

# PART I

## THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ESPIONAGE

**Part I:  
The American Response  
to Soviet Espionage**

**Archival Citations and a Note on the Documents**

The following 35 documents are reproduced in Part I. They represent an attempt to gather some of the more interesting, important, and revealing original documents available to American policymakers and intelligence officers during the period covered by this volume. It is hoped that these documents will provide researchers with ready access to some of the key decisions of the period, as well as give them a flavor of internal US Government discussions and concerns over Soviet espionage in America. Almost all of the documents are published here for the first time anywhere; although most of the documents were already declassified, 13 were declassified by NSA, FBI, and CIA specifically for this volume. In many cases the date of the declassification is marked on the document's first page.

1. Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).
2. Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Confidential File), "State 1939-40," box 9.
3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Confidential File), "State 1939-40," box 9.
4. J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, 25 October 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 12.
5. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attache Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.," 14 April 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Harry Hopkins Papers, "MID Reports—USSR—Volume V," box 190 [Chart not included].
6. Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 15.

7. Tokyo Circular 906 to Berlin and Helsinki, 6 October 1942, National Security Agency, "Jap Dip Dispatches," Venona Collection, Provisional Box 1.
8. US Army Signals Security Agency, "Memorandum on Russian Codes in the Japanese Military Attache System," 9 February 1943, National Security Agency Archives [Excerpt].
9. Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, White House Official Files (Subject File), "Justice Department—FBI Reports," box 18.
10. Anonymous letter to Hoover, undated [received 7 August 1943], National Security Agency Venona Collection, 54-001, box D046 [Russian original with English translation].
11. Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944, Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Tarasov file.
12. Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Soviet Codes," 27 December 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "Russia—1944," box 49.
13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—Atomic bomb," box 167.
14. Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, Igor Gouzenko file.
15. Hoover to Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—S," box 169.
16. Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—W," box 169 [Attachment not included].
17. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File), "Justice" (7), box 22 [Excerpt].

18. Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File, "Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 (Department of State).
19. [Meredith Knox Gardner], "Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic," 30 August 1947, National Security Agency, Venona Collection, box D017.
20. No author [probably William K. Harvey, CIA], Memorandum for the File, "COMRAP," 6 February 1948, Central Intelligence Agency, Vassili M. Zarubin file.
21. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, "Loyalty Investigations," box 11.
22. [Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Tom Clark Papers, "Attorney General—White House/President, 1948," box 83.
23. D. M. Ladd, Memorandum to the Director [J. Edgar Hoover], "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Reading Room, Alger Hiss File.
24. Tom C. Clark, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File), "Justice" (4), box 21.
25. [Robert J. Lamphere to Gardner], "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, With Alias," 9 May 1949, National Security Agency Venona Collection at 49-005.
26. Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, National Security Agency File, "Meeting 36," box 205.
27. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949, National Security Agency, Venona Collection at 49-018.
28. [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, aka; Karl Fuchs," 26 September 1949, National Security Agency, Venona Collection at 49-029.

29. W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee [H. Marshall Chadwell], "Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value," 9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 80B01731R, box 35.
30. Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—G," box 168.
31. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications," 27 June 1950, National Security Agency, Venona Collection, 50-025, box D045.
32. Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files (Subject File), "FBI—R," box 169.
33. Armed Forces Security Agency, "Russian Cryptology During World War II," undated [ca. 1951], National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 457 (National Security Agency), Historic Cryptographic Collection, box 526 [Excerpt].
34. No author [Washington Field Office, FBI], "William Wolf Weisband," 27 November 1953, National Security Agency, Office of Security files [Excerpt].
35. Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Staff Secretary Files (Subject Series), "Expose of Soviet Intelligence," box 23 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].

1. Loy W. Henderson, memorandum of conversation [with General Krivitsky], 15 March 1939.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

ADVISOR ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. DUNN  
MARCH 15 1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 15, 1939

~~Strictly Confidential~~ *File* *Return to LWS*

Statement made by General Krivitsky, a former general of the Soviet Army, formerly on duty in the Military Intelligence Section of the Soviet General Staff (alias Samuel Ginsberg)

July 14 1939

It will be recalled that General Krivitsky, who escaped from the Soviet Union at the time that the eight Red Army generals, including Marshal Tukhachevsky, were seized and executed, and whose civilian name is Samuel Ginsberg, came to this country with his wife on temporary visitors' visas in the latter part of 1938. In January 1939 he called at the Department and discussed at length certain aspects of Soviet developments with which he was particularly familiar. A memorandum prepared by Mr. Page setting forth some of the statements made by General Krivitsky is attached hereto. While the general was in the Department he told me frankly that he feared that agents of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs (the OGPU) might make some attack upon him or members of his family while they were in the United States. He said he was therefore living quietly and endeavoring not to attract attention to his actions.

General Krivitsky came in to see me today and the course of a rather extended conversation made a

DECLASSIFIED  
State Letter 1-11-72  
BY HPC  
DATE 6-3-86

DEPT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MARCH 15 1939

BOO.CO B BASSOFF, SERGE/4

1. (Continued)

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of statements, the substance of some of which are set forth below.

He has sold a series of four articles to the Saturday Evening Post and is writing a book which he hopes to have published in the not distant future.

On Tuesday evening, March 7, he entered a café near Forty-second and Broadway and took a table with a friend, a Mr. Shoup, one of the editors of the Jewish Daily Forward, whom he had met while in Paris. While they were talking at this table four men entered the restaurant and seated themselves at an adjoining table. One of these men made obvious efforts to attract the General's attention and the General recognized him as Sergei Bassoff, an agent of the OGPU who had been connected with the American work of that organization for many years and whose record had become known to the General while the latter was engaged in intelligence work in Moscow. Bassoff was formerly a Soviet sailor; he joined the Soviet secret police in 1920; he came to the United States as a Soviet secret agent some time during the early twenties; since his arrival in the United States he has been an employee of the Soviet secret service; he has been naturalized as an American citizen; he has been invaluable as a GPU courier traveling between various European countries on an American passport; in June 1937 he was arrested in Holland while transporting funds but was released shortly thereafter

See  
Mr. Murphy's  
memo  
attached  
hereto  
regarding  
Mr. Bassoff

1. (Continued)

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thereafter, apparently after having called upon the American Consul in Amsterdam for protection; after his release he proceeded to Moscow where he arrived in July 1937 and where he remained for some time.

Mr. Bassoff indicated by gestures that he desired to speak to the General and the General in a somewhat agitated frame of mind suggested to Mr. Shoup that they leave the cafe at once. Before they could get out, however, Mr. Bassoff stopped them and told the General that he desired to have a talk with him. When the General replied that he wished to have nothing whatever to do with Mr. Bassoff, the latter repeated his statement that it was necessary that they should have a talk. Mr. Shoup interrupted to suggest that all three of them go to the New York Times Annex, which was close by, where they could talk in private. The General then asked Mr. Bassoff if he intended to shoot him and Bassoff replied in the negative.

In the office of the New York Times Mr. Sheplin, a member of the editorial staff of that newspaper and a friend of Mr. Shoup, conducted them to a private room. Mr. Shoup withdrew to a distance so the conversation could be carried on without a third person overhearing. The General asked Bassoff who had sent him and Bassoff replied that the meeting had been accidental. The General said  
that



1. (Continued)

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that he knew that Bassoff must be acting under orders since otherwise he would not dare to talk with a person in such bad standing with the Soviet authorities as himself. Bassoff replied that the General still had friends in Moscow and that many persons continued to have confidence in him. He said, "Of course, we have read all that you have written and we suppose you are writing more." The General then inquired regarding the fate of a number of his friends and was informed that all had been shot. He was also told that the brothers of his wife "had suffered greatly". The intonations and gestures accompanying this statement were apparently made in order to convey the impression that the actions of the General and his wife were responsible for this suffering.

The General asked Mr. Bassoff if the latter was not afraid to approach him in such a manner in the United States. Bassoff said, "I have no fear. I am perfectly safe here." The General then told Bassoff that the latter would not dare take his life. Bassoff made no threat but contented himself with stating that there was nothing particularly to fear; that the penalty for such an act would probably be only a couple of years in jail.

The General told Bassoff to leave at once and not to approach him again. Bassoff thereupon left the building, joined his three friends who had waited outside, and  
disappeared.

1. (Continued)

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disappeared. The General had paid no particular attention to the three men accompanying Mr. Bassoff but Mr. Shoup told him later that they appeared to be of the gangster type.

The General told me that he believed that his life was in danger since the GPU organization in the United States was very strong and since he was certain that Bassoff would not have approached him unless he had been ordered so to do by the highest Soviet authorities and unless it had been decided that come what may the General must not be permitted to continue writing his experiences and memoirs. He said that in 1935 a GPU agent had been killed in New York City by an automobile in suspicious circumstances. There were ways of bringing about his own death in such a manner as to make it appear to be accidental.

I asked the General if he desired police protection and he replied that he did not presume to make such a request; that he hoped eventually to be able to leave New York and live quietly in some more remote place: but that he could not do so until he had finished some of his writings and had obtained an extension of his permit to remain in the United States, which expired on March 31.

Since General Krivitsky has served for many years in the Military Intelligence Service and since the work of that service is closely connected with that of the GPU (The Commissariat for Internal Affairs), I asked him  
several

1. (Continued)

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several questions regarding the organization of the GPU in the United States. He replied that there were two distinct branches of the GPU operating in this country. One branch was headed by some person in the Soviet Embassy, a person probably who had no diplomatic rank or perhaps a low diplomatic rank and who had little direct contact with the Ambassador or diplomatic members of his staff. Subordinate to this person were GPU centers in Amtorg, Intourist, and the various Soviet consular offices.

The second GPU branch had no connection whatever with the first and like the first, reported direct to Moscow. The head of the second branch lived in New York and undoubtedly many of his agents were American citizens. Although there was some contact between the two branches of the GPU they worked independently.

*Art*  
Eu:Henderson:LF

2. Attorney General [Frank Murphy] to the President, 17 June 1939.



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.

June 17, 1939

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I desire to direct your attention to the importance of investigations involving espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage. For some time an informal committee composed of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of War, the Department of Justice, the Post Office Department, and the Department of the Navy, has been acting as a clearing house for data or information concerning such matters. Such data or information was then transmitted to one of the investigative agencies for further action. The great majority of the investigations in this field have been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

Experience has shown that handling such matters through a committee such as is described above, is neither effective nor desirable. On the other hand, the three investigative agencies last mentioned have not only gathered a tremendous reservoir of information concerning foreign agencies operating in the United States, but have also perfected methods of investigation and have developed channels for the exchange of information, which are both efficient and so mobile and elastic as to permit prompt expansion in the event of an emergency.

As of course you are aware, the Department of Justice has developed in the Federal Bureau of

Investigation a highly skilled investigative force supported by the resources of an exceedingly efficient, well equipped, and adequately manned technical laboratory and identification division. The latter contains identifying data relating to more than ten million persons, including a very large number of individuals of foreign extraction. As a result of an exchange of data between the Departments of Justice, War and Navy, comprehensive indices have been prepared.

With a view to organizing investigative activities in this field on a more efficient and effective basis, I recommend the abandonment of the inter-departmental committee above mentioned, and a concentration of investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters in the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the G-2 Section of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

The directors of these three agencies should in that event function as a committee for the purpose of coordinating the activities of their subordinates.

If the foregoing recommendations meet with your approval, I suggest that confidential instructions be issued by you to the heads of the Departments interested in accordance therewith.

A draft of a memorandum which you may possibly care to use for that purpose, is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

Respectfully,

Attorney General.

Enclosure  
No.2100

3. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Secretary of State et al., 26 June 1939.

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
June 26, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR ✓ THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY x 2  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR x 2  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL x 2  
THE POSTMASTER GENERAL x 2  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY x 2  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE x 2

It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

4. J. Edgar Hoover to Major General Edwin M. Watson, 25 October 1940.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

October 25, 1940

~~SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL~~


Major General Edwin M. Watson  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General:

I am enclosing herewith for the information of the President and you a memorandum which I have just completed upon the present status of the espionage and counter-espionage operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to date. I thought the President might wish to have an up-to-date memorandum of exactly what we have done and are doing in this field. As you will note, the contents of this memorandum are highly confidential, in view of the delicacy of some of the operations upon which we are presently working.

With expressions of my best regards, I  
am

Sincerely,



Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E)(2)  
Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72  
By DBS, NLR, Date APR 3 1975

4. (Continued)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E)(2)

Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72

By DBS, NLR, Date APR 3 1975

October 24, 1940

~~Strictly Confidential~~

PRESENT STATUS OF ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER  
ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been operating for a period of many months on the eastern seaboard a shortwave radio station which is utilized by the German Intelligence Service for transmission of reports of German Agents in the United States to Germany. The directors of the German Secret Service in Germany also communicate with this station furnishing instructions and requests for information to the operators of this station for transmittal to German Agents in the United States. Needless to say, no one knows that this German communication system is actually controlled and operated in the United States by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who are considered both by German Intelligence Services in Germany and in the United States to be actual members of the German espionage ring. Through this station the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been able to develop voluminous information concerning the identity of German Agents in the United States, their movements, interests and program. All material furnished by German Agents through their complicated channels of communication to this station for transmittal to Europe is cleared by State, War and Navy Department officials prior to the time that it is actually transmitted to Germany. Collaterally, in the operation of this station the undercover Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been utilized for the transmittal of funds for salaries and expenses of German Agents operating in the United States, which has of course resulted in widening the knowledge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation relative to this espionage group.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have under constant observation and surveillance a number of known and suspected Agents of the German, Russian, French and Italian Secret Services. The FBI is able through its counter espionage efforts to maintain a careful check upon the channels of communication, the sources of information, the method of finance and other data relative to these agents. Arrest is considered inadvisable except in extraordinary cases because counter espionage methods of observation and surveillance result in a constantly growing reservoir of information concerning not only known but also new agents of these governments.



4. (Continued)

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Of course, when material is observed passing through the monitored channels which should not reach its European destination, such steps as are necessary are taken to prevent the ultimate delivery of this information.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are assigned in undercover capacities to those plants engaged in the production of materials which are vital to the national defense and to those factories in which the War or Navy Departments have a particular interest. Thus, Bureau Agents work in munitions plants, shipyards, aircraft plants, engine factories and other industrial units whose products and production are vital to the national defense. Agents selected for these posts are men qualified in the skills of the trade in which they are engaged. Their identities as Special Agents of the FBI are of course unknown to their associates in the plants or even to the plant officials. Not only is vital information pertaining to the production of plants in which these men are engaged developed through these Agents, but they are able through their daily contacts to study and observe fellow employees who may be utilized as confidential informants for the FBI in these plants.

Undercover Agents, of course, never contact their fellow employees and disclose their identities but appropriate contacts are established through regional field offices with plant employees known to be dependable in order that arrangements may be perfected whereby these employees will keep the FBI informed of all matters of interest to the national defense. Indicative of the tremendous coverage established by this method, it is interesting to note that in one Ohio city the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 133 confidential informants in a single industrial unit, all of whom furnish to the FBI information deemed of interest to the production of the plant. None of these informants are known to each other and each believes that he is the Bureau's sole source of information within that organization. Extraordinary care is exercised at all times in situations of this kind to avoid the so-called "labor spying", industrial espionage or other matters which would interfere in any manner with employer-employee relationships.

Informants of this character are maintained in more than twelve hundred key industrial facilities. Among the plants in which Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are assigned in undercover capacities are the Carl L. Norden Company of New York, manufacturer of bomb sights, the Vought-Sikorsky Aviation Corporation, Stratford, Connecticut, the Newport News Shipbuilding Company of Newport News, Virginia, the New York Shipbuilding Company of Camden, New Jersey, the Federal Shipbuilding Company of Kearney, New Jersey, the Shipbuilding Division of the Bethlehem Steel Company at San Francisco, California, the Bath Iron Works of Bath, Maine, and other plants.

4. (Continued)

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Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are actually operating in undercover assignments for intelligence purposes in many foreign countries. Included in the posts of assignment where men are stationed as of the date of this memorandum is Shanghai, China, where investigation by Bureau personnel has been under way for several months in connection with the espionage operations of German Agents. Specially qualified and carefully selected Special Agents are assigned in various undercover capacities in Mexico, from whence they operate in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Salvador and British Honduras. Other Agents are operating in Cuba, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Chile and other South American countries. Other Special Agents of the Bureau are on confidential missions in Moscow, Russia, Lisbon, Portugal, Berlin, Spain and Rome, Italy. A large detachment of Agents is stationed in the Hawaiian Islands to devote their entire time to general intelligence matters not only in the Hawaiian group but in other islands of the Pacific.

The office of the FBI at Juneau, Alaska, has been augmented in such a manner as to permit constant control of Bureau Agents in all settlements within the territory of Alaska. Particular care is exercised to constantly maintain appropriate channels of information with its sections of the Territory most adjacent to Siberia. At San Juan, Puerto Rico, the office of the FBI has been further enlarged and serves as the headquarters for a group of specially qualified Agents who from this point cover not only the American insular possessions in the Caribbean Sea but also make frequent visits to the insular possessions of other foreign governments.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are presently undertaking under appropriate cover a detailed examination of the numerous islands and cays in the Caribbean Sea, with particular emphasis on the minute islands of the Antilles groups. This project contemplates frequent personal contact with inhabitants of all of these islands and periodical physical surveys of the islands to determine whether foreign powers may be concentrating fuel or other supplies in any remote spot.

Bureau Agents are conducting police training schools at the present time in Haiti and another Agent is assisting the Government of Colombia in the improvement of its policing facilities. Another Agent recently completed an assignment in Ecuador, which was designed to improve relations between the United States and Ecuador.

4. (Continued)

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Arrangements have been perfected with the following companies to obtain through their facilities in Central and South America information concerning industrial, financial, political and propaganda manipulations and operations of foreign governments:

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey  
Pan American Airways, New York City  
National City Bank, New York City  
United Fruit Company of Boston,  
Massachusetts  
W. R. Grace Company, New York City  
Montgomery, Ward & Company, Chicago,  
Illinois  
Dun and Bradstreet, New York City  
The American Metal Company, Ltd.,  
New York City  
Sterling Products, Inc., New York City  
(marketers of Bayer aspirin and  
related products)  
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., New York City  
The American-Colombian Corporation,  
Washington, D. C.  
Stewart, James & Company, Inc., New York  
City  
American Express Company, New York City  
Smithsonian Institution, New York City  
E. A. Pierce & Company, New York City  
Pan American News Service, Washington, D. C.  
The Hemisphere Corporation, New York City  
Rockefeller Foundation, New York City.

All of these organizations have extensive interests and personnel in Central and South America and are in a position to obtain information of interest and value to the Government of the United States.

The employees of these companies who obtain this information do not know its purpose or the identity of the agency to which it is furnished.

4. (Continued)

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A close and constant liaison is maintained by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with operatives of the British Intelligence Service. These contacts are maintained not only in the continental United States but throughout the Western Hemisphere and a considerable volume of material is received daily from this source. Information so received is of course transmitted to interested governmental agencies.

Close liaison is maintained with the Canadian Intelligence Service, which it is to be noted operates independently of the British Intelligence Service. This agency has established over a period of many years excellent and dependable contacts in the Western Hemisphere. Officials of the FBI and officials of the Canadian Intelligence Service meet at least once a month in Ottawa, New York City or Washington for the purpose of exchanging data of interest to the national defense of Canada and the United States.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is collaborating with the Pan American Union and the State Department at the present time in perfecting plans for a conference of law enforcement officials and Intelligence Agents of the Western Hemisphere in order to establish a broader medium for the exchange of Intelligence information. Plans are also being perfected for the holding in the training facilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Washington, D. C., in January of a special session of the National Police Academy to be attended only by accredited representatives of the Central and South American countries. A comprehensive and extensive course in police methods, investigative procedure, Laboratory techniques and training methods will be afforded the representatives selected for this school. Invitations will be extended through the State Department to the Central and South American countries to have representatives attend this session of the National Police Academy. Not only will this school enable the FBI to increase its channels of information from Central and South America, but the school will undoubtedly contribute to a greater feeling of good will between the United States and its southern neighbor republics.

For the past year Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been engaged in the conducting of surveys of plants upon the priority lists of the War and Navy Departments. These surveys are intended to determine the vulnerability of American industrial units to espionage, sabotage and other detrimental efforts of foreign Agents. The Special Agent personnel engaged upon this type of work has received extensive specialized training in all aspects of plant protection and industrial security. To date, complete surveys have been made of more than 350 plants and detailed recommendations made both to the plant management and the War and Navy

4. (Continued)

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Departments as to the steps which should be taken to minimize the possibilities of espionage and sabotage of these plants.

Actually under survey at the present time are 243 plants, in which the War and Navy Departments are interested, and by November 1st, surveys will have been completed of more than 1,000 plants. Recommendations made to plant management pertain to vulnerable points, hazards, the selection and handling of personnel, the handling of confidential documents, the establishment of identification systems, the initiation or improvement of guard forces, the prevention of fires and other similar subjects pertinent to the protection of such facilities. A staff of more than 250 men is used in making these industrial surveys. Astounding evidence of the lack of comprehension of the potential danger to plant production on the part of plant management is disclosed in many of these surveys.

Collateral to the plant survey program, arrangements have been perfected whereby a special committee representing all of the insurance companies in the United States is cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the problem of industrial protection. Hundreds of carefully investigated and specially trained insurance company inspectors make frequent detailed checks of key facilities to insure that all recommended precautions against fire hazard and other interference with continuity of production may be maintained on an absolute minimum.

