixon

"Dr. Land [sic] asked the President if he might take a few minutes to discuss a matter which he believed to be of the utmost importance. Dr. Land said that there was surely agreement that the US overhead reconnaissance program plays a major role in the conduct of our foreign relations and in our knowledge of the enemy. He pointed out that each and every major step in the overhead reconnaissance program had been made possible by direct Presidential backing. No bureaucracy, he said, could go out on a limb to the extent necessary to achieve a quantum technical advance, and that such risks had to be borne by the President. Dr. Land said that the community is now at a stage where it again requires Presidential backing. This time it is with respect to a choice in the development of the near real-time readout capability. The cautious choice would be to utilize existing hardware and technology to develop a film imaging system which can be read out on call by US-based ground station. The adventurous choice, and one which would be a quantum technological advance, is to push the development of an electronic imaging system which can be read out through a relay satellite while the sensor is over the target. Dr. Land said that the electronic device offered significant advantages over a film system, and that the R&D time could be reduced from five to three years by the President saying that it should be done. Dr. Land asked the President to personally intervene."

(President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Memorandum for President's File, June 4, 1971)

adaptation to an existing satellite, while CIA experts believed FROG would be a risky and expensive new development.

Those differing views were at the heart of the competition for the real-time reconnaissance satellite. The battle lines had been drawn — Air Force's incremental and evolutionary, CIA's revolutionary and dramatic. Edwin Land campaigned vigorously for EOI because it was a revolutionary concept while FROG to him, was not a major advancement. Land very much favored the bold approach to problems "Do not undertake a program unless the goal is manifestly important and its achievement is nearly impossible."[22] —A quantum leap. A central and arguably the single most influential figure in the EOI-FROG drama was Edwin Land who took an active interest in CIA's concept as a means to, in his words, "see it now."[23]

The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Executive Committee (ExCom) was established in August 1965 by DOD and CIA agreement. The ExCom was powerful because it was made up of just the deputy director of defense, the DCI, and the president's science adviser. It controlled, subject only to the secretary of defense and the president, satellite project approvals and funding. ExCom first engaged in the EOI-FROG debate in November 1968, but by July 1971 it was evident that the principals were unable to agree on a position. Instead, DCI Helms and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird independently advised President Nixon. Helms told Nixon that EOI was the better choice and that FROG costs had been underestimated. Laird's memo supported EOI but expressed skepticism about its early availability, an important consideration for Nixon.

Ending the Debate

A memorandum from Henry Kissinger brought finality to an issue that had consumed, but eluded, ExCom officials. Kissinger advised all concerned in unambiguous terms that the president had concluded that the development of the EOI system, later known as KENNEN (KH-11), should be undertaken toward a 1976 operational date and "under a realistic funding program." Further, the president had decided

that there should be no further development of the Film Read-Out GAMBIT system. FROG was dead. [24]

Retired Lt Gen Lew Allen, who led the USAF competition for a real-time satellite, had one perspective on the end to the KENNEN story:

> *Although I supported FROG and [redacted] institutionally, my heart wasn't in it—they should not have gone forward. I had a conservative view of "K" [KENNEN], and still do, a remarkable technical vision, but one it is possible the country could do without…. A remarkable aspect of "K" history is the awesome effectiveness with which CIA and the Land Panel dedicated themselves to supporting "K" once Land made his basic commitment. The only parallel in history is the unified dedication of the Romans to the destruction of all Carthage."*

Richard Helms, however, saw KENNEN's great intelligence value:

> *[The] development of the KH-11 was an absolute masterpiece…I knew if it was ever going to be made to work it was going to be an absolute breakthrough. It was going to change the timeliness and the ability to collect intelligence in a way that nothing else had done except maybe the advent of the U-2 or the first photographic satellite. That was the kind of thing I wanted to see the Agency move forward on… we were more innovative than anybody else in government, including the Department of Defense.*[25]

Land's Legacy

Today, many years after the end of the Cold War, it is hard to appreciate just how little intelligence about the Soviet Union was available at the time. The Soviet Union controlled virtually all significant information and was highly secretive about its military, especially nuclear weapons. To make matters worse, the Soviet Union was an especially difficult environment for human intelligence operations. Fortunately, President Eisenhower—through the influence of Land, and often James Killian—saw that overhead reconnaissance provided the means for penetrating the Iron Curtain.

Land, who never held an official position in government, exerted great influence on intelligence matters through his engagements with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. He convinced Eisenhower to develop the U-2 at a time when the US was largely ignorant about the Soviet Union. U-2 intelligence greatly reduced US fears about what lay behind the Iron Curtain.

The Soviet Union's launch of the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile in August 1957 created a sense of urgency for intelligence on the new Soviet threat, and Land believed such intelligence could only be achieved through satellite reconnaissance. CORONA proved that the "missile gap," one of the hottest issues in US politics at the time, was a myth, a gap in reverse.

CIA's OXCART program never achieved its intended purpose of strategic reconnaissance over Russia (much to DCI McCone's disappointment), but it was the progenitor for the highly successful and more famous Blackbird tactical reconnaissance aircraft. Blackbird missions over North Vietnam and North Korea were flown with no losses, a tribute to the work of Land's team who helped design the features of the aircraft that made it virtually invulnerable to enemy attack.

CIA experts Bud Wheelon, Les Dirks, and others had the brilliance and vision behind the EOI/KENNEN satellite, but it was Land who made it happen. While he was an inventor in his Polaroid work, in national security his role was not to invent but to advance those ideas he thought most important. EOI was certainly one of those ideas and today, KENNEN-like satellites circle the globe giving US leaders near-instant intelligence on worldwide crises, as do commercial EOI satellites whose images in the media we see every day.

The DS&T that Land and Killian helped create became a

powerful technical intelligence collection organization, a peer with CIA's clandestine and analysis directorates. One of the DS&T offices —Development and Engineering, once the largest office in the CIA—was nationally recognized as a dominant player in satellite reconnaissance.

From available records, it appears that Land mostly retired from his national security intelligence work in the mid-1970s.[a] It is unclear why he chose to retire then, although it might have been occasioned by the epic legal battle Polaroid waged between 1976 and 1985 with one-time mentor Eastman Kodak. In the long run, neither company survived. Polaroid won the battle with Kodak in 1985 but filed for bankruptcy protection in 2001. Kodak, which contributed hugely to US national reconnaissance through its work on large optics, exotic films, and film processing, missed the boat on digital photography. It filed for bankruptcy protection in 2012. Land died on March 1, 1991, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, age 81.■

a. In 1980, Land founded the Rowland Institute at Harvard University. The Rowland Institute is a privately endowed, non-profit, basic research organization, conceived to advance science in a wide variety of fields.

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President John F. Kennedy pictured meeting Tanganyika's Prime Minister Julius Kambarage Nyerere at the White House on July 17, 1961. (National Archives)

Decision Advantage: Intelligence Support for Presidential Visits

Historical Lessons from Africa Diplomacy

Judd Devermont

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When US presidents welcome foreign leaders to Washington, they are inundated with paper. From talking points and draft statements to seating arrangements and dinner menus, the White House staff will prepare all of it, except for one essential document: the CIA leadership visit piece. It is this analysis—presented as a standalone assessment or integrated into the *President's Daily Briefing* (*PDB*)—that delivers decision advantage for the president of the United States.

A CIA visit piece is more than a written recitation of a foreign leader's career highlights or a preview of potential agenda items. When it is done well, it is a revealing and yet remarkably succinct study of a leader's hopes and dreams, attitudes and demeanor, and friends and enemies at home and abroad. In other words, it is a roadmap to understand who is sitting across the table and how to advance US national security interests.

Effective leadership analysis is exceedingly difficult to do in the best of circumstances, and arguably even more challenging when it comes to sub-Saharan Africa. Relative to other regions, there has been less reporting, comparatively fewer intelligence analysts, and a limited number of senior policy interactions. It requires deep subject-matter expertise and superior intelligence tradecraft to transcend these shortcomings and contribute to a successful presidential engagement.

As a former CIA analyst, national intelligence officer for Africa, and NSC senior director for African Affairs, I have drafted PDB visit pieces for presidents and personally prepped them for their meetings. When I was a junior analyst on West Africa, I penned intelligence assessments to help President Bush navigate sensitive foreign policy topics and deftly engage African counterparts whose ambitions threatened to undercut regional stability. Later, as a senior analyst, I participated in an executive briefing for President Obama before the African Leaders Summit in 2014. My colleague and I presented a framework to analyze and interact with more than 40 heads of state. Finally, in my role as NSC senior director, I previewed key points and context for President Biden's meeting with South African President Ramaphosa and Angolan President Lourenco, as well as for his phone call with Kenyan President Ruto.

My professional experience tracks with the declassified record. Even though it is incomplete and riddled with redactions, publicly released intelligence documents showcases how and why CIA leadership analysis has become pivotal to presidential meetings. By examining 34 PDBs and other intelligence reports from 1961 to 1987 and then cross-referencing these analytic assessments with 63 policy memos, public statements, and press reports, as well as personal reflections, it is possible to chart how the CIA perfected the visit piece; measure its policy successes and failures; and point to new innovations to elevate the art form, including through the transformative power of AI. In each of these examples, it was evident that deep expertise and analytic tradecraft were essential for success. As Martin Petersen noted in his article, "The Challenge for the Political Analyst" in *Studies in Intelligence* (Vol. 47, No. 1, 2003), credibility is paramount, and it only happens when the analysis is "relevant, timely, expert, objective, and informed."

Creating the Visit Piece

In the spring of 1961, President John F. Kennedy, still reeling from the Bay of Pigs crisis, expressed his dissatisfaction with his intelligence support.[1] His staff piled on, complaining about the daily stream of reports from multiple government agencies and the dense, often inscrutable bureaucratic jargon. The CIA, in response, rushed to create the *President's Intelligence Checklist* (the predecessor of the *PDB*) to address Kennedy's concerns. With crisp prose and a global perspective, it became an immediate hit. The president not only relied on the product to inform policy decisions, but it also served him well in his meetings with foreign leaders.

Kennedy believed in the power of personal diplomacy, especially with regards to Africa. He told his staff that he wanted to engage with his African counterparts, decreeing that "if African leaders want to meet me, good. Invite them down here."[2] Kennedy's interest and appetite for information about the continent was considerable; Arthur Schlesinger, one of Kennedy's closest advisers, recalled that some African leaders told him that the "American president knew more

President Kennedy received Sudan's President El Ferik Ibrahim Abboud (center) at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, on October 4, 1961. The CIA told Kennedy that Abboud needed to "demonstrate that the visit has produced tangible benefit." (Robert Knudsen, White House Photographs, JFK Presidential Library and Museum)

about their countries than they did themselves."[3]

Three months after the creation of the *President's Intelligence Checklist*, Kennedy received a CIA assessment regarding Sudanese general Ibrahim Abboud's state visit. Abboud, who the analysts judged to be a "sincere patriot, disgusted by the corruption among the civilians," was seeking to secure from Kennedy "some sort of dramatic impact project" to increase his prestige.[4]

The "visit piece," however, was hardly a developed art form, and it struggled to distinguish itself from traditional political analysis. In this early period, most assessments included a cursory reference to a leader's planned travel to Washington before segueing into more standard assessments on the country's political, economic, and security developments. While some exceptions exist (including an astute study on a "more self-assured" Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1973), the visit piece, as it related to African heads of state, was fairly mundane and not consistently crafted to advance a presidential meeting.[5] Judging from the declassified record, the art form only started to find its stride during the Carter administration and reached its apogee under President Ronald Reagan.

President Jimmy Carter regarded the CIA's leadership analysis as vital to his diplomacy, especially his landmark summit with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1978. He told CIA analysts that he wanted to be "steeped in the personalities of Begin and Sadat."[6] These psychological profiles enabled Carter to navigate negotiations between the two leaders; in 2013, he said that the CIA assessments had "steeled his resolve to seek a full-fledged treaty between Egypt and Israel."[7] It stands to reason that this diplomatic triumph at Camp David reaffirmed the importance of leadership profiles and visit

pieces. Carter, who boasted that he was more interested in Africa than his predecessors and spent "more effort and worry on Rhodesia than the Middle East," presumably demanded similarly rigorous analysis to inform his interactions with African leaders.[8] While still uneven as an art form, the CIA's 1978 assessment on Senegalese president Leopold Senghor, who possessed "an impressive blend of intellectual and political skills" and "moves as gracefully and comfortably in French culture as he does in African," was a significant improvement in analytic quality and insights.[9]

The visit piece reached new heights during the Reagan administration. Indeed, the CIA started to regularly label these assessments as such; 13 out of the 19 declassified analytic reports published to coincide with Reagan's meetings with African counterparts included the word "visit" in the title. The art form's growing prominence reflected Reagan's interest in people. National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane said Reagan "always focused on the human dimension of foreign policy, waiting to know more about everybody."[10] The increase in the quality of visit pieces also probably stemmed from Reagan's engagement on Africa. He met with more African leaders than any of his predecessors, and his policies to eject the Cubans from Angola and secure Namibian independence, as well as his antipathy toward Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's adventurism in the region, framed many of his interactions with African counterparts. CIA rose to the challenge, leveraging its expertise and tradecraft to ensure the president had the most critical analysis to charm, coax, and cajole his White House visitors.

