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SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 1939-1957

ROBERT LOUIS BENSON MICHAEL WARNER EDITORS

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Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957

Foreword

In July 1995, in a ceremony at CIA Headquarters, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch released the first group of NSA's Venona translations to the public. The DCI announced that a public conference on the Venona story would be held in 1996 as soon as the declassification of the translations had been completed. This conference is now at hand and follows the release of the last set of Venona translations. Some 2,900 Soviet intelligence messages are now on the Internet and in hard copy at major archives around the country.

While the cryptologic side of the Venona story belongs to NSA and its partners, the overall achievement is one of Intelligence Community cooperation. NSA and its US Army predecessor worked with FBI, CIA, the British, and allied services. This conference volume is itself a cooperative effort in keeping with the spirit of the times. It provides the public with information that had been closely held until recently and which is of extraordinary interest and importance.

It may be some time before historians and the general public sort out the full meaning of Venona. Lou Benson, co-editor of this conference volume, has prepared five historical monographs about the program. Considerable research, discussion, and writing by journalists and historians is already in progress, making this volume and the presentations at its accompanying conference potentially all the more timely and valuable to these scholarly efforts.

There can no longer be any doubt about the widespread and successful Soviet espionage operations against the United States and Great Britain during the 1940s, and that, aside from their own professional skill, Soviet intelligence services could count on the aid of the Communist parties of the target countries.

Earlier in my career I had the opportunity to supervise and participate in the last stages of the Venona program. From that experience I learned of the incredible determination and great skill of the analysts who made Venona possible. The result of their work was the body of translated messages, each one produced with the most painstaking and, I might add, honest effort. This is authentic material deserving of the most careful study.

William P. Crowell Deputy Director National Security Agency

August 1996

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Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957

Preface

The muggy Washington summer of 1948 grew even hotter when news media reported that a "blonde spy queen" three years earlier had given federal investigators convincing evidence of widespread Soviet espionage in America during World War II. In a few days the world learned her name—Elizabeth Bentley—and heard her and another ex-Communist agent, Whittaker Chambers, repeat their charges before Congress. Republican congressmen and candidates cited the stories as further evidence of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations' softness toward Communism and neglect of national security. Outraged officials both in and out of government, as well as Democrats fearing a campaign issue that would sink President Truman's apparently foundering re-election chances, insisted that Bentley and Chambers were peddling hearsay and innuendo.

Almost lost in the furor was one isolated recollection of Bentley's that ultimately would provide a clue to the truth behind the charges and denials. Bentley, according to press reports, had told a federal grand jury that an aide to President Roosevelt had learned during the war that American intelligence was on the verge of breaking "the Russian secret code." The aide, said Bentley, had passed this nugget to his Soviet contact.¹ For almost 30 years this fragmentary anecdote remained virtually all that the public would hear about one of the Cold War's greatest intelligence coups.

Bentley's charges, and the debates they fueled, typified the American experience with intelligence and related "internal security" issues in the era of totalitarianism and total war. For roughly 60 years the Western democracies struggled to preserve civil liberties and due process while ascertaining the extent of clandestine penetrations by the intelligence services of fascist and Communist regimes. At midcentury the Soviet Union's main strength was "human" intelligence—the collection of information through agents with access to foreign secrets. Washington's forte was "signals" intelligence the procurement and analysis of coded foreign messages. At the beginning of the Cold War strength met strength in a struggle that still reverberates 50 years later. The tale of this struggle is the Venona story.

The term "Venona" served as an arbitrary codeword stamped on a relatively small number of documents in order to limit access to a particular cryptanalytic breakthrough. This achievement enabled Western counterintelligence

""Blonde Leader of Spy Ring Credited With Reds' Arrests," Washington Post, 22 July 1948.

specialists to read portions of more than 2,900 Soviet diplomatic telegrams sent between 1940 and 1948. The encipherment of these telegrams shared a common flaw that left them vulnerable to cryptanalysis. It was that flaw—rather than any commonality of dates, origins, or subject matter—that made the messages a unique and discrete body of documents. American and allied services spent almost four decades deciphering the original texts and then puzzling over their meanings. By the time this effort was formally closed in 1980, the codeword "Venona" meant, to a handful of witting US Intelligence Community officers, the entire program of cryptanalytic and exploitation activities based on the messages.

Espionage in America

The United States made a tempting espionage target for allies and adversaries alike in the 1940s. Berlin, Tokyo, and Moscow all wanted to discover Washington's strategic plans and the progress being made in American factories and laboratories. Axis spies fared poorly in North America, however, in part because allied civilian and military counterintelligence services rolled up Axis nets and agents early in the war. Soviet intelligence fared much better. Indeed, the tensions and crises in East-West relations in the 1940s and 1950s unfolded along patterns determined in no small part by the success of Soviet intelligence officers, and, belatedly, by the growing ability of Western services to counter Moscow's espionage campaign.

Several advantages helped Soviet intelligence succeed where the Axis services failed. First, Soviet intelligence services, in many respects, were stronger than their Axis counterparts, with better leadership and more resources. Second, operating conditions in America were easier for several reasons, the foremost being the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally and therefore was able to post large numbers of officials on American soil in various liaison capacities. Beyond this, many Americans regarded their Russian allies as comrades-in-arms who should be helped with material as well as rhetorical support. There were some instances of American citizens volunteering actual secrets to Soviets during the war, and Soviet officials in the United States sometimes enjoyed considerable hospitality and access. Finally, Soviet intelligence benefited directly and indirectly from the activities and infrastructure of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).

Moscow collected secrets in the United States through overlapping organizations. The Communist International (better known as the Comintern) monitored the CPUSA and supervised the Party's clandestine apparatus. The CPUSA had reached the peak of its strength and limited influence in American life in the late 1930s, when the Great Depression and Stalin's opposition to Hitler and Mussolini convinced thousands of native-born Americans that capitalism was doomed and that the socialist experiment in Russia represented the world's only reliable bulwark against fascism.² Party leaders and some trusted members gathered political and industrial information, most of which probably made its way to Soviet intelligence services.³ Although the CPUSA lost perhaps a third of its members after the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 temporarily made the USSR a junior partner in Nazi aggression, a committed core remained in the ranks.⁴ In addition, military intelligence (GRU) officers based in Soviet consular posts worked with the Comintern and with Party-controlled agents in US Government agencies and private industry.⁵

Another Soviet organization, the NKVD (later to become the KGB)— Moscow's secret police and quasi-civilian intelligence service—had its own foreign intelligence arm. The service had long busied itself with internal repression and with foreign counterintelligence that helped guide covert action against émigré Russian political factions. In other types of foreign operations it had been overshadowed by the GRU, at least in the United States.⁶ This relationship would be reversed during the war.⁷

² Maurice Isserman estimates CPUSA membership at between 50,000 and 75,000 in the years before the war; *Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party During the Second World War* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pp. 18-21. ³ Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, with Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 8-11, 71-73, 323-326.

⁴ Translated messages disclose examples of the CPUSA's direct and indirect assistance to both the GRU and KGB. See Moscow 142 [circular], 12 September 1943, Translation 18 in this volume; New York 598-99 to Moscow, 2 May 1944, Translation 29; New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944, Translation 45; New York 12-13 to Moscow, 4 January 1945, Translation 80.

⁵ GRU refers to the Chief Directorate for Intelligence of the Red Army's General Staff (the organization was upgraded to a Chief Directorate in 1943). For a GRU view of operating conditions in the United States, see Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

⁶ KGB stands for the Committee for State Security. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the main foreign intelligence arm of the Soviet state is here called the KGB, its final name before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The organization had been reorganized, reauthorized, and renamed several times. It was called the Cheka or VChK (1917-22), the GPU (1922-23), the OGPU (1923-34), the NKVD (1934-41, 1941-43), the NKGB (1941, 1943-46), the MGB (1946-47, 1952-53), the KI (1947-52), the MVD (1953-54), and the KGB (1954-91). The KI was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1949 to 1952. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. ix. See also the new "biographical reference" published by Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service, *Veternay vneshney razvedki Rossii* [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence], Moscow, 1995, pp. 3-4.

⁷ One measure of the KGB's growing pre-eminence in the United States can be glimpsed in the message counts from the KGB and GRU residencies in New York. In 1940 the GRU New York residency sent three messages for every one sent by its KGB counterpart; in 1941 that ratio was reversed, and the KGB total remained higher from then on. An indication of the state of the US Government's knowledge of Soviet intelligence can be seen in Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941, Document 5. The KGB and GRU ran parallel "legal" and "illegal" intelligence networks in the United States. One set of operations was run by intelligence officers working under legal (usually diplomatic) cover in the "residencies" located clandestinely in Soviet diplomatic missions, trade, and media organizations-for example, the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and the Tass news agency.⁸ Other KGB and GRU networks, in contrast, had no apparent connections to Soviet establishments and were run by "illegals"-Soviet intelligence officers usually living under false identities. In addition, some GRU and KGB agents were themselves CPUSA officers whose clandestine activities were known, to a greater or lesser extent, to the CPUSA leadership and the Comintern. KGB officer Jacob Golos (covername SOUND), for instance, ran the Soviet-sponsored World Tourists corporation in New York and allegedly also served on the central control commission of the CPUSA. His lover, Elizabeth Bentley (covernames SMART GIRL and MYRNA), had moved from the open Party into underground work in the late 1930s. She helped Golos service various agents and run the World Tourists business.

Stalin wanted his intelligence officers in America to collect information in four main areas. He directed Pavel M. Fitin, the 34-year-old chief of the KGB's First Directorate, to seek American intelligence concerning Hitler's plans for the war in Russia; secret war aims of London and Washington, particularly with regard to planning for a second front in Europe; any indications that the Western allies might cut a separate peace with Hitler; and, finally, American scientific and technological progress, particularly in developing an atomic weapon.⁹

Soviet espionage operatives in the United States during World War II funneled information to Moscow through a handful of professional intelligence officers who sent reports to the Center and relayed orders and questions from the Center to agents in the field. Operations in America were led by experienced hands such as Vassili M. Zarubin (covername MAKSIM), who served as *rezident* in New York and later in Washington, and Iskhak A. Akhmerov (covernames MER and ALBERT), the senior illegal. Some Soviet case officers, however, were raw recruits recently brought into the services in order to fill out ranks depleted during Stalin's purges of the late

⁹ Stalin's four requirements are either cited or paraphrased (the text and notes do not specify which) and subsequently became a general directive sent to several residencies. Vladimir M. Chikov claims Stalin issued these requirements in the presence of the newly appointed KGB senior *rezident* in the United States, Vassili M. Zarubin; this suggests that Stalin did so in autumn 1941. See "How the Soviet Intelligence Service 'Split' the American Atom," *Novoe Vremia* [New Times; English ed.], 23 April 1991, p. 38.

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⁸ KGB use of Amtorg is discussed in Herbert Romerstein and Stanislav Levchenko, *The KGB Against the "Main Enemy": How the Soviet Intelligence Service Operates against the United States* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1989), pp. 19-21, 176-177.

1930s.¹⁰ For many of these officers, America was their first overseas post. Elizabeth Bentley described her initial meeting with "John" (Anatoli A. Yatskov, Venona covername ALEKSEI), who turned out to be

a thin, pale, blond, young man of about my height, who was dressed in badly fitting clothes of obviously European make.... He had that half-starved look so characteristic of new Soviet arrivals, his English was so meager I had difficulty in understanding him, and he displayed an astounding ignorance of American life.

"John," despite his unpromising debut, would play a key role in Soviet espionage against the atomic bomb.¹¹

During the latter part of the war, the KGB gradually took over assets and networks originally established by the GRU and the Comintern (particularly after Stalin dissolved the latter body in May 1943).¹² A general re-division of labor among the Soviet services appears to have given political tasks to the KGB, while focusing the GRU more on military collection; both collected scientific and technical data. In addition, agents hitherto run in cooperation with the CPUSA were turned over to direct Soviet control. This streamlining effort faced daunting operational security challenges; Bentley and others who had worked with the Soviets had learned far more than they needed to about other agents and operations—and resented the change in direction.

A Slow Response

The US Government had grown concerned about reputed fascist and Communist subversion in the late 1930s. The war in Europe—and the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939—gave J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation an opportunity to move against individuals and organizations suspected of working with the Russians. Tipped by a State Department probe that had uncovered American and foreign Communists

¹⁰ According to KGB defector Alexander Orlov, more than 3,000 KGB officers were shot in 1937 alone, even before the *Yezhovchina* reached its full fury. See *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (New York: Random House, 1952), p. 216.

¹¹ Elizabeth Bentley, *Out of Bondage* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951), pp. 101-102. See also Yatskov's biography in *Veternay vneshney razvedki Rossii*, pp. 169-171.

¹² See Moscow 142 (circular), 12 September 1943, Translation 18, for more on the dissolution of the Comintern and the transfer of its assets to the professional Soviet intelligence services.

traveling on fraudulent American passports, FBI Special Agents in 1939 raided the facilities of several organizations linked to the CPUSA and found sufficient evidence to arrest General Secretary Earl Browder on charges of passport fraud.¹³ In 1940, leads developed by British and Canadian investigators in the Woolwich Arsenal spy case pointed the Bureau toward the senior KGB officer in America, New York *rezident* Gaik Ovakimian (covername GENNADI), whom the FBI arrested in May 1941 for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.¹⁴ Information on Soviet intelligence contacts and methods obtained by the Bureau in these early investigations would prove valuable during and after the war.

American authorities, nonetheless, did not act as decisively as they might have at the time. At least three defectors from Soviet intelligence were in the United States (Alexander Orlov, Walter Krivitsky, and Whittaker Chambers) and have given the Bureau relatively current information, had they been questioned in depth—and well protected—by federal officials.¹⁵ In addition, the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 virtually reversed American attitudes toward the Soviets. The State Department quickly reached an understanding with Moscow that allowed Ovakimian to leave the country. Similarly, President Roosevelt commuted Browder's sentence in May 1942 in the interest of inter-allied relations. The FBI remained watchful, but the raids and prosecutions ceased.

Any foreign intelligence service needs secure communications channels between its headquarters and its officers abroad. Although Soviet intelligence services had clandestine radio transmitters in diplomatic missions located in several American cities, these apparently were to be used only

¹³ US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary [Subcommittee on Internal Security], "Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States," Part 23, 84th Congress, 2d Session, 1956, pp. 1207-1235.

¹⁴ Ovakimian had been in the United States since 1933, operating under cover of the Amtorg Trading Corporation. US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "The Shameful Years: Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States," 82d Congress, 2d Session, 1951, pp. 15-17. See also US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "Communist Methods of Infiltration (Education---Part 2)," 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, pp. 198-199, 215. In 1937 a British Security Service agent penetrated KGB officer Arnold Deutsch's spy ring in the Woolwich Arsenal. Leads from the case pointed back to Canada and eventually led Canadian authorities to arrest one of Ovakimian's contacts; see Andrew and Gordievskiy, *KGB*, pp. 223-224.

¹⁵ Walter Krivitsky gave some information of value to the Department of State; for a sample, see Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939, Document 1. See also Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, "Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947, Document 18. in emergencies. ¹⁶ In consequence, KGB and GRU stations cabled their important messages over commercial telegraph lines and sent bulky reports and documents—including most of the information acquired by agents—in diplomatic pouches. As a new European war loomed in 1939, the US Army had begun collecting enciphered Soviet telegrams, and soon thousands of cables were piling up in the offices of the Army's Signals Security Agency (SSA). A June 1942 agreement with the Navy and FBI gave the Army exclusive responsibility for analysis of foreign diplomatic and military ciphers, and the Army consequently had general responsibility for studying diplomatic traffic.

SSA analysts, based at Arlington Hall in Northern Virginia, soon began to explore whether the collected Soviet diplomatic messages might be readable. The Army and Navy had sporadically studied Soviet codes and ciphers over the preceding decade, but with little success. ¹⁷ Decrypted 1942 cables between the Japanese Army's general staff and its military attaches in Berlin and Helsinki showed that Finland's excellent cryptanalysts had made progress on some Soviet military ciphers, had determined the characteristics for sorting the still unsolvable diplomatic messages, and were sharing results with the Japanese. ¹⁸ This information was probably the immediate inspiration for SSA's examination of the Soviet telegrams. On 1 February 1943, SSA created a small program to examine the encrypted Soviet telegrams on orders from Col. Carter Clarke, Chief of the Special Branch of the Army's Military Intelligence Service (MID). Clarke seemed particularly concerned that Moscow and Berlin might negotiate a separate peace, and wanted to be able to warn his superiors of such a development.

Gene Grabeel, a Virginia schoolteacher who had recently arrived at Arlington Hall as part of its large civilian contingent, began the effort to read the Soviet diplomatic messages (and would continue working on the project for the next 36 years). She and others assigned to the project in 1943 spent months sorting stored and incoming telegrams by communications circuits. They gradually expanded their knowledge of the characteristics that separated the messages into the groups that the Finnish cryptanalysts had investigated. Five separate cryptographic systems became apparent.

¹⁶ Wartime transmissions by Soviet clandestine transmitters in the United States—with the exception of those to Latin America—were usually test messages. It should be noted, however, that Comintern agents in the United States operated clandestine radios in the 1930s, and clandestine radio nets apparently were important for Soviet wartime intelligence operations in Latin America. A hint of the Comintern-CPUSA radio link can be seen in Klehr and Haynes, *The Secret World of American Communism*, pp. 205-208. Examples of Comintern messages to officials in the CPUSA are Moscow 117 of 21 March 1936 and Moscow 121 of 23 March 1936, Translation 1.

¹⁷ See, for example, Stanford C. Hooper, Director of Naval Communications, to D. M. Crawford, Chief Signal Officer (US Army), "Communist Code and Cipher Material,"
7 January 1932, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 457 (National Security Agency), "Historic Cryptographic Collection," box 138.
¹⁸ Japanese Army General Staff message to military attaches in Berlin and Helsinki, Tokyo Circular 906, 6 October 1942, Document 7. SSA translated this message in early 1943.

More than half the telegrams belonged to a system that analysts dubbed "Trade" because it carried the messages of the Amtorg Trading Corporation and the Soviet Purchasing Commission—most of which concerned the transfer of Lend Lease materiel to the USSR. The other four systems were used by the KGB, GRU, Naval GRU, and Foreign Ministry, but these users would not be fully identified until the mid-1940s.

Moscow had already learned from well-placed agents that both enemies and allies were trying to read its diplomatic cables. Finnish troops found scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in the USSR's Petsamo consulate in June 1941, and before the end of that year a Soviet agent in Berlin reported that the Germans were trying to exploit a Russian codebook acquired from their Finnish allies.¹⁹ These developments in themselves were not alarming to Moscow, because the security of messages enciphered by one-time pads lies in the cipher and not in the codes per se (see inset). In any event, the compromised KGB codebook was not replaced until late 1943.²⁰ Another important piece of information came from British intelligence officer and Soviet agent H.A.R. "Kim" Philby in 1944, when he told the KGB that British cryptanalysts had turned their attention to Soviet ciphers.²¹

Philby probably reported nothing at that time about American efforts against the Soviet messages. (US analysts did not begin to collaborate with their British counterparts on Soviet communications in general until about August 1945.) Nevertheless, senior KGB officials may have become worried when White House aide Lauchlin Currie apparently told Soviet contacts (possibly in spring 1944) that the Americans were about to break a Soviet code. Currie had access to signals intelligence at the White House and could have heard overoptimistic rumors that Arlington Hall would soon be reading Soviet messages. Currie's tip probably was too vague to have alarmed Soviet cryptographers, but it might have worried higher-ups in Moscow. Indeed, the only change observed in the characteristics of the Soviet messages around that time appeared to be a cosmetic correction implemented to please higher authority. On 1 May 1944, KGB code clerks began using a new message starting-point indicator for telegrams-a change that ironically would make work easier for Arlington Hall cryptanalysts. 22

¹⁹ John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions* (New York: Crown, 1993), p. 399. ²⁰ San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943, Translation 19, acknowledges the San Francisco consulate's receipt of the new "075-B" codebook and the scheduled destruction of the "Pobjeda" code, which was almost certainly the one found in Petsamo (and recovered by the US Army in Germany in April 1945).

²¹ Genrikh Borovik and Phillip Knightley, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 235.

²² The change is ordered in Moscow [no number] circular, 25 April 1944, Translation 26.

What Made Venona Possible?

The messages broken by the Venona program were both coded and enciphered. When a code is enciphered with a one-time pad, the cryptographer who designed the system expects the encipherment to provide absolute security-even if an adversary somehow obtains an underlying codebook or debriefs a defecting code clerk (such as Igor Gouzenko). A flaw in the encipherment, however, can leave such messages vulnerable to analysis even in the absence of a codebook. Such was the case for the Soviet diplomatic systems from which the Venona translations came. Arlington Hall's Venona breakthrough in 1943-46 was a purely analytic accomplishment, achieved without the benefit of either Soviet codebooks or plain-text copies of original messages. The 1944-46 messages-which yielded the early translations and the bulk of all translations-were recovered over a period of years by Arlington Hall cryptanalysts and decoded from a "codebook" that cryptolinguist Meredith Gardner reconstructed by using classic codebreaking techniques.

A Soviet code clerk preparing a message first reduced its text into numeric code groups drawn from a codebook (a kind of dictionary in which the words and common phrases correspond to four-digit numbers). After encoding the plain text with numeric code groups, the clerk would obscure the code groups by adding them, digit by digit, to a string of random digits. This second series of digits, called "additive" or "key," was known to both the sender and receiver because it was printed on the pages of a "one-time pad." One-time pads were periodically pouched to Soviet consular missions in sealed packets. The pad pages-with 60 five-digit additive groups per pagewere used in order, always starting with the group in the upper lefthand corner (the pad-page number to be used was more or less concealed somewhere on the face of the message). Code clerks in different Soviet missions used up these packets at varying rates, depending on the volume of messages to be enciphered or deciphered.

The security of such an encipherment-decipherment system depends on both the randomness (that is, unpredictability) of the "key" on the one-time pad pages and the uniqueness of the one-time pad sets held by the sender and the receiver. Different Soviet organizations used their own codes, changing them every few years (probably more to improve vocabulary and convenience than to enhance security).

The flaw in the Soviet messages resulted from the manufacturers' duplication of one-time pad pages, rather than from a malfunctioning random-number generator or extensive re-use of pages by code clerks. For a few months in early 1942, a time of great strain on the Soviet regime, the KGB's cryptographic center in the Soviet Union for some unknown reason printed duplicate copies of the "key" on more than 35,000 pages of additive and then assembled and bound these in one-time pads. Arlington Hall's Lt. Richard Hallock analyzed Soviet "Trade" messages in autumn 1943, producing evidence of extensive use of duplicate key pages (often with different page numbers) assembled in separate one-time pad books. Thus, two sets of the ostensibly unique one-time pad-page sets were manufactured. Despite the opinion that a single duplication was insufficient for solution, Hallock and his colleagues continued to attack the Trade messages and made considerable progress in understanding the cryptographic basis of the diplomatic systems. From Hallock's original discovery, additional analysis yielded techniques for finding duplicate pages separated in time and among different users. The duplicate pages began showing up in messages in mid-1942 and were still occurring in one circuit as late as June 1948. Nevertheless, most of the duplicate pages were used between 1942 and 1944-years of rapid expansion of Soviet diplomatic communications.

We do not know how and when the Soviets discovered the flaw, but we believe Moscow learned of it through agents William W. Weisband and Kim Philby. By the time the Soviets saw the consequences of the manufacturing flaw in the late 1940s, however, most of the duplicate one-time pad pages had already been used. The set of potentially exploitable messages thus was bound by the production of the duplicate pages and the West's ability to spot duplicate uses. Finding duplicates, however, only made the messages potentially readable; indeed, some messages and passages remained unexploitable even after 37 years of effort.

> Cecil James Phillips National Security Agency

In November 1944 Arlington Hall analysts solved this new starting-point indicator problem and soon expanded their effort against the "Trade" messages to encompass a second, still unidentified Soviet system. This was the breakthrough that eventually made the cables readable. The method revealed hundreds of instances in which individual pages of additive digits from KGB one-time pads were duplicated by key used for Trade messages. Over a period of years, cryptanalysts were able to determine the one-time pad additive values for significant parts of hundreds of enciphered tele-grams, leaving the coded texts vulnerable to crypto-linguist codebuilders trying to recover the meanings of the four-digit words and phrases.²³

American authorities inferred during World War II that the Soviets were engaged in espionage, but as yet there was little coordination among the various counterintelligence organizations. A June 1939 Presidential directive gave the FBI responsibility for domestic counterintelligence with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (better known as the G-2).²⁴ The three organizations comprised a body known as the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and stood together to protect their monopoly on domestic counterintelligence work from other agencies, particularly the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its activist chief, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan. OSS eventually developed a capable counterintelligence apparatus of its own in Europe—the X-2 Branch—but it had no authority to operate on American soil.

In keeping with the limited extent of interagency cooperation, American counterintelligence organizations made uneven progress in integrating signals intelligence leads during the war. OSS and the FBI separately launched their own cryptologic intelligence operations, but these were short-lived.²⁵ (Neither OSS nor the FBI, incidentally, was shown the Army's "MAGIC" intercepts of wartime foreign diplomatic messages.) The X-2 Branch of OSS had been created to provide British intelligence services with a point of contact in OSS for sharing certain sensitive "ULTRA" reports derived from decrypted German military and intelligence communications.²⁶ Unfortunately for OSS, however, X-2 monitored the agents of Axis—not

²³ Several cryptanalysts contributed to this breakthrough, including Genevieve Feinstein, Cecil Phillips, Frank Lewis, Frank Wanat, and Lucille Campbell.

²⁴ The reasoning and terms of Roosevelt's directive can be seen in Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939, Document 2; and Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State, et al., 26 June 1939, Document 3.

²⁵ Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship*, 1940-46 (London: Airlife, 1993), pp. 69, 110-111.

²⁶ Timothy J. Naftali, "ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy," in George C. Chalou, ed., *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), pp. 222-223. allied—services. It had little influence over security clearances for OSS personnel (some of whom indeed spied for the Soviets).²⁷

Coordination was little better between the military's cryptologic services, which in any event had left domestic security largely to the FBI. The Army and Navy signals intelligence organizations barely cooperated with one another, jealously guarding their reports and their access to President Roosevelt. Outside of the Oval Office there was no collation and analysis of the totality of the intelligence information—let alone the counterintelligence leads—collected by the US Government.

Hoover's FBI monitored the CPUSA during the war but did not always share its leads with other agencies. In April 1943, FBI agents began to collect solid information on current KGB activities and personnel. New York consular officer Vassili M. Zarubin (a KGB general operating under the alias Zubilin) called on senior CPUSA officer Steve Nelson in Berkeley, California. Unbeknownst to both, the FBI had been watching Nelson for weeks. Zarubin's conversation made it obvious to Bureau eavesdroppers that he was an important KGB officer (although they could not yet know that he was Gaik Ovakimian's replacement as senior KGB *rezident* in America).²⁸ The FBI watched Zarubin from that day until he left the United States in 1944 (although he occasionally gave his trailers the slip), and Bureau agents catalogued hundreds of contacts and leads developed by this operation.²⁹

More leads dropped into the Bureau's mailbox in August 1943, in the form of an anonymous letter drafted on a Russian typewriter and mailed in Washington, DC. This extraordinary note—the author's identity still is uncertain—denounced Zarubin and 10 other KGB officers in North America, along with two of their assets.³⁰ Special Agents quickly concluded that the letter was genuine and largely accurate, although they gave little

²⁷ X-2 was prohibited from collecting on Soviet intelligence. Evidence of Soviet penetrations in OSS can be seen in New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943, Translation 11; New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944, Translation 56; and New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944, Translation 62. For more on penetrations of OSS, see Hayden B. Peake, "Soviet Espionage and the Office of Strategic Services," in Warren F. Kimball, ed., *America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Superpower* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

²⁸ William Branigan, comment on Herbert Romerstein's "Soviet Intelligence in the United States," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence* (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), p. 201. Branigan was the Special Agent who recorded the Nelson-Zarubin meeting.

²⁹ An indication of Bureau operations at the time can be seen in Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944, Document 11.

³⁰ The anonymous letter is included as Document 10. For an analysis, see the CIA memorandum probably drafted by William K. Harvey, "COMRAP," 6 February 1948, Document 20. Information in Pavel Sudoplatov's controversial memoir suggests the author of the Anonymous Letter might have been Zarubin's assistant, a Lt. Col. Mironov, who was discharged from the KGB in 1944 on psychiatric grounds; see Sudoplatov, with Anatoli Sudoplatov, Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness-A Soviet Spymaster* (New York: Little, Brown, 1994), pp. 196-197.

credence to its claim that the Soviets were passing secrets to Japan. The FBI subsequently increased surveillance of persons named in the letter and even doubled two agents recruited by one of them, KGB officer Andrei Shevchenko.³¹ Nevertheless, the FBI did apparently not pass copies of the anonymous letter to other agencies until after World War II, nor did Special Agents try to recruit Soviet officers named by its author.

The Atomic Era

US Government agencies ran a wartime security system that was porous for Soviet agents and yet opaque for American counterintelligence agencies charged with protecting secrets. FBI Director Hoover allegedly knew nothing of the super-secret Manhattan Project before Steve Nelson inadvertently informed him in the spring of 1943. High-level political and strategic motivations in Washington also hampered US efforts against Soviet espionage. President Roosevelt wanted to strengthen a distrustful Stalin in his fight against Hitler, and his lieutenants had no desire to antagonize Moscow by suppressing the CPUSA or publicly probing rumors that members of the Party had infiltrated government agencies. ³² Hoover, for his part, kept a close eye on the CPUSA but did not, at least before 1945, try to convince the White House that Soviet officials in the United States were actively engaged in espionage. Donovan's OSS also encountered the administration's reluctance to antagonize Moscow when OSS officers bought unidentified Soviet cryptographic documents from emigre Finnish cryptanalysts in late 1944. Secretary of State Edward P. Stettinius insisted that the papers be given back to the Russians, and Donovan promptly obeyed a White House order to return them to the Soviet Embassy.³³

The intrigues surrounding the development of the atomic bomb both symbolized and helped widen the growing breach between the Soviet Union and

³² Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle's and the FBI's slow reaction to allegations by former GRU courier Whittaker Chambers is cited as evidence of Roosevelt administration inattention to Communist infiltration; see Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 329-331.

³³ OSS purchased Soviet code and cipher material (or Finnish information on them) from émigré Finnish army officers in late 1944. The Secretary of State's protest, dated 27 December 1944, is included as Document 12. Donovan might have copied the papers before returning them the following January but there is no record of Arlington Hall receiving them, and CIA and NSA archives have no surviving copies. See Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 353-54.

³¹ Special Agents monitored Shevchenko's penetration of the Bell Aircraft Corporation in the last year of the war, feeding him innocuous information and developing leads uncovered in the operation. US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "Soviet Espionage Activities in Connection With Jet Propulsion and Aircraft," 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, pp. 101-128.

its Western allies in 1945. Washington and London jointly built the bomb but said nothing about their work to Moscow. Stalin's clandestine sources, however, obtained detailed political, military, and diplomatic reports on his allies' strategic planning and war aims.³⁴ He knew of the bomb project long before the new President Truman finally divulged it to him in July 1945. The KGB effort against the Manhattan Project (codenamed ENORMOUS) represented a shift in collection emphasis. Moscow hitherto had regarded the United States primarily as a source of information useful in the war against Germany; now America became in Russian eyes a rival and even a threat to the Soviet Union itself. Soviet agents penetrated the Manhattan Project at several points. At the Los Alamos facility alone, at least four agents reported through couriers such as Lona Cohen to the Soviet consulate in New York, where a KGB sub-residency under a young engineer named Leonid R. Kvasnikov (covername ANTON) coordinated operations and dispatched intelligence to Moscow.³⁵

US perceptions of the Soviets began shifting after the war had been won. Two defections in autumn 1945 galvanized US counterintelligence. Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk in the USSR's Ottawa Embassy, revealed to Canadian authorities that the Soviets had indeed penetrated the Manhattan Project and other agencies.³⁶ A few weeks later, Elizabeth Bentley gave the FBI details about spies in the State and Treasury Department, OSS, the Pentagon, and even the White House. Both Bentley's and Gouzenko's accounts dovetailed with the story that *Time* magazine editor and former GRU agent Whittaker Chambers had told FBI agents in 1942 and again, in detail, in May 1945.³⁷ By mid-November, the White House knew the

³⁴ KGB sources, for example, reported accurately on many aspects of Anglo-American planning; see New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943, Translation 11; and New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944, Translation 53. Ironically, the quality of KGB and Communist Party sources was not matched by any particularly insightful KGB analysis of the Western political scene. In particular, KGB officers and CPUSA officials composed some rather confused reflections on the presidential race of 1944; see New York 598-599 to Moscow, 2 May 1944, Translation 28.

³⁵ The four assets apparently were Klaus Fuchs (covernames CHARLES and REST), David Greenglass (covernames BUMBLEBEE and CALIBRE), Theodore Alvin Hall (covername YOUNGSTER [MLAD]), and a source covernamed FOGEL and PERS; see New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944, Translation 76. PERS seems to have been arbitrarily or erroneously converted to "Perseus" (there is no covername Perseus in the Venona messages) in Russian memoirs as the Soviet and Russian intelligence services sought to describe a high-level source in the Manhattan Project. For more on Russian claims for Perseus, see Chikov, "How the Soviet intelligence service 'split' the American atom," (Part 1), p. 38.

³⁶ Gouzenko's information helped Western cryptanalysts understand Soviet communications procedures but did not directly contribute to the Venona breakthrough. He brought out GRU messages that identified Soviet assets, but no codebooks or one-time pads.
 ³⁷ Weinstein, *Perjury*, pp. 340, 347. The FBI's handling of Chambers is recounted in D. M. Ladd to Hoover, "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948, Document 23.

outlines of the defectors' stories and had heard of their accusations against dozens of US Government employees, including high officials such as White House aide Lauchlin Currie, OSS executive assistant Duncan Lee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White.³⁸

A Canadian Government White Paper on the Gouzenko affair in July 1946 confirmed the gist of press speculation about Soviet wartime espionage and gave the Western public its first official account of the extent of the problem. This confirmation of the essential truth behind the rumors diminished public tolerance for Communism at home and abroad. Truman became convinced of the need for a government-wide tightening of security, but he had no intention of condoning witch-hunts for allegedly disloyal Democratic officials or blanket accusations against federal workers and Roosevelt's New Deal. Little could be done, for the time being, against the individuals named by Gouzenko or Bentley—apart from corroborating their reports and limiting the suspects' access to sensitive information—until Western governments could gather evidence that would stand up in court.


Domestic politics, however, prompted the White House to act. Republicans campaigning in the 1946 Congressional elections accused Democrats of ignoring Communist infiltration and disloyalty; the charge helped the GOP regain control of Congress for the first time since 1931. Truman's response was motivated in part by his own political considerations. Hoping to deter free-ranging Congressional probes and harsh Republican-drafted loyalty legislation, he signed Executive Order 9835, which institutionalized the wartime loyalty regime. The executive order mandated loyalty boards in all federal agencies and defined employee disloyalty to include membership in groups judged subversive by the Attorney General.³⁹

During this period, Bentley gave the FBI details that opened a hitherto unnoticed window on the networks run by "illegals"—Soviet citizens abroad under false identities who worked for the KGB or GRU in apparent isolation from official Soviet consular missions. Special Agents fanned out across the country to investigate Bentley's leads and to monitor persons whom she had named, and for about a year the FBI entertained hopes of "doubling" her against the KGB.⁴⁰

³⁹ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford, 1995), pp. 428-429. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volume 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 280.

⁴⁰ Elizabeth Bentley, with Afterword by Hayden Peake, *Out of Bondage: The Story of Elizabeth Bentley* (New York: Ballantine, 1988 [1951]); see Peake's commentary, pp. 266-267. The Gregory case is summarized in Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization [NKVD] in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946, Document 17.

³⁸ Hoover sent news of the Gouzenko defection to the White House on 12 September and reported the Bentley allegations on 8 November. See Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945, Document 13; and Hoover to Brigadier General Harold Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945, Document 15.



At roughly the same time, the renamed Army Security Agency (ASA—formerly the Signals Security Agency) developed evidence that would soon corroborate Bentley's testimony and the 1943 anonymous letter. After the war, the "Russian Section" at Arlington Hall expanded. Work on diplomatic messages benefited from additional technical personnel and new analysts among them Samuel Chew, who had focused on Japan, and linguist Meredith Gardner, who had worked on both German and Japanese messages. Chew had considerable success at defining the underlying structure of the coded Russian texts. Gardner and his colleagues began analytically reconstructing the KGB codebooks. Late in 1946, Gardner broke the codebook's "spell table" for encoding English letters. With the solution of this spell table, ASA could read significant portions of messages that included English names and phrases. Gardner soon found himself reading a 1944 message listing prominent atomic scientists, including several with the Manhattan Project.⁴²

Gardner henceforth made rapid progress, reading dozens of messages sent between Moscow and New York in 1944 and 1945. By May 1947 he had read one that implied the Soviets ran an asset with access to sensitive information from the War Department General Staff.⁴³ It became apparent to Gardner that he was reading KGB messages showing massive Soviet espionage in the United States.

Another problem soon arose—that of determining how and to whom to disseminate the extraordinary information Gardner was developing. ASA's reporting procedures did not seem appropriate because the decrypted messages could not even be paraphrased for Arlington Hall's regular intelligence customers without divulging their source. At this point, ASA knew nothing

⁴² New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944, Translation 74.

⁴³ New York 1751-1753 to Moscow, 13 December 1944, Translation 77. The actual agent (presumably William Ludwig Ullman, covername PILOT) was not indicated on the message.

⁴¹ David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 23-32. For the inadmissibility of wiretap evidence, see Robert J. Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 101-102. Daniel J. Leab has written a detailed account of the difficulty faced by the Justice Department in its 1946 prosecution of a Soviet officer accused of espionage, Lt. Nicolai G. Redin; "The Red Menace and Justice in the Pacific Northwest," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly 87* (Spring 1996), pp. 83-88.

about the federal grand jury impaneled in Manhattan to probe the espionage and disloyalty charges leveled by Bentley and other defectors from Soviet intelligence, so no one in the US Government was aware that evidence against the Soviets was suddenly developing on two adjacent tracks. Gardner took matters into his own hands in the summer of 1947, drafting "Special Report #1," which went to a handful of senior ASA officials. One item in it about an unidentified Soviet asset would later prove fateful:

LIB?? (Lieb?) or possibly LIBERAL: was ANTENKO [later understood as ANTENNA] until 29 Sept. 1944. Occurs 6 times, 22 October-20 December 1944. Message of 27 November speaks of his wife ETHEL, 29 years old married (?) 5 years, "..... husband's work and the role of METR(O) and NIL." [Spelling and punctuation in original]⁴⁴

Cooperation Expands

Deputy G-2 Carter Clarke read Special Report #1 and in late August or early September 1948 asked FBI liaison officer S. Wesley Reynolds for a list of KGB and GRU covernames. Clarke's hint that ASA had broken a KGB code piqued the interest of the Bureau, which at that time was questioning former Soviet agents living in the United States concerning the allegations of Bentley and others and information gathered from surveillance of Soviet officials during the war. The Bureau quickly sent ASA a list of some 200 names, and, although few of them appeared in the translated messages, the long cooperation later known as the Venona program had begun.⁴⁵ This cooperative spirit between cryptanalysts and investigators endures to the present day.

Full inter-agency cooperation, however, was still several years away. President Truman, unhappy about the mass of unanalyzed reports that the departments daily sent to the White House, had insisted in 1945 on greater coordination of intelligence information. His new Central Intelligence Group was intended to solve this problem, but it started out slowly. American intelligence agencies on the whole did not do a good job of presenting counterintelligence analyses to the President and his aides. FBI Director Hoover, for instance, frequently sent to the Truman White House

⁴⁵ It speaks volumes about inter-allied signals intelligence cooperation that Arlington Hall's British liaison officers learned of the breakthrough even before the FBI was notified. Meredith Gardner kept his British counterpart abreast of developments, and from 1948 on there was complete and profitable US-UK cooperation on the problem. The control term "Venona" did not appear on the translated messages until 1961. In the beginning the information was usually called the "Gardner material," and a formal control term—"Bride"—was finally affixed in 1950. From the late 1950s to 1961 the control term was "Drug."

⁴⁴ New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944, Translation 73. "Special Report #1" is included as Document 19.

allegations of Communist plotting and Soviet espionage. It is not clear how much of this information actually reached the President, however, or how seriously it was regarded by White House aides.

Despite the Truman administration's sustained but piecemeal restructuring of the Intelligence Community, the division of labor in counterintelligence functions remained much as it had been set early in World War II. The new National Security Council preserved the FBI's and armed services' monopoly of domestic counterintelligence in NSC-17/4 and 17/6 in 1949.⁴⁶ The agencies outside this monopoly were expected to provide information but were not invited to join operations involving domestic security. The new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the closest institutional successor to OSS and CIG and, consequently, the inheritor of OSS's dismal security reputation, saw little of the information Gardner and his colleagues were developing. CIA counterintelligence officers, however, now had wider access to signals intelligence than had their predecessors in X-2, and they briefly joined the Army and Navy in a Joint Counterintelligence Information Center (JCIC) to exploit current signals intelligence leads, using X-2's wartime employment of ULTRA as its model.⁴⁷ The JCIC received Special Report #1 at roughly the same time Colonel Clarke notified the FBI, but the Bureau never joined the JCIC or sought its assistance with the Soviet translations. When the JCIC inquired about additional Special Reports in early 1949, Clarke apparently instructed his subordinates not to provide anything. The early American effort to use the information from the Soviet messages thus remained understaffed and highly compartmented, and exploitation opportunities were almost certainly lost in consequence. For several years the major investigative burden remained with the FBI, which assigned the most important inter-agency liaison work to a single Special Agent, Robert Lamphere.

"I stood in the vestibule of the enemy's house, having entered by stealth," Lamphere recalled in his memoir of the investigations.⁴⁸ Lamphere began sharing liaison duty with Wesley Reynolds in the spring of 1948. That October he had a private meeting with Meredith Gardner and began fulltime liaison on the project. It was Lamphere's tenacity that taught the FBI how to use the translations against Soviet espionage. Through him the

⁴⁷ The JCIC worked under the cover of "OP32Y1," an office at the Naval Communications Annex on Nebraska Avenue in Washington. Its CIA contingent was detailed from the Office of Special Operations and included ex–FBI agent William K. Harvey. The Central Intelligence Group became the Central Intelligence Agency with the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947 in September of that year.

⁴⁸ Lamphere, The FBI-KGB War, p. 86.

⁴⁶ NSC-17/4 is included under Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949, Document 26.

Bureau received a steady flow of translations and re-translations, as well as Gardner's insights about the "tradecraft" of Soviet spying. Gardner and his colleagues, in return, received collateral evidence, identifications, and additional leads.⁴⁹ The process was essentially a slow comparison of evidence for and against various competing hypotheses, with the knowledge gained in many cases being greater than the sum of its parts.

By the time Lamphere began using the translated messages, the public controversy over "loyalty" and "red-baiting" had risen dramatically amid growing concern over US-Soviet tensions. New allegations that prominent American citizens had spied for the Soviets burst upon the public in July 1948, when Bentley spoke before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Her testimony recounted, among other things, Lauchlin Currie's alleged distress over US efforts to read wartime Soviet telegrams (this seems to have been the first public clue to the existence of ASA's effort). A few days later Whittaker Chambers charged that Roosevelt administration figures Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White were secret Communists. Heated denials by the accused and their supporters added to the drama and controversy as elections loomed that autumn. Republican Congressmen and activists hailed the testimony as the long-suppressed proof of Democratic inattention toward Communist subversion. Truman bitterly resented such charges and insisted that the Hiss affair in particular was a GOP "red herring." ⁵⁰

Truman's repeated denunciations of the charges against Hiss, White, and others—all of whom appear under covernames in decrypted messages translated before he left office in January 1953—suggest that Truman either was never briefed on the Venona program or did not grasp its significance. Although it seems odd that Truman might not have been told, no definitive evidence has emerged to show he was. In any event, Truman always insisted that Republicans had trumped up the loyalty issue and that wartime espionage had been insignificant and well contained by American authorities.⁵¹

In December 1948 the FBI identified a Soviet agent covernamed SIMA as Judith Coplon, a young Justice Department analyst recruited by the Soviets

⁴⁹ Two of Lamphere's blind memos to Gardner can be seen as "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, with alias," 9 May 1949, Document 25; and "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949, Document 27.

⁵⁰ Hamby, *Man of the People*, p. 453. President Truman repeated his "red herring" remark late that year; see Truman to Attorney General Tom Clark, 16 December 1948, Document 22. Another glimpse of the White House attitude can be seen in George M. Elsey's note to Clark M. Clifford, 16 August 1948, Document 21.

⁵¹ Mr. Truman wrote in his memoirs in 1956: "The country had reason to be proud of and have confidence in our security agencies. They had kept us almost totally free of sabotage and espionage during the war;" see Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 291.

in 1944.⁵² Coplon would become the first person arrested on the basis of a Venona lead. FBI agents detained her in March 1949 along with a KGB official under UN cover; her purse contained ostensibly sensitive documents (which the Bureau had routed through her office as bait). Director Hoover or (less likely) someone higher in the Truman administration forbade FBI officials testifying at her trial from introducing the translated messages as evidence. This protection of the cryptanalytic breakthrough forced prosecutors and government witnesses into elaborate cirumlocutions; Special Agent Lamphere, for example, testified that suspicion had fallen on Coplon because of information from a reliable "confidential informant" that was not a wiretap. ⁵³ Although both of Coplon's convictions would be overturned on appeal, subsequent prosecutions developed in the same manner, with the too-sensitive codebreaking secrets obscured behind mounds of corroborating evidence.

The Coplon case set the pattern for an intense series of investigations and prosecutions that followed over the next two years. Meredith Gardner and his colleagues (working from May 1949 under the auspices of AFSA, the new Armed Forces Security Agency) supplied covernames and translations to the FBI; Lamphere and other Special Agents tracked down the leads:

- February 1949. ASA observed that messages containing "Material G" were quoting British Foreign Office telegrams sent to the British Embassy in Washington during the war. Not until March 1951, however, did American and British cryptanalysts conclude that "G," "GOMMER," and "GOMER" (the Russian transliteration of HOMER) had to be the same agent who had provided the cables to the KGB. By the beginning of May 1951, the list of possible suspects had narrowed to one name: Donald Maclean of the Foreign Office. Maclean, with compatriot Guy Burgess, soon fled to the Soviet Union.
- September 1949. The FBI determined that covernames REST and CHARLES, both denoting a scientist in the wartime Manhattan Project, referred to physicist Klaus Fuchs, author of a paper quoted in one message.

⁵³ Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War*, p. 115. For more on the administration's handling of the Coplon case, see Clark to Truman, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949, Document 24.

⁵² New York 27 [to Moscow], 8 January 1945, Translation 82, notes Coplon's transfer to the Department of Justice headquarters in Washington. Lamphere claims the date of her transfer from New York to Washington clinched the identification; see *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 97-98. See also the KGB's request for information on Coplon in Comintern files; Pavel Fitin to Georgi Dimitrov, 19 October 1944, reprinted in Klehr and Haynes, eds., *The Secret World of American Communism*, pp. 294-295.

British authorities interrogated Fuchs in late 1949. His information in turn led the FBI to courier Harry Gold, arrested in Philadelphia on 22 May.⁵⁴

- February 1950. Lamphere suspected that a Soviet agent covernamed CALIBRE had to be an enlisted man posted at the Manhattan Project facility at Los Alamos during the war. Subsequent AFSA analysis, and additional information from Harry Gold, led to David Greenglass, who confessed to the FBI on 15 June 1950 and also implicated his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg.
- Spring 1950. Covername NICK had emerged in 1949 as one Amadeo Sabatini, who had fought in Spain together with KGB asset Morris Cohen. Sabatini apparently kept quiet about Cohen but did point the FBI toward a Jones Orin York (almost simultaneously identified as Venona covername NEEDLE). When questioned in April 1950, York alleged that a former case officer of his was an AFSA employee named William Weisband. AFSA suspended Weisband in May.
- Late June 1950. The FBI discovered that information in the messages about an agent who collected technological and scientific secrets, codenamed LIBERAL and ANTENNA, matched the known facts about New York engineer Julius Rosenberg. Two messages also implicated his wife, Ethel. Rosenberg had been questioned on the basis of David Greenglass' information on 16 June and tailed ever since, but he was not arrested until a month later. 55
- Sometime in 1949-50. Gardner translated a 1944 message that described the recruitment of Harvard physics student Theodore Alvin Hall. Soon afterward, the Bureau determined that the covername YOUNGSTER [MLAD], found in other messages, matched Hall. Special Agents questioned Hall in 1951, but he was never prosecuted (probably because a case could not have been made without revealing AFSA's program).

Translated messages also corroborated various charges made by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. By June 1950 the Bureau determined that the covername ALES, mentioned in one KGB message, referred to former State Department aide Alger Hiss, then serving a sentence for perjury. ⁵⁶ Around the same time, Lamphere told Gardner that the

⁵⁶ Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945, Translation 89.

⁵⁴ See [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, aka; Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949, Document 28; Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 133-134. See also W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee [H. Marshall Chadwell], "Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value," 9 February 1950, Document 29; Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950, Document 30.

⁵⁵ See Lamphere's blind memo, "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950, Document 31; Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950, Document 32. See also Lamphere, *The FBI-KGB War*, pp. 178-186.

covername JURIST meant Harry Dexter White, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who had died suddenly a few days after denying Whittaker Chambers' August 1948 charge before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.⁵⁷ The translations also clarified another sensational spy case a few years later when the FBI identified the covername MARQUIS as Joseph Milton Bernstein, a GRU agent linked to the Institute of Pacific Relations and *Amerasia* magazine.⁵⁸

Double Dilemma

The KGB had not been surprised by the wave of charges, arrests, and prosecutions. Intelligence officials in Moscow nonetheless faced much the same dilemma that confronted the FBI and AFSA. Both sides now had sources too important to risk. The Americans and their allies had to be careful in investigating certain suspects. The Soviets had to be equally wary in protecting their agents.

The Soviets apparently had monitored Arlington Hall's "Russian Section" since at least 1945, when William Weisband joined the unit (see inset). Weisband's earliest reports on the work on Soviet diplomatic systems were probably sketchy and might not have provided clear warning to Moscow about the exploitability of the KGB messages. By 1947, Weisband could have reported that KGB messages were being read, although by then virtually all of the exploitable messages had been transmitted and were in Arlington Hall's possession. Where Weisband had sketched the outlines of the cryptanalytic success, British liaison officer Kim Philby received actual translations and analyses on a regular basis after he arrived for duty in Washington in autumn 1949.⁵⁹

Timely warnings from Philby helped the KGB protect some of its agents and operations. Various accounts indicate that in October 1949 Moscow began advising American agents who had dealt with Klaus Fuchs that they

⁵⁹ Philby's Washington posting has been discussed in many books; a concise account is in Borovik and Knightley, *The Philby Files*, p. 273. The late John Costello clarified the timeliness of Philby's warning somewhat in his notes on Guy Burgess' KGB file (Costello cited it as File 83792, Volume 4, pp. 76-183). The Burgess file indicated that Philby had learned by late September that British and American authorities believed CHARLES was Klaus Fuchs. Mr. Costello summarized some of his notes for Robert Louis Benson in 1995.

⁵⁷ It remains unclear which messages led the FBI to the White identification, but some of the more important messages in which he appeared are New York 1119-1121 to Moscow, 4 August 1944, Translation 50; New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944, Translation 71; and New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945, Translation 84.

⁵⁸ Venona sheds some light on the Amerasia affair; see New York 927-28 to Moscow, 16 June 1943, Translation 12; and New York 1103 to Moscow, 8 July 1943. See also Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 64-65.

Who Was William Weisband?

In 1950 one Jones Orin York (covername NEEDLE) told the FBI that he had passed secrets to the KGB since the mid-1930s. A worker in the aircraft industry on the west coast, York said that his KGB handler during 1941-42 had been one Bill Weisband, who had helped him buy a camera for photographing documents.^a

York's allegation was disturbing news, implying that the KGB had a mole in the sensitive Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Born in Egypt in 1908 of Russian parents, Weisband emigrated to America in the 1920s and became a US citizen in 1938. He joined the US Army Signals Security Agency in 1942 and performed signals intelligence and communications security duties in North Africa and Italy, where he made some important friends before returning to Arlington Hall and joining its "Russian Section." Although not a cryptanalyst, as a "linguist adviser" (he spoke fluent Russian) the gregarious and popular Weisband had access to all areas of Arlington Hall's Soviet work. Meredith Gardner recalled that Weisband had watched him extract the list of Western atomic scientists from the December 1944 KGB message mentioned earlier.

Weisband always denied involvement in espionage, and the US Government never prosecuted him for it. While suspended from AFSA on suspicion of disloyalty, he skipped a federal grand jury hearing on Communist Party activity. As a result, in November 1950 Weisband was convicted of contempt and sentenced to a year in prison. He died suddenly of natural causes in 1967.

The Venona messages do not hold a definite reference to William Weisband. Nevertheless, three messages mention a "ZVENO" (the Russian word for "link"). The earliest and clearest reference suggests procedures for the KGB's London residency to use in contacting ZVENO, who was awaiting a transfer to England. ZVENO, according to one message, had spent the last four weeks in an Italianlanguage course in Virginia and would leave for Britain by mid-July.^b NSA records show that Weisband spent that June honing his skills in a language (probably Italian) at Arlington Hall, shipped out on 17 July, and arrived in London by 29 July.

^a Information that York provided in a later FBI interview can be seen in the Washington Field Office's memorandum "William Wolf Weisband," 27 November 1953, Document 34.

^b New York 981 to Moscow, 26 June 1943; this was not fully translated until 1979.

might have to flee the country through Mexico.⁶⁰ Some operatives, such as Morris and Lona Cohen and their case officer "Mark," avoided the net that was closing around other KGB agents. (The Cohens, as "Helen and Peter Kroger," would be convicted of espionage in the United Kingdom in 1961.)

⁶⁰ Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, *The Rosenberg File: A Search for Truth* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983), p. 74.

The long spate of prosecutions and loyalty hearings coincided with, and helped heighten, the atmosphere of suspicion and accusations now known as McCarthyism. Republicans in Congress were echoing widespread sentiment when they criticized the Truman administration for its failure to prevent Communism from conquering Eastern Europe and China. "Softness" on Communism abroad was portrayed by Republicans as the corollary of laxness at home. Suspicions that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had neglected internal security fed charges of a Democratic-led coverup of the wartime *Amerasia* affair, as well as Eisenhower administration Attorney General Herbert Brownell's 1953 accusation that then President Truman had ignored FBI warnings about Harry Dexter White in 1946.⁶¹ Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy and allies exploited this confusion and rancor, blaming Communists in the State Department for "losing" China and accusing federal workers of disloyalty on flimsy pretexts.

The tacit decision to keep the translated messages secret carried a political and social price for the country. Debates over the extent of Soviet espionage in the United States were polarized in the dearth of reliable information then in the public domain. Anti-Communists suspected that some spies-perhaps including a few who were known to the US Government-remained at large. Those who criticized the government's loyalty campaign as an overreaction, on the other hand, wondered if some defendants were being scapegoated; they seemed to sense that the public was not being told the whole truth about the investigations of such suspects as Julius Rosenberg and Judith Coplon. Given the dangerous international situation and what was known by the government at that time, however, continued secrecy was not illogical. With the Korean war raging and the prospect of war with the Soviet Union a real possibility, military and intelligence leaders almost certainly believed that any cryptologic edge that America gained over the Soviets was too valuable to concede--even if it was already known to Moscow.

Intensified political and legal pressure on the CPUSA coincided with shifts in Soviet intelligence tactics. Two pieces of legislation for a time gave the Justice Department broad powers against the Party. Between 1949 and 1957 the government, invoking the Alien Registration Act (better known as the Smith Act), won convictions of a dozen top CPUSA leaders for advocating the violent overthrow of the government.⁶² The following year, Congress overrode Truman's veto and passed the Internal Security Act (often called

⁶² The Supreme Court's decision in *Yates v. US*, handed down in June 1957, all but voided the Smith Act as a tool for prosecuting Party leaders.

⁶¹ Attorney General Brownell had President Eisenhower's approval for this November 1953 charge; both men almost certainly had seen translated messages about White (and probably about Hiss as well). Indeed, Eisenhower may have been briefed on the program by the G-2 while he was still Army Chief of Staff in 1947. One of the FBI warnings about White is included as Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946, Document 16.

the McCarran Act), which required Communist-affiliated organizations to register with the government and allowed emergency detention of potential spies and saboteurs.

These and other governmental actions sent the CPUSA partially underground in 1951. Party leaders took this step in an effort to protect essential cadres, but the move actually hastened the CPUSA's decline. In addition, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 critique of Stalinism prompted demoralizing internal debates in the CPUSA and precipitated the departure of still more members.⁶³ Soviet intelligence officers apparently received orders to steer clear of the closely monitored CPUSA, and they urged assets to avoid open contacts with Communist causes. By 1953 the FBI had concluded that the CPUSA was no longer a serious espionage threat, although the Bureau still regarded it as a potential recruiting ground for spies.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, intensive surveillance of Soviet diplomats and nationals did not stop KGB and GRU officers, even those working under official cover, from meeting with assets, and from continuing to operate with some effectiveness in the United States.⁶⁵

Venona in Later Years

Allied efforts to translate the wartime cables would continue for years to come (many translations would be first published in the 1960s and 1970s), but identifications of Soviet agents in America fell off in the 1950s. The CIA finally became an active partner in the Venona effort. ⁶⁶ After senior manager Frank Rowlett transferred to the CIA in 1952, selected analysts in the Agency's Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Staffs used the translations as a reference point to check the memories of KGB and GRU officers who had defected after the death of Stalin. Defectors once again became the US Intelligence Community's primary source of relatively current information on Soviet intelligence. American analysts sifted the

⁶³ Joseph R. Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 220-230.

⁶⁴ One FBI report of the period claimed that there was "no conclusive indication that the Communist Party, USA, is playing a role [in espionage] at this time;" see "Role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence," February 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Office of the Advisor for National Security Affairs, box 16, p. 48.
⁶⁵ Oleg Kalugin has written a memoir of Soviet operations in the United States during this period; see Kalugin and Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 1-4, 36. Some of the agents in the late 1950s and early 1960s proved devastating to American intelligence, particularly to the National Security Agency. A contemporary "exposé" can be under Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, 23 May 1960, Document 35.

⁶⁶ CIA received its first Venona translations in 1953, after veteran signals intelligence officer Frank Rowlett transferred to the Agency (the aforementioned Special Reports seen by OSO personnel in 1948 were not translations per se). CIA's William Harvey was formally briefed on the program in August 1952. AFSA was reconstituted as the National Security Agency on 4 November 1952.

defectors' accounts and compared them with information supplied by Venona and various liaison services to catalogue Soviet intelligence officers worldwide.⁶⁷ Venona thus became a touchstone for American counterintelligence—a kind of super-secret central reference point for FBI and CIA leaders to use in judging the accuracy of subsequent information.