The Special Agent staff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is undergoing extensive expansion but great care is exercised to insure that the high standards of personnel selection and qualification are not lowered. The training center on the Marine Reservation at Quantico, Virginia, is filled to maximum capacity and in addition, five Special Agent schools are operated in Washington at all times. Through the combined facilities thus available, eight training schools for newly appointed Special Agents are in operation at all times. In addition, upon completion of the training course in Washington, Special Agents when assigned to field duty are required to continue their training under the supervision of Special Agents in Charge for a considerable period.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, because of its work in the field of law enforcement, has established and maintained for years friendly contacts with police officials throughout the

4. (Continued)

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country. To insure a coordination of state, county and municipal law enforcement agencies with the Federal program for the national defense, there have been completed a series of conferences with police executives, these conferences being called by the Special Agents in Charge of each division of the Bureau. A nationwide coordinated plan of procedure under the supervision of the FBI with reference to national defense investigations has been worked out. In every section of the country Special Agents in Charge of the FBI field offices have called together groups of police officers, as a result of which there has been established in each community the machinery whereby thousands of police of local, county and state jurisdiction are available for use in the handling of those types of inquiries and investigations which the FBI believes can be referred to those agencies. This program gives the local officers a high degree of pride in the fact that they are cooperating in the national defense program and it likewise serves to assist the FBI in the handling of routine cases which the police are qualified to handle. The system is presently working in excellent manner and as the emergency becomes greater, the machinery so established will permit an even wider use of the services of local law enforcement agencies.

Closely aligned with the program of enlisting the active assistance of local departments has been the development of the FBI National Police Academy. This Academy, inaugurated in 1935, has trained selected officers from local, county and state police organizations in investigative methods and advanced crime detection. An effort has been made in the three months' course of training afforded officers in this Academy, to qualify them as instructors in their own departments. Thus the 515 graduates of the Academy are in a position to make the FBI methods available in police departments having a total law enforcement personnel of 86,137. Each year a retraining session of the National Police Academy is held. On October 5th there was completed the Fifth Annual Retraining Session of the former graduates of the Academy and considerably more than 300 of the graduates returned to Washington for an intensive course of study and training in the handling of investigations pertinent to the national defense.

In view of the known practices on the part of certain groups of foreign representatives which extend beyond the scope of diplomatic usages, careful and constant observation is made of these groups in Washington and at other strategic and carefully selected places. This operation is productive of considerable

4. (Continued)

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information of interest to the Federal Government concerning actual and proposed activities contrary to the best interests of the country. This type of work is, of course, done under guarded circumstances and in a most careful manner.

A constant monitoring is maintained of all movements and expenditures of foreign funds, their location, sources and distribution, with special emphasis of course upon those funds in which there is a direct or indirect interest on the part of the German, Italian, Russian, Japanese and French Governments.

Because of the FBI's friendly relationships over a period of many years with various banking establishments, excellent cooperation is received from financial institutions. This monitoring program of course produces much valuable information not only from the standpoint of detecting espionage, sabotage and similar activities for which the funds may be used, but also develops data and information of interest to the Treasury Department in reaching administrative decisions with reference to desirable legislation, etc.

The Bureau has prepared and maintains extensive suspect lists composed of data concerning several thousand individuals located in the United States and its territories whose nationalistic tendencies and activities are considered potentially inimical to the welfare of the United States. These records are maintained according to the nationality of the individuals involved, as well as geographically. In the event of greater emergency or the enactment of additional legislation when it might become necessary to take such individuals into custody or to intern them, the information maintained in these suspect lists, instantaneously available, sets forth the names, addresses, activities and source of information upon each individual in convenient form for necessary action. This list is of course being increased daily as the facts justify. Individual lists are maintained upon German groups and sympathizers, Communist groups and sympathizers, Fascist groups and sympathizers, Japanese and others.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Technical Laboratory, which is the largest and best equipped of its kind in the world, has trained personnel constantly engaged in the handling of scientific studies and technical crime detection methods in the solution of espionage and sabotage cases by Laboratory procedures.

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The Intelligence operations of the FBI require the constant use of skilled experts in document identification, including the comparison of handwriting and typewriting, chemical, physical and other scientific analyses. This Laboratory has proved itself a most valuable adjunct to the investigation of national defense matters. Constant work is carried on in the solution of cryptograms, in decoding ciphers, and in similar matters. Research is being continued by members of the Laboratory staff to enlarge the possibility of utilization of Laboratory technicians in internal security cases. Members of the technical staff who are authorities upon the subject of explosives have completed a lengthy series of experiments for the purpose of perfecting methods of handling bombs and infernal machines. Detailed instructions upon this subject are being prepared for dissemination throughout the United States. Included in the experiments conducted was a complete study of the efficiency and practicability of a freezing process which would render bombs ineffective and inoperative. Research has been conducted as to the possible use of portable X-ray equipment in the study of bombs at the point of their location. Experimentation has made possible the wider adaptation of spectography in cases involving espionage and sabotage. Extensive research is being conducted in the use of infrared light, ultraviolet light and black light for photographic purposes, particularly in the development of concealed and secret writings.

Radio stations are being operated at strategic points for the purpose of intercepting messages transmitted to European nations by small but powerful portable transmitters in the hands of foreign agents. An experimental radio station is being operated for the purpose of intercepting radio waves carrying impulses transmitted by specially designed teletypewriter machines, which messages are not intelligible to receiving equipment designed to receive either regular code messages or voice messages.

Information concerning sabotage methods utilized throughout the world has been obtained and compiled in comprehensive form in order that Bureau Agents will have first hand knowledge as to the potential means and methods which may be utilized in perpetrating sabotage. The staff of the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been doubled in the past year and the Identification Division operates on a twenty-four hour a day basis. Daily receipts of fingerprints have doubled in the past year, the daily average number of prints received at the present time approximating 12,000 per day. All of these prints are answered within a 36-hour period. Included in the



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fingerprints being searched at the present time are applicants for appointment to positions in the service of the Federal Government, current enlistments in the War and Navy Departments, and persons being engaged to work upon secret and confidential projects for the War and Navy Departments. Two thousand fingerprints are received each day from the Director of Alien Registration and after appropriate classification these prints are searched and filed as a permanent record of the alien's registration in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This material, of course, provides a valuable source of information relative to the identity, location and background of aliens. Included in the Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprint collection at the present time are more than 14,000,000 prints. This constitutes the largest reservoir of information based on fingerprints in the world.

Extensive investigations are being conducted upon the basis of complaints received from officials and citizens relative to violations of espionage and sabotage laws, as well as other statutes designed to maintain the internal security of the nation. Indicative of the volume of this work receiving attention, it may be noted that on a single day 2,985 complaints of this kind were received.

The Bureau has established a special unit to handle cases involving violations of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Based upon a comprehensive study of records available from the World War period, the Bureau estimates that enforcement of the Conscription Act will require the services of 1,085 field Agents. Based upon World War figures, the Bureau estimates that in the course of the registration and conscription of 16,500,000 males between the ages of 21 and 35, there will be violations of the law on the part of approximately 900,000 persons. On the basis of the average number of cases closed per Agent per month, it would require a staff of approximately 5,500 Agents to handle this volume of work. Since, however, the present Selective Service program will be extended over a period of five years, Bureau estimates provide for the use of 1,085 men upon this type of work. A comprehensive program has been outlined which contemplates not only close personal liaison with the 6,500 draft boards throughout the country, but also a systematic check to locate persons failing to register, persons failing to report to draft boards when called, to investigate cases of conscientious objectors and all other possible violations under the statute.

Close relationship is maintained with the State, War, Navy and Treasury Departments, as well as other departments and agencies participating in the national defense program. The heads of the

4. (Continued)

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various governmental departments are informed promptly of any information obtained which relates to the operations of those departments.

Weekly meetings are held with representatives of Military and Naval Intelligence, the Treasury and State Departments for the purpose of exchanging information of current interest, outlining future programs and otherwise coordinating the work in the Intelligence field.

In a most discreet and careful manner, constant check is being made of those Consular representatives whose conduct is reported to be detrimental to the United States. Their movements, contacts and financial transactions are the subject of constant observation and study.

5. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attache Moscow Report 1903, "N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R.,"  
14 April 1941 [Chart not included].

<p><b>DECLASSIFIED</b></p> <p>Classification</p>	<p>1 Enclosure <b>2037-155-2</b> 26 Copy No. <b>17</b></p>
<p><b>MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION</b> <b>WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF</b> <b>MILITARY ATTACHE REPORT Soviet Union.</b></p>	
<p>Subject <u>N. K. V. D. of the U. S. S. R.</u> Country Reported On <u>S100</u>  <small>Serial Descriptive Title</small> <u>RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 28 1941</u> I.G. No. <u>S100</u></p>	
<p><small>Source and Degree of Reliability:</small>          Constitutional Acts 1922-1936; Collection of Laws 1934-1941; Bolshaya Sovetskaya Ensiklopedia, Soviet press and personal contacts.</p>	
<p><small>Summarization of Report</small>          The history and organization of the N. K. V. D.</p>	
<p><u>INTRODUCTION.</u></p> <p>The N. K. V. D. is the abbreviated name most commonly used to designate the <u>NARODNI KOMMISSARIAT VNUTRENIK DEL</u> (the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs). The compounded abbreviation "<u>NARKOMVNUDEK</u>" is also frequently used. The functions and organization of this governmental department are not wholly new, having origin as far back as 1881.</p>	
<p><u>OKRANA.</u></p> <p>In 1881 was formed the <u>OKRANOYE OTDELENIYE</u> - loosely translated as the Department of Safety - in the capital city of St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), for the purpose of "pre-serving public safety and order". It was then a section in the city police department and its duties were to "investigate political crimes and combat the revolutionary movement". Gradually, all the large cities organized similar police divisions. Although these divisions were organic parts of the city police departments, the Tsar's government exercised complete control over all police and used them as an agency to assist in maintaining "state security, order and peace". The Okrana existed up to the February Revolution of 1917.</p>	
<p><u>CHEKA.</u></p> <p>During the revolution the Bolsheviks realized that some organization was needed to combat counter-revolutionary movements, and on December 20, 1917 the <u>VSYA-ROSSISKAYA CHEREZVICHAINAYA KOMMISSIA PO BORBE S KONTREREVOLUTSIYEI, SPEKULATSIYEI I SABOTAZHYEI</u> (The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage) was created by the Soviet or Peoples Commissars as an All-Union Commissariat.</p>	
<p>G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6  <small>Copy No. 1, RS; 2, LC; 3, Section File</small></p>	
<p>From <u>M. A. Moscow</u> Report No. <u>1903</u> Date <u>April 14, 1941</u>  <small>This line to appear on all succeeding pages</small></p>	
<p>WAR DEPARTMENT FORM 17</p>	<p>Classification</p> <p><b>3855 43</b></p>
<p>Page 1</p>	

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GPU.

The Cheka lasted until March 1, 1922 when its name was changed to the GPU - GOSSUDARSTVENNOYE POLITICHESKOYE UPRAVLENIYE (The State Political Administration) with little or no changes in function. Gradually, each republic organized its own GPU and on November 23, 1923 the republic GPU's were united into the OBEDINYENNOYE GOSSUDARSTVENNOYE POLITICHESKOYE UPRAVLENIYE (The Unified State Political Administration) (OGPU).

OGPU.

The purpose of the OGPU was to unite all the revolutionary forces of all the republics to "combat the political and economic counter-revolutionary movements, espionage and banditry". The chief of the OGPU was appointed by the Presidium of the then Central Committee of the U. S. S. R. and had a vote in the committee.

The head of the OGPU at that time was also a member of the Supreme Court; and the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. It was responsible for the legality of all acts of the OGPU. It was simply another CHEKA with broader powers. These powers grew to such proportions that it became for a while the most powerful and feared government agency. It had so much power that its activities were actually curtailed in 1934 when it was incorporated into the N.K.V.D.

N. K. V. D.

At the time of the Civil War all of the republics organized their own republic commissariats of internal affairs. These commissariats controlled the militia, criminal investigations and prisons. But in 1930 these republic N.K.V.D.'s were liquidated and the term was not used again until 1934 when the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. was formed as an All-Union Commissariat. It was responsible for the following:

- (1) Preservation of revolutionary order and state security.
- (2) Protection of public property.
- (3) Registration of civil acts, and vital statistics.
- (4) Protection of the border.

The following administrations were organized and subordinated to it:

- (1) State security.
- (2) Militia.
- (3) Border and internal protection.
- (4) Fire protection.
- (5) Corrective labor camps and settlements.
- (6) Department of civil acts.
- (7) Administrative economic administration.

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Although the N.K.V.D. was made an All-Union Commissariat, it again formed the N.K.V.D. in all the republics, except the R.S.F.S.R., which republic became directly under the All-Union N.K.V.D. The same administrations listed above were organized in all the subordinate administrative divisions down to and including the city or district and village.

At the same time, the N.K.V.D. collegium within the Supreme Court was abolished, and certain cases were referred to the court having jurisdiction. Cases of treason and espionage were referred to the Military collegium or the Supreme Court or to the military tribunal having jurisdiction. Cases coming within the functions of the State Security Administration were all referred to the Supreme Court.

To take over all other court functions of the abolished N.K.V.D. collegium, there was formed the Special Advisory Council within the All-Union Commissariat. It consisted of five members and was actually a court in itself. This step gave the N.K.V.D. even more power for it permitted it to try its own cases.

In November, 1935, the N.K.V.D. took over the surveying and cartography administration of the U.S.S.R. with all of the technical agencies to carry out its functions. This latter was taken away in 1938 when it became an All-Union Administration under the Soviet of Peoples Commissars (SOVNARKOM).

In October, 1935, the administration of highways was brought into the N.K.V.D. where it remains today.

When the new Constitution was ratified in December, 1936, the N.K.V.D. became a Union-Republic Commissariat and has remained as such to the present time. In February, 1941, the State Security Administration was removed from the N.K.V.D. and formed into a new commissariat.

Today the N.K.V.D. is organized into six administrations:

- (1) Militia.
- (2) Border and Internal protection.
- (3) Fire protection.
- (4) Corrective labor camps and settlements.
- (5) Registration of civil acts, vital statistics and preservation of state papers.
- (6) Construction and maintenance of highways.

Each republic, autonomous republic, territory, autonomous territory, city or district and village has an agency of some kind for each one of the above named administrations. Theoretically, each one of these subordinate N.K.V.D. Commissariats controls its own six administrations under the next higher N.K.V.D., but there is no doubt that in practice each administration works in close harmony and directly under the administration of the next superior N.K.V.D. administration.

Although it has not been so stated, it may be that since there are seven (7) vice commissars, each administration and the chief inspection is under one of these vice commissars. The chief inspector is responsible to the Commissar only and functions as

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the Chief Inspector of the Commissariat. The attached chart shows the organization of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. as it is today.

#### ADMINISTRATIONS.

Since a few of the administrations have little or no military value they are discussed briefly below.

##### Fire Protection Administration.

This administration confines its activities to cities and towns. Each city has its fire department, theoretically subordinated to the city Soviet but with probably a greater responsibility to the fire administration of the oblast Soviet above it. Funds for the city departments come from city budgets and therefore only the fire administration headquarters of the U.S.S.R. and the sixteen (16) republics are financed by the national budget.

In rural communities all fire administrations are voluntary, and since the Soviet Union is 67% rural, it means that 67% of the personnel in the fire administration forces are unpaid volunteers. In addition, all factories and mills also have their own volunteer fire brigades. Hence, the city personnel in the city fire departments is relatively small. The estimated number of fire administration personnel is 60,000 for the entire country, exclusive of volunteers.

##### Civil Acts & Vital Statistics Administration.

This administration is purely civil in character. It is also charged with the preservation of state papers, and the personnel for this administration is trained in the N.K.V.D. Institute mentioned above.\* Except for the headquarters of this administration, which are established in the U.S.S.R., republics, territories, oblasts and cities, the routine duties of this administration as they apply to small towns, villages and rural areas, are performed by the militia. National funds are used to maintain only the headquarters of the administrations of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics. The personnel is estimated at 10,000.

##### Highway Administration.

This administration is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the All-Union, the Republic, the regional, and the territorial highways. The responsibility for the district and village roads lies with the respective Soviets. The personnel in this administration is made up principally of technicians. The labor for highway projects comes from the corrective labor camps. When an important highway must be built it is not infrequent that an appeal (with rather stiff persuasion) is sent out to the Komsomols, trade unions, Osoaviakhim and the Party, to donate services to a highway project. This administration is maintained entirely by the national budget. Its personnel is estimated at 6,000.

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\* See chart.

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See the following reports for other administrations:

Militia	-	Report No. 1904 - 2037-2105/1
Border Guards & Internal Troops	"	" 1906 - 2037-1552/2
Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies	"	" 1908 - 2037-1552/27

REMARKS.

The personnel strength of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. is estimated as follows:

a. Militia	575,000
Including:	
Railway Guards	(25,000)
Enterprise Guards	(50,000)
b. Border Guards	150,000
c. Interior Troops	50,000
d. Convoy Troops	50,000
e. Fire Personnel	60,000
f. Civil Acts Administration	10,000
g. Highway Administration	5,000
Total	700,000

Control over this commissariat is actually centralized in the Soviet of Peoples Commissars, where orders are carried out by the Commissar of the N.K.V.D. of the U.S.S.R. In none of the subordinate organs is this control released, but the responsibility of maintenance and financing is forced upon agencies other than the U.S.S.R. Although the Soviets disclaim forced labor in this country, the organization of this commissariat is interesting to note. In it are the means to apprehend (militia), try and sentence (advisory council) and imprison offenders (corrective labor). Any governmental organization that has a crying need for labor simply calls upon the N.K.V.D. to supply it. If the amount of labor is insufficient to supply the need, it is relatively an easy matter to institute a reign of terror on any pretext and fill up labor colonies to meet requirements. There is little doubt that during the purges of the past, one eye was kept on the labor needs of governmental projects.

The N.K.V.D., including the State Security, has protected the present regime but has also prevented the development of the country. Its close supervision over the people, its pogroms, its raids and arrests, has instilled fear to such an extent that initiative in all phases of national economy has disappeared. The individual is too concerned with the problems of simply living that he is

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reluctant to attempt any changes or improvements for fear of a mistake - and a mistake means prison.

The N.K.V.D. has every individual under observation from birth to death. It registers the birth, assigns quarters, controls internal, as well as external, passports, it prevents or permits travel within the country, its secret agents are everywhere; its actions are swift. An individual simply disappears in the middle of the night and no one ever sees or hears of him again. The N.K.V.D. is used as the check and balance weapon by the government - whenever a group in the government gets too popular, or too powerful, or when Stalin needs scapegoats to cover government mistakes he unleashes his N.K.V.D. The N.K.V.D. and the State Security are the most powerful weapons in the hands of the government. The Soviet Union is in itself a prison and the N.K.V.D. and State Security are its keepers.

1 enclosure:  
Chart.

*Joseph A. Michels*  
Joseph A. Michels,  
Major, Cavalry,  
Ass't. Military Attache.

FORWARDED

Frank B. Yinton,  
Major, Cavalry,  
Military Attache.

From M. A. Moscow

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6. Hoover to Watson, 18 February 1942.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

February 18, 1942

PERSONAL AND  
CONFIDENTIAL

Major General Edwin M. Watson  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Watson:

As of possible interest to the President and to you, I am transmitting herewith copy of a revised delimitation agreement executed by General Lee, Admiral Wilkinson and myself on February 9, 1942. It will be observed that this agreement outlines the respective responsibilities of Military and Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation under various conditions.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E)(2)  
Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72  
By DBS, NLR, Date JUN 25 1975

Attachment

By special messenger

~~STRICTLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 9, 1942

*SUBJECT: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of  
the Federal Bureau Investigation, the  
Office of Naval Intelligence and the  
Military Intelligence Division*

*The Agreement for Coordination of the  
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office  
of Naval Intelligence and the Military  
Intelligence Division.*

I.           The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereunder. It is now agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage, (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the reporting agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II.           FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the categories involving civilians in the United States and its territories with the exception of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska other than that specifically described in Paragraph III.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E)(2)

Justice Dept. letter, 9-21-72

By DBS, NLR, Date

JUN 25 1975

6. (Continued)

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2. Investigation of all cases directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of designated group or set of circumstances.
3. The coordination of civilian organizations furnishing information regarding subversive movements.
4. Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.
5. Keep MID and ONI advised of important developments, such as:
  - (a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.
  - (b) Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.
  - (c) Developments affecting vital utilities.
  - (d) Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems.  
(for c and d above, no protective coverage is contemplated)
6. Ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat Fifth Column Activities (overt acts of all sorts in groups of armed forces of enemies); and transmitting to MID, ONI and State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

6. (Continued)

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7. Keeping ONI and MID informed of any other important developments.

III.

MID will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.
2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.
3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.

6. (Continued)

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IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval employ or control, and all civilians in Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Midway Islands.
2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph I.

ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore, and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

3. Informing FBI and MID of any important developments.

V. The ultimate test of cooperation and coordination of the Intelligence agencies is the manner in which they function under conditions of national emergency or actual warfare. There should be no doubt as to the identity of the agency or official who is primarily responsible for carrying on intelligence operations under the broad conditions for which the governing principles are listed hereinafter.