Serving the President

The CIA's visit piece typically consists of five elements. It delves into a leader's personality, their goals, and the context for the meeting—specifically the country's political, economic, and security situation. It also includes a warning component, informing the president that his counterpart may criticize US policy or press for a change to the US approach. Finally, it often features an outlook section, forecasting whether a leader or his country will succumb to or overcome emerging challenges.

Personality

A visit piece's most critical task is revealing a leader's personality: not what they have done, but who they are. The study of an African leader's disposition, temperament, and personal history helps to explain what makes them tick. It is fundamental to a visit piece, and it is certainly the hardest for intelligence analysts to master. The declassified assessments, for example, stressed Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie's "unusual personal vigor and determination" and Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda's tendency to become "highly emotional."[11] They characterized Sudanese leader Jafaar Nimeiri as "low-key, unpretentious" and explained that Mozambican president Samora Machel was "given to dominating conversation."[12] The most exceptional pieces tapped into a leader's mindset; in 1973, for example, CIA analysts asserted that "as Mobutu's confidence has grown, so have his pretensions to leadership in Africa." At the same time, they judged that he "remains troubled... by the picture many have of him as being overly pro-US."[13]

Goals

A visit piece uncovers what an African leader wants from his interactions with the US president. While a predictable feature of the art form, it takes talent and experience to go beyond the obvious. The declassified record is full of intelligence assessments that highlighted potential requests for more financial or military assistance, or a desire "to improve his stature at home," as was the case for President Quett Masire of Botswana in 1984.[14] More impactful have been visit pieces that unearthed broader foreign policy priorities, such as Senghor's likely requests for US funding in support of Angolan rebel Jonas Savimbi or Ivorian president Felix Houphouet-Boigny's hope for "assurances that the US remains



In a PDB prepared for President Nixon (right) on October 10, 1973, the CIA judged that President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (left) had "increasingly engaged in posturing on nonaligned issues" to address criticism that he is too close to Washington. (National Archives)

committed to protecting its friends in the Third World."[15] The most sophisticated pieces raised potential quid pro quos; in 1985, the CIA suggested that in return for more US assistance, Machel may accept a symbolic US naval visit to Maputo, the addition of a defense attaché to the US embassy, and more balanced voting by Maputo's representative at the United Nations.[16]

Context

A CIA visit piece also analyzes the political, security, and economic context underpinning a presidential meeting. It explains what is driving a leader's actions and any potential asks of the US government. Houphouet, for example, was concerned about "the crumbling institutions of the states around him," and Senghor was animated by a "fear of Soviet intervention in Africa and elsewhere."[17] Visit pieces often underline a leader's expectations, such as Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi's belief that his acceptance of a military access agreement obliged the United States to help Kenya.[18]

The assessments also touch on an African leader's opinion of US allies and adversaries, such as Senegalese president Abdou Diouf's criticisms of French president Francois Mitterrand's Africa policies or Zimbabwean prime minister Robert Mugabe's close relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, North Korea, and China.[19] Several assessments in the declassified record explained why the Soviet Union valued its partnerships with African leaders, such as Somalia's Mohamed Siad Barre in 1970s.[20] The rare visit piece even called out when a leader was being disingenuous. In 1983, the CIA pointed out that Kaunda's insistence that he pursued a balanced foreign policy was "only partly valid."[21]

Warning

An effective visit piece also prepares the US president for difficult conversations, identifying areas of disagreement and steering them away from counterproductive topics. The CIA profile generally incorporates several red flags and "watch out fors" into its analysis, such as highlighting that Sudan's Abboud "has been critical of the level of American aid" and that Senghor's policies on Arab-Israeli issues "conflict with US interests."[22] In 1982, the CIA warned that Liberian leader Samuel Doe's frustrations with the economy posed "the most serious potential irritant to Liberian-US relations."[23]The visit piece on Mugabe's 1983 meeting with Reagan was forthright about potential landmines, noting that Mugabe "resents Western criticism of his efforts to quell dissident violence" and that he is "extremely sensitive to any actions by Washington that he believes infringe on Zimbabwe's sovereignty."[24]

Outlook

A visit piece usually includes an outlook section, forecasting what the future may hold for a leader or country and what that could portend for US interests. It may be as routine as predicting another election win for Kenya's Moi or asserting that Nigerian leader

Ibrahim Babangida's "prospects for remaining in office over at least the next year or so appear favorable."[25] Some assessments addressed a pending leadership transition, concluding that a successor to Senghor "probably will continue to follow moderate, democratic principles."[26]

The analysis, however, has historically tended to skew negative, such as the CIA's judgment in 1962 that Ugandan prime minister Milton Obote may gradually adopt some anti-Western sentiment or the risk of growing regional and ethnic tensions in Cameroon and Togo.[27] In 1969, the CIA painted a grim picture of Haile Selassie's grip on power, arguing that his reforms paradoxically undercut his control and "unhappiness with his autocratic rule will likely continue to grow and nurture serious and perhaps successful plotting."[28]

Grading the Analysis

A visit piece, regardless of how well written and considered, is only as valuable as it is convincing to the reader and adept at shaping the president's conversations as well as contributing to favorable outcomes. While the CIA's initial forays into visit pieces were occasionally outmatched by Department of State and National Security Council memos, the declassified record reveals some impressive results. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took onboard the CIA's message that Mobutu wanted to strike a balance between being viewed as independent while remaining "on good terms with the US." In their meeting, Kissinger praised the Zairian leader's UN speech as a masterpiece because it sounded "critical of the United States, but when one read it, it was not so bad." Nixon added that the speech showed that Mobutu was a "skillful politician."[29]

The analysis on Senghor was prescient that the Senegalese leader fancied himself a mediator. He informed President Carter that "he is part Jewish and can speak frankly to both sides" of the Arab-Israeli question.[30] The CIA also accurately pinpointed Liberian leader Doe's need for continued US support to shore up his shaky regime. In press remarks following his White House visit, Doe exclaimed that "President Reagan assured me we can continue to count on America's understanding and support."[31]

The CIA particularly excelled at framing why African leaders viewed themselves as non-aligned and how navigating global geopolitical competition was central to their foreign policies. Following his engagement with Abboud, Kennedy publicly confirmed that the United States "fully endorsed the determination of the newly-independent countries of Africa to maintain their independence."[32] In press interviews during his visit to Washington in 1985, Mozambique's Machel was adamant that his country was "African, independent, and non-aligned," adding that "there is no question of blocs."[33] Reagan seemingly reached a similar conclusion, writing in his diary that Machel "turned out to be quite a guy and I believe he really intends to be 'non-alligned' [sic] instead of a Soviet patsy."[34]

The visit pieces had mixed results when anticipating an African leader's key priorities or potential issues to discuss. The CIA published a long paper on Liberia's economy ahead of President William Tubman's meeting with President Lyndon Johnson, accurately previewing the Liberian leader's deep concern with his country's pressing foreign debt service and rising commodity prices.[35] Tubman and Johnson subsequently dedicated several paragraphs to Liberia's economic challenges in their joint statement.[36] Similarly, several of the CIA visit pieces accurately captured how many West African leaders had become apprehensive about Libyan meddling in the region, especially in Chad. After his meeting with Reagan in 1983, Senegal's Diouf told the Washington Post that "we must stop the Chadian adventure."[37]

On the other hand, the CIA repeatedly failed to identify global issues that the African leaders discussed in their engagements with US presidents, including the situation in Berlin in the 1960s or Lebanon in the 1980s.[38] The

The CIA warned President Reagan in 1983 that Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda may reiterate his criticism that the West is "applying a double standard on foreign policy issues to the Africans' disadvantage."

agency's obsession with Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) leader Thomas Sankara—they saw Libya's hand behind his coup in 1983—prompted analysts to repeatedly flag the country as a likely topic in visit pieces on Senegal's Diouf[39] and Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema; Upper Volta, however, was absent in any of the public statements, press reports, diary entries, or the memorandum of conversation from Eyadema's meeting with Reagan.

The visit pieces had some other big misses. Ahead of Nimeiri's meetings with Reagan in late 1983, CIA raised concerns about the Sudanese leader's "erratic personal behavior," warning that his decision to introduce sharia law had alarmed the country's leftists, secular elite, and predominately non-Muslim southerners.[40] Despite the agency's growing worry that Nimeiri was vulnerable to a coup, Reagan seemed unconvinced and sidestepped any questions about the Sudanese regime's increasing fragility; Nimeiri was eventually removed from power by a popular uprising some 16 months later.[41] Moreover, the visit piece in the 1980s failed in one fundamental aspect: they did not fully understand their customer. In his diaries, Reagan repeatedly opined on whether an African leader was a believer in "free enterprise," whereas only the profile on Houphouet examined the Ivorian president's economic philosophy.[42] A central precept of leadership analysis is knowing your principal's interests, which based on this sample the CIA seemed to have flubbed during the Reagan administration.

Profiling for the Future

US presidents almost certainly will continue to benefit from the CIA's insights on the leaders' political acumen, as well as their top concerns for their country's economy or security, or their needs during global crises. The visit piece, after more than six decades of evolution and refinement, has become a vital resource for US presidents.

At the same time, the art form seems ripe for another

innovation—this one powered by the generative power of artificial intelligence. The drafting of leadership profiles and assessments are innately human endeavors, but AI has the potential to augment and enhance this critical intelligence product. The 2023 National Intelligence Strategy called for enhancing the IC's capabilities in language, technical, and cultural expertise by harnessing open-source big data, AI, and advanced analytics. Below are three recommendations on how to leverage AI in the analysis of African leaders, as well as other prominent global figures.[43]

Scale

The drafting of a leadership assessment is a time-intensive effort, requiring deep substantive expertise and a mastery of analytic tradecraft. While analysts focus on the visiting African leader, AI could generate additional profiles on the entire delegation, adding further value to the engagement. This is more than a just force multiplier; it is crucial for policy success. In the CIA's piece on Zambian president Kaunda's visit, the analysts highlighted the participation of Reuben Kamanga, the ruling party's top foreign affairs specialist, who was instrumental in repairing relations between the United States and Zambia.[44] In contrast, the CIA failed to mention Cape Verde's foreign minister—whom Reagan disliked, according to his subsequent diary entry—in its visit piece on President Aristides Pereira in 1983.[45]

Customization

A visit piece is typically directed toward the US president and later distributed to other senior policymakers. While the analysis for the president addresses strategic topics, it often excludes details useful for subsequent meetings and engagements with US officials. By leveraging AI, it would be possible to generate tailored analyses to plug into existing assessments for additional readers. For example, the CIA only briefly discussed the cocoa market in its visit piece on Houphouet in 1983, whereas the Department of State dedicated several sections to the topic in its own memorandum.[46] With AI's assistance, a leadership profile could have multiple bespoke versions to better align with varied US policy needs.

Data Analytics

Leadership profiles, as is the case for other intelligence assessments, use all-source information to back up analytic judgments. This art form, however, rarely avails itself of big data to strengthen its argumentation. AI's capacity to identify common themes and patterns in the underlying data and quickly summarize large amounts of text could help analysts to quantify some of their work. For instance, the CIA explained in 1973 that Ethiopia's "budget suggests that they may be less worried than they say" about the threat from Somalia.[47] By tapping into AI, the visit piece could have included a deeper analysis of the budget to contrast the emperor's stated priorities with his government's current actions.■

AI Promising, But Improvements Needed

While the state of the art is evolving rapidly, existing AI models are underwhelming when generating leadership profiles and integrating the best standards of analytic tradecraft. It will require significant AI model training and iteration, as well as a proficiency with the art form, to raise the current AI level to something that will strengthen and enrich intelligence products. For example, when this author asked leading models what Kenyan President William Ruto might raise with President Biden during their meeting on May 23, 2024, the answers ranged from unexceptional to unacceptable:

ChatGPT 4 offered the most complete take, indicating that "Ruto views this as an opportunity to usher in a new era of dynamic partnerships, particularly in transforming trade and investment, green energy, digital technology, and multilateralism, aiming for shared prosperity not only for Kenya and the United States but globally."

Anthropic's Claude generated a passable answer, identifying five potential topics, including "strengthening economic and trade ties between the two countries, possibly discussing the proposed US-Kenya free trade agreement that was being negotiated," and "security cooperation, given Kenya's role in fighting terrorist groups like al-Shabab in East Africa." The only problem, however, is that there is no free trade agreement currently under discussion.

Meta AI spun out a very basic response, generating a list of 11 topics Ruto could possibly raise, such as expanding economic ties, strengthening people-to-people ties, furthering technological innovation, and addressing climate and clean energy.

Google's Gemini failed the exercise entirely, acknowledging that it was "still learning how to answer this question" and recommended trying Google Search.