Spy stories again dominated the headlines during 1957. In January the FBI wound up an operation it had run for almost a decade, hauling in Soviet asset Jack Soble and his associates on the basis of reports from double-agent Boris Morros—whom the Bureau had initially spotted in the company of Vassili Zarubin in April 1943.⁶⁸ A timely defection in Paris soon led the FBI to an even bigger catch. In the spring of 1957 the KGB recalled from New York an unreliable illegal, Lt. Col. Reino Hayhanen, who feared punishment at home and sought sanctuary in the American Embassy in Paris. Hayhanen gave the FBI enough information to locate the Brooklyn studio of his superior, an artist whom he knew only as "Mark." Special Agents spotted the elusive Mark when he returned to his studio one last time and found stolen documents and espionage gear in the artist's hotel room. Arrested in June 1957, Mark gave his name as "Col. Rudolf Abel," refusing to cooperate further. He was really William Henry Fisher, a senior KGB officer born in England who had entered the United States in 1948. Abel's arrest marked the first time the government had caught a Soviet "illegal" working in America. Indeed, Abel may well have been Iskhak A. Akhmerov's successor as illegal rezident in the United States. 69

The year 1957 ended with the FBI surveilling a pair of GRU illegals, Walter and Margarita Tairov, in New York. Although the Tairovs vanished and apparently fled the country in early 1958, the operation against GRU illegals was another first for American intelligence. The CIA had spotted one of the pair in Europe with help from its penetration of the GRU in East Germany, Lt. Col. Petr S. Popov. Timely liaison work enabled FBI Special Agents to amass scores of leads from surveillance of the duo.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, the couple almost certainly spotted the surveillance, and their flight and subsequent report were among the factors that soon led to Popov's arrest.

⁶⁷ CIA transferred the management of its portion of the Venona program to James Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff in 1965.

⁶⁸ Jack Soble was a Lithuanian whose given name was Sobolevicius; he and his brother had penetrated Leon Trotsky's entourage for the KGB in the 1920s; see Andrew and Gordievskiy, KGB, pp. 154-155. Hollywood producer Boris Morros was doubled by the FBI in 1947 and reported on the activities of Soble and members of his almost-moribund spy ring, while also passing low-level secrets and misinformation back to Moscow; see Boris Morros, My Ten Years as a Counter-Spy (London: Werner Laurie, 1959), pp. 191, 204-206. Morros is covername FROST in New York 18-19 to Moscow, 4 January 1945, Translation 80. Soble is covername ABRAM in New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944, Translation 31. ⁶⁹ See Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Veternay vneshney razvedki Rossii [Veterans of Russian Foreign Intelligence], pp. 158-159. Abel was exchanged for downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962.

⁷⁰ Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, pp. 92-93.

Venona had contributed to just one of these cases. Only a handful of American intelligence officials knew the truth behind the big spy cases of 1957: that US counterintelligence efforts against the Soviets, at least in the United States, had relied on volunteers since the Venona program peaked. This was not for want of trying. NSA had pored over the Soviet traffic and had kept its shrinking Venona team looking for additional leads. The FBI had penetrated the CPUSA and searched for illegals---but still did not catch Rudolf Abel for almost a decade. CIA divisions created clever but only marginally effective programs designed to establish coverage of Soviet installations abroad, to induce Soviet intelligence officers to defect (the REDCAP program), and to monitor the mail of Soviet illegals in America (HTLINGUAL). Despite all these efforts, the Intelligence Community's most important counterintelligence leads in the late 1950s came from volunteers-both walk-ins like Hayhanen and KGB Maj. Peter S. Deriabin, as well as agents-in-place like Popov and Polish intelligence officer Michal Goleniewski.⁷¹ American counterintelligence was once again, as it had before Venona, left to rely on voluntary sources.

Venona, according to US policy at the time, could only be shared with a small, witting cadre of senior American intelligence officers. The tiny fraction of Soviet messages that were read convinced the CIA and FBI that Soviet espionage, at least in the 1940s, was aggressive, capable, and farreaching-and that at least some wartime spies and agents of influence remained unidentified. Nothing that the West learned in subsequent years suggested that Soviet intelligence had grown any less capable or aggressive. Senior American intelligence officers also knew how poorly American intelligence had fared in its efforts to recruit agents to report on Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Direct approaches to Soviet officers and illegals in the early Cold War usually failed, and by the 1960s American intelligence was relying on voluntary defectors such as Anatoli Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko, and defectors-in-place such as Aleksi I. Kulak and Dmitri F. Polyakov, for relatively recent information about Soviet intelligence services. The leads they provided were often valuable but sometimes troubling for Western counterintelligence officers. Remembering how many clues to Soviet penetrations had accumulated in the files before Venona finally provided incontrovertible evidence of espionage against the West, molehunters in the CIA and FBI privately resolved to leave no defector's tip uninvestigated.

Only a short step led from this conclusion to a new concern among some, particularly in the CIA, that the Soviets might try to stage such defections to

⁷¹ The ineffectiveness of the CIA's and FBI's mail opening operations is attested in US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (better known as the Church Committee), "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Volume III, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1974, pp. 576-578, 652. feed misinformation to American and Western intelligence services. While this possibility is now considered to have been remote, it could not be resolved beyond all doubt at the time. It was impossible to prove the negative and rule out the possible existence of Soviet misinformation operations designed to distract Western services from the most damaging penetrations in their midst. Even so, American counterintelligence services would spend much of the 1960s doing all they could to prove that negative, and to minimize the possibility of deception.

The extreme secrecy of the Venona information tended to ensure that any precautions would be viewed skeptically by some of the very intelligence personnel they were designed to protect. Only a handful of American intelligence officers had access to the Venona secret, and those who did not have such access had no way, in many cases, to judge the reliability of the evidence gathered against alleged Soviet agents in the 1940s. As a result, even seasoned intelligence professionals viewed the spy cases and internal security debates of the 1940s and early 1950s as McCarthyite hysteria. This attitude probably influenced some in the Intelligence Community as a whole to underestimate the Soviet espionage threat.

Elizabeth Bentley died in Connecticut in December 1963, long before the end of the Cold War she had helped to start. She never knew about the Venona secret, or about the way in which her testimony (among that of others) assisted the program. Before she died, she had been denounced as a traitor, a liar, and a criminal by everyone from her old comrades to a former President of the United States. The controversy over her testimony was only a skirmish in the national debate over the true extent of Soviet espionage, and over the federal government's attempts to balance competing requirements of civil liberties and internal security. The declassification of Venona augments and clarifies the evidence in the public domain, and consequently should move the debate from the politics and personalities of those who testified in public to the capabilities and actions of political leaders and intelligence officers—both American and Soviet—who worked in many cases behind the scenes.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFSA	Armed Forces Security Agency, 1949-52
ASA	Army Security Agency (US Army), from 1945
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency, from 1947
CIG	Central Intelligence Group, 1946-47
CPUSA	Communist Party of the United States
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence, from 1946
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GRU	Chief Directorate for Intelligence, Red Army General Staff
G-2	Military Intelligence Division (US Army)
HCUA	House Committee on Un-American Activities, US Congress
шС	Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KGB	Committee for State Security, from 1954
MGB	Ministry for State Security, 1946-47, 1952-53
MID	Military Intelligence Division (see G-2)
NIA	National Intelligence Authority, 1946-47
NKGB	Peoples Commissariat for State Security, 1943-46
NKVD	Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, 1934-43
NSA	National Security Agency, from 1952
NSC	National Security Council, from 1947

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NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Directive
OGPU	Unified State Political Directorate, 1923-34
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OSS	Office of Strategic Services, 1942-45
SSA	Signals Security Agency, US Army, 1942-45
USCIB	United States Communications Intelligence Board, 1946-58

Chronology

1939	
10 January	Soviet intelligence defector Walter Krivitsky has the first of several debriefings at the Department of State.
26 June	President Roosevelt secretly gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Military Intelligence Division (MID), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) exclusive responsibility for counterespionage.
23 August	Germany and USSR sign Non-Aggression Pact.
1 September	World War II begins as Germany invades Poland.
1940	
21 May	President Roosevelt authorizes the FBI to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of persons suspected of subversion or espionage; surveillance was to be limited insofar as possible to aliens.
5 June	FBI-MID-ONI "Delimitation Agreement" further specifies the division of labor in domestic intelligence work.
28 June	The Alien Registration Act (the "Smith Act") criminalizes conspiracy to overthrow the government, requires resident aliens to register, report annu- ally, and provide notice of address changes.
20 August	KGB agent Ramon Mercader assassinates Leon Trotsky in Mexico.
1941	
10 February	Walter Krivitsky found dead of a gunshot wound in a Washington hotel; the police rule his death a suicide.
5 May	Federal agents arrest Amtorg employee and KGB New York <i>rezident</i> Gaik Ovakimian for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
22 June	Germany invades Russia.

FBI arrests 29 German military intelligence agents, crippling Germany's clandestine operations in the United States.
US Government allows Ovakimian to leave the country.
London KGB <i>rezident</i> Anatoli Gorski informs Moscow that his agent reports London has decided to build an atomic bomb.
Japanese aircraft attack Pearl Harbor; America enters the war.
Senior KGB officer Vassili M. Zarubin arrives in San Francisco on his way to succeed Ovakimian as New York <i>rezident</i> .
MID's Special Branch begins producing daily "Magic Summaries" analyz- ing foreign diplomatic messages for the White House and senior military commanders.
The Office of the Coordinator of Information becomes the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Interagency agreement divides signals intelligence duties: Navy assigned to handle naval codebreaking; the US Army's Signals Intelligence Service to handle diplomatic and military traffic; and the FBI works clandestine radio communications.
President Roosevelt bars all agencies except the FBI and the armed services from code-breaking activities. The services interpret this directive as authorization to deny signals intelligence to OSS.
US Army's renamed Signal Security Agency (SSA) formally begins work on Russian diplomatic traffic.
KGB New York <i>rezident</i> Vassili M. Zarubin meets CPUSA official Steve Nelson in Oakland and discusses espionage.
Communist International (Comintern) resolves to disband.

7 August	FBI receives an anonymous Russian letter naming Soviet intelligence officers in North America.
31 October	San Francisco KGB residency acknowledges the receipt of a new code- book.
1944	
1 May	The KGB, apparently on short notice, changes the indicator system for its cables, leaving the one-time pad page numbers <i>en clair</i> .
November	SSA's Cecil Phillips discovers the new KGB indicator, which is then used to detect "key" duplicated in Trade messages.
December	OSS purchases Soviet code and cipher material from Finnish sources; the Roosevelt administration orders the material returned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
15 December	The War Department transfers operational control of SSA from the Signal Corps to MID.
1945	
12 April	President Roosevelt dies; Harry Truman sworn in as his successor.
27 April	A US Army Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) team finds Russian code and cipher material in a German Foreign Office cryptanalytic center in a castle in Saxony-Anhalt.
8 May	Germany surrenders.
10 May	FBI conducts a lengthy debriefing of former Soviet agent Whittaker Chambers.
June	Earl Browder ousted as leader of the Communist Political Association, which reclaims its old name, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).
16 July	The Manhattan Project detonates the world's first nuclear explosion, Trinity, in New Mexico; Soviet agents had warned Moscow in advance.
14 August	Japan capitulates.
5 September	Soviet GRU code clerk Lt. Igor Gouzenko defects in Ottawa.

6 September	The War Department authorizes merger of SSA with selected Signal Corps units to form the Army Security Agency (ASA), under MID.
12 September	US-UK signals intelligence Continuation Agreement extends wartime cooperation in this field.
20 September	President Truman dissolves OSS.
7 November	Elizabeth Bentley interviewed at length for the first time by FBI agents about her work for the KGB.
1946	
22 January	Truman creates the Central Intelligence Group and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
13 June	The State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board adds the FBI and renames itself the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).
8 July	National Intelligence Authority Directive 5 secretly directs the DCI to conduct, as "services of common concern," all foreign intelligence and counterespionage.
10 July	CIG joins the new USCIB and gains access to signals intelligence.
15 July	A Canadian Royal commission releases its report on the Gouzenko affair to the public.
17 July	Attorney General Tom Clark urges Truman to renew and broaden Roosevelt's 1940 authorization to conduct electronic surveillance on "persons suspected of subversive activities"; the President soon approves.
20 December	ASA's Meredith Gardner translates part of a KGB message containing a list of atomic scientists.
1947	
22 March	Executive Order 9835 tightens protections against subversive infiltration of the US Government, defining disloyalty as membership on a list of subversive organizations maintained by the Attorney General.

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26 July	President Truman signs the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council (NSC) and transforming CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Around 1 September	Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic.
12 December	NSCID-5 reiterates but qualifies DCI's counterespionage authority to avoid precluding certain "agreed" FBI and military counterintelligence activities.
1948	
l July	NSCID-9 puts USCIB under the NSC and increases civilian control of signals intelligence.
20 July	General Secretary Eugene Dennis and 11 other CPUSA leaders arrested and indicted under the Smith Act of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the US Government.
31 July	Elizabeth Bentley testifies before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), publicly accusing Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie of being Soviet agents.
3 August	Whittaker Chambers names Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White as Commu- nists in testimony before the HCUA.
19 October	Meredith Gardner and Robert Lamphere meet at Arlington Hall and for- mally inaugurate full-time FBI-ASA liaison on the Soviet messages.
17 November	Chambers produces the "Pumpkin Papers" to substantiate his new charge that Hiss and White spied for Moscow during the 1930s.
16 December	A federal grand jury indicts Alger Hiss for perjury.
December	FBI identifies covername SIMA as Justice Department analyst Judith Coplon.
1949	
4 March	FBI arrests Coplon and Soviet UN employee Valentin A. Gubitchev in New York.

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23 March	Truman approves NSC 17/4, which reconstitutes the secret Interdepartmen- tal Intelligence Conference to coordinate jurisdiction of FBI and military counterintelligence.
20 May	Defense Secretary Louis Johnson directs a quasi-merger of service signals intelligence in a new Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), subordinate to the JCS.
23 September	Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.
1 October	The People's Republic of China is proclaimed in Beijing.
1950	
21 January	Alger Hiss is convicted of perjury.
24 January	Klaus Fuchs confesses to espionage.
9 February	Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, brandishes a list of Communists allegedly working in the State Department.
22 May	FBI arrests Harry Gold for espionage.
25 June	North Korean troops invade South Korea.
17 July	FBI arrests Julius Rosenberg.
24 August	AFSA assigns Soviet intercept material a restricted codeword ("Bride") and special handling procedures.
23 September	Congress passes the Internal Security Act (the "McCarran Act"), which it would soon pass again over President Truman's veto. The Act requires Communist-linked organizations to register and allows emergency deten- tion of potentially dangerous persons.
1951	
25 May	British Foreign Office officials Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess flee Great Britain to defect to the Soviet Union.
July	CPUSA announces that the Party will operate as a "cadre organization," with many of its leaders underground.

1952	
	AFSA detects duplicate key pages in GRU messages.
4 November	Truman creates the National Security Agency (NSA) to supersede AFSA and further centralize control of signals intelligence under the Secretary of Defense and a reconstituted USCIB.
1953	
	NSA places the "POBJEDA" codebook—recovered in Germany in April 1945—against KGB messages from 1941 through 1943. More than half of the burned codebook proves useable.
5 March	Stalin dies.
6 April	KGB defector Alexander Orlov's story appears in <i>Life</i> magazine; finally alerting the FBI to his residence in the United States.
19 June	Julius and Ethel Rosenberg executed after President Eisenhower again denies executive clemency.
27 July	Armistice signed in Korea.
6 November	Attorney General Herbert Brownell sparks controversy by claiming in a Chicago speech that former President Truman had appointed Harry Dexter White to head the International Monetary Fund despite FBI warnings that White was a Soviet agent.
1954	
20 December	CIA's Directorate of Plans creates the Counterintelligence Staff, with James J. Angleton as its chief.
1956	
8 March	NSC approves the FBI's proposed "Cointelpro" operation against the CPUSA.
4 June	The Department of State releases Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes.

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October	Soviet troops suppress a popular uprising in Hungary.
1957	
25 January	FBI arrests Jack and Myra Soble for espionage on the basis of evidence provided by double agent Boris Morros.
4 May	KGB officer Reino Hayhanen, en route from the United States, defects at the US Embassy in Paris.
17 June	Supreme Court in <i>Yates v. US</i> rules the government had enforced the Smith Act too broadly by targeting protected speech instead of actual action to overthrow the political system; this ruling makes the Act almost useless for prosecuting Communists.
21 June	Federal authorities detain Hayhanen's superior, KGB illegal Col. Rudolf Abel, in New York.
15 November	Abel is sentenced to 30 years and conveyed to prison.

PART I

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ESPIONAGE

Part I: The American Response to Soviet Espionage

Archival Citations and a Note on the Documents

The following 35 documents are reproduced in Part I. They represent an attempt to gather some of the more interesting, important, and revealing original documents available to American policymakers and intelligence officers during the period covered by this volume. It is hoped that these documents will provide researchers with ready access to some of the key decisions of the period, as well as give them a flavor of internal US Government discussions and concerns over Soviet espionage in America. Almost all of the documents were already declassified, 13 were declassified by NSA, FBI, and CIA specifically for this volume. In many cases the date of the declassification is marked on the document's first page.

- 1. Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).
- 2. Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Confidential File), "State 1939-40," box 9.
- 3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Confidential File), "State 1939-40," box 9.
- 4. J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, 25 October 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 12.
- 5. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attache Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Harry Hopkins Papers, "MID Reports—USSR—Volume V," box 190 [Chart not included].
- 6. Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department---FBI Reports," box 15.

- Tokyo Circular 906 to Berlin and Helsinki, 6 October 1942, National Security Agency, "Jap Dip Dispatches," Venona Collection, Provisional Box 1.
- 8. US Army Signals Security Agency, "Memorandum on Russian Codes in the Japanese Military Attache System," 9 February 1943, National Security Agency Archives [Excerpt].
- 9. Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 18.
- 10. Anonymous letter to Hoover, undated [received 7 August 1943], National Security Agency Venona Collection, 54-001, box D046 [Russian original with English translation].
- 11. Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944, Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Tarasov file.
- Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Soviet Codes," 27 December 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "Russia—1944," box 49.
- Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—Atomic bomb," box 167.
- 14. Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, Igor Gouzenko file.
- Hoover to Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—S," box 169.
- Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI----W," box 169 [Attachment not included].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File), "Justice" (7), box 22 [Excerpt].

- Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, "Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).
- [Meredith Knox Gardner], "Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic," 30 August 1947, National Security Agency, Venona Collection, box D017.
- 20. No author [probably William K. Harvey, CIA], Memorandum for the File, "COMRAP," 6 February 1948, Central Intelligence Agency, Vassili M. Zarubin file.
- George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, "Loyalty Investigations," box 11.
- 22. [Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Tom Clark Papers, "Attorney General— White House/President, 1948," box 83.
- 23. D. M. Ladd, Memorandum to the Director [J. Edgar Hoover], "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Reading Room, Alger Hiss File.
- 24. Tom C. Clark, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File), "Justice" (4), box 21.
- 25. [Robert J. Lamphere to Gardner], "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, With Alias," 9 May 1949, National Security Agency Venona Collection at 49-005.
- 26. Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, National Security Agency File, "Meeting 36," box 205.
- 27. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949, National Security Agency, Venona Collection at 49-018.
- [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, aka; Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949, National Security Agency, Venona Collection at 49-029.

- 29. W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee [H. Marshall Chadwell], "Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,"
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- 30. Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI---G," box 168.
- [Lamphere to Gardner], "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950, National Security Agency, Venona Collection, 50-025, box D045.
- 32. Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI---R," box 169.
- 33. Armed Forces Security Agency, "Russian Cryptology During World War II," undated [ca. 1951], National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 457 (National Security Agency), Historic Cryptographic Collection, box 526 [Excerpt].
- No author [Washington Field Office, FBI], "William Wolf Weisband," 27 November 1953, National Security Agency, Office of Security files [Excerpt].
- 35. Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Staff Secretary Files (Subject Series), "Expose of Soviet Intelligence," box 23 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].

1. Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939.

PR. DUNN DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 15, 1939 arch trut 6 Ratin Statement made by General Krivitsky, a former general of the Soviet Army, formerly on duty in the Military Intelligence Section of the Soviet General Staff (alias Semuel Ginsberg) July 14 1939 It will be recalled that General Krivitsky, who escaped from the Soviet Union at the time that the eight 800. Red Army generals, including Marshal Tukhachevsky, were 000 seized and executed, and whose civilian name is Semuel Ginsberg, came to this country with his wife on temporary ω visitors' visas in the latter part of 1938. In January Ø 1939 he called at the Department and discussed at length ASSOFF, SERGE certain aspects of Soviet developments with which he was particularly familiar. A memorandum prepared by Mr. Page setting forth some of the statements made by General Krivitsky is attached hereto. While the general was in the Department he told me frankly that he feared that agents of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs (the OCPU) 28 might make some attack upon him or members of his family 1-11-72 while they were in the United States. He said he was therefore living quietly and endeavoring not to attract Date FIEU attention to his actions. NARS, | General Krivitsky came in to see me today and Quring 土品 the course of a rather extended conversation made a fum ar 194 P à

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of statements, the substance of some of which are set forth below.

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He has sold a series of four articles to the <u>Saturday</u> <u>Evening Post</u> and is writing a book which he hopes to have published in the not distant future.

On Tuesday evening, March 7, he entered a café near Forty-second and Broadway and took a table with a filend, a Mr. Shoup, one of the editors of the <u>Jewish Daily Forward</u>, whom he had met while in Paris. While they were talking at this table four men entered the restaurant and seated themselves at an adjoining table. One of these men made obvious efforts to attract the General's attention and the General recognized him as Sergei Bassoff, an agent of the OGPU who had been connected with the American work of that organization for many years and whose record had become known to the General while the latter was engaged in intelligence work in Moscow. Bassoff was formerly a Soviet sailor; he joined

the Soviet secret police in 1920; he came to the United States as a Soviet secret agent some time during the early twenties; since his arrival in the United States he has been an employee of the Soviet secret service; he has been naturalized as an American citizen; he has been invaluable as a GPU courier traveling between various European countries on an American passport; in June 1937 he was arrested in Holland while transporting funds but was released shortly thereafter

thereafter, apparently after having called upon the American Consul in Amsterdam for protection; after his release he proceeded to Moscow where he arrived in July 1937 and where he remained for some time.

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Mr. Bassoff indicated by gestures that he desired to speak to the General and the General in a somewhat agitated frame of mind suggested to Mr. Shoup that they leave the cafe at once. Before they could get out, however, Mr. Bassoff stopped them and told the General that he desired to have a talk with him. When the General replied that he wished to have nothing whatever to do with Mr. Bassoff, the latter repeated his statement that it was necessary that they should have a talk. Mr. Shoup interrupted to suggest that all three of them go to the New York Times Annex, which was close by, where they could talk in private. The General then asked Mr. Bassoff if he intended to shoot him and Bassoff replied in the negative.

In the office of the <u>New York Times</u> Mr. Sheplin, a member of the editorial staff of that newspaper and a friend of Mr. Shoup, conducted them to a private room. Mr. Shoup withdrew to a distance so the conversation could be carried on without a third person overhearing. The General asked Bassoff who had sent him and Bassoff replied that the meeting had been accidental. The General said that

that he knew that Bassoff must be acting under orders since otherwise he would not dare to talk with a person in such bad standing with the Soviet authorities as himself. Bassoff replied that the General still had friends in Yoscow and that many persons continued to have confidence in him. He said, "Of course, we have read all that you have written and we suppose you are writing more." The General then inquired regarding the fate of a number of his friends and was informed that all had been shot. He was also told that the brothers of his wife "had suffered greatly". The intonations and gestures accompanying this statement were apparently made in order to convey the impression that the actions of the General and his wife were responsible for this suffering.

The General asked Mr. Bassoff if the latter was not afraid to approach him in such a manner in the United States. Bassoff said, "I have no fear. I am perfectly safe here." The General then told Bassoff that the latter would not dare take his life. Bassoff made no threat but contented himself with stating that there was nothing particularly to fear; that the penalty for such an act would probably be only a couple of years in jail.

The General told Bassoff to leave at once and not to approach him again. Bassoff thereupon left the building, joined his three friends who had waited outside, and

disappeared.

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disappeared. The General had baid no particular attention to the three men accompanying Mr. Bassoff but Mr. Shoup told him later that they appeared to be of the gangeter type.

The General told me that he believed that his life was in danger since the GPU organization in the United States was very strong and since he was certain that Bassoff would not have approached him unless he had been ordered so to do by the highest Soviet authorities and unless it had been decided that come what may the General must not be permitted to continue writing his experiences and memoirs. He said that in 1935 a GPU agent had been killed in New York City by an automobile in suspicious circumstances. There were ways of bringing about his own death in such a manner as to make it appear to be accidental.

I asked the General if he desired police protection end he replied that he did not presume to make such a request; that he hoped eventually to be able to leave New York and live quietly in some more remote place: but that he could not do so until he had finished some of his writings and had obtained an extension of his permit to remain in the United States, which expired on March 31.


Since General Krivitsky has served for many years in the Military Intelligence Service and since the work of that service is closely connected with that of the GPU (The Commissariat for Internal Affairs), I asked him several

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several questions regarding the organization of the GPU in the United States. He replied that there were two distinct branches of the GPU operating in this country. One branch was headed by some person in the Soviet Embassy, a person probably who had no diplomatic rank or perhaps a low diplomatic rank and who had little direct contact with the Ambassador or diplomatic members of his staff. Subordinate to this person were GPU centers in Amtorg, Intourist, and the various Soviet consular offices.

The second GPU branch had no connection whatever with the first and like the first, reported direct to Moscow. The head of the second branch lived in New York and undoubtedly many of his agents were American citizens. Although there was some contact between the two branches of the GPU they worked independently.

fint. Eu:Henderson:LF



2 Investigation a highly skilled investigative force supported by the resources of an exceedingly efficient, well equipped, and adequately manned techni-cal laboratory and identification division. The latter contains identifying data relating to more than ten million persons, including a very large number of individuals of foreign extraction. As a result of an exchange of data between the Departments of Justice, War and Navy, comprehensive indices have been prepared. With a view to organizing investigative activities in this field on a more efficient and effective basis, I recommend the abandonment of the interdepartmental committee above mentioned, and a concentration of investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters in the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies should in that event function as a committee for the purpose of coordinating the activities of their subordinates. If the foregoing recommendations meet with your approval, I suggest that confidential instructions be issued by you to the heads of the Departments interested in accordance therewith. A draft of a memorandum which you may possibly care to use for that purpose, is enclosed herewith for your consideration. Respectfully, Attorney General. Enclosure No.2100

3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939.

Hyde Park, N. Y., June 26, 1939 CONFIDE TIAL MENORANIUM FOR - THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY APPLICATION OF MAR · 2 - 5 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ÷ ÷ 1.14 THE POSTMASTER GENERAL x 12 THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY THE SECRETARY OF COMPERCE x 2 It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be con-trolled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Neval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities. No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into metters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or subotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above. I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the mearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counter-escionage, or sabotage. (Ligned) Frenklin & Possiels

4. J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, 25 October 1940.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR Federal Bureau of Investigation Anited States Bepartment of Instice Washington, D. C. October 25, 1540 SINCER G Lajor General Edwin L. Watson Secretary to the President The Thite House Washington, D. C. Ly dear General: I am enclosing herewith for the infor-mation of the President and you a memorandum which I have just completed upon the present which I have just completed upon the present status of the espionage and counter-espionage operations of the Federal Dureau of Investigation to date. I thought the Fresident might wish to have an up-to-date memorandum of exactly what we have done and are doing in this field. As you will note, the contents of this memorandum are highly confidential, in view of the delicacy of some of the operations upon which we are presently working. vorking. With expressions of my best regards, I cm Sincerely, Inclosure DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E)(2) Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72 By DBS, NLR, Date APR 3 1975 15

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

Bederal Bureau of Investigation

Anited States Department of Instice Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E)(2) Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72 By DBS, NLR, Date APR 3 1975


October 24, 1940


<u>Strictly Considential</u>

PRESENT STATUS OF ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been operating for a period of many months on the eastern seaboard a shortwave radio station which is utilized by the German Intelligence Service for transmission of reports of German Agents in the United States to Germany. The directors of the German Secret Service in Germany also communicate with this station furnishing instructions and requests for information to the operators of this station for transmittal to German Agents in the United States. Needless to say, no one knows that this German communication system is actually controlled and operated in the United States by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who are considered both by German Intelligence Services in Germany and in the United States to be actual members of the German espionage ring. Through this station the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been able to develop voluminous information concerning the identity of German Agents in the United States, their movements, interests and program. All material furnished by German Agents through their com-plicated channels of communication to this station for transmittal to Europe is cleared by State, War and Navy Department officials prior to the time that it is actually transmitted to Germany. Collaterally, in the operation of this station the undercover Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been utilized for the transmittal of funds for salaries and expenses of German Agents operating in the United States, which has of course resulted in widening the knowledge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relative to this espionage group.


Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have under constant observation and surveillance a number of known and suspected Agents of the German, Russian, French and Italian Secret Services. The FBI is the through its counter espionage efforts to maintain a careful check upon the channels of communication, the sources of information, the method of finance and other data relative to these agents. Arrest is considered inadvisable except in extraordinary cases because counter espionage methods of observation and surveillance result in a constantly growing reservoir of information concerning net only known but also new agents of these governments.







-3- (a) Arrangements have been perfected with the following companies to obtain through their facilities in Central and South America information concerning industrial, financial, political and propaganda manipulations and operations of foreign governments: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Pan American Airways, New York City National City Bank, New York City United Fruit Company of Boston, Eassach**usetts** W. R. Grace Company, New York City Montgomery, Ward & Company, Chicago, Illinois Dun and Bradstreet, New York City The American Letal Company, Ltd., New York City Sterling Products, Inc., New York City (markcters of Bayer aspirin and related products) Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., New York City The American-Colombian Corporation, Jashington, D. C. Stewart, Jones & Company, Inc., New York City American Express Company, New York City Smithsonian Institution, New York City E. A. Pierce & Company, New York City Pan American News Service, Washington, D. C. The Hemisphere Corporation, New York City Rockefeller Foundation, New York City. All of these organizations have extensive interests and personnel in Central and South America and are in a position to obtain information of interest and value to the Government of the United States. The employees of these companies who obtain this information do not know its purpose or the identity of the agency to which it is furnished.









- 7 information of interest to the Federal Government concerning actual and proposed activities contrary to the best interests of the country. This type of work is, of course, done under guarded cir-cumstances and in a most careful manner. A constant monitoring is maintained of all movements and expenditures of foreign funds, their location, sources and dis-tribution, with special emphasis of course upon those funds in which there is a direct or indirect interest on the part of the German, Italian, Russian, Japanese and French Governments. Because of the FBI's friendly relationships over a period of many years with various banking establishments, excellent coopera-tion is received from financial institutions. This monitoring program of course produces much valuable information not only from the standpoint of detecting espionage, sabotage and similar activities for which the funds may be used, but also develops data and information of interest to the Treasury Department in reaching administrative decisions with reference to desirable legislation, etc. The Bureau has prepared and maintains extensive suspect lists composed of data concerning several thousand individuals located in the United States and its territories whose nationalistic tendencies and activities are considered potentially inimical to the welfare of the United States. These records are maintained according to the nationality of the individuals involved, as well as geographically. In the event of greater emergency or the enactment of additional legislation when it might become necessary to take such individuals into custody or to intern them, the information maintained in these suspect lists, instantaneously available, sets forth the names, addresses, activities and source of information upon each individual in convenient form for recessary action. This list is of course being increased daily as the facts justify. Individual lists are maintained upon German groups and sympathizers, Communist groups and sympathizers, Fascist groups and sympathizers, Japanese and others. The Federal Eureau of Investigation Fechnical Laboratory, which is the largest and best equipped of its kind in the world, has trained personnel constantly engaged in the handling of scientific studies and technical crime detection methods in the solution of espionage and sabotage cases by Laboratory procedures.






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5. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attache Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941 [Chart not included].



G-3 Report

I.G. No. 3100

QPU.

The Cheke lasted until March 1, 1928 when its name was changed to the GPU - COSUMARSTVENOVE POLITICHISKOVE UPRAVLENITE (The State Political Administration) with little or no changes in function. Gradually, each republic organised its own GPU and on November 23, 1923 the republic GPU's were united into the <u>OHEDINYCHNOTE</u> <u>OCSUDARSTVENNOTE</u> <u>POLITICHISKOTE</u> UPRAVLENITE (The Unified State Political Administration) (OGPU).

OGPU.

The purpose of the OGPU was to unite all the revolutionary forces of all the republics to "combat the political and economic counter-revolutionary movements, espionage and banditry". The chief of the OGPU was appointed by the Presidium of the then Central Committee of the U. S. S. R. and had a vote in the committee.

The head of the OGPU at that time was also a member of the Supreme Court; and the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. was responsible for the legality of all acts of the OGPU. It was simply another CHEKA with broader powers. These powers grew to such proportions that it became for a while the most powerful and feared government agency. It had so much power that its activities were actually curtailed in 1934 when it was incorporated into the N.K.V.D.

N. K. V. D.

At the time of the Civil War all of the republics organized their own republic commissariats of internal affairs. These commissariats controlled the militia, criminal investiga-tions and prisons. But in 1930 these republic N.K.V.D.'s were liquidated and the term was not used again until 1934 when the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. was formed as an All-Union Commissariat. It was responsible for the following:

(1) Preservation of revolutionary order and

- state security.

 - (2) Protection of public property.
 (3) Registration of civil acts, and vital statistics. (4) Protection of the border.

The following administrations were organized and subordinated to it:

- State security. (1)
- (2) Militia. Border and internal protection.
- (3)
- (4) Fire protection.
- Corrective labor camps and settlements. (5) Department of civil acts.
- (6) (7) Administrative economic administration.

From M. J. Moscow

Report No. 1903

Date: April 14, 1941

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G-2 Report

1.G. No. 3100

Although the N.K.V.D. was made an All-Union Commissariat, it again formed the N.K.V.D. in all the republics, except the H.S.F.S.H., which republic became directly under the All-Union N.K.V.D. The same administrations listed above were organized in all the subordinate administrative divisions down to and including the city or district and village.

At the same time, the N.K.V.D. collegium within the Supreme Court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court having jurisdiction. Cases of treason and espionage were referred to the Military collegium of the Supreme Court or to the military tribunal having jurisdiction. Cases coming within the functions of the State Security Administration were all referred to the Supreme Court.

To take over all other court functions of the abolished N.K.V.D. collegium, there was formed the Special Advisory Council within the All-Union Commissariat. It consisted of five members and was actually a court in itself. This step gave the N.K.V.D. even more power for it permitted it to try its own cases.

even more power for it permitted it to try its own cases. In November, 1935, the N.K.V.D. took over the surveying and cartography administration of the U.S.S.R. with all of the technical agencies to carry out its functions. This latter was taken away in 1938 when it became an All-Union Administration under the Soviet of Peoples Commissars (SOVNARKOM).

In October, 1935, the administration of highways was brought into the N.K.V.D. where it remains today.

When the new constitution was ratified in becember, 1936, the N.K.V.D. became a Union-Republic Commissariat and has remained as such to the present time. In February, 1941, the State Security Administration was removed from the N.K.V.D. and formed into a new commissariat.

Today the N.K.V.D. is organized into six administrations:

(1) Militia.

(2) Border and Internal protection.

(3) Fire protection.

(4) Corrective labor camps and settlements.

(5) Registration of civil acts, vital statistics

and preservation or state papers.

(6) Construction and maintainance of highways.

Each republic, autonomous republic, territory, sutonomous territory, city or district and village has an agency of some kind for each one of the above memod administrations. Theoretically, each one of these subordinate N.K.V.D. Commissariats controls its own six administrations under the next higher N.K.V.D., but there is no coubt that in practice each administration works in close harmony and directly under the administration of the maxt superior N.K.V.D. administration.

Although it has not been so stated, it may be that since there are seven (7) vice commissers, each administration and the chief inspection is under one of these vice commissers. The chief inspector is responsible to the Commisser only and functions as

From M. A. Moscow

Report No. 1903 Date: April 14, 1941

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the Chief Inspector of the Commissariat. The attached chart shows the organization of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. as it is today.

ADMINISTRATIONS.

Since a few of the administrations have little or no military value they are discussed briefly below.

Fire Protection Administration.

This administration confines its activities to cities and towns. Each city has its fire department, theoretically subordinated to the city Soviet but with probably a greater responsibility to the fire administration of the oblast Soviet above it. Funds for the city departments ecome from city budgets and therefore only the fire administration headquarters of the U.S.S.R. and the sixteen (16) republics are financed by the national budget.

In rural communities all fire administrations are voluntary; and since the Soviet Union is 67% rural, it means that 67% of the personnel in the fire administration forces are unpaid volunteers. In addition, all factories and mills also have their own volunteer fire brigades. Hence, the city personnel in the city fire departments is relatively small. The estimated number of fire administration personnel is 60,000 for the entire country, evolusive of volunteers.

Civil Acts & Vital Statistics Administration.

This administration is purely civil in character. It is also charged with the preservation of state papers, and the personnal for this administration is trained in the N.K.V.D. Institute mantioned above." Except for the headquarters of this administration, which are established in the U.S.S.R., republics, tarritories, oblasts and cities, the routime duties of this administration as they apply to small towns, villages and rural areas, are performed by the multitis. Mational funds are used to maintain only the headquarters of the administrations of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics. The personnel is estimated at 10,000.

Highway Administration.

This administration is responsible for the construction and maintainence of the All-Union, the Republic, the regional, and the territorial highways. The responsibility for the district and village roads lies with the respective Soviets. The personnal in this administration is made up principally of technicians. The labor for highway prejects comes from the corrective labor camps. When an impertant highway must be built it is not infrequent that an appeal (with rather stiff persuasion) is gent out to the Komsomels, trade unions, Geoeviathim and the Party, to donate services to a highway project. This administration is maintained antirely by the mational budget. Its personnel is estimated at 6,000.

Fran M. L. Moscow

* See chart.

Depart Ho. 1903 Date: April 14, 1941

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G-2 Report I.G. No. 5100 See the following reports for other administrations; Bepert Ho. 1906 - 2037-2/05/ Militia Border Guards & Internal · 1005 - 2037-1552/2 Treope-. Corrective Laber Camps and Calentis 1905-2037-1552/27 . REMARKS. The personnel strength of the H.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. is estimated as follows: e. Militia 575,000 Including: Bailway Quards (25,000) Enterprise Quards (50,000) b. Border Guarda 150,000 c. Interior Troops 50,000 d. Convoy Troops 50,000 e. Fire Personnel 60,000 f. Civil Acts Administration 10,000 g. Highway Administration 5,000 Total 700.000 Control over this commissariat is actually contralized in the Soviet of Peoples Commissars, where orders are carried out by the Commissar of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. In none of the subordinate organs is this control released, but the responsibility of maintainence and finanoing is forced upon agencies other than the U.S.S.R. Although the Soviets disclaim forced labor in this country, the organization of this commissariat is interesting to note. In it are the means to apprehend (militia), try and sentence (advisory council) and imprison offenders (corrective labor). Any governmental organization that has a crying need for labor simply calls upon the N.K.V.D. to supply it. If the amount of labor is insufficient to supply the need, it is relatively an easy matter to institute a reign of terror on any pretext and fill up labor colonies to meet requirements. There is little doubt that during the purges of the past, one eye was kept on the labor needs of governmental projects. The N.K.V.D., including the State Security, has protected the present regime but has also prevented the development of the country. Its close supervision over the people, its pogroms, its raids and arrests, has instilled fear to such an extent that initiative in all phases of national economy has disappeared. The individual is too concerned with the problems of simply living that he is

From M. A. Moscow

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reluctant to attempt any changes or improvements for fear of a mistake - and a mistake means prison. The M.K.V.D. has every individual under obser- vation from birth to death. It registers the birth, assig quarters, controls internal, as well as external, passport it prevents or permits travel within the country, its sect agents are everywhere; its actions are swift. An individu simply disappears in the middle of the night and no one ev- sees or hears of him again. The N.K.V.D. is used as the check and balance weapon by the government - whenever a gr in the government gets too popular, or too powerful, or wi Stalin needs scapegoats to cover government mistakes he un leaches his N.K.V.D. The N.K.V.D. and the State Security the most powerful weapons in the hands of the government.	gns ts, net ual ner roup ten
The Soviet Union is in itself a prison and the H.K.V.D. and	
State Security are its keepers.	
Jarget at Vaice	hela.
Joseph A. Michela, lenclosure: Major, Cavalry, Chart. Ass't. Military Atta	
FORWARDED Simple D. Yoston, Nation F.A. Militare Attack	

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6. Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER



Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Instire Washington, D. C.

February 18, 1942

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PERSONAL AND

Major General Edwin M. Watson Secretary to the President The White House Washington, D. C.

My dear General Watson:

As of possible interest to the President and to you, I am transmitting herewith copy of a revised delimitation agreement executed by General Lee, Admiral Wilkinson and myself on February 9, 1942. It will be observed that this agreement outlines the respective responsibilities of Kilitary and Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation under various conditions.

> Sincerely, DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. E(E)(2) JUSTICE Dept. letter, 9-21-72 By DBS, NLR, Date JUN 251975

Attachment

By special messenger



February 9, 1942

SUBJECT: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the <u>Wilitary Intelligence Division</u> The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereunder. It is now agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage, (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the reporting agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II.

FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the categories involving civilians in the United States and its territories with the exception of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone, Guam. American Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska other than that specifically described in Paragraph III.

> DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. E(E)(2) Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72 By DBS, NLR, Date JUN 251975

-2-2. Investigation of all cases directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of designated group or set of circumstances. The coordination of civilian organizations furnishing inforз. mation regarding subversive movements. 4. Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its . operations in this field. 5. Keep MID and ONI advised of important developments, such as: (a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts. (b) Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities. (c) Developments affecting vital utilities. (d) Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems. (for c and d above, no protective coverage is contemplated) 6. Ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat Fifth Column Activities (overt acts of all sorts in groups of armed forces of enemies); and transmitting to MID, ONI and State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

7. Keeping ONI and MID informed of any other important developments.

- 3 -

III.

<u>WID will be responsible for:</u>

 Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.

2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands ddjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.

3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.

IV.

ONI will be responsible for:

- 1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval employ or control, and all civilians in Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Hidway Islands.
- 2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph I.

ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore, and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

3. Informing FBI and WID of any important developments. V. The ultimate test of cooperation and coordination of the Intelligence agencies is the manner in which they function under conditions of national emergency or actual warfare. There should be no doubt as to the identity of the agency or official who is primarily responsible for carrying on intelligence operations under the broad conditions for which the governing principles are listed hereinafter.

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

VI. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the Military Commander assumes responsibility for Intelligence coverage. He has authority to coordinate intelligence activities of the participating agencies, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities by the assignment of missions, the designation


of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong, nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

- 5 -

VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance to the Wilitary Commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the Wilitary Commander. VIII. It is assumed that the Wilitary Commander will not hesitate to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL

II. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Military Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Military Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:



I. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. Then the Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agency, the Wilitary Commander should obtain the necessary authority from the War Department. II. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the Wilitary Commander, whenever either of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended through the director of each service.

- 7 -

III. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be the agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same principles will govern the Navy Department.


PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS

IIII. Under these conditions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division will operate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV. IIV. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such amendments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the

- 8 subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions. traymande.0 Assistant Chief of Staff G-2. Far Department Director, Office of Naval Intelligence Aifector (Federal Bureau of Investigation

7. Tokyo Circular 906 to Berlin and Helsinki, 6 October 1942.

-C R E Tokyo (WOTNS) From: Berlin and Helsinki To: October 6, 1942 JMA REVISED TRANSLATION Circular #906 (Seven parts complete) To Col. HAYASHI and Major HIROSE. We have commenced the study of Russian diplomatic and commercial codes, and have obtained the following results. For our information let us know how you are getting along. 1. Extent of interception. Mostly from Moscow and the Foreign Office in Kuibyshev. Also from the embassies and consulates in Japan and Manchoukuo. Very little material aside from this. 2. Diplomatic. (12) (1) (Type 8 ?) Subtracting the first group of the text from the third group, the first and second digits give the additive page; the third digit is the same as the second; the fourth and fifth digits ? 3 give the vertical and horizontal coordinates; the . fifth digit is always even; the code seems to be a. 4 figure one. The additive table is 50 pages each of This type is used in all messages 50 groups. This type is used in all messages centering in Kulbyshev and about ****** of these around Moscow. C. I. #896 (Japanese) Page 1 ARMY SECRET 573.



·(` SECRE group from the end is a multiple of 10 and, as sub-tracting the first and second digits from the third and fourth digits gives an ascending sequence in each telegram, it is thought that this indicates the additive page. The additive table is 40 pages each of 50 groups. This form is used from Tokyo -- HASHI -to (LADOGA ?) and from -- HASHI² -- to Manchuria. (5) Special form 2(b). The second group from the end is a multiple \prec Aside from this it is the same as the of 1Ø. preceding paragraph. This form is used for messages going in the opposite direction as the previous paragraph. 3. Commercial. The first and second digits of the first group of the text give the vertical and horizontal coordinates. The third digit gives the length of the message. (Up to 6% groups is 1; and increases 1 for each 6% groups thereafter.) The fourth and fifth digits give the additive page. The additive table is 50 pages each of 50 groups. a - Kana spelling. (Japanese) Inter. 10/6/42 (12) Trans. 1/29/43 Retrans. 2/6/43 (B-d) C I. #896 Page 3. ARMY SECRET

8. US Army Signals Security Agency, "Memorandum on Russian Codes in the Japanese Military Attache System," 9 February 1943 [Excerpt].

archies 3,6.9,1943. (CBNI 17 SECRET Four Fornt · ACC 4665 (su free 1920 + 10820) MEMORANDUE ON RUSSIAN CODES IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE SYSTEM footnote 17 The present memorandum records all quickly available information concerning Russian codes which have been transmitted in the Japanese Military Attache (JMA) system of enciphered code. The transmissions seem all to have taken place from Europe (Berlin, Stockholm, Helsinki, Hungary) to Tokyo-(once to Hsinking). The earliest found is dated July 1, 1941; the most recent, Decem-ber 22, 1942. All but one (number 8 below), which does not seem to be an ordinary code, were enciphered by the C additive-book, no matter what the date or the cipher-alphabet used (1,2,3). Cipher text. The text seems to suffer from more than the usual transmission garbles. It is possible that haste and indifference have produced many of the deviations from intelligible Russian and numerals that are found. Materials used. Circumstances caused the preparation of the memorandum to be hasty. The various message-parts had already been recorded on cards by originating station, station addressed, date, serial number, additive-book page, and the first and last words of the code involved. Unfortunately, the corresponding terminal munbers had not been recorded. Additional information has been sought principally by inspection of the first and last available parts of each message. It has been impossible in the time spent to correct many, garbles and other inaccuracies in the Russian words or to check the work of the compiler of the cards, although some errors of both sorts have been detected and amended in passing. <u>Types of codes</u>. Each code is classed, when this could be easily done, as one- or two-part and as four- or five-digit. <u>Treatment of the Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet</u>. The earliest tramsmissions (1-3) used the code-values for the letters of the Russian alphabet provided in the basic code of the JMA system. These are properly quadriliteral groups introduced by NQ; thus, NQAZ $\stackrel{-}{=}$ Russian A. (See 7.) On some occasions, NQ is used only at the beginning and the end of a Russian word, and is to be read before each intervening letter-pair. (See 5.) In the longer code-book messages here treated, NQ never appears, but is to be read before each applicable letter-pair. (See 1,2,3, and compare 8.) BENNET DENNET

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method was caused by the great time, effort, and expense 1 ten- tails. In all longer transmissions sent later (beginning with 4), the Russian letters were incorporated as individual-letter (JL) spellings into the message in transliteration, the 26 letters of the Roman alphabet being substituted for the 31 of the Russian (, the hard sign being omitted). This change in method reduces the length of words by helf. The table of translitera- tion is given below. Note that the use of π , V, Q, (foru,), X, and E (for 3) agrees with the use of the corresponding Lorse letters when applied to Russian. The use of the other letters agree both with the Lorse and with the usual Slavonic translitera- tion of the Cyrillic letters (off. H[Serbian X = Croatian H], C,Y), except for J (taken away from W, which becomes I, and assigned to Y). The special Horse letters for W, W, and A have been re- placed by Q, U, and A respectively, so that, finally, the follow- ing pairs of letters are represented each by the same letter: AJ (a), E3 (E), W W (I), YW (U), WUW (Q). Cyrillic Transl. in Transl. used Cyrillic Transl. in Transl. use messages in EII(b)4a A A P R R B B V T T T T F G G G Y U U A D D A P F F A D D A P F F A U C TS 3 Z Z U U U A D D A S S S B W V ZH U C TS 3 Z Z U S W U U A I I I W Q SHH W I I I W Q SHH M M M M S E E N M Y Y ZH Y ZH Y ZH M J C CH M I I I W Q SHH M M M M Y A A Transliterated YE when it does not follow a consonant. b At first the usual Slavonic Y was used for bi . But since in systems for use in English-speaking countries YU, A, and on occasion YE are used for M , A may the store, in order to avoid some one's misunderstanding a form like YUCHYUAT (for 6H) YMBAT b), to employ I, a symbol widely used							
AA (a), E3 (E), M Å (I), Y Θ (U), W Ψ (Q). Cyrillic Transl. in Transl. used Cyrillic Transl. in Transl. use messages in EII(b)4a messages in EII(b)4ε A A A P R R B B B C S S B V V T T T T G G G Y U U A D D D A Φ F F E E E E, YE X H KH X V ZE U C TS 3 Z Z Y J CH M I I I W Q SH N I I I W Q SHCH K K K B W SHCH N N N 3 E E O O O V U YU G P P A A YA a Transliterated YE when it does not follow a consonant. b At first the usual Slavonic Y was used forbl. But since in systems for use in English-speaking countries YU, YA, and on occasion YE are used for Ю, Я, and E, it was thought better, in order to avoid some one's misunderstanding a form like VYUCHYAT'(for BbJYYWBATb), to employ I, a symbol widely used	method wa tails. I the Russi spellings the Roman (, the h reduces t tion is g and E (fo letters w agree bot tion of t C, Y), ex to Y). T placed by ing pairs	s caused by th n all longer t an letters wer into the mess alphabet bein ard sign being he length of w iven below. N r 3) agrees wi then ap, lied to h with the Hor he Cyrillic let cept for J (ta he special Hor Q, U, and A r o f letters ar	e great time, or ransmissions so age in transli g substituted omitted). Th ords by half. ote that the u th bke use of Russian. The se and with th tters (Of. H - ken away from to se letters for espectively, s e represented	effort, and ent later (as individ for the 31 is shange i The table se of W, V the corres use of the e usual Sla -[Serbian 2 A, which bo W, W, and o that, fin each by the	(beginning lual-letter the 26 lett of the Rus in method of transli , Q, (foru, conding Lor e other let avonic tran K <u>-</u> Croatia ecomes I, a S have bee nally, the	t en- with 4), (JL) ers of sian tera-), X, se ters slitera- n H], nd assigned n re- follow-	
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9. Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER



Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Instice Mashington, D. C. UAN 7 1941

> PERSONAL AND COMPLEXITELE BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Harry Hopkins The White House Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

Through a highly confidential and reliable source it has been determined that on April 10, 1943, a Russian who is an agent of the Communist International paid a sum of money to Steve Nelson, National Committeeman of the Communist Party, USA, at the latter's home in Oakland, California.

The money was reportedly paid to Nelson for the purpose of placing Communist Party members and Comintern agents in industries engaged in secret war production for the United States Government so that information could be obtained for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

The Russian agent of the Communist International has been identified as Vassili Zubilin, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSE. New York City is his headquarters.

Both Nelson and Zubilin will meet in the near future with other leaders of the Communist International (Comintern) apparatus active in the United States.

It has likewise been determined through a highly confidential and completely reliable source that the National Headquarters of the Communist Party, USA and, particularly, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA are sware of and have approved of the assignment which has been given to Nelson by the Communist International.

Steve Nelson has used the following aliases: Steve Joseph Nelson, Stephan Mesarosh, Steve J. Mesarosh, Joseph Fleisbinger and "Hugo." It is reported that he was born in Yugoslavia in 1903. His true name is unknown. According to a biographical sketch of Nelson which appeared in the Daily Worker for November 10, 1937 (when the Daily Worker was admittedly the official organ of the Communist Party), Nelson joined the Communist Party, USA in January, 1925. He claims

- 2 -

to have been naturalized under the name, Stephan Mesarosh, at Detroit, Michigan on November 26, 1928.

According to Nelson's own statements, he performed espionage work for the Soviet Government in 1931 and 1932. In 1935 he was vice president of the Workers Alliance in Pennsylvania and was a subdistrict organizer of the Communist Party in Pennsylvania at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Nelson went to Spain as a political commissar of the International Brigades and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He returned from Spain in the latter part of 1937 and became active in the affairs of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and the American League for Peace and Democracy. Since 1938 he has been a national figure in the Communist Party, USA and is now a member of the National Committee, a high policy-forming body of the Communist Party, USA.

Steps are being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify all members of the Communist International (Comintern) apparatus with which Steve Nelson and Vassili Zubilin are connected, as well as the agents of that apparatus in various war industries.

Because of the relationship demonstrated in this investigation between the Communist Party, USA, the Communist International and the Soviet Government, I thought the President and you would be interested in these data.


These matters are being brought to your attention at this time for your confidential information inasmuch as the investigation is continuing.

Sinceraly yours,

10. Anonymous letter to Hoover, undated [received 7 August 1943] [Russian original with English translations].

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Mr. HC	DOVER .	
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


Г-н. ГУБЕР,

Несбичайные обстоятельства побуждают нас сообщить Вам о деятельности, т.наз. руководителя советской разведки в этой стране. Этот "советский" разведчик действительно занимает очень, пост в ГПУ (ныне НКВД), пользуется огромным доверием советского правительства, но фактически, как нам совершенно точно известно, сам он работает но фактически, как нам совершенно точно изветно, сам од ракотает для Японии, а его жена для Германии. Таким образом он, прикрываясь именем СССР, является опасным врагом СССР и США. Огромный аппарат кадровых работников НКВД, находящийся в США под его начальством не подозревает, что благодаря предательству своего руководителя, они так-же наносят страшный вред своей стране. В таком-же дожном подожении находится и вся их сеть агентов,, среди которых много граждан США и наконец сам Браудер, имеющий непосредственный контакт с ним. Браудер передает ему очень важные сведенияю США, думая что все это идет в Москву, но, как ви видите все это идет японцам и немцам. "Руководитель советской" здесь - Зубилин Василий, 2 секретарь посольства СССР, настоящее его имя 2 Зарубин В. заместитель начальника управленияразведки за границей НКВД. Лично занимается нелогальной переправкой агентов в США и из США, организует секретные радиостанции и изготовляет поддельные документы. Его ближайщие помощники: 1. его жена, руководит политической разведкой здесь, имеет огромнув сеть агентов почти во всех министерствах в том числе и Стэйт Департиенте. В НКВД посылает дезинформацию, а все ценное передает немцам через некого Бориса Мороз ()оливуд). Установите наблидение за ней и вы вскроете всю ее сеть очены быстро. 2. Кларин Павел вицеконсул в Н.Иорке. Имеет огромную сеть агентов среди русских эмигрантов, встречается с ними почти открыто, недегально переправляет агентов в США. Многие еге агенты работают на очень высоких постах в различных американских организациях, все они русские. 3. Хейфен - вицекосул в С.Франциско, занимается политической и военной разведкой по западному берегу США, имеет большую сеть агентов в портах и на военных заводах, собирает очень ценний стратигический материал, который напревляетсяЗубилиным в Японию. Имеет радиостанцию в консульства. Сам он очень большой трус, при вресте быстро выдаст всех агентов чтобы спасти себя и остаться в этой стране. 4. Квасников, работает инженером в Амторге, является почошником Зубилина по технической разведки, через Семенова - работающего тоже в Амторге, обворовывает всю военную промышленность Америки. Семенов имеет своих агентов во всех промышленных городах США, на всех военных заводах по авиации, химии и в крупных институтах. Работает очень нахально и грубо, его проследить и захватить на месте преступления очень легко. Аресту он будет просто рад, т.к. давно ищет причину остаться в США, ненавидит НКВД но страшный трус и любит деньги. Всех своих агентов выдаст с удовольствием, если ему пообещать американский паспорт. Сн уверен что работает для СССР, но все его материалы идут через 3. в Японию, если ему об этом рассказать, то он сам поможет вам найти остальных. 5. Шевченко, уполномоченный Закупочной комиссии в Буффело.


Занимается тем-же и Семенов. 6. Лукянов, уполномея. закупочной комиссии в портах Н7Иорка и Филаделфия. Помощник Зубилина по военно морской разведке. Имеет много агентов в этих портах. Его материалы очень ценные и опасные для CILA, т.к. все переправляются Зубилиным через жену немцем. 7 - - 2 секретарь миссии СССР в Канаде, помощник З. по Канаде. 8. Тарасов - секретарь посольства СССР в Мексике, помощник З. по Менсинее

9. Дбытов - аттеше посольства СССР эдесь, помощник З. по Вашингтону. Совершенно особое положение занимает, второй после Зубилина по



11. Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944.

KEARIN Pobruery 25, 2041 DR(-11/036 Kr. Birch D. O'Noal The American Ambassy Mexico, D. P. Ra: Alto Case · * \$ \$14) · · · · · · · · · We was a start of the start Dear Sir: Your office stated that it was believed this individual was Your office stated that it was believed this individual was identical with Pavel P. Klarin, a Vise Consul of the Russian Consulate-Comeral in New York City, and a suspected Russian agent who had left the United States for Maxieb in Newsber 1945, but has not been located. You were advised by Bureau cable dated February 24, 1944 that the Russian' Consulate General in New York City is located at 7 East Cist Street, and were requested to effect a discreet surveil-lance of Kis rin and to forward a picture taken of him and Frokhorov at the Maxiean simport. at the Maxican airport. Attached for your use are three photographs of Xlarin together with his signature. You should advise the Bureau as soon as possible whether Klarin is identical with the unidentified individual mentioned ab078-For your information and the information of the affices receiving copies of this letter, the following is set forth. This should be maintained in a strictly confidential manner. You are aware numerous secret writing letters in this case were intercepted up until secret writing letters in this case were intercepted up until Hovember 19:3, at which time it appears that the subjects became approhensive of the socurity of their method of communication. They indicated that couriers were to be used in the future for their communications, and we know that an attrupt was actually made to use itra. Anna Colloms, How York City, as a courier. š × × ţ. 6 5 M DECLASSIFIED BY SALCCCC



of times in the Sarly hours of the morning, sometimes at \$100 and 4100 A.M.

Zubilin was born Jamary 22, 1900, in Koscow, Pussia. He claims to have been graduated from the Pleichanoff Institute of sconomy and to have subsequently hold several positions in the People's Commissiniat of Pinance of the U.S.S.B., which is known. as Harkenfin. In 1941 he was appointed attache of the Soviet Embassy in China. In 1942 he was appointed Third Secretary of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, D. C., and he is at the present time the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

for your strictly confidential information, it has been determined that Zubilin paid a sum of money to a member of the Mational Committee of the Sommunist Party in April 1943, for the purpose of defraying expenses of Communist Party members engaged in espionage activities of the Soviet Onion and for Communist Party sources.

According to information recrived, Zubilin holds the rank of general in the MVD and is engaged in the movement of Soviet agents into and out of the United States. He reportedly organizes secret radio stations, prepares counterfeit documents, and obtains industrial and military information for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

For your guidance in the investigation of Soviet agents in Latin America, the following information is furnished to show the type of information Soviet agents in the United States, both those who are mombers of the Communist Party, USA, and those who are Soviet citizens, are attempting to obtain.

1. Formulas and blueprints for all inventions, discoveries and innovations of a military significance.

2. Formulae and blueprints for all inventions, discoveries, and innovations of an industrial significance.

3. Information regarding the means of communication between individuals in this country and persons in countries European countries who do not wish to have their nations annexed by the Coviet Union at the close of this war.

4. Information reacting the number of students and the curricula of the actuals operated by the United States Army for suministrative officers who are to be sent to territories freed from Axis occupation.