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

VI. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the Military Commander assumes responsibility for Intelligence coverage. He has authority to coordinate intelligence activities of the participating agencies, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities by the assignment of missions, the designation

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of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong, nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance to the Military Commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the Military Commander.

VIII. It is assumed that the Military Commander will not hesitate to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY  
INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL  
LAW.

IX. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Military Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Military Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

6. (Continued)

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1. Agents of the FBI, of ONI, and of MID will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs II, III, and IV.
2. In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.
3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

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I. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agency, the Military Commander should obtain the necessary authority from the War Department.

II. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the Military Commander, whenever either of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended through the director of each service.

III. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be the agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same principles will govern the Navy Department.

PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS

IIII. Under these conditions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division will operate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV.


XIV. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such amendments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the





6. (Continued)

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subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions.

  
Assistant Chief of Staff  
G-2, War Department

  
Director, Office of Naval  
Intelligence

  
Director, Federal Bureau of  
Investigation

7. Tokyo Circular 906 to Berlin and Helsinki, 6 October 1942.

~~SECRET~~

From: Tokyo (WOTNS)  
To: Berlin and Helsinki  
October 6, 1942  
JMA

REVISED TRANSLATION

Circular #906 (Seven parts complete)

To Col. HAYASHI and Major HIROSE.

We have commenced the study of Russian diplomatic and commercial codes, and have obtained the following results. For our information let us know how you are getting along.

1. Extent of interception.

Mostly from Moscow and the Foreign Office in Kuibyshev. Also from the embassies and consulates in Japan and Manchoukuo. Very little material aside from this.

2. Diplomatic. (23A)

(1) (Type 8 ?)

Subtracting the first group of the text from the third group, the first and second digits give the additive page; the third digit is the same as the second; the fourth and fifth digits give the vertical and horizontal coordinates; the fifth digit is always even; the code seems to be a 4 figure one.

The additive table is 50 pages each of 50 groups. This type is used in all messages centering in Kuibyshev and about \*\*\*\*\* of these around Moscow.

C. I. #896

(Japanese)

Page 1

ARMY

~~SECRET~~

7. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~

(2) Special form 1 (a).

Subtracting the first group of the text from the second group from the end, the first and second digits give the number of groups in the text of the message; the third, fourth, and fifth digits are all either 4 or 6. ✓ (Z Z C)

In subtracting the first group of the text from the third group from the end, the first, second, third, and fourth digits are very often all the same. This is believed to be the number of the additive table. (The fifth digit is believed to give the consecutively ascending additive page for each message.) (Z Z C)

The additive table is  $\frac{1}{2}$  pages each of 70 groups. This type is used for about half the messages centering in Moscow and between the representatives in Vladivostok and Tokyo. )

(3) Special form 1(b).

Only the difference between the second group from the end and the first group of the text mentioned in the previous paragraph. (Z Z D)

This type is used between Tokyo, Vladivostok, Seoul, Hakodate, and Dairen. Between Seoul and Vladivostok (they also) subtract the fourth group of the text from the third group from the end, and the seventh group from the end from the fourth group from the end.

(4) Special form 2(a).

The difference between the second and third groups from the end is a series of 2's and 8's. Moreover the sum of the digits in the third (Z Z E)

C. I. #896

(Japanese)

Page 2.

ARMY

~~SECRET~~

7. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~

group from the end is a multiple of 10 and, as subtracting the first and second digits from the third and fourth digits gives an ascending sequence in each telegram, it is thought that this indicates the additive page.

The additive table is 40 pages each of 50 groups.

This form is used from Tokyo -- HASHI<sup>a</sup> -- to (LADOGA ?) and from -- HASHI<sup>a</sup> -- to Manchuria.

(5) Special form 2(b).

The second group from the end is a multiple of 10. Aside from this it is the same as the preceding paragraph.

This form is used for messages going in the opposite direction as the previous paragraph.

3. Commercial.

The first and second digits of the first group of the text give the vertical and horizontal coordinates. The third digit gives the length of the message. (Up to 60 groups is 1; and increases 1 for each 60 groups thereafter.) The fourth and fifth digits give the additive page.

The additive table is 50 pages each of 50 groups.

a - Kana spelling.

C I. #896

(Japanese) Inter. 10/6/42 (12)  
Trans. 1/29/43  
Retrans. 2/6/43 (B-d)

ARMY

~~SECRET~~

Page 3.

8. US Army Signals Security Agency, "Memorandum on Russian Codes in the Japanese Military Attache System," 9 February 1943 [Excerpt].

Archives  
CBVI 17  
Acc 4665

~~SECRET~~

Feb. 9, 1943.

First Report

(see folder 9720410820)

MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIAN CODES IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE SYSTEM

footnote 17

The present memorandum records all quickly available information concerning Russian codes which have been transmitted in the Japanese Military Attache (JMA) system of enciphered code.

The transmissions seem all to have taken place from Europe (Berlin, Stockholm, Helsinki, Hungary) to Tokyo-(once to Hsinking). The earliest found is dated July 1, 1941; the most recent, December 22, 1942. All but one (number 8 below), which does not seem to be an ordinary code, were enciphered by the C additive-book; no matter what the date or the cipher-alphabet used (1,2,3).

Cipher text. The text seems to suffer from more than the usual transmission garbles. It is possible that haste and indifference have produced many of the deviations from intelligible Russian and numerals that are found.

Materials used. Circumstances caused the preparation of the memorandum to be hasty. The various message-parts had already been recorded on cards by originating station, station addressed, date, serial number, additive-book page, and the first and last words of the code involved. Unfortunately, the corresponding terminal numbers had not been recorded. Additional information has been sought principally by inspection of the first and last available parts of each message.

It has been impossible in the time spent to correct many garbles and other inaccuracies in the Russian words or to check the work of the compiler of the cards, although some errors of both sorts have been detected and amended in passing.

Types of codes. Each code is classed, when this could be easily done, as one- or two-part and as four- or five-digit.

Treatment of the Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet. The earliest transmissions (1-3) used the code-values for the letters of the Russian alphabet provided in the basic code of the JMA system. These are properly quadriliteral groups introduced by NQ; thus, NQAZ = Russian A. (See 7.) On some occasions, NQ is used only at the beginning and the end of a Russian word, and is to be read before each intervening letter-pair. (See 5.) In the longer code-book messages here treated, NQ never appears, but is to be read before each applicable letter-pair. (See 1,2,3, and compare 8.)

~~SECRET~~

8. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~

It seems reasonable to assume that the abandonment of this method was caused by the great time, effort, and expense it entails. In all longer transmissions sent later (beginning with 4), the Russian letters were incorporated as individual-letter (JL) spellings into the message in transliteration, the 26 letters of the Roman alphabet being substituted for the 31 of the Russian ( , the hard sign being omitted). This change in method reduces the length of words by half. The table of transliteration is given below. Note that the use of W, V, Q, (forЩ), X, and E (forЭ) agrees with the use of the corresponding Morse letters when applied to Russian. The use of the other letters agree both with the Morse and with the usual Slavonic transliteration of the Cyrillic letters (cf. H -- [Serbian X = Croatian H] -- C, Y), except for J (taken away fromЙ, which becomes I, and assigned toЧ). The special Morse letters forШ,Ю, and Я have been replaced by Q, U, and A respectively, so that, finally, the following pairs of letters are represented each by the same letter: АА (a), ЕЭ (E), ИИ (I), УЮ (U), ЩЩ (Q).

Cyrillic	Transl. in messages	Transl. used in EII(b)4a	Cyrillic	Transl. in messages	Transl. used in EII(b)4a
А	А	А	Р	Р	Р
Б	В	В	С	С	С
В	W	V	Т	Т	Т
Г	Г	Г	У	У	У
Д	Д	Д	Ф	Ф	Ф
Е	Е	Е, YE <sup>a</sup>	Х	Х	КН
Ж	В	ZH	Ц	С	ТS
З	Z	Z	Ч	J	СH
И	I	I	Ш	Q	SH
Й	I	I	Щ	Q	SHCH
К	К	К	Ъ	***	I <sup>b</sup>
Л	L	L	Ы	Y	I
М	М	М	Ь	X	E
Н	N	N	Э	E	YU
О	O	O	Ю	U	YA
П	P	P	Я	A	

a Transliterated YE when it does not follow a consonant.  
 b At first the usual Slavonic Y was used forЫ. But since in systems for use in English-speaking countries YU, YA, and on occasion YE are used forЮ, Я, and E, it was thought better, in order to avoid some one's misunderstanding a form like VYUCHIVAT' (forВЫУЧИВАТЬ), to employ I, a symbol widely used by linguists and lexicographers to express the sound ofЫ.

~~SECRET~~

9. Hoover to Harry Hopkins, 7 May 1943.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

MAY 7 1943

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Harry Hopkins  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

Through a highly confidential and reliable source it has been determined that on April 10, 1943, a Russian who is an agent of the Communist International paid a sum of money to Steve Nelson, National Committeeman of the Communist Party, USA, at the latter's home in Oakland, California.

The money was reportedly paid to Nelson for the purpose of placing Communist Party members and Comintern agents in industries engaged in secret war production for the United States Government so that information could be obtained for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

The Russian agent of the Communist International has been identified as Vassili Zubilin, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR. New York City is his headquarters.

Both Nelson and Zubilin will meet in the near future with other leaders of the Communist International (Comintern) apparatus active in the United States.

It has likewise been determined through a highly confidential and completely reliable source that the National Headquarters of the Communist Party, USA and, particularly, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA are aware of and have approved of the assignment which has been given to Nelson by the Communist International.

Steve Nelson has used the following aliases: Steve Joseph Nelson, Stephan Mesarosh, Steve J. Mesarosh, Joseph Fleisbinger and "Hugo." It is reported that he was born in Yugoslavia in 1903. His true name is unknown. According to a biographical sketch of Nelson which appeared in the Daily Worker for November 10, 1937 (when the Daily Worker was admittedly the official organ of the Communist Party), Nelson joined the Communist Party, USA in January, 1925. He claims

9. (Continued)

- 2 -

to have been naturalized under the name, Stephan Mesarosh, at Detroit, Michigan on November 26, 1928.

According to Nelson's own statements, he performed espionage work for the Soviet Government in 1931 and 1932. In 1935 he was vice president of the Workers Alliance in Pennsylvania and was a subdistrict organizer of the Communist Party in Pennsylvania at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Nelson went to Spain as a political commissar of the International Brigades and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He returned from Spain in the latter part of 1937 and became active in the affairs of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and the American League for Peace and Democracy. Since 1938 he has been a national figure in the Communist Party, USA and is now a member of the National Committee, a high policy-forming body of the Communist Party, USA.

Steps are being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify all members of the Communist International (Comintern) apparatus with which Steve Nelson and Vassili Zubilin are connected, as well as the agents of that apparatus in various war industries.

Because of the relationship demonstrated in this investigation between the Communist Party, USA, the Communist International and the Soviet Government, I thought the President and you would be interested in these data.

These matters are being brought to your attention at this time for your confidential information inasmuch as the investigation is continuing.

Sincerely yours,





10. Anonymous letter to Hoover, undated [received 7 August 1943] [Russian original with English translations].

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No 10  
Copy to 7-10-46  
54-00

Mr. HOOVER,

Exceptional circumstances impel us to inform you of the activities of the so-called Director of the Soviet Intelligence in this country. This "Soviet" intelligence officer genuinely occupies a very high post in the GPU (now NKVD), enjoys to a vast extent the confidence of the Soviet Government, but in fact, as we know very accurately, works for Japan himself, while his wife (works) for Germany. Thus, under cover of the name of the USSR, he is a dangerous enemy of the USSR and the U.S.A. The vast organisation of permanent staff [KADROVYE] workers of the NKVD under his command in the U.S.A. does not suspect that, thanks to the treachery of their director, they are also inflicting frightful harm on their own country. In this same false position is also their whole network of agents, among whom are many U.S. citizens, and finally BROWDER himself, who has immediate contact with them. BROWDER passes on to him very important information about the U.S.A., thinking that all this goes to MOSCOW, but, as you see, it all goes to the Japanese and Germans. The "Director of the Soviet Intelligence" here is ZUBILIN, Vasilij, 2nd secretary in the embassy of the USSR, his real name is ZARUBIN, V., deputy head of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate [UPRAVLENIE] of the NKVD. He personally deals with getting agents into and out of the U.S.A. illegally, organises secret radio-stations and manufactures forged documents. His closest assistants are:

1. His wife, directs political intelligence here, has a vast network of agents in almost all ministries including the State Department. She sends false information to the NKVD and everything of value passes on to the Germans through a certain Boris MOROZ (HOLLYWOOD). Put her under observation and you will very quickly uncover the whole of her network.
2. KLARIN, Pavel, vice-consul in NEW YORK. Has a vast network of agents among Russian emigrés, meets them almost openly, brings agents into the U.S.A. illegally. Many of his agents work in very high posts in American organisations, they are all Russian.
3. KhEJFETS - vice-consul in SAN FRANCISCO, deals with political and military intelligence on the West Coast of the U.S.A. has a large network of agents in the ports and war factories, collects very valuable strategic material, which is sent by ZUBILIN to Japan. Has a radio station in the consulate. He himself is a great coward, on arrest will quickly give away all the agents to save himself and remain in this country.
4. KVASNIKOV, works as an engineer in AMTORG, is ZUBILIN's assistant for technical intelligence, through SEMENOV - who also works in AMTORG, is robbing the whole of the war industry of America. SEMENOV has his agents in all the industrial towns of the U.S.A., in all aviation and chemical war factories and in big institutes. He works very brazenly and roughly, it would be very easy to follow him up and catch him red handed. He would just be glad to be arrested as he has long been seeking a reason to remain in the U.S.A., hates the NKVD but is a frightful coward and loves money. He will give all his agents away with pleasure if he is promised an American passport. He is convinced that he is working for the USSR, but all his materials are going via Z. to Japan, if you tell him about this, he will help you find the rest himself.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2CJG/UM  
ON 7-10-96

[Continued overleaf]

~~TOP SECRET~~

10. (Continued)

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

5. SHEVCHENKO, agent for the Purchasing Commission in BUFFALO. Deals with the same as SEMENOV.

6. LUKYANOV, agent for the Purchasing Commission in the ports of NEW YORK and PHILADELPHIA. ZUBILIN's assistant for naval intelligence. Has a lot of agents in these ports. His materials are very valuable and dangerous to the U.S. as they are all being sent on by ZUBILIN through his wife to the Germans.

7. The 2nd Secretary of the USSR Legation in Canada, Z.'s assistant for Canada.

8. TARASOV - secretary of the USSR Embassy in Mexico, Z.'s assistant for Mexico.

9. DOLGOV - attaché of the USSR Embassy here, Z.'s assistant for WASHINGTON. [A person who] occupies a most special position, ranks next after ZUBILIN in the NKVD, is a 2nd secretary in the USSR Embassy here - MIRONOV, his real name is MURKOV (ZUBILIN is a general in the NKVD, MIRONOV - a colonel). Both hate each other over their positions. In the NKVD line they directed the occupation of Poland. ZUBILIN interrogated and shot Poles in KOZIELSK, MIRONOV in SEMROBIELSK. All the Poles who were saved know these butchers by sight. 10,000 Poles shot near MOLENSK was the work of both of them. If you prove to MIRONOV that Z. is working for the Germans and Japanese, he will immediately shoot him without a trial, as he too holds a very high post in the NKVD. He has some high level agent in the office of the White House.

Postmarked: WASHINGTON, D.C., 2. a.m., 7th August 1943.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Г-н. ГУБЕР,

Несбычайные обстоятельства побуждают нас сообщить Вам о деятельности, т. наз. руководителя советской разведки в этой стране. Этот "советский" разведчик действительно занимает очень пост в ГПУ (ныне НКВД), пользуется огромным доверием советского правительства, но фактически, как нам совершенно точно известно, сам он работает для Японии, а его жена для Германии. Таким образом он, прикрываясь именем СССР, является опасным врагом СССР и США. Огромный аппарат кадровых работников НКВД, находящийся в США под его начальством не подозревает, что благодаря предательству своего руководителя, они так же наносят страшный вред своей стране. В таком же ложном положении находится и вся их сеть агентов, среди которых много граждан США и наконец сам Браудер, имевший непосредственный контакт с ним. Браудер передает ему очень важные сведения США, думая что все это идет в Москву, но, как вы видите все это идет японцам и немцам.

"Руководитель советской" здесь - Зубилин Василий, 2 секретарь посольства СССР, настоящее его имя Зарубин В. заместитель начальника управления разведки за границей НКВД. Лично занимается нелегальной переправкой агентов в США и из США, организует секретные радиостанции и изготавливает поддельные документы. Его ближайшие помощники:

1. его жена, руководит политической разведкой здесь, имеет огромную сеть агентов почти во всех министерствах в том числе и Стэйт Департементе. В НКВД посылает дезинформацию, а все ценное передает немцам через некого Бориса Мороз (Голливуд). Установите наблюдение за ней и вы вскрыете всю ее сеть очень быстро.
2. Кларин Павел, вице-консул в Н.Йорке. Имеет огромную сеть агентов среди русских эмигрантов, встречается с ними почти открыто, нелегально переправляет агентов в США. Многие его агенты работают на очень высоких постах в различных американских организациях, все они русские.
3. Хейфец - вице-консул в С.Франциско, занимается политической и военной разведкой по западному берегу США, имеет большую сеть агентов в портах и на военных заводах, собирает очень ценный стратегический материал, который направляется Зубилиным в Японию. Имеет радиостанцию в консульстве. Сам он очень большой трус, при аресте быстро выдаст всех агентов чтобы спасти себя и остаться в этой стране.
4. Квасников, работает инженером в Амторге, является помощником Зубилина по технической разведке, через Семенова - работающего тоже в Амторге, обворовывает всю военную промышленность Америки. Семенов имеет своих агентов во всех промышленных городах США, на всех военных заводах по авиации, химии и в крупных институтах. Работает очень нахально и грубо, его проследить и захватить на месте преступления очень легко. Аресту он будет просто рад, т.к. давно ищет причину остаться в США, ненавидит НКВД но страшный трус и любит деньги. Всех своих агентов выдаст с удовольствием, если ему пообещать американский паспорт. Он уверен что работает для СССР, но все его материалы идут через З. в Японию, если ему об этом рассказать, то он сам поможет вам найти остальных.
5. Шевченко, уполномоченный Закупочной комиссии в Буффало. Занимается тем же и Семенов.
6. Лукянов, уполномоченный закупочной комиссии в портах Н.Йорка и Филадельфия. Помощник Зубилина по военно морской разведке. Имеет много агентов в этих портах. Его материалы очень ценные и опасные для США, т.к. все переправляются Зубилиным через жену немцам.
- 7 - - 2 секретарь миссии СССР в Канаде, помощник З. по Канаде.
8. Тарасов - секретарь посольства СССР в Мексике, помощник З. по Мексике
9. Дайгов - атташе посольства СССР здесь, помощник З. по Вашингтону. Совершенно особое положение занимает, второй после Зубилина по

10. (Continued)

НКВД, 2 секретарь посольства СССР здесь - Миронов, его настоящая фамилия Марнов (Зубилин - генерал НКВД, Миронов-полковник НКВД) Оба друг друга ненавидят по должностям. По линии НКВД руководили оккупацией Польши. Зубилин допрашивал и расстреливал поляков в Козельске, Миронов в Старобельске. Все спасшиеся поляки знают этих ~~назвечей~~ ~~лицо~~ ~~лицо~~. 10000 расстрелянных поляков под Моленском дело рук их обоих. Если Миронову сказать, что З. работает на немцев и японцев, то он немедленно расстреляет его без суда, т. к. имеет тоже очень высокую пост в НКВД? Имеет какого то крупного агента в офисе Белого Дома.

postmarked Washington, D.C., 2 a.m., 7<sup>th</sup> August 1943.

11. Hoover to Birch D. O'Neal, "Alto Case," 26 February 1944.

KLARIN

February 26, 1944

DBC-41036

Mr. Birch D. O'Neal  
The American Embassy  
Mexico, D. F.

Re: Alto Case

Dear Sir:

Please refer to your cable of February 23, 1944, advising that Jacob Epstein, who has been identified as one of the writers of the secret writing letters emanating from Mexico in this case, met an unidentified individual at a restaurant and conferred with him on the night of February 21, 1944, for forty minutes. This unidentified individual then went to the Russian Embassy and the next day this same individual appeared at the airport in Mexico City in company with Alexei Prokhorov, Russian diplomatic courier who went to Mexico from the United States by plane on January 28, 1944, and was returning to the United States. The unidentified individual then went to the Geneva Hotel, and it was determined that one Paul Klarine was registered at the hotel from 7 East 62nd Street, New York City (the 62 was obtained from a garble and this could be 61), nationality Russian, registered at the Hotel Geneva since November 23, 1943.

Your office stated that it was believed this individual was identical with Pavel P. Klarin, a Vice Consul of the Russian Consulate-General in New York City, and a suspected Russian agent who had left the United States for Mexico in November 1943, but has not been located. You were advised by Bureau cable dated February 24, 1944 that the Russian Consulate General in New York City is located at 7 East 61st Street, and were requested to effect a discreet surveillance of Klarin and to forward a picture taken of him and Prokhorov at the Mexican airport.

Attached for your use are three photographs of Klarin together with his signature. You should advise the Bureau as soon as possible whether Klarin is identical with the unidentified individual mentioned above.