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

The *Temple of Time* (pictured), developed by Emma Willard in the mid-19th century to teach world history, is an example of the memory palace, a mnemonic device developed centuries ago. The author of this article received special permission from the Library of Congress to view an original *Temple of Time* wall hanging and workbook to aid in this research. (LOC photo)

Memory Techniques in the Intelligence Community

A Tool for Improving Analysis?

Cody Herr

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This article presents the findings of an experiment to test the effect of memory training on intelligence analysis. The results indicate a significant relationship between memory training and a boost in recall of key details from intelligence reporting. This strongly suggests a link between memory optimization and analytic performance. Many organizations require memory testing and training. In contrast, the Intelligence Community places tremendous demand on intelligence analysts' memory, but it does not provide training or testing to improve this skill. Overall, this article recommends a modest IC investment in memory training to better support policymaking.

Memory is a core component of human cognition and an essential skill for intelligence analysis.[a] Analysts rely on memory for every facet of their job—from evaluating vast amounts of data to briefing and answering policymakers' questions. Recent studies in psychology and neuroscience show that memory training can improve cognitive performance. Top universities, tech companies, special operations units, and foreign intelligence services require memory testing and training. Yet, the US Intelligence Community does not provide its workforce with memory testing, education, or training.

The IC places tremendous demand on intelligence analysts' memory.[b] The measure of an analyst is determined in large part by their ability to recall details quickly and accurately. Thus, the IC's effectiveness is linked to the individual analyst's memory. The IC trains its analysts to mitigate cognitive biases but does not train them to improve cognition. Analysts develop expertise through education and experience but do not learn to optimize their memory to use that knowledge. The result is inconsistent performance across the IC workforce. This inefficient system lowers the quality of intelligence analysis provided to policymakers.

Intelligence analysts must contend with ever-increasing amounts of information. They risk cognitive overload even as they use artificial intelligence and machine learning. Improved human memory can reduce this burden by optimizing information organization and recall skills—freeing up mental resources for critical and creative thinking—tasks only humans can perform. As Sherman Kent noted, "Whatever the complexities of the puzzles we strive to solve, and whatever the sophisticated techniques we may use to collect the pieces and store them, there can never be a time when the thoughtful man can be supplanted as the intelligence device supreme."[1]

Improving the cognition of analysts formed an important part of the intelligence literature in the 1980s and 1990s. Richards Heuer devoted an entire chapter of *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* to memory improvement. He began this chapter claiming that "Differences between stronger and weaker analytical performance are attributable in large measure to differences in the organization of data and experience in analysts' long-term memory."[2] Similarly, in 1984, Robert Sinclair explored methods to harness heuristics and memory techniques to overcome memory's limitations in his groundbreaking Center for the Study of Intelligence monograph, "Thinking and Writing: Cognitive Science and Intelligence Analysis."[3]

This article seeks to modestly advance Heuer and Sinclair's work on the role of memory in intelligence analysis. It is the first academic work to test the memory tasks associated with intelligence analysis and the first memory study to involve IC members. It is also the first study to train memory strategies to improve analysts' performance and, thereby, the analysis provided to policymakers.

Theory

We theorize that intelligence analysts' performance is a function of three independent variables. The first independent variable is education, which involves Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs), analytic tradecraft, product creation, and briefing. The second independent variable is experience, which involves on-the-job practice and deployments. The third independent variable is memory, which involves encoding, organizing, and recalling the knowledge gained from education and experience. All three independent variables must be highly present for optimal analyst performance. Memory optimization is lacking in the IC, which results in inconsistent overall

a. This article is derived from the author's master's thesis, *Think Again: Intelligence Analysis and the Art of Memory*, submitted to the faculty of the National Intelligence University, June 2024.
b. See Dennis J. Gleeson Jr., "Artificial Intelligence for Analysis: The Road Ahead," *Studies in Intelligence* 67, No. 4 (December 2023).

performance. This inconsistent performance results in suboptimal intelligence analysis provided to policymakers.

Intelligence analysts receive education in IC doctrine and tradecraft as part of their professional development. They gain experience in the office and in the field. However, the IC does not train its analysts on how to encode and recall what they have learned. Intelligence analysts are not trained to optimize their memory to gain a return on investment in education and experience. Simply put, analysts do not learn how to learn. This is a gap in analyst professional development. Therefore, we assume the variables of education and experience are present and adequate causal mechanisms of the dependent variable of recall performance. Thus, we focused solely on the independent variable of memory. Specifically, we focused on memory's impact on recall performance, which is the dependent variable of the experiment.

Data Collection

We used a posttest-only control group experiment to test the hypothesis that memory training increases intelligence analysts' ability to recall key details, thereby improving their performance. The experiment subjects were randomly divided into two study groups: a memory training group and a control group. The memory training group received training on mnemonic devices that use mental imagery and spatial contextualization—specifically elaborative encoding, the major system, and the memory palace. The control group received no training. Both groups were tested with the same instrument. The testing involved both groups reviewing notional unclassified intelligence reporting containing 15 sequential pairings of actors with actions. After five minutes, participants were tested on their ability to match the actors and actions in the correct sequence. One week later, both groups were retested with the same instrument to gauge long-term memory retention of the material. All participants completed a demographic survey to identify moderating variables that could impact the results.

Data collected from the tests and surveys was used to determine if memory training increased analysts' ability to recall key details from reporting. Differences between the memory training group and control group were analyzed statistically via the t-test and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) methods to interpret the results. The threshold for statistical significance was a p-value below 0.05. In other words, for the differences in mean values to be considered significant, there is at least a 95-percent confidence that they are not due to random chance.

Participants

All 30 participants in this study were National Intelligence University (NIU) graduate students, US federal employees, and active members of the IC. Every participant self-identified as an intelligence analyst or an intelligence officer with experience performing intelligence analysis.[a] All participants completed a 10-week refresher course on intelligence analysis at NIU approximately two weeks before the experiment. Participants ranged in age between 26 and 43, with a mean age of 33. Fourteen participants self-identified as female (46.6 percent), which is in line with the 2022 federal workforce and civilian labor force female ratios of 45.0 percent and 46.7 percent, respectively.[4] Military members of the IC comprised 56.6 percent of participants. Approximately one-third of participants (30 percent) claimed prior exposure to memory techniques in their personal experience. This ratio provided suitable variance to test the impact of prior exposure to memory techniques on recall performance and durability in this study. The study's sample size and variance were sufficient to perform analysis of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests.

a. In this article, intelligence officer denotes a civilian or service member in the IC who is not a career analyst. It does not denote rank.

Test Procedure

Data collection occurred in person at NIU in a distraction-free classroom environment. Consent forms, tests, and surveys were hand-distributed and administered on paper copies. No digital media was used in data collection. The author of this article and at least one NIU faculty member were present for all data collection events.

Data collection proceeded in three steps. First, participants were asked to memorize 45 items of information in five minutes. The information consisted of one sheet of paper with 15 pairs of actors with associated actions in sequential order. After the five minutes, the information sheets were collected, and participants were given a five-minute break. Participants could socialize in place but were not permitted to discuss the test or write anything down. Second, after the five-minute break, participants were provided a blank information sheet and asked to recall and record as much of the previous information as possible from memory. Third, one week later, participants were again provided the blank information sheet and asked to recall and record the information from memory. Participants were asked not to write down any test information and had no prior knowledge of the one-week retest prior to its execution as a "pop quiz."

Experiment design

- Participants (N= 30) were randomly assigned to a memory training group or control group.
- Participants were given five minutes to memorize test material.
- Participants' recall was tested at five minutes and one week.

Finally, a demographic survey collected information on three moderating variables that could impact participant's performance in the study. These moderating variables were 1) prior exposure to memory techniques; 2) intelligence community experience; and 3) education level. A separate descriptive survey collected participants' overall views of the experiment and their opinions on the potential for the IC to provide memory training to its analysts.

Scoring

Incorrect responses were assessed with respect to the sequence of items in the original list. This involved counting the number of responses that were out of sequence and assigning a numerical value to the number of places out of sequence the item occurred. For example, if the sixth items on the list were written in the eighth place, a sequence value of 2 was assigned to that incorrect response. This is based on the concept of positional distance developed by Alec Solway, et al.[5] In this study, the Sequence Index was introduced to correct for the phenomenon that an item recalled out of order necessarily introduces a second error in the place where the item would have appeared, whether or not the other item was recalled correctly.[6] For example, recall of the sequence 1,2,3,4,5 as 1,3,2,4,5 contains two positional errors of distance 1 resulting from the single reversal of (2,3).[7] The Sequence Index corrects for this and allows for straightforward computation of the magnitude of overall sequence accuracy. This allows for a more accurate and nuanced comparison of results across an entire item list using a single index for each participant and test.[8] The total sequence value (sum of positional distance errors) for each response sheet at each time point was converted to the sequence index (SeqI) using the formula SeqI = (∑ position errors ÷ 2) ÷ (# correct responses).

Memory Training Group

Intelligence analysts struggle to recall details from reporting because the human mind is poorly suited to encode abstract information such as numbers, dates, and timelines. Evolutionary psychologists claim that modern humans and primitive hunter-gatherers share the same basic brain

physiology.[9] Thus, modern humans are the inheritors of thousands of years of selective adaptation, which fashioned the ideal hunter-gatherer mind. Therefore, our minds are calibrated to remember predators, potatoes, and potential mates—not passwords, pin codes, or Pyongyang's military order of battle. To do that, memory techniques known as mnemonic devices act as software to run on our hunter-gatherer hardware. Mnemonic devices work by converting arbitrary information into vivid and emotionally charged images and scenes that stick in the mind.

Heuer put it this way:

> *Specifically, information that is vivid, concrete, and personal has a greater impact on our thinking than pallid, abstract information … Mnemonic devices are useful for remembering information that does not fit any appropriate conceptual structure or schema already in memory. They work by providing a simple, artificial structure to which the information to be learned is then linked. The mnemonic device supplies the mental "file categories" that ensure retrievability of information. To remember, first recall the mnemonic device, then access the desired information."*[10]

Mnemonic Devices

The following paragraphs describe the three mnemonic devices used in the experiment: mental imagery and elaborative encoding; the major system; and the memory palace.

Mental Imagery and Elaborative Encoding

Mental imagery optimizes memory by engaging parts of the brain involved in creativity and imagination. Indeed, the word imagination derives from the Latin word imago or image. Aristotle claimed that "to think is to speculate with images."[11] Albert Einstein and Marcel Proust claimed that mental imagery played a central role in their creative processes.[12] Simply put, the mind is optimized to remember what it engages with creatively, such as mental imagery.

Elaborative encoding is a mnemonic device that imbues mental imagery with emotional cues to convert abstract information into vivid, emotionally charged images and scenes. Elaborative encoding is a way to hack the hunter-gatherer mind's natural proclivity for threat avoidance, jovial social interaction, and mate-seeking. All the world's memory champions use elaborative encoding, often in conjunction with the other mnemonic devices used in the experiment.[13] In psychology, this phenomenon is known as the emotional arousal theoretical framework.[14]

Elaborative encoding also operates according to the Von Restorff effect, named for pioneering German female psychiatrist and pediatrician Hedwig von Restorff (1906–62). The Von Restorff effect states that people are more likely to notice and remember things that stand out from the norm, such as vivid, emotionally charged images or scenes.[15] Several neuroscience experiments using brain scans show that areas associated with emotion and memory are activated during elaborative encoding. This suggests that emotion serves as a kind of turbo booster, strengthening the imprint of the memory.[16] Other laboratory experiments demonstrate that "emotional arousal, even from an unrelated source, is capable of modulating memory consolidation."[17]

Major System

The major system is a mnemonic device for encoding and recalling long numbers. French scholar Aimé Paris (1798–1866) developed the system to aid in mathematics.[18] The major system translates numbers into basic phonetic sounds and uses elaborative encoding to transform these sounds into vivid mental images. These images are easier for the mind to remember than arbitrary numbers. The major system involves four steps. First, memorize the translation of numbers 0-9 into simple phonetic sounds. Second, separate the long number into manageable chunks of

two to four numbers per chunk. (George Miller's famous article "Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two," describes the "chunking" process and is why US telephone numbers are separated into groups of three and four numbers.)[19] Third, translate the chunks into words by adding vowels between the chunks. Last, create a memorable mental image of the word combinations. To recall the original number, reverse the process to translate the mental image back into numerical form using the memorized translation code. Memory champions use the major system to perform incredible memory feats like memorizing the mathematical constant pi out to thousands of digits.[20] The major system provides intelligence analysts a tool for encoding and recalling details from intelligence reporting such as timelines, actor/action associations, military order of battle charts, equipment specifications, and mapping coordinates.