Zubilin's closest essistent in the Seviet Conculste General in New York w.s Favel F. Klarin, new in Mexico. It is reported that in Modico Zubilin's assistant was Leon Marasov, First Secretary " of the Russian Ambanay at Moxico City. It should be noted that

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Leon Tarasov was accompanying Alexel Prokherov at the time Frokherov departed from Mexico City by plane on February-22, 1944. All of the above information is extremely confidential and sust be so maintained by all of the offices receivin; copies of this letter. It is furnished to aid in the investigation of this - c case, which is of increasing importance to the Sureau. It is -requested that all offices submit investigative reports of -investigations to date within the very near future, and that all -offices conduct all necessary investigation promptly and -thoroughly. Very truly yours, John Adgar Boover 58

12. Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Soviet Codes," 27 December 1944.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON December 27, 1944 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Soviet Codes You will recall our conversation on the Soviet codes. I have informed General Donovan that he should send through General Deane in Moscow to General Fetin. the Soviet General with whom Donovan deals on all. matters connected with the exchange of information in his field, a message informing the Soviet Government that in dealing with other matters one of our agencies had run across certain material which purported to be related to Russian messages sent in code. He was also asked to explain that we had taken advantage of the opportunity to prevent this material from falling into the hands of the enemy and that we would immediately make it available to the Soviet Government if they so desired. I feel sure that this will take care of the matter, as the Soviet Government will be informed and will see that we are fully disposed to cooperate with them and not retain any material which they themselves might desire to have. DECLASSIFIED State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

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By J. Scheuble Date FEB 1 8 1972

13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945.

ALT (PSF-SURS)19: JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Bepartment of Justice Pashington, B. C. POP_ORCEP September 12, 1945 Honorable Matthew Connelly Secretary to the President YSSO GLAN The White House Washington, D. C. NHT 79-5 (FBI Min 9-21-85) Dear Mr. Connelly: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have advised that they have obtained positive information through a former employee of the Soviet Military Attache at Ottawa, Canada, that the Soviets have an extensive espionage network in Canada. The Soviets have made the obtaining of complete information regarding the atomic bomb the Number One project of Soviet espionage and these data must be obtained before the end of this year. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police report that there is considerable loose talk in the Office of the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa regarding the "next war" which the Soviet Union will have with the Anglo-American mations. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police received from the same source information that an assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State under Mr. Stettinius, was a paid Soviet spy. This man's name, or nickname, is unknown at the present time but further inquiry is being made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to obtain further identifying data. No information regarding this situation is being furnished to the State Department in the absence of further identifying data. With regard to the atomic bomb project, Dr. Allen May, a British scientist assigned to the McGill University Laboratory in Canada, has been identified as a paid Soviet spy of long standing. May spent some time during September, 1944, at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, working on the separation process for uranium and is well informed as to the methods of setting up uranium piles or lattices. 61



14. Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945.

INWN EDGAR HOOVER Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Justice Mashington, D. C. 200 MESSENGER SEF 27/ 1945 Date: September 24, 1945 Mr. Frederick B. Lyon To: Chief Division of Foreign Activity Correlation State Department Mashington, D. C. rea: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bireau of Investigation SOVIET ESPICNAGE ACTIVITY Subject: \mathfrak{S} C Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18, 1945. Additional information has been obtained by a Bureau representative from Igor $: \mathcal{P}$ 20242 Guzenko as follows; INTEPNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 0 U Guzenko stated that all intelligence activities outside the Soviet Union and inside the Soviet Union are coordinated by G. H. Malenkov, a member. ω of the Political Bureau of the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a . . member of the Central Committee of the same organization and the man who is mentioned by many Soviet officials as Stelin's successor. Malenkov, according \mathbb{P} <u>.</u> to Queenio, is actually the head of all intelligence activity, and Eilitary is. Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the NAVD and the political apparatus are C1 all ultimately responsible to him. There are numerous jurisdictional clashes, particularly between the Military and Maval Intelligence organizations and the NEWD. All such matters are referred to Maleniov. Malenkov is the actual head of the political apparatus in foreign countries and all communications, reports, et catera, from the Political Secretary in any Enbassy are sent directly to Malenkov and not to Molotov or any person in the Peoples Commissariat of Forsign Affairs. RM/R Likewise, no communication from the Wilitary or Naval Attaches in any imbassy would go to Molotov. Such communications go to the Chief of 500 -Esplonage for the area covering the particular Embassy. :2 In the same way, the Embassy Secretary who represents the NKVD does FORTICIÓRY Έ not send any correspondence to the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs BUY According to Guzenko, the only person in the Embessy who would be corresponding with the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs would be the Ambassador himself, who in every instance is only a front, and possibly one or two men close to the Ambassador who are called "innocents. DECLASSIFIED BY SPACLLEUM

Gueenko stressed that the Ambassador was advised in general terms of policical and economic matters which the Political Secretary, the MKVD representative and the Military or Maval Attaches receive and which they felt world possibly be of interest to the Ambassador. The Ambassador, however, is not consulted or advised with regard to the primary functions of these intelligence organizations.

According to Guzenko, he has heard discussions in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa indicating that the present system of supervising the activities of the Communist Party of a particular country through the Political Secretary in the Embassy is much more efficient and much more effective than the old cumbersome Commutern setup. Under the present organization, the directives issued by Malenkov through the Embassies to the Parties throughout the world are much more direct and there is less possibility of misinterpretation.

The man in the Embassy in Canada who handles political matters is Cousarov, the Third Secretary, who has his own cryptographer, one Patony, who also acts as a door guard at the Embassy.

The aforementioned system is known to Guzenko to be in operation in the United States, Canada and Mexico and possibly in the other Western Memisphere countries. It is also in effect in Great Britain, to his versonal knowledge. He calieves that this system is likewise in effect in all other countries in the world where the Soviets have diplomatic establishments, although there are variations for those countries occupied by the Red Army.

Guzenko states that in the Western Hemisphere and in Great Britain no reports are ever made to Moscow directly by individual espionare agents, whether they refer to Military, Industrial or Political Espionage. All such reports clear through the Embassies and are transmitted by the Embassies.

SOVINT PENETRATION OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS OF DIFER COUNTRIES

Guzenko stated that from conversations which he had heard in the Embassy and from traffic which he had read, it appeared the Soviets were intending to plant many Soviet explorage agents in the diplomatic establishments already in the United States and Canada, as well as in those diplomatic establishments which are yot to be set up in the United States. These espionage agents are to be sent from Eastern, Central and Falkan European countries. These would number between 50% to 180% of the employees below the rank of Ambassador and would actually be Soviet trained Hilitary Intelligence, MKVD or Comintern men.

Guzenko pointed out that Lieutenant Kulakov had told him that one of his, Kulakov's, best friends is an officer in the MKYD. This NKVD officer is

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the code clerk for the Lublin-Polish Embassy in Moscow. Kulakow's friend were his NKVD uniform to work and it is apparently a standing joke in Moscow that the NKVD operates the Polish code room.

According to Guzenko, another NKVD man who is a close friend of Lieutenant Kulakov is Marshal Tito's personal cipher clerk in Yugoslavia. Cuzonko states that this cipher clerk is almost worked to death because Tito sends messages to Moscow asking for instructions and advice on the most minor matters.

Guzenko stated that Soviet Intelligence had good coverage at the present time in the Czech Embassies and he knows from reading dispatches that the Military Attache who is being assigned to the Czech Legation in Ottawa is a Syviet espionage agent. This individual had aspected to be appointed Adjutant to the Chief of the Czech General Staff, but the Soviets decided that he should go to Canada in the immediate future as Military Attache, considering this to be an equally important post.

Guzenko stated that in Washington, D. C. the Czech Eilitary Attache is a Soviet spy named Hess. It seems that Colonel Zabotin, the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa, made a trip to Washington shortly after his arrival in Ottawa and sent a cable to Woscow telling them that he had mat Hess, who seemed to be sympathetic and that Zabotin felt that he could be developed. Moscow immediately cabled back that Zabotin should stay away from Hess because he was already being operated as a spy by Ceneral Saraev, Soviet Military Attache in Washington, D. C.

INTELLATIONAL PLANS OF THE SOVIETS

Guzonko was asked what the attitude in the Soviet Fibessy in Ottawa was towards the San Francisco Conference and the other conferences in which the United States, Great Britain and Russia played leading roles.

He stated that in the Embassy the meetings of the All Union Communist. Farty of Bolsheviks, which is known in the Embassy as the Provisional Union, discussed such matters. They were likewise discussed in the meetings of the Komsonols (Young Communist League), which is known in the Embassy as the "Sports League," and there was also considerable loose talk in the Embassy itself. From these incidents, Guzenko understood that the Soviets considered all such conferences as merely "talk fests" which served only to conceal from the Anglo-American powers and from the rest of the world the actual plans of the Soviets. Anything of a material nature which could be gained by the Soviets through such conferences was, of course, all to the good and would not have to be gained by force of arms.

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He stated that he had been told that the Soviet Union's budget for war, which would include intelligence activities, appropriations for the Red Army and Red Navy and for war production, would be greater during the coming year, which was ostensibly a year of peace, than it had been last year during a year of actual warfare.

He further stated that he had been informed that the Soviet Union was not converting its factories to consumer goods production, such as the United States and Canada had announced those countries were doing, but, on the other hand, the Soviets were increasing their war potential by setting up additional plants devoted solely to war production in Siberia. He stated that he was informed that the Soviets would continue to increase their industrial production for war and would obtain consumer goods from factories in the satellite states of Eastern Europe and through purchases in the Western Hemisphere.

Guzenko stated that the Soviets before the use of the atomic bomb were confident that within ten years their military potential would enable them to conquer the world. Since the atomic bomb has been used by the United States, they have set their calendar ahead and have instructed all espionage agents to make the obtaining of the complete construction plans of the bomb itself the No. 1 espionage project. They have issued instructions that this information should be obtained by the end of this year, 1945. Guzenko stated that the last message received at the Embassy from Moscow before he left on September 5, 1945, was stressing the necessity for obtaining the atomic bomb before the end of this year.

He was asked whether this meant the Soviets had set their calendar up the full ten years. He stated he did not know, but that he was merely telling what he knew.

Guzenko stated that all responsible Soviet officials know that the Soviet Union is aiming toward beating the United States and Creat Britain in the next war, which will permit the Sovietization of the entire world.

THE IDENTITY OF SOVIET AGENT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Guzenko was questioned carefully regarding the possible identity of the individual in the Department of State under Stattinius who is a Soviet spy. Guzenko stated he did not know the man's name but that he had been told that an Assistant to Stattinius was a Soviet spy. This information came to him in the following menner:

After the arrival of Kulakov in Ottawa in the Summer of 1945, Kulakov and Guzenko got into a discussion on the agencies of the Canadian organization as compared to the United States organization. Guzenko was bearing in mind the

- 4 -

adverse opinions held by the Soviet inspectors with regard to the American or gan zation in 1944. Kulakov informed Guzenko that although the Canadian, or cantration was closely knit and well operated and most productive, that there were, of course, more agents in the United States and that he had learned in Moscow that an Assistant of Stettinius, then the United States Secretary of State, was a Soviet spy. Guzenko pointed out that this information would necossarily have come to Kulakov's attention prior to May 17, 1945, because Kulakov left Moscow for the United States and Canada on that date. He stated have suspected his motives, since it involved an individual who was not being run by Colonel Zabotin.


Guzenko pointed out that the Soviets were frantic to obtain the secrets of the atomic bomb and that an incident had been reported in the press recently which appeared to him to have been inspired by a Soviet agent. This Soviet agent might not necessarily be the same one to whom Kulakov referred, political espionage agents. He referred specifically to the announcement made in London by Stettinius that the atomic bomb should be turned over to the Security Council of the United Nations. Guzenko suggested that if the Purean could determine who suggested to Stettinius that this statement be made, the Stettinius referred to by Kulakov.

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
15. Hoover to Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR ND.V Federal Bureau of Investigation 71Mc5 11-18-53 (P Antted States Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 111.5/Kr. 10106:8:70 November 8, 1945 TOP SHORET BY SPECIAL MESSENGER Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan DECLASSIFIED Military Aide to the President E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) TWT/C.T. T. 24-76 TWT/C.T. MCC. 4000 - 1973 PROJECT NCT 76-75 By NLT-<u>MC</u>, NARS Date/0-29-76 The White House Washington, D. C. And a star of the BEAVILIT Dear General Vaughan: COVE As a result of the Bureau's investigative operations, information has been recently developed from a highly confidential source indicating that a number of persons employed by the Government of the United States have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Soviet Government. At the present time it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the information they were transmitting. The investigation, however, at this point has indicated that the persons named hereinafter were actually the source from which information passing through the Soviet espionage system was being obtained, and I am continuing vigorous investigation for the purpose of establishing the degree and nature of the complicity of these people in this espionage ring. The Bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested: Dr. Gregory Silvermaster, a long time employee of the Department of Agriculture. Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. George Silverman, formerly employed by the Railroad Retirement Board, and now reportedly in the War Department. Laughlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to the late President Roosevelt. 69



-3in either Washington, D. C. or New York City. In the past, it is reported, the contact man made trips to Washington, D. C. once every two weeks and would pick up on such occasions an average of forty rolls of 35-millimeter film. Investigation of this matter is being pushed vigorously, but I thought that the President and you would be interested in having the foregoing preliminary data immediately. With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards, Sincerely yours, ~ 240

16. Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946 [Attachment not included].



individual to Anatole Borisovich Gromov, who until December 7, 1945, was assigned as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., when he returned to the U.S.S.R. Gromov had previously been under suspicion as the successor to Vassili Zubilin, reported head of the NKVD in North America, who returned to Moscow in the late Summer of 1944. This whole network has been under intensive investigation since November, 1945, and it is the results of these efforts that I am now able to make available to you.

I also feel that it is incumbent upon me at this time to bring to your attention an additional factor which has originated with sources available to this Bureau in Canada. It is reported that the British and Canadian delegates on the International Monetary Fund may possibly nominate and support White for the post of President of the International Bank, or as Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. The conclusion is expressed that assuming this backing is forthcoming and the United States acquiescence, if not concurrence, resulting, White's nomination to this highly important post would be assured. It is further commented by my Canadian source that if White is placed in either of these positions, he would have the power to influence to a great degree deliberations on all international financial arrangements.

This source, which is apparently aware of at least some of the charges incorporated in the attached memorandum against White, commented that the loyalty of White must be assured, particularly in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has not ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. Fear was expressed that facts might come to light in the future throwing some sinister accusations at White and thereby jeopardize the successful operation of these important international financial institutions.

I thought you would be particularly interested in the above comments, which originated with sources high-placed in the Canadian Government, on the subject at hand.

With expressions of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours.

, soover



Attachment

17. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization [NKVD] in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946 [Excerpt].

SBORBT UNDERGROUND SOVIET ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION (MKVD) IN AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT October 21, 1946 75

UNDERGROUND SOVIET ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION (NKVD) IN AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PREDICATION


BACKGROUND OF CURRENT PRESENTATION

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth certain charges against officials and employees of the Federal Covernment. These charges will be dealt with in detail and information arising from other sources and investigation will be coordinated in an effort to give an over-all view of the situation concerning underground Soviet espionage activities in the United States Covernment at the present time.

A time element exists in making a factual approach to the material set forth. Although the majority of the basic charges against the individuals mentioned herein concern activities dating back several years, these charges must be viewed from the fact that they only became available in November of 1945. Consequently the reader must consider the difficulty of actually proving these activities by investigation at this late date. The facts are strong in many instances and circumstantial in others primarily because of the disparity in time between the date of the activities and the actual report of these activities to the authorities. A determined effort has been made to produce as much actual and circumstantial evidence as possible, either to prove or disprove the basic charges. At the outset it is considered proper to make a statement concerning the source of the basic charges which will be outlined hereinafter. This source who became available and cooperative in November, 1945, for protective purposes in view of continued assistance being received therefrom, is being given the cover name of Gregory. All material originating with Gregory will be so designated and will be set forth as nearly as possible in the very words used by Gregory in reporting the material submitted.

Background of Gregory

Gregory is an individual of American origin and descent, and was educated in both American and foreign educational institutions. Gregory possesses far above the average of academic learning. As far as political affiliations are concerned Gregory first came in contact indirectly with the Communist Party while attending one of the leading educational institutions of New York City. Gregory's first activity was as a speaker for the American




was associated up to the time of his death on November 27, 1943. The ostensible business purpose of United States Service and Shipping Corporation is to engage in the shipping of parcels and merchandise to Soviet Russia.

Synopsis of Gregory's Courier Activities

As outlined above, Gregory's first contact with the Soviet Intelligence Service was with an individual known only as "Tim" who, in view of definite identification at a later date will hereinafter be referred to as Jacob M. Golos, Secretary of World Tourist, Inc. World Tourist, Inc., was a New York corporation chartered on June 10, 1927. It is interesting to note that Golos pleaded guilty to an indictment along with World Tourist, Inc., charging failure to register as agents of the Soviet Government in March, 1940. He received a fine of \$500 and a jail sentence of four months to one year which was later changed to probation.

After the passage of an initial probationary period, when Gregory was supplying Golos with material secured from the Italian Library of Information, Golos began to use Gregory as a courier for the collection of information from various individuals in Washington, D. C., and New York City. The majority of these persons were employed in the United States Government or had sources therein. During early activities as a courier, Gregory became definitely aware of the connection of Golos with the Soviet Intelligence Service, namely the NKVD as distinguished from the Red Army Intelligence. Regular service as a courier began during the summer of 1941 when Gregory came in contact with a parailel of Soviet espionage headed by Wathan Gregory Silvermaster who has held several positions in the United States Government in past years and is now Chief of the Division of Economic Analysis of the War Assets Administration. Silvermaster and his wife, Helen Witte Silvermaster, according to Gregory, were in turn in contact with many other individuals in the United States Government from whom they secured material and made it available to Gregory for transmitta: to Golos. This material was delivered to Gregory in the form of written reports, actual accuments, exposed but undeveloped film and verbally requiring its recording in shorthand which Gregory later transcribed. Gregory was eventually placed in contact with another parallel of Soviet espionage, headed by Victor Perlo, who was formerly employed with the War Production Board and later by the Foreign Economic Administration. Gregory met Perlo with others at the apartment of John Abt in New York City who was then and is now General Counsel for the Analgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO. Abt is married to Jessica Smith, the President of the S.R.T. Publications, Incorporated, and editor of its magazine "Soviet Russia Today," Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda organ. Gregory acted as a courier for the collection of information of interest to the Soviet Government from this group and delivered it in the same manner to Golos. Gregory's activities as a courier for both the Silvermaster and Perlo groups continued for Golos until his death on November 27, 1943. Collaterally, while serving Golos, Gregory also served others in a small way. Gregory mentioned specifically that while working with Golos,

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then National Chairman of the Communist Party. Browder, in no instance kept this information for delivery to a third person since he did not wish to become compromised in the collection of material of this type. It is significant to note, however, that Gregory is definite in stating that Browder was cognizant of the activities of Golos and his use of Gregory as a courier. It is Gregory's opinion that Golos violated his directives in making information available to Browder. This presumably was done on a personal friendship basis. From information submitted by Gregory, "Charlie" whom Gregory never personally observed has been tentatively identified as Dr. Abraham Benedict Weinstein, a practicing dentist at 20 East 53rd Street. New York City. During the course of instant inquiries, Dr. Weinstein has been in contact with several of the individuals prominent in this case and dealt with in full detail hereinatter in addition to other individuals known to be Soviet agents. It is significant to observe that while working with Golos and his successors, Gregory had specific instructions to have no associations whatscever with the Communist Party or any of its fringe groups. Gregory's true name had never figured prominently in any of the activities of the Party or its fringe groups until the advent of the current inquiries. It was through Golos that Gregory became associated with the United States Service and Shipping Corporation, New York City, mentioned hereinbefore, and he assisted Gregory from time to time with grants of money plus all traveling and incidental expenses. As will be seen nereinafter, through the groups previously mentioned as headed by Silvermaster and Browder, as well as various miscellaneous individuals, it is apparent that the Soviet Intelligence Service was successful in securing material from the Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, the Treasury Department, the War Department, the Department of Justice, the Foreign Economic Administration and numerous other agencies of the Federal Government. In numerous instances the documents themselves were made available from these agencies for copying verbatim or for photographing in the basement of the Silvermaster home where investigation has determined a fully equipped photographic laboratory was located. As pointed out hereinbefore investigation in this case has only extended over the period November 8, 1945, to the present time. Consequently it has not been possible to show that each and every one of the individuals mentioned by Gregory is interrelated in their activity. The normal practice of espionage would not permit contacts between each and every individual during that period. However, it will be observed numerous contacts between the subjects of instant inquiries have transpired and in some instances under very suspicious circumstances. A studied attempt has been made to establish the basic truth or falsity of Gregory's information and certain observations are apropos in this connection. Gregory has mentioned over 150 names and in no instance has investigation indicated that a non-existent person was mentioned.

Only in those instances where only a first name was given and no identifying data was available has it been impossible to identify the person to whom Gregory was referring. In addition, the methods by which the passage of information was effected are those which by experience have been tried, tested and used by all effective intelligence services, including particularly the Russian. It is also significant that Gregory, by actual observation, has identified Olga Borisovna Pravdina of Antorg as "Margaret" and Anatoli Borisovich Gromov of the Soviet Empassy as "Al." Gregory has reported with a high degree of accuracy situations of the United States Government policy which were only known within the Government itself as examples of material which was passed through Gregory to Golos and his successors for use of the Soviet Government. Also reported by Gregory was the existence of a photographic laporatory in the basement of the Silvermaster home during the time Gregory was acting as a courier. This laboratory was used for the reproduction of documents brought to the Silvermaster home by various component elements of that particular espionage group. Investigation determined that such a photographic laboratory sufficiently well equipped for the copying of documents was located in the basement of the Silvermaster home. In few instances has Gregory reported information which could not either directly or circumstantially be verified. A high degree of accuracy has prevailed throughout the revelations made by Gregory. In conclusion, it should be carefully borne in mind that in no instance has the information furnished by Gregory proved false, unfounded, or materially inaccurate despite intensive and searching investigation thereor. \smile Set out hereinarter is a summary of the information submitted by Gregory, gathered from other sources and established by investigation concerning the Russians identified to date in this espionage group, the Soviet system of espionage, the espionage agents comprising the Silvermaster and Perlo groups and the miscellaneous personalities serving the Soviet espionage system inue, endent of association with any organized group as far as is known. 6 81


METHOD OF OPERATICN OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE SYSTEM


As a result of the revelations made by Gregory, considerable information concerning the modus operandi of the present Soviet underground espionage organization was obtained. Although these methods are related as pertaining to espionage activities of the USSR, it should be noted they differ little from the method used by any country engaged in effective secret intelligence. As an example, their clandestine activities are cloaked with cover companies such as World Tourist, Inc., and the United States Service and Shipping Corporation in this instance. Pertinent material from mumerous sources is collected by the use of couriers and cover addresses. Intermediaries of a primary, secondary and tertiary character are apparent. There is a certain but not necessarily significant absence of advanced technical methods, either in the transmittal of communications or the gathering of information itself. The only technical device apparent in the operations of these espionage parallels was the use of the copying camera.


Soviet espionage has one clear cut advantage over that practiced by any other country within the borders of the United States. This advantage centers in the existence of an open and active Communist Party whose members are available for recruitment for any phase of activity desired. As will be seen hereinafter, in almost every instance Soviet espionage agents, particularly sub-agents, are recruited from among individuals closely associated with the Communist Party, or at least strongly pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, who in the main are native born Americans or individuals not native born but sufficiently familiar with the American way of life to avoid detection. Even the Germans with the large German minority in the United States were not so advantageously placed nor does the fanaticism of the most ardent National Socialist exceed that of the militant members of the Communist Party selected for cooperation directly with the USSR.

Briefly, Soviet intelligence is broken into three branches, namely Military-Naval, Political and General. The first, namely Military-Naval, is handled by Red Army Intelligence. The gathering of political and general information is left in the main to the NKVD, now the MGB, or Ministry of State Security, with which this case deals.

Gregory has described what is referred to as the "pole" method of establishing a ring of individuals for the gathering of information. The term "pole" in reality is the designation of the individual at the apex of the organization which is a self-contained unit. For example, six individuals would be active in the obtaining of information for the Russians. No one of these six individuals would know the identity of the other five. Each individual would have a courier whose identity he did not know and/or a mail drop by which he would dispose of the material which he gathered. None of the six individuals in this self-contained unit would know the identity of their











18. Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, "Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947.


Some New Yorthing contemporting June 10, 1947 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE: Subject: Walter Krivitsky At about 9:30, Monday morning, February 10, 1941, Thelma Jackson, a Negro chembermaid, found sprawled on the **8**6 bed of his fifth floor room at the Hotel Bellevue, 15 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., the body of Walter G. Krivitsky, his death caused by the contact discharge of a .38 caliber bullet into his right temple, approximately six 20200/6-1047 hours previously. Walter Krivitsky was born Samuel Ginzberg, June 28, 1699, to middle class peasants in the Russian Ukraine near the Polish border. From 1919 to 1937, Krivitsky served in Military Intelligence of the Soviet Army. In 1923 he was Ø, Military intelligence of the Soviet Army. In 1925 he was sent to organize the nucleus of a Communist army in Germany in preparation for a revolution in Germany. In May 1935, he was called to Moscow by the Soviet War Industries Insti-tute. In 1935, he was sent abroad as Chief of Soviet Mili-tary Intelligence for Western Europe, which job he held until November 1937. In the 1937 primes for Westerl until November 1937. In the 1937 purge, many of Krivitsky's fellow generals were liquidated. In December, Krivitsky himself was ordered back to Moscow but refused to return. 3 In the course of his 18 years in the Soviet Military Intelligence, Krivitsky was twice decorated for espionage work. In March 1938, at Paris, Krivitsky gave an interview to a Russian emigré paper on the death of Maxim Gorky. Krivitsky, in this interview, published by Russian emigré paper <u>Les Dernieres Nouvelles</u> on March 4, 1938, said that Maxim Gorky may have been killed on Stalin's orders' if he did not die from natural causes, since Gorky had been re-fused permission by Stalin to attend the International Convention of Anti-Fascist Authors at Paris recently, and had been under close surveillance. Krivitsky stated he himself had a price on his head and had decided to remain abroad "to rehabilitate tens of thousands of so-called spies". On April 29, 1939, the <u>Saturday Evening Postupub-</u> lished one in a series of articles by Krivitsky exposing m Soviet espionage activities. In this article, Krivitsky predicted the Soviet-German pact which was concluded in August 1939. Krivitsky's articles, following closely of after the Moscow trials, were an important factor in the decision of many to leave the Communist Party camp. During 1939, Ignace Reiss, an associate and friend of Krivitsky's had been under close surveillance. Krivitsky stated he CS/ SECRET FILE in the











19. [Meredith Knox Gardner], "Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic," 30 August 1947.

TOP SECRET CREAM 30 August 1947 copy # 5 WDGAS-93 I. D. SPECIAL ANALYSIS REPORT # 1 COVERNAMES IN DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC Prepared by ASA I. D. 30 August 1947 Distribution: his wow uport 2 copies D Chief, ASA Chief, OP-2Ø-2 LSIC (thru Col. Marr-Johnson) 1 copy 1 cory 1 copy WDGAS-93-B 1 copy A TOP SECRET CREAM 93

COVERNAMES IN DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC

1. Limitations of the report.

Any report made at this time on the contents of traffic encrypted by the system the must necessarily be fragmentary and subject to correction in detail. If the nessages that are in any degree readable, there are large gaps in solution of the cipher key (additive), and in the code book only about 15 per cent of the equivalences are identified, some only tentatively. Both these difficiencies are constantly being ameliorated, with the result that such reports at this will be outdated very rapidly until a much higher degree of recovery has been reached.

2. Colleteral information.

The collateral information given about the covernames is both scanty and tentative, for reasons implied in paragraph 1. The most reliable data related to the names are the date and place of origin of the messages containing them. Since most of the readable traffic originated in New York, it will be necessary to indicate the origin only in the case of Washington, Cabberra, and Stockholm messages. All the messages used are directed to Moscow.

3. Use of covernames.

It is known from the Report of the Royal Commission /in Canada/ appointed under Order in Council P. C. 411 of February 5, 1946 (report dated June 27, 1946) thet egencies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics engaged in conspiratorial activities are accustomed, for reasons of security, to refer to persons that are furthering these activities by covernemes, and in particular that this is done in encrypted messages sent between diplomatic installations and Moscow.

4. Coverneres in Sector

The traffic encrypted by the system contains many covernames, which are definitely proved to be such by two circumstances, (1) that many of them are so designated in messages (given as a supplement hereto) that describe themselves as dealing with changes in covernames (KLICHKI) and (2) that many of them are contained in the formula: "A (henceforth B)", in which A is evidently the real name of the old covername and B the (new) covername.

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The classic example for the "henceforth" formula is in a message of 23 August 1944, New York-Moscow, internal address SEMION. There occurs the expression "MALUICA Vitally Semionovich (henceforth "EM")." The next sentence starts with "EM's". Now, Vitally Semionovich Mamluiga (usual transliteration: Vitalli Semenovich Mamluga) is the name of a person known to have been with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. After giving his name in full, the originator of the Essage gave him a covername and immediately proceeded to use it. (EM is not known cutside this message, the rest of which is not yet readable; but see section 15.) In this case, where perhaps the need for security was not great, the covername seems to be the name of the initial letter of MAMLUIGA--M. This circumstance must not, however, lead us to employ the term "covername" for initials used for the task of brevity, the expansion of which is always evident from other passages in the message concerned. (Covernames themselves can be so abbreviated.)

5. Reliability of "readings".

In the following it must be borne in mind that some of the covernames are expressed by single code groups not yet found in other contexts and others contain groups not yet found in other contexts. When any form has been assumed for the equivalent of such a group, it is here generally followed by a question mark. The forms assumed are based (1) on calculations made possible by the fact that the way a consepart code and that complete one-part codes of the same longth are available (this process of comparison and calculation has yielded many values that were later verified) and (2) on the analogy of verified covernames. As maniformed below, the covernames fall in part into "families".


6. Families of covercemes.

It has become ovident that many of the covernames can be put into categories on the basis of some similarity between them. In the Report of the Royal Commission we find the alliterating family BACK, BACON, BADEAU, BAGLEY (all members of the Group "Research"; cf. p. 729). We find a Promotheus that seems to belong to a "mythology" family, examples of which in traffic are Jupiter and Carbis. In New York message 798 appended below, we find Erie immediately followed by Euron (in fact, Erie gave the clue for the identification of Huron). There is a family of mancient Phoenician cities: Carthage, Tire, and Siden.

The arrangements of the material from this point will be based on such categories. First, covernames apparently for persons will be listed: Addresses, signatures, specifically Russian Christian names, Christian names not specifically Russian, relationships and conditions of age, station and calling, mythological names, names of animals, names of plants, and miscellaneous. Then covernames apparently for places and institutions will be listed: Ancient

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8. Signatures.

The constant Camberra signature is a group that has been tentatively tagged HFIM (Joachim). Only one case of a Washington signature (?) is known, a group presumably in the range of VAV to VAX. It could be something like VAVILOV or even VANH (Bacchus). No Stockholm signatures are known.

The most frequent New York signature is MAY, with an overall frequency of 15%, only a handful of which occurrences are not signatures. Occasionally, to distinguish his own remarks from a document he is transmitting, MAY will use the expression "PRIMECHANIVE MAYA" (May's nots), thus confirming that MAY is a signature and that the value of the signature group is MAY (for MAYA is a different group and certainly mayas "of May" in dates).

Another signature, in about the range for ANTON (Anthony), occurs 1¢ times (Rey Nork). Once (12 December 1944) the form is "ANTON (?) and MAK" (MAE is possibly a garble for MAY). All occurrences are from October 1944 to January 1945. The name also occurs in the text 8 times (New York, May-December 1944). In a message of 23 August 1944, ANTON (?) is associated with SERGEY (?) and AKIM, apparently in connection with southwestern factories and plants.

A signature in the right range for BORIS occurs at least twice as a New York signature, on 23 October and 31 December 1944.

SERGEN (?) (Sergius): There are 2 candidates for this value. One occurs 2 September 1944 and 11 Jennary 1945; the other occurs 17 times, 16 May 1944 - 15 January 1945. The second one is associated with ARTON (i) and AKIM (see section ⁸).

ALEKSEY (Alexis): occurs 5 times, 9 May - 14 December 1944.

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9. Specifically Russian Christian names.

Some covernemes that are Russian Christian names have already been mentioned in sections 7 and 8. Others are as follows:

ARSENIY (Arsonius):	in 5 New York messages, 16 June-22 December 1944.
VITALIY (Vitalis):	occurs in 3 messages, 9 August, 23 August 31 December 1944. Also occurs in a real name (see MAMLUICA in section 4.)
YAKOVI (Jacob):	was GROM before September 1944.

AKIM (Joachim): occurs 8 times in 8 messages (all with a SEMION gedress), 16 June-28 Dec. 1944. See section 8.

10. Christian names not exectfically Russian.

Although many Soviet citizens have Christian names virtually identical with name forms in other languages than Russian, it seems safe to set up a category that would include vaguely international forms together with definitely non-Russian forms. In connection with some of these names, the following quotation from This is My Story by Louis Francis Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily MORTARY, (McGrew-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London: 1947) pp. 138-135, is given for whatever reference value it may have.

The so-called "Dutch" or Corman, comrade-though his accent was indeterminate to my untrained sar-was the first of a long line of personages with foreign accents and foreign origins who paraded through the governing apparatus of the Communist party of the U.S.A. No one, and least of all any well-educated American, has any complaint about full participation of the foreign born in American life; our own ancestors came from after to make up this lend of the free. But the right of theses who are agents of a foreign power to cross our borders under alieness and order American citizens about, is another matter. Yet, to my surprise, this was what I found in the building at Thirty-five East Twelfth Struct when I entered it and began to work there.

These men of many names and no names bore aliases like Edwards*--carelessly chosen plurals of "Christian names" such as Roberts, Richards, Stevers, Michaels, Johns and, occasinally, something more distinctive taken from England or the Middle Vost. The secult one of these gentlemen to impress himself upon me was "Roberts," then acting in a vital secretaris capacity in the Farty. That is, he way one of the chief factors in the national secup. Still in the stage of pleasantries upon such matters, I had gaily referred to him as "The Chesh're Cat Commissar" because of his perpetual mechanical smile. It was not unpleasant but unreal. Like the

* Budonz had met Cerhard Eisler under the name of Edwards; see pp 135 and 137 and his testimony in District Court, Washington, on 24 July 1947.

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celebrated feline, his nemes kept vanishing. Shortly after my labor editorship bagen, he suddenly converted himself into "Comrade Peters" and then into "Comrade Steve" and then, after a long time, back to "Comrade Roberts". It kept one busy trying to keep up with these transformations.

Before the publication of Budenz's book, certain groups had tantatively been identified as equivalent to RICHARD, ROHERT, and the like. That such names occur in the code book has been amply verified, e.g. by the message of 2 December 1944, listing nuclear physicists and mathematicians. To serve as surnames in cally colleguy, some of these names would have to take on an S.

The group that seems to stand for ROHERT (it follows next after RO) occurs 35 times. The group for RICHARD (2 places beyond RIT) occurs 6 times (plus once in RICHARDT FAIMER). Eoth are restricted to New York messages. RICHARD is the new covername given in September 1944 to someone whose previous (cover?) mane seems to have begun with LO (see message 70% appended below). A ROHERT occurs from 7 June 1944 on through 17 January 1945-of course not necessarily one single individual throughout.

It is significant that ROHERT was always "transmitting" written matter to the originator(s) of the messages: the formula "Robert? has transmitted" occurs five times in the index.

Another individual of particular interest is one whose name would seem to begin with HE (or, by the more usual transliteration, KHE). This may be HERRI (Henry), though there is almost certainly another and more usual spelling of "Henry" in the book, GENRI OR CENRIH. HENRI! figures in arrangements for a rendezvous in front of a Merico City movie house (M. Y. message of 14 June 1944); in other messages also he is located in DEREVNIA (the Country, covernme for MERICO). In a message of 16 Angust 1944 there seems to be talk of calling him back to TIR (Tyre, covername for Hew York). He occurs 21 times, from 26 May-19 August 1944. The other group, GENRI, occurs in message 798 (below) and perhaps in a message of 1 June 1944 involving the securing of a DEREVENSEOY (Mexican) visa.

Other such names are;

AL' or EL' (Al?):	occurs 1 October in phrase "Al' or KL'" (both attempts to render English Al?)	
DIK (Dick):	was KEO (Echo) before October 1944; occurs in five messages, 23 October -26 December 1944.	
DONAL'D (Donald):	became FILOT: September 1944; this second name appears in section 11 below.	
DUE ? HAN (Duncar):	occurs in message of 26 May 1944.	
KARL (Carl):	was SKAT before October 1944; occurs once 26 December 1944.	


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
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	CENRI(H) (Henry):	was TAM before October 1944. See the last paragraph above.
	DZHON (John):	was GUDZON before October 1944; occurs once 14 December 1944, with AMIR?
	PETER:	was CECRNOTT (Black) before October 1944.
	CHARL'2 (Charles):	was something else until October 1944.
	ERIKI:	was something else until October 1944.
	1956 ? :	Canberra, twice 1 September 1945. Seems to have furnished information on the Anstralian Security Service. Same name twice from New York, 26 July and 16 August 1944.
	KLOD (Claude):	Canberra, April-October 1945. KLOD is Canberra's regular purveyor of information; he occurs 13 time 8 times in the formula "'KLOD' has communicated".
	NIK (Bick?):	22 July 1944; message contains names DuPont, Ford, Mellon, Weir, Pow.
	(CHARL'Z ERUK) (Charle	s Bruno): in H.Y. message 14 June 1944, this is the name HEMRI? is to give as a password at the rendezvous.)
	DORA:	in two messeges, 23 October 1944 and 4 January, 1945.
	EDRA (Cora):	20 December 1944.
, ,	OIA:	a Washington female agent; name changed to some- thing else in October 1944. Occurs in 2 messages, 3 May and 10 August 1944, both dealing with KOMAR (that is, probably KRAVCHENKO). It is planned to make these messages the subject of a separate repor In the former OLA is described as seeking more detailed information on the KOMAR affair. In the latter she has something to do with the supposition that (does not think that?) KOMAR is staying at 209 West 97th Street.
	RITA:	mentioned 10 August 1944 in the phrase "the first two parts (of?) the business of RIDA". (The message also mentions KOMAR, issue of LA VOZ/Merico City Communist organ/ for 7 June, HEMAI?).
	11. Relationships and	Conditions of Age, Station and Calling.
	OTCHIM (Stepfather):	in 3 messages, 17 May - 27 December 1944.
	SVAT (Matchmaker: Son-	or Daughter-in-law's Father); 23 Ang. and 6 Dec. 1944.

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DEDUSHKA (Granopapa or GZ	9 May - 14 August 1944.			
NABOB (Nabob):	apparently a high American diplomatic official. Occurs 5 times in 3 messages, 9 May, 7 September, 14 December 1947; in message of 7 September, in connection with postwar treatment of Germany.			
ATAMAN (Hetman):	occurs 4 times in 3 messages, 17 May, 7 June, 6 October, 1944.			
FILOT? (Pilot):	was DORAL'D before September 1944.			
12. Mythological Rames:				
YUPITER (Jupiter):	becare ORIOL? (Eagle) in October 1944.			
SERES (Ceres):	in 4 mosseges, 4 Mey - 25 July 1944.			
MUZA (Muse):	4 July 1944; communicated concerning Secret Funds Division, Emerson Bigelow, aid of 92,000,000 Portuguese escudos, Northern European division of Secret Intelligence Branch, etc.			
ERO (Echo):	became DIX in October 1944; cccurs 14 times, 2 May			
	23 October, 1944.			
GTOM (Crome):	became YAKOV? in September 1944. Cocurs 3 times, 18 May, 15 June, 25 July.			
13. Names of animals.				
TIULEN' (Seal);	10 August 1944, (a KOMAR or Kravchenko message).			
ORIOL? (Eagle):	was YUPITER until October 1944. Cccurs 5 Dec. 1944			
LUN' (Een Harrier):	in 4 messages, 3 May- 17 August 1944.			
GUE ' (Goose):	changed to something else October 1944.			
KOMAR (Gnat etc.):	probably covername for Viktor Alacaayavich <u>Kravchenko</u> . For a complete development of this idea, a separate report would be necessary. Occurr in 8 messages so far partly read, 6 between 3 and 23 May, 1944, 2 on 10 August, 1944; EDMAR is the object of intense interset, including attempts to locate him (20 May: "is living with? KERENSKOY in the state of Connecticut etc.").			
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



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	occur, apparently as oper Krug), KTN-e? (WBB B-e?-	In a message of that date the following names ating from New York: KRUC (Circle, or the name -OLOV until October 1944), EMA,?-, St-c? ame)MALIAR (Painter), VAN (Jan), ENK	
16.	Covernames apparently for	places and institutions:	
L	Ancient places (also rivers, etc.).		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	TIR (Tyrs):	covername for New York.	
	SIDON (Siden):	covername for London.	
	KARFAGET (Carthags):	covername for Washington.	
	NIL (Nilo?):	was something beginning with TU (TUMAN, Mist?) until September 1944; linked with METR, which see.	
17.	Geographical features.		
	STRANA (Land, Country):	covername for the United States.	
	OSTROV (Island):	covername for Great Britain; changed October 1944. to something beginning with EK (or EX).	
	OSTROVITIANIE (Islander):	Briton.	
	DEREVRIA (the Country /i.e., rural districts/): covername for Mexico. DEREVENSKOT (Country, Rural): Mexican.		
	ZEMLIAE (Fellow Countryes	an): Coveryord for some nationality, possibly U.S.	
18.	Miscellaneous.		
	BANK (the Bank):	probably covername for the U.S. State Department; occurs 24 times, (once in the plural from Canberra, probably in the literal sense).	
	DOM STARUET (the Old Wom	an's House): in 2 messages, 26 May and 10 Aug. 1944.	
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20. No author [probably William K. Harvey, CIA], Memorandum for the File, "COMRAP," 6 February 1948.

71-65teed to seresse through 1.7 THE HISTORICAL REVIEN PROGRAM OF the Central Intelligence Agency. 6 February 1948 a de la companya de Esta de la companya d MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE Subject: COMPAP - VASSIL, M. ZUBILIN 1. Set out below for record and cross check purposes is a brief summary of an extensive operational Soviet espionage case within the U.S., known to have been, at least until August 28, 1944 and possibly subsequently, under the control and direction of a Major General of State Security (then NKGB, now MGB). This case has been given the code name COMRAP, inasmuch as it involves personnel who, prior to 1943, had been long active in the illegal conspiratorial and quasi-intelligence operations of the Comintern Apparatus. 2. For purposes of clarity the initial portion of this case summary is given in narrative form, from the standpoint of its investigative development. 3. As of late 1942 and early 1943 intensive investigative coverage was being main-tained on the activities and movements of <u>Steve NELSON</u>, then head of the Alameda County, California, section of the CPUSA, which is and has been for some years one of the largest County sections of the Party, probably the most powerful section outside greater New York. NELSON at this time was one of the important and longtime Communist functionaries who, on numerous occasions in the past, had been implicated on the periphery at least of Soviet espionage operations. Steve NELSON was born in Yugoslavia, probably Croatia, shortly before 1900. He first entered the United States about 1920 when he jumped ship in New York City and through the laxity of immigration procedures he was permitted subsequently to legalize his status, later becoming, by naturalization, a U.S. citizen. The exact date of NELSON's initial affiliation with the Communist movement is unknown, but there is at least some reason to believe that he was active in Agitprop work in Yugoslavia prior to his first entry into the U.S. Shortly after his arrival he became affiliated with the predecessor organizations of the CPUSA and his Party career has been one of ever-increasing responsibility. About 1930, the exact date being unknown, Steve NELSON was dispatched through the clandestine channels of World Tourist in New York to Moscow as a student from the CPUSA to the Lenin School. It is interesting to recall, in this connection, that World Tourist was the firm headed by Jacob N. GOLOS (RAZIN) who has since become of paramount interest in view of his participation as a leading figure in the Soviet espionage parallels loosely grouped together in the GREGORY case; it being remembered that GOLOS was responsible 55 to a large degree for the operation of these parallels until his death in New York City in November 1943. 4. After graduating from the Lenin School NELSON served for about eighteen months on an undisclosed Comintern assignment reportedly of an operational intelligence • e . . . CL GRICORIE NARAUNICH KHELTZIC ERMENDEL NA DARBAHENENES SRINDEL MARAUNICHENES SRINDEL MARAUNICHENES SRINDEL MARAUNICHENES OPS COLON PORTON AND M · · · · · · · · 105





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
have never been definitely identified.

9. Almost immediately thereafter the unidentified man conferring with NELSON was positively identified as Vassili Mikhailovich ZUEILIN, then Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and shortly thereafter promoted to the position of Second Secretary. Through other cases and collateral information, it was ascertained that ZUEILIN was a Major Ceneral of State Security, that his real name is V. ZARUBIN (apparently no relation to Georgi N. ZARUBIN, Soviet Ambassagor to Canada during the time of the extensive operation of Col. Nikolai ZABOTIN, Soviet Military Attache and GEU head in Canada from the summer of 1913 until December 12, 1945).

10. Through investigation it was established that during 1943 and 1944 Ralph BOWMAN ("Al") was in frequent correspondence with Steve NELSON, concerning matters pertaining to this intelligence parallel, through a complicated series of Party and Party affiliated individuals serving as mail drops. During this time also Steve NELSON is known to have been in possession of a complete formula for the preparation of a secret ink adaptable for clandestime secret writing of espionage communications, and he was in possession also of certain ingredients for the preparation of this ink. While no secret writing communications were actually intercepted ip this case, it should be noted that it was established that Mordecai RAPPAPOET in 1943 was in possession of a formula for secret ink exactly the same as the one possessed by NELSON.

1. The next major development in this case was the receipt in August, 1943 of an anonymous letter, postmarked at Washington, D.C. on August 7, 1943, mailed from a mail box in the proximity of the Soviet Embassy, and addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This letter was written on a Russian typewriter in obviously military style, and, as will be noted below, could only have been written by an indivual closely acquainted with and undoubtedly deeply implicated in Soviet espionage operations within the U.S. This anonymous letter stated that the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vassili M. Zubilin, was actually the bead of the Foreign Department (given in Russian as INO) of the NKVD (meaning obviously GUGE/NKVD) for North America, having jurisdiction over not only the U.S. but Canada and Mexico as well. The letter stated that ZUBILIN was running a large network of agents, that his real name was V. ZARUBIN and that he was in Poland at least shortly after the Soviet couption in 1939 where he was responsible for the massacre of several thousands of Poles. The letter also described him as a Major General of MKVD and listed in detail a number of Soviet officials in North America who, according to the letter, were serving as his assistants in Soviet espionage operations. The other persons named in the letter, plus the substantiating information concerning them developed through independent investigation and other sources.

a. <u>Elizabeta Yurevna Zubilin</u> According to the letter ZUBILIN's wife, Elizabeta, personally was operating a network composed of a large number of agents serving in agencies of the UIS. Government. It has been established independently that



expressed a particular interest in jet propulsion, rocket motors, and related matters, and upon at least two occasions he furnished his sub-agents with Leica camers for photographing documents.

e. Leonid A. TARASOV. More commonly known as Lev TARASOV, he was first an important official of the newly opened Soviet Embassy in Maxico City, and was described in the letter as ZUBILIN's chief subordinate in Maxico. TARASOV later became either first or second secretary of the Soviet Legation, later Embassy, in Mexico and was independently identified as deeply involved in operational Soviet espionage. It is interesting to note that TARASOV was at least to a large part responsible for the Mexican end of the Altschuler case, a Soviet espionage case involving numerous secret writing messages which were never completely deciphered between the U.S. and Latin America. This case involved, among other things, efforts to procure the release or disposal of Jacques Morrard VANDENDRESCHD, allies Frank JACSON, the receipt of the anonymous letter TARASOV departed Mexico for the Soviet Union and his functions, at least in the Altschuler case, were taken over by another Soviet intelligence official, possibly Pavel KLARIN, referred to in greater detail below, and later by Gregori KASPAROV, referred to above.

f. <u>Pavel KLARIN</u> At the time the anonymous letter was received KLARIN, also known as Paul KLARIN and Pavel M. KLARIN, was Vice Consul assigned to the Consulate General, USSR, in New York City. The letter described him as an assistant to ZUBILIN, responsible for the operation of an extensive espionage net in the New York area. These allegations were substantiated by independent investigation. There appears no question but that KLARIN, during the period he spent in New York before proceeding to Mexico as an official of the Legation there in 1943 or 1944, was responsible for the New York ramifications of the Altschuler case. He has been identified almost without doubt as the writer of the Southbound secret writing letters in this operations.

g. <u>Vassili D. MIRONOV</u>. According to the anonymous letter this individual was a colonel of the NKVD and ZUBILIN's personal assistant and secretary in the Embassy. The letter stated that he also operated an espionage network which included U "an important agent in the White House". MIRONOV's Embassy position and his close association with ZUBILIN were verified; however, independent investigation failed to substantiate the allegations concerning his espionage operations.

h.<u>Servevi G. LUKIANOV</u>. LUKIANOV, an engineer with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission also was listed in the letter as an assistant to ZUHILIN and as a Soviet Intelligence official actually operating agents. However, LUKIANOV departed from the U.S. for Vancouver, Canada, about the time of the receipt of the anonymous letter, and consequently it was impossible to substantiate the allegations of his espionage activities in the U.S. The Canadian authorities were not able to establish definitely his participation in Soviet espionage in Canada, although they did report that his activities were highly suspect and that he

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assumed to himself on frequent occasions diplomatic prerequisites which were not in accordance with protocol or with his position as interpreted by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

1. VITALLI G. PAVIOV. This individual was described in the letter as Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ottowa, Canada, and, under the direction of ZUBILIN, responsible for NKVD operations in that country. It will be recalled that these allegations were completely substantiated in September 1945 by Igor Serrelevich GUZENNO, Red Army Intelligence code clerk who defected in Canada.

j. Semen SEMENOV. SEMENOV was named in the letter as a Soviet Intelligence official and engineer representing the Soviet Government in the U.S. It was impossible to substantiate the allegations concerning SEMENOV.

k. <u>Vassili (?) DALGOV</u>. DALGOV, also a Soviet engineer in the United States, was named by the writer of the anonymous letter as another assistant to ZUBILIN in his espionage operations. In his case, likewise, it was not possible to substantiate this allegation through independent investigation.

12. In connection with the anonymous letter, the pertinent contents of which are set out above, a number of observations appear of importance. Intensive efforts to identify the writer of this communication and/or the Russian language typewriter on which it was written proved completely fruitless, which was and is most unfortunate, since the writer of this letter obviously possessed both authentic and detailed knowledge of Soviet Intelligence operations in the U.S., at least as of 1943. The independent substantiation of so many of the allegations made in the letter, as reflected above, leaves absolutely no doubt as to its basic authenticity. Only one portion of the letter appears open to definite question, 1.e., the allegation that Vassili Mikhailovich ZUBILIN and Elizabeta Jurevna ZUBILIN were betraying the Soviet Union, passing "dis-information" to their superiors and transmitting valid intelligence data to German and Japanese authorities through Boris MORBOS As noted above, intensive efforts to substantiate this part of the letter were made without result, and in addition it was not possible to establish the existence of any channel whereby MORROS or the ZUEILINS, through other intermediaries could have passed intelligence information during 1943 to Germany or Japan. Set out below is a possible explanation of the inclusion in this letter of these apparently false allegations, which explanation may have some validity, at least insofar as the motovation for including these statements existed in the mind of the writer of the

13. From the language of the letter and the apparent important intelligence position of the writer thereof, it is believed that the writer was unable to take any personal action against ZUBILIN and his associates, either because of a hostage situation or because the writer felt that he could not safely complain, except anonymously, to U. S. authorities. Remembering that at the time of receipt of the

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letter the Soviet Union and the U. S: were in the position of at least quasiallies, it is believed probable that these allegations were included by the writer of the letter for the purpose of forcing the U. S. authorities to take action on the theory that perhaps no action would be taken against the diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet Union mentioned in the letter unless some betrayal to the common energy was alleged.

lk. The possible motivation for the rest of the letter is more difficult to spedulate upon. It is believed, however, that the letter was written by an officer, either of the Red Army Intelligence or of State Security, sufficiently highly placed to have a detailed knowledge of ZUBILIN's network. It is interesting to note that the letter gave personal characteristics and personal comments concerning each of the individuals mentioned, reflecting with little question that the writer was personally acquainted with the individuals he named. It is, of course, possible that the motivation for this letter stemmed from the writer's past participation in or knowledge of the NKVD purge of Red Army Intelligence in the middle and late 1930's.

15. In the summer of 1944 there began a general exodus of Soviet officials named in the anonymous letter and closely connected with ZUBILIN. The last of the individuals named in the letter to depart from the U. S. was SCHEVCHENKO, who did not finally depart until January 18, 1946. PAVIOV, it will be recalled, departed from Canada for the Soviet Union early in 1946 after the defection of Igor Sergeievich GUZENKOY It will also be recalled that this exodus was a direct result of the inspection conducted in the spring and summer of 1944 of NKCB and GRU facilities in the U. S. by two Soviet Intelligence inspectors, who, according to GUZENKO, diplomatic couriers using the names <u>Hikkail MILSKY</u> and <u>Gregori KOSSAREV</u>. It is recalled further that KOSSAREV, who presumably was an NKCB inspector, has never been identified, but that GUZENKO identified MILSKY as a Colonel <u>MILLSHTEIN</u>, Deputy Director of the North American section of Red Army Intelligence in Moscow.

16. ZUBILIN, himself, departed from the port of New York/City for the Soviet Union on August 28, 1944, and at about the same time KHEIFETS, KLARIN, and several of the other individuals named also departed.

17. ZUEILIN'S successor in the NKGB apparatus in the U. S. is believed to have been Anatoli Borisevich GROMOV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from the summer of 1914; until December 7, 1945, when he departed from the port of New York City ostensibly for the Soviet Union. It will be/recalled that GROMOV was identified as the Soviet agent "Als" who was GRECORY's superior in the GRECORY case. Shortly after his departure from the U. S. it was ascertained that GROMOV was assigned as Counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from where he departed, at least quasi-clandestinely, late in 1946. His present whereabouts are unknown and have been unknown since that time. It is interesting to note that investigation of GROMOV's contacts and activities did not

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-9reflect his active personal participation in many of the operations ZUBILIN is known to have directed, although it is entirely possible that such implication may have existed inasmuch as GROMOV's full significance was not realized nor his full identity as "Al" ascertained until November 1945, approximately a month before he departed from the U. S. 16. In connection with this case further, it is interesting to note that in addit-ion to his contacts with ZUBILIN, Steve NELSON was also in contact, at least in the spring of 1943, with what appeared to be a separate and distinct Soviet Intelligence operation headed by Feter IVAPOVy at that time Secretary of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, California. NELSON, during the early months of 1943, made clandestime interesting to TVAPOV of a constitute for another statement of the source of the sour meets with IVAMOV and, in addition, was responsible for putting IVANOV in touch with a number of Communist and pro-Communist professors directly or indirectly connected with the radiation laboratory at the University of Californial It will be recalled that this laboratory was one of the key installations of the DSM project. It is also known that during the early months of 1943 NELSON made attempts to procure information concerning this project from Party contacts employed therein. While it has never definitely been established, the speculation has been advanced that Peter IVANCV was a GRU official, whereas it will be recalled that ZUBILIN and his assistants were officials of the NKGB. It is interesting to note that the approaches used by IVANOV in his efforts to recruit agents to secure information concerning the DSM project very closely paralleled approaches known to have been made by Arthur Alexandrovich ADAMS, a highly important Soviet espionage agent definitely identified as working for Red Army Intelligence, who was intermittently active in the U. S. from 1919 to 1946. ADAMS was last active in the U. S. from 1938, when he entered this country on a fraudulent Canadian passport, until he disappeared in New York City late in January, 1946. IVANOV departed from the U. S. shortly after his series of contacts with NEISON, and his present whereabouts are not known. The full scope of IVANOV's activities and operations was never definitely ascertained. 19. In 1945 Steve NELSON was made a member of the National Board of the National Committee of the GPUSA, which required, under Party rules, his moving to the vic-inity of New York City. In the fall of 1945 NELSON proceeded to New York where he became a full time official at Party Headquarters, 35 East 12th Street, assuming, in addition to his membership on the National Board, the position of Director of Foreign Nationality Group work for the Party. Since that time NELSON has made a number of highly suspicious contacts, but there has been little definite indication of operational espionage on his part. However, he has been in frequent contact with individuals highly suspect as Soviet espionage agents, including a number of visiting Polish and Yugoslav officials whose intelligence significane is open to little question. In addition he has continued his interest in Communist scaman courier routes. 20. By the time of NELSON's move to New York, at least the form in which this Soviet espionage parallel existed in the Spring of 1943 appears to have materially changed and its present form is unknown.

21. Through the investigation of the COMRAP case, in addition to the large number of individuals identified as major participants, many others were involved as strongly suspect Soviet agents. Very briefly, there are set out below the identities of a number of these individuals. AN LON

Max and Grace GRANICH. These two individuals, husband and wife, who have long been active in Communist and Communist Front Circles in the New York ares were identified as mail drops used in the operation of this parallel by NELSON and BOWMAN Both of them have been active in the past in the Far East and have maintained an intense interest in Far Eastern affairs. In 1947 they moved to a farm in New England, and are known to have expressed to associates a desire to return to China at some time in the future, During 1943 and 1944 the GRANICH's were receiving mail from Madame Sun Yat Sen containing conspiratorial messages and signed by her with the cover name "Suzy". It is noted that one of these letters to the GRANICH's mentioned the return to the U. S. of John S. SERVICE, State Department official implicated in the illegal disclosure of classified documents in connection with the <u>Philip</u> Jacob JAFFE case and strongly suspect, in that connection, of working for Soviet Intelli-gence. Madame Sun Yat Sen's letter mentioned SERVICE as a "reliable individual" who "thinks as we do".

In the summer of 1945 three Chinese Communist delegates to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco visited Max and Grace GRANICH in New York and were almost immediately escorted by Grace GRANICH to an apartment in lower Manhattan, subsequently identified as occupied by Aube TZERKO, a concert planist, born in Canada under the name of <u>Abraham KOTZER.</u> TZERKO became of extreme interest in Feb-ruary 1946, when he was contacted by Sam CARR (real name Schmil KOGAN). It will be recalled that CARR was one of the principal recruiting agents in the GRU espionage ring operated in Canada by Colonel Nikolai ZABO IN from the summer of 1943 until the fall of 1945. At the time he contacted TZERKO in February, CARR was enroute back to Canada from Havana, Cuba, where as a fraternal delegate of the Canadian Communist Party of Canada) he had attended a National Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Subsequent investigation reflected that TZERKO and CARR have been close associates and there appears little question but that TZERKO was invoived in the disappearance in Canada of Sam CARR in April 1946. It was never possible to ascertain the exact significance of the visit to TZERKO's apartment by the three important Chinese Communists attending the UNCIO.

Alexander BITTELMAN (real name Uschur BITTELMACHER). BITTELMAN was drawn into the CIMMAP case through his close and frequent contacts with the principal figures therein and it was strongly indicated by the investigation that he was at least indirectly connected with the activities of this net. BITTELMAN, who was born in Russia, and whose deportation was requested very recently by the Department of Justice, has long been an important national functionary of the CPUSA. He has interested himself particularly in Party organization and propaganda among the Jewish minority elements and he is considered by many Party leaders to be the

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foremost Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist dialectician in the Party. The exact extent of BITTELMAN's intelligence activities has never definitely been ascertained.