For your information and the information of the offices receiving copies of this letter, the following is set forth. This should be maintained in a strictly confidential manner. You are aware numerous secret writing letters in this case were intercepted up until November 1943, at which time it appears that the subjects became apprehensive of the security of their method of communication. They indicated that couriers were to be used in the future for their communications, and we know that an attempt was actually made to use Mrs. Anna Collopy, New York City, as a courier.

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DECLASSIFIED BY SPL C. C. C. M.  
ON 7-30-96

11. (Continued)

It now appears from the information furnished by your office relative to Epstein's meeting with the unidentified individual believed to be Klarin, that the subjects are using either Russian diplomatic couriers or the Russian diplomatic pouch or both. This consideration should be borne in mind by all offices investigating this case.

The following is background information regarding Klarin as furnished to the State Department when Klarin became attached to the Russian Consulate General in New York. His full name is Pavel Fanteleevich Klarin, born August 15, 1903, Iziun, former Dnarkov, Gubernia, Russia. He graduated from high school in Iziun in 1920, and from the Economic faculty of the Don State University in 1926. He was employed as a field economist for "kolkhozes" in various parts of the Soviet Union from 1925 to 1931. From 1931 to 1935 he was the economist of the All Ukrainian Union of Cooperatives. From 1935 to 1937 he was economist of the All Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce; from 1937 to April 1939, senior economist of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. From April to June 1939, he headed the Agriculture Section of the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair, and then served as the administrative assistant to the Commissioner General of the U.S.S.R. at the Fair. On February 17, 1940, he became Vice Consul of the Consulate General, located at 7 East 61st Street, New York City. He listed his American address as 11 East 61st Street, New York City. He stated that he came to the United States on April 6, 1939, aboard the S. S. Queen Mary; that he is the father of two children, Klavdia, 12 years old in January 1941, and Nada, 9 years old in January 1941.

There is a copy of a letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the State Department dated March 8, 1941, indicating that Klarin was admitted to the United States at the port of New York on April 6, 1939, temporarily for business, destined to the Antony Trading Corporation, and was to leave the United States within thirty days after the close of the New York World's Fair. He requested an extension of five months to complete work as an employee of the Soviet Commission in the New York World's Fair, but this request was denied on January 30, 1940, since the World's Fair was not to re-open in 1940. A request was then submitted by the Consul General in New York for a change in Klarin's status from a temporary visitor to that of a government official, he having been appointed Vice Consul of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in New York and his appointment accepted by the United States Government and certified by exequatur on March 4, 1940.

Surveillance conducted by the New York Field Division have established that Klarin has been in considerable contact with Vassili Mikhailovich Zubilin, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., and undoubtedly the head of the Soviet intelligence activities in the United States at the present time. It has been found that Zubilin and Klarin have met a number

11. (Continued)

of times in the early hours of the morning, sometimes at 3:00 and 4:00 A.M.

Zubilin was born January 22, 1900, in Moscow, Russia. He claims to have been graduated from the Plekhanoff Institute of Economy and to have subsequently held several positions in the People's Commissariat of Finance of the U.S.S.R., which is known as Harkentfin. In 1941 he was appointed attache of the Soviet Embassy in China. In 1942 he was appointed Third Secretary of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, D. C., and he is at the present time the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

For your strictly confidential information, it has been determined that Zubilin paid a sum of money to a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party in April 1943, for the purpose of defraying expenses of Communist Party members engaged in espionage activities of the Soviet Union and for Communist Party couriers.

According to information received, Zubilin holds the rank of general in the NKVD and is engaged in the movement of Soviet agents into and out of the United States. He reportedly organizes secret radio stations, prepares counterfeit documents, and obtains industrial and military information for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

For your guidance in the investigation of Soviet agents in Latin America, the following information is furnished to show the type of information Soviet agents in the United States, both those who are members of the Communist Party, USA, and those who are Soviet citizens, are attempting to obtain.

1. Formulas and blueprints for all inventions, discoveries and innovations of a military significance.
2. Formulas and blueprints for all inventions, discoveries, and innovations of an industrial significance.
3. Information regarding the means of communication between individuals in this country and persons in occupied European countries who do not wish to have their nations annexed by the Soviet Union at the close of this war.
4. Information regarding the number of students and the curricula of the schools operated by the United States Army for administrative officers who are to be sent to territories freed from Axis occupation.

Zubilin's closest assistant in the Soviet Consulate General in New York was Pavel F. Klarin, now in Mexico. It is reported that in Mexico Zubilin's assistant was Leon Tarasov, First Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Mexico City. It should be noted that

11. (Continued)

Leon Tarasov was accompanying Alexei Prokhorov at the time Prokhorov departed from Mexico City by plane on February 22, 1944.

All of the above information is extremely confidential and must be so maintained by all of the offices receiving copies of this letter. It is furnished to aid in the investigation of this case, which is of increasing importance to the Bureau. It is requested that all offices submit investigative reports of investigations to date within the very near future, and that all offices conduct all necessary investigation promptly and thoroughly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover



12. Edward P. Stettinius, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Soviet Codes,"  
27 December 1944.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


December 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Codes

You will recall our conversation on the Soviet codes. I have informed General Donovan that he should send through General Deane in Moscow to General Fetin, the Soviet General with whom Donovan deals on all matters connected with the exchange of information in his field, a message informing the Soviet Government that in dealing with other matters one of our agencies had run across certain material which purported to be related to Russian messages sent in code. He was also asked to explain that we had taken advantage of the opportunity to prevent this material from falling into the hands of the enemy and that we would immediately make it available to the Soviet Government if they so desired.

I feel sure that this will take care of the matter, as the Soviet Government will be informed and will see that we are fully disposed to cooperate with them and not retain any material which they themselves might desire to have.



DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR

*ACT (PJK-S-165) 1945*



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

September 12, 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Matthew Connelly  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED COPY

*NAT 78-5*  
*(FBI Memo 9-21-45)*

Dear Mr. Connelly:

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have advised that they have obtained positive information through a former employee of the Soviet Military Attache at Ottawa, Canada, that the Soviets have an extensive espionage network in Canada. The Soviets have made the obtaining of complete information regarding the atomic bomb the Number One project of Soviet espionage and these data must be obtained before the end of this year. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police report that there is considerable loose talk in the Office of the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa regarding the "next war" which the Soviet Union will have with the Anglo-American nations.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police received from the same source information that an assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State under Mr. Stettinius, was a paid Soviet spy. This man's name, or nickname, is unknown at the present time but further inquiry is being made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to obtain further identifying data. No information regarding this situation is being furnished to the State Department in the absence of further identifying data.

With regard to the atomic bomb project, Dr. Allen May, a British scientist assigned to the McGill University Laboratory in Canada, has been identified as a paid Soviet spy of long standing. May spent some time during September, 1944, at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, working on the separation process for uranium and is well informed as to the methods of setting up uranium piles or lattices.



13. (Continued)

May is reported to have furnished the Soviets in Ottawa with a small quantity of U233 which is one of the isotopes of uranium and this specimen was flown directly to Moscow.

The information regarding May has been furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Major General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineering District project.

It has also been definitely determined by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that Dr. May, in the first part of July, 1945, advised the Office of the Military Attache in Ottawa, that the United States Navy was using radar-controlled projectiles against Japanese suicide planes and that the tubes and batteries within the projectile were finished with a special plastic protective device against the shock of firing, which the American authorities have not furnished to the British.

This latter information has been called to the attention of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Canadian situation is being followed closely and any additional information will be brought to the attention of the President and you.

With assurances of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover




14. Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.



~~TOP SECRET~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: September 24, 1945

To: Mr. Frederick B. Lyon  
Chief  
Division of Foreign Activity Correlation  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18, 1945. Additional information has been obtained by a Bureau representative from Igor Guzenko as follows:

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Guzenko stated that all intelligence activities outside the Soviet Union and inside the Soviet Union are coordinated by G. M. Malenkov, a member of the Political Bureau of the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Central Committee of the same organization and the man who is mentioned by many Soviet officials as Stalin's successor. Malenkov, according to Guzenko, is actually the head of all intelligence activity, and Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the NKVD and the political apparatus are all ultimately responsible to him.

There are numerous jurisdictional clashes, particularly between the Military and Naval Intelligence organizations and the NKVD. All such matters are referred to Malenkov.

Malenkov is the actual head of the political apparatus in foreign countries and all communications, reports, et cetera, from the Political Secretary in any Embassy are sent directly to Malenkov and not to Molotov or any person in the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

Likewise, no communication from the Military or Naval Attaches in any Embassy would go to Molotov. Such communications go to the Chief of Espionage for the area covering the particular Embassy.

In the same way, the Embassy Secretary who represents the NKVD does not send any correspondence to the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. According to Guzenko, the only person in the Embassy who would be corresponding with the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs would be the Ambassador himself, who in every instance is only a front, and possibly one or two men close to the Ambassador who are called "innocents."



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Guzenko stressed that the Ambassador was advised in general terms of political and economic matters which the Political Secretary, the NKVD representative and the Military or Naval Attaches receive and which they felt would possibly be of interest to the Ambassador. The Ambassador, however, is not consulted or advised with regard to the primary functions of these intelligence organizations.

According to Guzenko, he has heard discussions in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa indicating that the present system of supervising the activities of the Communist Party of a particular country through the Political Secretary in the Embassy is much more efficient and much more effective than the old cumbersome Comintern setup. Under the present organization, the directives issued by Malenkov through the Embassies to the Parties throughout the world are much more direct and there is less possibility of misinterpretation.

The man in the Embassy in Canada who handles political matters is Gousarov, the Third Secretary, who has his own cryptographer, one Patony, who also acts as a door guard at the Embassy.

The aforementioned system is known to Guzenko to be in operation in the United States, Canada and Mexico and possibly in the other Western Hemisphere countries. It is also in effect in Great Britain, to his personal knowledge. He believes that this system is likewise in effect in all other countries in the world where the Soviets have diplomatic establishments, although there are variations for those countries occupied by the Red Army.

Guzenko states that in the Western Hemisphere and in Great Britain no reports are ever made to Moscow directly by individual espionage agents, whether they refer to Military, Industrial or Political Espionage. All such reports clear through the Embassies and are transmitted by the Embassies.

#### SOVIET PENETRATION OF DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Guzenko stated that from conversations which he had heard in the Embassy and from traffic which he had read, it appeared the Soviets were intending to plant many Soviet espionage agents in the diplomatic establishments already in the United States and Canada, as well as in those diplomatic establishments which are yet to be set up in the United States. These espionage agents are to be sent from Eastern, Central and Balkan European countries. These would number between 50% to 100% of the employees below the rank of Ambassador and would actually be Soviet trained Military Intelligence, NKVD or Comintern men.

Guzenko pointed out that Lieutenant Kulakov had told him that one of his, Kulakov's, best friends is an officer in the NKVD. This NKVD officer is

the code clerk for the Lublin-Polish Embassy in Moscow. Kulakov's friend wears his NKVD uniform to work and it is apparently a standing joke in Moscow that the NKVD operates the Polish code room.

According to Guzenko, another NKVD man who is a close friend of Lieutenant Kulakov is Marshal Tito's personal cipher clerk in Yugoslavia. Guzenko states that this cipher clerk is almost worked to death because Tito sends messages to Moscow asking for instructions and advice on the most minor matters.

Guzenko stated that Soviet Intelligence had good coverage at the present time in the Czech Embassies and he knows from reading dispatches that the Military Attache who is being assigned to the Czech Legation in Ottawa is a Soviet espionage agent. This individual had expected to be appointed Adjutant to the Chief of the Czech General Staff, but the Soviets decided that he should go to Canada in the immediate future as Military Attache, considering this to be an equally important post.

Guzenko stated that in Washington, D. C. the Czech Military Attache is a Soviet spy named Hess. It seems that Colonel Zabotin, the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa, made a trip to Washington shortly after his arrival in Ottawa and sent a cable to Moscow telling them that he had met Hess, who seemed to be sympathetic and that Zabotin felt that he could be developed. Moscow immediately cabled back that Zabotin should stay away from Hess because he was already being operated as a spy by General Sarazev, Soviet Military Attache in Washington, D. C.

#### INTERNATIONAL PLANS OF THE SOVIETS

Guzenko was asked what the attitude in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa was towards the San Francisco Conference and the other conferences in which the United States, Great Britain and Russia played leading roles.

He stated that in the Embassy the meetings of the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which is known in the Embassy as the Provisional Union, discussed such matters. They were likewise discussed in the meetings of the Komsomols (Young Communist League), which is known in the Embassy as the "Sports League," and there was also considerable loose talk in the Embassy itself. From these incidents, Guzenko understood that the Soviets considered all such conferences as merely "talk fests" which served only to conceal from the Anglo-American powers and from the rest of the world the actual plans of the Soviets. Anything of a material nature which could be gained by the Soviets through such conferences was, of course, all to the good and would not have to be gained by force of arms.

14. (Continued)

He stated that he had been told that the Soviet Union's budget for war, which would include intelligence activities, appropriations for the Red Army and Red Navy and for war production, would be greater during the coming year, which was ostensibly a year of peace, than it had been last year during a year of actual warfare.

He further stated that he had been informed that the Soviet Union was not converting its factories to consumer goods production, such as the United States and Canada had announced those countries were doing, but, on the other hand, the Soviets were increasing their war potential by setting up additional plants devoted solely to war production in Siberia. He stated that he was informed that the Soviets would continue to increase their industrial production for war and would obtain consumer goods from factories in the satellite states of Eastern Europe and through purchases in the Western Hemisphere.

Guzenko stated that the Soviets before the use of the atomic bomb were confident that within ten years their military potential would enable them to conquer the world. Since the atomic bomb has been used by the United States, they have set their calendar ahead and have instructed all espionage agents to make the obtaining of the complete construction plans of the bomb itself the No. 1 espionage project. They have issued instructions that this information should be obtained by the end of this year, 1945. Guzenko stated that the last message received at the Embassy from Moscow before he left on September 5, 1945, was stressing the necessity for obtaining the atomic bomb before the end of this year.

He was asked whether this meant the Soviets had set their calendar up the full ten years. He stated he did not know, but that he was merely telling what he knew.

Guzenko stated that all responsible Soviet officials know that the Soviet Union is aiming toward beating the United States and Great Britain in the next war, which will permit the Sovietization of the entire world.

THE IDENTITY OF SOVIET AGENT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Guzenko was questioned carefully regarding the possible identity of the individual in the Department of State under Stettinius who is a Soviet spy. Guzenko stated he did not know the man's name but that he had been told that an Assistant to Stettinius was a Soviet spy. This information came to him in the following manner:

After the arrival of Kulakov in Ottawa in the Summer of 1945, Kulakov and Guzenko got into a discussion on the agencies of the Canadian organization as compared to the United States organization. Guzenko was bearing in mind the

14. (Continued)

adverse opinions held by the Soviet inspectors with regard to the American organization in 1944. Kulakov informed Guzenko that although the Canadian organization was closely knit and well operated and most productive, that there were, of course, more agents in the United States and that he had learned in Moscow that an Assistant of Stettinius, then the United States Secretary of State, was a Soviet spy. Guzenko pointed out that this information would necessarily have come to Kulakov's attention prior to May 17, 1945, because Kulakov left Moscow for the United States and Canada on that date. He stated that he did not ask for the name of this individual because Kulakov would have suspected his motives, since it involved an individual who was not being run by Colonel Sabotin.

Guzenko pointed out that the Soviets were frantic to obtain the secrets of the atomic bomb and that an incident had been reported in the press recently which appeared to him to have been inspired by a Soviet agent. This Soviet agent might not necessarily be the same one to whom Kulakov referred, but on the other hand, it had all the earmarks of the technique used by Soviet political espionage agents. He referred specifically to the announcement made in London by Stettinius that the atomic bomb should be turned over to the Security Council of the United Nations. Guzenko suggested that if the Bureau could determine who suggested to Stettinius that this statement be made, the Bureau might be able to identify a Soviet agent, if not the Assistant to Stettinius referred to by Kulakov.

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
15. Hoover to Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, 8 November 1945.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

November 8, 1945



~~TOP SECRET~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan  
Military Aide to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
JUSTICE  
Original Source letter, August 1973  
PROJECT MLT 76-7  
By MLT-HL, NARS Date 10-29-76



Dear General Vaughan:

As a result of the Bureau's investigative operations, information has been recently developed from a highly confidential source indicating that a number of persons employed by the Government of the United States have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Soviet Government. At the present time it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the information they were transmitting. The investigation, however, at this point has indicated that the persons named hereinafter were actually the source from which information passing through the Soviet espionage system was being obtained, and I am continuing vigorous investigation for the purpose of establishing the degree and nature of the complicity of these people in this espionage ring.

The Bureau's information at this time indicates that the following persons were participants in this operation or were utilized by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet is interested:

Dr. Gregory Silvermaster, a long time employee of the Department of Agriculture.

Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

George Silverman, formerly employed by the Railroad Retirement Board, and now reportedly in the War Department.

Laughlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to the late President Roosevelt.

-2-



*Victor Perlow, formerly with the War Production Board and the Foreign Economic Administration.*

*Donald Wheeler, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services.*

*Major Duncan Lee, Office of Strategic Services.*

*Julius Joseph, Office of Strategic Services.*

*Helen Tenney, Office of Strategic Services.*

*Maurice Halperin, Office of Strategic Services.*

*Charles Kramer, formerly associated with Senator Kilgore.*

*Captain William Ludwig Ullman, United States Army Air Corps.*

*Lieutenant Colonel John H. Reynolds of the United States Army, a former contact of Gaik Ovakimian, former head of the Soviet Secret Intelligence (NKVD) in New York, is also apparently involved in the Soviet espionage activities stemming from Washington, D. C.*

*In addition to the foregoing group in the Government it appears at this time that Mary Price, formerly Secretary to Walter Lippmann, the newspaper columnist and presently publicity manager of the United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, is also associated with the foregoing group.*

*The Government documents were furnished to Gregory Silvermaster, who thereafter photographed them and turned over the undeveloped, but exposed film to a contact of the Soviets*

15. (Continued)

-3-

in either Washington, D. C. or New York City. In the past, it is reported, the contact man made trips to Washington, D. C. once every two weeks and would pick up on such occasions an average of forty rolls of 35-millimeter film.

Investigation of this matter is being pushed vigorously, but I thought that the President and you would be interested in having the foregoing preliminary data immediately.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,



Sincerely yours,

*J. Edgar Hoover*

16. Hoover to Vaughan, 1 February 1946 [Attachment not included].

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

February 1, 1946

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General Harry Hawkins Vaughan  
Military Aide to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



Dear General Vaughan:

As of interest to the President and you, I am attaching a detailed memorandum hereto concerning Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury Department.

As you are aware, the name of Harry Dexter White has been sent to Congress by the President for confirmation of his appointment as one of the two United States delegates on the International Monetary Fund under the Bretton Woods agreement. In view of this fact, the interest expressed by the President and you in matters of this nature, and the seriousness of the charges against White in the attachment, I have made every effort in preparing this memorandum to cover all possible ramifications. As will be observed, information has come to the attention of this Bureau charging White as being a valuable adjunct to an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, D. C. Material which came into his possession as a result of his official capacity allegedly was made available through intermediaries to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, his wife, Helen Witte Silvermaster, and William Ludwig Ullmann. Both Silvermaster and Ullmann are employees of the United States Treasury Department, reportedly directly under the supervision of White.

The information and documents originating in the Treasury Department were either passed on in substance or photographed by Ullmann in a well-equipped laboratory in the basement of the Silvermaster home. Following this step, the material was taken to New York City by courier and made available to Jacob M. Golos, until the time of his death on November 27, 1943. Golos, a known Soviet agent, delivered this material to an individual tentatively identified as Gaik Ovakinian. Ovakinian you will recall was arrested some years ago as an unregistered agent of the Soviet Government and subsequently, by special arrangements with the Department of State, was permitted to return to the U.S.S.R.

After the departure of Gaik Ovakinian, Golos delivered his material to an individual who has been tentatively identified as Dr. Abraham Benedict Weinstein. Subsequent to the death of Golos, the courier handling material received from the Silvermasters and Ullmann delivered it through an unidentified

individual to Anatole Borisovich Gromov, who until December 7, 1945, was assigned as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., when he returned to the U.S.S.R. Gromov had previously been under suspicion as the successor to Vassili Zubilin, reported head of the NKVD in North America, who returned to Moscow in the late Summer of 1944. This whole network has been under intensive investigation since November, 1945, and it is the results of these efforts that I am now able to make available to you.

I also feel that it is incumbent upon me at this time to bring to your attention an additional factor which has originated with sources available to this Bureau in Canada. It is reported that the British and Canadian delegates on the International Monetary Fund may possibly nominate and support White for the post of President of the International Bank, or as Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. The conclusion is expressed that assuming this backing is forthcoming and the United States acquiescence, if not concurrence, resulting, White's nomination to this highly important post would be assured. It is further commented by my Canadian source that if White is placed in either of these positions, he would have the power to influence to a great degree deliberations on all international financial arrangements.

This source, which is apparently aware of at least some of the charges incorporated in the attached memorandum against White, commented that the loyalty of White must be assured, particularly in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has not ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. Fear was expressed that facts might come to light in the future throwing some sinister accusations at White and thereby jeopardize the successful operation of these important international financial institutions.

I thought you would be particularly interested in the above comments, which originated with sources high-placed in the Canadian Government, on the subject at hand.