Memory Palace

The memory palace is the world's oldest and arguably most powerful mnemonic device, particularly when combined with elaborative encoding and the major system. It uses mental navigation along well-known spatial routes stored in memory, such as a college campus, place of worship, or childhood home. To-be-remembered information is mentally placed at landmarks along the imagined route. The information is then recalled by mentally retracing the route, "picking up" the "placed" information along the journey.[21]

Heuer recommended the memory palace in *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*:

> *Try to memorize the following items from a shopping list: bread, eggs, butter, salami, corn, lettuce, soap, jelly, chicken, and coffee; the list is difficult to memorize because it does not correspond with any schema already in memory. The words are familiar, but you do not have available in memory a schema that connects the words in this group to each other. If the list were changed to juice, cereal, milk, sugar, bacon, eggs, toast, butter, jelly, and coffee, the task would be much easier because the data would then correspond with an existing schema—items commonly eaten for breakfast. Such a list can be assimilated to your existing store of knowledge with little difficulty, just as the chess master rapidly assimilates the positions of many chessmen.*
>
> *To learn the grocery list of disconnected words, you would create some structure for linking the words to each other and/or to information already in long-term memory. You might imagine yourself shopping or putting the items away and mentally picture where they are located on the shelves at the market or in the kitchen. Or you might imagine a story concerning one or more meals that include all these items. Any form of processing information in this manner is a more effective aid to retention than rote repetition.*[22]

Heuers' views were informed by the pioneering work of Francis Bellezza, an Ohio State professor emeritus of psychology and noted scholar of mnemonic devices.[23]

The memory palace was taught in the Western educational system from ancient Greece until the late 19th century, including in US schools. One example of the memory palace in American classrooms is Emma Willard's 1846 *The Temple of Time*.[24] This system taught world history through an imaginary walk through a large, printed representation of an ancient Greek temple (depicted in the cover image of this article). Students followed along with the lessons by creating mental images of important historical events and persons, mentally "placing" the images along the temple's numbered columns.[25,26]

Findings

The results of the experiment revealed four key findings. First, memory-training-group participants scored 45 percent higher overall than controls. Second, memory-training-group participants recalled 57 percent more information after one week than

controls. Third, memory-training-group participants were five times more likely to achieve a perfect score on long-term and short-term memory tests than controls. Last, participants of both groups with prior exposure to memory techniques scored 18 percent higher than participants with no prior exposure. These findings meet or exceed the standard of statistical significance and support the hypothesis that memory training increases intelligence analysts' ability to recall key details, thereby improving their performance.

Statistical Significance

The threshold for statistical significance used throughout the experiment was p-value below 0.05. In other words, for the differences in mean values to be considered significant, there is at least a 95-percent confidence that they are not due to random chance. The t-test for the overall mean score comparison between the study groups revealed a p-value of 0.00000001, meaning that the results were almost certainly not due to random chance. Statistical analysis and graphing were performed with Stata 18.0 Basic Edition.

Impact of Moderating Variables

A demographic survey collected information on three moderating variables that could impact participant's performance in the study. These moderating variables were prior exposure to memory techniques, intelligence community experience, and education level.

Analysis of the demographic survey and experiment results revealed:

- Participants with prior exposure to memory techniques scored 18 percent higher than participants with no prior exposure (p-value = 0.026). This result is considered statistically significant.
- There was no statistical significance in the difference in recall scores between participants with greater IC experience.
- There was no statistical significance in the difference in recall scores between participants with advanced degrees versus undergraduate degrees.

Experiment Results

The experiment provided the following results:

- Memory training group participants scored 45 percent higher overall than controls.
- Memory training group participants recalled 57 percent more information after one week than controls.
- Memory training group participants were five times more likely to achieve a perfect score on long-term and short-term memory tests than controls.
- Participants of both groups with prior exposure to memory techniques scored 18 percent higher than participants with no prior exposure.

Unexpected Findings

The experiment revealed an unexpected correlation between increased age and lower recall performance. Participants aged 34 and older scored 21 percent lower than those aged 33 and younger on both the short-term and long-term memory tests, regardless of study group. This result is statistically significant. A body of medical literature and common experience correlate increased age with memory loss. However, this study assumed that greater IC experience and higher education levels would compensate for age-related memory degradation. Of note, no other demographic but age on the participant survey yielded significant score variance. These demographics included sex, occupation (analyst vs. officer), and military experience.

We predicted that participants with greater IC experience and more formal education would score higher on memory recall tests. Surprisingly, the findings indicated no statistical significance in the difference in scores between participants with 1–20 years of IC experience. There was also no significance in the difference in recall

scores between participants with advanced degrees versus undergraduate degrees. This finding is likely due to the negative impact of age on memory performance addressed in the previous paragraph.

Despite the memory training group's superior overall performance, the group made significantly more "near miss" errors than controls. These errors involve minor semantic mistakes, such as recalling the verb "jump" or "leap" instead of the correct verb "hop." These errors likely occurred while the memory training group mentally "decoded" remembered mental images back into the original test information. This result exposes a weakness in mnemonic devices that would require additional training to overcome.

Limitations and Future Research

The experiment had three limitations. First, all 30 participants were IC members and intelligence analysts or officers, but not all served as full-time analysts. Although there was no significance in score variance between analysts and officers, the study was designed to test analysts. A larger sample of solely analysts would better gauge the impact of memory training on analysts' recall performance. Second, this study used notional unclassified intelligence reporting that did not contain violent or disturbing material. Future studies should use actual classified reporting to better replicate conditions in the field. Last, participants ranged in age between 26 and 43. Future studies should use a broader age distribution to better represent IC demographics and more accurately gauge the impact of age on memory.

The memory training group received training on the three best-known mnemonic devices that use mental imagery and spatial contextualization—elaborative encoding, the major system, and the memory palace. A future direction for research is to study the impact of individual mnemonic devices on specific intelligence analysis tasks, such as critical thinking, creative thinking, product creation, and briefing. Those findings would help analysts employ the best mnemonic device for the analytic task at hand.

Recommendations

Intelligence analysts over the age of 34 would benefit most from memory training, based on the results of this study. Memory training is cost-effective and does not require special technology. For example, the results in this study were achieved in a one-hour block of instruction using only a short video, briefing slides, whiteboards, and paper handouts. Of note, according to a descriptive survey, all participants of the memory training group found the instruction valuable, and 96 percent of all participants thought the IC should provide memory improvement training to its workforce.

Conclusion

This article presented the findings of an experiment to test the effect of memory training on intelligence analysis. The results indicate a significant relationship between memory training and a boost in recall of key details from intelligence reporting. This strongly suggests a link between memory optimization and analytic performance. Memory techniques that use mental imagery to convert abstract information into vivid, emotionally charged scenes are the most effective for intelligence analysis. As a result, we can proclaim with confidence that mnemonic devices have a place in the analyst's toolkit—just as Heuer and Sinclair theorized in the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, this article recommends a modest IC investment in memory training to better support policymaking and improve the overall skill of the workforce.■

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intelligence in public media

Four Shots in the Night: A True Story of Espionage, Murder, and Justice in Northern Ireland

Reviewed by Aaron Edwards, PhD



Author:	*Henry Hemming*
Published By:	Quercus Books/Public Affairs, 2024
Print Pages	368
Reviewer:	The reviewer is a senior lecturer in defense and international affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and author of *Agents of Influence: Britain's Secret War Against the IRA* (Merrion Press, 2021).

In *The Riddle of the Sands* (1903) by Erskine Childers, his two principal characters, Carruthers and Davies, ostensibly enjoying a sailing expedition to Germany, discuss the best way to preserve the secrecy surrounding their unfolding covert spying mission. "The English charts, being relatively useless, though more suitable to our role as English yachtsmen, were to be left in evidence, as shining proofs of our innocence. It was all delightfully casual, I could not help thinking." *The Riddle of the Sands* highlights how improvisation of clandestine tradecraft can pay strategic dividends. If done right, true intentions can be hidden in plain sight among the paraphernalia of everyday life. This is an idea explored in Henry Hemming's fascinating new book, *Four Shots in the Night*, which tells the story of one Irish Republican Army member's bid to hide in plain sight while he spied on behalf of the British Army.

The IRA split in 1969, with the Official IRA remaining true to the left-leaning cause its leadership had begun to espouse in the early 1960s, and the Provisional IRA wishing to pursue a more militant nationalist agenda. Both IRAs grew out of the same parent organization that claimed lineage to the early 20th century, a time of revolutionary turbulence in Ireland. While both IRAs disagreed on whether fighting the British necessarily meant fighting the Ulster Protestants who wished to retain the link with Great Britain, they nonetheless shared much the same organizational DNA. Both groups enforced a strict code of conduct on their members, which stipulated that they should never engage in "loose talk," which could lead to dismissal from the IRA and, if treason was proven in a "court martial" process, summary execution.

It is no surprise, therefore, that informers have been considered "folk devils" by Irish republicans and their supporters. For the British, however, spies were essential; the secret information they provided was seen as critical to shaping and influencing the government's assessments of IRA policy, plans, and psychology. How that information was collected took many forms, including interrogating terrorist suspects, recruiting known IRA members as informers, or, at the apex of what was known colloquially as "the intelligence pyramid," two-legged agents who could be infiltrated into terrorist organizations. Known as human intelligence (HUMINT) within the British Army, this was information gathered from people to help decisionmakers apply the state's finite resources more effectively to defeat terrorism.

The collection of HUMINT was not without its challenges. Over many generations Irish nationalists had come together in close-knit communities, often related by blood. They were unlikely to give up information about the IRA easily for fear of betraying their own people or inviting violent retribution for even the allegation of indulging in such transgressions. In psychological terms, IRA members and supporters became increasingly paranoid as information did frequently leak out. While this paranoia reinforced the corrosive effect of trust between IRA volunteers and their communities, it also aided the British state in pilfering the organizational cohesion and morale of its terrorist opposition. In a strategic sense, it also presented opportunities to Britain's Intelligence Community who could fish in a pool of individuals, as Hemming suggests, with "knowledge that could be turned into intelligence and then used to prevent future attacks."

One of those people was an IRA member from Derry/Londonderry in the northwest of Northern Ireland, Frank Hegarty. He had become involved in the IRA at the outset of the Troubles and was particularly active in the 1970s. As Hemming notes early on, the deterioration in the security situation meant "ordinary people like Frank Hegarty, with no history of violence, were becoming involved" in terrorism and could bring reports from inside the heart of the biggest terrorist threat to British security in a generation.

Hegarty routinely walked his greyhound, Blue, on the same stretch of road near the Creggan estate in Derry. He cut a solitary figure amidst a bleak windswept park adjacent to a lonely reservoir, a mere stone's throw from the Irish border. It was on one of these daily rituals in 1980 that he was approached by a man who he had seen on several occasions walking his own dog. "Jack" had been working toward speaking to Hegarty for some time. He disguised his real intent beneath the facade of "dog talk." Jack was really an agent runner with the British Army's clandestine Force Research Unit (FRU) and he had a job offer to make: would Hegarty like to do his part for the greater good by informing on the IRA? After thinking it over Hegarty duly accepted, thus beginning a close relationship with Britain's intelligence services.

Without the declassification of intelligence collected by Hegarty and passed onto the FRU, it is impossible to know the details of the secret information he brought to his handlers. Hemming does draw some inferences, including how Hegarty stored weapons and ammunition for the IRA in Derry City Cemetery. However, Hemming lacks access to former IRA volunteers who may have commented on Hegarty's character—beyond passing references to his nickname, "The General"—or the granular detail on how Hegarty's information informed the intelligence and security machinery at the heart of Britain's war against the IRA. While negotiating access is challenging, significant intelligence dossiers have since been declassified in the UK National Archives.

A casual glance at the Army's monthly intelligence reports for Derry in the mid-1980s, for instance, reveal that the processing and dissemination was only as good as the tactical handling and exploitation of HUMINT. My own book, *Agents of Influence*, examines the efficacy of these reports, declassified after repeated requests under the UK's Freedom of Information Act (2000). It is obvious that intelligence was critically important to British counterterrorism efforts but could also be quite underwhelming in its content. While assets like Hegarty could confirm the presence of new weapons, such as the M60 heavy machine-gun and a batch of RPG-7s, in the arsenal of the Derry IRA, they were limited in providing tactical and operational insights in other parts of the province. Only by advancing the role of agents inside the IRA could the security forces get a

more strategic-level insight into the group's activities. With greater coverage came greater responsibility for managing both the collection and management of intelligence reporting. Here there were clearly blind spots in the imaginations of those holding critical positions in each stage of the intelligence cycle.

Despite no conceptual-based assessment of how the intelligence cycle worked in driving the momentum of security forces operations, *Four Shots in the Night* is an important contribution. It details several key twists and turns in the Frank Hegarty story as he passed on regular reports about the Provisionals' military operations to his FRU handlers. Hemming is especially prodigious at working his way into the mindset of an ordinary man who was at once a secret agent while also acting as a key aide to senior IRA and Sinn Féin leader Martin McGuinness, responsible for, among other mundane tasks, driving him around the Irish countryside on IRA business. The reader is offered a rare glimpse into how mentally challenging it was for Hegarty to maintain his cover as a British agent. "The need to bottle up so much of what he is feeling adds to the mounting pressure in Frank Hegarty's life," writes Hemming. Keeping everything casual while dealing with a "carousel of meetings, conversations, and places to be," soon took its toll. Matters would come to a head when Irish police, acting on a tipoff, seized huge IRA arms dumps in Roscommon and Sligo in January 1986.