<u>Alexander "RACHTENEERS.</u> TRACHTENBERG, a member of the National Committee of the Party, is the director of International Publishers, most important of the Communist Party publishing firms. TRACHTENBERG figured in the COMRAP investigation through his intimate association with many of the other subjects thereof. Collaterally, it was ascertained that he was in close contact with a number of other strongly suspect Soviet agents, not implicated, so far as is known in this case, but definitely implicated in other Soviet espionage operations. Of particular interest in this regard is TRACHTENBERG's association with Joseph Milton-MERNSTEIN, alias Joe BERNSTEIN, alias Joe B., alias Joe <u>BURSIEY</u>, alias Joe <u>BURSIEN</u> BERNSTEIN, a minor Party figure for many years, has been closely connected with a number of individuals who have figured in the <u>GREGON</u> case, involving, it will be recalled, the operation of extensive Soviet espionage parallels centered in agencies of the U. S. Government. In addition, <u>BERNSTEIN</u> appears identical with an individual known to have been described by Fnilip Jacob JAFFE as an important Soviet espionage agent. There is good reason to believe, on the basis of certain correspondence between subjects in the <u>GREGORY</u> case referring to <u>BERNSTEIN</u>, that at least for several years during world war II <u>HERNSTEIN</u> may have been operating a Soviet espionage parallel in Mashington, D.C., identical with the so-called Third Parallel referred to by GREGORY about which GREGORY knew practically nothing.

21. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) DEPT. OF JUSTICE LIR. 2-26.73 BY ALT NARS Date 2.6.73

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

August 16, 1948

Memorandum for Mr. Clifford:

The following represents the consensus of opinion at our meeting this morning with the Attorney General and Mr. Peyton Ford:

(1) The President should not at this time make a statement regarding "spies" along the lines proposed by Mr. Spingarn.

(2) Attention will be given by Justice to the possibility and desirability of referring the question of Soviet espionage in the Federal Government to a bi-partisan commission, such as the Hoover Commission.

(3) Justice should make every effort to ascertain if Whittaker Chambers is guilty of perjury. (37) Provertigation of Chambers confinement in manufal institution (4) The Attorney General will furnish the White House

with a description of the data Miss Bentley claims to have obtained for Soviet agents during the war, and the White House should endeavor to determine how much of this information was freely available to the Soviet Government through routine official liaison between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The purpose of this would be to make it clear that Miss Bentley was not successful in transmitting secret material to the Russians that they did not already have.

(5) The White House should ascertain the facts concerning the retention of Mr. Remington in CMAR, his transfer to the Council of Economic Advisers and his subsequent transfer to the Department of Commerce.

6. In. E.

GEORGE M. ELSEY

22. [Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948.

The President THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON December 16, 1948 Memorandum for: Attorney General The President From: I wonder if we could not get a statement of facts from the FBI about the meddling of the House Un-American Activities Committee and how they dried up sources of information which would have been accessible in the prosecution of spies and communists. Their meddling efforts were in fact a "red herring" to detract attention not only from the shortcomings of the 80th Congress but also contributed to the escape of certain communists who should have been indicted. I'll appreciate it if you will look into this a little bit and we will talk it over at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow. NIC? OFFICE OF THE RECEIVED DEC 10 1948 341920 ORNEY GENER 119

23. D. M. Ladd, Memorandum to the Director [J. Edgar Hoover], "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT The Director DATE: December 29, 1948 то FROM : D. M. Ladd JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, SUBJECT: with aliases; et al; PERJURY ESPIONACE - R Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated December 1 1948, in which you were advised that the notes of Mr. Adolf Berle concerning his interview with Whittaker Chambers were turned over to the Bureau in June' of 1943. You attached a routing slip to my memorandum and inquired, "Do I understand correctly that Chambers talked to Berle in 1939; we interviewed him first in May 1942; and Berle gave us information first in June 1943? How did we come to contact Chambers in 1942 and did we take any investigative action then? What did we do in the year from May 1942 to June 1943 about the data received from Chambers: E." You subsequently inquired by phone on December 27 as to why we did not interview Chambers sconer than May 13, 1942. The following sets forth in chronological order the various investigative stops taken by the Bureau. The Bureau's first reference to Whittaker Chambers appeared in a pamphlet published in 1932 by International Pamphlets, 799 Broadway, New York. (61-7562-Sub 2-161) This pamphlet is a reprint of a short story by Whittaker Chambers entitled "Can You Hear Their Voices? - The Arkansas Farmers' Fight For Food" which was first published in the "New Masses" for March, 1931. This item was referred to by a Miss Hazel Huffman of the Federal Theater Project in New York City in testimony before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (Dies Committee) on August 19, 1938. (61-7582, Volume 1, page 778) The New York Office of the Bureau on October 18, 1940; submitted the original report of Confidential Informant Bob M dated September 16, 1940, advising that Ludwig Lore, a former member of the Communist Party and likewise a #contact of this Bureau, had told Bob M about an unidentified individual who had been a high officer in the GPU for eight years abroad and seven years in this country. (There was nothing at this time to identify the individual referred to by Lore as Whittaker Chambers.) INDEXED - 28 1.7.4.7. /333 - 657 RECORDED - 28 By letter dated November 13, 1940, the Bureau instructed the New York Office to make every effort to determine the identity of this unidentified individual for the purpose of securing whatever information he had in his possession (61-7566-1977; 100-25824-1) LW:EN 35% 65 JAN 31 1949

Memorandum to the Director

On February 28, 1941, Mr. Adolf Berle of the Department of State requested someone from the Bureau to contact him regarding Chambers. On March 1, 1941, Mr. Rosen advised Mr. Berle's secretary that it was his understanding that Mr. Carson and Mr. Foxworth of the Bureau had an appointment with Mr. Berle. (100-25824-1X)

At this time there was a nationalistic tendency card filed in the Bureau indices which indicated that Whittaker Chambers was alleged to be a Communist and formerly a member of the IWW, also former staff editor of the "Daily Worker" and contributing editor of "New Masses."

On March 3, 1941. Mr. Forworth in a memorandum to you made reference to his conversation with you that date concerning Whittaker Chambers. Reference was made to the aforementioned nationalistic tendency card and <u>Forworth stated</u>, "We are not conducting any investigation and I have accordingly informed Mr. Berle." (100-25824-1X1)

On March 10, 1941, Mr. Berle telephonically advised Mr. Forworth that he was afraid that the Russian agencies were looking for Whittaker Chambers. This matter was not followed up and the memorandum concerning it was merely filed. (100-25824-112) (This is the memorandum which was referred to in the memorandum to you from Assistant Director L. B. Nichols dated September 1, 1948, which prompted the memorandum to all Assistant Directors bringing to the attention of Supervisory personnel the significance of initialing communications.) (100-25824-52) (ATTACHED)

Information was received on April 29, 1941, from Confidential Informant Victor Riesel, then assistant editor of "New Leader" newspaper, that Whittaker Chambers, a former member of the Communist Party, was then a motion picture reviewer for "Time," "Life" and "Fortune" magazines and was at that time (1941) strongly anti-Communist. (100-5740-5)

On May 9, 1941, the New York Office reported an interview with Mr. Ludwig Lore on May 8, 1941, pursuant to the Bureau instructions of November 13, 1940. Lore declined to furnish the name of the unknown former GPU agent and stated that he had been advised that this man's case had been discussed with the Director of the FBI some six or seven months previous by an intermediary who had suggested that the former GPU agent wanted some sort of immunity guarantee before exposing himself and that the Director had stated that no such agreement could be entered into. Lore also alleged that this former GPU agent had delivered to the President of the United States through a trusted friend who had the necessary

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Memorandum to the Director

contact a list of persons in the Government who were Communists or pro-Soviet and that this list had been on the President's desk for several weeks but nothing had been done about it. (100-25824-2)

The New York Office was advised on May 16, 1941, that you had no recollection of ever having been approached by any intermediary who discussed some type of immunity guarantee which could be given to an agent of the GPU if he were willing to expose himself. The New York Office was instructed to obtain from Ludwig Lore the identity of the former GPU agent. (100-25824-2)

On <u>August 3, 1941</u>, the New York Office advised that <u>Ludwig Lore had</u> identified the individual to whom he had referred as <u>Whittaker Chambers</u>, an associate editor of "Time" magazine. (100-25824-5)

On August 18, 1941, Assistant Director E. J. Connelley in New York was instructed to institute a detailed investigation regarding Chambers to determine his character, background, activities and affiliations in a highly discreet and tactful menner. At the completion of the investigation the feesibility of openly interviewing Chambers would be considered. (100-25824-6)

During the conduct of this investigation <u>Mr. Will Alen</u> of the "Washington Deily News" contacted Assistant Director L. B. Michols during October 1941 and advised that Ludwig Lore, a former Communist in New York City, knew an individual familiar with OCPU activities whom Allen subsequently contacted. Allen obtained from this person the names of three alleged OCPU agents - Hyman Ealodny, Helen Kalodny and Sophic Menken. Investigation was immediately instituted by the Bureau on the three individuals named. (100-25824-18)

Allen was again interviewed by a representative of the Washington Field Office on November 26, 1941, but stated that he could not under any circumstances divulge the identity of his informant in New York City. Allen was again interviewed by Assistant Director Nichols on January 28, 1942, at which time he stated that his informant's initials were W.C. (obviously Whittaker Chambers) (100-25824-19)

On February 11, 1942, the New York Office advised that Ludwig Lore did not introduce Allen to Chambers, but Lore claimed that Allen had been introduced to Chambers by Isaac Bon Levine. (100-25824-20)

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Memorandum to the Director

The logical leads in the investigation into the background of Whittaker Chambers having been completed, the New York Office advised the Bureau on March 4, 1942, that an effort would be made to interview Chambers. In this regard a follow-up letter was sent to New York on April 30, 1942.(100-25824-2)

It will be noted that there was an investigative delay from August 18, 1941 until March 4, 1942, in conducting the necessary investigation into the background and activities of Chambers for the purpose of laying the proper predication for an interview. The Field was followed by the Bureau on this matter in October, November and December, 1941, and in January, 1942, as new information was received or investigative suggestions made. (100-25824-8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19)

It is possible that this investigative delinquency was a reflection of the general investigative delinquency in the Field during the period immediately prior to and subsequent to Peerl Harbor.

Chambers was interviewed by Special Agents John E. Paul and E. J. Greenwald, Jr. of the New York Office on May 13, 1942, the results being transmitted to the Bureau by letter on May 14, 1942. Chambers advised that he had given all of the information which was in his possession to Mr. A. A. Berle of the State Department in Weshington, D. C., in September, 1939, and before discussing any of the matters with the Agents put through a long distance call to Mr. Berle at the latter's home.

Chambers advised Berle in the presence of the Agents that there were present in his office two VBI Agents who wished to secure the information that he, Chambers, had given to Barle and asked if this would be all right. Apparently Berle was in accord for Chambers thanked him and thereafter supplied considerable information which he indicated had been furnished previously to Mr. Berle in September, 1939. (100-25824-22)

During the course of this interview Chambers denied that he was directly connected with the OGPU and stated that he was in the underground movement of the Communist Party, USA as a kind of "morale officer" to guide recruits in the Party's policy. He denied that he had ever been to the USSR. (In this regard the investigation conducted by the Bureau prior to the interview failed to disclose any indications of travel by Chambers to or residence in the USSR as originally alleged by Ludwig Lore, who you will recall died shortly after the conclusion of this investigation, and so was not available to recheck allegations made by him concerning Chambers.) (100-25824-22)

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Memorandum to the Director

As will be seen from the foregoing, the first knowledge the Bureau had that Chambers had been interviewed by Adolf Berle on September 2, 1939, in Washington, D. C., came to us as a result of our interview with Chambers May 13, 1942. You will recall in connection with this matter SAC Cerson was brought up from Miami to interview Berle on September 3, 1948, regarding the latter's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in order to clarify the ambiguities in Berle's testimony and to cause a correction in the inference left by Berle's testimony that he had advised the FBI in 1939 of Chambers' allegations. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson that his recollection being refreshed, he could state that he does not recall or have any record of any prior conversation with the FBI prior to March. 1941, concerning Chembers and that he does not recall having furnished to the FBI in 1941 any information concerning Chambers' interview with him. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carcon on September 3, 1948, that in 1939 (and by inference in 1941 as well) he did not feel free to divulge the content of Chambers' conversation to the FBI inasmuch as Chambers had indicated that he did not so desire and had further indicated that he would not back up the story and also did not desire the information furnished to the FBI, particularly if the source was to be revealed. (100-25824-50)

The Bureau may have been delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of the Chambers interview regarding the data which Chambers had furnished the Bureau and to Berle, in order to make sure that it was the same. However, Chambers when interviewed on May 13, 1942, had indicated that what he was furnishing to the Bureau at that time was the substance of what he had given to Mr. Berle in September, 1939.

An analysis of the Eureau's action with regard to individuals mentioned by Chambers in the 1942 interview shows that 21 persons were already subjects of Eureau investigations, as well as two organizations, namely, Astorg Trading Corporation and Tass News Agency. On five other persons, investigations were instituted on the basis of Chambers' allegations. These persons were: Asimov; Harry Weit, with aliases; Paul Massing; Hedd Massing; and Helen Vare (Cappel). Two individuals, Balph Souman and Margaret browder, became the subjects of investigation at a later date on the basis of information developed through other sources, data furnished by Chambers in each instance already appearing in the Eureau files. With regard to Bowman, it was noted that he was established to be identical with the person mentioned by Chambers as Rudy Baker but Chambers was never able to identify Bowman's photograph as Baker.

Regarding those individuals montioned by Chambers, concerning whom no investigative action was undertaken, Mrs. Lila Field and Harold Ware were

- 5 -

Memorandum to the Director

dead and the Bureau files contained considerable information regarding Mare. Gertrude Schilbach, a German Communist involved in the murder of Ignaco Reiss in Switzerland, was not indicated to be in the United States. Isidore Miller was not alleged to be either a Communist or an espionage agent. The circumstances regarding the disappearance of Juliet Poyntz were generally known to the Bureau and Chambers' suspicions contributed nothing to the picture at that time. Chambers mentioned one Post who "was obtained from the underground movement of the Party" and, according to Chambers, became a co-editor of a State Department publication. He has subsequently been identified as Richard Hovell Post, a State Department employee and a Loyalty investigation has been conducted concerning him. Chambers mentioned an unnamed individual "connected" with the Communist underground who, was in the Trade Agreement Section of the State Department. This person has been identified as Henry Julian Wadleigh, who was formerly employed by the State Department and who was recently interviewed in connection with the most current allegations of Chambers. As to the latter two individuals, Chambers' statements with regard to them were less positive than as to other persons and he did not state in unequivocal language that they were Party members at the time he left the movement in 1938, as he did in the cases of many of the individuals discussed.

It should be noted that subsequent to the Chambers interview on May 13, 1942, Bureau files an numerous individuals were reviewed, certain investigations were opened, and efforts were made to identify persons named by Chambers, the principal one of which was his superior "Peter." In a report dated December 1, 1942, in the Chambers file, the New York Office identified "Peter," the reputed head of the underground movement of the Communist Party, as J_Peters, author of "The Communist Party, A Manual of Organization." (100-25824-25)

Whittaker Chambers meanwhile had been bedridden with angina pectorus from November, 1942 until March 5, 1943, when Agents of this Bureau were able to interview him for a period of five minutes. At this time Chambers identified a photograph of Alexander Stevens, with aliases, as "Peter" his superior in the Communist Party underground. (100-184255-67)

Thereafter, the desirability of determining whether the information furnished to Mr. Berle was identical with that furnished to the Bureau by Chambers became apparent and subsequent to Mr. Berle's recovery from an illness which had afflicted him in May, 1943 (94-4-3869/8) the Liaison Section of the Bureau obtained Mr. Berle's notes of the 1939 interview, which were very

- 6 -

Memorandum to the Director

sketchy and disjointed in June, 1943. Copies of these notes were placed in the Whittaker Chambers file. (100-25824-27)

The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, for any independent recollection which he might have had to explain or clarify the ambiguities in his notes, although it is probable that Mr. Berle not having reduced these notes to a memorandum would have been unable to contribute materially to the matters under investigation after a lapse of almost four years since the date of his interview with Chambers.

DELINQUENCIES NOTED

1. The Bureau did not press Mr. Berle for information which he might have had concerning Whittaker Chambers at the time he made his inquiry in March, 1941, concerning the Bureau's possible interest in Chambers. The files do not indicate a definite explanation, but if one exists it might be that the Bureau did not feel that it was desirable to press the Assistant Secretary of State for information which he did not see fit to volunteer concerning a subject which had been raised by him.

2. There was an investigative delinquency in the period required for investigation of the background and activities of Whittaker Chambers from August 18, 1941 to March 4, 1942. An explanation, if such exists, might be the general investigative delinquency in the Field immediately prior to and subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

3. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of our interview with Whittaker Chambers on May 13, 1942, to determine the substance of the information which had been furnished by Chambers to Berle in 1939. The Bureau waited until June, 1943 to obtain Berle's notes concerning the interview. The only possible explanation for this delinquency was that Chambers' telephone conversation with Berle and his interview with the Agents indicated that he was furnishing the Bureau in May, 1942, the substance of what he had given to Berle in 1939.

4. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, at the time his notes were obtained, for any independent recollection which he might have had of the 1939 conversation in addition to the

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Memorandum to the Director

notes. The Bureau files do not indicate what if anything Mr. Berle said at the time the notes were obtained by the Bureau, but it is doubtful that he would have been able to contribute materially to a clarification of the notes in 1943 after a lapse of almost four years from the date of his original interview with Chambers.


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24. Tom C. Clark, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949.




testimony in defense.

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its conclusion.

copy of this memorandum.



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25. [Robert J. Lamphere to Gardner], "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, With Alias," 9 May 1949. THE SEATS GLINT 49-005 May 9, 1949 FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, with alias In connection with the investigation to identify Zora, the person who recruited Judith Coplon and Marion Davis Berdecio in the Fall of 1944 as Soviet espionage agents, an identification has been made which indicates that Zora is identical with Flora Don Wovschin. Miss Wovschin was born February 20, 1923, at New York City. Her mother, Miss Maria Wicher, and her stepfather, Enos Regnet Wicher, presently reside at 229 East 79th Street, New York City. He is a professor at Columbia University. Mrs. Maria Wicher was born in Russia and became a citizen of the United States in 1922. Flora Don Wovschin's father, Dr. William A. Wovschin (deceased), was born in Russia and became a citizen of the United States in 1914. Miss Wovschin attended the University of Wisconsin, Columbia University, and received her degree at Barnard College. While at Barnard she was active in the American Students Union and was possibly a member of the American Youth for Democracy. She was acquainted with both Judith Coplon and Marion Davis Berdecio while at Barnard. She was employed by OWI from September 9, 1943, to February 20, 1945, when she transferred to the State Department. She stayed at the State Department until September 20, 1945, when she resigned. Her mother and stepfather reportedly were very active in the Communist movement when they resided in the State of Wisconsin. We have recently received information to the effect that Flora Don Wovschin went to Russia several years ago, after renouncing her American citizenship, and in Russia she married a Soviet engineer. It is reported that she is unhappy at the present time and would like to return to the United States. Dr. 9 Sept 1986 - anglase sinces Wousering war reported homen died serving as a nurse in Ninth Konea. DECLASSIFIED BY SPJ-CLCCum 131

26. Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON March 22, 1949 ANDAR' MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT : At its 36th Meeting, the National Security Council, including the Secretary of the Treasury and a representative of the Attorney General for this matter, agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend that you approve the enclosed draft directive on coordination of internal security (NSC 17/4). The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the enclosed memorandum dated March 21, 1949. SIDIFY A. SOUTRS Executive Secretary APITROV"D: HARRY S. TRUMA Date: march 23, 1949 SALA BELATE

The Prosident (ONLIL NSC_17/4 COPY NO. 1 A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL on INTERNAL SECURITY DECLASSIFIED . 11652 By NLT NARS De 11-5-75 March 22, 1949 WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL

NSC 17/4

CONFIDENTIAL

March 22, 1949

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

INTERNAL SECURITY

References:

A. NSC 17/3
B. Memos for National Security Council from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 26, 1948, March 3, and March 21, 1949

At its 36th Meeting, the National Security Council considered the references and agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend to the President that he approve the proposed directive enclosed herewith. The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the Reference memo dated March 21, 1949.

Subject to the approval by the President of the above recommendations, the National Security Council also directed the NSC representative on Internal Security to arrange for the prompt study of the points outlined by the Secretary of the Army in the reference memo dated March 21, 1949, and to submit for Council consideration such recommendations with respect thereto as are deemed appropriate.

> SIDNEY W. SOUERS Executive Secretary

Distribution:

The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, National Security Resources Board

CONFIDENTIAL

March 22, 1949

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act, the following arrangements for the purpose of effecting more adequate and coordinated internal security.

2. The following two permanent committees, together with such secretariat as may be required, shall be responsible for coordinating internal security.

<u>a</u>. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) is responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. It consists of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army; and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force.

b. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal -Security (ICIS) is hereby created and shall be

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responsible for coordinating all phases of the internal security field other than the functions outlined in paragraph $2-\underline{a}$ above. It shall be composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice and the National Military Establishment.

3. Both Committees shall invite non-member agency representatives as ad hoc members thereof when matters involving their responsibilities are under consideration.

4. In accordance with arrangements to be determined in each case, there shall be transferred to the IIC and the ICIS for incorporation as subcommittees or for the absorption of their functions such existing committees as are operating in their respective fields of responsibility. The two committees shall also establish such new subcommittees as will assist them in carrying out their responsibilities.

5. The IIC and the ICIS will, whenever appropriate, hold joint meetings or establish joint subcommittees.

6. The National Security Council shall designate a representative who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the NSC, shall:

a. Assist and advise the NSC in coordinating the activities of the IIC and the ICIS;

b. Assist and advise the IIC and the ICIS in carrying out their respective responsibilities and in collaborating on problems of common interest;

<u>c</u>. Submit to the IIC or the ICIS questions
 which, in his opinion, require their consideration;
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<u>d</u>. As representative of the NSC, participate as an observer and advisor in all meetings of the IIC and the ICIS;

e. Submit for consideration by the NSC problems which cannot be resolved by either the IIC or the ICIS or by the two committees acting together, outlining any divergent solutions which have been proposed and his own recommendations;

 \underline{f} . Report to the National Security Council from time to time, at least quarterly, on progress being made for the provision of adequate internal security;

 \underline{g} . Have no powers of instruction, direction or supervision over either the IIC or the ICIS.

7. The IIC and the ICIS shall prepare and submit for consideration and approval by the N-tional Security Council proposed charters for the IIC and the ICIS respectively. The Department of Justice representative shall serve as the Chairman of the ICIS for this purpose. The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council shall assist the IIC and the ICIS in coordinating the preparation of the proposed charters. These charters shall define, in accordance with the foregoing, the respective functions and responsibilities of the committees and shall provide for their chairmanship and staff.

NSC 17/4


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
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
27. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949.

49-018 TOP OF COPSE ANATOLI BORISOVICH GROMOV It appears that Bademus (Vadim) is identical with Anatoli Borisovich Gromov. He arrived in the United States on September 15, 1944. He was designated as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. The early mention in the material of Bademus on July 25, 1944, is not inconsistent inazanch as it is indicated therein that Bademus was not in the United States at that time. Identifying data concerning Gromov has previously been made available to you. Front See - y Str Ende to sort. DECLASSIFIED BY Spacicle SEGRET COPSE 139

28. [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, a.k.a. Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949.







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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Executive Reg stry 0-9081

9 February 1950


MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee
FROM:	The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
SUBJECT:	Failure of JAEIC to Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value.

1. It is the opinion of the JAEIC that considerable counter espionage information is and has been available in the files of the FBI and elsewhere which would have been and probably still is of considerable value to the JAEIC in making its estimates of the status of the U.S.S.R. atomic energy program. Some of this information has become available through the investigations conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Canadian Royal Commission, However, essentially all information that has become available is of a peripheral nature, incomplete, and of relatively little value because of the length of time which has elapsed since the incidents occurred. The Nuclear Energy Division of OSI made a request for specific information to the Director of the FBI on 21 September 1949, and while some information was furnished in answer to this request, it was only of slight value.


2. More specifically, if the SAEIC had known of the implications of the Fuchs case in June 1949 at the time when the July estimate was being written, the estimate of the time by which the Soviets could have obtained their first bomb would have been appreciably advanced, as no allowance was made in making that estimate for successful espionage on details of bomb design and construction. Of course, the JAEIC does not know how long Fuchs has been under investigation, but the fact still remains that the JAEIC was not informed until <u>after</u> the man's arrest.

3. If the pattern set forth above is followed, it seems obvious that much counter espionage information will not be made available. The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of the investigations of a Congressional Committee or the arrest of the offenders in isolated instances. This is very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of time, as the information is so old by the time we get it that it is of little value.

4. The JAEIC desires to point out to the SIC this possibly large area of information which is being denied us. Furthermore, in view of the paucity of information from other sources, the elimination of this deficiency is urgently necessary if the JAEIC is to perform its duties adequately.



30. Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950.



She stated that Golos told her that Brothman would furnish her with certain blueprints. Following that she met with Brothman about ten times in the summer of 1940 until the fall of that year, and obtained blueprints from him for Golos. She said that in the fall of 1940 Golos claimed to have become disgusted with Brothman and told her he was turning Brothman over to someone else.

As a result of this information an investigation of Brothman was conducted, which resulted in an interview of Brothman on May 29, 1947. At first Brothman denied recognizing the name or photograph of Golos. Upon being shown a photograph of Bentley, which he identified as a person whom he knew as "Helen," he then admitted that he did recognize the photograph of Golos.

Brothman related that some time in 1938 cr 1939 Golos had come to his office at 114 East 32nd Street, New York City, and advised Brothman that he had contacts with the Russian Government, by reason of which he was in a position to obtain contracts from that government for Brothman if Brothman would turn over to him blueprints of certain products on which Brothman was working at the time. Brothman advised that the blueprints in question were his own property. He said Golos visited his office on several occasions thereafter until Golos introduced him to "Helen." Golos advised that "Helen" would thereafter obtain the blueprints. "Helen" visited Brothman's office over a dozen times during 1938, 1939, and 1940. Some time in 1940 she stopped coming and another individual named Harry Gold appeared at Brothman's office and said that he represented Golos. Thereafter Gold visited Brothman's office on a number of occasions during 1940 and 1941, and obtained blueprints from Brothman. He said the last time Gold picked up the blueprints, according to the best of his recollection, was late in 1941 or early 1942. He was emphatic in stating that Gold was the last individual to pick up any blueprints or material for Golos. He stated that Harry Gold was, at the time of the interview, namely May 29, 1947, employed by him as a chemist in his laboratory at Elmhurst, Long Island. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Brothman.

Upon receiving the information about Gold from Brothman, Gold was interviewed the same day at A. Brothman Associates Laboratory, 8503-57th Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island. Gold related in substance that he had met Jacob Golos in October, 1940, at a meeting of the American Chemical Society at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia. At this time Golos propositioned Gold, saying that he had connections with individuals in a foreign country, not maming the country, and also had connections with Abraham Brothman in

-2-

New York who was turning over certain blueprints. Golos told Gold that he required the services of a chemist to go to New York City, obtain the blueprints from Brothman, and then evaluate them on a chemical basis. Gold stated that about two weeks after this, in November, 1940, he contacted Brothman in New York City and introduced himself as a representative of Golos. For the next six months he made visits to New York City on the average of every three weeks to obtain blueprints from Brothman. He said that during this period he received four or five telephone calls from Golos, who always stated that they would have to get together very soon, but that actually this never happened. He said the last telephone call from Golos was in May, 1941, after which time he had no further word from Golos. He denied that he ever had seen Golos except on the occasion when he met him in October, 1940. Gold claimed that after his second or third trip to New York City Brothman became friendly and exhibited an interest in Gold's career as a chemist. He said that ever since that time Brothman had been interested in having Gold join Brothman's organization, but that it was not until February, 1946, that he could see his way clear to accept such employment, which he did at that time. Gold denied any financial agreement with Golos, and cleimed he never received a cent from Golos. He insisted that he stood the expenses for the trips to New York City on the first two occasions, after which Brothman became friendly and furnished him a five-dollar bill to cover expenses. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Gold. On July 22 and 31, 1947, Abraham Brothman and Harry Gold, respectively, were called before the Federal Grand Jury, Southern District of New York. Both testified in substance before this Grand Jury to that which they had furnished on interview. The investigation of the Grand Jury concerning the charges of Elizabeth T. Bentley culminated in the finding of a "no bill." After extensive and intensive investigation which developed information indicating that Harry Gold was very probably the United States contact of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, he was interviewed at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and on May 22, 1950, he furnished a signed statement admitting espionage activity. He admitted that he began the procurement of industrial information for the Soviet Union in the fall of 1936, and continued this activity until 1943, except for the period from 1938 to 1940 while he attended Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio.

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Gold advised that very early in 1944 his then superior made arrangements for him to meet Dr. Klaus Fuchs in New York City. This first meeting occurred on a Saturday afternoon in February or March, 1944, on the East Side of Manhattan, from where they took a cab uptown to a restaurant around Third Avenue in the 50's, possibly Manny Wolf's Restaurant. Following the dinner they walked about and completed arrangements for further meetings. Gold recalled the arrangements for actual recognition to be that he was to carry a pair of gloves in one hand, plus a green-covered book, while Fuchs was to carry a handball. He introduced himself as "Raymond" and Fuchs introduced himself as Klaus Fuchs. He said that Fuchs never used the name "Raymond" because he knew it was fictitious.

At this first meeting no written information was passed, but Fuchs revealed that he was with the British Mission working with the Manhattan Engineer Project. He told Gold that the British Mission was working on the separation of isotopes, and Gold believes there was at least implied the eventual utilization of the energy produced by nuclear fission in the form of a weapon. Following this, Gold had about four meetings with Fuchs in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens. During at least two of these meetings Fuchs furnished written information to Gold, who thereafter delivered it to his superior, "John." He said that he had taken a brief glance at the material on one occasion and found it to consist of a number of folded sheets of paper containing mathematical equations which seemed to concern mathematical derivations.

Gold further advised that he lost contact with Fuchs when Fuchs failed to keep a meeting in August, 1944. He stated that "John" obtained the information whereby he was once more enabled to contact Fuchs. "John" gave Gold the address of Mrs. Heineman in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the sister of Fuchs. As a result of this, he met Fuchs at the Heineman residence shortly after Christmas Day, 1944, or early in 1945. At that time Fuchs told him that he was at Los Alamos, New Mexico, a short distance from Santa Fe. Fuchs also gave him written information at the time and the two made an arrangement to meet in June of that year in Santa Fe. Gold stated that on this occasion he had been given a sum of approximately fifteen hundred dollars to offer Fuchs in a very diplomatic manner so as not to offend him. He said that Fuchs "turned it down cold." Gold returned to New York with the money and information which he delivered to "John."

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Gold has further advised that he met Fuchs in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in June, 1945, and again in September, 1945. On both of these occasions Fuchs furnished him with written information. He said that during the September, 1945, meeting Fuchs told him that he had been present at the initial large-scale trial of nuclear fission at Alamogordo, New Mexico. He also stated that Fuchs told him at the time that he probably would return to England scon, but that by paying a call to Fuchs' sister he could ascertain just when. Gold said he made one or two attempts to see Fuchs again at the home of his sister, but was not successful. After the possible second attempt, which was either in late January or early February, 1946, Gold missed a scheduled appointment with his superior, "John," and has not seen or heard from him since. In connection with the current interview of Fuchs in London by representatives of this Bureau, still and movie photographs of Gold were surreptitiously obtained for display to Fuchs. Previously, Fuchs and Robert and Kristel Heineman had failed to recognize a photograph of Gold. On May 20, 1950, Fuchs was shown the new still photographs of Gold and he did not identify them, though he stated he could not reject them. On May 22, 1950, Fuchs viewed three repeat showings of the moving pictures of Gold, after which he stated that Gold was very likely his contact in the United States. It is most interesting to note that this information was received by cable at 11:08 AM, while Gold had first admitted his espionage activity to the interviewing agents in Philadelphia at approximately 10:45 AM the same day. On May 23, 1950, a complaint was filed before a United States Commissioner for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York,

Commissioner for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, charging Harry Gold and "John" Doe with conspiracy to commit espicaage on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in violation of Section 32, Title 50, United States Code. A warrant was issued and Gold was thereupon taken before United States District Judge James P. McGranery at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for arraignment. Judge McGranery gave Gold the complaint to read and he admitted that he was the Earry Gold named in the complaint. A preliminary hearing was set for June 12, 1950, and bail was set at one hundred thousand dollars, in default of which Gold was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

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Further information of interest to the President and you will be furnished as it develops. With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards, Sincerely yours, on all C -6-

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
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
31. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950.


50 125 TOP SECRET June 27, 1950 STUDY OF CODE NAMES IN MGB COMMUNICATIONS Reference is made to the memorandum dated June 23, 1950, bearing the above caption. Since the referenced memorandum was prepared it has been determined that one JULIUS ROSENBERG is probably identical with the individual described as ANTENNA and LIBERAL in that memorandum. It is also believed now that DAVID GREENGLASS is identical with the individual described as KALIER, and that RUTH PRINTZ GREENGLASS is identical with the individual known under the code name OSA. From the information available to date it is believed that ANATOLI ANTONOVICH YAKOVLEV is identical with the individual described under the code name ALEKSEY in the referenced memorandum. More complete details concerning these individuals will be furnished to you at a later date. DECLASSIFIED BY SPACLCCCM

32. Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR **Iederal Sureau of Investigation** United States Department of Justice Washington 25, D.C. July 18, 1950 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BY SPECIAL MESSENGER Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison Naval Aide to the President The White House Washington, D. C. My dear Admiral: I thought the President and you would be interested in the attached memorandum which sets forth information concerning Julius Rosenberg, who was arrested on July 17, 1950, for conspiring to violate the Espionage Statute. As further pertinent information regarding this matter is received you will be advised. This information has been made available to Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President, and Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council. With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards, Sincerely yours, , aA Enclosure











33. Armed Forces Security Agency, "Russian Cryptology During World War II," undated [ca. 1951] [Excerpt].


TOP SECRET SUEDE NEVER TO BE SEEN BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS. NARA Date 5-24-4 0 tuthority N/N/D 9 6 DECLASSIFIE USSR Ref. No: S/UQ0-Z/ Issued : CB/OU/27, Copy No: 20 4 RUSSIAN CRYPTOLOGY DURING WORLD WAR II DNIV DM1v S/UQO-Z/C4 [48 Pages plus Appendix 3 Pages] DAM JIB DŜi TOP SECRET SUEDE RCMP














34. No author [Washington Field Office, FBI], "William Wolf Weisband," 27 November 1953 [Excerpt].

WF0 121-13210 ESPIONACE ACTIVITIES On October 0, 1953, JONES ORIN YORK was interviewed by SA WILLIAT L. BYRME, JR. and SA FRANCIS D. COOLEY, at which time he submitted the following signed statement: "Burbank California October 6, 1953 "I, JONES ORIN YORK, make the following voluntary statement to WILLIAN L. BYRNE, JR. and FRANCIS D. COOLEY, who are known to me to be Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I know I do not have to make any statement, have the right to consult an attorney before making a statement, and that my statement; may be used against me in a court of law. "I was born August 5, 1893, at Bushnell, Illinois, and attended school at Western Illinois Normal School until 1910. After spending approximately one year in Ragan, Nebraska, with my parents I came to Berkeley, California, arriving on December 11, 1911. I worked as a clerk, telephone switchboard installer, and for two automobile agencies. Since 1910 I have been interested in the aviation field; I learned to fly an airplane in 1919 and since that time I have been employed in occupations relating to the aircraft industry. I am presently selfemployed as an aircraft engineer, consultant and fabricator of special aircraft apparatus at 2030 North Naomi Street, Burbank, California. "In 1935 I was employed as an aeronautical engineer at Douglas Aircraft Corporation, El Segundo Division; at that time I met a group of Russians who were touring aircraft plants in the Los Angeles area as representatives of the Soviet Covernment Purchasing Commission. One of these Russians was STANISLAU SHUMOVSKY. He was identified to me as a technical representative from the Centrel Hydro-Asrodynamics Institute of Moscow, USSR. "STANISLAU SHUMOVSKY indicated interest in an airplane engine I was designing and gave me \$200.00 as evidence of his interest in my work, with the idea that eventually I might develop something that the Russians would actually purchase. Later, in 1935 or 1936, SHUMOVSKY asked me to furnish him information; from Douglas Aircrait Corporation, El Segundo Division, which I did and he furnished me various sums of money. "About the first part of 1936 SHUMOVSKY introduced me to a man using the name of 'BROOKS' and I continued furnishing information and receiving money from 'BROOKS' until January, 1938, when 'BROOKS' arranged to put me in contact with a man named 'WERNER.' I continued to furnish material to 'WERNER' and receive money from him until about January, 1939. At that time I lost contact with 'WERNER' but in about February, 1940, he recontacted me and I agreed to continue to furnish information to the Soviets. 'WERNER' told me that a new contact had been arranged for me, and it was agreed that my new contact to identify himself would inquire regarding a violin which I owned. Also, 'WEENER' took a picture of SHIRLEY TEMPLE, tore it in half, and said my new contact, upon contacting Lo, would present the half which 'WERNER' was retaining in order to identify himself. DECLASSIFIED BY SOH bla

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"The next individual who contacted me and to whom I furnished information was known to me as 'BILL' and I understood his last name was VILLESBEND. I cannot recall when 'BILL' first contacted me, but I believe it was about two "...inths after I moved into 1.301g North Harper Avenue, Los Angeles, California. I don't know when I moved into that address, but do recall that I obtained a telephone very shortly after I rented the premises. 'BILL' came to my Harper Avenue address and produced the half of the picture of SHIRLY TEMPLE that had been previously retained by WERNER. 'BILL' also told me he was supposed to tell me the birthdate of my mother, but I said this was unnecessary as I was satisfied he was my new contact.

"At this first meeting 'BILL' asked if I could obtain information, and I said that I could, but advised him that I needed a camera. 'BILL' said that he would furnish me money for this purpose. 'BILL' gave me about \$250.00 to purchase, a camera, I believe at our second meeting, which occurred about a month after he first contacted me. I purchased a Contax No. 3 camera with an FL.S Sonnar lens at 'The Dark Room,' a camera shop, located on Wilshire Boulevard, about two blocks west of La Brea Avenue, in Los Angeles for about \$250.00, paying a substantial down payment and the balance in monthly installments. I used this camera to photographic information on airplanes being produced at Northrop Aircraft Company, Hawthorne, California. In particular I remember photographing specifications of the P-61 airplane, also known as the 'Black Widow,' and delivering the film I had taken to 'BILL.'

"I also recall that 'BILL' gave me a list of material in which the Russians were interested. When he gave me this list, 'BILL' said that there was some hesitancy about furnishing me this list as it might reflect that the Russianes lacked information on those subjects. I don't recall the items on the list, but is was very broad and included many matters on which I had no information and was unable to obtain information.

"I met with 'BILL' about ten times over a period of about one year and I believe that during this time he paid me approximately \$1,500.00; during these contacts, I turned over to 'BILL' airplane specifications, the details of which I cannot now recall. I am not certain that these documents were all classified as confidential data but am sure some of them were so classified. I never gave 'BILL' any actual documents but when I gave him the film I would prepare a summary of the information the film contained and any suggestions I had concerning the information During the course of our meetings, 'BILL' came to my home three or four times, and recall on one occasion, I showed 'BILL' a copy of a poem I had written entitled, 'The Vandal's Doom," which dealt with the German attack on Runsia. 'BILL' stated he liked this poem very much and asked if he could aske a copy of it. I agreed and the next time he came to my home he typed out a copy on my typewriter and indicated that his superior would like the theme of this poem, and that he would forward it to him.

"I recall meeting 'BILL' on one occasion at the Florentine Gardens in Hollywood, and on another occasion at a bar near the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Fairf'nx Avenue in Los Angeles. At one of my meetings with 'BILL' I recall

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"that he drank two scotch and sodas and I noticed that he was making some marks on the edge of a newspaper. 'BILL' explained that these marks were in Arabic and indioated the time of our next meeting. He sold that anyone could take this newspaper and they would not know what these marks signified. 'BILL' also told me how to say some simple greeting phrases in Arabian such as 'Salaam Alechiem,' meaning 'Peace Unto You,' and the reply, 'Alechiem Salaam.'

"In the sarly part of our contacts I received a telephone call from 'BILL." The operator said the call was from Pendleton, and I presume she meant Pendleton, Oregon. 'BILL' said he would not be able to keep a scheduled meeting, and would contact me when he returned to Los Angeles.

"In the latter part of 1942 I met 'BILL' near the Garden of Allah on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles, and he told me he would no longer contact me, that 'ay next contact might possibly be a woman, and that the new contact would inquire about my violin. It was arranged that I would meet my new contact at a statue in Westlake Park in Los Angeles on a date I cannot now recall.

"During my meetings with 'BILL' no one else was ever present, and I never met any person with whom he was associated. I did ask 'BILL' about SHUMOVSKY and from what 'BILL' told me I gained the impression he was personally acquainted with SHUMOVSKY. I remember that 'BILL told me SHUMOVSKY 'was fine,' and that he was 'not in this country.' I remember that 'BILL' was very much concerned over the suffering of the Russian people because of the war and mentioned the sacrifices being made by the Russians.

"I subsequently met my new contact whose name I cannot recall in according with instructions I had received from 'BILL' and continued furnishing information to this new contact until the latter part of 1943, when he told me the information he had been receiving from me was unsatisfactory and then did not appear for a scheduled meeting. I have had no further contact with Soviet representatives since that these

"After the last contact with 'BILL' in the latter part of 1942, I did not see him again until August, 1950. At that time I was at the Federal Building; Ice Angeles, having just testified before a Federal Grand Jury. I was standing on the front steps of the Federal Building and I observed 'BILL' walking along the sidewalk about 75 yards away. With me at this time were Special Agents THOMAS E. BEVANT and S FRANCIS D. COOLEY and I pointed 'BILL' out to them.

"I have read the foregoing statement consisting six and one-quarter pages and it is the truth.

*/s/ JONES GRIN YORK

100.5

Witnessed: s/ FRANCIS D. COOLEY Special Agent, FBI Los Angeles 10/0/53

s/ WILLIAM L. BYRNE, Special Agent, FBI, Los Angeles, Calif. 10-6-53."

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On August 10, 1950, BAS FRANCIS D. COOLEY and THOMAS E. BRIANT of the Los Angeles Office were standing on the steps of the Federal Building in Los Angeles, California, with JONES ORIN YORK, At that time, YORK pointed out the subject, who was then about seventy-five yards away as the individual he knew as BILL VILLESHENT and to whom he furnished information for transmission to the Soviets.

It is noted that YORK placed the date he first met the subject as approximately one month prior to the time he purchased a Contax Camera at "The Dark Room," a camera shop located on Wilshire Boulevard about two blocks west of La Brea Avenue in Los Angeles.

BENJAMIN HUBSCHMANN, owner of "The Dark Room," 5570 Wilshire Boulevard, Advised that his records reflected that J. O. YORK, 15012 North Halper Avenue, Los Angeles, telephone number, Gladstone 8540, purchased a Contax Camera, number 86, a Sonnar FL.5 lens on October 15, 1941, for \$257.70. The down payment of \$157,70, made at the time of purchase, and payments of \$50.00 each were made on January 1942, and March 9, 1942. The lens number on this camera was 1820645 and the book number was B-50419. The records further reflect that on January 25, 1943, 7058 purchased lens, Zeiss lens number 1005110, for \$133.90.

With regard to the estimate by YORK that he believes subject first const tacted him about two months after he moved into 13012 North Harper Avenue in Loss Angeles, California, it is observed that the application records for the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company for the years 1941 and 1942 have been destroyed however, telephone directories for those years reflected that J. O. YORK was life as residing at 1,002 North Harper Avenue, telephone - Gladstone 6346, in director dated from September, 1941, until June, 1942.

WEISBAND was interviewed by Washington Field Office agents on May 9,41950 and May 13, 1950, and by Los Angeles agents on August 10, 1950. Then interviewed WEISBAND denied being implicated in Soviet espionage. He said that to the best off his knowledge, he had never been acquainted with anyone in the Communist Party into did he know anyone who had been engaged in espionage. He denied ever having any documents or material from AFSA nor had he ever advised any unauthorized period any operations being carried on at AFSA. Subject declined to furnish a signed shaw ment denying that he had been involved in espionage activities.

On July 1, 1953, a photograph of JONES ORIN YORK was exhibited to WEISHAM and he stated he recognized the photograph as being that of "YORK," an individual with whom he was acquainted, but he declined to answer any further questions concerning JONES ORIN YORK.

On July 1, 1953, WEISBAND also said he would not admit nor deny he had ever been involved in Soviet espionage activities.

Mrs. PATRICIA BAUMANN, formerly 1952 Marergo Avenue, South Pasadene, California, was interviewed by Los Angeles agents on May 12 and 13, 1950. Mrs. BAUMANN has recently been remarried and is now known as Mrs. BOBERT F. CALLICOTT, 35. Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Ivstice Washington, D. C.

May 23, 1960

PERSONAL ATTENTION VIA LIAISON

Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA White House Staff Secretary The White House Washington, D. C.



Dear General:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a document entitled, "Expose of Soviet Espionage, May 1960," which we prepared in the FBI and copies of which have been furnished to the Vice President, the Attorney General, Under Secretary of State Dillon, and Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The material contained in this document is unclassified and was prepared for use by the State Department in case it desired to use any portion of it before the United Nations or for public release.


I thought that you might desire to have a copy of this in the event there is any portion which you consider should be called to the President's attention.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,

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Enclosure



SOVIET-BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION:

Recent Soviet propaganda has denounced the United States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception which President Eisenhower might expect on his visit to Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on May 11, 1960, as wondering what would have been the reaction of the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the United States on the eve of his visit to this country.

The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, two Soviet espionage agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield, Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A. Kirilyuk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting to induce this American to furnish information regarding United States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a vital United States Government agency where he could obtain classified information for the Russians. While this meeting was taking place Kirilyuk and the American were under observation by Leonid A. Kovalev, another Soviet employee of the United Nations who was conducting a countersurveillance. Unknown to the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians.

Not only did these Russians stoop to spying, but they callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy in the most reprehensible manner -- the subversion of an American on American soil.

Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photographed the Russians, no publicity was given to this incident in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace.

And this is not an isolated incident - nor has the target always been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against this country, and through the years have procured a volume of information which would stagger the imagination. This information includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major

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U.S. cities and vital areas which have given the Russians the product of aerial reconnaissance just as surely as if Soviet planes had been sent over this country.

2. ACQUISITION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

In a free country such things as aerial photographs are available to the public and can be purchased commercially. The Soviets have been fully aware of this and throughout the years have taken full advantage of this free information, collecting aerial photographs of many areas of the United States.


For example, during October, 1953, two Soviet officials visited Minneapolis where they purchased fifteen aerial photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In October and November, 1953, two Soviets traveled in Missouri and Texas and obtained aerial maps of Dallas, Tulsa, Fort Worth and the surrounding areas covering a Naval air station, an Army airfield, and an Air Force base. In April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased aerial photographs of five Long Island communities. Also, in April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased three aerial photographs of Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas. In May, 1954, three Soviets traveled to California where they ordered from a Los Angeles photography shop \$60 worth of aerial photographs covering the Los Angeles area.


However, they have not been content with acquisition of publicly available data. For example, on May 3, 1954, Leonid E. Fivnev, an assistant Soviet air attache stationed in Washington, who had previously traveled extensively throughout the United States and had obtained commercially available aerial photographs of various areas of this country, requested a Washington, D. C., photographer to rent an airplane to take photographs of New York City which were not commercially available. He specified the scale to be used and the altitude from which the photographs were to be taken. He offered \$700 for this activity. Obviously the photographs which he requested would depict vital port areas, industrial facilities, and military installations in the New York area.


For this brazen abuse of his diplomatic privileges Pivnev was declared persona non grata on May 29, 1954, and departed from this country on June 6, 1954.


But this did not stop the Soviets. They continued their systematic program of collecting aerial photographs of major cities and vital areas of the United States. On January 19, 1955, the State Department sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador placing restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of data

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This activity has continued throughout the decade into 1960, as illustrated by the case previously cited where a Washington, D. C., photographer has been utilized for the purpose of photographing military installations.

4. THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE OF THE SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIALS

Only a few of the many examples of abuse of their diplomatic privileges by Soviet-bloc officials in the United States have been mentioned. In the more flagrant cases, the United States Government has asked the offending officials to leave this country. During the decade, 1950 - 1960, 19 Soviet officials have been asked to leave. Many more have been engaged in intelligence activities throughout the years.

The Soviet Union has maintained a large staff of officials in this country since its first recognition in 1933. These officials have been assigned to Soviet embassies, consulates, trade delegations, news media, the United Nations, and the Amtorg Trading Corporation. It is from these installations that the primary intelligence activities are directed against the United States. A former Soviet intelligence officer who defected from the Soviets has estimated that from 70% to 80% of the Soviet officials in the United States have some type of intelligence assignment. Other defectors have confirmed that a high per cent of the officials are intelligence agents. As of May 1, 1960, there were 328 Soviet officials stationed in this country. They were accompanied by 455 dependents, many of whom are also potential intelligence agents.

Nor is this the full strength of Soviet-bloc intelligence. As of May 1, 1960, there were 272 satellite officials stationed in the United States accompanied by 435 dependents. This almost doubles the potential of Soviet intelligence services. The satellite intelligence services have been developed according to the Soviet pattern, their personnel selected or approved by the Soviets and they are trained and guided by Soviet policies and procedures. Recent defectors from satellite intelligence services have advised that the Soviets have access to all data obtained by the satellites and, in fact, maintain an advisor system at headquarters level to make certain that the satellites operate consistent with Soviet interests.

This coordination is not limited to headquarters' levels. Beginning in November, 1958, the Soviet and satellite military, naval and air attaches stationed in the United States began a series of monthly meetings under the guidance of the Soviet military attache. During this

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initial meeting the satellite representatives were given specific target assignments for the collection of information desired by the Soviets and arrangements were made for the over-all correlation of their activities.

5. INDUSTRIAL SPYING AND CIRCUMVENTION OF REGULATIONS:

This large group of Soviet-bloc officials stationed in the United States has systematically over the years developed a most important part of the modern intelligence machine which was referred to by one Soviet official as the best industrial spying system in the world. Volumes could be written as to the techniques used and the ways and means developed by the Soviet bloc to obtain information regarding the industrial potential of the United States often with the use of subterfuge and deceit as well as deliberate circumvention of Customs regulations.

The following examples illustrate this activity:

In 1924 the Amtorg Trading Corporation was organized in New York for the purpose of acting as an importer and exporter on the North American continent for official trusts of the Soviet Union. Amtorg continued to operate during World War II, although in 1942 the Soviet Government created the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., to purchase war material. This Purchasing Commission was dissolved after the end of World War II, and its activities absorbed by Amtorg. Since its organization, Amtorg Trading Corporation has been staffed primarily by representatives of the Soviet Government who have official status. Former employees of Amtorg have advised that it was standard practice for Soviets attached to Amtorg to request permission for Soviet officials to visit industrial facilities throughout the country on the promise of orders to be forthcoming if the products were found satisfactory. In many instances the officials of the companies would later be advised by Amtorg that Moscow would have to approve the order. In instances where a contract was given to a particular company, Amtorg consistently demanded blueprints of the particular product and other data to which it was not

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entitled by normal business practices. Amtorg officials also consistently insisted on a clause in the contract which would give Soviet inspectors the privilege of inspecting all of the merchandise before it was shipped to Russia. Another device utilized by Amtorg officials was to gain the confidence of some employee in a plant which had a contract with the Russian Government and, through this employee, obtain blueprints which were copied in the Amtorg office and the copies forwarded to Russia. Amtorg officials would also advertise for employees who, when they appeared for an interview at the Amtorg office, would be instructed to bring proof of their ability in the form of blueprints of former projects. When the applicants for employment later showed up with the blueprints, the blueprints would be photographed and the photographs forwarded to Russia. Amtorg has also followed a practice of preparing detailed catalogues concerning American industry. Congressman Mundt on January 29, 1947, described one of these catalogues as "a manual for bombing America." It was pointed out that the book contained detailed information including many photographs and maps of vital areas of the United States. In this connection Amtorg Trading Corporation during the 1940's prepared a monthly magazine called "American Engineering and Industry" and an annual guide called "Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry." This latter publication in 1946 was described as a three-volume, 5,000-page document. In August, 1956, Milos Prochazka, a Czechoslovakian official assigned to the Commercial Office at the Czech Embassy, furnished to an American the specifications for the components of 2 steel mills to be purchased in the United States for the Czechs. He outlined a plan whereby the American would act as an exclusive agent to purchase these mills ostensibly for a private concern in a Western country. He would obtain estimates and if the estimates were approved, the Czechs would furnish the name of the purchasing company, a power of attorney and the necessary bank credit. Thereafter, the mills would be shipped to the Czech agent in the Western country and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia. - 9 -

6. EXPLOITATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION: It is no secret that one of the results of the freedom of our democratic society is the availability of voluminous information to members of the public merely for the asking. Some of the cases previously cited clearly indicate that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are aware of this fact and have taken full advantage of this democratic freedom; however, it remains for former Soviet-bloc intelligence officers to testify as to its real significance and importance to the Soviet-bloc intelligence services. One defector has stated tha intelligence services. One defector has stated that the ease with which information is obtained in this country has resulted in a reduction of the hazardous and timeconsuming clandestine operations which would otherwise consuming clanaestine operations which would otherwise be necessary. Another has estimated that the Soviet Military Attache's office in the United States is able to legally obtain 95% of the material useful for its intelligence objectives. He stated that, in fact, 90% of an intelligence agent's time in any other country in the world would normally be consumed clandestinely obtaining information which is readily available in the United States through Government agencies or commercial publishing houses. pointed out that Polish military intelligence obtains more technical data in the United States than from all the other countries in the world combined. Although such information is collected in a number of ways, the following techniques in addition to those previously mentioned have been most productive. One of the most useful techniques is attendance at conventions of American organizations by Soviet-bloc officials. During the year preceding Khrushchev's visit to this country, Soviet officials alone attended approximately 30 conventions covering various fields of endeavor including aeronautics, electronics, plastics development, education and others. Typical were the activities of 2 Soviets who attended the Western Electric convention held in Los Angeles during August, 1959. As usual, at the inception, they began to collect voluminous literature. When the volume became unwieldy one Soviet left the material at a check stand and resumed his collection activities. It was estimated that the literature picked up by these Soviets at this one convention weighed approximately 250 pounds. - 10 -

Another technique utilized is correspondence with chambers of commerce and industrial facilities throughout the United States through which voluminous information regarding transportation systems, major industries, etc., is obtained. In many instances useful maps of the areas are also secured.

Still another technique is the subscription to American publications and collection and review of United States Government documents. For example, during June, 1959, it was ascertained that the personnel of the Soviet Military, Naval and Air Attache Offices subscribed to 44 newspapers and 58 magazines of a technical, scientific, military and general news nature. It is apparent that the Soviets have a definite program of subscribing to newspapers published at or in the vicinity of vital United States military bases.

Purchases from the United States Government have long been a productive source for Soviet-bloc intelligence. For example, on December 28, 1944, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., ordered copies of 5,810 patents. On the same date the New York office of this Commission purchased two copies of 18,000 patents. On January 1, 1945, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington again ordered copies of 5,342 different patents. On January 12, 1945, copies of 41,812 patents were ordered. The next order was for 41,810. The acquisition of copies of patents has been continued throughout the years as illustrated by the fact that in early 1959 Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache, requested an American to instruct him in the use of the "Search Room" of the United States Patent Office so that he could locate patents in which he was interested.

The Soviets have, of course, not restricted themselves to the acquisition of patents. For example, on March 10, 1954, an Assistant Soviet Air Attache purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for the East and West Coasts of the United States from the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Department of Commerce. On March 12, 1954, a chauffeur of the Soviet Air Attache purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for Canada and Alaska. Six days later an Assistant Soviet Attache ordered "The Pilot's Handbook" for the Far Fast and Europe. These handbooks contained

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diagrams of all of the principal airfields and the approaches used in landing planes.

In April, 1954, Soviet officials stationed in Washington obtained from the Map Information Office of the U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, topographic maps covering North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Kentucky, and an area within a 50-mile radius of Washington, D.C.

This collection activity has continued unabated up to the present time. Literally thousands of similar documents are obtained in this country every year by Soviet-bloc officials assigned in this country and through registered agents such as the Four Continent Book Corporation and the Tass News Agency.

A statement of a satellite defector illustrates the value to the Soviet-bloc of United States Government publications. He stated that on one occasion, Polish military intelligence obtained an 18-volume edition prepared by the United States Army Engineers regarding United States port facilities. It was purchased from the Government Printing Office at nominal cost, but its estimated value to the Polish military intelligence was placed at \$50,000.

Not content with the large volume of publicly available material, Soviet-bloc officials have resorted to deceit. For example, on November 5, 1958, Ion Dubesteanu, an assistant military attache of the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C., was declared persona non grata for activity beyond the scope of his official duties. Using a false name and identity, Dubesteanu had corresponded with U. S. military installations soliciting material and had rented post office boxes at North Beach, Maryland, under assumed names to which such material was to be sent.

Reconnaissance trips by Soviet-bloc officials have been a most productive source of intelligence. The officials have been observed to carefully prepare for such trips by reviewing publications collected in this country, doing research at the Library of Congress, et cetera. Exclusive of trips from Washington, D. C., to New York City, officials of the Soviet Military Office alone took 16 trips

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to various areas of the country in 1958 and 1959. They visited 26 states in 1958 and 37 in 1959. They covered most of the strategic areas of the country and covered some areas as many as four times. During these trips they followed a definite pattern of visiting chambers of commerce, driving around the perimeter of industrial facilities and wherever possible circled military, naval and air installations in the areas visited. They collected all available literature and maps relating to industrial facilities, transportation systems, power plants, dams, chemical factories, et cetera, and wherever possible took photographs in addition to making extensive notes.

7. PROPAGANDA AND PERSONAL APPEARANCES

Exploitation of our freedoms has also taken the form of propaganda. Not content with the distribution of over 20,000 copies of the illustrated monthly magazine, "USSR," which is in reciprocity for distribution of a similar American magazine in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy has a carefully planned program of distributing press releases. As of February, 1960, the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy was distributing press releases to almost 7,000 individuals and institutions in the United States, including newspaper editors, business leaders, radio stations, public libraries, television stations, teachers, labor leaders, scientists, and leaders in trade and commerce.

In addition, since January 1, 1959, 30 different officials attached to the Soviet Embassy have made, or were scheduled to make, 74 public appearances (not including 7 additional invitations for appearances by the Soviet Ambassador) before various groups in this country. Nineteen other Soviets attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, employed by the United Nations Secretariat or assigned to Intourist, made, or were scheduled to make, 39 public appearances during the same period.

These public appearances normally involved speeches or participation in forums on the part of the Soviet officials and were made before various types of groups, including high school, college, and university groups, parent-teacher associations, advertisement and civic clubs, fraternities, professional associations or clubs, religious and cultural groups, travel clubs and community centers. Some of these were television appearances. It is apparent that the Soviets are taking every opportunity to spread the gospel of communism by exploitation of the intense desire of Americans to learn more about the Soviet Union.

- 13 -

<u>8. USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS</u>

Attention is called to the fact that many of the incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated to the concept of fully exploiting the freedoms of the countries they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they would not prostitute the United Nations.


9. "ILLEGAL" OPERATIONS


Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in addition, operated a parallel clandestine espionage system known as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920's. Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making full use of secret communications channels and other clandestine techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic relations.

It is apparent that during the decade 1950-1960 the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that a special directorate was created in 1947 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told, while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that as early as June, 1952, an order was sent to intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal" organizations which could function without interruption under any conditions.

That this policy was followed with respect to the United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 1956, a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from

- !4 -





in Russia in 1917 and under Lenin's guidance, established a dictatorship through which all resistance was systematically crushed. The success of the movement led Lenin to reiterate in later years that "The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution."