With expressions of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Attachment



17. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization [NKVD] in Agencies of the US Government," 21 October 1946 [Excerpt].

SECRET

UNDERGROUND SOVIET ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION (NKVD)  
IN AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

October 21, 1946

UNDERGROUND SOVIET ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION (NKVD)  
IN AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PREDICATION

BACKGROUND OF CURRENT PRESENTATION

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth certain charges against officials and employees of the Federal Government. These charges will be dealt with in detail and information arising from other sources and investigation will be coordinated in an effort to give an over-all view of the situation concerning underground Soviet espionage activities in the United States Government at the present time.

A time element exists in making a factual approach to the material set forth. Although the majority of the basic charges against the individuals mentioned herein concern activities dating back several years, these charges must be viewed from the fact that they only became available in November of 1945. Consequently the reader must consider the difficulty of actually proving these activities by investigation at this late date. The facts are strong in many instances and circumstantial in others primarily because of the disparity in time between the date of the activities and the actual report of these activities to the authorities. A determined effort has been made to produce as much actual and circumstantial evidence as possible, either to prove or disprove the basic charges. At the outset it is considered proper to make a statement concerning the source of the basic charges which will be outlined hereinafter. This source who became available and cooperative in November, 1945, for protective purposes in view of continued assistance being received therefrom, is being given the cover name of Gregory. All material originating with Gregory will be so designated and will be set forth as nearly as possible in the very words used by Gregory in reporting the material submitted.

Background of Gregory

Gregory is an individual of American origin and descent, and was educated in both American and foreign educational institutions. Gregory possesses far above the average of academic learning. As far as political affiliations are concerned Gregory first came in contact indirectly with the Communist Party while attending one of the leading educational institutions of New York City. Gregory's first activity was as a speaker for the American

League Against War and Fascism in late 1934 or early 1935. The American League Against War and Fascism was succeeded by the American League for Peace and Democracy, both of which have been reported from numerous sources to be and generally accepted as Communist front organizations. From contacts made while appearing as a speaker for the American League Against War and Fascism, Gregory was introduced to and became a member of the Communist Party in 1935 in New York City. Following this affiliation Gregory held numerous temporary positions having no relationship to Communist Party activities but at the same time in an extra-curricular manner participated in many of the activities of the Party and its fringe groups. As an example, Gregory, during the summer of 1936, served as an assistant at the Amtorg Camp in Napanoch, New York, a summer camp for the Children of Soviet Nationals, attended by children ranging in age from 2 to 15. In June of 1938 through an employment bureau of the educational institution attended by Gregory, contact was made with the Italian Library of Information, an adjunct of the Italian Propaganda Ministry situated at 595 Madison Avenue, New York City. Gregory there came in contact with information which was thought of interest to the Communist Party. In a then sincere effort to assist the Communist Party, Gregory approached Ferruccio Marini and offered to make available to him what information was learned as a result of employment with the Italian Library of Information. Marini is a former member of the Communist Party of Italy, a former student of the Lenin School, Moscow, USSR; and an individual who since his arrival in the United States in 1928 has been active in the National Administration of the Communist Party. Gregory remained with the Italian Library of Information until March, 1939. In the meanwhile Marini had introduced Gregory to an individual originally known only as "Tim." "Tim" was later identified by Gregory as Jacob M. Golos of World Tourist, Inc. After the introduction to Golos, Gregory delivered all information which was gathered dealing with the Italian Library of Information to him rather than to Marini. The activities of Golos will be set forth in detail hereinafter.

In September, 1939, at the instigation of Golos, Gregory secured a position as secretary to Richard H. Waldo, the President and owner of McClure's Syndicate which published and distributed the "Whirligig." Golos explained to Gregory that Waldo was suspected of being affiliated in some way with the Germans and the Communist Party was seeking information concerning his activities. Gregory, in fact, was successful in securing considerable information regarding Waldo between September, 1939 and February, 1940, but no facts significant in proving what the Communist Party desired were forthcoming. In April, 1941, the United States Service and Shipping Corporation, 212 - 5th Avenue, New York City, was organized, and Gregory became an official of this organization. This company was established with money belonging to the Communist Party - USA, or to the Soviet Union, made available by Earl Browder, then National Chairman of the Communist Party. According to Gregory, Browder made available \$15,000 and John Hazard Reynolds, the original President, who was personally selected by Browder for this position, submitted another \$5,000 to augment the capital. While it has been claimed by Communist Party functionaries that the funds supplied by Browder in this connection were funds of the Party, Gregory's superiors in the Soviet Intelligence Service described the funds as "Russian Funds." The United States Service and Shipping Corporation, Gregory states, is a cover firm for Soviet espionage, in the same category with World Tourist, Inc., with which Golos



was associated up to the time of his death on November 27, 1943. The ostensible business purpose of United States Service and Shipping Corporation is to engage in the shipping of parcels and merchandise to Soviet Russia.

Synopsis of Gregory's Courier Activities

As outlined above, Gregory's first contact with the Soviet Intelligence Service was with an individual known only as "Tim" who, in view of definite identification at a later date will hereinafter be referred to as Jacob M. Golos, Secretary of World Tourist, Inc. World Tourist, Inc., was a New York corporation chartered on June 10, 1927. It is interesting to note that Golos pleaded guilty to an indictment along with World Tourist, Inc., charging failure to register as agents of the Soviet Government in March, 1940. He received a fine of \$500 and a jail sentence of four months to one year which was later changed to probation.

After the passage of an initial probationary period, when Gregory was supplying Golos with material secured from the Italian Library of Information, Golos began to use Gregory as a courier for the collection of information from various individuals in Washington, D. C., and New York City. The majority of these persons were employed in the United States Government or had sources therein. During early activities as a courier, Gregory became definitely aware of the connection of Golos with the Soviet Intelligence Service, namely the NKVD as distinguished from the Red Army Intelligence. Regular service as a courier began during the summer of 1941 when Gregory came in contact with a parallel of Soviet espionage headed by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster who has held several positions in the United States Government in past years and is now Chief of the Division of Economic Analysis of the War Assets Administration. Silvermaster and his wife, Helen Witte Silvermaster, according to Gregory, were in turn in contact with many other individuals in the United States Government from whom they secured material and made it available to Gregory for transmittal to Golos. This material was delivered to Gregory in the form of written reports, actual documents, exposed but undeveloped film and verbally requiring its recording in shorthand which Gregory later transcribed. Gregory was eventually placed in contact with another parallel of Soviet espionage, headed by Victor Perlo, who was formerly employed with the War Production Board and later by the Foreign Economic Administration. Gregory met Perlo with others at the apartment of John Abt in New York City who was then and is now General Counsel for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO. Abt is married to Jessica Smith, the President of the S.R.T. Publications, Incorporated, and editor of its magazine "Soviet Russia Today," Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda organ. Gregory acted as a courier for the collection of information of interest to the Soviet Government from this group and delivered it in the same manner to Golos. Gregory's activities as a courier for both the Silvermaster and Perlo groups continued for Golos until his death on November 27, 1943. Collaterally, while serving Golos, Gregory also served others in a small way. Gregory mentioned specifically that while working with Golos,

17. (Continued)

certain material was delivered to one "John" who has not been further identified to date. "John" was introduced to Gregory by Golos and after having made several contacts he introduced Gregory to an individual known only as "Margaret." Gregory's meeting with Margaret occurred in the latter part of 1941 or the early part of 1942. Subsequent to the introduction Gregory met Margaret five or six times over a period of approximately four months. Margaret did not receive material collected by Gregory but merely arranged for contacts between Golos and "Charlie" who Gregory never saw but is convinced was Golos' superior, to whom the material which Golos received was delivered. Just prior to the death of Golos he instructed Gregory to meet Margaret who would make an introduction to a new person who was to receive the material obtained from the Silvermaster group. This contact was made and Margaret introduced Gregory to an individual known only as "Catherine." Material from the Silvermaster group was only delivered to "Catherine" on one or two occasions when these arrangements were apparently upset by the death of Golos. Taking stock for the moment, the only individual who has been definitely identified in this "John," "Margaret" and "Catherine" series of contacts is "Margaret," who is Olga Borisovna Pravdina, a former employee of Amtorg Trading Corporation, a Soviet purchasing agency. Her husband, Vladimir Sergeevich Pravdin, was the head of TASS News Agency, the official news organ of Russia, in New York City. They both returned to Russia in March, 1946. ✓

Immediately following the death of Golos, "Catherine" introduced Gregory to "Bill" who has not been further identified. "Bill" received all of the material collected by Gregory from November, 1943, until September, 1944. In October, 1944, "Bill" turned the operation of Gregory as a courier over to an individual known only as "Jack." Cooperation with Jack continued until December, 1944, when Gregory was removed from duties as a courier for this espionage group. However, during the period of service with "Jack" he introduced Gregory to an individual known only as "Al." Through ordinary investigative procedures it was learned that "Al" contacted Gregory in November, 1945. As a result of this contact he was identified as Anatoli Borisovich Gromov, then First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Gromov had been under suspicion for a considerable period as a successor to Vassili Zubilin, reported head of the NKVD in North America until the late summer of 1944 when he returned to Moscow, USSR, following the inspection of espionage facilities of the Soviet Government in North America by representatives of the NKVD and the Red Army Intelligence. Gromov departed from the United States for Moscow, USSR, on December 7, 1945. It is suspected that his position has been assumed by Fedor Alexeevich Garanin, an official of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.

Gregory is unable to state specifically in any instance to whom Golos, "Bill," "Jack," or "Al" (Gromov) delivered the material which was collected for them. However, Gregory does state that during the period of associations with Golos he selected those items of a political, economic or social intelligence character and made them available to Earl Browder.

then National Chairman of the Communist Party. Browder, in no instance kept this information for delivery to a third person since he did not wish to become compromised in the collection of material of this type. It is significant to note, however, that Gregory is definite in stating that Browder was cognizant of the activities of Golos and his use of Gregory as a courier. It is Gregory's opinion that Golos violated his directives in making information available to Browder. This presumably was done on a personal friendship basis. From information submitted by Gregory, "Charlie" whom Gregory never personally observed has been tentatively identified as Dr. Abramam Benedict Weinstein, a practicing dentist at 20 East 53rd Street, New York City. During the course of instant inquiries, Dr. Weinstein has been in contact with several of the individuals prominent in this case and dealt with in full detail hereinafter in addition to other individuals known to be Soviet agents.

It is significant to observe that while working with Golos and his successors, Gregory had specific instructions to have no associations whatsoever with the Communist Party or any of its fringe groups. Gregory's true name had never figured prominently in any of the activities of the Party or its fringe groups until the advent of the current inquiries. It was through Golos that Gregory became associated with the United States Service and Shipping Corporation, New York City, mentioned hereinbefore, and he assisted Gregory from time to time with grants of money plus all traveling and incidental expenses.

As will be seen hereinafter, through the groups previously mentioned as headed by Silvermaster and Browder, as well as various miscellaneous individuals, it is apparent that the Soviet Intelligence Service was successful in securing material from the Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, the Treasury Department, the War Department, the Department of Justice, the Foreign Economic Administration and numerous other agencies of the Federal Government. In numerous instances the documents themselves were made available from these agencies for copying verbatim or for photographing in the basement of the Silvermaster home where investigation has determined a fully equipped photographic laboratory was located. ✓

As pointed out hereinbefore investigation in this case has only extended over the period November 8, 1945, to the present time. Consequently it has not been possible to show that each and every one of the individuals mentioned by Gregory is interrelated in their activity. The normal practice of espionage would not permit contacts between each and every individual during that period. However, it will be observed numerous contacts between the subjects of instant inquiries have transpired and in some instances under very suspicious circumstances. A studied attempt has been made to establish the basic truth or falsity of Gregory's information and certain observations are apropos in this connection. Gregory has mentioned over 150 names and in no instance has investigation indicated that a non-existent person was mentioned.

17. (Continued)

Only in those instances where only a first name was given and no identifying data was available has it been impossible to identify the person to whom Gregory was referring. In addition, the methods by which the passage of information was effected are those which by experience have been tried, tested and used by all effective intelligence services, including particularly the Russian. It is also significant that Gregory, by actual observation, has identified Olga Borisovna Pravdina of Amtorg as "Margaret" and Anatoli Borisovich Gromov of the Soviet Embassy as "Al." Gregory has reported with a high degree of accuracy situations of the United States Government policy which were only known within the Government itself as examples of material which was passed through Gregory to Golos and his successors for use of the Soviet Government. Also reported by Gregory was the existence of a photographic laboratory in the basement of the Silvermaster home during the time Gregory was acting as a courier. This laboratory was used for the reproduction of documents brought to the Silvermaster home by various component elements of that particular espionage group. Investigation determined that such a photographic laboratory sufficiently well equipped for the copying of documents was located in the basement of the Silvermaster home. In few instances has Gregory reported information which could not either directly or circumstantially be verified. A high degree of accuracy has prevailed throughout the revelations made by Gregory. In conclusion, it should be carefully borne in mind that in no instance has the information furnished by Gregory proved false, unfounded, or materially inaccurate despite intensive and searching investigation thereof. ✓

Set out hereinafter is a summary of the information submitted by Gregory, gathered from other sources and established by investigation concerning the Russians identified to date in this espionage group, the Soviet system of espionage, the espionage agents comprising the Silvermaster and Perlo groups and the miscellaneous personalities serving the Soviet espionage system independent of association with any organized group as far as is known.

METHOD OF OPERATION OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE SYSTEM

As a result of the revelations made by Gregory, considerable information concerning the modus operandi of the present Soviet underground espionage organization was obtained. Although these methods are related as pertaining to espionage activities of the USSR, it should be noted they differ little from the method used by any country engaged in effective secret intelligence. As an example, their clandestine activities are cloaked with cover companies such as World Tourist, Inc., and the United States Service and Shipping Corporation in this instance. Pertinent material from numerous sources is collected by the use of couriers and cover addresses. Intermediaries of a primary, secondary and tertiary character are apparent. There is a certain but not necessarily significant absence of advanced technical methods, either in the transmittal of communications or the gathering of information itself. The only technical device apparent in the operations of these espionage parallels was the use of the copying camera.

Soviet espionage has one clear cut advantage over that practiced by any other country within the borders of the United States. This advantage centers in the existence of an open and active Communist Party whose members are available for recruitment for any phase of activity desired. As will be seen hereinafter, in almost every instance Soviet espionage agents, particularly sub-agents, are recruited from among individuals closely associated with the Communist Party, or at least strongly pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, who in the main are native born Americans or individuals not native born but sufficiently familiar with the American way of life to avoid detection. Even the Germans with the large German minority in the United States were not so advantageously placed nor does the fanaticism of the most ardent National Socialist exceed that of the militant members of the Communist Party selected for cooperation directly with the USSR.

Briefly, Soviet intelligence is broken into three branches, namely Military-Naval, Political and General. The first, namely Military-Naval, is handled by Red Army Intelligence. The gathering of political and general information is left in the main to the NKVD, now the MGB, or Ministry of State Security, with which this case deals.

Gregory has described what is referred to as the "pole" method of establishing a ring of individuals for the gathering of information. The term "pole" in reality is the designation of the individual at the apex of the organization which is a self-contained unit. For example, six individuals would be active in the obtaining of information for the Russians. No one of these six individuals would know the identity of the other five. Each individual would have a courier whose identity he did not know and/or a mail drop by which he would dispose of the material which he gathered. None of the six individuals in this self-contained unit would know the identity of their

courier or the identity of the person collecting the material from the mail drop. The next step up the ladder would be an individual responsible for receiving the information from three couriers and/or mail drops. He would correlate this material and in turn would have a courier and/or mail drop to which he delivered the edited information. The other three in the unit would operate similarly. The two individuals each handling three sources of information in turn would not know the identity of their courier or the person collecting their edited material from a mail drop if this was used. In this manner a single individual unknown to anyone else in the group would eventually come in the possession of all the information obtained by the original six sources. This individual or "pole" at the apex of the triangle usually knows all the original sources of information, couriers, mail drops and editors in the unit. According to Gregory, the individual designated the "pole" would normally be a Russian who in turn would pass the information on to the proper authorities for transmittal to Moscow by diplomatic coded cable or diplomatic pouch. As will be seen, this system has as its purpose the security of the espionage organization. Any one member of the group with the exception of the "pole" who becomes compromised will be able to directly compromise the minimum of other individuals in the unit. This in intelligence parlance is generally known as the double cutout system. It is possible to vary it, however, by extensions to a triple or quadruple cutout system with little difficulty.

As will be seen hereinafter, the NKVD was interested in securing all types of information including economic, political, social, industrial, technical and military. Instructions were often given to the courier to relate to the Silvermaster or Perlo group directing them to attempt to secure information on specific matters. Requests for specific material, however, were comparatively limited, resulting in the conclusion that this particular parallel of Soviet espionage was operating more or less as a sponge accepting any type of material that might become available from any source that could be recruited. To gain the full benefit of this type of operation, it is absolutely necessary that effective correlation be made on a higher level. It is not possible to learn whether this actually occurred. It is quite obvious, however, that Gregory's handlers were well schooled in the operation of a secret intelligence service. In this regard some of the cautions expressed to Gregory to avoid detection or compromise are of interest.

Gregory was issued repeated warnings to take every precaution possible to detect a surveillance. This included a tour of New York City in order that a prior knowledge would be available of the location of drug stores with two exits, rest rooms with two exits, movie theaters and other establishments that could be entered and left quickly eluding a surveillance.

Gregory never departed from any premises at the same time with any individual with whom contact was made for Soviet intelligence. Further, with respect to surveillances the instructions were issued to observe automobiles, and their occupants. When on foot, crossing and recrossing the street was recommended and walking the opposite direction on one-way streets when an automobile surveillance was suspected. All contacts were made very cautiously and multiple appointments were the order of the day. For example a rendezvous would be set for 4:00, 6:00 and 8:00 o'clock on a certain date and the contact ultimately consummated at any one of these three times.

Precautionary measures were taken concerning the maintenance of incriminating material on the premises of the courier and other units in the system. Methods were described whereby subsequent detection of the entrance of these premises clandestinely by outsiders could be determined. All incriminating material following its use was to be burned or flushed down the toilet. Couriers traveled with no marks of identification in their persons or on their clothing. Meeting places in general were such public establishments as restaurants and theaters. Hotels, private homes and bars were avoided. When bulky material was transported it was left in a locker in a railroad or bus terminal and the key delivered to the individual who was ultimately to receive it. Repeated cautions were given to all participants in this group to avoid discussing anything pertinent over the telephone.

Another interesting factor is the manner in which finances were handled. Couriers and persons serving in other capacities requiring reimbursement did not receive a regular salary but did receive payment for traveling expenses and other incidentals. At least until the fall of 1943 the whole service was operated on a very frugal basis. At least during the probationary period reimbursement for traveling and incidental expenses had to be supported in detail by receipts or sales slips. It is estimated by Gregory that Golos received between \$2,000 and \$3,000 every two months for the operation of his particular parallel. When considering that he only paid traveling expenses and incidentals, it is quite obvious that he was operating other parallels than the one with which Gregory is familiar. Money in some instances came to Golos through Gregory who received it from unidentified individuals believed to have been officially connected with the Soviet Consulate in New York City. Denominations of money were never in larger amounts than \$20 and Gregory's own expenses did not exceed \$100 per month. After the death of Golos, finances seemed to be more readily available and requirements concerning receipts and sales slips were somewhat relaxed. Delays in payments were infrequent and one of Golos' successors commented to Gregory that money was no object as long as it was being used for a worthwhile purpose.

It is interesting to note that one of the duties exercised by Gregory was to buy Christmas presents for the individuals supplying information, as well as for the members of their family each year. These presents, for

which Gregory received reimbursement, bore a direct relationship to the usefulness the particular individual had demonstrated to the Russians, and some were of a substantial value, costing approximately \$100. With the exception of one instance, Gregory did not pay for any of the information gathered from Golos' contacts. In this instance payment was made on a regular basis to an individual temporarily in financial straits. While Gregory was dealing with others than Golos, substantial sums of money were received personally as remuneration for services rendered. This may be attributable, at least in some instances, to the fact that Gregory was dealing directly with the Russians rather than with an intermediary such as Golos.

As can be seen from the above methods and instructions and handling of finances, the Soviets are not in any sense of the word novices at conducting secret intelligence. The modus operandi, however, is not novel or different from that of any other country where diplomatic relations exist. It is obvious that all of the information gathered eventually filters into the Soviet Embassy or one of its Consulates where it in turn can be forwarded to Moscow by coded cable or diplomatic bag. It is logical to assume that other parallels of Soviet espionage are in operation whereby material can be forwarded to Moscow outside the above indicated methods of transmittal. The present methods of filtering this material through diplomatic establishment is the most efficient during the existence of diplomatic relations and the other systems, although they may be dormant now, will only be used as an alternate means of communication in the event of the breaking of these relations.

The Soviet organization mentioned by Gregory based upon the "pole" principal was stated to have been the type of organization being put into effect by the Soviets at the time Gregory ceased active handling of the groups discussed in detail in this memorandum. During the period that Gregory was active as a courier and intermediary the personnel of the Silvermaster group, the Perlo group and the miscellaneous group in Washington, D. C., mentioned by Gregory and discussed hereinafter, operated on a fairly informal basis, channelling the material to Gregory through the leaders of the groups and occasionally holding group meetings. The gradual elimination of Gregory from active participation as a courier was indicated to have been a part of the Soviet design to place espionage activities in the departments of the United States Government on a more businesslike basis under direct Soviet control.