Hegarty immediately fell under suspicion. Before he could be apprehended and interrogated by the IRA's infamous Internal Security Unit (ISU, known colloquially as the "Nutting Squad"), his FRU handlers exfiltrated him to England. After suffering a bout of homesickness, Hegarty was persuaded to return to Derry by McGuinness, who allegedly gave Hegarty's mother, Rose, a personal assurance that he would be unharmed. McGuinness lied. As soon as Hegarty arrived back in Derry, he was seized by the Nutting Squad and taken away for interrogation. Hemming details the grisly torture Hegarty suffered, including apparently having his eyeballs gouged out by his captors.

Hegarty's body was discovered on a lonely border lane. His hands had been tied behind his back, black tape had been placed over his eye sockets, and his corpse bloodied by gunshot wounds. Hemming concludes how it was likely that Hegarty was shot dead by Freddie Scappaticci, a middle-ranking IRA commander from the Markets area of Belfast, who was second-in-command of the Nutting Squad. Although outwardly presenting himself as a ruthless IRA volunteer, "Scap" was not all he seemed. Like Hegarty, he too had been recruited by the British and was now being handled by the FRU detachment working out of Belfast.[a]

The great tragedy of the Frank Hegarty story is that, at its core, deception is more an art than a science. Not only is this confirmed by the murder of suspected agents inside the IRA but also in the fact that the British government has commissioned inquiries into the activities of those agencies it charged with protecting the UK from terrorism. It is a curious outworking of the end of the Troubles where peace may well have come to the troubled province, but truth and justice have come, to paraphrase W.B. Yeats, dropping slow. While much of the story Hemming relates is well-known to close observers of the IRA, it his careful blending of the past, present, and future repercussions of the unpredictability of the human factor that gives us a remarkable 360-degree insight of one of the most controversial episodes of the Troubles. As with Childers' *The Riddle of the Sands*, where Carruthers observes how, all countries, "have spies in their service, dirty though necessary tools," Hemming too ponders whether a "Rubicon had been crossed" by Britain's secret agents in a bid to hide in plain sight. This book gives us at least some answers to that question. ■

a. See *Stakeknife's Dirty War: The Inside Story of Scappaticci, the IRA's Nutting Squad, and the British Spooks Who Ran the War*, by Richard O'Rawe, reviewed by Joseph Gartin, *Studies in Intelligence* Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2024).

intelligence in public media

Border of Water and Ice: The Yalu River and Japan's Empire in Korea and Manchuria

Reviewed by Yong Suk Lee



Author:	*Joseph A. Seeley*
Published By:	Cornell University Press, 2024
Print Pages	211
Reviewer:	The reviewer is a fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Asia Program.

I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
Is a strong brown god—sullen, untamed and intractable,
Patient to some degree, at first recognized as a frontier;
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce;
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges.

TS Eliot, "The Dry Salvages"

In *Border of Water and Ice*, first-time author Joseph A. Seeley, an assistant professor of history at the University of Virginia, introduces readers to the phrase "liquid geography." Readers know these words but they rarely see them in combination as a single phrase. Geography often brings to mind landscapes, terrains, and maps. It is a *terra firma*-biased word. Water flows in these places but it is rarely the most dominant or noticeable feature on a map; it's usually just a long-thin blue line traversing across the landscape. It is difficult to imagine the immensity of the world's great rivers, such as the Mississippi or the Nile, until you have stood on their banks. It is even more difficult to imagine the economic, social, cultural, and political significance of the great rivers, unless you lived alongside one.

Korea scholars would agree that it is difficult to overstate the importance of the Yalu River in Korean history. The Yalu more than any other river in Korea defines what is Korean. Just on the other side of the river is China, where people speak a different language, have different customs, and enjoy a different cuisine. It is a barrier, a life source, an economic resource, and a shaper of lives, events, and history. When taking all these factors into consideration, there is no better phrase than "liquid geography" to describe the study of the river's influence in modern Korean history.

Seeley's work examines a specific period in the Yalu River's history, when the Empire of Japan decided to bend the river to its will and reshape its flow. For centuries, Korea and China respected the Yalu as a barrier. Imperial authority from Seoul and Beijing ended at the respective sides of the river and troops guarded the border to deter smugglers and protect economic resources, such as timber. Japan dreamed bigger, however. For Tokyo, the Yalu was an obstacle to be bridged so it may use the foothold in Korea to go after a bigger prize: China.

As China slowly decayed and Western powers carved up the ancient empire into zones of influence, Japan did not want to be left out. The remote northeast corner of Asia where China, Korea, and Russia meet became a hotly contested geopolitical battleground. Dandong, China, just across the river from Sinuiju, Korea, was a den of international intrigue, with Russia, Japan, and Western powers competing for advantage, while the Chinese government tried desperately to hold onto illusions of control as it slowly decayed into obscurity.

Intrigue and subterfuge exploded into war, and Japan fought China and Russia before Western powers recognized its paramount control in the region. Japan first attempted to bridge the Yalu in 1894 to go to war against China in the Sino-Japanese war and then again in 1904 to fight the Russians in the Russo-Japanese war. It was a monumental task for the Japanese Army engineers; especially in 1904, when they realized that they could not replicate the army's 1894 river-crossing in the same spot because the mighty river had carved and changed the banks and shorelines.

As Seeley recounts, it is no surprise that one of the first major engineering projects the Japanese undertook after colonizing Korea was to build the first permanent bridge across the Yalu. After Japan formally annexed Korea in August 1910, the Yalu as a physical boundary gave Koreans who wanted to fight against Japanese forces occupying their homeland a safe haven. Most battles between Korean guerillas against Japanese forces took place along the Yalu. In winter, Korean forces would walk across the frozen river from their safe haven in China to attack isolated Japanese government outposts and police stations. Foot tracks of the night raiders across the snow and ice became a diplomatic sore point between Japan and China and underscored for Japanese authorities that they needed to take action to secure the northernmost flank of the empire.

Securing the empire went beyond bolstering the army in the north. Japan also undertook one of the biggest civil engineering challenges in the world at the time, building the largest hydroelectric dam in Asia before World War II. From 1937 to 1943, Japanese engineers using Korean and Chinese forced labor built the Supung dam. The dam generated electricity and helped control buildup of ice flows in the river, making it more navigable. Environmentally, the dam transformed the river and its seasonal pace for the people who lived alongside it, Chinese and Korean. For the Japanese, it was a physical symbol of Manchurian and Korean unity under Tokyo's control.

Seeley demonstrates the Yalu River's legacy as a border, an obstacle, and economic superhighway continues today. During the Korean War, the Chinese People's Liberation Army poured across the frozen river to join the fight in Korea. More recently, the other side of the Yalu River became a sanctuary again for Koreans fleeing their country, this time to escape manmade famine and brutal dictatorship. It is a vital economic hub for transfer of goods and services, licit or illicit. It is a critical safety valve for North Korea to survive and for China to help prevent instability just across the border. For the Kim family regime in Pyongyang, with a political system similar to a medieval Korean kingdom, the Yalu is potentially a dangerous source of foreign influence to undermine the regime. During the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reportedly ordered the border closed and executed illicit border-crossers to prevent the spread of the disease.

Border of Water and Ice is an innovative and imaginative work. The Yalu River is frequently mentioned in Korean history, but as a just place on a map. Seeley's book serves as a biography of the Yalu in the modern era and offers a masterclass in political geography.■

intelligence in public media

Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India's Secret Cold War

Reviewed by Charles Heard



Author: *Paul McGarr*
Published By: Cambridge University Press, 2024
Print Pages 266
Reviewer: Charles Heard is the pen name of a CIA officer.

On April 17, 1978, India's prime minister, Morarji Desai, stood up in parliament to deliver a statement on CIA activities in India. A US magazine, *Outside*, had published an article exposing a CIA mountaineering operation from the 1960s, to emplace nuclear-powered sensors high in the Indian Himalayas to monitor Chinese activities. The operation, which reportedly had been conducted without Indian government knowledge, was described as moderately successful, but at a potentially serious cost: one plutonium power source was lost in an inaccessible part of the mountain range, presumed the result of an avalanche.

Unsurprisingly, the expose caused a firestorm of criticism in Delhi, not least because the lost nuclear material was in an area where it might affect the headwaters of the Ganges. Onlookers expected India to forcefully decry overbearing US action. Instead, to "audible gasps," the prime minister acknowledged not only that the operation had taken place, but that it had been approved by the Government of India "at the highest level," including three prime ministers.

The episode, and its combination of operational optimism with middling results and Indian public disapprobation, is characteristic of India's conflicted intelligence relationship with the US during the Cold War, according to Paul McGarr's admirable new book, *Spying in South Asia*. McGarr, a lecturer in Intelligence Studies at King's College London, has distilled a decade's worth of research across archives on three continents to produce this volume on the intelligence aspects of India's relationships with the United States and United Kingdom during the Cold War. Each of the book's 10 chapters covers a

thematic issue that characterized one or more periods between India's independence in 1947 and the late 1980s. The result is more like a tightly edited volume of contributor essays than a standard chronological history. Chapters can certainly be read as standalones for readers with particular interest in, say, Western intelligence responses to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 or the rise of India in the 1960s as a preferred location for would-be Soviet defectors.

Spying begins roughly in 1946, with London's intelligence services belatedly realizing on the eve of Independence that an Indian national could be placed in charge of intelligence activities in India at any moment. The hasty burning of decades of Intelligence Bureau (IB) records for fear of "anti-British propaganda" filled the Delhi skies with smoke for weeks and served as a less-than-positive sign for future cooperation (15). Nonetheless, pragmatic considerations on both sides, along with shared concern about the People's Republic of China, led to India seeking and receiving support from British intelligence, predominantly via Britain's MI-5 (not SIS, which was prohibited at the time from operating in Commonwealth countries).

India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had his own deeply negative view of intelligence, informed by his having been jailed and harassed by colonial-era police. He accepted India's need to draw on Western resources as Delhi stood up its own apparatus, but remained skeptical of intelligence in general, of Western intelligence activities in his country in particular, and he repeatedly warned subordinates not to be taken in by Western counterparts. Indian intelligence officials at the working level, however, saw more upside in contact with London and Washington, to the point of talking about hiding the scope of engagement from Nehru to avoid his shutting it down (81). CIA was increasingly active in India during this period, in keeping with Eisenhower administration policy, but cooperative efforts to sabotage communist success in South India and to support a fragile Tibetan insurgency were underwhelming.

India's embarrassing defeat in the Sino-India war of 1962 laid bare its intelligence and military shortcomings, in turn driving a period of significant growth in India's intelligence apparatus, much of it midwifed with US assistance and focused on joint activity against China. CIA provided training and logistics support for a new paramilitary force intended to focus on Tibet, and the US helped the IB stand up its Aviation Research Center, a small fleet of US-provided C-46s and smaller aircraft, to conduct photo and technical reconnaissance against PRC forces in western China. Both remain active parts of India's intelligence community. Delhi also allowed American U-2s to overfly and refuel in Indian airspace, and even agreed to host U-2 flights from an airstrip in Charbatia. Nehru's death in 1964 brought this era of increased engagement to a close.

The period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s was dominated, in McGarr's account, by two interrelated themes: the exposure of CIA activities, both in India and around the world; and the rise and long rule of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. Multiple exposures of CIA operations during this period had seismic effects on the agency's profile and standing in the United States, of course. But leaders in Delhi naturally focused on the aspects that implicated India. In addition to *Outside*'s exposure of the Himalayan sensor effort, books by Thomas Powers and Seymour Hersh claimed that CIA had run an agent in India's cabinet during India's 1971 war with Pakistan. Hersh went a step further, declaring that the agent was Morarji Desai himself. That allegation caused yet another public furor, and is alluded to in Indian news articles and editorials to this day. Desai sued Hersh in the United States, unsuccessfully, for libel. (227)

Indira Gandhi was notoriously paranoid about CIA activity in India; McGarr quotes former CIA officer Russell Jack Smith derisively claiming that she saw CIA agents "beneath every charpoy and behind every neem tree." (188) McGarr later adds speculation from Daniel Patrick Moynihan's memoir about his time as US ambassador to India, that Gandhi knew her Indian National Congress party had earlier received CIA covert political funding and assumed after it ceased that CIA money must be continuing to go *somewhere* in India. (216) McGarr recounts several episodes of Gandhi's visitors coming away perplexed that she raised CIA or alleged foreign interference out of the

blue and appeared to credit even far-fetched ideas about their scope.

Gandhi's routine public invocation of an ill-defined "foreign hand" to blame for setbacks in India reinforced and energized a conspiracy-heavy and US-skeptical public political discourse that continues in India to the present. This naturally contributed to a cooling of intelligence engagement, with most of the last two chapters of the book focused on intelligence flaps and their reinforcing negative effects. After Gandhi's assassination in 1984, her son Rajiv became prime minister. McGarr characterizes his term as one of unfulfilled opportunity for warming intelligence ties, before his own killing in 1991, as the Cold War era drew to a close.