Joseph Stalin followed the Marxist-Leninist principles. The Communist Party in the United States, since it was organized in September, 1919, and throughout the years of Stalin's rule in Russia, was unalterably bound to Moscow. In the earlier years, Party leaders openly, boastfully and defiantly proclaimed their allegiance to and support of Soviet objectives. The nature of the Communist Party, USA, was exposed in 1949 and its leaders convicted in a court of law where the evidence laid out before the jury constituted irrefutable proof that the Communist Party, USA, advocated the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence. The policies and activities of the Communist Party, USA, have not changed to date. The current leaders of the Communist Party, like their predecessors, unwaveringly follow the lead of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Time and again, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has claimed that the Soviet Union does not and will not interfere in the affairs of other nations. Yet, in practically every country in the world to date the Soviet Union has established fifth columns in the form of Communist Parties which are under the complete domination and control of the Soviets and are sworn to uphold and aid the Soviet dream for world conquest. Through the directives it furnishes to these subversive forces, the Soviet Union clearly interferes with the political, social, and economic affairs of other nations on a continuing basis in the relentless drive toward world domination.

Today, the rallying cry of world communism is "peaceful coexistence." However, on May 5, 1960, Premier Khrushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paid tribute to V. I. Lenin and stated "The Soviet people are proud to know that the cause of our great leader and teacher lives and triumphs and that Lenin's dreams are being translated into reality by hundreds and millions of people--builders of socialism and communism--and that Lenin's cause is winning all upright men on earth." Referring to the triumph of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Khrushchev went on to reaffirm "Marxist-Leninist ideas" as the guide to the ultimate triumph of world communism.

- 17 -

Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, demanding the use of force and violence, represent the guides for communism to achieve world conquest. The extensive espionage activities directed against the United States which, in the past, have utilized communists and communist sympathizers in this country as well as other individuals who could be subverted, can be better understood when regarded as essential tools in the relentless and fanatical drive of international communism to conquer the world. drive of international communism to conquer the world. - 18 -

PART II

SELECTED VENONA MESSAGES

Part II: Selected Venona Messages

A Note on the Translations and List of Messages

The release of Venona translations involved careful consideration of the privacy interests of individuals mentioned, referenced, or identified in these documents. In very few cases, names have not been released because doing so would constitute an invasion of privacy.

In some of the Venona translations, the analytic footnotes indicated that the person referred to by covername had not been identified. Another—usually later—message may have footnoted that same covername with an identification. For example, in some early message translations, the covernames MER and ALBERT were footnoted as unidentified, but analysts subsequently determined (as footnoted in later translations of other messages) that the person in question was Iskhak A. Akhmerov, the KGB's chief illegal officer in the United States. Unfortunately for readers, the KGB occasionally re-used covernames; consequently, a single covername can designate two different persons. Even so, readers often can determine from context or geographic location which person is being referred to.

Finally, the Venona messages are replete with specialized Soviet intelligence terminology. The following are definitions of some of the more common terms and phrases.

The Russian word *klichka* (sobriquet or nickname) appears in the Venona translations as "covername." There are hundreds of covernames in the translations, including many seen in the messages included in this volume, such as ALBERT, LIBERAL, and ALES. Covernames designated Soviet officers, active or retired assets, valued contacts, and sometimes even prominent figures (such as CAPTAIN for President Roosevelt) and were periodically changed. Assets and contacts, however, rarely knew their covernames, which were to be used primarily in cable traffic. To complicate matters further, a Soviet intelligence officer like illegal *rezident* Iskhak Akhmerov typically had a covername (MER, and later ALBERT), aliases he used in his cover identity (William Grienke and Michael Green, among others), and "street names" he used in the company of assets and contacts ("Bill").

Fellow countrymen were members of the local Communist Party.

An **illegal** was a KGB or GRU officer, often a Soviet citizen, working abroad under alias with neither diplomatic cover nor visible connections to legal Soviet establishments. An individual illegal's cover story was his or her **legend**. Iskhak Akhmerov was the KGB's principal illegal in the United States before 1946 and thus was regarded as the illegal *rezident*. He apparently was succeeded in this role by Rudolf Abel. Several KGB and GRU illegals were shown in Venona messages to be operating in the United States, Mexico, and other countries. Although some Soviet illegals later used radios for direct clandestine communication with Moscow, illegals in the United States during World War II generally transmitted and received messages through Soviet diplomatic missions.

A leader (or group leader) was a KGB officer or an experienced local agent who handled and supervised a network or sub-network of assets. Such an officer might have either worked for an official Soviet entity or operated as an illegal. Venona messages showed that such agents as Jacob Golos and Sergei Kurnakov, while not themselves KGB officers, were nonetheless given significant responsibilities for certain networks. In many cases where the KGB gained control of older Comintern or GRU networks, the existing leader was left in charge for months or even years.

A line was a grouping of KGB officers by operational tasks. Some of these entities seen in Venona communications were the Second Line (which focused on ethnic groups of interest to Moscow, such as Ukrainians or Latvians); the Fifth Line (responsible for the security of the Soviet merchant fleet and its personnel); the White Line (concerned with White Russian emigres); and the Economic Line (a scientific and technical subresidency, headed by Leonid Kvasnikov, in the New York consulate).

The KGB and the GRU referred to one another as the **neighbors**. In KGB parlance, Near Neighbors meant the GRU-Naval auxiliary, while the GRU proper was referred to as Far Neighbors.

Probationers was the cover term for KGB agents. The term—which apparently fell out of usage after the 1940s—was sometimes applied to KGB officers who were temporarily not attached to a diplomatic mission and hence were being run as agents. To put on ice (sometimes rendered in cold storage) meant to suspend use of an agent.

The *rezident* was the KGB chief at a particular location; his station was called a **residency** (*rezidentura*). The New York residency supported a subresidency, under Leonid R. Kvasnikov, to collect scientific and technological secrets.

A worker (sometimes referred to as a cadre) was the KGB's usual term for its own officers working in a diplomatic or official Soviet establishment such as the TASS press agency or the Amtorg trading company.

Access to the Venona Translations

All the Venona translations—roughly 2,900 KGB, GRU, and GRU-Naval messages—are being released to the public. Paper copies have been sent to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, and to various federal repositories (typically at large state universities). The National Cryptologic Museum, adjacent to NSA headquarters at Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland, also has a complete set of the translations. Each release of the Venona translations in 1995 and 1996 was accompanied by an original explanatory monograph authored by Robert Louis Benson, co-editor of this volume. The translations and monographs can also be found on the Internet's World Wide Web, NSA's Homepage, at http://www.nsa.gov:8080\. This conference volume can be found on the World Wide Web, CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence Homepage, at http: //www.odci.gov/csi.

Translations included:1

1. Moscow [Comintern] 117, 121 to the US, 21 and 23 March 1936.

2. London [GRU] to Moscow, 10 August 1941. Klaus Fuchs interview

3. New York 854 to Moscow, 16 June 1942. Recruiting proposals

4. Moscow 424 to New York, 1 July 1942. More recruiting proposals

5. Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

6. Washington [Naval-GRU] 834, 846-8 to Moscow, 18 April 1943.

7. New York 782 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. Duncan Lee, OSS

8. New York 777-781 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. MI School

9. New York 786-7 to Moscow, 26 May 1943. Mrs. Roosevelt

10. New York 812 to Moscow, 29 May 1943. Agent "19"

11. New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943. OSS

12. New York [GRU] 927-8 to Moscow, 16 June 1943. GRU and Amerasia

New York [GRU] 938 to Moscow, 17 June 1943. Joseph Milton Bernstein
 New York 1132-3 to Moscow, 13 July 1943. Recruiting proposals
 New York [GRU] 1325 to Moscow, 11 August 1943. GRU espionage
 Washington [Naval-GRU] 1969 to Moscow, 13 August 1943. S&T

Washington [Naval-GRU] 1983 to Moscow, 14 August 1943. SALLY
 Moscow 142 (Circular), 12 September 1943. Comintern dissolved
 San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943. Pobjeda codebook
 Moscow 232-3 to all Residents, 2 December 1943. PETROV on security

San Francisco 510 to Moscow, 7 December 1943. Olga Khlopkova
 Mexico City 158 to Moscow, 23 December 1943. Assault to free Mercader
 San Francisco 31 to Moscow, 17 January 1944. Espionage against aircraft
 New York 195 to Moscow, 9 February 1944. Gold meets Fuchs

25. San Francisco 65 to Moscow, 10 February 1944. Kuznetsova deserts

26. Moscow [unnumbered], 25 April 1944. Keypad indicator change

27. New York 588 to Moscow, 29 April 1944. Perlo group

28. New York 598-9 to Moscow, 2 May 1944. CPUSA political analysis

29. New York 601 to Moscow, 2 May 1944. Norman Jay

30. New York 618 to Moscow, 4 May 1944. Jack Katz's cover

31. New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944. Jack Soble's cover

32. New York 628 to Moscow, 5 May 1944. Recruitment of Al Sarant

¹ All cables are KGB messages unless otherwise noted.

33. New York 640 to Moscow, 6 May 1944. Infiltration of an organization
34. New York 655 to Moscow, 9 May 1944. Report from Greg Silvermaster
35. New York 687 to Moscow, 13 May 1944. Perlo group, again
36. New York 696-7 to Moscow, 16 May 1944. Walter Lippman

37. New York 732 to Moscow, 20 May 1944. William Perl
38. Moscow 334 to Mexico City, 30 May 1944. The Fishers
39. New York 786 to Moscow, 1 June 1944. Try to bribe Niles in White House
40. New York 824 to Moscow, 7 June 1944. "The Ten"

41. New York 847B-848 to Moscow, 15 June 1944. Walter Lippman, again
42. New York 850 to Moscow, 15 June 1944. Report from Klaus Fuchs
43. New York 1053 to Moscow, 26 July 1944. Recruiting Max Elitcher
44. New York 1043 to Moscow, 25 July 1944. FBI attempt to enter Consulate

45. New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944. Browder, Bentley, Mary Price
46. New York 1076 to Moscow, 29 July 1944. KGB officers
47. New York 1088-90 to Moscow, 30 July 1944. Problems with seamen
48. New York 1102-3 to Moscow, 2 August 1944. Fisher case

49. New York 1105-10 to Moscow, 2/3 August 1944. Donald Maclean 50. New York 1119-21 to Moscow, 4/5 August 1944. Harry Dexter White 51. New York 1203 to Moscow, 23 August 1944. Document forgery 52. New York 1251 to Moscow, 2 September 1944. New covernames

53. New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944. HOMER, again 54. New York 1313 to Moscow, 13 September 1944. I. F. Stone 55. New York 1314 to Moscow, 14 September 1944. William Perl, again 56. New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944. OSS "Reds" list

57. Moscow 954 to New York, 20 September 1944. "Reds" list
58. New York 1340 to Moscow, 21 September 1944. Ruth Greenglass
59. New York 1388-9 to Moscow, 1 October 1944. White and Silvermaster
60. New York 1410 to Moscow, 6 October 1944. CPUSA work for KGB

61. New York 1433-5 to Moscow, 10 October 1944. I. F. Stone, again
62. New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944. Maurice Halperin
63. New York 1442 to Moscow, 11 October 1944. Disputes at KGB residency
64. New York 1469 to Moscow, 17 October 1944. Document photography

65. New York 1506 to Moscow, 23 October 1944. I. F. Stone might help 66. Moscow 374 to San Francisco, 7 November 1944. Order of the Red Star 67. New York 1585 to Moscow, 12 November 1944. Theodore Hall recruited 68. New York 1600 to Moscow, 14 November 1944. Greenglass, Sarant 69. Moscow 379 to San Francisco, 16 November 1944. *Fifth Line reorganized* 70. New York 1613 to Moscow, 18 November 1944. *Laurence Duggan* 71. New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944. *Aid to Harry D. White* 72. New York 1635 to Moscow, 21 November 1944. *Reward for Silvermaster*

73. New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944. *Ethel Rosenberg*74. New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944. *Listing atomic scientists*75. New York 1715 to Moscow, 5 December 1944. *Rosenberg, again*76. New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944. *Rosenberg ring*

77. New York 1751-3 to Moscow, 13 December 1944. Silvermaster
78. New York 1773 to Moscow, 16 December 1944. Rosenberg; ENORMOZ
79. New York 1797 to Moscow, 20 December 1944. Michael Sidorovich
80. New York 12-3, 15-6 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. ALBERT reports

New York 18-9 to Moscow, 4 January 1945. Boris Morros
 New York 27 to Moscow, 8 January 1945. Judith Coplon
 Moscow 14 to New York, 4 January 1945. Communist Party business
 New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945. KGB in Treasury

85. New York 82 to Moscow, 18 January 1945. *GRU asks KGB aid* 86. Moscow 200 to New York, 6 March 1945. *Bonus for Rosenberg* 87. Moscow 284 and 286 to New York, 28 March 1945. *Flora Wovschin* 88. Washington 1793 to Moscow, 29 March 1945. *HOMER, again*

89. Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945. ALES interviewed by KGB 90. Moscow 298 to NY, 31 March 1945. Evaluating ENORMOZ take 91. Moscow 337 to New York, 8 April 1945. Delivering Silvermaster take 92. New York 776 to Moscow, 25 May 1945. Transfer of KGB agents

93. New York 777-9 to Moscow, 25 May 1945. Berger and Krafsur
94. New York 781-7 to Moscow, 25/26 May 1945. KGB political analysis
95. Moscow 709 to New York, 5 July 1945. MLAD (Theodore Hall)
96. New York 1052-3 to Moscow, 5 July 1945. Rewards to agents

97. Moscow 34 to London, 21 September 1945. Gouzenko crisis
98. San Francisco 568 to Moscow, 7 November 1945. Kuznetsova aboard
99. Moscow 46 to London, 17 September 1945. Kim Philby's information

1. Moscow [Comintern] 117, 121 to the US, 21 and 23 March 1936.

TOP SECONT EIDER MASK 5471/U.S.A. 24 March 1936 BOt DATE: TROPE 1006 1.8. 10; 217 10: MER: 21 March 1936 Urge you speed up departure of (1 group) students for radio school. Furthermore urge that party choose 3 contains especially reliable and tested, with good American passports for our chief work. Furthermore urge you choose 5 young coundes well tested and especially woulded for by party knowing well photography and with good American passports. Flease reply immediately. 4 Ton croper strong MASK Prof 1 top search eider MASK NO: 5539/U.S.A. DATE: 30 March 1936 TROM: MOB U.S. TO: 121 30; 23 March 1936 DISE In addition to previous communication please inform us on following:-1. What short term courses for radio operators are there in your country, and of what duration are they. 2. Are there private courses, under whose control are they, are people who finish these courses registered somewhere or take over (1 group) engagements. 3. What are conditions for admission and what fees asked for. MASK TOP SECRET EIDER

2. London [GRU] to Moscow, 10 August 1941.

95 TRINE Reference No : 3/PPDT/1.7 (Previously issued as 3/NBF/T1478) USSR 11/15/1968 Issued Copy No . 1. BARCh's MEETING FUCHS AND PROBABLE REFERENCE TO ATOMIC MERGY PROJECT 2. From: LOMDON LUSCOW Tc: 1,5th Arrand 1941 22::7 Nu: TC DIRICTOR On 8th August BARCh[i] had a meeting with [C% a former acquaintance], Doctor FUCHS [FUKS] [a], who [1 group unidentified] [b] that [15 groups unrecovered] [in] [c] BIRMINGHAM [ii] [34 groups unrecovered] [B% in] three months [B% time] and then all the material [d] will be sent to CANADA for industrial production [e] [C% .] [1 group unidentified] [f] the fact that in GERMANY, in LEIPZIG [LEIPTSIG] [g] [9 groups unrecovered] AND SSOT FEISENBERG [KhEJSENBERG] [iii] [34 groups unrecovered] 1000 tons of dynamite. (Report when opportunity occurs [DOKLAD OKAZIEJ]. [h] BRICE [iv] No. 455 Notes [a] The following is an alternative reading: "... had a meeting with (C% a former acquaintance) cf Doctor Fuchs who" On technical grounds there is nothing to choose between those two versions. Without collateral it is impossible to say which is the correct one. [b] It appears from the two previous occurrences of this group that the general sense is "said". /[c]

			- 2 -
[0			ranslator. The case ending indicates that in" must precede "BIRMINGHAM".
[a	.] It	is almost cert	ain that this means "papers", "documents", etc.
[e	" •		translation. The sense is probably: to CAMADA so that industrial methods may be
	fo		collateral that laboratory facilities were quate and that the decision was taken to use
[f	-	ere is some evi raws attention	dence that the value of this group is: to"
[8	່ ອກ "•.	adjective and . in the LEIPZ	the sentence suggests that LEIPZIG should be that the passage should read: IG" tival ending has been tried without success.
(to "OK Free mea "DO whe was sig	interpret with AZIEJ", or mor- mathemathemathemathemathemathemathemathe	ical expression which it is exceedingly hard out the full context. e correctly "S OKAZIEJ", is equivalent to the ion". To send a report or letter "S OKAZIEJ" when the opportunity arises. thus suggests that a report was to be sent ty for sending one arose. If so, the report be sent in writing. (BRION could have t at any time and need not have waited for a ity.)
Comments:	[i]	BARCh:	Simon Davidovich KREMER.
	[ii]		FUCHS moved to BIRMINGHAM on 27th May 1941 and took up his research duties on the following day.
	[i ii]	HEISENBERG:	Professor Werner HEISENBERG who was Professor of Theoretic Physics at LEIPZIG University 1927-1941.
	[iv]	BRION:	Lt.Col. I.A. SKLYaROV.
•			

3. New York 854 to Moscow, 16 June 1942.

VENONA 95 IOP-SECRET DINIA R L129: W. AL. Dodd 20/8/24 (of 11/6/1957) Ref. No: USSR Issued : 0/30/4/1964 Copy No: 204 2nd RE-ISSUE PROPOSED RECRUITMENT OF SEVERAL AGENTS INCLUDING "UCN/29" AND JANE FOSTER (1942) From: NEW YORK MOSCOW To: 16/June 42 854 No: To VIKTOR. [1] The signing on of "UCN/29"^[ii] was delayed because of his prolonged absence and the necessity for checking additional information. He arrived today and we shall report results. [1 group unrecovered] "LIZA" [iii], we are cultivating the American Jane FOSTER[1v] with a view to signing her on. She is about 30 years old and works in WASHINGTON in the Dutch [2 groups unrecovered][H5 translator] of Melay languages. FOSTER is a FELLOWCOUNTRYWOMAN[ZEMLYACHKA],[v] [86 groups unrecoverable] [D%SK] was given [1 group unrecovered]. Her vetting was carried out by us. She is a FELLOWCOUNTRYWOMAN. She is described by the FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN[ZEMLYaK] as a [1 group unrecovered], dedicated person.TER[vi] has also been reported on favourably by "2013"[vii] who is a friend. We intend to sign her on with a view to making use of her connections and [2 groups unrecovered] [H% her] [1 group unrecovered] SOUTH AMERICA our tasks [1 group unrecovered]. We urgently request approval. MAKSIM^[viii] No. 552 [Note and Comments overleaf] Distribution m. f. 21 M. H. f. le Port disc, oss DINA VENONA 203

95	
	TOP SECRET-
a	
1	2
Note: [a] No	ot available.
Comments: [i]	VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.
[%i]	UCN/29 : Unidentified cover-name. See also NEW YORM's No. 253 of 19th February 1943 (Construction) and No. 955 of 21st June 1943 (Construction)
[iii]	LIZA : Unidentified cover-name. First occurrence in this lang.
[iv]	FOSTER : Later given the cover-name "SIANC" Frantance by
[v]	FELLOWCOUNTRYWOHAN: Member of the Communist Party.
[vi]	TER : The full name cannot be FCSTER. It will however be a fairly short name since TER is preceded by a single group probably of one or two syllables.
[vii]	
[viii]	MAKSIM : Vasilij ZUBILIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	TOTTECRET

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
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
4. Moscow 424 to New York, 1 July 1942.


	⁹⁵ VENONA TOP-SECRET
	USSR Ref. No.: (of 13/12/60)
	Issued : 20/10/67
	Copy No.: 204
	HEISSUE REFERENCE TO SIGNING ON OF PIERRE COT AND ALLOCATION TO HIM OF CUVERNAME "DAEDALUS" (1942)
	From: MOSCOW
	To: NEW YORK
	No: 424 1st July 1942
	[Addressee not recovered]
1. 31	Reference No. 579.[a]
	[3 groups unrecovered] our [2 groups unrecovered] about the signing on of Pierre COT (henceforth "DAEDALUS[DEDAL]")
	[46 groups unrecoverable]
	[1 group unrecovered] and how [ho][b] carries out[o] [2 groups unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered] information about his wife, her [1 group unrecovered], the social status of [her][b] contects, [1 group unrecovered] of DARDALUS. Report on how the preparation[d] is progressing. [Internet limit N: ast uncovered] [Signatury ast uncovered]
	Notes: [a] NEW YORK to MOSCOW No. 894 of 26th June (542)
	[b] Inserted by the translator.
· •	[c] or "spends/conducts".
	[d] or "training".
	DISTRIBUTION
ł	
	TOP-SECRET-
	VENONA

5. Washington [Naval-GRU] 2505-12 to Moscow, 31 December 1942.

 » VENONA
USSR Bef. No: 3/NBF/T172Ø
Lesued: 024/8/1965 Copy No: 2014
THE DESPATCH AND LEGALIZATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN WOMAN (1943)
From: 7.SHINGTON
To: LOSCON
No: 2505-2512 31 December 42
[8 part message complete]
[Part I]
To [Name No. 42][1].
Herewith material[s] on the despatch [FEREBROSK.][b] and legalization of the "AUSTRALIAN WORN[AVSTRALIARS]"[11].
Part [C one]
[16 groups unrecovered]
Chiefly [36 groups unrecoverable]
and demanded
[52 groups unrecovered]
for a month or two it is possible to [3 groups unrecovered] documents. In [4 groups unrecovered] the AUSTRALIAN WOMAN
[32 groups unrecovered]
(establiahments[KhcZYcJSTVO])[c]
[194 groups unrecovered]
Distribution:
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3/NBF/T1720
VENONA








· 95		VENONA		
	L	OP SECRET		
	-			
		- 5 -	3/NEP/T172Ø	
[Part	VIII]			
	Noney			
hanks	when My	keeps a strict check of all the expenditure is also subjected to over the boxeland by our out of the boxeland by out of the boxeland	to checking through the	
		[15 groups unrecoveral	ble]	
serie				
	End of par	t one[1].		
No. 7	45-752		[Name No. 91][vi]	
Notes	÷ [=]	The Russian word MATERIAL is " "Hocuments" or "documentary main it appears to mean "information	terial". In this context	
	[b]	PERFERONXA generally means the from one place to another. In it means the despatch of an a	n conspiratorial language	
	[c]	KhoZYaJSTVO is very difficult it can mean "economy", "farm"	to translate out of context. ", "establishment", "household".	
	[d]	Literally "the designations a service".	nd addresses of previous	
	[•]	Or "NEIGBOUR".		
	[1]	There is technical evidence t is "fingerprints".	hat the word after "taking"	
	• • •	I.e. "an illegal agent".		
	[h]	This can either be interprete or "contrabandletters" i.e. "	id as "contraband and lotters" "smuggled letters".	
	[3]	Literally "all objects being away". This presumably mo by ship and taken out of the	cans "all objects brought here	
	[2]	Inserted by translator.	_	
	[1]	I.e. part one of the material of the AUSTRALIAN WOMAN. The two will be sent later.	l on the despatch and legalisation ere is no indication that part	
			[Continued overleaf]	
3/NBI	F/T172Ø			
	* 			
	_	TUP JECK		
		VENON	A	


	95	VENO	NA				
	L	DP SECI	R 5 T		••••		
		-	- 6 -	3/NBF/T172Ø			
	Comments: [1]	[Name No. 42]	: Possibly C	apt. (1st Rank)	M.A. VORONTBOV.		
	[i1]	AUSTRALIAN WOMAN	(exact spe	rancia Yakil'nil lling not verifi dentical with Ed	ed) who is		
	[111]	TAYLOR	in message: and 8/6/19	ed cover-name. s passed between 43; the latest m 8/6/1943 (3/NEP	14/2/1943 essage was		
	[iv]	GRIEANS	: Members of Agency.	a non-Soviet co	unter-e spionage		
	[v]	davis[dēvis]	: Unidentific in WASHING	ed cover-name. TON's 1040-1041 f 5/6/1943.	Also mentioned of 13/5/1943		
	[vi]	[Name No. 91]	: Probably Ca	apt. (1st Rank)	I.A. EGORICHEV.		
	[√"]	NEIGHBOUR	Somet	Intelligence a that of the	Ongenization Noval Attack	í	
			· ·				
					•		
	3/NB#/T1720						
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6. Washington [Naval-GRU] 834, 846-8 to Moscow, 18 April 1943.


VENONA TOP SECRET Reissue (T1274) From: WASHINGTON MOSCOW Toz 834, 846-848 Nos: 18 April 1943 [Part I] To [Name no. 42][1]. [5 groups unrecovered] the following about the NATIVES[TUZERTs][ii] and their methods of work with the personnel [5 groups unrecovered]. Commander ERDMAN[iii] -- head of a group of NATIVES, 1. [7 groups unrecovered]. In a drunken condition he spoke indiscreetly [13 groups unrecoverable] I assume during the period 1918-21. [11 groups unrecovered], evacuated to [10 groups unrecovered] (D% these languages [[37 groups unrecoverable] ERIMAN [9 groups unrecovered] a) ERDMAN [4 groups unrecovered] Concerning this one of the interpreters who has been assigned to us (Lieutenant PLATEIPS[$\{v_i\}$) spake indiscreetly [2 groups unrecovered] refused to fulfill this [62 groups unrecoverable] d) I switched HOL"s[v] talephone over to my switchboard for monitoring. At a reception at MOL's place in a conversation with Captain Third Rank KhMTROV[v1] he[a] stated that they wanted to get him drunk and that our people behave "like snakes in the •) · grass". VENT TOP SECK

VENONA Jei Section Section f) In a personal letter the Chief of the Shipbuilders, who is in contact with us on shipbuilding matters, said that he could not give us radar. This was discovered when FINE[vii] put some oblique questions to the Department of the Navy [MORSICE MINISTERSIVO]. [Part II] g) Under [] group unrecovered] of ERDMAN Captain DONALD[viii], one of the acceptance officers at the plant[b] who isloyal to us, has been taken off the work. 2. [C% Informants] of the Intelligence Service [RAZVEDKA]. a) Interpreters: Lieutenant ANIKEEV[ix] who came from ODESSA in 1922, Lieutenant PLOTKINS who is the some of a SARATOV mar-chant, emigrated in 1926 and (2 groups unrecovered) was the only worker free [22 groups unrecoverable] readily[c], old sailors (over 40 years of age) no doubt dressed [B% in civilian clothes], sailors or intelligence men dressed as sailors who speak Russian, a unit of whom ware specially moved to Florida, military intelligence men of the American Army particularly -- [C% Poles], clarks [1 group un-recovered] [D% at the] bases and others. [Part III] Organisation and method of work: Secret survaillance by counter-espionage agents, for example at the tailor's where our people order uniforms, several cases of shadowing etc. have been noticed. 2. Special surveillance in key bases. 3. Throwing light on the functions of Deputy Commanders and their real role (Deputies for Political Matters[POMPOLIT]). 4. Discovering the attitude of the enlisted man towards the command, towards drink and women. 5. Finding out how Comrade STALIN is regarded and attempting to discredit him in the eyes of Red Fleet seamen. Bringing to light dissetisfaction among Red Fleet season, boasting about their own standards of living, and attempting to win their confidence. 7. Attempting to get them drunk and to corrupt them by using 8. The suggestion made to Red Seaman BUShUEV[x] [14 groups unrecoverable] carbon paper [11 groups unrecovered] the NATIVES. 10. Finding out the geographical ۰. VENONA








7. New York 782 to Moscow, 26 May 1943.




YENONA Constation, M2 In Strate (1.) (any Watel) Reissue (T9#8) (the second) NEW YORK MOSCON To: 777-781 Nos: 26 May 1943 [Part I] To VIKTOR[1]. "SLAVA"[i1] reports that the "Military Intelligence Training Center" school is situated at RITCHIS, Maryland. [5 groups unrecovered] Russian section. The school has 4 sectors: 1. Interrogation work with prisoners of war, has an Italian and Ger-man sections. [6 groups unrecovered][C\$ Italian] section, but it [36 groups unrecovered] , Far Eastern, Arabian, Turkey, USSR, England. 3. Counterintelligence, [6 groups unrecovered] [D5 who have served] in enemy armies and the "[1 group unidentified]ness' of their own students. 4. Photographic sector, they study [2 groups unrecovered], [18 groups unrecovered] everyone in the sector goes through a general course [86 groups unrecovered] and one each: Italian, French, English, Arabian, Spanish, [3 groups unre-covered], Russian, Turkish, a section of officers, counterintelligence, photographic and [2 groups unrecovered] section of China and Japan. (The basic school of the "Far East" is at SAVAGE[iii] [35 groups unrecoverable] Military Intelligence G2) [4 groups unrecovered]. The school prepares [5 groups unrecovered]. [Part II] In the school at RITCHIE instruction is given to enlisted men and officers. They [1 group unrecovered] together and go through one and the same course. [19 groups unrecovered] lieutenants, captains and several majors. M. H. J.C. (Auton) VENCIA and the second 219









9. New York 786-7 to Moscow, 26 May 1943.



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	[87 groups unrecovered]
[Part II]	[64 groups unrecoverable]
*	CaPTala[1 group unrecovered][a]".
	[71 groups unrecovered]
ľ	or further processing.
N	lo. 432 MAKSIM
N	Note: [a] This unidentified group is not simply an inflexion added to KAPITAN. It is possible that it is added to form an oblique case of the word KAPITANSHA - "Captain's wife" which might have been adopted to replace the form "wife of "CAPTAIN" which is used at the opening of the message.
c	Comments: [i] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. F. M. FITIN.
	[11] CAPTAIN : Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT. [111] SOKIRKIN : Possibly the Aleksej F. SOKIRKIN who by 1950 was
	1st Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WAShington
	[iv] SYNDICATE: People's Corrissoriat for Foreign Affairs. [v] VARDO : Elizaveta Yur'evea ZUBILINA.
	[v] MAKSIM : Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUEILIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.
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10. New York 812 to Moscow, 29 May 1943.





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11. New York 887 to Moscow, 9 June 1943.

	TO TRINE VENON
	7.16
	From: NEW YORK
	To: HONCOW
	No.: 887 - ۲ کیشرا کی
	To VIKTOR[1].
	1. "ZAYaTs"[ii] reports that according to information of a [C% brauch] of the "IZBA"[iii]
	[73 groups unrecovered]
	in ITALY. Also Italian workers are returning from GLH40NY.
	2. "KOKh"[iv] reports that the "LZBA" has received from its [C% branch] in SIDOM[v] two confidential reports on [3 groups unrecovered]. One of them from 30 April says that EDEN is inclined to side with the Foles but "KABAN"[vi] takes a more moderate position proposing to came [D% BYELORUSSIA] and the UKRAINE to the USSR and Eastern PRUSSIA to FOLAND
	{13 groups unrecovered}
	Poles and the chances for
	[18 groups unrecovered]
	"IZBA" from
	[39 groups unrecoverable]
	PLIT-GALATS(vii)
·	[13 groups unrecovered]
	diplomatic relations of [a] the USSR.
	No. 498 LUKA[viii]
	Notes: [a] Could alternatively be "with, by" etc. The preposition is uncertain.
	Comments:
	 [1] VINTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] AAYATS: i.e. "RARN" or "STOWANTI". Mourice HALFERIN, who became chief of the Latin American Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S.
	[iii] LZEA: Office of Strategic Services. [iv] KOKh: i.e. KOCH. Duncan C. LEE of the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S.
	[v] SIDON: LONDON. [v] KARAN: 1.e. "BOAR", Winston CHURCHILL.
	[vi1] PLIT-GALATS: Possibly a reference to Marcel PILET-GOLVZ, at this time a member of the Sviss Federal Council responsible for foreign
	offoirs. [viii] LUKA: Pawel P. KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.
	31 October 1960
	ST OCCOURT 1900
	THE VENONA

12. New York [GRU] 927-8 to Moscow, 16 June 1943.

· .	TOP-SECRET TRINE VENONA
	GRU LOF SECKET TRIVE EN ONA
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	From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW
	Nos. 927 - 928
	16 June 19 <u>43</u>
[Part I]	To the Director.
	1. MARQUIS[MARKIZ][1] has established friendly relations with T.A. BISSON, (in future "ARTHUR[ARTUR]") who has recently left BEW[11]; he is now working in the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the editorial office of MARQUIS's periodical. ARTHUR evidently is well informed and has [C% agents] in government institutions.
	2. ARTHUR passed to MARQUIS, so that as his colleague in the editorial office he might get acquainted with them, copies of four documents:
	(a) his own report for BEW with his views on working out a plan for shipments of American troops to China;
	(b) a report by the Chinese embassy in WASHINGTON to its government in China about the dimensions and means of trade between the Japanese in the occupied territories and Chinese industrialists in free Chinese [B% territory][a];
	(c) a brief BEW report of April 1943 on a general evaluation of the forces of the sides on the Soviet-German front and the prospects of the German summer offensive;
	(d) a report by the American consul in VLADIVOSTOK, WARD, on the economic and political situation in the VLADIVZOSTOK area.
	3. The reports are in translated form. We will pass on valuable points $[B_{2}^{*}$ by telegraph].
	4. A check on ARTHUR's personal connections will be undertaken on the spot. At the same time make use of the Centre's opportunities for checking.
[Part II]	5. Concerning JACK[DZhEK][iii][:]
÷	(a) No transactions were arranged. A few days ago $COX[KOKS][iv]$ met RUDI[v]. The latter [13 groups unrecovered]
	[35 groups unrecoverable]
	[13 groups unrecovered]
	. To ask RUDI [C% to replace] JACK is useless since he considers him the best of the possible candidates.
	(b) RUDI and JACK have put forward one person to set up a group of sources in NEZhIN[vi]. COX had [3 groups unrecovered] to use this person on pay by the month (189 American dollars). My instructions to him were - having received JACK's proposal, to give his views on the use and payment of the person for forwarding to the Centre. Now COX is asking the Centre to [C% agree] to the use and pay of the [C% proposed] jerson for three months to check his [b] possibilities. This person is a former member of one of the [B% local] committees of the KORFORATSIXa[Mi], a woman, name L. GORDON. I think payment for three months should be
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	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA
	• 2 •
	allowed, at the same time insisting on her being directed personally by COX ([6 groups unrecovered]).
	6. BREME[BREM][viii] has been detained by the school for several days to continue his training. He will return about the **th June[c].
	7. Reference your No. 9474 [d]. The instruction to cease [05 correspondence] with the [05 city] [1 group unrecovered] ([1 group unrecovered] only on my part) has been put into effect (this was per- mitted by you in May 1942, telegram No. 5466 [d]). As soon as possible with [2 groups unrecovered] in their name.
	5. The ship's departure is being held up until 26th June. MOK[ix] will be put on board on 22nd or 23rd June.
	No. 168 MOLIÈRE[MOL'ER][x]
	T.N.: [a] See New York to Moscow #989 of 24 June 1943, paragraph 1, which corrects this statement.
	 [b] Inserted by the translator. The "his" in the Russian is to be explained by the fact that the word used for "person" - ChELOVEK - is masculine.
	[c] A date between 16th and 22nd June.
	[d] Not available.
	Comments: [1] MARKIZ: Joseph Milton BERNSTEIN.
	(11) BEW: Board of Economic Warfare.
,	[111] DZhEK: Unidentified.
	[iv] KOKS: Unidentified.
	<pre>[v] RDI: Unidentified.</pre>
	[vi] NEXALN: Unidentified, probably a city. (fremuth NYC)
	[vii] KORFORATSINA: the Communist Party.
	[viii] BREM: Thomas BABIN.
	[ix] MOK: Unidentified.
	[x] MOL'ER: Pavel P. MIKhAJLOV, GRU Resident in NEW YORK.
	15 April 1968
	TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA
	TOTOE CECTE FINILLING LINUNA

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13. New York [GRU] 938 to Moscow, 17 June 1943.

	TOD OF OP OF OF VENIONIE
	TOP SECRET TRING VENONA
	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	No. 938
	17 June 19 <u>43</u>
	To the Director.
	I am transmitting the main points of a report of BEW[1]
	(compiled in April) reviewing the evaluation of the American and
	British Intelligence Services of the forces in the Soviet-German front in 1943 (the report was given by MARQUIS[MARKI2][ii] from
	ARTHUR (ARTUR) [111];
	1. The main conclusion in the [C\$ report]
	[20 groups unrecoverable]
	2. The evaluation of the British Intelligence Service:
	The ground and air forces of the USSR considerably exceed the German. The USSR's production of tanks and aircraft exceeds by
	far the German. The economic and possibly the military potential of the USSR have not reached their peak, but the German is on the decline.
	On the front by March there were 258 Soviet divisions, German (in the
	equivalent) 165-175, not considering Rumanian and others. Aircraft correspondingly 4,685-4,556 and 1,668.
	3. [The evaluation][a] of the American [Intelligence Service][a]:
	"It is inadequately defined: all the German losses on the front will be replaced by summer; by $\{C \neq 1 \}$ June of this year $3g \rightarrow g$
	new divisions will be formed and trained. The aim of the Germans in
	1943 is as before - the destruction of the Red Army in offensive operations."
	4. The BEI's own conclusions:
	a) Britiah Intelligence grossly exaggerates the Russian forces and underestimates the German forces, but the Americans do the
,	opposite.
	b) A full-scale offensive by the Germans is beyond the limits
	of their possibilities. At the same time the economy of the USSR is so strained that the armed forces cannot be, from the point of view of
	ability to conduct operations, at the 1942 level for more than a year.
	c) In the summer the Russians will have considerable
	superiority on the ground and undisputed mastery in the air.
	d) The superiority of the Germans is in transport both in
	the rear and along the front for regrouping.
	e) If by the summer Germany can replace all her losses and there will be no risk in weakening her garrisons in Europe, she can
	isunch an offensive on a scale almost equal to that of 1942. The
	German Command probably would not consider advantageous a transition to defense on all fronts. Their main task in 1943 will [C\$ therefore]
	be the destruction of the armed strength of the USSR.

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
· .	TOD SECDET	TDINE VENAL	
••		TRINE VENONA	
	- 2 -		
	f) The ability of the Russi the impact	ians to withstand for a long time	
	(43 groups ur	nrecoverable]	
	No. 169	MOLLERS[MOL'ER][iv]	
	Notes: [a] Inserted by translator.		
	Comments: [1] BEW: Board of Economic W	arfare.	
	[i1] MARKIZ: Joseph Milton BE		
	[i1i] ARTUR: Thomas Arthur BIS	Son.	
	[iv] MOL'ER: Pavel P. MIKhAJIA	ον.	
	• •		
		15 April 1968	
		• •	
	TOP SECRET	TRINE VENONA	

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
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14. New York 1132-3 to Moscow, 13 July 1943.

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USSF	2	Ref. No.: (of 27/2/1957)	
		Issued : 13 August, 1974	
		Copy No.: 301	
	3RD REISS		
	DETAILS OF VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROV: IN THE USA	ICH POZNER ("PLATON") AND HIS CONTACTS	
, ,	(1943)		
From			
To Nos		13th July 1943	
NOS	[2-part mesGage		
[Part I]	To VIKTOR[i]		
In t peti Litt in s back spec	The COUNTRY[STRANA] [17] since May ition for citizenship and received huanian citizen [2 groups unrecove secondary schools in LENINGRAD, Bi helor's degree from the PARIS Uni	d his first papers. In 1943 as a ered Soviet citizenship. He studied ERLIN, and PARIS where he received a versity in 1926. [2 groups unrecovered] pplied [1 group unrecovered] at the	
	[13 groups un	recoverable]	
		[Continued overleaf]	
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by GERTSOG [33 group: unrecovered] , but in the interests of our business was withdrawn. Flease check FLATON and canction his use as a probationer [STAZHER] and a cource of leade [NAVODCHIK]. [11 groups unrecoverable] No. 630 LUKA [mil] Footnotes: [1] VINTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [11] Inserted by translator. [11] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [12]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMONT". [11] GERTSOO : se "PLATOM". [11] GERTSOO : se "Manatified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1746 of 14th July 1943 Boot 21st November 1943 and 1930 of 21st November 1943 (11) [11] LIZEEVAE: Not traced [11] Eléne : Ellen POZMER, ake Helene KAGEN-POZMER,	by GERTEOG [33 group: unrecovered] , but in the interests of our business was withdrawn. Flease check FLATON and canction his use as a probationer [STAZHER] and a cource of leade [NAVODCHIK]. [11 groups unrecoverable] No. 630 LUKA [mil] Footnotes: [1] VINTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [11] Inserted by translator. [11] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [12]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMONT". [11] GERTEOO : de "OBCH"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1746 of 14th July 1943 and 1730 of 21st November 1943 and [11] LIZEEVAE: Not traced [12] Eléne : Ellen POZMER, ake Helene KAGEN-POZMER,			VENC	DN	
by GERTSOG [33 group: unrecovered] , but in the interests of our business was withdrawn. Flease check FLATON and canction his use as a probationer [STAZHER] and a cource of leade [NAVODCHIK]. [11 groups unrecoverable] No. 630 LUKA [mil] Footnotes: [1] VINTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [11] Inserted by translator. [11] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [12]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMONT". [11] GERTSOO : se "PLATOM". [11] GERTSOO : se "Manatified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1746 of 14th July 1943 Boot 21st November 1943 and 1930 of 21st November 1943 (11) [11] LIZEEVAE: Not traced [11] Eléne : Ellen POZMER, ake Helene KAGEN-POZMER,	by GERTEOG [33 group: unrecovered] , but in the interests of our business was withdrawn. Flease check FLATON and canction his use as a probationer [STAZHER] and a cource of leade [NAVODCHIK]. [11 groups unrecoverable] No. 630 LUKA [mil] Footnotes: [1] VINTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [11] Inserted by translator. [11] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [12]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMONT". [11] GERTEOO : de "OBCH"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1746 of 14th July 1943 and 1730 of 21st November 1943 and [11] LIZEEVAE: Not traced [12] Eléne : Ellen POZMER, ake Helene KAGEN-POZMER,	7	6P	55-6R-I		
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and a cource of leads [NAVODChIK]. [11 groups unrecoverable] No. 650 LUKA [mi] Footnotes: [i] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [ii] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [ii] Inserted by translator. [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMONNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DUKE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1944 and 1148 of 14th July 1944 and 1148 of 14th July 1944 and 1148 of 14th July 14	and a cource of leads [NAVODChIK]. [11 groups unrecoverable] No. 650 LUKA [mi] Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [ii] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [ii] Inserted by translator. [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMONNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DUKE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 MORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June, 1944 and possibly (as G.) in 1930 of 21st November 1943	, but in the	interest	s of our bus:	iness	vas withdrawn.
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 [ii] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [iii] Inserted by translator. [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PRAMOUNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DURE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1930 of 21st November 1943 (1944). [viii] LIZEEVXA.: Not traced [ix] Eléne : Ellen FOZMER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZMER, 	 [ii] PLATON : i.e. "PLATO". [iii] Inserted by translator. [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PRAMOUNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DURE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1930 of 21st November 1943 (1945). [viii] LIZEEVXA.: Not traced [ix] Eléns : Ellen FOZMER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZMER, 	No. 630				LUKA [mii]
 [iii] Inserted by translator. [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMOUNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DUKE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1944 and possibly (as G.) in 1930 of 21st November 1943 (1944). [viii] LIZEEVAL: Not traced [ix] Eléns : Ellen FOZMER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZMER, 	 [iii] Inserted by translator. [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARAMOUNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DUKE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1943 and 1148 of 14th July 1944 and possibly (as G.) in 1930 of 21st November 1943 (1944). [viii] LIZEEVAL: Not traced [ix] Eléns : Ellen FOZMER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZMER, 	Footnotes:	[i]	VIETOR	:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
 [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARANOUNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : 4e "DUKE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 (14th July 1943) and 1148 of 14th July 1943 (14th July 1943) and 1148 of 14th July 1943 (14th July 1943) and 1930 of 21st November 1943 (14th July 1943). [viii] LIZEEVXA: Not traced [ix] Eléne : Ellen FOZMER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZMER, 	 [iv] COUNTRY : U.S.A. [v]UNT : The preceding gap is the right length for this to be the end of "STUDIOS PARANOUNT". [vi] ARSENAL : U.S. War Department. [vii] GERTSOG : de "DUKE"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 (1448 of 14th July 1943) and 1148 of 14th July 1943 (1448 of 14th July 1943) and 1148 of 14th July 1943 (1448 of 14th July 1943) (1468 of 14th July 194		[ii]	PLATON	:	i.e. "PLATO".
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<pre>[vii] GERTSOG :</pre>	<pre>[vii] GERTSOG :</pre>		[•]	UNT	:	length for this to be the end of -
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[ix] Eléns : Ellen POZNER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZNER,	[ix] Eléns : Ellen POZNER, aka Helene KAGEN-POZNER,		[ינניס]	œrtsog :	:	Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 865 of 8th June 1943 1148 of 14th July 1943 553 of 16th June, 1944 and possibly (as G.) in
			[viii]	LIZA EVA	L .:	Not traced
			[ix]		:	
			27/2/19	57) ^{···} //Er		
VENONA	Xor 27/2/1957)			<u> </u>	JK.	




15. New York [GRU] 1325 to Moscow, 11 August 1943.

	TOP-SECRET TRINE ENONA
	UNU CRU
	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	No. 1325 11 August 19 <u>43</u>
	To the Director.
	[69 groups unrecoverable] Pereulok [a], house 14 and Rozaliya ZARETsKAYa, Khoromnyj Tupik [a],
	of the Lincoln Brigade. [B% There] held the post of aide-de-camp to the commander of the 15th Division, then staff officer in the Republican Army as [C% interpreter] in the line [1 group unrecovered] our [C% advisors]. Returned to the U.S.A. in [C% November] 1938. Up to 1 August 1943 worked in various explosives factories; last post assistant director of the T.N.T. factory in WILLIAMSFORT, Pennsylvania. Has now accepted an invitation to the post of [C% production] safety [b] [C% inspector] attached to the Explosives Division {UPRAVLENIE} of the War Department (the Division is in CHICAGO). FHIL[[fIl][1] evidently has already had a conversation with him as he has passed on material received from him on the technology of the production of an explosive called pentolite (a mixture of TNT and penta-critritol-tetra-nitrate) which is used for shells, bombs, and torpedoes. We await your in- structions. The question of the means of liaison [B% can be] decided later. [ii]
	2. MITRON[111] just did not turn up for the first meeting.
	3. MARQUIS[HARKIZ][iv] [1 group unrecovered] a two weeks' vacation.
	No. 212 NO{c][v]
	T.N.: [a] These are street names. The first word of the first name
	is not recoverable.
	[b] BEZOPASNOST': This can also mean "security".[c] The remaining letters of the signature are unrecoverable.
	Comments:
	[1] FIL: Not identified.
	[11] The information contained in this paragraph relates to Daniel Abraham ZARET.
	[iii] NITRON: Not identified.
	[iv] MARKIZ: Joseph Milton BERNSTEIN.
	[v] Almost certainly MOL'ER - Pavel F. MIKhAJLOV, GRU Resident in NEW YORK.
•	
	15 April 1968

16. Washington [Naval-GRU] 1969 to Moscow, 13 August 1943.

. 95 BRIDE IOP SECRET USER Ref. No: 3/NEF/T1139 (of 12/6/1959) Issued: 13/7/1960 Copy No: 2014 RE-ISSUE Nami Otta der LETTER FROM CARTER (1943) From: WASHINGTON Te: MOSCON 1969 No: 13 Aug. 43 To: [Name No. 42][1] CARTER[KARTER][11] has sent a letter via STELLA. [111] Since 26th July he has been working at the R.C.A. Informatory, FRIMMENCM, NEW JESDEY. It has a staff of 20 engineers. They are developing two projects by contract with the Army Signal Corps. These are to be ready by October -November 1943. Both projects are basically for the improvement of radar and its use in radio navigation for blind bombing (that is from a high altitude and a great [2 groups unrecovered]) without visual bearings and without optical sights. It is meant to be fitted on Flying Fortresses. CAPTER has been entrusted with drawing up instructions and a manual for the use of this apparatus. There is an opportunity of collaborating with other engineers. In an explanatory note CAPTER menticus the advantages of the new system over the british: it is not subject to interception and has greating acouracy. CARTER mentions his contacts with four engineers who are working in important war establighments. For checking purposes ### we have told} the NEIGHBOURS [SOMEDI][iv] about the last three of them. All are Communists. Philip FIEID FILIPP FIL'D]. Aged 30. Mechanical engineer. Jew. Wife OL'GA is Russian (party member). At present working in a military establishment (we will let you have the name later). Distribution [Continued overleaf] 3/NEF/T1139 -TOP-SECRET BRIDE 239



17. Washington [Naval-GRU] 1983 to Moscow, 14 August 1943.

	-, DRUG
	VIDAN
	USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T1206 (of 7/10/1959)
	Issued: (30/1/1961
	Copy No: 204
	RE-ISSUE
	SALLY AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE "SEVASTOPOL" (1943)
	From: WASHINGTON
	To: MOSCON
	No: 1983 14 Aug. <u>43</u>
	To: [Name No. 42].[1]
	The "SEVASTOPOL'" arrived in SAN FRANCISCO on 13th August. [B] The formalities with] the passengers went off normally. The formalities with the crew are being done on 14th August and about these I shall report later. SALLY[SELL][ii] is fealing all right. On 15th August sho [B] will come under the control of] [1 word unrecoverable].[a]
	No. 629 Nerres No. 91 [111]
	Note: [a] Very probably a name.
	Comments: [1] Name No. 42 : Unidentified.
	[11] SAILY : Unidentified cover-name.
	[111] Name No. 91 : Unidentified.
	Distribution
	Distribution
•	
	3/NBF/T1 206
	DRUG

241

18. Moscow 142 (Circular), 12 September 1943.

VENONA USER Reissue From: MOSCOW TOI CANBERRA No: 142[a] 12 September 1943 1. A change in circumstances - and in particular the dissolu-tion of the "BIG HOUSE[BOL"ShOJ DOM]"[1] - necessitates a change in the method used by the workers of our residencies to keep in touch with the leaders of the local FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN[SEMLYaCHESKL][ii] organisations on intelligence matters. 2. Our workers, by continuing to meet the leaders of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN, are exposing themselves to danger and are giving cause [1 group unidentified] [b] local authorities to suspect that the "BIG HOUSE" is still in existence. з. We propose : a) That personal contact with leaders of the local FELLOM-COUNTRYMAN organisations should cease and that FELLOMCOUNTRYMAN material should not be accepted for forwarding to the "BIG HOUSE." b) That meetings of our workers may take place only with special reliable undercover [SAKONSPIRIROVANNYJ] contacts of the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [Dt organisations], who are not suspected by the [1 group unidentified][b] local authorities, exclusively about specific aspects of our intelligence work (acquiring [1 group unidentified] contacts, leads [NAVODKI], rechecking of those who are being cultivated, etc.). For each meeting it is necessary to obtain our consent. [1 group unrecovered] [1 group missing] representative of the Soviet Union. No. 4048 VINTOR[111] Notes: This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO and OTTAWA. The unidentified group is the same in both cases.-organic [a] [b] Commenter BIG HOUSE: The COMINTERN. FELLOWCOUNTRYNAN (-MEN): Communist(s). VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [1] [111] 17 August 1971 VENONA TOP SECRET

243

19. San Francisco 441 to Moscow, 31 October 1943.

TOP SECRET DINAR VENONA			
m87V			
From: SAN FRANCISCO			
To: MOSCOW			
No.: 441 31 October 19 <u>43</u>			
I confirm receipt of Code "075-B"[1] copy No.27. Code "POBEDA"[11] will be destroyed [2 groups unidentified] after [B% such] code has been received in TYRE [TIR][111].			
242 CHARON [KhARON][1v]			
Comments: [1] KOD "075-B": The code designated Control and Control under different system of pad-page identification. The "B" stands for BEZOPASNOST' (Security), that is, "for use by the NKGB."			
[11] KOD. "POBEDA"; The code designated Internet "POBEDA" means "Victory."			
[111] TIR: New York.			
[iv] KhARON: Grigorij KhEJFETs			
<u>.</u>			
-TOP SECRET DINAR YENONA			

20. Moscow 232-3 to all Residents, 2 December 1943.

Ō

	TOP SECRET VENONA	
1		
	Peissue	
	PTOM: HORCHI	
	То: Слирерил	
	No: 233, 232	
	3 December 19 <u>43</u>	
	Circular(a). Once again we direct your attention to the insufficient secrecy in the work of the leaders and operational workers of the residencies. Some operational vorbers are being initiated into affairs of the residencies which have no relation to the work which they are carrying out. Of course this is the result of talkativeness and the inovitable resonances of brotherly rela- tions which are maintained among our workers. It is necessary to all [6 groups unrecovered] but each individual operational worker should know on the general work of the residency only what is necessary in order to carry out the work on his own assignment. In the premises of the embassy, legation, consulate (in the studies and work rooms of the residence) and in the private a- partments, probably fitted with special [1 group uniddnified], discussions are being conducted on operational questions. There have even been cases of setting up in the work room a conference of all the workers of the residency for a collective discussion of instructions of the [C% center]. It is categorically forbid- den during instruction and generally in discussion, particularly within the premises, to use the real surnames of workers and pro- bationers[STAZHERY], names of cities and countries, officials and other objectives. All this should be encoded. [1 group unrecovered] considering the cases cited above it is recommended instead of conversations aloud to exchange notes, which immediately after such a "secret conversation" [1 group unidentified] are destroyed. Our workers must not at work and in private life [4 groups unrecovered] from other [1 group uni- dentified] apparatus and [1 group unrecovered] other [1 group unrecovered] discussions in Russian about [5 groups unre- covered].	
	[5 groups unrecoverable] violation of rules of secrecy we will take strict measures. [1 group unidentified] providing the necessary secrecy in our work to a considerable extent depends upon the leaders of the resi- dencies themselves. The residents should not share with their subordinates communications which they are not supposed to know for the work.	
	No. 677 PETROV[1]	
	Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to HAVANA, MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA, SAN FRANCISCO and MEW YORK. Comments: [1] PETROV: Unidentified MOSCOW signature.	
Ŧ	OP SECRET MERIDIA 16 August 1971	

21. San Francisco 510 to Moscow, 7 December 1943.

42	ERILL
	TOP SECRET
USSR	Ref. No: 3/NBF/T1045 (of 19/9/1958) Issued: 19/27/1/1959
	Copy No: 204 $\mathcal{D} \not\in \mathcal{I}^{5}$
	<u>RE-ISSUE</u>
RE	FFRENCE TO "JULLA", "IVERI", AND "ZARE" (1943)
From: SAN FRA	NCISCO
To: MOSCO:7	
No: 510	7 Dec. <u>43</u>
Personal to PE	TPOV. [1]
wife's intimat 6 groups unre	relationships may become a subject for discussion since IVERI's out his wife's connections with Ben GOIDSTEIN! ¹ Y are being ZARE". [V] ZARE [G: in the course] [3 groups unrecovered] IVERI's are relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVERI secovered] soundal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact	e relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVERI
Wife's intimet [6 groups unre out to be fact We are sending No. 286 Comments: [1]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[[vi]] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addressee.
Wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286	PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULIA : Olga Valentinovana KLOPKOV JULIA : Olga Valentinovana KLOPKOV
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1] [11 [11]	<pre>relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVERL boovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his vishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/LKON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Kikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV.</pre>
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1] [11 [11] [14] [14] [14]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elena Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEJFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
wife's intimet [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1 [11] [11] [11] [1v [v]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elena Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEJFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [12] [14] [14] [14] [14]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elena Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEJFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
wife's intimet [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1 [11] [11] [1v] [v]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elena Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEJFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
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wife's intimet [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1 [11] [11] [11] [1v [v] [v]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By post g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elema Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [12] [14] [14] [14] [14]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By post g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elema Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11]	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By post g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elema Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul
wife's intimat [6 groups unre out to be fact we are sending No. 286 Comments: [1] [111 [111 [111 [111 [111] [112] Distribution	re relations with Ben and the subsequent [1 group unrecovered] IVER soovered] soandal that IVERI in his reports to you makes his wishes is [1 group unrecovered] and [3 groups unrecovered] you. By pist g a detailed letter of ZARE's on this case. Kh/KON[vi] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW addresses. JULL/. : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOV IVERI : Probably Wikhail Konstantinovich K/LATOZOV. GOLDSTEIN: Not known. ZARE : Elena Konstantinovna GORBUNOVA. KhAKON : Grigorij Markovich KhEJFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul

22. Mexico City 158 to Moscow, 23 December 1943.

95 VENONA Description SSR Ref. No.: 3/NEF/T2242 Issued: 10/5/77 Copy No.: 30/ UKA'S CONTACTS, PLANS FOR SUBGICAL OPERATION, \$29,000 REQUIRED (1943) FOR: MEXICO CITY o: MOSCOW D.: 158 Z3 December 1943 To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBGICAL OPERATION(s planned by the DOTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means(r) is impossible. Without rensfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Teleso our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRU[vi] [Continued overleaf]	YION[iii] it this bout delay
Issued: 10/5/77 Copy No.: 30/ UKA'S CONTACTS, PLANS FOR SURGICAL OPERATION, \$29,000 REQUIRED (1943) TOM: MEXICO CITY o: MOSCOW o.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETHOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBOICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without renseler 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	YION[iii] it this bout delay
Issued: 10/5/77 Copy No.: 30/ UKA'S CONTACTS, PLANS FOR SURGICAL OPERATION, \$29,000 REQUIRED (1943) TOM: MEXICO CITY o: MOSCOW o.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETHOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBOICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without renseler 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	YION[iii] it this bout delay
Copy No.: 301 UKA'S CONTACTS, PLANS FOR SUBGICAL OPERATION, \$20,000 REQUIRED (1943) rom: MERICO CITY o: MOSCOW o.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without remasfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	YION[iii] it this bout delay
UKA'S CONTACTS, PLANS FOR SUBGICAL OPERATION, \$29,000 REQUIRED (1943) rom: MERICO CITY o: MOSCOW o.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without rensfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	TON[iii] t this bout delay
rom: MEXICO CITY o: MOSCOW o.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group wurecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without rensfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group wurecovered]. [2 groups wurecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	TON[iii] t this bout delay
rom: MEXICO CITY o: MOSCOW o.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group wurecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without rensfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group wurecovered]. [2 groups wurecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	TON[iii] t this bout delay
 n.: 158 23 December 1943 To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUBGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without ransfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telegour [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi] 	bout delay
To PETEOV[ii]. Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SUNGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without rensfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Telego our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRLJ[vi]	bout delay
Contact has been established by LUKA[ii]. The SURGICAL OPERATION[s planned by the DOCTORS[iii] to take place in four days' time. At the tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without ransfer 20,000 in "KAFITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Teles our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRLJ[vi]	bout delay
tage [1 group unrecovered] by other means[iv] is impossible. Without ransfer 20,000 in "KAPITAN's" money[v] for urgent requirements. Teleg our [1 group unrecovered]. [2 groups unrecovered]. o. 38 YuRIJ[vi]	bout delay
[Continued overleaf]	
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2 pages] JV	
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VENONA TOP SEGRET	

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<u>an - 1979 - 11 - 1</u>		2
Footnotes: [] PETROV:	3/NBF/T2242 Lavrentij Pavlovich BERIYa.
	LUKA:	Pavel Panteleevich KLARIN: 2nd Secretary, Soviet Enbassy, MEXICO CITY, from 23 November 1943 to 24 May 1944; served previously and subsequently in the USA.
[113	.] SURGICAL OPERATION, DOCTORS:	Coverwords associated with the coverword "HOSPITAL", ie "prison". They appear to denote a release from prison and those effecting it: relating here to the attempt to secure the release of TROTSXIJ's assassin (cf. HEXICO CITY's Nos. 55 of 15 January 1944 (unpublished) and 193, 194 of 14 March 1944 (3/NBF/T770)).
[iv]	Or "with other funds	[SREDSTVA]".
[v]	KAPITAN's money:	Presumably U.S. dollars: "KAPITAN", ie "CAPTAIN", is President Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT's covername on the NEW YORK lane - first occurrence on this lang.
[vi]	YuRIJ:	Lev Aleksandrovich TARASOV.
	VENC	ONA EGRET

23. San Francisco 31 to Moscow, 17 January 1944.

Ruf. No: 3/NBF/11327 Issued: 18/11/1960 Copy No: 2044 1. "BUTCHER'S" CONTACTS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF "AL'HA" 2. DIRECT CIPHER LINK WITH "JULIA" (1944) M640. From: SAN FRANCISCO To: MORCOW No: Я 17 Jan. 44 "BUTCHER[MYASNIK]"[1] expresses [1 group unrecovered] that the chemist Leo LEVANES[11] (in future "AL'MA) will start giving us help. AL'MA [30 groups unrecovered] BUTCHER in [3 groups unrevovered] through BUTCHER - AL'MA. Among BUTCHER's contacts there are also some interesting targets in the aviation plants [1-group unrecovered] LOS ANGELES, No. 14 CHARON [KhARON][iii] Since a direct other link has been set up with "JULL" [1v] she wants [1 group unrecovered] there the amount expended on telegraphic communication. I gave JULLA [3 groups unrecovered] the sum of 155 dollars. No. 15 Comments: [1] BUTCHER : 🗰 [11] LEVANES : An angineer with the Shell Oil Company at DOMINIQUEZ, GALIFORNIA. [111] CHARON : Grigorij KhEJFETs, Soviet Vice-Jonsul in SAN FRANCISCO. [iv] JULIA : Olga KhLOPKOVA. Distribution 3/NBF/TH 327 TOP-SEC

24. New York 195 to Moscow, 9 February 1944.

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
95	VENONA		exect.	
	P-SECRET			
USSR		Ref. No.:		
		Issued :	/25/6/1973	
		Copy No.: 3(21	
MEETT	ING BETWEEN "GUS!" AND "RES		•	9-977
From: NEW YORK	(1944)			
To: MOSCOW				
No.: 195		9th February	1944	
Personal to VIKTOR[i	.].	- •		
In reply to No.	302[ii].			
	TIANE][vi] is a Labour Mem	Continued or		
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comparation of isotopes of ENORMOUS.	the working out of the process for the The work is proceeding in two directions:
	1 groups unrecoverable]
separation of isotopes by the combin preliminary and the electron method	ned method, using the diffusion method for for final separation. The work
preliminary and the electron method	6 groups unrecovered]
18th February, we shall report the :	_
No. 92	ANTON[xii]
Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
[ii] Not available.	
[iii] GUS':	i.e. "GOOSE"; Harry GOLD.
[iv] REST/R.:	Dr. Emil Julius Klaus FUCHS.
[v] COUNTRY:	U.S.A.
[vi] ISLAND, ISLANDERS:	GREAT ERITAIN, British.
[vi1] ENORHOUS:	a) U.S. Atomic Energy Project. b) Uranium.
[viii] General SOMERVELL:	Lt. General Brehan Burke SOMERVELL, Commanding General Army Service Forces,
	War Department. Henry Lewis STIMSON, Secretary of War.
[ix] STIMSON:	Rt. Hon. Ben SMITH, Minister Resident in
[x] Ben SMITH:	WASHINGTON for Supply from 1943.
[xi] LAWRENCE:	Professor Ernest Orlando LAWRENCE.
[mii] ANTON:	Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV.
VE VE	NONA
TOP	JECKE!