18. Charles Runyon [Department of State], Memorandum for the File,  
"Walter Krivitsky," 10 June 1947.

*Source: New York Times, contemporary.*

June 10, 1947

*File  
DC/R:ms  
6-16-48*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Subject: Walter Krivitsky

At about 9:30, Monday morning, February 10, 1941, Thelma Jackson, a Negro chambermaid, found sprawled on the bed of his fifth floor room at the Hotel Bellevue, 15 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., the body of Walter G. Krivitsky, his death caused by the contact discharge of a .38 caliber bullet into his right temple, approximately six hours previously.

Walter Krivitsky was born Samuel Ginzberg, June 28, 1899, to middle class peasants in the Russian Ukraine near the Polish border. From 1919 to 1937, Krivitsky served in Military Intelligence of the Soviet Army. In 1923 he was sent to organize the nucleus of a Communist army in Germany in preparation for a revolution in Germany. In May 1933, he was called to Moscow by the Soviet War Industries Institute. In 1935, he was sent abroad as Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence for Western Europe, which job he held until November 1937. In the 1937 purge, many of Krivitsky's fellow generals were liquidated. In December, Krivitsky himself was ordered back to Moscow but refused to return. In the course of his 18 years in the Soviet Military Intelligence, Krivitsky was twice decorated for espionage work.

In March 1938, at Paris, Krivitsky gave an interview to a Russian emigre paper on the death of Maxim Gorky. Krivitsky, in this interview, published by Russian emigre paper Les Dernieres Nouvelles on March 4, 1938, said that Maxim Gorky may have been killed on Stalin's orders if he did not die from natural causes, since Gorky had been refused permission by Stalin to attend the International Convention of Anti-Fascist Authors at Paris recently, and had been under close surveillance. Krivitsky stated he himself had a price on his head and had decided to remain abroad "to rehabilitate tens of thousands of so-called spies". On April 29, 1939, the Saturday Evening Post published one in a series of articles by Krivitsky exposing Soviet espionage activities. In this article, Krivitsky predicted the Soviet-German pact which was concluded in August 1939. Krivitsky's articles, following closely after the Moscow trials, were an important factor in the decision of many to leave the Communist Party camp. During 1939, Ignace Reiss, an associate and friend of Krivitsky's

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in the Soviet Secret Service, was machine-gunned at Lausanne, it is believed, by Hans Bruesse, OGPU political assassin who operated in cooperation with a woman agent, Gertrude Shelbach.

In November 1938, Krivitsky entered the United States on a temporary passport, using his original name, Samuel Ginzberg. On July 1, 1939, he was ordered to report to Ellis Island because his temporary visa had expired. He was given a hearing July 6 and his visa was extended to December 31. At about this time, he escorted his family safely to Canada, using the name of Thomas. At this time, Krivitsky's attorney, Louis Waldman, intimated that the Communists were maneuvering through the Labor Department to have Krivitsky deported in order that they might get their hands on him.

On October 11, Krivitsky testified before the Dies Committee as follows:

1. Soviet Intelligence uses the Communist Party here and the real head of the American Communist Party is Stalin.
2. Soviet Intelligence chiefs in the United States have been: Military: Boris Bycob since 1936; Alfred Tilden, 1929-1933; Felix Wolfe, 1924-1929. OGPU: Boris Shpak, 1936-1937; Valentine Markin, 1933-1934; Alexander Karin, 1928-1933.
3. The Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union are 90% subsidized by the Soviet Union.
4. OGPU supervised Military Intelligence and the Embassies after 1935 and 1936 when Stalin came to distrust the military.
5. Soviet agents are restricted to the jobs of recruiting and directing United States Party members who do the actual work of espionage.

On October 17, 1939, Representative Dickstein of New York charged that Krivitsky was "nothing but a phony" and "was induced" to testify to protect the publishers of his magazine articles from libel suit.

On November 9, 1939, Soviet Ambassador Oumansky, returning to the United States on the Reg, was asked if he had read any of Krivitsky's magazine articles naming Oumansky as a former OGPU agent. Oumansky appeared annoyed and replied that he had never heard of General Krivitsky and was never in the OGPU.

On December 30

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On December 30, 1939, Krivitsky's departure, three or four days previously from the United States for a secret destination, was revealed by the immigration authorities. The story subsequently delivered was that he went to Great Britain where he helped uncover extensive fifth column activities and to Paris where he collaborated with Paul Wohl, later of 173 Lexington Avenue, New York City, on various articles.

It appears that by March of 1940, Krivitsky was back in the United States, since it is stated in that month he told a story of meeting three men coming toward him on a New York street. One of these he recognized as the CGPU agent, Sergei Basoff, alias Jim.

It appears that Krivitsky, except for his articles and Dies Committee appearance, lived a retiring life and expressed to his friends a fatalistic belief that he would eventually be assassinated by Stalin. Among these friends were Boris Shev, his translator, Isaac Don Levine, Louis Waldman, New York attorney, and Suzanne LaFollette, described by the newspapers as a New York editor.

At some point during his residence in the United States, Krivitsky negotiated with Albert Goldman of Chicago, Trotsky's attorney, with a view to helping solve Trotsky's murder.

In the period before his death, Krivitsky told friends and associates that his assassination had become urgent because of his knowledge of identity and methods of many Party agents entering the Western Hemisphere. At an unspecified date, Paul Wohl, then in New York, wrote a note to Suzanne LaFollette asking her to warn Krivitsky that Hans Bruesse was in New York. Wohl, with whom Krivitsky had had a dispute about money, was the only one among his friends and associates to assert that Krivitsky had contemplated suicide. He was not, however, on close speaking terms with Krivitsky after their quarrel and stated that Krivitsky avoided him.

On Wednesday, February 5, according to his wife, Tanya Krivitsky, Krivitsky left her and his son, Alexander, seven years old, to whom he was particularly devoted, in New York in order to find a refuge in Virginia for himself and his family and in order to see Martin Dies, to whose committee he had already given much information on Soviet espionage.

Mrs. Krivitsky

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Mrs. Krivitsky stated that he did not take a pistol with him. According to Louis Waldman, one of the purposes of Krivitsky's visit to Washington was to push through his naturalization, which, among other things, would enable him to purchase a pistol in New York, something that, as an alien, he could not do. At this time, his friends stated Krivitsky had sufficient money earned from his writings to carry him for several years. It has also been asserted that he had voluminous notes and stacks of documents although the newspaper stories did not indicate their disposition.

According to Eitel Wolf Dobert, a former German Army officer, who has been described by the newspapers as a former political associate of his and who lived at Charlottesville, Virginia, Krivitsky arrived at Dobert's house in Charlottesville on Thursday, February 6. While there, he bought a pistol from Charles Henshaw, the clerk at the local hardware store, who later identified the gun found beside Krivitsky's body as the same gun which he had sold to Krivitsky. In buying the gun, Krivitsky had used the name of Walter Paref of Barboursville, Virginia. With the gun, he bought fifty mushroom bullets. Henshaw's statement was later taken by Detective Horace E. Caranfa and Lieutenant George E. Darnell of the Washington Police Department. The newspaper's story attributes a statement that Krivitsky sat up until 3 Sunday morning, writing the three suicide notes which were later found in his room at the hotel, to Dobert. The notes found were on stationery having the printed address, Charlottesville, Virginia. It does not, however, appear whether Dobert did or could have identified the notes as actually material written by Krivitsky Saturday night and early Sunday morning. On Sunday, February 9, Mrs. Dobert drove Krivitsky to the Hotel Bellevue in Washington where he registered at 6 p.m. as Walter Paref, a name which, according to Waldman, Krivitsky was taking steps to adopt as his legal name in the United States. Hotel employees did not recall that Krivitsky left his room after 6 p.m., Sunday. The occupants of the other rooms on the fifth floor stated that they had heard no shot. Thelma Jackson, the chambermaid, said that she passed the door several times on Monday morning and knocked each time until she finally used her pass key to get in. The body was found sprawled on the bed--it does not appear with the face up or the face down. Krivitsky's shoes were off and near his bed. His socks were still on his feet and he was otherwise dressed. Near Krivitsky's right hand, but with fingerprints obliterated by

blood

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blood from the wound, was the .38 caliber pistol purchased at Charlottesville, Virginia. There were only two openings to the room, the door, which was latched from the inside, and the window, which was either closed or locked--the story varies--which opened out on the sheer side of the building with no fire escape and no ledge. It is not stated whether the fifth is the top floor of the Bellevue. There was no sign of a struggle in the room which was ten feet square. The pistol was discharged close to Krivitsky's right temple and the contemporary comment was that it was not in his hand "where assassins would most likely have placed it".

The body was identified by J. B. Matthews of the Dies Committee who stated that Krivitsky had once told him: If they ever try to prove I took my own life, don't believe it. The case was handled by Bernard Thompson, Chief of the Detective Force of the Washington Police, and Detective Sergeant D. Guest who originally came to the scene.

Three notes were found in Krivitsky's room, one in English addressed to Waldman requesting that he help his family, adding as a postscript that he went to Virginia because he could get a gun there and asking Waldman to help his friends there who did not, he stated, know why he got the gun. A second in Russian was addressed to his wife and son and pitched in an emotional tone. He stated that "it" was very difficult . . . "but it is impossible . . . you will understand that I have to go . . . I think my sins are big . . . P.S. On the farm of Dobertov I wrote this yesterday but I did not have any strength in New York. I did not have any business in Washington. I went to see Dobertov because that is the only place I could get the firearms." A third in German was addressed to Suzanne LaFollette asking her to help his wife and son. The Washington Police compared the notes with samples of Krivitsky's handwriting and decided that they were authentic. Waldman initially denied their authenticity and the last news of this subject is that Waldman had procured photostatic copies which he and Krivitsky's friends had examined and in which he found discrepancies with Krivitsky's other writings. Waldman stated, however, that it was possible that the discrepancies were simply normal variations and that he proposed to have a professional examination made in New York.

Waldman and Krivitsky's friends called for a Federal investigation but the FBI refused to assume jurisdiction. Although Waldman and Krivitsky's friends sought to hold up

issuance

18. (Continued)

- 6 -

issuance of a certificate of suicide, the certificate was finally issued although the coroner agreed that he would impanel a jury in case further evidence "cropped up". Representative Rankin told the newspapers that the gun was in the wrong place for the death to have been a suicide. Mrs. Krivitsky felt sure that the Soviet had forced her husband to write the notes with the threat of assassinating her and his boy. She said that Krivitsky was especially devoted to Alexander. She stated that the note to her did not sound like her husband. Krivitsky's body was taken to New York and cremated February 15. On February 22, Representative Parnall Thomas said the Dies Committee should investigate because certain evidence led him to believe that the body found in the hotel was not Krivitsky's. Previously, over the weekend of Sunday, February 16, the offices of the New Leader in New York were raided. The safe was cracked but nothing was taken. Money left in the office was not removed, but the files were strewn about the office. It was suggested that the OGPU had been searching for Krivitsky's unpublished works.

A-P:CRunyon:ock: 6/11/47

19. [Meredith Knox Gardner], "Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic,"  
30 August 1947.

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WDGAS-93

30 August 1947

Copy # 5

I. D. SPECIAL ANALYSIS REPORT # 1

COVERNAMES IN DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC [REDACTED]

Prepared by ASA I. D.  
30 August 1947

Distribution:

2 copies	ID
1 copy	Chief, ASA
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✓ 1 copy	LSIC (thru Col. Marr-Johnson)
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his own copy to one  
recipient (Col. F. J. [unclear])  
or suspended further  
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### COVERNAMES IN DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC [REDACTED]

#### 1. Limitations of the report.

Any report made at this time on the contents of traffic encrypted by the system [REDACTED] must necessarily be fragmentary and subject to correction in detail. In the messages that are in any degree readable, there are large gaps in solution of the cipher key (additive), and in the code book only about 15 per cent of the equivalences are identified, some only tentatively. Both these deficiencies are constantly being ameliorated, with the result that such reports as this will be outdated very rapidly until a much higher degree of recovery has been reached.

#### 2. Collateral information.

The collateral information given about the covernames is both scanty and tentative, for reasons implied in paragraph 1. The most reliable data related to the names are the date and place of origin of the messages containing them. Since most of the readable traffic originated in New York, it will be necessary to indicate the origin only in the case of Washington, Canberra, and Stockholm messages. All the messages used are directed to Moscow.

#### 3. Use of covernames.

It is known from the Report of the Royal Commission /in Canada/ appointed under Order in Council P. C. 411 of February 5, 1946 (report dated June 27, 1946) that agencies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics engaged in conspiratorial activities are accustomed, for reasons of security, to refer to persons that are furthering these activities by covernames, and in particular that this is done in encrypted messages sent between diplomatic installations and Moscow.

#### 4. Covernames in [REDACTED]

The traffic encrypted by the system [REDACTED] contains many covernames, which are definitely proved to be such by two circumstances, (1) that many of them are so designated in messages (given as a supplement hereto) that describe themselves as dealing with changes in covernames (KLICHKI) and (2) that many of them are contained in the formula: "A (henceforth B)", in which A is evidently the real name of the old covername and B the (new) covername.

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The classic example for the "henceforth" formula is in a message of 23 August 1944, New York-Moscow, internal address SEMION. There occurs the expression "MAMLUIGA Vitaliy Semionovich (henceforth "EM")." The next sentence starts with "EM's". Now, Vitaliy Semionovich Mamluiga (usual transliteration: Vitalii Semenovitch Manlyga) is the name of a person known to have been with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. After giving his name in full, the originator of the message gave him a covername and immediately proceeded to use it. (EM is not known outside this message, the rest of which is not yet readable; but see section 15.) In this case, where perhaps the need for security was not great, the covername seems to be the name of the initial letter of MAMLUIGA--M. This circumstance must not, however, lead us to employ the term "covername" for initials used for the sake of brevity, the expansion of which is always evident from other passages in the message concerned. (Covernames themselves can be so abbreviated.)

### 5. Reliability of "readings".

In the following it must be borne in mind that some of the covernames are expressed by single code groups not yet found in other contexts and others contain groups not yet found in other contexts. When any form has been assumed for the equivalent of such a group, it is here generally followed by a question mark. The forms assumed are based (1) on calculations made possible by the fact that [redacted] uses a one-part code and that complete one-part codes of the same length are available (this process of comparison and calculation has yielded many values that were later verified) and (2) on the analogy of verified covernames. As mentioned below, the covernames fall in part into "families".

### 6. Families of covernames.

It has become evident that many of the covernames can be put into categories on the basis of some similarity between them. In the Report of the Royal Commission we find the alliterating family BACK, BACON, BADEAU, BAGLEY (all members of the Group "Research"; cf. p. 729). We find a Prometheus that seems to belong to a "mythology" family, examples of which in [redacted] traffic are Jupiter and Cerēs. In New York message 798 appended below, we find Erie immediately followed by Euron (in fact, Erie gave the clue for the identification of Euron). There is a family of ancient Phoenician cities: Carthage, Tire, and Sidon.

The arrangement of the material from this point will be based on such categories. First, covernames apparently for persons will be listed: Addresses, signatures, specifically Russian Christian names, Christian names not specifically Russian, relationships and conditions of age, station and calling, mythological names, names of animals, names of plants, and miscellaneous. Then covernames apparently for places and institutions will be listed: Ancient

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places, geographical features, and miscellaneous. Names occurring only in the special covername messages are sometimes not listed except in the text of those messages themselves (see supplement).

7. Addresses.

The addresses and signatures seem to be covernames. The constant address of Canberra and Stockholm messages and the address of by far the greater part of the New York messages is expressed by a group falling in the book just before the group for VIL and five places after the group for VIZ, a (visa). All probabilities favor the value VIKTOR (as an address, it is to be read in the dative case: VIKTORU, to Victor). The only other occurrence of the group is in the spelling VIKTORII (in which, unfortunately, II can be secured only by assuming a one-digit garble) in the expression of Victoria and New South Wales."

New York messages show at least three other addresses: 8 OTDELU (to the Eighth Division of Department) and SEMIONU (to Simeon or Simon), both confirmed from other uses, and a group falling two places after PETER, hence perhaps PIOTR (Peter) or PETROV or the like.

The frequency of VIKTORU in the latest index is 24 for Canberra, 4 for Stockholm, and for New York 296. New York four times follows this by 8 OTDELU (with a separating dash or period), Canberra 5 times with a period between and once without--once Canberra has simply VIKTORU 8. New York also has VIKTORU, SEMIONU twice, VIKTORU, BORIS(?)OVU once, and once VIKTORU OT KOMISSARI(?)AT(A?) (to Victor from the Commissari(?)at(?)). Canberra has one VIKTORU SEMIONU.

SEMIONU occurs 22 times as an address from New York (twice after VIKTORU), once from Canberra (after VIKTORU). All occurrences are after 19 July 1944.

8 OTDELU occurs 22 times, 11 of these after VIKTORU (with or without separating period or dash). One Canberra message begins "To Victor. In reply to your telegram No. 2383. 8 OTDEL(U)."

"PETROVU", or whatever it is, is an address at least 7 times, all from New York, from May to August 1944. (The group occurs in 4 other passages, twice preceded by TOVARISECH, "Comrade"; once in a Canberra message. Note that in all indications of frequency, unless otherwise stated, anti-garble repetitions have been eliminated.)

BORIS(?)OV occurs once in the phrase VIKTORU, BORIS(?)OVU" from New York, 17 August 1944.

- 3 -

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### 8. Signatures.

The constant Canberra signature is a group that has been tentatively tagged YEFIM (Joachim). Only one case of a Washington signature (?) is known, a group presumably in the range of VAV to VAK. It could be something like VAVILOV or even VAKH (Bacchus). No Stockholm signatures are known.

The most frequent New York signature is MAY, with an overall frequency of 160, only a handful of which occurrences are not signatures. Occasionally, to distinguish his own remarks from a document he is transmitting, MAY will use the expression "PRIMECHANIYE MAYA" (May's notes), thus confirming that MAY is a signature and that the value of the signature group is MAY (for MAYA is a different group and certainly means "of May" in dates).

Another signature, in about the range for ANTON (Anthony), occurs 10 times (New York). Once (12 December 1944) the form is "ANTON (?)" and "NAK" (NAK is possibly a garble for MAY). All occurrences are from October 1944 to January 1945. The name also occurs in the text 8 times (New York, May-December 1944). In a message of 23 August 1944, ANTON (?) is associated with SERGEY (?) and AKIM, apparently in connection with southwestern factories and plants.

A signature in the right range for BORIS occurs at least twice as a New York signature, on 23 October and 31 December 1944.

SERGEY (?) (Sergius): There are 2 candidates for this value. One occurs 2 September 1944 and 11 January 1945; the other occurs 17 times, 16 May 1944 - 15 January 1945. The second one is associated with ANTON (?) and AKIM (see section 8).

ALEKSEY (Alecis): occurs 5 times, 9 May - 14 December 1944.

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### 9. Specifically Russian Christian names.

Some covernames that are Russian Christian names have already been mentioned in sections 7 and 8. Others are as follows:

- ARSENIY (Arsenius): in 5 New York messages, 16 June-22 December 1944.
- VITALIY (Vitalis): occurs in 3 messages, 9 August, 23 August 31 December 1944. Also occurs in a real name (see MAMLUKA in section 4.)
- YAKOVY (Jacob): was GNOM before September 1944.
- AKIM (Acachim): occurs 8 times in 8 messages (all with a SEMION address), 16 June-28 Dec. 1944. See section 8.

### 10. Christian names not specifically Russian.

Although many Soviet citizens have Christian names virtually identical with name forms in other languages than Russian, it seems safe to set up a category that would include vaguely international forms together with definitely non-Russian forms. In connection with some of these names, the following quotation from *This is My Story* by Louis Francis Budenz, former managing editor of the *Daily Worker*, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London: 1947) pp. 138-139, is given for whatever reference value it may have.

The so-called "Dutch" or German, comrade--though his accent was indeterminate to my untrained ear--was the first of a long line of personages with foreign accents and foreign origins who paraded through the governing apparatus of the Communist party of the U.S.A. No one, and least of all any well-educated American, has any complaint about full participation of the foreign born in American life; our own ancestors came from afar to make up this land of the free. But the right of those who are agents of a foreign power to cross our borders under aliases and order American citizens about, is another matter. Yet, to my surprise, this was what I found in the building at Thirty-five East Twelfth Street when I entered it and began to work there.

These men of many names and no names bore aliases like Edwards\*---carelessly chosen plurals of "Christian names" such as Roberts, Richards, Stevens, Michaels, Johns and, occasionally, something more distinctive taken from England or the Middle West. The second one of these gentlemen to impress himself upon me was "Roberts," then acting in a vital secretarial capacity in the Party. That is, he was one of the chief factors in the national setup. Still in the stage of pleasantries upon such matters, I had gaily referred to him as "The Cheshire Cat Commissar" because of his perpetual mechanical smile. It was not unpleasant but unreal. Like the

\* Budenz had met Gerhard Eisler under the name of Edwards; see pp 135 and 137 and his testimony in District Court, Washington, on 24 July 1947.

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celebrated feline, his names kept vanishing. Shortly after my labor editorship began, he suddenly converted himself into "Comrade Peters" and then into "Comrade Steve" and then, after a long time, back to "Comrade Roberts". It kept one busy trying to keep up with these transformations.