McGarr is a detail-oriented but engaging writer, with an obvious love for the subject matter and a dry wit he sometimes allows to show through. He describes CIA officer Howard Imbrey, whose predecessor in Mumbai had to be withdrawn after an alcohol-fueled fall from a second-story window, as more focused on his job and "less interest[ed] in the potentialities of unpowered flight." (77) If any academic volume on intelligence could be said to be absorbing, it is this one. McGarr's copyeditors at Cambridge let him down, however, irritating at least this reviewer with a steadily increasing number of typos that distract from what is otherwise a set of well-constructed narratives.

The author's introduction and conclusion are harshly critical of decision makers in Washington and London. He describes their activities in India during this period as "misdirected, maladroit, and counterproductive," informed by flawed assumptions about what covert activity is capable of achieving and under what conditions (262–3). This criticism is valid to a point, but it is also impractical about what was achievable given the circumstances. Fresh openings or early successes did give way, time and again, under the pressure of ideological differences and political tensions, as McGarr says. But also, as he acknowledges, the United Kingdom and the United States regularly prioritized other goals over their activities in India. India was not a Cold War backwater, certainly, but neither was it driving US conceptions of national interest or policy making during this period. Nor should it have been. A truly well-calibrated intelligence approach to India probably would have lain somewhere between *Spying in South Asia's* centering of it, on the one hand, and Nixon's dismissal of it altogether, which McGarr correctly criticizes as reductive. (192) But it is far from clear that would have led to substantially more success.

Qualms aside, practitioners looking at contemporary competition with the PRC in the Indo-Pacific, who see India's potential and feel tempted to draw the obvious-seeming conclusion, would do well to absorb McGarr's caution. Indian leaders do not see their nation and its people as a burgeoning ally of the rules-based international order, but as a would-be equal and independent center of international power whose needs and interests must be accommodated by Washington or London, not bargained over. Faulty assumptions—and misconceptions about alignment—have derailed cooperation before and could easily do so again.

Besides, to borrow Faulkner's now-cliched line, the intelligence foibles of Cold War India are never dead; they're not even past. In 2021, locals in the Indian state of Uttarakhand suspected that flash floods, which killed dozens, had been caused by heat from the lost Himalayan sensor. Just this past August, faced with regional instability after Bangladesh Prime Minister Hasina's ouster from power, Indian media and some Indian officials, not to mention Hasina herself, warned darkly that a US "foreign hand" was responsible and shaping developments. Old habits are hard to break.

I warmly recommend *Spying in South Asia* to anyone seeking to better understand India's history with, and contemporary reactions to, US and UK intelligence agencies and their operations. It is readable, richly researched, and persuasive. And until India's intelligence writers—a group whose output McGarr accurately sums up as "self-serving accounts of former intelligence officers" and "sensationalist works" of conspiracy (12)—publish a better account, this is likely to be the definitive volume on the period and its aftereffects. ■

intelligence in public media

World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence

Reviewed by Scott A. Moseman, PhD



Author:	*Mark Stout*
Published By:	University Press of Kansas, 2023
Print Pages	388, endnotes, bibliography, index
Reviewer:	The reviewer is an assistant professor in the Department of Military History, Command and General Staff College and author of *Defining the Mission: The Development of Strategic Intelligence up to the Cold War*.

Popular culture and opinion generally place the beginning of the modern US intelligence apparatus to the early stages of the Cold War or as early as World War II. Among the reasons for this erroneous mindset is the enormous success of Gen. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan's propaganda campaign on the effectiveness of one of WWII's intelligence organizations, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Furthermore, its indirect offspring, CIA, immediately gained popularity as a spy hub in 1947 after its establishment through the National Security Act of that year. But the US intelligence community began much earlier. Scholar Mark Stout offers an alternative portrayal to the narrative that US intelligence had been inept until the 1940s in his book *World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence*. He contends that, in fact, WWI led to the development of most of the major subdisciplines associated with today's craft. The war, he adds, modernized US intelligence, and maturation, reorganization, reinvigoration, and reinvention followed soon after. (1) Stout succeeds in his endeavor—although this was not a hard argument to prove.

Why was it fairly easy to contend that organized US intelligence started in a much earlier era? Because there is a bounty of information about intelligence in that period, but it has been relatively underutilized, as writing about US intelligence in the period between 1880 and the 1940s is somewhat sparse. Stout's work succeeds in filling some gaps in intelligence research as he set out to disprove the "belief that modern American intelligence dates to World War II or to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947." (1) This he does in the first four pages of his introductory chapter. He follows up by showing where his work fits into the scholarship; he mentions the essential

authors to cover especially when discussing military intelligence to include: Michael Warner, James L. Gilbert, Robert Angevine, Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Marc B. Powe, and Wyman H. Packard. All these authors had the freedom to research because earlier US intelligence is not as interesting as Cold War intrigue. Stout demonstrates that US Army and Navy intelligence needs to be discussed together with the rest of the nascent community as they matured from the 1880s onward.[a]

Continuing in his introduction beyond dispelling the myths of when US intelligence started and how ineffective organizations supposedly were, Stout also provides definitions of intelligence and provides a timeline of the profession's growth. He divides his narrative into two parts: intelligence history up to WWI, followed by US intelligence operations during the war. The first part, in five chapters, covers intelligence's birth in 1882—the year the Office of Naval Intelligence was formally established—and its painful growth through the Spanish-American War, Philippines War, Progressive Era, and the Punitive Expedition in Mexico. These chapters demonstrate that US intelligence organizations were operating in fits and starts up through 1917.

The next six chapters detail how the subdisciplines of intelligence—aerial reconnaissance, radio intelligence, counterintelligence, and combat intelligence—grew throughout the war. In my view, Stout should have expanded his treatment of "Combat Intelligence," the 11th and penultimate chapter of the book, to discuss all the campaigns in which US intelligence was involved or have skipped the subject; a sampling simply will not do. The last chapter, "Legacies," explains how lessons learned from conducting intelligence operations in WWI carried through the budget-lean interwar years through to WWII. The book's layout is adequate for the subject, although the author may have devoted too space on theorists like Arthur L. Wagner and William S. Pye; although they are important characters, the time spent on them slows down the narrative. Overall, however, Stout's road map is easy to follow.

The great strengths of *World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence* are the depth of Stout's research and the biographies of the people he introduces. Stout's love of the intelligence subdisciplines is apparent in the chapters detailing US intelligence exploits during the war. Although the subdisciplines fall under a single umbrella, each requires considerably different research approaches. Yet the diverse and great number of endnotes and bibliographic entries show the intensity of his research in each section. Stout's treatment of people is masterful. He traces people through the narrative and ensures the readers note that the historical figure was mentioned before. He highlights names like Joseph Dickman, Ralph G. Van Deman, Dennis Nolan, and Richard Wainwright—usually hinting that the reader will see them again in a later chapter. Overall, Stout is a brilliant researcher.

A conscious effort to stratify the levels of intelligence would have benefited the author in avoiding blurry explanations of organizations and incidents in his storyline. There are distinct differences between strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence.[b] It would help the reader understand what certain aspects of US intelligence flourished, and why others did not. For instance, in the discussion of intelligence during the Civil War era, Stout states that after the war "military intelligence vanished without a trace." (15) What type of intelligence? It sure was not strategic intelligence, for Americans

did not start thinking of national-level information until the 1880s. Writing on the Spanish-American War, the author recognizes that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Military Information Division accomplished little work in Washington, DC, (49) while attachés brought in large amounts of information. Perhaps distinguishing what levels—strategic, operational, or tactical—they each operated in would clarify why. In addition to calling the War Department's intelligence arm the "central intelligence apparatus" (76), would it not be appropriate to call it a strategic intelligence organization, since it was the highest level of intelligence in the nation of the period? Stout should also call the American Expedi-

a. See this reviewer's *Defining the Mission: The Development of US Strategic Military Intelligence up to the Cold War,* which complements Stout's research on the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.
b. For useful definitions of these terms, see Jonathan M. House, *Military Intelligence: 1870–1991*.

tionary Force's (AEF) G-2 what it was—an operational intelligence organization. That would clear up why it operated so differently from Van Deman's organization in Washington. These examples among others would clarify why US intelligence organizations acted the way they did.

US intelligence did not operate in a vacuum. Social issues such as class conflict affected intelligence's ability to survive and thrive. Citizens' understandings of morality, individual apathy, and national daily rituals affected the gathering of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. The nation's political mood influenced whether US leaders wished to be outward-facing or inward-looking, and government leaders directed US intelligence in particular directions depending on the national context. Thus, US intelligence echoed broader US trends such as professionalization, progressivism, exceptionalism and imperialism, and government bureaucratization. Stout hints at the larger picture, such as discussing the Progressive Era in passing (93) and the "Progressive dream" (190), but more could be said about the interplay between US intelligence and the greater national environment.

Stout's reason for military intelligence's acceptance of the counterintelligence/counterespionage missions or the broader term "Domestic Security" may be too simplified. He states that "the most obvious reason . . . followed from a well-established understanding that in war knowledge is power." (196) He further observes: "It would have been astonishing if the American military had not undertaken a major counterintelligence effort. It was what modern war demanded." (200) Essentially the argument postulates that the Navy and War Departments were conducting normal warfare, just at home. These points need to be fleshed out. ONI and the Military Intelligence Division (MID) were largely excluded from operational intelligence missions in Europe. The AEF-G-2 and Adm. William S. Sim's staff had this discipline largely covered. There were not many strategic intelligence duties beyond what the attachés had covered abroad. ONI and MID had to justify their existence to Congress and their military masters because that is from where the money flowed. Military intelligence readily accepted these domestic security missions to justify their existence. Besides, the domestic civilian intelligence apparatus was still embryonic in the 1910s. Who else would partake in the duties?

Nonetheless, Stout accomplishes what he set out to do in *World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence*: convince the reader that the ideas and practices that emerged from WWI informed the US way of intelligence for years to come. (278) This book should be a standard for the intelligence schoolhouses in US civilian and military sectors. Students can glean insight into how the intelligence subdisciplines matured, how intelligence definitions changed over the eras he covers, and the interplay between US intelligence organizations over a century ago, with implications for today. Ultimately, Stout reminds us through the beginnings of intelligence organizations, the long run-up to US involvement in the war, and WWI itself that US intelligence is much older and more complex than scholars have given the community credit for. ■

intelligence in public media

Karla's Choice

Reviewed by David Robarge



Author: *Nick Harkaway*
Published By: Viking, 2024
Print Pages 300
Reviewer: The reviewer is CIA's chief historian.

John le Carré has remained a prominent figure in the publishing world since his death in December 2020 by the release of *Silverview*, a novel his son Nick Cornwell completed; a massive collection of his correspondence edited by his son Timothy, *A Private Spy*; and examinations of his libidinous private side in *The Secret Life of John le Carré* by his biographer, Adam Sisman, and *The Secret Heart* by a former lover, Suleika Dawson. Then, at the importuning of his family, Nick—already a noted author of fantasy and futurism stories under the pen surname Harkaway—agreed to write a continuation novel about le Carré's best known protagonist, British counterintelligence officer George Smiley. Although daunting, it was in many ways a labor of love because, as Harkaway writes in his Author's Note, "I grew up with George. His presence, in various forms, was a friendly ghost at my table…" He listened to audio recordings of the Smiley canon and saw the film portrayals of him by Denholm Elliott, Alec Guinness, and Gary Oldman, "and all of them echoed in my ears as I sat down to see whether I could fit some sort of story into that ten-year gap between *The Spy Who Came In from the Cold* and *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*. It was as if Smiley was there, waiting patiently, and I was slightly late. If you're quite prepared, Nicholas, we may begin." (xi-xii)

Karla's Choice takes place in 1963, filling in part of the time between *Spy* (1962) and *Tinker Tailor* (the early 1970s). Smiley has left the Circus—le Carré's fictionalized MI6—outraged and guilt-stricken at the loss of agent runner Alec Leamas in the botched WINDFALL operation recounted in *Spy* and given that codename in *A Legacy of Spies*, published in 2017. He is enjoying his quiet retirement reading and reconnecting with his faithless

wife, Lady Ann Sercomb—he "lived between libraries and love, and came as close to contentment as a man of his peculiar constitution is able" (26)—when the head of the Circus, known cryptically as Control (a clever allusion to MI6's tradition of referring to its chief simply as "C"), dispatches an officer to persuade Smiley to return and help with a thorny case that has just arisen. A Hungarian literary agent in London named Laszlo Bánáti has disappeared, and a KGB assassin sent to kill him has declined to do the deed and defected to the Circus. Control wants to know who Bánáti is and why the Soviets want him dead, and entrusts the mission to a reluctant Smiley, who sets the terms of his engagement in the aftermath of WINDFALL—what Control snidely calls "the Smiley way," but which George retorts is "just decency." After being trapped into accepting the assignment, Control directs him, "Then do that, George. Go and be decent, and maybe we'll all learn something." (63)

Smiley then enlists Bánáti's assistant, a young Hungarian émigré named Susanna Gero, to help track him down. She proves to be a natural at the spy business and also to possess a powerful streak of independence and courage. Along the way other familiar le Carré personalities appear: Soviet operations expert and arrogant lecher Bill Haydon; Toby Esterhase, head of technical services and another Hungarian whose occasionally fractured English is entertainingly rendered; Connie Sachs, the brilliant but besotted head of research; Peter Guillam, a case officer and more junior member of the Circus now working as a NOC in Germany; Oliver Mendel, a Scotland Yard Special Branch inspector who helps the Circus occasionally with security and investigative tasks; Sam Collins, working under cover as a Parisian nightclub owner; Jim Prideaux, resident agent in Prague; and others who become more familiar in later novels but here appear only briefly, such as Roy Bland and Percy Alleline.