<u> </u>	
	VENONA
	TOP SECITE I
	<u>Reissue</u> (1742)
	From: SAN FRANCISCO
	To: MOSCOW
	No: 65
	15 February 1944
	To VIKTOR(1).
	On the 9th of February of this year in PORTLAND second mate Eliza- veta Mitrofanovna KUZNETEOVA, born 1918, deserted from S.S. "PSKOV." KUZ- NETSOVA without receiving permission from the immigration authorities to remain in the U.S.A. went into hiding. On this matter we are sending "MATHOR"[6][11] to FORTLAND.
	No. 45 KDARON[111]
	·
	T.N. [1] I.S. in the musical sense. The service rank is MAKOR in Russian. Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] MAZHOR: 1.S. "MAJOR KEY," Vyachislav Aleksandrovich MISLUK. [111] KAARON: Grigorij KAEJFETS, Soviet Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO at that time.
	11 July 1969
	TOP SECRET COMP YENONA


25. San Francisco 65 to Moscow, 10 February 1944.

26. Moscow [unnumbered], 25 April 1944.



27. New York 588 to Moscow, 29 April 1944.


95	
TOP.	SECRET.
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USSR	Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T110 (of 1/1/1960)
	Issued : 18/10/196
	Copy No.: Ley
	5TH REISSUE , RULEVOJ, PEL, PROBATIONERS, MAKSIN, AMT AND MER
2. KRAMER, PERLO), FLATO, CLASSER, FITZGERALD STC: GROUP OF FELLOW CARTHAGE [WASHINGTON D.C.] (1944)
From: NEW YORK	
To: MOSCOW	· · ·
No: 588	29th April 1944
On 27th April UMNIT	SA[i] reported as follows:
"After ZVUK's[ii] d	
on RULEVOJ's instruction	[15 groups unrecovered]
	[41 groups unrecovered].
meeting with PEL [4 group P.[vii] more often than	
unrecove red) ex clusive c unreasonin g Zh IVOTNYJ] f	ting this up and exaggerating. At least [3 groups control of [a] the PROBATIONERS(STAZAERY) and expressed[b] as fear [D% that] we will contact them direct. It is KSIM[viii] or I should see R. and come to an agreement: i UMNITEA
····· ···· ···· ·····	[15 groups unrecovered]
I recommended [0% asking	g] [45 groups unrecovered]
<u></u>	[Continued overleaf]
DISTRIBUTION:	
	jun-
3/ NEP/ T11Ø	
3/NBP/T11Ø	
3/NBP/T11Ø	F OP-SCERFT-
3/NBP/T11Ø	HOP-SECRET-



·, 95	VII	
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		- 3 - 3/NBP/T11Ø
Comments: [v]	R.:	RULEVOJ. See comment [iii] above.
[Cont'd] [v i]	R:	Represents the abbreviation R. followed by the fullstop at the end of the sentence.
(vii)	Pet	PEL. See comment [iv] above.
[viii]	NAKSIN:	Vasilij Mikhajlovich ZUBILIN.
[ix]	AWT:	John J. 197. (Also occurs as AMT in No. 687 of 13th May 1944 (3/MBP/T916). It seems unlikely that this is a covername. Presumably it is a persistent misspelling.)
[x]	KRAMER :	Charles KRAMER.
[mi]	PERLO:	Victor PERLO. (Spelt as PRLO throughout the message; presumably a spelling mistake.)
[mii]	FLATO:	Charles FLATO.
(zi ii)	CLASSER :	Harold GLISSER.
[miv]	Edward FITZGERALD:	Bdward Joseph FIT2GERALD.
	FELLOT COUNTRINEN:	Members of the Communist Party.
	CARTHACE:	WASHINGTON D.C.
[= 1]	NEIGHBOURS :	Nenbers of another Soviet intelligence organisation.
[xviii]	υ.	UMNITAA. See comment [i] above.
[siz]	ARINA:	Probably Mary Wolfe PRICE.
(**)	NËR:	i.e. "MAYOR"; probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKHMEROV.
	•	
3/1152/T110		
		TCRET WES

28. New York 598-9 to Moscow, 2 May 1944.


Y. Reissue (T122) From: NEW YORS MOSCOV To: 598-599 No: 2 May 1944 We are transmitting information written down by RULEVOJ[1] [Fart I] after a conversation with Lih0[ii]. As regards the re-election of ROOSEVELT financial and business 1. 1. As regards one re-election of woosreal infinite an adsthess groups are on the whole non-committal[a]. They openly support DE#EY much more than any other canlidate but in support of ROOSEVELT they say very [D, little]. On the whole these circles leave the question open refraining from judgment. Such sharp propaganda of hate toward ROOSE-VELT, as came out earlier from these circles, is no longer being carried on; [36 groups unrecoverable] ROOSEVELT (the end of April) the labor movement and the party uschine of the Democratic party are for the most part carrying on A. In the po-litical circles of the Catholic Church those two had come out earlier against ROOSEVELT not not beginning [3 groups unrecovered]; FARLEY who is [3 groups unrecovered] church circles has gone over from the opposi-tion to a neutral position. TOBIN who is a strong influence is the Church is at present leading movement for ROOSEVELT in the circles of the AFL[AFT][iii]. The new Catholic group which the based is by Supreme Court Justice MURPHI is descripting influence and the description public support of ROOSEVELT and preparing optim difference of the description of the [36 groups unrecoverable] were former WILKIE supporters there is a growing tendency toward going over to the side of ROOSEVELT. The strategy of the Republicans still has not clearly been de-fined. The basic tendency apparently lies in the temptation of all [19 groups unrecovered] on internal questions {62 groups unrecovered}
{29 groups unrecoverable} 4. Opposition to ROOSEVELT in congress is sabotaging all ROOSEVELT's undertakings, with the exception of direct military appropriations. However the Democrats who stand in opposition to ROOSEVELT consider it impossible to remain in an anti-ROOSEVELT coalition during [Part II] 4. [22 groups unrecovered] against ROOCEVELT, but without any success. In [5 groups unrecovered] ¥. ...




29. New York 601 to Moscow, 2 May 1944.

	TOP-GECRET TOTAL
	<u>Reissue</u> (T154)
•	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	No: 601
	2 May 19 <u>44</u>
	1. The commentator of station WMCA[i] Norman JAY, henceforth "BOJKIJ[[ii], has twice sent DEDUShKA[iii] the text of his talks, which are consistently in a tone extremely friendly to us. We consider it advisable to profit by this circumstance and to invite BOJKIJ [C% to a restaurant] and get acquainted in the line of cover [LINIYA PRIKRYTIYA][a]. Telegraph what you think about BOJKIJ.
	2. LEONID[iv] and ALEKSEJ[v] can hand over the "NEIGHBOR's[SOSED]" [vi] affairs to STEPAN[vii]. Advise when LEONID is to leave for home and what he can occupy himself with in our line before his departure. LEONID [3 groups unrecovered]. Are we to turn that case over to STEPAN?
	3. At a meeting in the PLANT[ZAVOD][viii] GRIN[ix] [C% handed] KALISTRAT[x] a letter in which[,] in the name of the editor of "NEW MASSES", Joe NORTH[NORS], he asks for financial assistance to be given to the magazine, which is in a bad way. For the pres- ent [D% I] [1 group unrecoverable] the reason for so strange a step on GRIN's part or his appealing to KALISTRAT in particular[.] Telegraph your opinion and instructions.
	No. 320 NAJ[xi]
	Note: [a] LINIYA PRIKRYTIYA: That is to say that the meeting would be arranged with a member of the State Security organization in his official capacity as a member of the Consulate-General. Comments:
	 [i] Station WMCA is a NEW YORK, N.Y., broadcasting station. [ii] BOJKIJ: i.e. PERKY, Norman JAY. [iii] DEDUShKA: i.e. GRANDPAPA, Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General at NEW YORK.
	[iv] LEONID: Aleksej Nikolaevich PROKhOROV. [v] ALEKSEJ: Anatolij Antonovich YaKOVLEV.
	<pre>[vi] SOSED: Member of another Soviet intelligence organization [vii] STEPAN: Possibly Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.</pre>
	<pre>[viii] ZAVOD: The Soviet Consulate-General at NEW YORK, N.Y. [ix] GRIN: If not a cover-name this may possibly refer to Abner GREEN, of the American Committee for the Protec- tion of Foreign Born.</pre>
	<pre>[x] KALISTRAT: i.e. CALISTRATUS, Aleksandr Semenovich FOMIN. [xi] MAJ: i.e. MAY, Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.</pre>
	TOP-SECRET VENDE VENONA

30. New York 618 to Moscow, 4 May 1944.





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Footnotes		3/NBF/T463
Continued: [vi]	BEN :	Unidenuified covername. Also occurs in NEW YORK's Nos. 1050 of 26 July 1944 (3/NBF/T22.2) and 1351 of 23 September 1944 (unpublished).
		The U.S.A.
[viii]	MAJ:	i.e. "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.
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·		ZENONA

31. New York 625 to Moscow, 5 May 1944.

-95 VENC		
TOP-SEC		
USSR .	Ref. No.: 3/MBF/T916 (of 17/5/1957)	
	Issued : 1/7/69	
	Copy No.: 204	
CAPETERIA AS COVE	REISSUE R FOR ABRAT: HIS PARTNER APTEL	
•	(1944)	
From: NEW YORK To: HOSCOW		
No.: 625	5th May 1944	
[Addressee unrecovered]		
APPEL	groups unrecovered]	
 DISTRIBUTION:	[Continued overlcaf]	
	· · · · ·	
3/NBF/T916 (of 17/6/1957)	4.1.14	
	M. H. Jule cover (Cover Proportion	
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a	ollars.		- 2 - 3/NBF/T916 (of 17/5/1957)
<i>.</i>			[9 groups unrecoverable]
[Internal Seri	al No. u	Inrccovered] [Signature unrecovered]
N	ote: [a]	inserte	assumed that "in" is understood and it has, therefore, been ad by the translator. Nithout the insertion of "in", the I translation would be " had the business of several res".
c	omments: [i]	ABRAM:	Jack SOBLE.
	[ii]	APPEL:	Available information indicates that a Sam /PPEL was in some way connected with the S and V cafeteria which was set up by Jack SOBLE and his brother-in-law, Arnold WOLSTON.
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3	/NBF/T9 16 (of	17/5/19	957) - 2 -
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
32. New York 628 to Moscow, 5 May 1944.

	VF	NONA
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·	TOP SE	GRGT
	USSR	Ref. No.:
		Issued: 15/6/76
		Copy No.: 3¢1
	ALFRED SARANT, A LEAD OF ANTENNA	'S: PROPOSED RECRUITMENT, DETAILS (1944)
	From: NEW YORK	
	To: MOSCOW	
	No.: 628	5 Nay 1944
	a lead of ANTENNA's[ii]. He is lives in TYRE [TIR][iii]. He co 1940. He worked for two years i	d sanction the recruitment of Alfred SARANT[i], 25 years old, a Greek, an American citizen and mpleted the engineering course at Cooper Union in n the Signal Corps Laboratory at Fort MCNMOUTH past union activity. He has been working for two
		45 groups unrecoverable]
	entry into the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN apart from his family. Answer w	[ZEMLYaChESKAYa][iv] [Party][v]. SARANT lives ithout delay.
	No. 344	MAJ[vi]
	5 May	
	Footnotes: [i] Alfred SARANT:	Alfred Epaminondas SARANT. Later probably
	FOULDIEB. [I] AIIFEL SARANI:	either covername "SKAUT"/"METR" (ie "SCOUT"/ "METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HUGHES").
	[ii] ANTENNA:	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HRAHES"). Julius ROSENBERG.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [ii] TYRE:	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie " HUGHES") . Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HUAHES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [ii] TYRE:	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HUAHES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HNORES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HNORES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra [vi] MAJ:	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HUXEES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator. ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYSN.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra [vi] MAJ:	<pre>"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HIVATES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator. ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.</pre>
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra [vi] MAJ:	"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HUXEES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator. ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYSN.
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra [vi] MAJ:	<pre>"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HIVATES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator. ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.</pre>
	[ii] ANTENNA: [iii] TYRE: [iv] FELLOWCOUNTRYMA [v] Inserted by tra [vi] MAJ:	<pre>"METRE") or covername "Kh'YuS" (ie "HIVATES"). Julius ROSENBERG. NEW YORK CITY. N: Communist. unslator. ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.</pre>

33. New York 640 to Moscow, 6 May 1944.

Translator's notes: Translator's notes: 101
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means "clearance" (investigation into reliability etc.)
Comments:
[1] Esther Trebach RAND.
[11] Probably a cover word for ZIONISTS.
[111] Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York.
M. H Jies
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34. New York 655 to Moscow, 9 May 1944.



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- 2 - S/::57/1508	
that it would be more in the interest of the COUNTRY [STDAWA][viii] to conclude an agreement about a loan now than to wait for the	
end of the war.	
5. NABOB [N.BOB][ix] has decided to present to CAPTAIN [KIPITAN][x] a plan for a post-war trade agreement with us.	
[51 groups unrecoverable]	
Comments: [1] PEL: possibly Nathan Gregory SILVERUNSTER.	
[ii] OSTROVITYENE: the British.	
[iii] BLVK: the U.S. State Department.	
[iv] Hjalmar PROCOPE, Finnish Minister in 7%SHINGTON.	
 [17] Agaimar PROCOME, Finnish Minister in ASALGICK. [v] LIGA: the U.S. Government. 	
[vi] DACHA: the U.S. Embassy in MCSCOW.	
[vii]	
[viii] STRANA: the U.S.A.	
[ix] NABOB: Henry MORGENTH.U, Jr.	
[x] KAPITAN: Franklin D. ROCSEVELT.	
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35. New York 687 to Moscow, 13 May 1944.

TOP SECRET TRIME YENONA
<u>Reissue</u> (T910)
From: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 687 13 May 19 <u>44</u>
On HELMSMAN's[RULEVOJ][i] instructions GOOD GIRL[UMNITSA[ii] contacted through AMT[III] a new group [C% in CARTHAGE][C% KARFAGEN][iv]:
[53 groups unrecoverable]
HAGDOFF - "KANT"[v]. GOOD GIRL's impressions: They are reliable FELLON- COUNTRYMEN[ZEMLYaKI][vi], politically highly mature; they want to help with information. They said that they had been neglected and no one had taken any interest in their potentialities
[29 groups unrecoverable]
"STORM(ShTORM)"[vii]. RAIDER[REJDER][viii], PLUMB(LOT)[ix], TED[x] and KANT will go to TYRE[TIR][xi] once every two weeks in turn.
PLUMB and TED know PAL[PEL][xii]. We shall let you have identifying particulars later.
No. 373 MAYOR[MER][xiii]
Comments: [1] HELMSMAN: Earl BROWDER. [11] GOOD GIRL: Elizabeth BENTLEY. [11] AMT: Freeumsbly a mistake for John ABT. See also NEW YORK to MOSCOW No. 598 of 29 April 1944. (S/NBF/TILØ). [1] CARTHAGE: WASHINGTON, D.C. [1] KAIT: Henry Samuel MAEDOFF. [1] FELLOW COUNTRYMEN: Members of a Communist Party. [1] STORM: Unidentified. [1] STORM: Unidentified. [1] RAIDER: Victor FERLO. [1] PLUME: Possibly Charles KRAMER. [3] TED: Frobably Edward Joseph FITZGERALD. [3] TYRE: NeW YORK CITY. [3] XI: TYRE: NeW YORK CITY. [3] MATOR: Probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKh/EROV.
25 July, 1968
TOP-SECRET TRINE YENCHA

36. New York 696-7 to Moscow, 16 May 1944.

4			
	Reissue (T142)	5414	
	From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW		
	Nos: 696-697		
		16 May 19 <u>44</u>	
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{Part I}	To the 8th Department. In a conversation with SERGEJ	T[i] TMOPDIALIST[ii] said.	
	In a conversation with SERGES		
	1. The General Starf of the CONNER the success of the invasion of Europ GEN][iv] assured EISENHOWER that the serves in the COUNTRY to ensure the taking part in the invasion. The Is stopped objecting to the invasion. "KAPRAL"[vii]) told IMPERIALIST that the invasion plan proposed by the TK KAPRAL's words KABAN told him: "For to an operation of this kind. Hower recovered]	pe. Last week CARTHAGE[KARFA- pre were sufficient trained re- reinforcement of the units SLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][v] have LUN''s[vi] deputy (henceforth t KABAN[viii] had agreed with DWNSMEN[GOROZHANE][ix]. In r a long time I could not agree	
	[42 groups unred	coverable]	· .
	is sure that a break will ensue very Bulgaria and Hungary the BANK[x] su Germany only after the development of Western and Eastern Fronts.	pposes that they will break with	
	Only in passing did IMPERIAL tions, saying that it was desirable Soyiet-Polish problem before the in in the Polish Cabinet, MOSCOW ought	vasion: "In return for a change	
	I. [xi] continues to conside pation of the USSR in the war again Soviet-American relations. The mas that discussion of this question by interests of the COUNTRY. I. agree ceal that our future intentions in responsible circles in the COUNTRY policy of the COUNTRY.	ter of the DACHA[X11] told nim the press was contrary to the s with him but does not con- this matter are considered in	
[Part II	According to IMPERIALIST's r of 1944, hope to seize the Philippi	eport the American, by the end nes, Formosa, Singapore and	
	[180 groups un [10 groups unre		
	No. 376 16 May	MAJ[xiii]	
Ľ.		VENCNA	
,,,,	·		

2 Barris 2. ments: [i] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN. [ii] IMPERIALIST: Walter LIPPMANN. [iii] STRANA: The U.S.A. [iv] KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C. [v] OSTROVITYANE: The British [vi] LUN': i.e. HEN HARRIER, Cordell HULL. [vii] KAPRAL: i.e. CORPORAL, Edward R. STETTINIUS, Jr. [vii] KAPRAL: i.e. CORPORAL, Edward R. STETTINIUS, Jr. [vii] KAPRAL: i.e. BOAR, Winston CHURCHILL. [ix] GOROZHANE: The Americans. [x] BANK: The U. S. State Department [xi] I.: i.e. IMPERIALIST. [xi] DACHA: i.e. THE COUNTRY HOUSE, the U. S. Embassy in MOSCOW. [xiii] MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESYAN. Comments: 16 April 1974

37. New York 732 to Moscow, 20 May 1944.


TOP DRUG 14 11 From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No: 732 20 May 1944 Data from "GNOME"[1] about the "JET [VOZDUKh]" assembly 19 A of the WESTINGHOUSE firm. The assembly [9 groups unrecovered] increase in speed. It consists of a compressor-internal combustion chamber-turbine. The exhaust nozzle with the cross-section regulated by a central cone. Data of the assembly: Weight dry - 850 pounds. Full length - 100 inches. Diameter of the installation - 19 inches. Diameter of the compressor - 16 inches. Compression ratio of the compressor - 2.75/1, number of stages of the compressor - 6. Single-stage turbine. Temperature of the gas in the turbine [3 groups unrecovered] 00 Fahrenheit, maximum [67 groups unrecoverable] nozzle [11 groups unrecovered] works only when starting. The normal power of the thrust which is created by the assembly is equal of the leve ([3 groups unrecovered] [40 groups unrecoverable] [1] GNOME: William Perl. Comment: DRUG


38. Moscow 334 to Mexico City, 30 May 1944.

BRIDE USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T935 Issued: /21/8/1957 205 Copy No: 1273. PAYMENT OF A DEPOSIT FOR"THE PAIR" (1944) From: MOSCOW To: MEXICO CITY 30 May 44 No: 334 To YURIJ. [1] Payment of the deposit in the "PAIR" [ii] business we pourdion on principle [29 groups unrecovered] from the bank of banknots is registered by the appropriate departments[ORGANT], it is desirable in order to avoid compromise that "OKh"[111] should pay the deposit from his own [G6 money] which he will arguing [10 groups unrecovered] sent on from here. The Americans will not give a transit visa in MOSCOF if it is not secured in TIRE[[V] or [if][a] for this the Mexican Embassy in HOSCOF deed not [1 grap unrecovered] the passport on instructions from the COUNTRINE[V]. We shall communicate with you after a reply about the above possibilities has been received from MARSIM[VI]. Ne. 2334 VIETOR[VII] [Notes and Comments overleaf] Distribution 3/NBF/T935 (2 Pages)


IOD (FCDFT	
- 2 - 3/NBF/T935	
Notes: [a] Supplied by translator.	
Comments: [i] YullJ: Lev A. TARASOV, 1st Secretary at Soviet Embessy in	
[ii] The PAIR : Micholas and Maria FISHER.	
[iii] OKh : Adolfo OkIVE de "LB".	
[iv] TYRE : NEW YORK CITY.	
[v] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.	
[vi] HAKSE4: Vasilij ZUBILIN, 2nd Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON, April 1943-August 1944. [vii] VIKTOR: Lt. Com. P. M. FTRIN.	
[vii] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.	
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3/NBF/T935	
LOP-SEGRET-	


39. New York 786 to Moscow, 1 June 1944.





40. New York 824 to Moscow, 7 June 1944.






Non York-Poppar 10 SE UNET "three horness harnessed abreast to one vehicle"; and it framous in the history of the All-Chien Communist Party (Bolshevik) for its splice-tion to verious triusvirotes formed by Lenin and Otalin. breesibly ARECTEDITE AFTERNA s questionnaire address or interroga-tice-form address (meaning?). ^ONote that the terms to be coded can all be referred to covist percentral and control of their actions (by surveillance, microphones, ste.). The use of the post and of a special code suggests that the conterns might concern in part the sipher clark(s) and others handling correspondence between New York and Money. dins Soviet Consulate (in New York). The Amorg Trading Corporation. "net Any intelligence service. for the State Security apparetue in the Consulate. hans People's Commisseriat of Foreign Affairs (RARDER'T MULLIAN REAL DISCRETE DEL & RARCHINGEL & REED). ins State Security apparatus in the Consulate, Int is, operative, ÖΓ

41. New York 847B-848 to Moscow, 15 June 1944.

Processing
 Isus: <u>P</u>. 1/2/19/5 Gry No.: 2.64 EEGES EXPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ENROPE (1944) EEGES EXPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ENROPE (1944) M. ENGES EXPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ENROPE (1944) M. ENGES EXPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ENROPE (1944) M. ENGES (1945) M
 Isus: <u>P</u>(1/2/19/2) Cay No.: 2.64 ENERGY EXPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ENROPS (1944) ENERGY EXPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ENROPS (1944) YOURS WITH THE WAY AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND
COT NO.: 2044 EISENE EISENE EIRENTES ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE (1944) From: NEW YORK To: NOSCON No: 8.7B-848 No: 8.7B-848 Internet To: NOSCON Deternet To: NOSCON No: 8.7B-848 SEREEJ[i] reports the following: SEREEJ[i] reports the following: SEREEJ[i] reports the following: SEREEJ[i] and the correspondents LINDERJ[INDEEJ][i], and VERTE into the spectral policy of non-recognition of RAS[ii] and are afraid that it may lead YBARE into the spectral policy of non-recognition of RAS[ii] and are afraid that it may lead YBARE into the spectral policy of NANCE kas been inspired, since 1946, by CALIFH[RALIF][i]; and UURHM[NEENT][x] JS groups unrecoverable) JS groups unrecoverable) CUMAVE[FUNT][fii] with the help of COT[KOT][iii]. CAPTAN[KAFTAN][int] State FRINCE completely under their influence before the advantage may specified in the specified of the SISKELKAL) and possibly a base in find portand the specified of the s
EISING EXERCISA DEPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE (1944) From: NEW YORK To: NOSCON No: 0.78-04.0 To TINTOR[1] SEREJ[1] reports the following: SEREJ[1] reports the following: Sere of influence of the USSR. From conversalies to holve close contacts with government circles, the question of PANNEY's future is very disturbing and circles, which [2 groups unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of RAS[11] and are afraid that it may lead PANRE into the sport of influence of the USSR. From conversations with MPAREA into the subscript of PANNEY's future is very disturbing and circles[MARF][vi] and VISON[11], the 'ollawing emargent's the policy of non-recognition of RAS[11] and are afraid that it may lead PANRE into the sport of of PANNES bas been inspired, since 1946, by CALIPH[RAIIP][i] and UNEMPH[MENT][xi] JS groups unrecoverable] COUAVE[FUNCJ[[11]] with the help of COT[KOT][[111]]. CAPTAIN[KAPTANN][xr] the ports of MANNE bas been inspired, since 1946, by CALIPH[RAIIP][ix], and HUMPH[MENT][xi]. JS groups unrecoverable] COUAVE[FUNCJ[[111]] with the help of COT[KOT][[111]]. CAPTAIN[KAPTANN][xr] the port of MANNE bas been inspired, bince 1946, by CALIPH[MANI][xr] be port of the SSR. From the state function of PANNES is been inspired, bince 1946, by CALIPH[RAIIP][ix], the policy of the same time in the same time is to accure for the COUNTER[STATIN[[XAPTAN][xr] the port of MANNE bas been inspired, bince the fort of the same time is the same tis the same time is the same time is the same ti
<pre>IMPORTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE (1944) From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No: 047B-048 15th June 1944 Part I To VIKTOR[1] SERREJ[1] reports the following: SERREJ[1] reports the following: According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups marccovered], [1 group nurrecovered] policy of resognition of MaS[1] and are afraid that it may lead YBANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with IMPERIALIST[iv] and HARSCH[HADESh][vii] and VISSON[viii], the follwing emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LAHF[ISEI][i] and WISSON[viii], the follwing emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LAHF[ISEI][vii] and MISSON[viii], the follwing emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LAHF[ISEI][vii] and MISSON[viii], the follwing emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LAHF[ISEI][vii] and MISSON[viii], the follwing emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LAHF[ISEI][vii] and MISSON[viii], the follwing emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LAHF[ISEI][vi]] with the help of COT[KOT][STIAN][STANM][xv] the pormanom use of MAKAR and CASABLEAC.[KASABLANK]] and possibly a base in [INDO-CHINA and also to occure for the CONTEXT[STEANA][xv] the pormanom use of MAKAR and CASABLEAC.[KASABLANK] and possibly a base in [INDO-CHINA and also to oppose the statempts by the ISIANDERS(STRONTTATINE][xv] to take FRANCE coppose the attempts by the ISIANDERS(STRONTTATINE][xv] </pre>
<pre>From: NDW YORK To: NOSCOW No: &4,7B-84,8 15th June 1944 Fart I To VIRTOR[i] EERCEJ[ii] reports the following: EERCEJ[ii] reports the following: . According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups unrecovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of A&S[iii] and are afraid that it may lead YBANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with HBYEALHIST[iv] and CHEF[ShEP][v] and the correspondents LINDIFJ[[v1]. HASCH[HAESh][vii] and VISSOM[viii], the follwing emerges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 194,\$, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LINHY[LECI][x] and NURHYT[NEENT][xi] [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[STANJ[rii] with the help of COT[KOT][riii]. CAPTAIN[AFTANS][riv] hoped [5% at the same time] to accure for the CONTENT[STANAA][xv] the pormandut use of DAKAR and CASUBLANCA[ANALDANCA] and possibly a base in INFO-CHIN, and also to coppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[CONTONITYANE][rv1] to take FRINCE completely under their influence tefore the advancese was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]</pre>
<pre>To: MOSCOW No: 847B-84.8 15th June 1944 Part I To VIKTOR[i] SERREJ[ii] reports the following:</pre>
No: 8478-848 Ifth June 1944 Fart I To VINTOR[i] SERIEJ[ii] reports the following: SERIEJ[ii] reports the following: According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups marccovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of MAS[iii] and are afred that it may lead FMANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. Prom conversations with IMPSEIALIST[iv] and CHEF[[ShEP][v]] and the correspondents LINDIFY[INDIEJ][vi], HARSCH[HARSH][vi] and VISSON[Vii], the following: [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[ZUAV][iii] with the help of COT[KOT][iii]. CAPTAIN[KAPITAN][iv] hoped [Bi at the same time] to secure for the COMMENT[STRANA][vv] are in INDA-CHIN. and also to eppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][vr] to take FRINCE completely under their influence before the advances was grined. [27 groups unrecovered]
<pre>Part I To VIETOR[i] SERVEJ[ii] reports the following: According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups marcovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of RAS[iii] and are afreid that it may lead YBANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with IMPREALIST[iv] and CHIEP[ShEF][v] and the correspondents LINDLEY[LINDLEJ][vi], HARSCH(HARSh)[vii] and VISSON[viii], the following emerges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1948, by CALIPH(KALIP][ix], LEAHY[LEGI][x] and MURPHY[MERFI][xi] [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[ZHAV][stii] with the help of COT[KOT][stii1]. CAPTAN(KAPITAN)[xiv] hoped [BF at the same time] to sceure for the CONNTRY[STANA][xv] the in NDO-CHIN, and also to oppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTEOVITYANE][xvi] to take FRINCE completely under their influence before the advances was gained.</pre>
To VIXTOR[i] SERVEJ[ii] reports the following: According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups marccovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of BAS[iii] and are afreid that it may lead YFANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with IMPERIALIST[iv] and CHIEF[ShEF][v] and the correspondents LINDLEY[LINDLEY][v1], HARSCH(HADSh][vii] and VISSON[viii], the following emarges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LIAHY[LEGI][x] and MURPHY[MERVI][xi] [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[ZUAV][xii] with the help of COT[KOT][siii]. CAFTAIN[KAFTAN][xv] hoped [BS at the same time] to accure for the COUNTRY[STANA][xv] the permanent use of DAKAR and CASABLANCA[KASABLANKA] and possibly a base in INDO-CHINA and also to eppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITANE][vi] to take FRINCE completely under their influences tefore the advances was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]
SERVEJ[ii] reports the following: . According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups murccovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of RAS[iii] and are afraid that it may lead FRANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with IMPZEIALIST[iv] and CHIEF[ShEP][v] and the correspondents LINDLEY[LINDLEJ][v1], HARSCH[HARSh][v1i] and VISSON[v1ii], the following emerges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIFH[KALIF][ix], LCAHF[LEGI][x] and MURFHY[MERFI][xi] [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[ZUAV][xii] with the help of COT[KOT][xiii]. CAPTAIN[KAPITAN][xiv] hoped [E% at the same time] to accure for the COUNTEY[STRANA][xv] the permanent use of DAKAR and CASUBLINCA[KASABLINKA] and possibly a base in INDO-CHINA and also to oppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][xvi] to take FRINCE completely under their influence before the advantage was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]
According to statements by informed journalists who have close contacts with government circles, the question of FRANCE's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups marccovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of RAS[iii] and are afraid that it may lead YEANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with IMPERIALIST[iv] and CHIEF[ShEF][v] and the correspondents LINDLEY[LINDLEJ][v1], HARSCH[HAPSh][vii] and VISSON[viii], the following emerges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIPH[KALIF][ix], LICAHY[LEGI][x] and MURPHY[MERFI][xi] [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[ZUAV][xii] with the help of COT[KOT][xiii]. CAPTAIN[KAPITAN][xiv] hoped [E% at the same time] to nocure for the COUNTRY[STRANA][xv] the permanent use of DAKAR and CASABLANCA[KASABLANCA] and possibly a base in INDO-CHINA and also to eppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][xvi] to take FRINCE completely under their influence before the advantage was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]
<pre>with government circles, the question of FRANCS's future is very disturbing. These circles, which [2 groups unrecovered], [1 group unrecovered] policy of non-recognition of RAS[iii] and are afraid that it may lead FRANCE into the sphere of influence of the USSR. From conversations with IMPERIALIST[iv] and CHIEP[ShEP][v] and the correspondents LINDLEY[LINDLEJ][vi], HARSCH(HAPSh][vii] and VISSON[viii], the following emerges: the policy of the USA with regard to FRANCE has been inspired, since 1940, by CALIPH[KALIP][ix], LEAHY[LEGI][x] and MURPHY[MERVT][xi] [35 groups unrecoverable] ZOUAVE[ZUAV][xii] with the help of COT[KOT][xiii]. CAPTAIN[KAPITAN][xiv] hoped [B% at the same time] to accure for the COUNTRY[STRANA][xv] the permanent use of DAKAR and CAS:BLANCA[KASBLANKA] and possibly a base in INNO-CHINA and also to eppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][xvi] to take FRANCE completely under their influence before the advantage was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]</pre>
ZOUAVE[ZUAV][xii] with the help of COT[KOT][xiii]. CAFTAIN[KAPITAN][xiv] hoped [B% at the same time] to accure for the COUNTRY[STRANA][xv] the permanent use of DAKAR and CAS/BLANCA[KASABLANKA] and possibly a base in INDO-CHINA and also to oppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][xvi] to take FRANCE completely under their influence before the advantage was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]
hoped [E% at the same time] to accure for the COUNTRY[STRAMA][xv] the permanent use of DAKAR and CASABLANCA[KASABLANKA] and possibly a base in INDO-CHINA and also to oppose the attempts by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][xvi] to take FRANCE completely under their influence before the advantage was gained. [27 groups unrecovered]
DISTRIBUTION: [Continued overleaf]
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J/NBF/T24



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		- 3 - 3/NBF/T24	
Nates: [a]	Insorted by the	translator.	
Compents: [i]	VINTOR:	Lt. Gen. F.M. FITIN.	
[ii]	SERGEJ:	Vladimir Sergeevich FEAVDIN, WASS representative in U.S.J.	
[iii]	R'.S :	General Charles de GAULLE.	
[iv]	IMPERIALIST:	Walter LIPFMINN.	
[v]	CHIEF:	Unidentified covername.	
[7 1]	LINDLEY:	E _r nest Kidder LINDLEY.	
[vii]	HURSCH :	Joseph C. HIRSCH.	
[viii]	VISSON:	Andre VISSON.	
[ix]	CALIFH:	William Christian BULLITT.	
[x]	LELHY :	Admiral William D. LEAHY.	
[xi]	HJRPHY :	Robert Daniel MURPHY.	
• •	ZOUAVE :	Unidentified,	
[ziii]		Possibly Pierre COT.	
	CAPITIAN:	Franklin D. ROOSEVELT.	
[xv]	COUNTRY :		
	ISLANCERS:	the British.	
• •	HEN HARRER:	Cordell HULL Edward R. STETTINIUS, Jr.	
	ISLAND:	Great Britain.	
[xx]		i.e. IMPERIALIST, Walter LIPPMANN.	
	BEAR CURS:	U.S. Republican Party.	
[xcti]		e. RAS/General Charles de GAULLE	
	The LELCUE:	U.S. Government.	
[xxiv]	IDE: MARSHALL:	Simon Samuel REAFSUR, of the TASS News Agency. General George Catlett MARSHILL.	
3/NBF/T24	NRECOLUMN	General George Callett ministration.	
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Comments: [xxvi] DULLES: (Cont'd) [xxvii] FIST: [xxviii] D.: [xxix] "44Y:	- 4 - Z/NBF/T24 John Fosier DULLES. Thomas Edmund LEWEY. i.e. DULLES. Stepon Zakharovich AFRESYAN.	•
		- - -
3/NBP/T24	FCRET	

42. New York 850 to Moscow, 15 June 1944.

5017 BRIDE Rof No: USSR /16/6/1954 Issued: Copy No: 605 REFERENCE TO THE PROB. BLE DEP.RTURE OF "REST". From: NEW YORK MOSCO To: 15 June 1944 850 No.: TO VIKTOR[1]. [1 group unrecovered][a] received from REST[ii] the third part of report MSN - 12 Efferent Fluctuation in a Stream [STRUYa] [37 groups unrecoverable] Diffusion[b] Method - work on his speciality. R.[iii] expressed doubt about the possibility of remaining in the COUNTRY [STR.N.][iv] without arousing suspicion. According to what R. says, the ISLANDERS [OSTROVITYANE][v] and TOWNSMEN [GOROZALNE][vi] have finally fallen out as a result of the delay in research work on diffusion. The TOWNSMEN have told the representative of the ISLAND[vi] that construction of a plant in the ISLAND "would be in direct contradiction to the spirit of the agreement on ENORMOUS [ENORMOZ][vii] signed together with the Atlantic Charter." At present the ISLAND's director [RUKOVODITEL'] in CARTHAGE [KARFAGEN][iX] is ascertaining the details of the transfer of work to the ISLAND. R. assumes that he will have to leave in a month or six weeks. a month or six weeks. MAY [MAJ][x] No. 458 15th June [T.N. and Comments overleaf] Distribution TOT BRIDE

	- 2 -	
	T.N.: [a] This is a garbled group consibly representing a cover- name, or alternatively an adverb (one possibility being "finally") with "we" or "I" being understood immediately following.	
	[b] Only the latter part of the word has been recovered, but "diffusion" is probable from the context.	
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: probably LtGeneral P.M. FITIN.	
	[ii] REST: Emil Klaus Julius FUCHS.	
	[iii] R.: i.e. REST.	
	[iv] STRANA: the U.S.A.	
	[v] OSTROVITYANE: the British.	
	[vi] GOROZILINE: the imericans.	
	[vii] OSTROV: Great Britain.	
	[viii] ZNORMOZ: the Manhattan Engineering District.	
	[ix] KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.	
	V.S. No.: PH-60 (Revision)	
	W.S. No.: PH-60 (Revision)	
,	W.S. No.: PH-60 (Revision)	
	W.S. No.: PH-60 (Revision)	
	W.S. No.: PH-60 (Revision)	
	W.S. No.: PH-60 (Revision)	


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43. New York 1053 to Moscow, 26 July 1944.

VENONA Ator 5 Reissue (T282) From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No: 1053 26 July 1944 TO VIKTOR[i]. In July ANTENNA[ii] was sent by the firm for ten days to work in CARTHAGE [KARFAGEN][iii]. There he visited his school friend Max ELITCHER[a], who works in the Bureau of Standards as head of the fire control section for warships [which mount guns] [b] of over five-inch calibre. He has access to extremely valu-able materials on guns. Five years ago Max ELITCHER [MAKS E.] graduated from the Electro-Technical Department of the City College of NEW YORK, He has a Master of Science degree. Since finishing college he has been working at the Bureau of Standards. He is a FELLOW COUNTRYMAN [ZEMLYaK][iv]. He entered the FELLOW COUNTRYMEN's organization [ZEMLYaChESTVO] after finishing his studies. By ANTENNA he is characterized as a loyal, reliable, level-headed and able man. Married, his wife is a FELLOW COUN-TRYWOMAN [ZEMLYaChKA]. She is a psychologist by profession, she works at the War Department. Max ELITCHER is an excellent amateur photographer and has all the necessary equipment for taking photographs. Please check ELITCHER and communicate your consent to his clearance [OFORMLENIE]. No. 594 MAJ [v] 26 July Notes: [a] Given in Roman alphabet. ស៊ែ Inserted by translator. Comments: VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. ANTENNA: Julius ROSENBERG. KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D. C. ZEMLYAK: Member of the Communist Party. MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESYAN. [i] [ii] [iii] [iv] Iv] 28 April 1975 YENONA

44. New York 1043 to Moscow, 25 July 1944.



represented the	KHATA [v]	- 2 - S/NBF/T46
BORIS stances in which to anyone and wh give some guidar	nen it is n	special instructions on the circum- destroy the ciphers without reference ermissible to use weapons. Please
No. 581.		
his Be having de	stroved) +	wing enciphered and sent off a telegram ore he left the point he was at and to he originals GRIMM[v11] requests that its telegram was in three parts.
No. 583.		
riedse explain () groups un Vor should	letter number 4 addressed to SON[SYN][v111] recovered] and whether to send it at the we obtain from GRANDPAPA the immediate MAY[MAJ][ix]
No. 588		
T.N: [a] Ins	serted by t	he translator.
T.N: [a] Ins Comments: [1]	•	he translator. LtGeneral P.M. FITIN.
Comments: [1]	VIKTOR: Shakh:	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK.
Comments: [1] [11] [111]] VIKTOR:] ShAKh:] ZAVOD:	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NEW YORK.
Comments: [1] [11] [111] [1v]] VIKTOR:] ShAKh:] ZAVOD:] DEDUSHKA	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK.
Comments: [1] [11] [11] [1v] [v]] VIKTOR:] ShAKh:] ZAVOD:	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK.
Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [17] [v] [v1]] VIKTOR: Shakh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA Khata:	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAPRYGIN.
Comments: [1] [11] [111] [1v] [v] [v1] [v11] [v11]	 VIKTOR: ShAkh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA BORIS: GRIMM: SYN: 	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK.
Comments: [1] [11] [111] [1v] [v] [v1] [v11] [v11]	<pre>VIKTOR: ShAkh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA KhATA: BORIS: GRIMM:</pre>	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NEW YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAFRYGIN. probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN.
Comments: [1] [11] [111] [1v] [v] [v1] [v11] [v11]	 VIKTOR: ShAKh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA DEDUSHKA: BORIS: GRIMM: SYN: 	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAPRYGIN. probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN. not identified.
Comments: [1] [11] [111] [1v] [v] [v1] [v11] [v11]	 VIKTOR: ShAKh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA DEDUSHKA: BORIS: GRIMM: SYN: 	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAFRYGIN. probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN. not identified. probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.
Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11]	 VIKTOR: ShAKh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA DEDUSHKA: BORIS: GRIMM: SYN: 	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAFRYGIN. probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN. not identified. probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.
Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11]	 VIKTOR: ShAKh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA DEDUSHKA: BORIS: GRIMM: SYN: 	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAFRYGIN. probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN. not identified. probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.
Comments: [1] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11] [11]	 VIKTOR: ShAKh: ZAVOD: DEDUSHKA DEDUSHKA: BORIS: GRIMM: SYN: 	LtGeneral P.M. FITIN. Konstantin Alekseevich ChABANOV, clerk at the Soviet Consulate-General, NEW YORK. the Soviet Consulate-General in NET YORK. : Evgenij Dmitrievich KISELEV, Soviet Consul-General in NEW YORK. the F.B.I. the MGB cipher clerk in NEW YORK. possibly Aleksandr Pavlovich SAFRYGIN. probably Nikolaj Alekseevich GOLOVIN. not identified. probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN.


45. New York 1065 to Moscow, 28 July 1944.

	Ref Not S/WBP/792 Issued:
	Cepy Ne: 105
REFERENCES	TO THE "ORK OF "MAYOR '
<u>Item 2</u>	
	REISSUE
From: NE" YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
No.: 1065	28 July 19 <u>44</u>
To VIKTOR[1]	
his opinion about the adv suspects was made under p reason dislikes DIR. M if DIR is really ill she rest, but afterwards be acquired considerable exp should not be employed or Telegraph your opinion.	which renders her unsuitable for our work. possible to get H. [R.][vii] to change risability of this decision which MAYOR pressure from GOOD SIRL, the for some WOR has informed G.G. [U.][vii] that will need rather to be withdrawn for a used on liaison [with][a] a conspirative been working for a long time and has perience. MAYOR proposes that she h active FELLOW-COUNTRYMANLY[vi] work.
No. 596	
Distribution	[Continued overleaf]
a/	TOP SECRET BRIDE

	- 2 - S/NBF/T92
· · ·	Please advise whether information on the COUNTRY's [STRAMA][ix] war production and war effort should be brought to the notice of the head Neighbour [SOSED][x] (of course without indicating the source). Your are aware of the danger of people possibly being sent to check our sources. Moreover, the lack of exchange of information with the Neighbour here does not contribute, in my view, to our friendly relations; nevertheless, I have not as yet established relations with him.
	No. 597 PAY [MLJ][x1]
	T.N.: [a] Inserted by translater.
	Comments: [1] VIKTOR: probably LtGeneral P.N. FITIN.
	[11] UANTEA: Elizabeth BENTLEY.
	[111] NER: unidentified.
	[iv] RULEVOJ: Barl BROWDER.
	[v] DIR. possibly Mary Tolfe PRICE.
	[vi] ZEMLYaCHESKIJ: i.e. Communist Party.
	[vii] R.: i.e. RULEVOJ.
	[viii] U.: i.e. UENITSA.
	[1x] STRANA: the U.S
	[x] SOSED: a member of the Soviet military intelligence organisation.
	[x1] MAJ: Pavel Ivancvich FEDOSIMOV.
	ò
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	\$/178F/T92
	· ·


46. New York 1076 to Moscow, 29 July 1944.

	95 VENO		
	USSR	Ref. No.: 3/NEF/T492 (of 5/4/54) Issued: (20/1/76	
	-	Copy No.: 301	
	-	MENTION OF SERGEJ, MAKSIM, ZVUK, SECOND LINE,	
	From: NEW YORK		
	To: MOSCOW		
	No.: 1076	29 July 1944	
	To VIKTOR[i].		
	Herewith the personal report 1. ARTEX[ii] controlled several	ts: 1 probationers [STAZDERY] of the Second	
		oners on his own only after SERGEJ[iv] had	
	[20 gr	roups unrecovered].	
	minimum. His miserable cover (m conditions obtaining here, from d With a different cover he could h effectively. Ferhaps he is expen- according to what he says, he has years because of his cover and [6]	anguage, he barely [~ group unrecovered] the essenger-guard) actually stopped him, in the doubling for [DUBLIROVANLE] the inspectors. have acted with greater initiative and more riencing a feeling of dissatisfaction since, s not been able to show his worth for many 8 groups unrecovered] he stops opening doors ers who are capable of nothing else.	
		[Continued overleaf]	
•			
	VE		
,	TO	P-SECRET	
		*	




47. New York 1088-90 to Moscow, 30 July 1944.

	TOP-SEC	RET-DINA	RVENON	Α
	Þ			
	Reissu	<u>e</u> (7529)		
From: 1	EW YORK			
To: M	10SCOW			
No: 1	1088-1090	30 Ju	19 <u>44</u>	
[Part I] To				
. and [2 g	[C% As a result roups unrecovered] V] [2 groups unrecov ITALIJ[ii] it has b	vered] West Coast been established:	
l. The	organization			
		cs unrecoverable]		
VOVCHEK' VITALIJ'	s[111] reports have a s concern, displayed	peen received [4 gr in the opinion	roups unrecovered]	
	[14 group	os unrecovered]		
duration unrecove created his auth [AGENTUR irritabi him. Al work:	illegal payment [3 g of his stay [C% with red] on shore. Uncon around V. an atmosphe ority in the local ap A] connected with it lity, rudeness and si lity, has led to exc	a friends in Canada heealed affairs wit re of gossip and h oparatus and the ag . On his side this rrained relations w ceptional slackness	 [4 groups h women have have undermined gent network has caused hth those around in operational 	
not and car por	Contact with the shi established on all v investigating of obv ried out. V. did nod t or were expected in agent network for th	ressels. The guard rious cases of sabo know how many shi PORTLAND or SEATT	ling of the ships tage were not ps and which were in TF The reports for	• •
	V. did not control t unrecovered] time li nt network.	the work of the gro aison was not esta	up leaders [8 groups blished with the ship	p
c) shij	He did not take ster p KOMILES.	es to investigate t	the sabotage on the	
d) cir	[7 groups unrecovere cumstances of sabotage	d] did not take st e on the ship ODES	eps to ascertain the SA.	
reia	The serious fact of ate [C% although this ter].	the loss of the sh affair came to th	ip IL'ICh he did not e knowledge of the	
ſ)	Contact with			
	[15 gro	ups unrecovered]		
port	t of VANCOUVER [2 gro	ups unrecovered] t	he ship P. VINOGRADON	V.
	T OP-SECI	OT DINA	R VENON	A



	T OP SECRET DINAR
	[x1] BABYLON: San Francisco. [x11] MAY: Stepan APRESYaM.
	[xiii] AKIM: Serej Grigor'evich LUK'YaNOV.
	[xiv] BORIS: Aleksandr Pavlovich SAPRYKIN, MGB cipher clerk in New York.
	TOP-SEGRET-DINAR
L	


48. New York 1102-3 to Moscow, 2 August 1944.




S/ILLYTA (nerely to gain the desired time) to obtain transit visas. Similtaneously from "KA2.N'" send a telegram to the Embassy of the COUNTRY with a request to issue transit visas for the passports they will receive from the Embassy of the COUNTRY-SIDE. The PAIR [2 groups unrecovered] their return address and are sending a reply paid telegram saying that they have been notified by their relation BASS that they have got visas for the COUNTRYSIDE and that they have to apply for a transit visa to the Embassy of the COUNTRY. The latter will obvicusly ask the PAIR either it say why they need to come to GMTRNA or to give all necessary particulars [D%]. art II] [51 groups unrecoverable] Enbassy of the COUNTRY in SMYRNA immediately to telegraph verbatin [1 group unrecovered]. Should complications arise the PAIR are to telegraph BASS and you me so that "wres can be taken and fresh pressure brought to bear. According to BASS's information there should be no complications. 4. For your information we advise how the business of getting a visa for the COUNTRY was [05 managed]. To begin with NILES[NUMIS][X] refused to intervene in the case, explaining that he had only recently interceded for one refuges and recommended approaching Congressman KLEINS[KLINS]. The latter did not [6 groups unrecovered] and it was only then that NILES intervened. The affair was hald up because of the Party Convention and was actually settled in the last sim days. All documents, telegrams [and][a] vouchers for the money orders, the parcel and the deposit were received by BASS today in an envelope of the TEAPLE[KNRAM][mf] [5 groups unrecovered] from the BANK[mi]]. The business [1 group unrecovered] extremely sound and there is every chance [of success][a]. The BANK them [05 asked the Ministry of Forigm infairs[MID] of the COUNTRYSHDE about [9 groups unrecovered].' MAY[MAJ][xiii] No. 611 Note: [a] Inserted by the translator. [i] VIKTOR : [ii] MAKSIM : VIRTOR : Lt. Gen. P.H. FITIN. MARSIM : Vassilij Mikhejlovich ZUBILIN, 2nd Secretury at the Comments: Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON. THE PAIR: Nicholas and Maria FISHER. [:::] [iv] BASS : Michael BURD. RAILWAY WORKER: It is not clear whether this is a cover-name or a reference to his occupation. Maxican. The adjectival form is used here. [vi] [vii] COUNTRYSIDE: MOSCOT. SEAVENA : (vi:1 COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO. [ix] COUNTRY: U.S.A. David K NILES was Administrative Assistant to the NILES. ix] President. Presumably the Anite House. Compare NEW YORK's No. 1840 of 29 December 1944 (S/NEF/T478) U.S. Department of State. [id] TEAPLE ': BANK (ai) Stepan Zakharovich APRESYaN, Soviet Vice Consul [initi] in NEW YORK. S/NEF/T47

49. New York 1105-10 to Moscow, 2/3 August 1944.

• 95 VENONA ad stade USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T3 (of 21/8/50) Issued: **3**\$/11/1965 Copy No: 204 FOURTH REISSUE INTELLIGENCE FROM SOURCE "H." Reference To [6% stepan] H.'S WORK FOR A COMMITTER (1944) From: NEW YORK To: MOSCO. **.** . No: 11ø5-111ø 2/3 August 44 -[Siz-part wessage complete] [149 groups unrecoverable] [Part I] [C% the army [PO ARETI]] [)/ groups unrecovered] [AM(73,1) [(KEMP5,1] [BF General EXEMPTER] [4. groups unrecovered]. The Committee is [2 groups unrecovered] on [D% political] and economic questions for drawing up instructions to EIS3MHOERS and VIISON of e-political [6% eature]. [9 groups unrecovered] af treaties[a] on civilian questions of the type already signed with Holland and Belgium and the treaty[a] with [4 groups unrecovered] [3% on [P0]] [4 groups unrecovered] Army [B% of Liberation] [ARMING 06V0B0......] [37 groups unrecovered] <u>____</u> [Part II] [20 groups unrecoverable] [B% the Allies] [1 group unrecovered] the European Advisory Commission [EVROFEJSKIJ KONSUL'T.TIVNYJ SOVET][b] in SIDON[i] will [8 groups unrecovered] in CARTHAGE[KARFAGIN][i1] is/are taking part in the work of the Committee. Almost all the work is done by H.[G.][i1] who is present at all the sessions. In connexion with this work H.[G.] obtains secret documents [6 groups unrecovered]. The ISLUTDENS(OSTROVITYANE][iv] [13 groups unrecovered] The TRUST[TREST][v] in CLUTHAGE DISTRIBUTION در د. 3/NBF/T3







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	-			
	. H)P-SE	-	Tester
				- 4 - <u>3/NBP/T3</u>
	Comments: [i]	SIDON	:	LONDON.
	• •	CARTHAGE		SHIRGTON D.C.
		•		Abbreviation for HOMER [GOMER] the covername of Donald Duart M.CLEAN.
	[iv]	IS LANDFAS	:	The British.
	[v]	TRUST	:	Soviet Embassy.
	[v i]	BO!!R	:	Winston S. CHURCHILL.
	[vii]	CAPTAIN	:	Franklin D. ROSSEVZLT.
	[viii]	LEAGUE	:	The U.S. Covernment.
	[ix]	COUNTRY	:	U.S.A.
	[x]	ISLIND	:	Great Britain.
	[x i]	INVIL	:	Allied Codename for allied landings in the South of France.
	[xi i]	STEPAN		Unidentified. May or may not be a covername. If a covername it is evidently not the STRPAN last reported constantiant in NEW YORK's No. 852 of 16th June, 1944 (3/NEF/T416).
	[xiii]	ш л	:	Stepsn Zakharovich APFESYAN, Soviet Vice- Consul in NSW YORK.
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	3/NBP/T 3			
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		FO	P	DECKET
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
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50. New York 1119-21 to Moscow, 4/5 August 1944.


· · · · · ·	BRID	E		
	TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM		CANC	
USSR	_	Ref No:	S/NBF/7244	•
		Issued: Copy No:		
	KCL'TSOV'S ACCO	UNT OF A CO "JURIST".	NVERSATION	
i	From: NEW YORK			
•	To: MOSCO7 Nos.: 1119-1121		4-5 Aug 1944	
	[Three-r	art message		
[Part I]	To VICTOR.		dom <u>i</u> , 20 80 j	
	KOL'TSOV[1 arrived in TYRE [T] hat yet [3 groupe u contents of a conve on 31st July at his JURIST replied as f	nrecovered; rsation wit apartment.	 I pass on the h JURIST (YURIS) 	ne V [[iv]
	1. [1 group unre 3 groups unrecover (2) DECREE [DEK	ed]:	thout attempting	3
	•	oups unrecc	interes t	
,	and so on. De arrived at [C%	finitive do possibly]	cisions were not	t .'
	[2 6 gr extremely risky	oups unreco	vered] Le Le comunit	
	· · ·	• • • •	[Continued over	rleaf]
Distribut	lon		-	
			i.	
•				
	,			
S/NBF/T244 [4 Pages]	i t			
-		BRID	E	







,	
BRIDE	
USSR Ref. No: S/NEF/T2Li, (or 3/10/1952)	
Issued: 25/11/1958	
Сору №: 204	
KOL'TSOV'S ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION WITH "JURIST".	
-	
Fiom: NET YORK	
To: MOSCOW	
Nos. 1119-1121 4-5 Aug.	
AMERICAENT	
Amend first page to read:	
[Three-part message complete]	
(Part I] To VIETOR.	
KOL'TOOV i advises: "On Lth August I arrived in TIRE TIR LILL, I have	
NOL'TSOV ^[1] advises: "On 4th August I arrived in TRE[IR] ^[1] . I have not seem <u>MARSIM[11]</u> since Monday. Here is the substance of a conversation with JURIST[INRIST] ^[1] on Mst July at his apartment. To my questions JURIST	
replied as follows:	
"1. [1 group unrecovered] ithout attempting [3 groups unrecovered]:	
(a) DECREE [DECRET] [v]	
[15 groups unrecovered]	
interest and so on. Definitive decisions were not arrived at	
[07 possibly] [26 groups unrecovered]	
obtaining the document extremely risky.	
Distribution [Continued overleaf]	
S/hEP/T244 (Amendment)	
TOD CHARLET	
, CRIDE	



51. New York 1203 to Moscow, 23 August 1944.

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	er	BRI IOP-SEC	DE RET-	
		NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM		
	USSR		Ref No: S/NBF/T2L5	
			Issued: 48/10/1952 Copy No: 25	
			COPA NO: 0	
		SETTING-UP OF TEC "ODESSITE" AND "	CHNICLL ENTERPRISES UNDER SECOND-HAND BOOKSELLER"	
	From:	NEW YORK		
	To:	MOSCOW		
	No.:	1203	23 Jug 1514	
	The ba by SEC data S person the "A enterp and tr premis organi equipm	To organise t ve been compelled to ESSITE [ODESSIT][a] c echnical process of t asic part [1 group un COND-H.ND BOOKSELLER SECOND-H.ND BOOKSELLER a. Please authorise "line. We conside prise by organising an ransferring it to ano seas for this purpose isation of the two en ment 2500 dollars com	<pre>technical -oint "A" in TYRE [TIR][i] set up 2 independent enterprises, iovers only the second part of the manufacture of dies [ShTAMPY]. recovered; can be carried out [BUKINST]. According to our R is a devoted and reliable the use of SH. 5. [B.] in r it essential to expand ODESSITE's a stamp [ShTEMPEL'NYJ] workshop ther part of the city. Sultable have been selected. For the tterprises and for technical prising 1000 for 0.[111] and tired. Telegraph permission.</pre>	
	No. 67	73.	[Continued overleaf]	
	Distri	ibution		
		/T245 res] FO	BRIDE	

	- 2 -	S/NBF/T245	
	I am awaiting an answer	to No. 650[b].	
	MAY [MAJ][11]	
	T.N.: [a] CDESSIT: an inhebitant of	CDESSA.	
	[b] This is the second of two	messages transmitted	
	[b] This is the second of two under external serial nummin in which MJJ asked for more in finding out about the graduated and the gradu	ber 1163 of 15 Aug 1944 re information to assist	
	in finding out about the (Troup KREJMER [S/NBF/T239].	
	Comments: [1] TIR: NEW YORK, N.Y.		
	[11] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich	FEDOSIMOV.	
	[iii] I.e. ODESSITE.		
		-	
		W.S. No.: XY-63.3	
	•	. •	
	. ·	•	
		· · ·	
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-	S/N3F/7245		

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52. New York 1251 to Moscow, 2 September 1944.