Before the publication of Budenz's book, certain groups had tentatively been identified as equivalent to RICHARD, ROBERT, and the like. That such names occur in the code book has been amply verified, e.g. by the message of 2 December 1944, listing nuclear physicists and mathematicians. To serve as surnames in daily colloquy, some of these names would have to take on an S.

The group that seems to stand for ROBERT (it follows next after RO) occurs 35 times. The group for RICHARD (2 places beyond RIT) occurs 6 times (plus once in RICHARD PALMER). Both are restricted to New York messages. RICHARD is the new covername given in September 1944 to someone whose previous (cover?) name seems to have begun with LO (see message 700 appended below). A ROBERT occurs from 7 June 1944 on through 17 January 1945-- of course not necessarily one single individual throughout.

It is significant that ROBERT was always "transmitting" written matter to the originator(s) of the messages: the formula "Robert? has transmitted" occurs five times in the index.

Another individual of particular interest is one whose name would seem to begin with HE (or, by the more usual transliteration, KHE). This may be HENRI (Henry), though there is almost certainly another and more usual spelling of "Henry" in the book, GENRI OR GENRIE. HENRI? figures in arrangements for a rendezvous in front of a Mexico City movie house (N. Y. message of 18 June 1944); in other messages also he is located in DEREVIA (the Country, covername for MEXICO). In a message of 10 August 1944 there seems to be talk of calling him back to TIR (Tyre, covername for New York). He occurs 21 times, from 26 May-10 August 1944. The other group, GENRI, occurs in message 798 (below) and perhaps in a message of 1 June 1944 involving the securing of a DEREVENSKOY (Mexican) visa.

Other such names are:

AL' or EL' (Al?):	occurs 1 October in phrase "Al' or EL'" (both attempts to render English Al?)
DIK (Dick):	was EEO (Echo) before October 1944; occurs in five messages, 23 October -26 December 1944.
DONAL'D (Donald):	became PILOTT September 1944; this second name appears in section 11 below.
DUN?KAN (Duncan):	occurs in message of 26 May 1944.
KARL (Carl):	was SKAT before October 1944; occurs once 26 December 1944.

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HENRI(H) (Henry): was TAM before October 1944. See the last paragraph above.

DZHON (John): was GUDZON before October 1944; occurs once 14 December 1944, with AMUR?

PETER: was CERNOWY (Black) before October 1944.

CHARL'Z (Charles): was something else until October 1944.

ERIK?: was something else until October 1944.

HEB?: Canberra, twice 1 September 1945. Seems to have furnished information on the Australian Security Service. Same name twice from New York, 26 July and 16 August 1944.

KLOD (Claude): Canberra, April-October 1945. KLOD is Canberra's regular purveyor of information; he occurs 13 times 8 times in the formula "'KLOD' has communicated".

NIK (Nick?): 22 July 1944; message contains names DuPont, Ford, Mellon, Weir, Pew.

(CHARL'Z ERUKO (Charles Bruno): in N.Y. message 14 June 1944, this is the name HENRI? is to give as a password at the rendezvous.)

DOBA: in two messages, 23 October 1944 and 4 January, 1945.

KORA (Cora): 29 December 1944.

OIA: a Washington female agent; name changed to something else in October 1944. Occurs in 2 messages, 3 May and 19 August 1944, both dealing with KOMAR (that is, probably KRAVCHENKO). It is planned to make these messages the subject of a separate report. In the former OIA is described as seeking more detailed information on the KOMAR affair. In the latter she has something to do with the supposition that (does not think that?) KOMAR is staying at 299 West 97th Street.

RITA: mentioned 19 August 1944 in the phrase "the first two parts (of?) the business of RITA". (The message also mentions KOMAR, issue of LA VOZ/Mexico City Communist organ/ for 7 June, HENRI?).

11. Relationships and Conditions of Age, Station and Calling.

OTCHIM (Stepfather): in 3 messages, 17 May - 27 December 1944.

SVAT (Matchmaker: Son- or Daughter-in-law's Father): 23 Aug. and 6 Dec. 1944.

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DEDUSHKA (Grandpapa or Grandfather): Occurs 5 times in 3 messages, 9 May - 14 August 1944.

NABOB (Fabob): apparently a high American diplomatic official. Occurs 5 times in 3 messages, 9 May, 7 September, 14 December 1947; in message of 7 September, in connection with postwar treatment of Germany.

ATAMAN (Hetman): occurs 4 times in 3 messages, 17 May, 7 June, 6 October, 1944.

PILOT? (Pilot): was DONAL'D before September 1944.

12. Mythological Names:

YUPITER (Jupiter): became ORIOL? (Eagle) in October 1944.

SERES (Ceres): in 4 messages, 4 May - 25 July 1944.

MUZA (Muse): 4 July 1944; communicated concerning Secret Funds Division, Emerson Bigelow, aid of 92,000,000 Portuguese escudos, Northern European division of Secret Intelligence Branch, etc.

EHO (Echo): became DEK in October 1944; occurs 14 times, 2 May 23 October, 1944.

GNOM (Gnome): became YAKOV? in September 1944. Occurs 3 times, 18 May, 16 June, 25 July.

13. Names of animals.

TIULEN? (Seal): 10 August 1944, (a KOMAR or Kravchenko message).

ORIOL? (Eagle): was YUPITER until October 1944. Occurs 5 Dec. 1944

LUN? (Hen Harrier): in 4 messages, 3 May - 17 August 1944.

GUS? (Goose): changed to something else October 1944.

KOMAR (Gnat etc.): probably covername for Viktor Alacayavich Kravchenko. For a complete development of this idea, a separate report would be necessary. Occurs in 8 messages so far partly read, 6 between 3 and 23 May, 1944, 2 on 10 August, 1944; KOMAR is the object of intense interest, including attempts to locate him (20 May: "is living with? KEREKSKOY in the state of Connecticut etc.").

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14. Names of plants.

TIUL'PAN (Tulip): 1ø August 1944; (a KOMAR or Kravchenko message) changed to something beginning with KAN Sept. 1944.

15. Miscellaneous.

LIB?? (Lieb?) or possibly LIBERAL: was ANTERKO until Sept. 1944. Occurs 6 times, 22 October - 2ø December 1944. Message of 27 November speaks of his wife ETHEL, 29 years old married (?) 5 years, ".....husband's work and the role of METR(0) and NIL".

AMUR? (Amour?): was ZEA---?--et (Jeannette?) before October 1944; occurs once 14 December 1944 with DZRON.

METR (like many other equivalences in the code book, this might have an alternative reading, perhaps METRO; as METR it means "meter" and as METRO it is a nickname, applied for example to the Paris subway system); was SKAUT until September 1944. Occurs 27 Nov. 1944 (something about LIB?'s wife Ethel? knowing about her husband's work and the role of METR(0) and NIL; notice in message 7øø below how METR(0) and NIL come together). Seems to occur 5 December 1944 in phrase "METR(0) and ?HYUTSON (Hughson)". Note on page 73 of the Report of the Royal Commission: "Metro..... ...the Embassy of the U.S.S.R."

GRAFT: occurs 26 May 1944 in phrase "of GRAFT and EARL"; message mentions FFI (Forces Francais de'l Interieur?) or possibly a name ending in FFI (FFY). In 1945, GRAFT was used in Canada as the covername of Colonel Nikoloy Zabolin, Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa and head of military intelligence work in Canada (see Report of the Royal Commission).

EM (M): covername of Vitaliy Semionovich Mamluga in message of 23 August 1944. He was a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, having entered the U.S. in December 1943. He was still here in September 1946 This name may be EMA, and may be the same EMA liste 28 November 1944 (see below).

KANUK? (Canuck?): Occurs 4 times in 2 messages, 24 July and 1 August 1944.

SI (C?): occurs 23 October and 6 December 1944.

PA (Pat?): occurs 14 December 1944.



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List of 28 November 1944; In a message of that date the following names occur, apparently as operating from New York: KRUG (Circle, or the name Krug), KIN--?--(was R--?--OLOV until October 1944), EMA, --?--, St--?-- (this word may not be a name) --MALIAR (Painter), YAN (Jan), ENK.....

16. Covernames apparently for places and institutions:

Ancient places (also rivers, etc.).

TIR (Tyre): covername for New York.  
SIDON (Sidon): covername for London.  
KARFAGEN (Carthage): covername for Washington.  
NIL (Nile?): was something beginning with TU (TUMAN, Mist?) until September 1944; linked with METR, which see.

17. Geographical features.

STRANA (Land, Country): covername for the United States.  
OSTROV (Island): covername for Great Britain; changed October 1944. to something beginning with EK (or EX).  
OSTROYITIYANIN (Islander): Briton.  
DEREVNIA (the Country /i.e., rural districts/): covername for Mexico.  
DEREVENSKOY (Country, Rural): Mexican.  
ZEMEL'YAK (Fellow Countryman): Coverword for some nationality, possibly U.S.

18. Miscellaneous.

BANK (the Bank): probably covername for the U.S. State Department; occurs 24 times, (once in the plural from Canberra, probably in the literal sense).  
DOM STARUHI (the Old Woman's House): in 2 messages, 26 May and 16 Aug. 1944.

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19. Conclusion.

In its present state the [redacted] traffic tends to arouse curiosity more than it does to satisfy it. This unsatisfactory state of affairs makes it imperative that this report be supplemented at intervals. It is proposed that such supplements not be complete revisions of this report, but rather be of such a nature that they would be filed with it and used in conjunction with it. When enough material has been accumulated, a new report will be made. ✓

( This report incorporates the previous brief tentative report of 20 June 1947. )

A final reminder of the extremely provisional nature of all assumptions made in this report is desirable. Future supplements will not fail to specify those that have become untenable.

20. No author [probably William K. Harvey, CIA], Memorandum for the File, "COMRAP,"  
6 February 1948.

to be released through  
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of  
the Central Intelligence Agency.

71-65-

6 February 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Subject: COMRAP - VASSILI M. ZUBILIN

1. Set out below for record and cross check purposes is a brief summary of an extensive operational Soviet espionage case within the U.S., known to have been, at least until August 28, 1944 and possibly subsequently, under the control and direction of a Major General of State Security (then NKGB, now MGB). This case has been given the code name COMRAP, inasmuch as it involves personnel who, prior to 1943, had been long active in the illegal conspiratorial and quasi-intelligence operations of the Comintern Apparatus.

2. For purposes of clarity the initial portion of this case summary is given in narrative form, from the standpoint of its investigative development.

3. As of late 1942 and early 1943 intensive investigative coverage was being maintained on the activities and movements of Steve NELSON, then head of the Alameda County, California, section of the CPUSA, which is and has been for some years one of the largest County sections of the Party, probably the most powerful section outside greater New York. NELSON at this time was one of the important and long-time Communist functionaries who, on numerous occasions in the past, had been implicated on the periphery at least of Soviet espionage operations. Steve NELSON was born in Yugoslavia, probably Croatia, shortly before 1900. He first entered the United States about 1920 when he jumped ship in New York City and through the laxity of immigration procedures he was permitted subsequently to legalize his status, later becoming, by naturalization, a U.S. citizen. The exact date of NELSON's initial affiliation with the Communist movement is unknown, but there is at least some reason to believe that he was active in Agitprop work in Yugoslavia prior to his first entry into the U.S. Shortly after his arrival he became affiliated with the predecessor organizations of the CPUSA and his Party career has been one of ever-increasing responsibility. About 1930, the exact date being unknown, Steve NELSON was dispatched through the clandestine channels of World Tourist in New York to Moscow as a student from the CPUSA to the Lenin School. It is interesting to recall, in this connection, that World Tourist was the firm headed by Jacob N. GOLOS (RAZIN) who has since become of paramount interest in view of his participation as a leading figure in the Soviet espionage parallels loosely grouped together in the GREGORY case; it being remembered that GOLOS was responsible to a large degree for the operation of these parallels until his death in New York City in November 1943.

4. After graduating from the Lenin School NELSON served for about eighteen months on an undisclosed Comintern assignment reportedly of an operational intelligence

50-23

CC GREGORY ANDREW KHEITEL  
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nature somewhere "in Central Europe". Before returning to the U.S. in 1933, NELSON is known to have been, for a brief period, in Shanghai, China, and he has stated that while in Shanghai he was closely associated with Arthur EWERT, alias Harry BERGER, who was active in the Comintern Apparatus for many years and was dispatched to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1937 under supporting cover from Yujantorg for the purpose of guiding the abortive Communist revolution in Brazil the following year. It will also be recalled that EWERT, who was known in Rio as BERGER went insane while being interrogated by the Brazilian police. Upon his return to the States about 1933, NELSON became increasingly active in Communist revolutionary work in the trade union field and was particularly active in the industrial areas of Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland.

5. Shortly after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War NELSON went to Spain where he became a political commissar of the International Brigades, specifically attached to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and eventually attaining the rank of Lt. Colonel. Upon his return from Spain, subsequent to the collapse of the Spanish Republic, NELSON was immediately made a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA by co-optation. It is amusing to note that the procedure adopted in NELSON's case in placing him upon the National Committee was an exact parallel of the procedure used to give Stalin his first post on the Central Committee of the Bolshevik fraction of the Social Democratic Party of Russia. Shortly thereafter, NELSON was transferred to the Alameda County section of the Party. The exact intelligence significance of NELSON's service in Spain has never fully been revealed, although it has been reported that he served as an "NKVD agent" during this period. During the period between his return to the U.S. and late 1942, when he is known to have been re-activated as an intelligence agent, his exact intelligence participation also is not known, although there are indications that during this period he may have carried out certain Comintern assignments.

6. On April 10, 1943, it was ascertained through technical coverage of his residence in Berkeley, California that NELSON was in carefully veiled but detailed conversation with an individual, then unidentified, who spoke English with a heavy European, probably Russian, accent. This conversation which last for several hours, revealed without question that NELSON was an important figure in a Soviet net engaged in operational espionage, in the maintenance of illegal Communist seaman courier routes and at least to some extent in the clandestine forwarding of propaganda through illegal means to the Far East, and that the then unidentified visitor was NELSON's Soviet superior. The conversation opened with the unknown visitor counting ten bills or bundles of currency and its significance was almost immediately tabbed by the following interchange:

NELSON: "Jesus, you count money like a banker."

Unknown man: "Well, you know I used to do it in Moskva."

Through this conversation it was revealed that NELSON had been recruited shortly before January 1, 1943 by a "man from Moscow" and that this recruitment had been with the knowledge of "the old man", which was an obvious reference to Earl Browder.

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then General Secretary and undisputed head of the CPUSA. Both NELSON and his unknown visitor referred to this network as the Comintern Apparatus and as the "Apparat". It is interesting to note that this conversation took place only a month prior to the formal dissolution of the Communist International and that actually, as will be set out below, the unknown man was identified later as an official of the then GUGB, later the NKGB, and now the MGB. During the conversation references were made to one "Rapp" and to one "George". It was indicated that "Rapp" was responsible for West Coast clandestine courier routes and that "George" was responsible for liaison with BROWDER on all Apparat matters. "Rapp" was subsequently identified as Mordecai RAPPAPORT, an old time Communist waterfront figure, and "George" was subsequently identified as Getzel HOCHBERG, who was then acting as BROWDER's bodyguard and was accompanying him on his various Party trips throughout the U.S. HOCHBERG was an active Communist Party member. NELSON complained bitterly to his visitor about the inefficiency of both RAPPAPORT and HOCHBERG and it is interesting to note that a few days afterward both of them were denoted and disciplined, RAPPAPORT being transferred from San Francisco to Los Angeles where he was given a minor Party post and HOCHBERG being transferred from New York to Detroit merely as a Party member.

7. During the conversation frequent mention was made of an individual referred to as "Al" who was described as located in or near New York and as head of the Apparat although obviously Al also was under the direction and control of NELSON's unidentified visitor. Al was subsequently identified as Ralph BOWMAN, a supposedly minor editorial writer for the now defunct New Masses, a leading weekly organ of the Communist Party for many years. It is interesting to note that while BOWMAN maintained an office at the New Masses, his name did not appear on the magazine's masthead and that he was extremely successful in concealing his movements and contacts and in veiling his true significance.

8. Also discussed as a usable recruit, during this conversation, was a woman, later identified as Louise Rosenberg BRANSTEN, wealthy California woman and former wife of Richard BRANSTEN, alias Bruce MINTON, well known Party propagandist for many years and a frequent contributor to New Masses before his "deviation" as a result of the BROWDER-POSTER split in the CPUSA. It is noted that BRANSTEN, as Bruce MINTON, was partially responsible for the initial recruitment of two of the agents active in the GREGORY case, having referred these two to BROWDER who, in turn, arranged their recruitment with Jake GOLDS. At the time of this conversation in 1943, Louise Rosenberg BRANSTEN was the mistress of Gregori Markovich KHELFETS, at that time and until the summer of 1944 Soviet Vice Consul in San Francisco, who was identified through independent investigation as an NKGB official active in the running of operational nets on the West Coast. KHELFETS was mentioned in inference in the conversation between NELSON and his visitor, and reference was made also to William SCHNEIDERMAN, California State Secretary of the CPUSA, it being indicated by NELSON that SCHNEIDERMAN was reluctant to take the chance involved in making Party members available for "special work" (a stock Party term for Soviet Intelligence assignments). A number of other individuals, cryptically referred to in this conversation,

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have never been definitely identified.

9. Almost immediately thereafter the unidentified man conferring with NELSON was positively identified as Vassili Mikhailovich ZUBILIN, then Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and shortly thereafter promoted to the position of Second Secretary. Through other cases and collateral information, it was ascertained that ZUBILIN was a Major General of State Security, that his real name is V. ZARUBIN (apparently no relation to Georgi N. ZARUBIN, Soviet Ambassador to Canada during the time of the extensive operation of Col. Nikolai ZABOTIN, Soviet Military Attache and GPU head in Canada from the summer of 1943 until December 12, 1945).

10. Through investigation it was established that during 1943 and 1944 Ralph BOWMAN ("AL") was in frequent correspondence with Steve NELSON, concerning matters pertaining to this intelligence parallel, through a complicated series of Party and Party affiliated individuals serving as mail drops. During this time also Steve NELSON is known to have been in possession of a complete formula for the preparation of a secret ink adaptable for clandestine secret writing of espionage communications, and he was in possession also of certain ingredients for the preparation of this ink. While no secret writing communications were actually intercepted in this case, it should be noted that it was established that Mordecai RAPPAPORT in 1943 was in possession of a formula for secret ink exactly the same as the one possessed by NELSON.