Harkaway introduces some new characters—Tom Lake, a strapping former paramilitary officer; the Bad Aunts, "a brain trust dedicated to answering questions which would stump more conventional analysis" but "who couldn't get 'properly cleared'" and had to work in an outbuilding away from Circus headquarters (107–8); and a duplicitous interior designer *cum* forger named Raghuraman Vishwakarma. Harkaway develops Ann Smiley's character more fully than le Carré did, and readers can better appreciate how the Smileys' strained relationship occasionally worked. Her tender side emerges, as does her steely reserve; after Smiley acquiesces to return to what she ironically calls his "grey mistress," the Circus, "She would not crack. If she could not induce Smiley to stay by her side with her laughter, she absolutely declined to keep him with her tears." (32)

The novel's setting shifts from London to Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, Lisbon, and back to London as Smiley tries to raise Bánáti. He turns out to be a former KGB asset named Ferencz Roka who has threatened the personal security of Smiley's soon-to-be nemesis, Karla, while looking for his wayward son, Léo, who fell afoul of East German authorities and probably died in captivity. The story becomes more le Carré-esque as Harkaway leads us through some occasionally complicated scenarios interspersed with vignettes of spycraft and the silent ruminations of his characters as they grapple with their motivations and attitudes toward each other. The action accelerates toward the end as Smiley and Karla move closer to Roka in their respective campaigns—one to save him, one to dispose of him.

Besides changing genres, Harkaway faced three other challenges in taking on the formidable task of filling in his father's *oeuvre*. First, he had to recreate geographic and institutional settings le Carré lived in and could recount from personal experience but which he, not born until 1972, could not have. He has compensated for that lack with thorough research and travel and extensive conversations with his father and, presumably, intelligence veterans. Second, he had to place the novel's action, atmospherics, and character development in between what was in *Spy* and *Tinker Tailor* without showing awareness of what will come, notably by not giving away how the latter tale ends. We get no indications that Haydon is a Soviet mole even though he'd been recruited by the time covered in *Karla's Choice*, or that Control suspects anything is amiss. Aside from a recent setback attributed to assets' careless tradecraft rather than treachery within, the Circus was enjoying a bit of an operational hey-day and had its own high-level penetration of the Stasi. Of

course, in the real world in 1963, Kim Philby had been unmasked and fled to Moscow, but we're dealing with a fictional MI6 here.

Third, Harkaway had to replicate the literary style and explore the persistent themes of betrayal, deception, and moral compromise that made his father's books so fascinating to read and, at times, so controversial. He does those exceptionally well, as a few examples illustrate:

For Smiley, the experience of returning to the Circus that evening was like a willed drowning.… Now, as he approached the familiar door, he found that he was once again engaging in the exercise of paranoia, which had governed his former life.

Susanna looked back at Smiley and wondered what he was thinking. His voice was still gentle and he was the same shy, kind and yet almost resentful tortoise of a man he had been when he brought her in, but now there was something else in his quiet: a watchfulness that touched everything as if a fog were paying attention to the house it surrounded.

[Connie Sachs speaking] Then, in forty-five, glory and medals. The Soviets liberated Hungary, which is the first time in recorded history anyone's ever shown up for them and it was a bloody mess... Not history, in Mitteleuropa. This is the English mistake, to separate then from now. In those places there is only now, and it goes back forever.

As his practitioner father often did in his own works, throughout the book Harkaway also offers sometimes cynically cast insights into the intelligence business:

Not everybody in an organization needs to be a bright star—someone has to plod along and fill in all the gaps. Most of spying is ordinary, and the extraordinary is rarely good news.

The notion of constant danger was a madness that men in his profession must both inhabit and put aside, and the truth was more complex: that the world could change in an instant from clear and kind to desperate and cold, and the trick to survival lay in knowing that instant before it happened, and not when.

In [Smiley's] experience, the first twenty-four hours of any interrogation were definitive. Within that time any person under questioning was cut adrift from their understanding of the world, whether or not they had arrived at their present state by choice, and would reach as a frozen swimmer does for any friendly hand. Human beings are not naturally silent, and in the sudden reversal of total vulnerability even less so.…A defector by definition wants to spend his coin before his former masters can steal back its value, and is the more ready to open up. Sometime on the second or third day, that changed: there was guile again, and often resentment, and the job became not a confession but a negotiation, from which neither side would ever emerge entirely satisfied. You give me this, I give you that; but the very act of trade made the product suspect.

It was the Circus's established practice, in cases of agents recruited by compromise or extortion, to leverage betrayal into a kind of dependency, solving problems as they arose, making gifts and fostering additions, so that eventually the Circus was vastly more needed for what it provided than it was resented for what it sought in exchange."

Karla's Choice misses the mark only a few times. No inkling has been given that Susanna, 23, is so sexually promiscuous and perspicacious that she immediately sees through Bill Haydon's unspoken interest in her on their first meeting, nor would she be able to enter and move around a Circus building to meet Control without obtaining visitor access and having an escort. Thirty-something Guillam seems too young and inexperienced to be so worldly wise and to be handling such a sensitive and valuable agent as Hans Deiter Mundt, the Circus's mole in the Stasi. The car chase and escape through an underground maze in Budapest that provide the most exciting part of the book seem

incongruous for Smiley, described earlier as "a stout, hurried little man with pouchy cheeks and thick-framed spectacles" (38) (in *Tinker Tailor* he's "small, podgy, and at best middle-aged…[h]is legs were short, his gait anything but agile").

Harkaway uses the suspenseful sequence to offer up some dry humor, however; "Smiley's hope now, as he racked his brains for every instruction he'd ever been given on evasive high-speed driving, and found it amounted to going fast and not hitting anything…." (274) More in keeping with Smiley's character is how he cleverly bluffs his way through a Hungarian checkpoint by posing as a haughty East German commissar while knowing only one word of the local language.

Karla's Choice is as much about Smiley's choices as Karla's. After Leamas's death at the Berlin Wall at the end of *Spy*, Smiley resolves to fight only within boundaries and makes his moral declaration to Control's emissary: "We chose to win a bloody battle with more blood. When I came to my senses, I realized I'd crossed a line. I tell myself the Circus must triumph because the other side is monstrous…But…we abandoned our obligations and chose to be every bit as monstrous ourselves in quest of victory, and I said nothing"—which Smiley refuses to do anymore. (29) In his own eloquent introduction, Harkaway contrasts Smiley's and Karla's ethical worlds that Karla will set the terms for in the end:

> *Smiley's Circus was the depiction of intelligence work, which for a lot of people—whether they know it or not—framed the Cold War. His was the grim, unrelenting and unacknowledged theatre of espionage, bounded by the threat of nuclear annihilation, fought through a mosaic of countries shoehorned into a binary international conflict, and ultimately unwinnable because victory of any real meaning lay in another arena entirely.…Success, tacitly, meant something else: finding humanity in the deadlocked shadows, making the world better rather than worse as you go along, looking for a way to be kind in a context which favoured the cruel.*

In essence, Smiley's choice, as indirectly posed to him by a colleague, is this: "What is it you don't want to do, George?" (146) But Karla chooses to follow a much different course at the novel's end (no spoiler here). Consequently, Smiley's psychological and ethical state is set for what transpires in the *Quest for Karla* trilogy (*Tinker Tailor*, *The Honourable Schoolboy*, and *Smiley's People*) after he makes his second choice—to return to his "grey mistress" because, as Ann rightly observes, "You have one more thing you need to do." (296)

Karla's Choice has received many highly favorable reviews, so the question arises whether Harkaway plans to join the Ian Fleming, Robert Ludlum, and Tom Clancy literary estates and write more stories that posthumously extend the work of the deceased originator. "There were always supposed to be more Smiley books," Harkaway notes, but none as expansive as the early ones appeared. He writes that Alec Guinness's consummate portrayal of Smiley in the BBC series constrained le Carré's imagination; "The external Smiley had supplanted the one in his head." (xi–xii) Harkaway appears to have no such impediments and hints in the acknowledgements that *Karla's Choice* might not be his only excursion into 20th-century spy fiction. For le Carré—and Smiley—devotees, he's off to an auspicious start.■

intelligence officer's bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake and other contributors

History

The federal Bureau of Investigation Before Hoover: Volume II, the fBI and American Neutrality, 1914–1917
By Heribert von Feilitzsch and Charles H. Harris III
(Henselstone Verlag, 2024) 436 pages, index.

When New Mexico State University professor Charles Harris examined the Bureau of Investigation files he requested from the National Archives (NARA) about bureau operations prior to the Hoover era, he received two surprises. The first was the high volume of material he received; the second was the scarcity of law enforcement coverage and the large amount on intelligence and counterintelligence operations, some previously unreported. With the help of historian Heribert von Feilitzsch, he decided to present the material in four volumes, covering the period 1908–1924 and focusing on intelligence and counterintelligence matters. Volume I covering 1908–1914 appeared in 2023.[a] To emphasize that they are dealing with the bureau before it actually became the FBI in 1935, the authors adopted the designation fBI to discuss a federal agency called the Bureau of Investigation (BI).

Volume II deals with the period of US neutrality before it entered WWI, 1914-1917, in which "agents of Germany, Great Britain, France, and Russia first competed with each other on US soil, then dragged the US into the conflict." (xi)

The authors first address early the staffing problems and the managers that resolved them. Then they discuss how the BI worked to improve its SIGINT, HUMINT, collection, analysis, and counterintelligence capabilities throughout the country. At the same time they examine many of the events the BI dealt with, some seldom mentioned and others prominent in news accounts or memoirs, all documented in Volume II with primary sources.

The bombing in 1915 of the Vanceboro Bridge that connected Canada (in New Brunswick) and the United States (in Maine) is an example of a little known case. Carried out by German agent Werner Horn, the authors show that in the controversy that followed the BI sided with Horn "over British demands." (70ff) An example of a well-publicized case involved Horst von der Goltz, who published his undocumented memoir in 1917.[b]

Not all operations listed in Volume II were successful. Among those discussed is the bombing of the Black Tom munitions depot in New Jersey. The perpetrators remain unknown to this day, though the authors suggest some suspects.

Although Volume II tells of instances in which the bureau lost its focus or overextended its resources to the detriment of counterintelligence operations, the case of Emilio Kosterlitzky, a multilingual Russian BI informant illustrates its overall tradecraft development in counterintelligence.

The period of US neutrality also included the Mexican War, the Mexican revolution, efforts by Britishish intelligence to get America into the war, and the German attempt to have Mexico invade the United States expressed in the famous Zimmermann telegram incident. The authors portrays the role intelligence played in these and related events of the period.

a. *The fBI and The Mexican Revolutionists 1908-1914*, by Heribert von Feilitzsch and Charles H. Harris III. (Henselstone Verlag, LLC 2023). It was reviewed in *Studies* 68, No. 1 (March 2024).
b. Horst von der Goltz, *My Adventures As A German Secret Agent (NY: McBride, 1917).*

By the time the United States entered WWI, the BI had established its importance and was working with the intelligence arms of the Departments of State and War. The Bureau's main missions were "monitoring the southern border, arresting German agents, interning enemy aliens, rounding up slackers (draft-dodgers), and managing an explosion of human resources through the informants of the American Protective League" a group of civilians working independently. (346)

The fBI and American Neutrality provides a portal though which the BI can be seen as a fully functioning intelligence service before the Hoover era. ■

The Hidden Cost of Freedom: The Untold Story of the CIA's Secret Funding System, 1941–1962
By Brad L. Fisher
(University Press of Kansas, 2024) 341 pages, index.

While going through his late grandfather's papers, Brad Fisher, a senior research scientist at Science Systems, Inc., was surprised to discover a letter of appreciation signed by Allen Dulles, the director of central intelligence (DCI) and CIA's third head. It "had been presented to my grandfather [Lyle Fisher] on October 16, 1958," (13) shortly after his retirement from the Government Accounting Office (GAO), by "Allen Dulles personally at a private luncheon, held at the old CIA headquarters at 2430 E Street NW in Foggy Bottom." (18)

Brad Fisher had known nothing of his grandfather's relationship with the CIA and he was curious to learn the reason for the honor. To satisfy his curiosity, Fisher began a search of pertinent archives. Progress was slow "until key documents linking my grandfather to the CIA—the "family jewels" of my collection—were serendipitously declassified several years after I began this research." (18)

These documents revealed that Lyle Fisher "had been the GAO's sole liaison" since 1946, first to CIA's predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and then after September 1947 to CIA. It was for this work that the agency formally recognized him for two contributions. The first was "the formative role in the establishment of CIA's special financial system for handling unvouchered funds" used for secret intelligence operations that were subject only to DCI control. (21) The second concerned his influence in advising the comptroller general to remain neutral on the CIA Act of 1949 that provided the statutory foundation for the clandestine funding system of the CIA while reducing GAO's role. (24) These results only enhanced Fisher's curiosity as to the specifics of what his grandfather had done. This required that he understand the clandestine funding system of the early days of central intelligence.