All and a second se	- Con U & Reven		VE	NONA	
	(Fritzente	<u>Reissue</u> (T301)	hat	,	
From: NEW 1	ORK			•	
To: MOSCO	w			÷.	
No: 1251					
			:	2 September 1944	
TO VIKTOR [i]					
you of the : KLEMENS - L [vii], RYBO: LIBERAL[x], FOGEL' - PE selected [C new cover-n. which we pro DONAL'B - P ShERVUD - K ART[xxii],	<pre>lew cover-ni [[iv], ABRAH .OV - [C% B] GNOM - YaKG & [xiv], ODI % by you] wi mmes introdu opose to rep LLOT[xvii], VYa2 [xx], SEN'OR - BE] © point of</pre>	M - ChEKh[v], T LOK][viii], REL OV[xi], SKAUT - ESSIT - ROST[xv ith a view to e uced by you the place as follow LOJER - RICHAR [l group unreco RG[xxii]. All view of encodin	ST - BEK[i], YuL'PAN - KANT E - SERE[ix], TU]. All these conomy of mean re are disadvas s: STELLA - E D[xvii], DUGL vered]T - ZONA these cover-n	DROZD - AKhMED[iii [vi], AIDA - KLO ANTENNA - NIL[xiii], cover-names were s. Among the ntageous ones MILIYa[xvi]	ι,
No. 700				MAJ [xxiv]	
2 Septem	ber		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·····	-
[b]	nothing to be an inco	no. 744 of 25 do with the surrect reference RK's no 1403 of	bject of this	ever, no. 744 has message so must 4	
[ii] [iv] [v] [vi] [vii] [vii] [vii]	KAVALERIST laevich KU DROZD - AR KLEMENS - ABRAM - Ch TYuL'PAN - AIDA - KLO RYBOLOV - is repeate RELE - SER tively ide other refe January 19 ANTENNA -	RNAKOV. hMED: i.e. THF LI: i.e. CLEME EKh: i.e. ABRA KANT: i.e. TU BLOK: i.e. OSE BLOK: i.e. OSE das GE. There B: i.e. RELAY mitified as Mort erence to SERB i 145 and would ha LIBERAL: Julia	CAVALRYMAN - BE RUSH - ARHMED, ENCE - LEE, uni AM - CZECH, Jac JLIP - KANT, Ma ach RAND. PREY - BLOCK, u s is no other c - SERB. RELE ton SOBELL. Ho is in NEW YORK ' ot appear to re us ROSEMBERG.	dentified. k SOBLE. rk ZBOROWSKI. midentified. BLO ccurrence of eith has been tenta- wever, the only s no. 50 of 11	a
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
OF SECRET MENONA	
 [xv] FOEL' - FORS: 1.E. FORM THE GROWTH, unidentified. [xv] ODESSIT - ROST: i.e. ODESSITE - GROWTH, unidentified. [xvi] STELLA - EMILIYA: Unidentified. [xvii] DONAL'D - FILOT: i.e. DONALD - FILOT, William Ludwig ULLMAN. [xvii] LOJER - RICHARD: i.e. LAWYER - RICHARD, Harry Dexter WHITE. [xi] DUGLAS - IKS: i.e. DOUGLAS - X, JOSeph KATZ. [xxi] DUGLAS - IKS: i.e. SHERWOOD - PRINCE, Laurence DUGGAN. [xxi]T - ZONA; i.eT - ZONE, unidentified. [xxii] SEN'OR - BERG: i.e. SENOR - BERG, unidentified. [xxii] SEN'OR - BERG: i.e. SENOR - BERG, unidentified. [xxiv] MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESYAN. 	
20 May 1975	
20 May 1975	
	·
	<pre>Comments (cont'd.) [xii] SKAUT - METR: i.e. SCOUT - METRE, probably either Joel BARR or Alfred SARNT. [xii] TU NIL: Unidentified. [xii] TU NIL: Unidentified. [xii] TOU NIL: Unidentified. [xii] TOU NIL: Unidentified. [xii] STELLA - EMILIYA: Unidentified. [xvi] ULMAN. [xvii] DONAL'D - PILOT; i.e. DOWALD - PILOT, William Ludwig ULMAN. [xvii] LOUER - RICHARD: i.e. LAWYER - RICHARD, Harry Dexter WHITE. [xi] JUGIAS - IKS: i.e. DOUGLAS - X, JOSeph KATZ. [xi] STERVUD - RICHARD: i.e. SHERWOOD - PRINCE, Laurence DUGGAN. [xvii] MIRANDA - ART: Probably [xvii] MIRANDA - ART: Probably</pre>

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53. New York 1271-4 to Moscow, 7 September 1944.

•	VENOR TOP SEC		
	US SE	Ref. No: 3/NBF/T81 (of 9/4/1951) Issued: (1/1965) Copy No: 204	
		DE-ISSUE	
	REPORT ON I	INFORMATION GIVEN BY "HOMER" (1944)	
	From: NEN YOOK To: MOSCOW	DØ 14	
	No: 1271-1274	7 Sept. <u>44</u>	
[Part I]] To: VIRTOR[i].		
		HOMER's[COMER][ii] report of 2nd September (the report are in inverted commas):	
	that "in the opinion of the m the fate of ENGLAND depends a	Anglo-American economic talks HOMCE points out majority of the members of the British Government almost entirely on AMERICA. They consider that and prosperous power if she maintains the volume do in two ways:	
	1. By getting supplies or otherwise.	e from AMERICA gratia by DECREE(DEARET)[iii]	
	2. By restoring her ex	xports to the required volume.	
		e British Government consists in 12 groups unrecovered]	
	will be delayed until the end permission	d of the war with JAPAN and also receiving	
	DISTRIBUTION	[Continued overleaf]	
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	3/NBF/T61		
	TOP	SECRET	
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LO	DEL	
		- 4 - 3/NBF/T81
Comments: [i]	VINTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
[ii]	HOMER:	Donald Duart MACLEAN.
[ii i]	DECREE :	Lend-Lease.
[iv]	NABOB:	Henry NORCENTHAU, Jr.
[v]	HEN-HARRIER:	Cordell HULL.
[vi]	LEAGUE :	U.S. Government.
[vii]	CAPTAIN:	Franklin D. ROOSEVELT.
[viii]	BOAE:	Winston S. CHURCHILL.
[ix]	STRANG :	Sir Tillian STRANG, U.K. Representative on European Advisory Commission.
[x]	н.	Abbreviation for HOMER, the covername of Donald Duart KiCLEAN.
[zi]	ABSENAL:	War Department.
[xii]	ECCLOY:	John J. McCLOY, Assistant Secretary of War.
[x iii]	LAWYER:	Harry Dexter WHITE.
[xiv]	LERPES;	Reginald Wildig Allan LEEPER, HBM Ambaseadur in ATHENS.
[27]	ICBA:	0.8.8.
[xvi]	MAY:	Stepan Zakharovich APRESYaN, Soviet Vice Consul in NEW YORK.

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3/NBF/T81

54. New York 1313 to Moscow, 13 September 1944.

TOP SECRET DAUNT T276 0-1-4 From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No.: 1313 13 Sept 1944 To VICTOR[1]. Your number 4247[a]. SERGEJ[i1] has three times attempted to effect liaison with PANCAKE [BLIN][i11] in CARTHAGE [KARPACEN][iv] in the line of cover[v] [CS but] each time PANCAKE declined [CS on the grounds of] being busy with trips. IDE [YaZ'] has carefully attempted to sound him, but P. [B.][v1] did not react. P. occupies a very prominent position in the journalistic world and has vast connections. To determine precisely his relations to us we will commission ECHO [EKhO][v11] to make a check. No.733. Your number 4246[a]. NICK [NIK][viii] has been[b] summoned to TYRE [TIR][ix] and a meeting has been arranged [69 groups unrecoverable] character [KhARAKTERISTIKA] given to BOB[x] by IKS[xi]. However, BASS [BAS][xi1] said that he did not intend to embark on a [C% risky][c] business as there was no need. In time he and BOB will get big commissions for the deal in CHILE. BASS said that BOB was behaving rather [C% despicably] with the companies who were intending[d] personal representation in Chile [C% and] if it had not been for BASS's insistence they would have broken off business relations with BOB. BASS says that BOB is not keen to get an appointment in Chile, preferring to remain in the COUNTRY [STRANA][xi11]. In our work with BOB allowance should be made for the difficulties which are encountered in carrying through affairs begun by others and without having received in good time exhaustive characters [KhARAKTERISTIKI] of probationers. No.734 MAY [MAJ][xiv] T.N.: [a] Not available. [b] Or "is being". [c] Or [C% compromising]. [d] A group with some such meaning as "to set up" appears to have been omitted at this point. Comments: [1] VICTOR: possibly Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. [11] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN. [111] BLIN: Isidor Feinstein STONE. See S/NBF/T23, Item 4, in which on 23 October 1944 MAJ reported on a meeting between SERGEJ and BLIN in WASHINGTON. -[iv] KARPAGEN: WAHHINGTON, D.C. [v] i.e. in SERGEJ's capacity as TASS representative (cf S/NBF/T23). (OVER) **E PIDE** TOP SECRET DAUNT

[vi] B.: i.e. BLIN.

[v11] EKhO: possibly Bernard SCHUSTER (Communist Party name CHESTER).

[viii] NIK: Amadeo SABATINI. Compare S/NBF/T166, in which on 6 Sept 1944 MAJ said: "In DOUGLAS's opinion he should not continue to work in the West" (apparently referring to NIK). SABATINI is known to have acted as "go-between" on behalf of Grigorij KhEIPETS, Soviet.Vice-Consul in SAN FRANCISCO.

[1x] TIR: NEW YORK, N.Y.

[x] BOB: Robert Owen MENAKER.

[x1] IKS: Joseph KATZ.

[x11] BAS: Michael BURD (originally WEISBURD).

[x111] STRANA: The United States of America.

[xiv] MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.

55. New York 1314 to Moscow, 14 September 1944.

	A STATE OF A		VE	NONA
	Re	eissue (T53)	·	
From: NEW YO	DRK			
To: MOSCOW	1			
No: 1314				
			14 Sep	tember 19 <u>44</u>
To VIKTOR[i].				
material rece deserves renu by the rest o bonus by you.	ived and the meration for	rest [1 group material no]	only the expens dging by an appr garbled] sent b ess valuable tha [iv] group who w im 500 dollars.	aisal of the y us GNOM
No. 736 14 Septembe	er		MAJ[v]	
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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
[iii] TI [iv] LI	KTOR: Lt. Ge IOM: i.e. GNO R: NEW YORK BERAL: Juliu J: i.e. MAY,	ME, William H CITY. S POSENBERC	PERL, originally	MUTTERPERL.
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	•••		28 Apri	1 1975
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	State of the State		VEN	UNA

56. New York 1325-6 to Moscow, 15 September 1944.

TOP SECRET DAUNT DRUG Re-1ssue (T21) From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No. 1325,1326 15 September 1944 To VIKTOR[1]. According to KOCH's [KOKh][11] advice, a list of "reds" has been compiled by the Security Division of IZBA[111]. The list contains 4 surnames of persons who are supplying information to the Russians. One of them sounds like JIMENEZ. The list is divided into two categories: 1. Open FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN [ZEMLYaKI][iv] (among them "IZRA"[v]) and 2. Sympathizers, left-wing liberals etc. (among them "HWRE" "#ZAYATS"[v1]). KOKE is trying to get the list. PILOT[v11] [2 groups unrecovered] plan dated 22 August for the transfer of the COUNTRY's[v111] air force from Europe [11 groups unrecovered] groups of B-24s: 10 will be sent to China-Burma-India, [18 groups unrecovered] groups of B-29s, [6 groups unrecovered] 33 groups of B-17s: 11 [5 groups unrecovered] 4 to the northern sector of the Pacific with a reserve of 100 percent, 6 to the southwestern part with a reserve of 100 percent [39 groups unrecoverable] A-26, 1 to the southwestern sector of the Pacific, 3 are remaining in Europe. 4. 3 groups of B-25s: 1 to the northern sector of the Pacific, 2 to the central. 5. 3 groups of P-[1 group unrecovered]: 2 to the COUNTRY [1 group unrecovered], 1 to the central sector of the Pacific. 6. l group [8 groups unrecovered] 7. 23 groups of P-47s: the crew of 6 groups to the COUNTRY as strategic reserves, the material part is remaining in Europe as a reserve, 7 to the central sector of the Pacific, 10 are remaining in Europe. 8. 17 groups of P-51s: 4 to the COUNTRY, 2 to China India Burma with a reserve of 100 percent, 11 to the central sector of the Pacific. 9. 6 groups of P-38s: 1 to the COUNTRY, 2 to China India Burma with a reserve of 50 percent, 3 to the central Pacific. DRUG LINT TOP SECRET

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	· · ·
	T op secret daunt - Drug
	10. 17 groups of military transports C-47s: 3 to the COUNTRY,
	1 to China India Burma with a reserve of 25 percent, 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ to the central Pacific, $2\frac{1}{2}$ in Europe.
·	11. [5 groups unrecovered]
	3 to the central Pacific, 4 in Europe.
	[42 groups unrecovered]
	except the A-26 and
	[32 groups unrecoverable]
	and 390; medium bombers 322, 323 and 386 - Yu; fighters 36, 353,356,358,362,365,366,373,404 and 406; night fighters 416,417, 427 and 415; transports 3123, 314, 53 and 78.
. · · ·	No.741 MAY [MAJ][1x]
	T.N. [a] The list is transmitted in New York's No.1354 of 22 September 1944.
	Comments: [1] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN
	[1] VIRIOR: Lt. Gen. F.M. FIIN [11] KOKh: Duncan C. LEE
	[11] IZBA: C.O.I O.S.S.
	[11] ILBA: C.C.I C.S.S. [1v] ZEMLYaKI: Members of the Communist Party.
	[v] IZRA: Donald WHEELER
	[v] ZAYATS: Maurice HALPERIN
	[vi] ZANAIS. MAUFICE ALLEAIN [vi1] FILOT: William Ludwig ULLMANN
	[vii] COUNTRY: U.S.A.
	[1x] MAJ: Stepan APRESYAN
	·
	T op secret daunt -Drug

57. Moscow 954 to New York, 20 September 1944.

	MGB	Ling & H & A & d Visco	/ENONA	
	From: 405CON		Ties:	
	To: NL. YORK			
	но.: 954			
			20 September 1944	
	Reference no. 741[1].			
		niv with our nurmission. Ci	livj. In future	· .
	ilo. 4332	[rccoverable)	
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ł	have and a start of the			
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	Note:	e eren er el e energe	····	
	[a] No. 741 is the internation of 15 September 1325 of 15 Septem	al serial number of NEC YORM per 1944.	to NOSCOW message	
	Comments: [1] KOKh: i.e. SOCH Dung	out C LES		
	[11] IIRNA: i.e. YRNA, I [111] I.RA: Donald MEGLER.			
	<pre>[iv] A.YaTs: i.e. "HARE" c [v] I.BA: Office of Strut</pre>	or STOMANY," Surice SALPs tegic Services.	RIN.	
			l November 1968	
			ENONÁ	
	. TOTAL			

58. New York 1340 to Moscow, 21 September 1944.

	YEAR MA
	Reissue (T1362)
	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	No: 1340
	21 September 19 <u>44</u>
	To VIKTOR[i].
	Lately the development of new people [D% has been in pro- gress]. LIBERAL[ii] recommended the wife of his wife's brother, Ruth GREENGLASS, with a safe flat in view. She is 21 years old, a TOWNSWOMAN [GOROZHANKA][iii], a GYMNAST [FIZKUL'TURNITSA][iv] since 1942. She lives on STANTON [STANTAUN] Street. LIBERAL and his wife recommend her as an intelligent and clever girl.
	[15 groups unrecoverable]
	<pre>[C% Ruth] learned that her husband[v] was called up by the army but he was not sent to the front. He is a mechanical engineer and is now working at the ENORMOUS [ENORMOZ][vi] plant in SANTA FE, New Mexico.</pre>
	[45 groups unrecoverable]
	detain VOLOK[vii] who is working in a plant on ENORMOUS. He is a FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMLYAK][viii]. Yesterday he learned that they had dismissed him from his work. His active work in progressive organizations in the past was the cause of his dismissal.
	In the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN line LIBERAL is in touch with CHESTER[ix]. They meet once a month for the payment of dues. CHESTER is interested in whether we are satisfied with the collab- oration and whether there are not any misunderstandings. He does not inquire about specific items of work [KONKRETNAYA RABOTA]. In as much as CHESTER knows about the role of LIBERAL's group we beg consent to ask C. through LIBERAL about leads from among people who are working on ENORMOUS and in other technical fields.
¢	Your no. 4256[a]. On making further enquiries and checking on LARIN[x] we received from the FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN through EKhO[xi] a character sketch which says that they do not entirely vouch for him. They base this statement on the fact that in the Federation LARIN does not carry out all the orders received from the leader- ship. He is stubborn and self-willed. On the strength of this we have decided to refrain from approaching LARIN and intend to find another candidate in FAECT [FAKhIT][xii].
	No 751 MAJ[xiii] 20 September
•	· ·
	a seguramenta da construcción de la
	A POTR & SALAN
	VENONA

Ters	VERONA'
	2.
Comments: [i] [ii] [iii] [iii] [iii] [iv] [vi] [vi	Communist League.
	28 April 1975
	VENONA

59. New York 1388-9 to Moscow, 1 October 1944.

v 82	BRIDE
	TOP SECRET
	USSR Ref Main S/1:3F/T96
	Issued: 26/2/1954 Cop: No: 10
	REISSUD
	ACCOUNT OF A DISCUSSION WITH "ALBERT" CONTERNING "ROTERT'S" GROUP.
	From: NEW YORK
·	Te: MOSCOV Nos.: 1383 - 1389 1 Oct 19 <u>44</u>
	[Swo-part message complete]
[Part I]] To VIKTOR[1].
	Your telegram no. 4012[47]. ADDET AL'BERT [116] has told me that his original proposal about new cover [PRIKEVII] holds good and that in the near future he will send us a [C5 special] note [C5 on this subject]. In order to invest wisely the sum allotted by you ALBERT has to think out a number of details which will take him some time yet.
	Your no. 4270[3].
	[E7 1.] On the question of the possibility of splitting ROBERT's[iv] group into smaller units ALBERT gave the following answer:
	KOL'TSOV'S[v] meeting with [C: RICHARD [RICHARD]][vi] and KOL'TSOV's attempt to obtain answers to a number of questions of an international
	[Continued overleaf]
	Distribution
	S/HEP/T95 [3 Pages] TOP-SEGNET BRIDE

s/175/201

character produced an unfavourable impression on ROBERT. ROBERT was surprised at our ducision to have recourse to the aid of a special man for reising with (C. RICHARD) questions on which ROBERT (C. himself) as leader of the group, in his own words, is working ceaselessly. Why did we ducide to ask (D. RICHARD)

· - ? -

[25 groups whrecoverable]

in other [Compres] this step of ours ROHDED took as a mark of insufficient confidence in his business dyilities. It is true he later o pressed reyret at having related touchily [BOLEZNERNO] [6 groups unrecovered] in ALDERT's opinion shows that ROHDET is jealous about 'encreachments

[15 groups unrecovered]

not to agree to our mensures calculated to "httpass" ROBERT. ILDERT is convinced that in attempt to "remove" members of the group, however biroumspectly, will be received [1 group unrecovered] unfortunable by ROBERT. [Ds said that; in that case (he][2] could in the meantime have a chat with ROBERT about the possibility of breaking the group into the or three sub-groups for greater secrecy and more effective ortunisation of the work, leaving however the overall direction in ROBERT's hands.

[Part II]

ALBERT [C: warned mc] that for the time being the question can only be put in this form and that he will discuss it with ROBERT when coession offers. At the same time he observed that his relations with ROBERT were very good and that the latter mould consent to a meeting between ALBERT himself or The 'vil' and any member of the group. Possibly, in [12] ROBERT's tendency not to "relinguish" anyone [,]12] SOUND's [ZVUK][vili] education is making itself felt.

2. "our points 3, 4, 5, 5 and 7 I have passed on to LEBRT in detail.

 ALPERT promised to write specially on your point 1. For the time being he told me the fellewing:

ROBERT is not restricting himself to receiving material from the probationers [STACHERU], but is giving them tasks in consultation with ALBERT. The instruction not to impersonalise [C] the group's] materials will be borne in mind (it is already being carried out). FILOT(ix] is bringing ROBERT's wife (he is not marvied himself) into the processing [OBRABCTNA] of materials. She is not only in the know about her husband's work, but actively helps him in the processing.

There is no information about the KNUTL's[X] enquiry being finished. ROBERT is no less interested in a favourable outcome than we are and is trying to keep

[Continue1 overleaf]

s/1771/293

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82	BRIDE TOP-SECRET	
	abreast of developments. If they have not dismissed him from his present work, it means that there is no concrete information about his work for us but only suspicions connected with his FDLLOW-DOWNTRY LADWind; [D. membership]. His wife is not free from [D. suspicion]	
	[23 groups unrecoverable]	
	[D questions] raised in your letter no. 3 and which have in the menatime remained unanevered we will rewind (LPERT.	
	The materials on the conspiracy ond the competitors[xii]of the ISLUED [OSERTY][xiii], as it turns out, have to be obtained through IZLULARY] and so I am passing the task on to VLDIM(XV).	
	No. 786 Miy [muj][xmi] 1 October	
	Totto in a armite ble Totto: [2] Jacopted by the translator.	
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: meterly LtCeneral P.M. FITIM.	
	[11] Johnworldeble: [e. albert, mobule, Joke ale Abdulond [116] .L'BERT: pot-identified. Athene Rov.	
	[iv] ROPERD: Withan Dregory SILVERUSTER.	·
	<pre>[v] KCL'TSOV: not identified.</pre>	
	[vi] RIGhuRD: Scoribly Harry Dexter WHITE.	
	[vii] 5L': not identified.	
	[viii] ZVJK: Jacob GOLOS. According to Elizabeth BENTLET, in her book "Cut of Bondage", OCLOS was opposed to the Russian policy of assuming direct convrol of agents.	
	[ix] PILCT: possibly "illiam Ludwig ULLMAN.	
	[x] Kh.T: the F.B.I.	
	[xi] ZENLYaChESKIJ - i.e. the Communist Party. This is an adjective derived from the noun ZENLYaK, which is used as a cover- name for a member of the Communist Party.	
	<pre>[xii] KONKUPENTU - i.e. members of a non-Soviet intelligence organisation.</pre>	
	<pre>[xiii] CSTROV: Great Britain. [xiv] IZRA: not identified. [xv] VLDIM: Inatolij Borisewich GROHOW, M.G.B. resident in W.SHENGOOW, D.G. [xvi] VLJ: Pavel Ivanevich FEDOSEN/2</pre>	
	s/cree/auto BRIDE	

From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No: 1389 1 October 1944 Extract(a) Materials about the conspiracy[_ACOVOR] and the COMPETITORS [KONKURLMITY][1] of the ISLAND[OSTROV][11], as it turns out, have to be obtained through ILRA[111] and so I am passing the task on to VADIM[iv]. Notes: [3] This is the last paragraph of a long two-part message on an entirely different subject. The message is addressed to VINTOR[FITIN] and signed by MAJ(APRoSYAN]. Conments: etts: [1] MUMKURENTY: Members of a non-Soviet Intelligence Organization. [14] OSTROV: Great Britain. [14] LAG: Donald Miven WHELEN. [14] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, MDB resident in WASHINGTON. 11 March 1970 VENCHI ----


60. New York 1410 to Moscow, 6 October 1944.

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•	95			
	100	SEGRET-		
	USSR	Ref. No.	3/NBF/T93 (of 4/7/51)	
		Issued Copy No.	3¢1	
		REISSUE		
	1. LUKA, PAYMENT TO ATAM 2. PROFILEM OF UNFULFILL	AN FOR PUBLICATION OF BOOM ED ASSIGNENTS: EKHO, IKS, (1944)	RIT. RULEVOJ	
:	From: NEW YORK			
	To: MOSCOW			
	No.: 141ø To VIKTOR[i]	6 October	1944	
	the unwillingness of the FKhO has been described to	s failed to carry out most FELOWCOUNTRYMEN (ZEALYAK o you as a worker occupyin organisation. In an int	[][v] to co-operate. g a responsible position erview with [C% IKS][vi]	
	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi	ising with IKS the	
	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi	ising with IKS the	
	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi	ising with IKS the es a more responsible	
	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi	ising with IKS the es a more responsible	
	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi	ising with IKS the es a more responsible	
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	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi	ising with IKS the es a more responsible	
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	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi Co	ising with IKS the es a more responsible	
	ouite a different pidure	came to light. EXhO is ra another worker who occupi Co	ising with IKS the es a more responsible	

VENONA 95 3/NBF/195 (or 4/7/51) position to carry out our tasks, leaving $\Xi_{-}[iv]$ the role of go-between. He says that, because of the modest nature of his position among the FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN, he cannot [29 groups unrecoverable] the selection of a replacement for RIT[vii], the search for a safe house, the selection of candidates for planting in the KhATA[viii] etc remain unfulfilled for the reasons indicated above. E. recommends us to arrange with RULEVOJ[ix] for a responsible worker to be assigned to us, one who is capable of carrying out the necessary measures without asking permission from the authorities each time. If we do not do this, he will continue to be unable, so he says, to cope with our tasks. No. 802 6 October MAJ[x] Footnotes: [i] VIKTOR: Lt General P.M. FITIN. [ii] LUKA: Pavel P. KLARIN. .[iii] ATAMAN: Boleslaw Konstantin GEBERT. [iv] ĒKhO/Ē.: ie "ECHO"; Bernard SCHUSTER. [v] FELLOWCOUNTRYMEN: Members of the Communist Party. ie "X"; formerly "STUKACh", ie "INFORMER", and "DUGLAS", ie "DOUGLAS"; Joseph KATZ. [vi] IKS: [vii] RIT: Only occurrence; presumably an unidentified covername. [viti] Khata: The Federal Bureau of Investigation. [ix] RULEVOJ: ie "HELMSMAN"; Earl BROWDER. [x] MAJ: ie "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN. VENONA

61. New York 1433-5 to Moscow, 10 October 1944.

BRIDE USSR Rof No: S/UBF/DU1L Issued: /9/12/1953 Copy No: 205 OFERATIONAL REPORT BY "SERGEJ" ACD "MAY'S" COMMENTS ON "SERGEJ'S" "CRK From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW Nos.: 1433 - 1435 10 October 1944 [Three-part message complete] [Part]] [99 groups unrecovered] [5 groups unrecoverable] SERGEJ[i] has brought in IDE [YaZ'][i1] but is not able to direct his work systematically as he sees him too rarely. Among SERGET's acquaintances are persons of great interest from [1] of the context of the know, nevertheless they provide useful comments on the forcign policy of the COUNTRY [STRANA][iii]. Among them SERGEJ is studying Joseph BLRNES and I. STONE[iv] who, however, for the time being is avoiding SERGEJ. [Among his][a] ether serious targets SERGEJ has no epportunity for the [BJ development] of CRITIC [KRITIK] for obtaining leads [NAVODKI] (in my opinion too CRITIC is no good for anything else []][a]. [Part II] 2. Decisive results in the business of signing up valuable people can be obtained in only two ways, first by transforring SERGEJ to CARTHAGE [K.RFAGEN][v] and secondly by making use of the FELLOW COUNTRYMEN [ZEMLYaKI]vi] [Continued overleaf] Distribution g1. S/NBF/T414 BRIDE [3 Pages]





	BRIDE
	- 5 - S/WEY/TL14
	T.N.: [a] Inserted by the translator.
	[b] "In a nutshell" is given in English in the original.
	[c] I.e. questions for which a knowledge of the possible sources (both institutions and persons) would be helpful.
	[1] The last digit of the last of those groups is the same as the last digit of the group for "his".
	Comments: [i] SERCEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN, TASS News Agency correspondent.
	[ii] Yaz': Simon Samuel KRAFSUR.
	[iii] STRAIL: the U.S.A.
	[iv] Isider Feinstein STONE.
	[v] KLRFAGEN: WASHINGTON.
	[vi] ZENLYAKI: members of the Communist Party, in this case of the U.S.A.
	[vii] REDAKTSIYa: TASS News Agency.
	[viii] KhATA: the F.B.I.
	[ix] MJ; Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.
	[x] RULEVOJ: Barl BROWDER.
	[xi] XULLK: Thomas E. DEWEY.
•	S/NBF/T414 TOP-SECRET
	BRIDE
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62. New York 1437 to Moscow, 10 October 1944.

VENONA 4GB From: New YORK I XIS . 10.500.. To: No.: 1437 is October 1944 To the ôth Separtment. Z.YaTs[i] reports that a telegram from BARI of LD Coptemper has inrived in the BANK[ii], in which is discussed the introduction by TITO of strict regula-tions [governing], the movements and activities of the military missions of the COUNTRY (STRAWA](iii) and the ISLWD [OSTROV][iv]. In the telegram it is stated that the ISLWD mas replied by stopping supplies to the partisus and the evac-uation of wounded. The telegram considers that the probable cause of the intro-duction of strict measures is TITO's intention to conceal from the missions the present control that he exercises over the whole country. No. 817 [signature unrecoverable] Jee for Completing Notes: [a] Inserted by translator. Comments: mments: [1] LAYATs: i.e. "HARE" or "STOWAWAY," aurice MALPERIN. [11] BANK: U.S. State Department. [111] STRUNA: U.S.A. [11] OUTROV: GREAT BRITAIN. 4 November 1968 FRINE VENONA

63. New York 1442 to Moscow, 11 October 1944.





64. New York 1469 to Moscow, 17 October 1944.

VENO. WY Reissue (T1308) From: NEW YORK TOI MOSCOW 1469 No: 17 October 1944 TO VIKTOR[i]. Today we received from ROBERT(ii) 56 undeveloped films including the following materials: 1. Reviews by the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the Far East according to information of the economic COMPETITION [KON-KURENTSIYa][iii]. A review by the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the economic situation of GERMANY. A memorandum for KAPITAN[iv] on DECREE[DEKRET][v] to the з. French. A review by the Ministry of Economic Warfare about 4. [22 groups unrecoverable] negotiations of the COUNTRY[STRANA][vi] and the ISLAND[OSTROV][vii] about DECREE. Report of the Embassy of the COUNTRY in SIDON [viii] 7 about [1 group unrecovered] GREECE. Measures taken (6 groups unrecovered) in Sweden. 8. Negotiations on DECREE with FRANCE. 9. [8 groups unrecovered] about the situation in ITALY. 10. A recent of the Embassy of the COUNTRY in 11. MADRID about German assets in Spain. The economic scale of defense. 12. 13. A memorandum [3 groups unrecovered] for KAPITAN on the question of DECREE for [1 group unrecovered]. 14. A telegram to the BANK[ix] from the Embassy of the COUNTRY on [2 groups unrecovered]. A memorandum of the executive committee on 15. [19 groups unrecovered] YENONA 357

ENONA z. [5 groups unrecovered] international cartels. 16. 17. Instructions on the dissolution of the National Socialist Parties of GERMANY and affiliated organizations. The situation on economic control of 18. [10 groups unrecovered] 20. A general review [4 groups unrecovered] crises of the COUNTRY. The materials are recent. [15 groups unrecovered] at once the undeveloped films. No. 835 . MAJ[x] Comments: VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER. COMPETITION: Non-Soviet Intelligence Organization. KAPITAN: i.e. CAPTAIN, Franklin D. ROOSEVELT. DECREE: Lend Lease. COUNTRY: The United States. ISLAND: Great Britain. SIDON: LONDON. BANK: State Department. MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK. [i] [ii] [iii] [iv] [v] [vi] [vii] [viii] [ix] [x] 7 December 1971

65. New York 1506 to Moscow, 23 October 1944.

TOP SECRET TRINE VENIONIA
- IOP SECRET TRINE VENONA
<u>deissue</u> (T23.~)
From: New York
To: .ioscov
No.: 1506 23 October 1944
To VIKTOR[i].
SERGEJ[ii] in CARTHADE[iii] has made the acquaintance of PANCAKE[BLIN][iv]. Earlier SERGEJ had several times tried to [B] contact] him personally and also through IDE[YaJ'][v] but the impression had been created that PANCAKE was avoiding a meeting. At the first conversation SERGEJ told him that he had very much desired to make his acquaintance since he greatly valued his work as a correspondent and had likewise heard flattering
[23 groups unrecoverable]
to [B\$ contact] him, particularly the attempts of IDE and of people of the TRUST [TREST][vii], but he had reacted negatively fearing the consequences. At the same time he implied that the attempts at rapprochement had been made with insufficient caution and by people who were insufficiently responsible. To SERG2J's reply that naturally we did not want to subject him to unpleasant complications, PANCAKE gave him to understand that he was not refusing his aid but [B\$ one should] consider that he had three children and did not want to attract the attention of the KhATA[viii]. To SERG2J's question how he considered it advisable to maintain lisison F. replied that he would be glad to meet but he rarely visited [B\$ TYRE[ix]] where he usually spent
[54 groups unrecoverable].
His fear is primarily explained by his wnvillingness to spoil his career. Materially he is well secured[.] He earns as much as 1500 dollars a month but, it seems,he would not be averse to having a supplementary income. For the estab- lishment of business contact with him we are insisting on [1 group unrecovered] reciprocity. For the work is needed a qualified [2 groups unrecovered] CARTHAGE. Telegraph your opinion.
No. 843 23 October
 Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
(ii) SERCEJ: Vladimir PRAVDIN, TASS representative.
[iii] CARTHAGE: washington, D.C.
(iv) PANCÁKE: Isidore F. STONE.
[v] IDE: Samuel KRAFSUR.
(vi) P.: i.e. PANCAKE.
[vi] F.: 1.e. FARCARE. [vii] TEUST: The Soviet Embassy in Washington.
. [vii] TRUST: The Soviet Embassy in Washington.

TOP SECRET TRINE VENONA			
- ż -			
Comments: [viii] KhATA: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Cont.) [ix] TYRE: New York City. [x] NAJ: Stepan APRESYAN.			
• • •			
23 January 1968			
TOP SEGRET TRINE VENONA			

66. Moscow 374 to San Francisco, 7 November 1944.

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BRIDE	
USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T960 Issued: (1/30/1/1958 Copy No: 名でう	
NOTIFICATION OF AN AMARD (1944)	
From: HDSCO!/	
TO: SEN FRANCISCO	
No: 374 7 Nov. 44	
The Government has awarded you the Order of the Red Star. On behalf of us all and of the Presidium I warmly congratulate you on this high award and wish you the best of success in your work for the good of our country.	
No. 5215 VIRTOR[1]	
Comments: [1] VIETOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.	
Distribution	
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3/NBF/T960	

67. New York 1585 to Moscow, 12 November 1944.

95 USSR Ref. No: 25/4/1961 Issued: 11 Ĺ Copy No: 2014 DECISION TO MARITAIN CONTACT WITH THEODORE HALL (1944) From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOV! No: 1585 12 Nov. 44 To VIKTOR. [1] DER[11] visited Theodere HALL [TEODOR KhOLL], [111] 19 years old, the son of a further. He is a graduate of HARVARD University. As a telented physicist he was taken on for government work. He was a GTMNAST [FIZULL*TURNIK][1v] and conducted work in the Steel Founders' Union. [a] According to BEX's account HALL has an exceptionally keen mind and a broad outlook, and is politically developed. At the present time H. is in oharge of a group at "CAMP-2"[v] (SNTA-FE). H. handed over to BEX a report about the CAMP and named the key personnel employed on ENOMAUS. [v] He decided to do this on the advice of his colleague Saville SAX[AVIL SAXS], [vii] a GYMMAST living in TIME. [viii] SAX's mother is a FELOWCOUNTRYMAN [ZEMINAT [14]] and works for RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF. With the aim of hastening a meeting with a compotent person. H. on the following day sent a coav of the report by S. to the and works for RUSSING TAK Identify. In the aim of natering a meeting with a competent person, H. on the following day sent a copy of the report by S. to the PLANT[7AVD]. [-1] ALEXSIT[7] received S. H. had to leave for CAME-2 in two days! time. He[b] was compelled to make a decision quickly. Jointly with MAY[MAJ]. [-1] he gave BER consent to feel out H., to assure him that everything was in order and We gave ban consent to feel out h., to assure him that everything was in broad and to arrange limitson with him. H. left his photograph and came to an understanding with BEK about a place for meeting him. BEK met S. [1 group garbled] our automobile. We consider it expedient to maintain limitson with H. [1 group unidentified] through S. and not to bring in anybody else. MAX has no objection to this. We shall send the details by post. No. 897 [Signature missing] 11th November Distribution [Notes and Comments overleaf] t Biji


95	
TOP SECRET	
Notes: [a] I.e. Trade Union [PROFSOYuZ]. [b] I.e. ALEXSEY.	
Comments: [i] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.	
[iv] GYNNAST : Possibly a member of the Young Communist Loogue.	
[v] CAMP-2 : LOS ALAMOS.	-
[vi] ENORHOUS: Manhattan Engineering District - U.S. Atomic Energy Project.	
[viii] TYRE : MET YORK CITY.	
[ix] FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN: Member of the Communist Party.	
[x] PLANT : Soviet Consulate.	
[x1] ALEKSEJ : Anatolij Antonovich YaKOVLEV, Soviet Vice-Consul in NET YORK.	
[xii] MAY : Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.	
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-TOP SECRET	
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
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68. New York 1600 to Moscow, 14 November 1944.

	AFR BUTT	
	TOP DECIMINE VEDONA	
	Reissue (T293)	
	From: NEW YORK	
	To: MOSCOW	
	No: 1600	
	14 November 19 <u>44</u>	
	TO VIKTOR[i].	
	LIBERAL[ii] has safely carried through the contracting of "Kh'YuS"[iii]. Kh'YuS is a good pal of METR's[iv]. We propose to pair them off and get them to photograph their own materials having given a camera for this purpose. Kh'YuS is a good photographer, has a large darkroom [KAMERA] and all the equipment but he does not have a Leica. LIBERAL will receive the films from METR for passing on. Direction of the probationers will be continued through LIBERAL, this will ease the load on him. Details about the con- tracting are in letter no. 8. OSA[v] has agreed to cooperate with us in drawing in ShMEL' [vi] (henceforth "KALIBR" see your no. 5258[a]) with a view to ENORMOUS [ENORMOZ][vii]. On summons from KALIBR she is leaving on 22 November for the Camp 2 area [viii]. KALIBR will have a week's leave. Before OSA's departure LIBERAL will carry out two briefing meetings.	
	No. 901 ANTON [ix]	e
	Notes: [a] Not available. Comments:	
	<pre>[i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. [ii] LIBERAL: JULIUS ROSENBERG. [iii] Kh'YUS: i.e. HUGHES, probably Joel BARR or Alfred SARANT.</pre>	
	<pre>[iv] METR: i.e. METER, probably either Joel BARR or Alfred SARANT</pre>	
	[vij] ShMEL'/KALIBR: i.e. BUMBLEBEE/CALIBRE, David GREENGLASS. [vii] ENORMOZ: Atomic Energy Project.	•
	[viii] Camp 2: LOS ALAMOS Laboratory, New Mexico. [ix] ANTON: Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV.	
	1 May 1975	
;	TOP SECRET VENONA	

69. Moscow 379 to San Francisco, 16 November 1944.





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	95
	JOP SECRET
	3 3/HBF/T798
	Note: [a] See LOSCON to OTTANN No. 568 of the same date - 3/MEM/TH 275
	Comments: [i] FITROV : Unidentified MOSCOW cover-name.
	[i1] CITRE : NGB Headquarters in MOSCO7.
	[iii] TU : Presumably this is an abbreviation referring to some directorate [UFRAVLINE], and T possibly stands for Transport[TR.NSPORINCE], Technical[TEKNNICh_SKOE] or Territorial[TERRITORL.L'NOE].
	[iv] SHALL : Unidentified cover-name.
	[v] VITALLJ : Pavel Kuzmich REVIZOROV of the S.G.P.C.
	[vi] VOVCHEK : Probably Aleksandr Pavlovich BOChEK of the S.G.P.C.
	[vii] YaKOV : Unidentified covor-name.
	[viii] VOLKOV : Andrej Romanovich ORLOV of the S.G.P.C.
	[iz] FETR : Aleksandr Petrovich GRACHEV of the S.G.P.S.
	[::] SIRGEJ : Viktor Vasil'evich AFAMAS'EV, described as Director of the Fifth Line in HOSOS'-NEW YORK No. 303 of 1st April 1945 (3/*BF/T1097).
	[:1] SE-IN : Unidentified MOSCON cover-name.
	·
	3/1925/17798
	TOP SECRET

70. New York 1613 to Moscow, 18 November 1944.

77 TOPSECD Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T1996 USSR Issued : (1/3/1972 Copy No.: 30/ REISSUE OF ITEM I OF 3/NBF/T37 (of 7/3/1951) From: NEW YORK To: MOSC OW No.: 1613 18th November 1944 To VIKTOR[i]. In mid-October AL'BERT[ii] tried to get in touch with KNYaZ'[iii]. The latter's wife stated that KNYaZ' had left for the PROVINCES[iv] and would return after Christmas. At one time KNYaZ' was compelled to resign because of the dismissel of LUN''s[v] former deputy on the grounds of organisational and political disagreement. As a result of the election, LUN⁴⁴s dismissal and the appointment of LOTsMAN[vi] in his place are not ruled out. Inasmuch as KNYaZ' is friendly with LOTsMAN [1 group unrecovered] he could count on a leading post in the BANK[vii]. [Continued overleaf] 3/NBF/T 1996

	95 VERVER
	T OP-SECRET
	- 2 - 3/NBF/T1996
	About five months ago, having proposed to AL'EERT the suspension of meetings with KNYa2', you promised to give, subsequently, instructions on how AL'HEERT would explain the break to KNYa2'. AL'HEERT considers that a complicated explanation is not necessary as KNYa2' knew of AL'HERT's chronic illness and himself recommended the latter to go away to the COUNTRYSIDE[viii] or to ARIZONA for a few months
	[34 groups unrecoverable]
	use: 1. If LOTSMAN gets an interesting post it goes without saying that KNYaZ' must "get in on it" by using his friendship.
	2. If not, then we can try notwithstanding to use KNYaZ''s proximity to LOTSMAN to fix him up in a suitable establishment, still extracting, via him, interest- ing information which will [C% in any case] come LOTSMAN's way; or to send him to MI[ix] or to some other place in the PROVINCES, using the cover of representative of a firm (according to AL'EERT the PROVINCIAL[iv] experience of KNYaZ' allows him to count on any such appointment), and there to use him as the head of a private office (instead of, or with, ChEKh[x]).
	If you agree I shall brief AL'HERT in this spirit. We consider that KNYaZ' should be turned over to VADIM[xi] only after AL'HERT
•	has ascertained his prospects No. 907 MAJ[xii] 18th November
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
	[ii] AL'BERT: i.e. "ALBERT"; probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKhMEROV.
	[iii] KNYaZ': i.e. "PRINCE"; possibly Laurence DDGGAN.
	[iv] PROVINCES, Latin AMERICA(N). PROVINCIAL:
	[v] LUN': i.e. "HEN-HARRIER"; Cordell HULL.
	[vi] LOTSMAN: i.e. "CHANNEL-PILOT"; Henry Agard WALLACE.
	[vii] BANK: U.S. State Department.
	[viii] COUNTRYSIDE: MEXICO.
	3/NBF/T1996
	TOP SECRET

95	VENON	
TOPS		
	- 3 - 3/NEF/T1996	
Comments [Cont'd]: [ix] MI:	Probably CHILE.	
[x] ChEKh:	i.e. "CZECH"; Robert Owen MENAKER.	
[xi] VADIM:	Anatolij Borisovich GRCMOV, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in WASHINGTON.	
[xii] MAJ:	i.e. "MAY"; Stepan Zakharovich APRESYaN.	
7/NBF/T1996		
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	Volestop to	
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71. New York 1634 to Moscow, 20 November 1944.

53	BRIDE	
T.O.P.SEGRET		
USSR	<u> </u>	Ref.No.: S/NBF/T294
		Issued: 122/1/1953 Copy No.: 45
	FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR "F	ICHARD"
From: NEW YORK		
To: MOSCOW		
No.: 1634		20 Nov. 19 <u>山</u>
To VICTOR[i].		
Accord complained recen	ling to advice from ROBERT[ii htly about [D% financial]	i] RICHARD's[iii] wife
	[65 groups unrecoverab]	
in particular wi heavy expenses.	ith business [BIZNES] since t	this would relieve them
participation wi that in view of CARTHAGE [KAREAG	I told RICHARD's wife, who kn th us, that we would willing all the circumstances would BEN][IV]. ROBERT thinks that ar payment but might accept g	rly have helped them an not allow them to leav t RICHARD would have
	[7 groups unrecovered]	
	nses which may come to up to	
.LBERT provide for RICH ROBERT, PILOT[V] assistance.	I said to ROBERT that in his ARD's daughter's education a and the rest against attemp	opinion we would agree and definitely advised oting to offer RICHARD
		[Continued overleaf]
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		/
an a		
S/NBF/T294		
[2 pages]	TOP SECR	ET (CANCE)
	BRIDI	

	- 2 - S/NBF/T294	
Whil	e sharing ALBERT's opinion about the necessity for	
assistance we the offer of a	e sharing ALBERT's opinion about the necessity for draw your attention to the fact that RICHARD has taken ssistance favourably. Please do not delay your answer.	
No. 912 21st November	MAY [MAJ][V1]	
Comments. [i]	VICTOR: possibly LieutGeneral Pavel M. FITIN.	
	ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.	•
	RICHARD: possibly Harry Dexter WHITE.	
	KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.	
	PILOT: William Ludwig ULLMAN.	
[vi]	MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV.	
	W.S. No.: XY-70.5	
s/nbf/t294	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
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Amendment to: S/NEP/T294 (of 22/1/1953) USSR Ref No: Issued: 20/1/1954 205 Copy No: From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW No.: 1634 20 November 19<u>44</u> AMENDMENT In line 3 of the last paragraph on page 1, please amend the sentence to read "ROBERT, PLOT[v] and PA..... against attempting to offer RICHARD assistance." Distribution Amondment to: S/NBF/T294 [1 Page] TOP SECRET ER/ BRIDE

72. New York 1635 to Moscow, 21 November 1944.

TOP-SECRET
USSR Ref. No: S/NBF/T177 (of 2/4/1952)
Issued: 1/5/1956
Сору №: 205
RE-ISSUE 1. REPORT FROM "ROBERT" EXPRESSING DISTRUST OF GENERAL HURLEY, AND
1. REPORT FROM "ROBERT" EDERESSING DEFINISTION CONSIDERED RELIABLE REFERENCE TO LISTS OF GERMANS AND AUSTRIANS CONSIDERED RELIABLE BY "IZBA" AND THE "ISLANDERS" RESPECTIVELY (1944)
A NEWTON OF "PORFET'S" "PROFOUND SATISFACTION" WITH HIS REMARD, AND
REFERENCES TO "ALBERT", "EL' "AND "DORA" (1944)
Fyon: NEW YORK
To: MOSCOW
No: 1635 21 Nov. 44
To VIKTOR. [1]
ROBERT[11] reports:
1. During his visit to the Chinese 8th Army General HURLEY[a] ^[111] asseverated his friendship. CHOU EN-LAI should be warned that H. [Kh.] cannot be trusted. We think H. is a CHLA-HUD UJ-[G5 TU] (Stooge)[a] of CHLANG K/I-SHEK. Even the EANK(iv] considers H.'s views to be in contradiction to the BANK's policy.
2. $IZBA[V]$ has passed on to the Army a list of 20,000 "reliable Germans" with whom IZBA considers it safe to have dealings. It is impossible to obtain the list here at the moment. Perhaps it could be procured in SIDON[Vi]. An analogous list of Austrians has been compiled by the ISLANDERS[OSTROVITYANE][Vi].
No. 913 [Continued overleaf]
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<i>n</i>
JOD SECRET
- 2 - S/NBF/T1 77
1. ALBERT asks for word to be passed to you that $\widetilde{E}L'[b]$ and he [D, profoundly]
[20 groups unrecoverable]
2. ROBERT is sincerely overjoyed and profoundly satisfied with the reward $[given him][e]$ [G: in accordance with your instructions]. As he says his work for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. He emphasised that he did not take this only as a [G? personal] honour, but also as an honour to his group. He wants to see the reward and the book.
3. DORA[viii] is very uncasy about the fate of her relations [and][0] again asks news of their whereabouts.
No. 914 MAY[MAJ][ix] 21 st November
T.N.: [a] Given in Latin letters in the original.
[b] I.e. the Russian name for the letter "L". [c] Inserted by translator.
Comments: [1] LtGen. P.M. FITIN.
[11] Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.
[iii] Brigadier-General Patrick Jay HURLEY, appointed U.S.
[iv] U.S. Department of State.
[x] Office of Strategic Services [0.S.S.].
(wi] LONDON.
[vii] The British.
[viii] Helen (WITTE) SILVERMASTER, wife of ROBERT.
<pre>[ix] Probably Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in NEW YORK.</pre>

D

73. New York 1657 to Moscow, 27 November 1944.

	Reissue(T9.2) New York NOSCOW
	657 27 November 19 <u>44</u>
Surname Married [ZEMLYAK Knows ab In view tively a No. 922 A MAZURIN of Plant	Tour no. 5356[a]. Information on LIBERAL's[ii] wife[iii]. that of her husband, first name ETHEL, 29 years old. five years. Finished secondary school. A FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN (][iv] since 1938. Sufficiently well developed politically. bout her husband's work and the role of METR[v] and NIL[vi]. of delicate health does not work. Is characterized posi- and as a devoted person.
at ARSEN	IJ's[ix] plant [x]. [2 groups unrecovered] [D% I request cision on the question]. ANTON [xi]
Comment: [: [[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[a] Not available. [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. [i] LIBERAL: Julius ROSENBERG. [ii] Ethel ROSENBERG, nee GREENGLASS. [ii] ZEMLYAK: Member of the Communist Party. [v] METR: Probably Joel BARR or Alfred SARANT. [v] NIL: Unidentified. [ii] Vladimir Nikolaevich MAZURIN. [ii] MAI: i.e. MOSKOVSKIJ AVIATSIONNYJ INSTITUT, Moscow Aviation Institute. [ix] ARSENIJ: Andrej Ivanovich ShEVCHENKO. [x] Bell Aircraft Plant, NIAGARA FALLS, N.Y. [x] ANTON: Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV.
	1 May 1975
-	

74. New York 1699 to Moscow, 2 December 1944.


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	TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KI NEVER 10 BE REMOVED FROM T	
		Ref No: S/NEF/T193
		Losued: 1/5/1952 Copy Ho: 205
	4 TTMB / 13 DOPTSHOP OF S 150	
		MGED OF THE TREATEN OF ATOMIC IMERCY. IF AF UNIDEMITTED FRARM (FOREIDLY ICLA NAFOLY AND "IMEMISSION".
	From i ····· NE7 ·YORK	
	To: MOSCUI Description (Sector) No: 1699	2 Dec 1944
	Condlusion of telegrain No. 940 [m	
	our country addressed hinself to h yenting to liston to hin, sent his commentator of the paper. In att howas not admitted to him by the	REFICE, Harold UREY, Hens STANARM, arnor EISETDENG, STRASSENMAN unrcoyvergblo] EFUL[111] and the latter, nut i to DECK (DEK][1V] as utlitary empting to vinit HELMSKAN [RHLEVUJ][V]
	• ••••	ATCM
		[T.H. and Commonts overloaf]
	Distribution	
	<u>Distribution</u>	
• •		BRIDE.
•		.j. 1j.


- 2 -3/1032/1193 T.N.: [a] Inserted by the translator. This internal serial number is used for the second of two homoges transmitted under external serial number 1691 of t Dec 1924; it was signed by MaX, and dealt with an entirely different subject [see 3/MBF/T37, Ltws 2]. The necessory of which the present text gives the last part probably contains actorial derived from MADD[[Theodore Alvin MaIL]]. Enveroous re-use of an internal serial number is not without presedent on this lane. Comments: [i] [北고] To judge by the names which follow, the problem of atomic energy. MJBJE, Nichela, Brouident and Energer of ARKERS, which produces and distributes Encoden action picture files in the Jostern Berisphere. Collateral suggests that the "he" of this paragraph was STAR [Saville SAX]. (غنذ) : [1v] NEK: Sorgej KARMAKOV. [v] RULEVCJ: Marl DRCHDER. W.S. Ho .: XX-56.6 S/NDF/T193


75. New York 1715 to Moscow, 5 December 1944.

VENONA Reissue(T9.3) NEW YORK From: To: MOSCOW 1715 No: 5 December 1944 TO VIKTOR[i]. Expedite consent to the joint filming of their materials by both METR[ii] and Kh'YuS[iii] (see our letter no. 8). LIBERAL[iv] has on hand eight people plus the filming of materials. The state of LIBERAL's health is nothing splendid. We are afraid of putting LIBERAL out of action with overwork. No. 943. Your no. 5673[a]. DIK[v] is directly in touch with FLOKS's [vi] husband and not with FLOKS herself. The intention of sending the husband to see RAMSEY [RAMZAJ][vii] is explained by [C% the possibility] of avoiding a superfluous stage for transmitting in-"structions. No. 944 ANTON [viji] Your no. 5598[a]. The sending of passengers on Liberty ships from TYRE[TIR][ix] to Soviet Northern ports has become exceptionally difficult. They can only be sent to England to await there a ship headed for the Soviet North. MAJ[x] No. 945 4 December Notes: [a] Not available. : Comments: VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. METR: i.e. METER, probably either Alfred SARANT or Joel BARR. Kh'YuS: i.e. HUGHES, probably either Joel BARR or [i] [īi] [iii] Alfred SARANT. Alfred SARANT. LIBERAL: Julius ROSENBERG. DIK: i.e. DICK, Bernard SCHUSTER. FLOKS: i.e. PHLOX, probably Nos. 619 of 4 May 1944 and 1020 of 20 July 1944. RAMZAJ: POSSIBLY ANTON: Leonid KNASNIKOV. TIR: NEW YORK CITY. MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESYAN. [iv]. [v] [vi] See NEW YORK's fvii]
[viii] [ix] [x] 1 May 1975 VENONA

76. New York 1749-50 to Moscow, 13 December 1944.







77. New York 1751-3 to Moscow, 13 December 1944.

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	BRIDE
	NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.
	USAR Ref No: S/M3F/T190
	Lisuod: (21/5/1952
	COLD NO: DO
	Alefican W.R DEP.RIMENT AND DRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE Documents sent to Mascusi.
	Prud: NEW YCRK
	TO: NUSCOV
	No: 1751-1753 [13 Dec 1944] [Three-part message complete]
	<u>BYTRICTS</u>
	[Part I] To VICTCR. RCDERT[1] has rassed on to us a secret document "The Post- War Troop Dasis of the War Department" drawn up by division [CTEL.]
	G-3 on the 19th of lugust[ii]
	To the document is attached an explanation of the same dato in which it is said in particular that the document replaces a provisional document drawn up on the 24th of June.
	The document was sent to you by post on the 3th of December.
	[5 groups unrecovered]
	Talegraph whether the contents of the British Mimistry of Foreign Affeirs' commentary of the Jrd of July on the "Mandbook on Civilian Affairs in Germany" should be telegraphed. The connentary was sent to you by the same post.
	No. 953 Mar [New][iv] 13th December.
	[Compents overleaf]
	Distribution
·	s/NLF/T190 [2 Fages] BRIDE 10-P-SECRET

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		- 2 -	\$∕NDF/1190	
Contents:	[i]	RUFERT: Nathan Gregory SILV	RULSTER.	
	[ii]	The main body of the telegra of this document containing rest of the document.	a consists of page 1 a tabular summry of the	
	[ii i]	This connentary is in the for Foreign office dated Jrd Jul S.HE.F. connenting on the S.HE.F. civil affairs Har An obstract of this letter of 1544 in Nos. 1510-1513 (inte (see FH 32).	y 1944 to C.B.P.FRARE at a third draft of the adbook for Germany. Wes transmitted on 23 Dec	
	[iv]	MiJ: Pavel Ivenovich FEDOSI	к ч.	
·			W.S. No: XY-56.3	
			······································	×
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
S/NDF/T190

78. New York 1773 to Moscow, 16 December 1944.

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	There was at a stant of			OMA
	-			
	Reis	<u>sue</u> (T1304)		
From: NEW YO	RK			
To: MOSCOW	,			
No: 1773				
			16 Decembe	èr 19 <u>44</u>
TO VIKTOR[i].				
KALIBR expres being carried thought to th of the Camp w information a	sed his readine on at Camp-2[i is question ear ere openly taki bout ENORMOUS[E	ss to help in t v] and stated t lier. KALIBR s ng all precauti NORMOZ][v] fall	see KALIBR[iii]. hrowing light on t hat he had already aid that the autho onary measures to ing into Russian h e progressive [B%	y given Drities prevent Mands.
	[17 gro	oups unrecoverab	le]	
referring to	nis ignorance o	r the proprem,	expresses the wish	n that ·
our man shoul serts that KA sider such a : up a question any questions KALIBR KISTIAKOWSKI [ent working a	<pre>d meet KALIBR a LIBR would be v meeting advisab naire and pass of priority in also reports: ix}(MLAD's[x] r t the Camp. Th cess. Advise w</pre>	nd interrogate ery glad of suc- le? If not, I it to LIBERAL. terest to us. OPPENHEIM[viii eport mentioned e latter is doi	expresses the wish him personally. F h a meeting. Do y shall be obliged t Report whether you from California the latter) are a information on th	Ae as- you con- to draw bu have and at pres- ther-
our man shoul serts that KA sider such a up a question any questions KALIBR KISTIAKOWSKI [ent working a modynamic pro	<pre>d meet KALIBR a LIBR would be v meeting advisab naire and pass of priority in also reports: ix}(MLAD's[x] r t the Camp. Th cess. Advise w s.</pre>	nd interrogate ery glad of suc- le? If not, I it to LIBERAL. terest to us. OPPENHEIM[viii eport mentioned e latter is doi	him personally. F h a meeting. Do y shall be obliged t Report whether yc } from California the latter) are a ng research on the	Ae as- you con- to draw bu have and at pres- ther-
our man shoul serts that KA sider such a up a question any questions KALIBR KISTIAKOWSKI [ent working a modynamic pro two professor No. 967	<pre>d meet KALIBR a LIBR would be v meeting advisab naire and pass of priority in also reports: ix}(MLAD's[x] r t the Camp. Th cess. Advise w s.</pre>	nd interrogate ery glad of suc- le? If not, I it to LIBERAL. terest to us. OPPENHEIM[viii eport mentioned e latter is doi	him personally. F h a meeting. Do y shall be obliged t Report whether yo] from California the latter) are a ng research on the information on th	Ae as- you con- to draw bu have and at pres- ther-
our man shoul serts that KA sider such a up a question any questions KALIBR KISTIAKOWSKI [ent working a modynamic pro two professor No. 967 15 Decembe Comments: [i] V [ii] O [iii] K [iv] C [vi] T [vii] L [vii] O [ix] K [x] M	<pre>d meet KALIBR a LIBR would be v meeting advisab naire and pass of priority in also reports: ix)(MLAD's[x] r t the Camp. Th cess. Advise w s. r IKTOR: Lt. Gen SA: i.e. WASP, ALIBR: i.e. CA ALIBR: i.e. CA ALIBR: I.e. CA INGROZ: Manhat roject. IR: NEW YORK C IBERAL: Julius PPENHEIM: Press f the LOS ALAMO ISTIAKOWSKY: D</pre>	nd interrogate ery glad of suc le? If not, I it to LIBERAL. terest to us. OPPENHEIM[viii eport mentioned e latter is doi hether you have Latter is doi hether you have unable David Gr y LOS ALAMOS. tan Engineering TY. ROSENBERG. umably Dr. J. F S Laboratory. T. George Bogda ivision at the G. Theodore A.	him personally. F h a meeting. Do y shall be obliged t Report whether yc] from California the latter) are a ng research on the information on th ANTON [xi] S. EENGLASS. Dist., U.S. Atomi obert OPPENHEIMER, n KISTIAKOWSKY, CH LOS ALAMOS Laborat HALL]	Ae as- you con- to draw ou have and at pres- ther- hese ic Energy , Director hief of
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our man shoul serts that KA sider such a up a question any questions KALIBR KISTIAKOWSKI [ent working a modynamic pro two professor No. 967 15 Decembe Comments: [i] V [ii] O [iii] K [iv] C [vi] T [vii] L [vii] O [ix] K [x] M	<pre>d meet KALIER a LIBR would be v meeting advisab naire and pass of priority in also reports: ix}(MLAD's[x] r t the Camp. Th cess. Advise w s. r IKTOR: Lt. Gen SA: i.e. WASP, ALIBR: i.e. CA amp-2: Probabl NORMOZ: Manhat roject. IR: NEW YORK C IBERAL: Julius PPENHEIM: Pres f the LOS ALAMO ISTIAKOWSKY: D he Explosives D LAD: i.e. YOUN</pre>	nd interrogate ery glad of suc le? If not, I it to LIBERAL. terest to us. OPPENHEIM[viii eport mentioned e latter is doi hether you have Latter is doi hether you have unable David Gr y LOS ALAMOS. tan Engineering TY. ROSENBERG. umably Dr. J. F S Laboratory. T. George Bogda ivision at the G. Theodore A.	<pre>him personally. F h a meeting. Do y shall be obliged t Report whether yc } from California the latter) are a ng research on the information on th ANTON [xi] S. EENGLASS. Dist., U.S. Atomi obert OPPENHEIMER, n KISTIAKOWSKY, Ch LOS ALAMOS Laborat HALL] IKOV.</pre>	Ae as- you con- to draw bu have and at pres- ther- hese ic Energy , Director hief of tory. 1 1 75


79. New York 1797 to Moscow, 20 December 1944.


	95 VE	NONA
	TODE	
	USSR	Ref. No.:
		Issued: 16/6/76
		Copy No.: 301
	1. DISCUSSION OF ARNO'S CON 2. KRON	VER AND PLAN TO SET UP LABORATORY
		TOWN, LIBERAL TO GO THERE AND PUT THEM IN CONTACT
		(1944)
	From: NEW YORK	
	To: MOSCOW	
	No.: 1797	20 December 1944
	To VIKTOR[1].	
•	Your No. 5740[ii].	
		his cover with ARNO[iii]. ARNO's note about his sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the
	setting up a laboratory was subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARNO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he expl For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note rements with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yet, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should reater detail. The picture will not become clearer
	setting up a laboratory was subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARNO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he expl For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note researchs with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yet, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should
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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	setting up a laboratory was a subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARMO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he explu- For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g before the end of January.	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note reements with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yet, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should reater detail. The picture will not become clearer ARNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town.
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	setting up a laboratory was a subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARMO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he explu- For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g before the end of January.	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note rememts with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yst, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should reater detail. The picture will not become clearer ARNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town. [Continued overleaf]
	setting up a laboratory was a subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARMO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he explu- For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g before the end of January.	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note rememts with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yst, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should reater detail. The picture will not become clearer ARNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town. [Continued overleaf]
	setting up a laboratory was a subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARMO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he explu- For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g before the end of January.	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note rememts with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yst, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should reater detail. The picture will not become clearer ARNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town. [Continued overleaf]
	setting up a laboratory was a subject on which to work ARW Production Conditions of the ARMO envisages concluding ag was not needed: now he explu- For our part we consider that difficulties of organising a the chances of reaching agree agreements with which he is study the possibilities in g before the end of January.	sent in postal despatch No. 8 of 24 October. As the O chose "Problems of the Fractical Application Under Process of Thermal Diffusion of Gases". In his note rememts with firms. At first he said that our help ains that not more than two thousand will be needed. t ARNO does not give sufficient consideration to all the laboratory and has not, as yst, adequately worked out ements with interested firms - on the conclusion of counting heavily. I suggested to him that he should reater detail. The picture will not become clearer ARNO intends to open the laboratory in his own town. [Continued overleaf]



80. New York 12-3, 15-6 to Moscow, 4 January 1945.

BRID	Ē	
TOP SECR	ET	
USSR	Ref No: S/W7F/75L4 Issued: 21/5/1954	
	Copy Na: Zaś	
"ALBERT'S" CESERVA	TIONS ON "ROBERT".	
From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW		
Nos.: 12, 13, 15, 16	4 Jenuar: 19 <u>45</u>	
[Four-part mes	sage complete}	
[Part I] To VINTOR[i].		
time the advisability of two or three persons who filming and safekeeping concentrated in ROBERT'S that we are not proposin of the people but we van possible conditions for materials, since, judgin KhATALIVJ is probably in and there is no guarants accident, materials he m happens will not fall in cur sources would not be the moment everything is		
Distrigution	[Continued overleaf]	
	·	
s/NET/T544		
[4 Pages]		
4	OP-SECRET-	
	BRIDE	





	- 4 - S/NET/T5-4	
	This sentence contains a similar anacoluthon in the original. Presumably some part of the subordinate clause has been omitted.	
·	(b) SUPRUGI means "ccuple" in the sense of a married ccuple.	
	[c] Presumably an error for "presence".	
	[1] I.a., cvert.	
	[e] Inserted by the translator.	
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: probably LtGeneral P.M. FITIN.	
	[ii] "JERT: not identified.	
	(iii) ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER.	
	[iv] KhATA: the F.B.I.	
	<pre>[v] KOL'TSOV: not identified.</pre>	
	[vi] ELERON: not identified.	
	[vii] ZhOLUD': pessibly Bella [criginally Bela ?] GOLD.	
	[viii] ZhENYa: possibly Sonia Steinman GOLD.	
	[ix] ZEMLYaKI: members of the Communist Party.	
	[x] DORA: Helen Witte SILVERMUSTER.	
	[xi] EL': not identified.	
	[xii] PILOT: possibly William Ludwig ULLMAN.	
	[xiii] GOROZhLNE: .mericans.	
	[xiv] KLRFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D.C.	
	[xv] M/J: MGB resident in NEW YORK.	
	".S. No.: XY-1.06 (Revision)	
	S/1137/T544	
	•	

i

81. New York 18-9 to Moscow, 4 January 1945.

Reissue (T210.2 and 211) From: NEW YORK MOSCOW To: No: 18-19 4 January 1945 [Part I] To VIKTOR(1). [w:]Further to No.2[a]. Here is the gist of the enclosure to LOUIS's[ii] memorandum: 1. In "Memoranda on Conversations" LOUIS sets out the reactions to FROST[iii] of various persons with whom he and FROST came in contact. Opinions agree that FROST is not running the business competently, that he is making many empty promises, that he is not listening to advice and that he over-estimates his capabilities. 2. In "Summary Report" LOUIS reports about the various steps in the development of the company and FROST's mistakes which were connected with them. He considers it necessary soon to reorganize the company by setting up the following departments (in order of importance): 1. Production. 2. Selection of music to publish, of the artists and gramophone recordings. 3. Promotion. 4. Distribution. Except for PROST LOUIS considers that none of the present personnel is adequate to deal with the tasks which confront each of these departments. In his opinion FROST should concentrate his attention on the problems of the second department; LOUIS himself, not knowing the technology of production, undertakes to head distribution. For promoting the products ability of high order is required. At present the company is failing to deal with the problem of production and this means that business is at a standstill. For In the this is necessary the conlistment of a specialist who could surround himself with experienced sound recorders, chemists and machine experts and who would know the market. 4144 [Part II] He and 4 qualified workers could solve the personnel problem. He [68 groups unrecoverable] Chronological Report for 1944" LOUIS describes the activities of the company. Magazine 4 and 5. Newspaper clippings and a copy of postal and telegraphic [1 group unidentified] on company business. The end Confe sponde the group 1 cm 2 . 3 ? No.12 MAY[MAJ][iv] M.H Ohr-


DINAR VENONA Ί⇔r ALUBERT[V] is urgently asking for a CONTAX camera for ACORN [ZhOLUD'][vi]. It is extremely difficult to get one here. Please telegraph YuRIJ[vii] at once. here. No.13 MAY Your No.6165[b]. DDT is a disinfectant used by the army of the COUNTRY [STRANA][v111]. See our letter No.1 of 1944, the paragraph about CHROME PIGMENT [KRON][ix]. No.14 ANTON [x] Your No.5351[c]. You agreed to the use of AKhMED[xi] in the second line. In order to decide the question of whether to use him as a group leader in this line in place of BEK[xii]. again place permit NAZAR[xiii] to have a chat with AKhMED for-the purpose of verification. In confurnce of a second beg No.15 4 January MAY. Notes: [a] Not available [b] Not available [c] Not available Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN [11] LOUIS: Alfred K. STERN. [111] FROST: Boris MORROS. [iv] MAJ: Stepan Zakharovich APRESYaN. [v] AL'BERT: Probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKhMEROV. [v1] ZhOLUD': Bella GOLD. [vii] YuRIJ: Lev A. TARASOV. [viii] STRANA: U.S.A. [1x] KRON: Unidentified cover-name. [x] ANTON: Leonid Romanovich KVASNIKOV. [xi] AKhMED: Unidentified. [xii] BEK: Sergej Nikolaevich KURNAKOV. [xiii] NAZAR: Stepan Nikolaevich ShUNDENKO.

82. New York 27 to Moscow, 8 January 1945.

i	
	TOP SECRET MENONA
	Reissue(T212.1)
	From: NEW YORK
	To: MOSCOW
	No: 27
	8 January 19 <u>45</u>
	TO VIKTOR[1].
	SERGEJ's[ii] conversation with SIMA[iii] took place on [B% 4 January]. SIMA gives the impression of being a serious person who is politically well developed and there is no doubt of her sincere desire to help us. She had no doubt about whom she is working for and said that the nature of the materials in which we are interested pointed to the fact that it was our country which was in question. She was very satisfied that she was dealing with us and said that she deeply appreciated the confidence shown in her and understood the importance of our work.
	SIMA's transfer to a new job was made at the insistence of her [D% superiors]
	[64 groups unrecoverable]
	generalizing materials from all departments [OTDELY]. SIMA will probably start work on 15 February.
	On the basis of this preliminary information there is reason to assume that in her new job SIMA will be able to carry out very important work for us in throwing light on the activities of the KhATA[iv]. The fruitfulness of her work will to a considerable ex- tent depend upon our ability to organize correct and constant di- rections. It should be remembered that SIMA from an operational point of view is quite undeveloped and she will need time to learn conspiracy and to correctly gain an understanding of the questions which interest us.
	A final decision on the question of direction and liaison can be taken [B% only] after she has moved to CARTHAGE[KARFAGEN][v] when it will be ascertained [B% specifically] what her new job con- sists of.
	No. w22 MAJ[vi] 8 January
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. [ii] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN. [iii] SIMA: Judith COPLON. [iv] KhATA: The Federal Bureau of Investigation. [v] KARFAGEN: WASHINGTON, D. C. [vi] MAJ: Stepan APRESYAN.
	29 January 1974
	FOP-SECRET AND VENONA

83. Moscow 14 to New York, 4 January 1945.


	BRIDE /	
	FOP SECRET	
	TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY . NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE,	
	USSR Ref No: S/N37/T259	
	Lesued: (30/10/1952 Copy No: 25	
•	Copy No: Les	
	1. ADDRESS FOR "FOTON'S" CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS WIFE.	
	2. MENTION OF LIAISON WITH MATUS.	
	3. FINANCES FOR "GROWTH's" ENTERPRISE.	
	4. INSISTENCE BY "SACHS" THAT HIS MATERIAL IS HANDED TO "THE FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN'S" ORGANISATION AS WELL AS TO THE MGB.	
	From: NEW YORK	
	From: NEW YORK To: MOSCOW	
	No.: 14 4 Jan 19 <u>45</u>	
	To VICTOR ^[1] .	
	FOTON receives telegrams from his wife not from the address indicated by you in letter No. 7 but 9 Kuznetskij Most[11] [,] the RUTOVSKIJ's apartment. Advise what sort of an address FOTON ought to use.	
	No.7 ANTON	
	[Continued overleaf]	
	Distribution	
	S/NBF/T259 BRIDE	
	[3 Pages] JOPSEGRET	



·			
da	BRIDE	_	
	REPT UNDER LOCK AND REY :	CANOF	
	- 3 -	S/NBF/T259	
[iv]	SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergee	vich PRAVDIN.	
[v]	in which on 23 Aug 1944 1000 dollars to expand (concerned with the man [ShTAMPY]), and S/NBF/T 28 Dec 1944 BORIS (MGB NEW YORK) queried "the allotted to ODESSIT's e had deciphered as 150. that MOSCOW replied tha	M.J asked for "ODESSIT's enterprise" uffocture of dies 248 in which on cipher clerk in amount additionally nterprise", which he It must be assumed it this figure was we rise to the observations	
[v1]	a member of the Communi	L Derived from the Yak [FELLOW COUNTRYMAN] - .st Party of the country ino English noun	
[vii]	ROBERT: Nathan Gregory	SILVERMASTER.	
[viii]	RULEVOJ: Earl Russell E		*
[ix]	EKhO: Bernard SCHUSTER name - CHESTER).	(Communist Party	
[x]	R.: 1.e. RULEVOJ (see [viii] above).	
[x1]	M/J: Pavel Ivanovich FE to the Consul-General a the Soviet Consulate-Ge	nd NKGB resident in	
	W.5	. No.: XY-66.2	
S/NBF/T259	BRID	E REFELCANOE	

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84. New York 79 to Moscow, 18 January 1945.



VENDIA 2. VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER. RICHARD: Harry Dexter WHITE. ROUBLE: Probably Harold GLASSER. MAJ: Pavel Ivanovich FEDOSIMOV. NABOB: Henry MORGENTHAU, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. MAJ's confusion is due to the fact that the proposed pro-motion, which later took place, was from "assistant secretary of the treasury." There was probably no slip of the pen, but he sorted the positions out correctly by using the Russian words for "assistant" and "deputy" respectively. ZEMLYACHESKIJ (adjective) and ZEMLYAKI (noun) refer to members of the communist party of the country in ques-tion. Here, therefore, they mean "American communist party" (attributive) and "members of the American commu-nist party" respectively. ALBERT: Iskhak Abdulovich AKHMEROV, alias W. GREINKE. REJDER: i.e., RAIDER: Victor PERLO. ZhENYa: Sonia GOLD, nee STEINMAN, employed in the Treas-ury Department from 24 August 1943 to 21 August 1947. If she was in fact GLASSER's secretary at the time of this message, the statement here is a strong confirmation of the identifications of ROUBLE and ZhENYA; if she was not, it strongly suggests that one or both identifica-tions are incorrect. Footnotes: [i] [ii] [iii] [iv] [v] [vi] [vii] [viii] [ix] [x] [xi] not, it strongly suggests that one or both identifica-tions are incorrect. [xii] Probationers: Agents. 29 September 1976 VENONA

85. New York 82 to Moscow, 18 January 1945.

	TOP SECRET TRINE VENGELA
	-103
	Prom: New YORK
	10:
	No:
	ić January 1 <u>7-2</u>
	To VIRTOR[1].
	Recently TSERBER[ii] asked ROBART[iii] how he could reestablish con- tact with the man through whom he was connected with the "FELLOW- COUNTRY.EN(ZEMIYAR](iv]. TSERBER works in the accounts section of PEAK's[PIK][v] department. Since you advised in no. 3937 [a] that TSERBER was a probationer of the NEIGHBORG[SOSEDI][vi] allow us to inform the head NEIGHBOR about TSERBER's request. If the NEIGHBORS have lost contact with him he [B% probably]
	(13 groups unrecoverable).
	ALBERT(AL'EERT)(vii) also (5 groups unrecoverei).
	المال(مانا) (المان) (viii)
	ic January
•	
	, ,
	Notes: [a] Not available.
	Comments: [i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.
	[11] TSERBER: Unidentified. Either a cover-name "CERBERUS" or a transliteration of a surname of German origin CERBER or LERBER.
	(iii] ROBERT: Nathan Gregory SILVER-ASTER.
	[iv] LELYAKI: Jembers of the Communist Party
	<pre>[v] PIX: Fossibly Virginius Frank CO2.</pre>
	[vi] SOSEDI: Headers of another Soviet Intelligence organi- zation, here apparently the GRU.
	(vii) AL'BERT: Probably Iskhak Abdulovich AKhAEROV.
	(viii) Lw: Stepan APRESYAN.
	27ey _y6c
	TOP SECRET TRINE YENONA
	· .

86. Moscow 200 to New York, 6 March 1945.

	١	/ENONA			
95	TOP	ECRET			
USSR		Ref. 1	No.: 3/NBF/T2208		,
		Issue	1: 17/6/76		
			No.: 301		
BONUSES FOR S	OURCES, INCLU	JDING LIBERAL AND NIL,	SIFTS OR PAYMENTS FOR :		
From: MOS	204	(1945)		61.10 6.1	
	York				
No.: 200	10101	6 Ma	rch 1945		
		[66 groups unrecovered]	• • • • •		
either the pu	W dollars[,] [rchase of val	arding the sources as a NLL[ii] 58 groups unrecoverable uable gifts for the pre- ssis of well thought out) Dationers [STAZDER] o		
		[28 groups unrecovered]	cover-acorres.	,	
No. 1306		VIKTO	{ [iii]		
Footnotes:	LIBERAL:	Formerly covername "A	TENNALL THE BOSTNEL	EDC	
	L] NIL:	ie either "(River) NII formerly "TU"; unic "NIL" also occurs in N 1944 (3/NBF/T58), 125 and 1657 of 27 November	E" or a name eg "NEIL. lentified covername. ' IEW YORK's Nos. 863 of of 2 September 1944 (NEALE"; "TU"/ 16 June	
[ii	I] VIKTOR:	Lt General Pavel Mikha	jlovich FITIN.		
		· · · ·			
3/NBF/T2208 [1 page] AJH		VENIONI)	
	1	COP-SECRI)	

87. Moscow 284 and 286 to New York, 28 March 1945.

Reissue(T940)	
From: MOSCOW	
To: NEW YORK	
No: 286, 284	
28	March 19 <u>45</u>
<pre>[Part I] With Post No. 1 were received "ZORA's"[i] report there are the following facts which deserve serious at</pre>	
1. In the report of 2 February 1945 in 2 pages, she,	
the situation concerning the change of working location institutions of the "COUNTRY[STRANA]"[ii] by the code	
tions adopted by us in our telegraphic and written con "CLUB{KLUB}"[iii], "BANK"[iv], "CABARET[KABARE]"[v].	rrespondence
2. In the reports of 1 and 3 February "20RA" several	
tions the words "BANK", "CABARET", "HOUSE[DOM]"[vi], ' is not a question about communications which have been	"CLUB". It
unrecovered] in the OFFICE (KONTORA) [vii] in which you	filled in
the prearranged designations, but about [1 group unrec written personally by ZORA nos. 8, 10, 111, 112.	covereal
3. In the report of [1 group unrecovered] January 194	5 "ZORA"
in detail sets forth the following story: "SIMA's"[vi WOOLWORTH[VUL'VORT][ix] from the Military Department of	iii] chief,
entrusted "ZORA" with finding out in her [31 groups unrecovered]	
was such an informer. "ZORA" gave	
[19 groups unrecovered]	
John DUNNING[DANING][x] [3 groups unrecovered]. To D question, whender [C% she] was interested in this inf group unrecovered] the "BANK" ZORA answered that anot tion, whose name she had been forbidden to disclose, ested in the information and that this other institut: get in touch with him. A member of the Military Depai "SIMA's" institution AleXSander SACKS[xi] [Aleksandr 1 conversation with ZORA [2 groups unrecovered] about the [10 groups unrecovered]	ormation [] her institu- was inter- ion would rtment of SAKS] in a
by him declined. SACKS gave ZORA the task of trying the "RADIO STATION[RATSIYa]"[xii] materials about Swi	to get in ss-German
Personal Person	

TOTO NA	
2.	
financial operations [C% and]	
[38 groups unrecoverable]	
[Part II] To "ZORA's" question to SACKS and WOOLWORTH, why they are not receiving material from the "RADIO STATION" through an offi- cial representative, [2 groups unrecovered] institutions of the "COUNTRY" including the "BANK", WOOLWORTH is trying to [C% seek out] [5 groups unrecovered] the CLUB. WOOLWORTH told "ZORA" that in the IZBA[xiii], BANK, RADIO STATION, FARM[KhUTOR][xiv] [4	
<pre>[17 groups unrecovered]</pre>	
by the next post answer:	
1. Why [1 group unrecovered] ZORA.	
 Were these reports read [1 group unrecovered] by the liaison man. 	
Did "MAJ" [xv] and "SERGEJ" [xvi] see these reports.	
4. Who told "ZORA" [3 groups unrecovered] and then told "[1 group unrecovered]"	
[13 groups unrecovered]	
to WOOLWORTH and SACKS.	
6. Why did ZORA begin to take	
[33 groups unrecovered]	
steps taken to curtail ZORA's dangerous activities.	
Without waiting for instructions from us after you reply to the questions which have been raised, immediately and in detail enlighten our liaison man about the serious mistakes he has com- mitted in the work with "ZORA". As an ultimatum warn ZORA that if she does not carry out our instructions and if she undertakes steps without our consent, we shall immediately terminate all relations with er. Forbid ZORA to recruit all her acquaintances one after the other. Take all steps to see that ZORA's activities do not lead to serious political complications with the "COUNTRY". This example clearly illustrates not only the falling off in the Resi- dency's work of controlling and educating probationers, but also the lack of understanding by our operational workers of the most elementary rules in our work.	
No. 1893 [Signature unrecoverable]	

D

D

3. Comments: ZORA: Flora Don WOVSCHIN. STRANA: U.S.A. KLUB: Probably the Department of Justice. BANK: U.S. State Department. KABARE: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American [i] [ii] [iii] [iv] [v] Affairs. DOM: Probably refers to the central MGB organization in MOSCOW. KONTORA: Local MGB organ or residency. [vi] In MOSCOW. KONTORA: Local MGB organ or residency. SIMA: Judith COPLON. VUL'VORT: This is the transliterated form of the name WOOLWORTH. However, it is probably an error for WOHLFORTH. Robert Martin WOHLFORTH was at this time Chief of the Economic Warfare Section, Department of Justice, NEW YORK CITY. DUNNING: Not further identified. SACKS: Alexander SACKS also worked in the Economic Warfare Section of the Department of Justice. RATSIYA: Office of War Information. IZBA: Office of Strategic Services. KhUTOR: Foreign Economic Administration. MAJ: i.e. MAY, Stepan APRESYAN. SEREJ: Vladimir PRAVDIN. [vii] [viii] [ix] [x] [xi] [xii] [xiii] [xiv] [xv] [xvi] 31 January 1974 VISIONA 417

88. Washington 1793 to Moscow, 29 March 1945.

VENONA 95 100-SECOLI Ref. No: 3/NEF/T1727 USSR Issued: 13/10/1965 Copy No: 204 MATERIAL FROM "H" (1945) Degist From: WASHINGTON MOSCOW To: م ''ن 29 March 45 1793 No: ξıκ, To the 8th Department. Material from "H[G]"[1]. I am transmitting telegram No. 2535 of 16th March, 1945 from the "NOCK[ZAKOULOK]"[ii] to the "POOL[OMUT]"[iii]. "Sent to WASHINGTON as telegram No. 2535 of 16th March and repeated to MOSCOW. Secret MOSCOW telegrams Nos 823 and 824. 1. [The remainder of the text (360 groups) has been largely recovered. It is a Russian translation of the telegram referred to above, which was sent by Mr. Eden (the Foreign Secretary) to Lord Halifar (British Anbassedor in WASHINGTON).] [1 group unrecoverable][a] [2 groups unrecoverable][a] [a] The WASHINGTON HGB officer's signature and reference Note: number are unrecoverable. Comments: [1] "H" : Abbreviation for HONER, the cover-name of Donald Duart MACLEAN. See comment [1] in 3/NEF/T1725 issued 13th October, 1965. [ii] NOCK : The British Foreign Office. [111] POOL : British Embassy in WASHINGTON. Distribution: 3/NBF/T1727 VENONA

	<u>،</u> د	TOP	SECRET B	Hink VE	NONA	
				0m 4	84	
	Fro	m: WASHINGTON				
	To:				•	
	No.	: 1793		29 March 19 <u>45</u>		
	То	the 8th Departmer	nt.			
	"NO0 [OM1	Materials of OK [2AKOULOK]"[11] DT]"[111].	"G"[1]. I am tran No.2535 of 16 Mar	smitting a telegra ch this year to th	am of the he "POOL	
		"Sent to WASHIN to MOSCOW.	IGTON under No.2535	of 16 March and 1	repeated	
		SECRET.				
		Reference teleg	rams from MOSCOW N	os.823 and 824.		
ţ		that the Presid putting to the consider it imp stage. From th telegram No.912 to reconsider h	rams arrived simul Prime Minister (No ent is still not i Russians all those ortant to reach an e Prime Minister's , you can see that is position in the r A. Clark KERR, an	(718). The messag inclined to support questions, on whi agreement with th answer, transmitt he is urging the	e shows us in ch we em at this ed in President	
	·	unrecovered] to supplemented by in the decision your disposal to us on the basis on such a basis for the Commiss: Americans togeth	possible please see n, the President ar MOLOTOV, suggested my telegram No.253 of these affairs. o induce them to ma of this draft. We will it be possibl ion's work. We be mer take a firm pose way on some of the	d show them [2 gr by Sir A. Clark 7. You should ta Use all argument ke a concerted ef are convinced th e to establish a leve that if we a tion the Pureta	oups KERR and ke part s at fort with at only foundation	÷
		accebe orte M. Cl	ot succeed in persu lark KERR's draft a nim to send Mr. HAR	s it stands in m	nt to y opinion	
			[10 groups unre	coverable]		
		question of a tr to instruct Sir Mr. HARRIMAN in	. (From the Prime he point on which w "uce). If this wer A. Clark KERR imme making a communica the urgency of th	e cannot give way e done, I should a diately to concert	is the be ready	

	TOP SECRET DINAR VENONA	
	FOI SHOREF DIMIN	
	 [10 groups unrecovered] specific points, which 	
	[35 groups unrecoverable]	
	Comments:	
	[1] G: i.e., HOMER [GOMER], Donald MacLean.[11] NOOK: The British Foreign Office.	
	[11] NOOK. The British Foreign Office. [111] POOL: British Embassy in Washington.	
	20 July 1965	
	20 0019 1909	
	•••	
	TOP SECRET DIMAR VENONA	

Ξ. TRINE YENONA TOP SECRET From: WASHINGTON To: 1.OSCOW 1793 No: 29 March 1945 Attachment In paragraph 3 of the NSA version of the translation of this message the "10 groups unrecoverable" should contain the following: "instructions covering at least the more important points" Paragraph 4 should read: "4. My immediately following telegram contains arguments on specific points which you should use with Mr. STETTINIUS and the President in andi-tion to those contained in the Prime Linister's message no. 912." c'il ant 415 24 . ay. 1960

89. Washington 1822 to Moscow, 30 March 1945.

	ENONA
	MGB
	From: WASHINGTON
	To: MDSCOW
	No: 1822
	36 March 1945
	Further to our telegram No. 283[d]. As a result of $"[D \neq A.'s]"[1]$ chat with "ALES"[11] the following has been ascertained:
	1. ALES has been working with the NEIGHBORS[SOSEDI][111] continuously since 1935.
	 For some years past he has been the leader of a small group of the NEIGHBORS' probationers[STAZHERY], for the most part consisting of his relations.
	3. The group and ALES himself work on obtaining military information only. Materials on the "BARK"[iv] allegedly interest the NEIGHBORS very little and he does not produce them regularly.
	4. All the last few years ALES has been working with "FOL'"[v] who also meets other members of the group occasionally.
	5. Recently ALES and his whole group were awarded Soviet decorations.
	6. After the YaLTA Conference, when he had gone on to MOSCOW, a Soviet personage in a very responsible position (ALES gave to understand that it was Comrade VYShINSKIJ) allegedly got in touch with ALES and at the behest of the Military NEIGHBORS passed on to him their gratitude and so on.
	30- 431 VADIM(v1)
	Hotes: [a] Not available.
	Comments: [1] A.: "A." seems the most likely garble here although "A." has
	not been confirmed elsewhere in the WASHINGTON traffic. [11] ALES: Probably Algor HISS.
•	[iii] SOSEDI: Members of enother Soviet Intelligence organization, here probably the GRU.
	[iv] BANK: The U.S. State Department. [v] POL': i.e. "PAUL." unidentified cover-mame.
	[vi] VADIM: Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, MGB resident in WASHIMOTOR.
	8 August 1969
	TOP DEGREE MENON
	·

90. Moscow 298 to NY, 31 March 1945.

	YENONA
USSR	Ref. No: 3/NBF/T2090
	Issued : A265/16/08/1979
	Copy No:
	IISSUE
EVALUATION OF MAT	TERIAL ON ENORMOZ: FROM JLAR AND FROM MLAD (1945)
From: MOSCOW	
To : NEW YORK	
No : 298	31 March 19 <u>45</u>
ANTON [i]	—
We are sending herewith an eval materials from "ChARL'Z" [iii] about	sation on ENORMOZ [ii]. Referenced are the FUNICULAR $[1v]$:
a) 5/46 [v].	
[31 grd	oups unrecovered]
gaskets [SAL'NIKI]	
b) 5/60 - [6 groups unrecovered calculation, which will be used during by the set of the set of	d] - contains an interesting method of ng the design.
c) $5/62$ - technical data on the	e FUNICULAR and
[12 gr	oups unrecovered]
d) 7/83, paragraph 1 - about t - offers substantial interest.	ne degree of separation of the membrane [v1]
	sts of the membrane and information about rest. What is needed is [7 groups unre-
	of the [c% stability] of the FUNICULAR - this question received earlier they form tion.
 MLAD's [vii] report about we covered] great interest. 	ork [4 groups unrecovered] [1 group unre-
No. 1972	VIKTOR [viii]
<u>Distribution</u>	[continued]
P Copies	14 h h
1-2 NSA (A265) 3 FBI	
4 CIA 5 Security Service	
6 7 (via CIA)	
 ASIO (via NSA) Security Service/ Representation 	entatives - WASHINGTON
10	MENIANIA
3/NBF/T2090	CANANED BY HEAVESHA 1732

HAL!	720					YENONA
				-2-		3/NBF/T2090
Footnotes:	[i]	ANTON :	: Leoni	d Romanovi	ch KVASNI	κον
	[ii]	ENORMOZ :	The M Bomb)	anhattan Pi	roject (D	evelopment of the Atomic
	[iii]	ChARL'Z :	ie CH	ARLES; Dr.	Klaus Em	il FUCHS.
	[iv]	FUNICULAR:	First fusio	occurence. n plant K25	Probab at CLIN	ly the gaseous dif- TON Tennessee.
	[v]	A dispatch month or p serial fro	ostal d	ispatch num	nber and	ment.is probably the the second a running t.
	[vi]	membrane :	Also :	referred to	as "bar	ier" in some books.
	[vii]	MLAD :	Theod	ore M. HALI)	
	{viii]	VIKTOR :	Lt. G	eneral Pave	l Mikhaj	Lovich FITIN



91. Moscow 337 to New York, 8 April 1945.

BRIDE 95 TOP-seere Ref. No: 3/NBF/T1031 (pf 30/7/1958) USSR Issued: 25/11/1959 Copy No: 204 2nd RE-ISSUE WARNING ABOUT THE COMPETITORS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR "ALBERT'S" GROUP (1945) From: MOSCOW NEW YORK To: 337 8 Apr. <u>45</u> No: 5.0' According to information we have received from VADIM[1] the Competitors of the "COUNTRY"[11] and the "ISLAND"[111] have worked out joint measures for strengthening work [71 groups unrecovered] transmission of information by telegraph. Give tasks [15 groups unrecovered] [29 groups unrecoverable] and people devoted to us. In the work with $\text{ALBERT}^*s^{[\nabla]}$ group it is essential to adhere to the following: JULIA's [YuLIYa] [71] meeting with ART[ART] [V11] or EERG[V111] should not be more than 3 times a month. 1. 2. [15 groups unrecovered] ROBERT's [ix] materials should be conveyed to $\text{TYRE}^{[x]}$ only on film and in 3. small batches. ELSA, HERG and ART, who are to be co-opted by ALEERT for the purpose, are to take turns in making the trip to CARTHAGE[st] for HOMERT's materials. 4. Distribution [Continued overleaf] 3/NBF/T1 031 (2 Pages) 427

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	95
	FOD SECOLT
	2 3/IEF/TH 031
•	With the probationers [3 groups unrecovered] [B% ROBERT] and his wife
	5. As regards the work with the probationers in TYRE follor the same principles. Organise the work of your
	[60 groups unrecovered]
	No. 153 <u>PHTROV[xiii]</u>
	Emrrov[x11]
	Comments: [1] VADIM : Anatolij Borisovich GROMOV, 1st Secretary at
	Soviet Embassy, Washington.
	[11] COUNTRY : U.S.A.
	[111] ISLAND : GREAT BRITAIN.
	[iv] ELSA : Unidentified cover-name.
	[v] ALHERT : "
	[v1] JULLA : Olga Valentinovna KhLOPKOVA.
	and the second sec
	[ix] ROHERT : Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER. [x] TIRE : NEW YORK CITY.
	[x1] CARTHAGE : MASHINGTON, D.C.
	[x11] DORA : Helen SILVERMASTER.
	[xiii] PETROV : Unidentified MOSCOW signatory.
•	
	•
	J/NEF/TIOM


92. New York 776 to Moscow, 25 May 1945.

<image/> <text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text>	~~	VENONA		
 FIGHT DEPENDENT OF PRODUCTIONES FROM PARE DEPENDENT AND SUBSECUENT CLEARER OF PRODUCTIONES FROM PARE DE POURSE OF PRODUCTIONES FROM PARE DE POURSE OF POURSE	95			
 FIGHT DEPENDENT OF PRODUCTIONES FROM PARE DEPENDENT AND SUBSECUENT CLEARER OF PRODUCTIONES FROM PARE DE POURSE OF PRODUCTIONES FROM PARE DE POURSE OF POURSE	TGSR	B	Lef. No: 3/NBF/T150 (of 21/1/1952)	
EXTIME ELENSTER OF PROJUNCIES FLOW CLEEPT TO THOMAN AND SUBSECUENT ILENSTER OF "CLEEPT FROM WALAR" TO "WALLE" (1945) Frem: NT: YORK To: MOSCOT No: 76 Jon MNO. 3396[s]. To VIETOR[1]. Jumin on concentance with the understanding with "YALLE" (1], CLEEPT will (1] on an "ALLE" (ENTRY)" (*). On 25th May "CLEEPT [CLEEPT SOLE (LIEVAN" [KLOW WILL" ['11] on an "ALLE" (ENTRY)" (*). Mos. 463 SERCEJ[12] 25 May 125 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not available. Comments: [1] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. P. L. FITIN. [11] CLEEPT : Robert Sone LS. [12] ID DILLARS : Trotskylies. [13] CLEEPT : Possibly Jems. INSTITUTION			-	
TLINSTER OF FROLATIONEES FROM "CLECH" TO "BOHAN" AND SUBSECTION TRINSTER OF "CLECH" FROM "MALAR" TO "VADIN" (1945) From: NT YORK To: MOSCOT No: 776 Z5 May 45 To VINTOR[1]. To VINTOR[1]. To VINTOR[1]. To Star Y COEH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOHAN" [iii] of the productioners dealing with "POLECATS [KLORNET]"[iv] and "RATS [KINTSY]"[v]. On 155 June in accordance with the understanding with "VADIN" [val], CLECH will be handed over by NAZAR[vii] to VADIN in THER[vii]. No. 463 SERCEJ[is] 25 May 1945 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not evailable. Comments: [a] No. 3396 not evailable. Comments: [i] VINTOR : Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN. [iii] COEM: : Robert SOBLE. [iv] POLECATS: Trotskyltes. [v] EATS : Possibly Jems. [v] EATS : Possibly Jems.		c	opy No: 204	
<pre>From: NET YORK To: MOSCOT No: 776 JS May 45 To VINTOR[1]. To VINTOR[1]. To VINTOR[1]. To VINTOR[1]. To 25 May 45 To VINTOR[1]. To 25 May 45 To VINTOR[1]. To 25 May 45 To 25 May 45 To ADDA TO 2000 For THE STATE (KADRYNT) [11] or ADDA [1</pre>		REI 36UE	<u>*</u>	
<pre>From: NF: YORK To: MOSCOT No: 776 To VIENOR[1]. To VIENOR[1]. On 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 29th kay "C2ECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOMAN"[iii] on 3956 not available. SERCEJ[ix] 25 Hay 1945 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not available. [iii] C2ECH : Robert Onen MENKER. [iii] CDEANS : Trotskyites. [iv] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [v] PLTS : Possibly Jems. <u>DISTRIBUTION</u> [Continued overleaf]</pre>	This	NSFER OF PRODATIONERS FROM "CZE	CH" TO "ROHAN" AND SUBSECUENT	
<pre>Te: MCSCOT No: 776 25 May 45 To VINTOR[1]. Do 29th Lay "CZECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "ROEAH"[iii] of the productioners dealing with "POLSCATS [KhORNET]"[i] and "RATS [KARSY]"[v]. On tat June in accordance with the understanding with "WADIL"[v1], CZECH will on tat June in accordance with the understanding with "WADIL"[v1], CZECH will on tat June in accordance with the understanding with "WADIL"[v1], CZECH will on tat June in accordance with the understanding with "WADIL"[v1], CZECH will on tat June in accordance with the understanding with "WADIL"[v1], CZECH will <u>55 May 1945</u> Notes: [a] No. 3396 not evailable. Generate: [1] VINTUR : Lt, Gen. P. & FTIN. [1] COLAN : Robert SOLE. [1] COLAN : Robert SOLE. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [1] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [2] EATS : Possibly Jern.</pre>		TRANSPER OF "CZECH" PROMINAZ	AR" TO "VADIL" (1945)	
<pre>M: MSGOT M: 76 M: 7</pre>	From . No	אמא ייי		
<pre>Not 76 25 May 54</pre>				
To VIETOR[1]. Your No. 3396[a]. On 29th Lay "CZECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOKAN"[iii] of the probationers dealing with "POLECARS [KDOR'KI]"[iv] and "RAIS [KRISY]"[v]. On 1st June in accordance with the understanding with "VADIN"[vi], CZECH will be handed over by MAZAR[vii] to VADIL' in TIRE[vi]). No. 483 SERCEJ[ix] 25 Lay 1945 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not svailable. Comments: [i] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. P. L. FITIN. [ii] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [ii] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [v] POLECARS: Trotskyites. [v] RATS : Possibly Jems. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]			25 Nay 45	
Your No. 3396[s]. On 29th hay "CZECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "ROKAN" [iii] of the probationers dealing with "POLECATS [KHOR'KI]"[iv] and "RATS [KENSY]"[v]. On 1st June in accordance with the understanding with "VADIW"[vi], CZECH will be handed over by NAZAR[vii] to VADIR' in TYRE[viii]. No. 463 <u>SERCEJ[ix]</u> 25 ::ay 1945 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not available. Comments: [i] VIETOR : Lt. Gen. P. L. FITIN. [ii] CZECH : Robert Owen MENNER. [ii] ROHAN : Robert SOBLE. [iv] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [v] EATS : Possibly Jewn. <u>DISTRIBUTION</u> [Continued overleaf]		-		
On 29th Hay "CZECH [ChEKh]"[ii] will complete the transfer to "BOKAN"[iii] of the probationers dealing with "POLECATS [KHOR'KI]"[iv] and "RATS [KHYSY]"[v]. On 1st June in accordance with the understanding with "WADIN"[vi], CZECH will be handed over by NAZAR[vii] to VADIN in TYRE[viii]. No. 483 SERCEJ[ix] <u>25 Hay 1945</u> Notes: [a] No. 3396 not available. Comments: [1] VIKTOE : Lt. Gen. P. L. FITIN. [iii] CZECH : Robert Owen MENAKER. [iii] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [iv] FOLECATS: Trotskyites. [v] BaTS : Possibly Jown. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]	To VIKTOR	l[1].		
of the probationers dealing with "POLISCATS [KDNNT] [1] and "RATS [KENSY]"[*]. On 1st June in accordance with the understanding with "VADIN" [vi], CZBCH will be handed over by NAZAR[vii] to VADIL in TYPE[viii]. No. 463 SERCEJ[ix] 25 Hay 1945 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not available. Comments: [i] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. K. FITIN. [ii] CZECH : Robert Owen MENAKER. [iii] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [iv] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [v] EATS : Possibly Jews. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]	Your	No. 3396[a].		
25 Hay 1945 Notes: [a] No. 3396 not available. Comments: [1] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. K. FITIN. [11] CZECH : Robert Oven MENAKER. [11] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [11] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [v] RATS : Possibly Jews. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]	of the pr On 1st Ju be handed	robationers dealing with "POLECAT une in accordance with the unders	<pre>IS [KhOR'KI]"[iv] and "RAIS [KRYSY]"[v]. standing with "VADIN"[vi], C28CH will TYRE[viii].</pre>	
Comments: [1] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. L. FITIN. [11] CZECH : Robert Owen MENAKER. [11] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [11] POLECATS: Trotskyltes. [17] RATS : Possibly Jews. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]	25 Lay 19			
<pre>[ii] CZECH : Robert Owen MENAKER. [iii] ROMAN : Robert SOBLE. [iv] POLECATS: Trotekyites. [v] RATS : Possibly Jews. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]</pre>			. FITIN.	
[iv] POLECATS: Trotskyites. [v] EATS : Possibly Jews. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf]				
[v] EATS : Possibly Jews.				
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95 IOP DIN - 2 -3/18F/T15Ø Comments [Cont'd]: [vi] VLDIM : Aratolij Borisovich GROKOV, Pilat Secretary at the Soviet Echasoy in 7AUHINGTON. [vii] MAZAR : Stepan Nikolmevich ShONDENKO, an employee at the Soviet Consulate, NEW YORK. [vili] TYRE : MEN YORK CITY. [ix] SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN, TA33 representative in NE. YORK. 3/NEF/11 50 420

93. New York 777-9 to Moscow, 25 May 1945.


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	95 VENONA
	TOPSECRET
	USSR Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T2 (of 19/7/1950) Lesued : 15/9/1973
	Copy No.: 301
	STH REISSUE
	JOSEPH BERGER, CONTACT OF "YAZ"": DETAILS, SUGGESTIONS FOR
	RECRUITMENT DURING VISIT TO MOSCOW (1945)
	From: NEW YORK
	Nos.: 777-779 25th May 1945
	[3-part message complete]
	[Part I] To VIKTOR[i].
	Joseph BERGER(ii], who is a lead of "Ya2'["][iii] and has already been reported on, has left for SMYRMA[iv] as a member of
	the COUNTRY's[STRANA][v] delegation to the Reparations Commission. BERGER - 40 years old, [1 group unrecovered], of Russian-Jewish extraction, married, has
	[32 groups unrecoverable]
-	[Continued overleaf]
	3/1037/12
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



* VENU	NA	
* LOP-SECR	ET O	
- 3	3 - 3/NBF/T2	
Footnotes: [i] VIRTOR:	Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.	
[ii] Joseph BERGER/B.:	Joseph Isadore BERGER; nom de plume Jeremiah DIGGES. See also details in NEW YORK's No. 765 of 17th May 1944 (3/NEF/T242).	
[iii] YaZ':	i.e. "IDE"; Simon Samuel KRAFSUR, a TASS comployee.	
[iv] SMYRNA:	HOSCOW.	
[v] COUNTRY :	U.S.A.	
[v i]5:	Probably the list letter of BERGER's nom de plume (see Fo thote [ii]).	
[vii] BIDDLE:	Francis BIDDLE, U.S. Attorney General.	
[viii] HANNEGAN:	Robert E. HANNEGAN, elected Chairman of the Democratic National Committee on 22nd January 1944.	
[ix] FELLOWCOUNTRINEN:	Members of the Communist Party.	
[x] Or "to".		
[xi] CARTHAGE:	WASHINGTON, D.C.	
[Xii] Or "meetings".		
[miii] SERGEJ:	Vladimir Sergeevich PRAVDIN, Editor of the TASS News Agency in NEW YORK CITI.	
3/NBF/T2		
TOP-3	ENONA ECRET	

94. New York 781-7 to Moscow, 25/26 May 1945.

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	ان الأرامين بلين اليكتاب» ا	
	USSR	Ref. Ho.: 3/NBF/T27 (of 27.2.1951)
		Issued : 4/8/1971
	•	Copy ro.: 301
	FRESS AND OFFER	5TH REISSIE REACTIONS TO TRUGLED'S BECOMING FRESIDENT
	AND FORECAST	OF CHIPGES IN AGERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1945)
•	From: NORK	· .
	To: MOSCOW	
	Nos.: 781-787	25th, 26th May 1945
	[Part I] To VIKTOR(i).	[7-part message complete]
	350(a)). [7 gro past were not al	: of MATROS's[i1] accession to power, a considerable preign policy of the COUNTRY[STRANA][ii1] should be and foremost in relation to the USSR (see our No. pups unrecovered] in economic circles which in the ways able to exert decisive influence in questions forting foreign policy, since this
		[13 groups unrecoverable]
		[Continued overleaf]
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		- 5 - 3/:TF/T27	
Convents [Contid]:	[x] Shef:	i.e. "CHIEF"; unidentified covername.	
([xi] KAPITALIST:	i.e. "GAPITALIST"; probably William Averell HARRINE.	
· · ·	[xii] Long journey:	PRAVDIN, the originator of this message returned to	
	(xiii) The TSWID:	Fine TOPK from SAL TRADESISCO on 14th May 1945.	
	[XII], THE TOWLE:	CULAT BRITAIN. i.e. "CORPORAL"; Edward R. SPETTINIUS, Jr.	
η	(xy) DAVITS:	Joseph S. LAVIES, mho was engaged on special missions to LOHDON and MOSCOW as President TRUMMN's personal	
	[xvi] SIDON:	reprosentative.	
	[xvii] SERGEJ:	LONDON.	
		Vladimir Sergeevich FAAVDIN, Editor of the TASS Yews Agency in MEW YORK CITY. He covered the United Nations Conference at SAN FRANCISCO, which was in session from April 25th to June 26th 1945.	
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
95. Moscow 709 to New York, 5 July 1945.

VENONA Reissue(T223) From: MOSCOW To: NEW YORK No: 709 5 July 1945 Your no. 613[a]. The incident involving GRAUBER[i] should be regarded as a compromise of MLAD[ii]. The cause of this is ALEKSEJ's[iii] completely unsatisfactory work with the agents [AGENTURA] on ENORMOUS[ENORMOZ][iv]. His work with [9 groups un-recovered] for this reason we consider it of the utmost importance to ensure supervision so that the C OUNTRY[b][v] [23 groups unrecoverable] we once more [3 groups unrecovered] attention to [2 groups unre-covered] our instructions. For the future [4 groups unrecovered] : immediately inform us by telegraph about each meeting [with the agents of ENORMOUS. In [C% the next post] [3 groups unrecovered] on this same question to send the most precise reports on meetings, [14 groups unrecovered] [C% every] meeting with permanent staff[KADROVYJ] [14 groups unrecovered] from all these areas. You [18 groups unrecovered] to seek safe flats in the areas of the camps[vi]. This question you must [17 groups unrecovered] our workers on the development [35 groups unrecovered] GRAUBER case meetings[C] of our operational worker with MLAD [you] must [4 groups unrecovered] No. 4533 VIKTOR[vii] . YENONA

VENONA 2. Not available. Or possibly "[in] the COUNTRY". Or "meeting". Notes: [a] (b) [c] Comments: GRAUBER: An error for [i] a second and a second [ii] MLAD: i.e.[YOUNG, Theodore Alvin HALL, a physicist employed at LOS ALAMOS.]
[iii] ALEKSEJ: Anatolij Antonovich YaKOVLEV, an employee at the Soviet Consulate in NEW YORK.
[iv] ENORMOUS: Manhatten Engineering District [U.S. Atomic Energy Project).
[v] COUNTRY: U.S.A.
[vi] Camps[LAGER']: Probably a reference to atomic energy sites. Camp-2 is LOS ALAMOS, New Mexico.
[vii] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN. 1. 25 March 1976 VENONA

96. New York 1052-3 to Moscow, 5 July 1945.

	CITET AND YENON	
USSR	Ref. No: 3/NBF/T2277	
	Issued : A265/17/08/19 Copy No:	979
NEW YORK ARGUES FO	CONTINUATION OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO ART AND BERG (1)	945)
From: NEW YORK		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
To : MOSCOW		
No : 1052	5 July 19 <u>45</u>	
VIKTOR [i]		
that we have been p	[ii]. The reason for the recommendation lay in the aying monthly to ART [iii] and BERG [iv] 100 dollars opriate the termination of their salary.	
	[43 groups unrecoverable]	
. With postal disp	Datch No.	
	[28 groups unrecovered]	
No. 620	SERCEJ [V]	
Footnotes: [i]	VIKTOR: Lt. General Pavel Mikhajlovich FITIN	
[ii]	Not available.	
	ART : Helen KORAL BERG : formerly SEN'OR; unidentified; also occurs	
	NEW YORK's No. 1267 of 6 September 1944 (3)/ 1332 of 18 September 1944 (3/NBF/T317), 158 November 1944 (3/NBF/T305), 1636 of 21 Nove (3/NBF/T295), 1803 of 22 December 1944 (3/N and 50 of 11 January 1945 (3/NBF/T306) and No. 1251 of 2 September 1944 (3/NBF/T301), March 1945 (3/NBF/T867) and 337 of 8 April (3/NBF/T1031).	2 of 12 maber 1944 BF/T288) MOSCOW's 275 of 25
[v]	SERGEJ: Vladimir Sergejevich PRAVDIN; TASS represen USA.	stative in
Distribution	· ·	
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4 CIA 5 Security S 6	ervice	
7 (via 8 ASIO (via		
	ervice Representatives - WASHINGTON	
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97. Moscow 34 to London, 21 September 1945.

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	- 95 VERVONA
	TODECOLT
	JUT JECKET
	USSR Ref. No.: 3/NBF/T4 (of 25/8/1950)
	Issued : 1/21/3/1973
	Copy No.: 30/
	Copy No.: 507
	9th REISSUE
	REORGANISATION OF CONTACT WITH "KLIKS", "ADAM", "DZLONSON" AND "STENLI" IN VIEW OF THE CANADIAN AFFAIR (1945)
	From: HOSCOW
	To: LONDON
	No.: 34 21st September 1945
	To BOB[i].
1	In view of the "NEIGHBOURS (SOSEDI]"[ii] affair in CANADA and the circumstances
	which have arisen at your end as a result of this, transfer "KhIKS"[iii] at the regular meeting to "ADAM's"[iv] control. Temporarily, until further notice, cut
	down meetings with "KhIKS" to once a month. Urge "KhIKS" to concentrate his atten- tion on passing us material dealing only with large fundamental issues. As "ADAM"
	is by nature a rather phlegmatic person, encourage him to adopt a manner at meetings with "KhIKS" which will impress the latter so that "KhIKS" senses "ADAM's" authority.
	On "DZhONSON's"[v] return from [2 groups unrecoverable][a] with him not oftener
	than once a month. The position remains the same for "STEMLI"[vi] also. If, however,
	[Continued overleaf]
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being peid to y; may break off cor in your work wit covered] [C% pan of contact, go t check when going under any oircum For such conting to an agreement and check appoin	nu and to out that temposities the agenu- tic and case to the atress out to a sistances, to encies make on this with twents you	equence of local circumstances, greater attention is ur workers by the COMPETITORS[KONKURENTY][vii], you rarily with the sources. For the period of the "lull" ts[AGENTURA], try to create a pretext [2 groups unre- es of] carelessness. Meet them more by neutral methods , sinemas, etc. Warn all our comrades to make a thorough meeting and, if surveillance is observed, not to try, o evade the surveillance and meet the agent regardless. a use of check appointments[KONTROL'NYE YaVKI]. Come th the sources. Verify once more the passwords, addresses have, so that, in case of loss of contact, the sources out undue difficulty.	
We agree wi	th your pro	oposal about handing over "DZhONSON"	
		[4 groups unrecoverable]	
		[43 groups unrecovered]	
Note: [a] Th	e word foll etached dut	Lowing "from" could be "colony", "colonies" or ty".	
Comments: [1] BO	B:	Probably Boris Mikhajlovich KROTOV, 3rd Secretary and Consul General in LONDON from August 1941 to March 1947.	
(ii) NE	IGHBOURS :	Nembers of another Soviet intelligence organisation: in this case the GRU, from which GUZENKO defected in OTTAWA on 5th September 1945.	
[iii] Khi	iks:	i.e. "HICKS"; probably G. F. de M. BURGESS.	
[iv] AD	AM :	Unidentified covername.	
[v] DZ	Lonson :	i.e. "JOHNSON"; unidentified covername. Also occurs in MOSCOW's No. 47 of 18th September 1945 (3/NBF/T260).	
[vi] 81.	ENLI:	i.e. "STANLEY"; H. A. R. PHILBY.	
[vii] CO	MPETITORS :	Members of a non-Soviet intelligence organisation.	
		VEINONA	
3/NBF/T4	· .		
	.•	TOP SECRET	

98. San Francisco 568 to Moscow, 7 November 1945.

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	TOP SECTOR YENONA	
	j)11-41	
	From: SAM FRANCISCO	
	To: NDSCOM	
	lio: 568	
	7 Hovember 1945	
	To SUMER[1].	
	On 4 Hovember this year the traitor to the fatherland KULHETSOVA[11] was shipped to VLADIVOSTOK on the tanker "BELGOROD." Details in a supple-	
	Bent.	
	Bo. 295 SURGET[111]	
,		
	Comments :	
	 SEMEN: Unidentified cover-mame. Elisabeta,Mitrofanovna NUELETSOVA, second mate of the ship "PENDV" 	
	who deserted in FORTLAND on 9 February 1964.	
	[111] SERGEJ: Viktor AFAMAS'EV.	
	<u>.</u>	
	26 May 1978	
	TOP CHERRICAL VENONA	
	TOBGESHEIM	
	•	

99. Moscow 46 to London, 17 September 1945.

VENONA 95 SECRET DINAR USSR Ref. No: 3/NBF/T720 (of 12/10/1955) Issued : (1/2/1965 NIGB 204 Copy No: -2nd RE-IS SUE CONMENT-ON-THE-ACCURACY-OF-"STANLEY'S"-INFORMATION-(1945)-5278 From: MOSCOW L LONDON To: No: ٠. 46 17 Sept <u>45</u> To BOB[i]. [0% The ohiefs[NAChAL;STVO]][] gave their consent to the ohecking of the acouracy of your telegram[] concerning "STANLEY's[STENL]"[ii] data about the events in CANADA[iii] in the "NEICHBOURS'[SOSEDI]"[iv] sphere of activity. STANLEY's information does correspond to the faots. No . 680 7 SAFET. 45 VIKTOR[v] Notes: This message was accorded the highest degree of priority in despatch-known-to-be used on the MOSCOW-LONDON link. It was originated before 8 p.m. (MOSCOW-LINE).on.17th September and transmitted between 8.11 and 8.13 p.m. It co ld have been deciphered in LONDON by 6.20 p.m. B.S.T. For further detail and MNR/CO see 3/NBF/C19. ເຮັງ NAChAL'STVO is the collective noun deriving from the noun NAChAL'NIK which means 'chief' or 'head'. [] Or 'telegrams'. DISTRIBUTION [Continued overleaf] 3/NBF/T72Ø **TOP SECRET** DINAR VENONA

DINAR	
- 2 - 3/NBF/T72Ø	
- 2 - 3/NBF/T72Ø Commente: [i] BOB : Unidentified LONDON Addresses.	
[ii] STANLEY : Probably H.A.R. PHILBY.	
[iii] GUZENKO defected in OTTAWA on 5th September 1945.	
[iv] NEIGHBOURS : Nembers of another Soviet intelligence organisation, in this instance the GRU.	
[v] VIKTOR : Lt. Gen. P. M. FITIN.	
•	
3/NBF/T720	
TOD CLODET DINAR	

The codeword "Venona" has come to signify the 37-year American and allied program to read and exploit Soviet intelligence messages collected in the 1940s. The several thousand messages revealed to Western analysts that Stalin's agents had stolen some of the most sensitive wartime secrets, including plans for the atomic bomb. The program, through painstaking cryptanalysis and detective work, succeeded in breaking up many of the Soviet espionage nets in the United States and elsewhere.

Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch declassified the Venona program in July 1995. This volume has been published in conjunction with the conference on Venona co-sponsored in Washington by the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Center for Democracy in October 1996. The volume is intended to be a handbook for scholars interested in Venona. It includes important US Government documents outlining the American response to Soviet espionage, as well as 99 of the most significant and revealing Soviet messages translated by Western analysts.

Mr. Robert Louis Benson serves with the Office of Security of the National Security Agency. A former US Air Force officer, Mr. Benson earned his B.A. in history at the University of Wisconsin. He has written and lectured extensively on Venona. Dr. Michael Warner is Deputy Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency History Staff. Dr. Warner received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago and served as an analyst in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence before joining the Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1992.

MOSICIE R.S. FOR MAN TICE DA P.I. 12 1 3 3 3 4 5 FITTE S. S. S. S. G. LUTTI DELERCIA TERTOR SET. I CHARLONE TTA INDEED ADDEED ADDEE

ROBOINT ROIMTMEEROM TOCHIA e m OTO BODMCE MODO **BBT** -MOD 1 all 1