The Hidden Cost of Freedom presents the results of his research. Fisher examined the clandestine funding mechanisms used by OSS during WWII and their post-war evolution under the CIG and early CIA. He also includes the impact of their directors often difficult relationship with Congress. Particular attention is given to operations in the 1950s that did not go well and how Dulles showed his reluctance to provide details to Congress. This discovery led Fisher to conclude: "I now firmly believe that my grandfather had begun to seriously question the agency's good faith near the end of his career." (373) Fisher hints that the luncheon and letter were a subtle attempt to ensure Lyle's silence, especially to Congress, concerning funding accountability during difficult operational years in the 1950s. (371)

While Fisher found no direct evidence to support his suspicions, and acknowledged his grandfather took his secrets to his grave, *The Hidden Cost of Freedom* is a unique, well-documented account of early CIA's clandestine funding. ■

Policing Show Business: J. Edgar Hoover, the Hollywood Blacklist, and Cold War Movies
By Francis MacDonnell
(University Press of Kansas, 2024) 308 pages, index.
Reviewed by John Ehrman.

The era of blacklists, when Hollywood writers, actors, and directors were not allowed work for years during the late 1940s and 1950s because of their ties—real or imagined—to communism or subversion, largely has slipped from popular memory. This is unfortunate, but in *Policing Show Business*, retired historian Francis MacDonnell gives us a thoroughly researched and detailed account of the role of the FBI and, in particular, J. Edgar Hoover had in monitoring the movie industry and helping develop the blacklists.

MacDonnell's account is a good reminder of what can happen when one person exercises almost total control of a domestic intelligence service and uses it to pursue his obsessions. The FBI's investigations came well after Communist influence in Hollywood, which never was

that great, had waned and were driven more by Hoover's subordinates' efforts to please their star-struck boss than by the discovery of any national security threat. Long-running investigations of such figures as Yip Harburg, who wrote the lyrics for *The Wizard of Oz*, and Dore Schary, a writer and studio executive who produced a number of classic films, says MacDonnell, serve to highlight the "slapdash quality of the analysis found in the bureau's anti-Communist counterintelligence work during the 1940s and 1950s." (128) This judgment is a little too broad—the FBI did solid work against real Soviet spies during this time—but is an accurate assessment of its Hollywood effort.

This is a book for specialists, aimed at film and cultural historians rather than intelligence readers. For its intended audience, the wealth of information about how actors, directors, and studio executives navigated a world of informers and G-men will no doubt be of great interest. Although MacDonnell makes good points along the way, the long chapters filled with dense paragraphs that assume the reader has a background in film and Hollywood history—today's general readers likely are unfamiliar with many of the characters in her tale—make for hard going. *Policing Show Business* is a fine volume for reference and researchers, but reading it from start to finish takes a level of dedication that few of us have. ■

Soviet and Nazi Defectors: Counter-Intelligence in WW2, The Cold War

By Nigel West
(Frontline Books, 2024) 264 pages, index.

After WWI, the British Security Service (MI5) and its counterpart services on the continent struggled to deal with Soviet espionage. In *Soviet and Nazi Defectors*, intelligence historian Nigel West provides an introduction to the problem and a major contribution to its solution, defectors. The breakthrough defection of Walter Krivitsky in 1937, a former GRU illegal rezident in The Hague, and those that soon followed played important roles in identifying Soviet agents operating in the West.

West initially provides an overview of defectors and their contributions. He gives particular credit to former intelligence officer Gordon Brook-Shepherd for his early writings based on personal interviews with the defectors in many cases. West also documents errors, many unforced, in the public defector literature. The persistent mischaracterization of the Volkov letter involved in the Philby saga is a good example.

This is followed in the basic narrative of the book by eight case histories of defectors [E. Vermehren, G. Tokaev, Y. Rastvorov, Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, A. Golitsyn, O. Lyalin, A. Shevchenko, Y. Yurcenko] from four different countries. Most names will be familiar but West adds new information from recently declassified files, not all operationally valuable but interesting. For example, after reviewing the case of Vladimir Kuzichkin, who defected to Britain, he notes that Kuzichkin "became one of London's most popular acupuncturists–with actor Alec Guinness as a patient." (xviii) The case of Anatoli Golitsyn who defected to CIA adds little new operational detail but does contribute some career and personal details from Golitsyn's unpublished multi-volume memoir. Of particular value in each case history are West's comments on related espionage cases. The three appendices composed of recently released official studies written in 1944 and 1948 by MI5 and MI6 include more than 10 additional defector cases.

Soviet and Nazi Defectors is a valuable introduction to the role of defectors in counterintelligence operations and a fine contribution to intelligence literature. ■

Non-US Intelligence

Iran's Ministry of Intelligence: A Concise History

By Steven R. Ward
(Georgetown University Press, 2024) 197 pages, index.

In 1978 and 1979, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a component of Iran's armed forces, gained world attention for its role in what became known as the Iranian Hostage Crisis. But the IGRC was not responsible for Iran's domestic security and foreign intelligence requirements. Those functions would be assigned in 1984 to the recently created Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS). In *Iran's Ministry of Intelligence*, West Point graduate and retired CIA senior analyst covering Middle Eastern and South Asian nations, Steven Ward, presents an informative account of Iran's little known intelligence service.

After presenting a broad and valuable perspective in a chronology, Ward discusses MOIS's origins and its links to SAVAK (its predecessor under the shah), before

turning to its leadership, organization, and culture. Ward then describes MOIS operations and tradecraft in its domestic security role and overseas activities.

Although MOIS was initially Iran's primary intelligence agency, the "fist of the regime," (159) Ward concludes its current status has declined somewhat due to competition from the "sixteen to twenty-one formal members" of Iran's intelligence community. Though not all are identified, he notes that the IRGC and MOIS have had bureaucratic conflicts. (85)

Ward finds that MOIS human intelligence operations follow the standard practices of spotting, recruiting, vetting, tasking, and running agents. They achieve generally positive results dealing with the challenges from foreign intelligence services, violent domestic separatists, and Sunni terrorist organizations. He cites MOIS claims that among its most notable successes was that it infiltrated and broke CIA espionage networks directed against Iran. (88) When dealing with internal threats which include the activities of independent journalists, human rights advocates, labor unions, and even environmentalists, he notes "that they have abused suspects and detainees while being careful to act within Iranian laws." (85)

When writing about the intelligence services of closed societies, documentation is particularly important. Ward acknowledges that he had no access to Iran's archives, but he did gain access to hundreds of secret cables and reports written in 2014 and 2015 by MOIS officers serving in Iraq that had been obtained, verified, summarized, and published by two US news organizations in 2019. (84)

Iran's Ministry of Intelligence is the first and most complete, even though concise, history of this important agency. An enormously valuable contribution to the intelligence literature. ■

Pakistan's ISI: A Concise History of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate

By Julian Richards
(Georgetown University Press, 2024) 185 pages, index.

Unlike many modern nations, Pakistan had no military or intelligence services when it achieved independence in 1947. What became the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), had to be created based on experience gained from the British Indian Army. (6) Formally part of the armed forces of Pakistan, the ISI has become an important element in Pakistan's government, with powerful influence on its leaders. In *Pakistan's ISI*, former British intelligence officer and current director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham, Julian Richards, summarizes ISI's history from its creation "to the reinstatement of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021." (2)

Initially established to coordinate tactical and strategic intelligence among the armed forces in mainly domestic operations involving India, Kashmir, and the ill-fated East Pakistan, the ISI gradually became "the preeminent intelligence agency" at the very heart of power in Islamabad." (77) Richards describes its ever increasing influence in the Pakistani government that ISI considered to be "flawed and incompetent," though ISI had operational problems of its own. These evolved, Richards notes, as ISI cloaked "itself in an almost mythical status of brutal effectiveness" that in addition to operational ability, included "torture, disappearance, and extrajudicial execution" that Richards concludes is "a long way away from where it needs to be." (164)

Richards comments on the major projects involving ISI in varying degrees. With regard to Pakistan's nuclear program begun in the 1970s, in which "it seems clear that China was a key partner, especially on weaponization technology" he notes that "it is not clear how far the ISI was directly involved in or supportive of this endeavor in the early years" although ISI was concerned about the independent nuclear proliferation activities of the nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan in the 1980s. (118)

As to the question of whether the ISI was fully aware that Osama bin Laden had been living in Pakistan "under the nose of an army" before the United States "neutralized him" in May 2011, Richards presents two hypotheses: "either the ISI leadership knew all along but chose to deny it, or they genuinely did not know and were hoodwinked by lower-level officers." The author favors the latter theory, with qualifications. (46)

Pakistan's ISI also examines the organization's perplexing relationship with the Taliban before and after 9/11. Before then, in Afghanistan ISI "found itself driving the mobilization of resistance against the Soviet incursion…." (25) Richards argues that "In what became one of the final chapters of the Cold War, ISI was instrumental in facing down the Soviet Union's military by organizing

and deploying the Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan." From that point on the ISI was a "full-spectrum agency, akin to the CIA." (77)

Although absent source notes, specific bibliographic references are mentioned in the narrative and Richards is careful to point out where speculation had to be introduced. Pakistan's ISI is an excellent introduction to the ISI and a major contribution to the literature of intelligence. ■

Roots of Counterterrorism: Contemporary Wisdom from Dutch Intelligence
By Constant Willem Hijzen
(Oxford University Press, 2024) 399 pages, index.

Constant Willem Hijzen (pronounced high-zen) is an affiliated researcher in Intelligence Studies at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, where he studies intelligence practices in the prevention of terrorism. *Roots of Counterterrorism* describes his research and presents his findings.

The events that triggered this study occurred in March 1979, when the British ambassador to the Netherlands, Sir Richard Sykes, and his butler Karel Straub were killed in front of the ambassador's residence in The Hague. (2) As the Dutch security service *Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst* (BVD) investigated, they learned that the British permanent representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had also been assassinated in Brussels at about the same time. Hijzen asks if the events were related, could they have been prevented, and do the counterterrorism practices in effect at the time need to be modified?

In addressing these questions, Hijzen first provides a thorough review of the role of intelligence in Cold War counterterrorism before the jihadi terrorism of the post-9/11 years. (32) Then he presents five chronological chapters—1968–78—concerning BVD cases that include case summaries—Hijzen calls them Vignettes—that amplify the challenging dynamics of intelligence work in the domain of counterterrorism. For example the chapter on BVD operations in the 1975-78 period is augmented a vignette of "an interview with a former intelligence officer and excerpts from several agent operations in South Moluccan communities [that] shed some light on the BVD's operational work against the violent South Moluccan youth." (237)

With this background Hijzen discusses how and why the core functions of intelligence (requirements, collection, analysis, and disseminate) as applied by the Dutch security service and other Western security services, at the time of the Sykes assassination, "were markedly different in the years between 1968 and 1978." In part, the reasons were that the approach to dealing with the communist threat didn't apply to the terrorist threat. Then he suggests that the corrections implemented created a "paradigm of prevention" that if applied before the Sykes attack, might have prevented it. (319)

Unfortunately, no operational description of the "paradigm of prevention," a key condition of his study, is provided. One element is implied, however, when the lack of an analyst focusing on the past and daily terrorist activities in the early 1970s was identified as a missing factor. Hijzen further suggests that analytic emphasis should be on daily evaluation of input from which preventive actions will follow.

Finally, although the roots of counterterrorism are not identified specifically, they are implicit in this well-documented conceptual treatment of the issues with detailed quotations from other academics. The BVD counterterrorism record is impressive though not well known until the publication of *Roots of Counterterrorism*. Hijzen has contributed a though provoking account and a valuable addition to the literature. ■

dedicated in reverence for those

Whispers

stirring beneath the reposed constellation of etched fallen yesterdays, resting beneath rows of blood soaked stone. unfurled in arcane twilight

tattered and torn, unraveled forgotten moments, carved not in cold Alabama marble but ephemeral veiled moments whispered in tombs of wind

within places unspoken where angels dare to tread; pink scarred tears descend over trembling lips in cemeteries of promises betrayed, promises kept.

memories graved black, ashen over passing seasons. dust shrouds our fallen, for offerings renowned, for vigilance eternal. those few, damn good Americans

who, now, to come, or past, ascend in mourning. obscured wounds, shrouded scars, veiled truths resting beneath Columbia's adoration. venerable constellations aloft, in vigil.

beneath, a hallowed stone a monument carved of scars and fallen tears, lie reposed eternal the revered whispers of their ever-lasting final breath—whispers remembered.

–Resolute Lee

About the poem: dedicated to a fallen classmate, this poem honors those on the CIA Memorial Wall. The word count reflects the number of stars on the Wall. Resolute Lee is the pen name of an ODNI officer.

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