11. The next major development in this case was the receipt in August, 1943 of an anonymous letter, postmarked at Washington, D.C. on August 7, 1943, mailed from a mail box in the proximity of the Soviet Embassy, and addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This letter was written on a Russian typewriter in obviously military style, and, as will be noted below, could only have been written by an individual closely acquainted with and undoubtedly deeply implicated in Soviet espionage operations within the U.S. This anonymous letter stated that the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vassili M. Zubilin, was actually the head of the Foreign Department (given in Russian as INO) of the NKVD (meaning obviously GUGB/NKVD) for North America, having jurisdiction over not only the U.S. but Canada and Mexico as well. The letter stated that ZUBILIN was running a large network of agents, that his real name was V. ZARUBIN and that he was in Poland at least shortly after the Soviet occupation in 1939 where he was responsible for the massacre of several thousands of Poles. The letter also described him as a Major General of NKVD and listed in detail a number of Soviet officials in North America who, according to the letter, were serving as his assistants in Soviet espionage operations. The other persons named in the letter are listed below, together with a summary of the allegations in the anonymous letter, plus the substantiating information concerning them developed through independent investigation and other sources.

a. Elizabeta Yurevna Zubilin According to the letter ZUBILIN's wife, Elizabeta, personally was operating a network composed of a large number of agents serving in agencies of the U.S. Government. It has been established independently that

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Elizabeta ZUBILIN was active, at least as early as 1937, as a Soviet agent of importance under the cover name "Helen".

b. Boris Michael MORROS, a Hollywood film director of Russian extraction. It has been established independently and in fact MORROS has admitted serving as a Soviet agent under ZUBILIN and other individuals with the primary mission of establishing a cover firm or firms for Soviet espionage operations in the U.S. and Latin America. One of the allegations in the anonymous letter, and the only allegation which is considered untrue or inaccurate, was an allegation to the effect that the ZUBILINS were actually betraying the Soviet Union, were passing "dis-information" back to the Soviet Union, but were passing valid intelligence data to the Germans and Japanese through MORROS. Intensive investigation failed to substantiate this allegation in the anonymous letter, although without exception, where possible, all of the other allegations have been independently substantiated. The possible explanation for this rather startling statement is discussed below in connection with the evaluation of this letter and the writer thereof.

c. Gregori Markovich KHEIFETS, described in the letter as Soviet Vice Consul in San Francisco and an important assistant to ZUBILIN. Through independent sources it is known that KHEIFETS, until his departure for the Soviet Union in the summer of 1944, was active in operational Soviet espionage principally in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, it being noted that at least one of his sub-agents was controlled. KHEIFETS, during this period, used among other aliases, the alias of BROWN or "Mr." BROWN. His intelligence contacts were clandestinely made with maximum secrecy precautions and a predilection for the use of public places not readily susceptible to physical or other observation. Access to certain personal papers in KHEIFETS' possession reflected that he maintained a tremendously large number of contacts on the West Coast and that he undoubtedly was responsible for other extensive intelligence operations which were never completely identified. It is interesting to note that when KHEIFETS departed from San Francisco in the summer of 1944 he was replaced as Vice Consul by Gregory KASPAROV, who also was identified as taking over KHEIFETS' intelligence operations and contacts, as well as his overt duties as Soviet Vice Consul. However, KASPAROV did not use exactly the same approach as was frequently used by KHEIFETS, it being noted that KHEIFETS consistently claimed to be assigned to the Consulate in San Francisco as a representative of VOKS and stated on numerous occasions that prior to coming to the U.S. he had been an official of VOKS in Moscow.

d. Andrei Ivanovich SCHEVCHENKO, described in the letter was a subordinate of ZUBILIN's, active in technical espionage. For a period of several years until late January 1946 SCHEVCHENKO was an engineer with both the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and the Amtorg Trading Corporation. Inasmuch as two of SCHEVCHENKO's sub-agents were controlled, it is known that the allegations regarding him in the anonymous letter were without question true. It is interesting to note that SCHEVCHENKO's primary interest, at least as exhibited through his two controlled sub-agents, was in the procurement of technical documents from critical industrial facilities, including the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Buffalo. He is known to have

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expressed a particular interest in jet propulsion, rocket motors, and related matters, and upon at least two occasions he furnished his sub-agents with Leica cameras for photographing documents.

e. Leonid A. TARASOV. More commonly known as Lev TARASOV, he was first an important official of the newly opened Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and was described in the letter as ZUBILIN's chief subordinate in Mexico. TARASOV later became either first or second secretary of the Soviet Legation, later Embassy, in Mexico and was independently identified as deeply involved in operational Soviet espionage. It is interesting to note that TARASOV was at least to a large part responsible for the Mexican end of the Altschuler case, a Soviet espionage case involving numerous secret writing messages which were never completely deciphered between the U.S. and Latin America. This case involved, among other things, efforts to procure the release or disposal of Jacques Mornard VANDENDRESCHE, alias Frank JACKSON, the convicted assassin of Lev Davidovich BRONSTEIN (Leon TROTSKY). Shortly after the receipt of the anonymous letter TARASOV departed Mexico for the Soviet Union and his functions, at least in the Altschuler case, were taken over by another Soviet intelligence official, possibly Pavel KLARIN, referred to in greater detail below, and later by Gregori KASPAROV, referred to above.

f. Pavel KLARIN. At the time the anonymous letter was received KLARIN, also known as Paul KLARIN and Pavel M. KLARIN, was Vice Consul assigned to the Consulate General, USSR, in New York City. The letter described him as an assistant to ZUBILIN, responsible for the operation of an extensive espionage net in the New York area. These allegations were substantiated by independent investigation. There appears no question but that KLARIN, during the period he spent in New York before proceeding to Mexico as an official of the Legation there in 1943 or 1944, was responsible for the New York ramifications of the Altschuler case. He has been identified almost without doubt as the writer of the Southbound secret writing letters in this operations.

g. Yassili D. MIRONOV. According to the anonymous letter this individual was a colonel of the NKVD and ZUBILIN's personal assistant and secretary in the Embassy. The letter stated that he also operated an espionage network which included "an important agent in the White House". MIRONOV's Embassy position and his close association with ZUBILIN were verified; however, independent investigation failed to substantiate the allegations concerning his espionage operations.

h. Sergei G. LUKLANOV. LUKLANOV, an engineer with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission also was listed in the letter as an assistant to ZUBILIN and as a Soviet Intelligence official actually operating agents. However, LUKLANOV departed from the U.S. for Vancouver, Canada, about the time of the receipt of the anonymous letter, and consequently it was impossible to substantiate the allegations of his espionage activities in the U.S. The Canadian authorities were not able to establish definitely his participation in Soviet espionage in Canada, although they did report that his activities were highly suspect and that he



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assumed to himself on frequent occasions diplomatic prerequisites which were not in accordance with protocol or with his position as interpreted by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

i. VITALI G. PAVLOV. This individual was described in the letter as Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, and, under the direction of ZUBILIN, responsible for NKVD operations in that country. It will be recalled that these allegations were completely substantiated in September 1945 by Igor Sergeievich GUZENKO, Red Army Intelligence code clerk who defected in Canada.

j. Semen SEMENOV. SEMENOV was named in the letter as a Soviet Intelligence official and engineer representing the Soviet Government in the U.S. It was impossible to substantiate the allegations concerning SEMENOV.

k. Vassili (?) DALGOV. DALGOV, also a Soviet engineer in the United States, was named by the writer of the anonymous letter as another assistant to ZUBILIN in his espionage operations. In his case, likewise, it was not possible to substantiate this allegation through independent investigation.

12. In connection with the anonymous letter, the pertinent contents of which are set out above, a number of observations appear of importance. Intensive efforts to identify the writer of this communication and/or the Russian language typewriter on which it was written proved completely fruitless, which was and is most unfortunate, since the writer of this letter obviously possessed both authentic and detailed knowledge of Soviet Intelligence operations in the U.S., at least as of 1943. The independent substantiation of so many of the allegations made in the letter, as reflected above, leaves absolutely no doubt as to its basic authenticity. Only one portion of the letter appears open to definite question, i.e., the allegation that Vassili Mikhailovich ZUBILIN and Elizabeta Yurevna ZUBILIN were betraying the Soviet Union, passing "dis-information" to their superiors and transmitting valid intelligence data to German and Japanese authorities through Boris MORROS. As noted above, intensive efforts to substantiate this part of the letter were made without result, and in addition it was not possible to establish the existence of any channel whereby MORROS or the ZUBILINS, through other intermediaries could have passed intelligence information during 1943 to Germany or Japan. Set out below is a possible explanation of the inclusion in this letter of these apparently false allegations, which explanation may have some validity, at least insofar as the motivation for including these statements existed in the mind of the writer of the letter.

13. From the language of the letter and the apparent important intelligence position of the writer thereof, it is believed that the writer was unable to take any personal action against ZUBILIN and his associates, either because of a hostage situation or because the writer felt that he could not safely complain, except anonymously, to U. S. authorities. Remembering that at the time of receipt of the

letter the Soviet Union and the U. S. were in the position of at least quasi-allies, it is believed probable that these allegations were included by the writer of the letter for the purpose of forcing the U. S. authorities to take action on the theory that perhaps no action would be taken against the diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet Union mentioned in the letter unless some betrayal to the common enemy was alleged.

14. The possible motivation for the rest of the letter is more difficult to speculate upon. It is believed, however, that the letter was written by an officer, either of the Red Army Intelligence or of State Security, sufficiently highly placed to have a detailed knowledge of ZUBILIN's network. It is interesting to note that the letter gave personal characteristics and personal comments concerning each of the individuals mentioned, reflecting with little question that the writer was personally acquainted with the individuals he named. It is, of course, possible that the motivation for this letter stemmed from the writer's past participation in or knowledge of the NKVD purge of Red Army Intelligence in the middle and late 1930's.

15. In the summer of 1944 there began a general exodus of Soviet officials named in the anonymous letter and closely connected with ZUBILIN. The last of the individuals named in the letter to depart from the U. S. was SCHEVCHENKO, who did not finally depart until January 18, 1946. PAVLOV, it will be recalled, departed from Canada for the Soviet Union early in 1946 after the defection of Igor Sergeievich GUZENKO. It will also be recalled that this exodus was a direct result of the inspection conducted in the spring and summer of 1944, of NKGB and GRU facilities in the U. S. by two Soviet Intelligence inspectors, who, according to GUZENKO, represented both Red Army Intelligence and NKGB, and traveled under the guise of diplomatic couriers using the names Mikhail MILSKY and Gregori KOSSAREV. It is recalled further that KOSSAREV, who presumably was an NKGB inspector, has never been identified, but that GUZENKO identified MILSKY as a Colonel MILSHTEN, Deputy Director of the North American section of Red Army Intelligence in Moscow.

16. ZUBILIN, himself, departed from the port of New York City for the Soviet Union on August 28, 1944, and at about the same time KHEIFETS, KLARIN, and several of the other individuals named also departed.

17. ZUBILIN's successor in the NKGB apparatus in the U. S. is believed to have been Anatoli Borisovich GROMOV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from the summer of 1944 until December 7, 1945, when he departed from the port of New York City ostensibly for the Soviet Union. It will be recalled that GROMOV was identified as the Soviet agent "AL" who was GREGORY's superior in the GREGORY case. Shortly after his departure from the U. S. it was ascertained that GROMOV was assigned as Counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from where he departed, at least quasi-clandestinely, late in 1946. His present whereabouts are unknown and have been unknown since that time. It is interesting to note that investigation of GROMOV's contacts and activities did not

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reflect his active personal participation in many of the operations ZUBILIN is known to have directed, although it is entirely possible that such implication may have existed inasmuch as GROMOV's full significance was not realized nor his full identity as "Al" ascertained until November 1945, approximately a month before he departed from the U. S.

18. In connection with this case further, it is interesting to note that in addition to his contacts with ZUBILIN, Steve NELSON was also in contact, at least in the spring of 1943, with what appeared to be a separate and distinct Soviet Intelligence operation headed by Peter IVANOV, at that time Secretary of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, California. NELSON, during the early months of 1943, made clandestine meets with IVANOV and, in addition, was responsible for putting IVANOV in touch with a number of Communist and pro-Communist professors directly or indirectly connected with the radiation laboratory at the University of California. It will be recalled that this laboratory was one of the key installations of the DSM project. It is also known that during the early months of 1943 NELSON made attempts to procure information concerning this project from Party contacts employed therein. While it has never definitely been established, the speculation has been advanced that Peter IVANOV was a GRU official, whereas it will be recalled that ZUBILIN and his assistants were officials of the NKGB. It is interesting to note that the approaches used by IVANOV in his efforts to recruit agents to secure information concerning the DSM project very closely paralleled approaches known to have been made by Arthur Alexandrovich ADAMS, a highly important Soviet espionage agent definitely identified as working for Red Army Intelligence, who was intermittently active in the U. S. from 1919 to 1946. ADAMS was last active in the U. S. from 1938, when he entered this country on a fraudulent Canadian passport, until he disappeared in New York City late in January, 1946. IVANOV departed from the U. S. shortly after his series of contacts with NELSON, and his present whereabouts are not known. The full scope of IVANOV's activities and operations was never definitely ascertained.

19. In 1945 Steve NELSON was made a member of the National Board of the National Committee of the CPUSA, which required, under Party rules, his moving to the vicinity of New York City. In the fall of 1945 NELSON proceeded to New York where he became a full time official at Party Headquarters, 35 East 12th Street, assuming, in addition to his membership on the National Board, the position of Director of Foreign Nationality Group work for the Party. Since that time NELSON has made a number of highly suspicious contacts, but there has been little definite indication of operational espionage on his part. However, he has been in frequent contact with individuals highly suspect as Soviet espionage agents, including a number of visiting Polish and Yugoslav officials whose intelligence significance is open to little question. In addition he has continued his interest in Communist seaman courier routes.

20. By the time of NELSON's move to New York, at least the form in which this Soviet espionage parallel existed in the Spring of 1943 appears to have materially changed and its present form is unknown.

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21. Through the investigation of the COMRAP case, in addition to the large number of individuals identified as major participants, many others were involved as strongly suspect Soviet agents. Very briefly, there are set out below the identities of a number of these individuals.

Max and Grace GRANICH. These two individuals, husband and wife, who have long been active in Communist and Communist Front Circles in the New York area were identified as mail drops used in the operation of this parallel by NELSON and BOGMAN. Both of them have been active in the past in the Far East and have maintained an intense interest in Far Eastern affairs. In 1947 they moved to a farm in New England, and are known to have expressed to associates a desire to return to China at some time in the future. During 1943 and 1944 the GRANICH's were receiving mail from Madame Sun Yat Sen, containing conspiratorial messages and signed by her with the cover name "Suzy". It is noted that one of these letters to the GRANICH's mentioned the return to the U. S. of John S. SERVICE, State Department official implicated in the illegal disclosure of classified documents in connection with the Philip Jacob JAFFE case and strongly suspect, in that connection, of working for "Soviet Intelligence". Madame Sun Yat Sen's letter mentioned SERVICE as a "reliable individual" who "thinks as we do".

In the summer of 1945 three Chinese Communist delegates to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco visited Max and Grace GRANICH in New York and were almost immediately escorted by Grace GRANICH to an apartment in lower Manhattan, subsequently identified as occupied by Aube TZERKO, a concert pianist, born in Canada under the name of Abraham KOTZER. TZERKO became of extreme interest in February 1946, when he was contacted by Sam CARR (real name Schmil KOGAN). It will be recalled that CARR was one of the principal recruiting agents in the GPU espionage ring operated in Canada by Colonel Nikolai ZABOTIN from the summer of 1943 until the fall of 1945. At the time he contacted TZERKO in February, CARR was enroute back to Canada from Havana, Cuba, where as a fraternal delegate of the Canadian Communist Party of Canada) he had attended a National Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Subsequent investigation reflected that TZERKO and CARR have been close associates and there appears little question but that TZERKO was involved in the disappearance in Canada of Sam CARR in April 1946. It was never possible to ascertain the exact significance of the visit to TZERKO's apartment by the three important Chinese Communists attending the UNCIO.

Alexander BITTELMAN (real name Uschur BITTELMACHER). BITTELMAN was drawn into the COMRAP case through his close and frequent contacts with the principal figures therein and it was strongly indicated by the investigation that he was at least indirectly connected with the activities of this net. BITTELMAN, who was born in Russia, and whose deportation was requested very recently by the Department of Justice, has long been an important national functionary of the CPUSA. He has interested himself particularly in Party organization and propaganda among the Jewish minority elements and he is considered by many Party leaders to be the

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foremost Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist dialectician in the Party. The exact extent of BITTELMAN's intelligence activities has never definitely been ascertained.

Alexander TRACHTENBERG. TRACHTENBERG, a member of the National Committee of the Party, is the director of International Publishers, most important of the Communist Party publishing firms. TRACHTENBERG figured in the COMRAP investigation through his intimate association with many of the other subjects thereof. Collaterally, it was ascertained that he was in close contact with a number of other strongly suspect Soviet agents, not implicated, so far as is known in this case, but definitely implicated in other Soviet espionage operations. Of particular interest in this regard is TRACHTENBERG's association with Joseph Milton BERNSTEIN, alias Joe BERNSTEIN, alias Joe B., alias Joe BURSLEY, alias Joe BURSLEY, BERNSTEIN, a minor Party figure for many years, has been closely connected with a number of individuals who have figured in the GREGORY case, involving, it will be recalled, the operation of extensive Soviet espionage parallels centered in agencies of the U. S. Government. In addition, BERNSTEIN appears identical with an individual known to have been described by Philip Jacob JAFFE as an important Soviet espionage agent. There is good reason to believe, on the basis of certain correspondence between subjects in the GREGORY case referring to BERNSTEIN, that at least for several years during World War II BERNSTEIN may have been operating a Soviet espionage parallel in Washington, D.C., identical with the so-called Third Parallel referred to by GREGORY about which GREGORY knew practically nothing.

21. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for Mr. [Clark M.] Clifford, 16 August 1948.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 304

DEPT. OF JUSTICE LTR. 2-26-73

By ~~ALT~~ NARS Date 2-6-73

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1948

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Clifford:

The following represents the consensus of opinion at our meeting this morning with the Attorney General and Mr. Peyton Ford:

(1) The President should not at this time make a statement regarding "spies" along the lines proposed by Mr. Spingarn.

(2) Attention will be given by Justice to the possibility and desirability of referring the question of Soviet espionage in the Federal Government to a bi-partisan commission, such as the Hoover Commission.

(3) Justice should make every effort to ascertain if Whittaker Chambers is guilty of perjury.

(3A) *Investigation of Chambers' confinement in mental institution.*

(4) The Attorney General will furnish the White House with a description of the data Miss Bentley claims to have obtained for Soviet agents during the war, and the White House should endeavor to determine how much of this information was freely available to the Soviet Government through routine official liaison between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The purpose of this would be to make it clear that Miss Bentley was not successful in transmitting secret material to the Russians that they did not already have.

(5) The White House should ascertain the facts concerning the retention of Mr. Remington in OWMR, his transfer to the Council of Economic Advisers and his subsequent transfer to the Department of Commerce.

G. M. E.

GEORGE M. ELSEY

22. [Harry S. Truman] to the Attorney General, 16 December 1948.

*The President*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1948


Memorandum for: Attorney General


From: The President

I wonder if we could not get a statement of facts from the FBI about the meddling of the House Un-American Activities Committee and how they dried up sources of information which would have been accessible in the prosecution of spies and communists.

Their meddling efforts were in fact a "red herring" to detract attention not only from the shortcomings of the 80th Congress but also contributed to the escape of certain communists who should have been indicted.

I'll appreciate it if you will look into this a little bit and we will talk it over at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

*HST* 



23. D. M. Ladd, Memorandum to the Director [J. Edgar Hoover], "JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS," 29 December 1948.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director  
 FROM : D. M. Ladd *DL*  
 SUBJECT: JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS,  
 with aliases; et al;  
 PERJURY  
 ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: December 29, 1948

Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm  
 Mr. Clegg  
 Mr. Glavin  
 Mr. Ladd  
 Mr. Nichols  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Tracy  
 Mr. Carson  
 Mr. Egan  
 Mr. Gurnea  
 Mr. Harbo  
 Mr. Hendon  
 Mr. Pennington  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm  
 Mr. Nease  
 Miss Gandy

*2/2/49*

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated December 14, 1948, in which you were advised that the notes of Mr. Adolf Berle concerning his interview with Whittaker Chambers were turned over to the Bureau in June of 1943. You attached a routing slip to my memorandum and inquired, "Do I understand correctly that Chambers talked to Berle in 1939; we interviewed him first in May 1942; and Berle gave us information first in June 1943? How did we come to contact Chambers in 1942 and did we take any investigative action then? What did we do in the year from May 1942 to June 1943 about the data received from Chambers? E."

You subsequently inquired by phone on December 27 as to why we did not interview Chambers sooner than May 13, 1942.

The following sets forth in chronological order the various investigative steps taken by the Bureau.

The Bureau's first reference to Whittaker Chambers appeared in a pamphlet published in 1932 by International Pamphlets, 799 Broadway, New York. (61-7562-Sub 2-161) This pamphlet is a reprint of a short story by Whittaker Chambers entitled "Can You Hear Their Voices? - The Arkansas Farmers' Fight For Food" which was first published in the "New Masses" for March, 1931. This item was referred to by a Miss Hazel Huffman of the Federal Theater Project in New York City in testimony before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (Dies Committee) on August 19, 1938. (61-7582, Volume 1, page 778)

The New York Office of the Bureau on October 18, 1940, submitted the original report of Confidential Informant Bob M dated September 16, 1940, advising that Ludwig Lore, a former member of the Communist Party and likewise a contact of this Bureau, had told Bob M about an unidentified individual who had been a high officer in the GPU for eight years abroad and seven years in this country. (There was nothing at this time to identify the individual referred to by Lore as Whittaker Chambers.)

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 RECORDED - 28  
*74-1333-65*

By letter dated November 13, 1940, the Bureau instructed the New York Office to make every effort to determine the identity of this unidentified individual for the purpose of securing whatever information he had in his possession (61-7566-1977; 100-25824-1)

LW:EW  
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*1609*



Memorandum to the Director

On February 28, 1941, Mr. Adolf Berle of the Department of State requested someone from the Bureau to contact him regarding Chambers. On March 1, 1941, Mr. Rosen advised Mr. Berle's secretary that it was his understanding that Mr. Carson and Mr. Foxworth of the Bureau had an appointment with Mr. Berle. (100-25824-1X)

At this time there was a nationalistic tendency card filed in the Bureau indices which indicated that Whittaker Chambers was alleged to be a Communist and formerly a member of the IWW, also former staff editor of the "Daily Worker" and contributing editor of "New Masses."

On March 3, 1941, Mr. Foxworth in a memorandum to you made reference to his conversation with you that date concerning Whittaker Chambers. Reference was made to the aforementioned nationalistic tendency card and Foxworth stated, "We are not conducting any investigation and I have accordingly informed Mr. Berle." (100-25824-1X1)

On March 10, 1941, Mr. Berle telephonically advised Mr. Foxworth that he was afraid that the Russian agencies were looking for Whittaker Chambers. This matter was not followed up and the memorandum concerning it was merely filed. (100-25824-1X2) (This is the memorandum which was referred to in the memorandum to you from Assistant Director L. B. Nichols dated September 1, 1948, which prompted the memorandum to all Assistant Directors bringing to the attention of Supervisory personnel the significance of initialing communications.) (100-25824-52) (ATTACHED)

Information was received on April 29, 1941, from Confidential Informant Victor Kiesel, then assistant editor of "New Leader" newspaper, that Whittaker Chambers, a former member of the Communist Party, was then a motion picture reviewer for "Time," "Life" and "Fortune" magazines and was at that time (1941) strongly anti-Communist. (100-5740-5)

On May 9, 1941, the New York Office reported an interview with Mr. Ludwig Lore on May 8, 1941, pursuant to the Bureau instructions of November 13, 1940. Lore declined to furnish the name of the unknown former GPU agent and stated that he had been advised that this man's case had been discussed with the Director of the FBI some six or seven months previous by an intermediary who had suggested that the former GPU agent wanted some sort of immunity guarantee before exposing himself and that the Director had stated that no such agreement could be entered into. Lore also alleged that this former GPU agent had delivered to the President of the United States through a trusted friend who had the necessary

Memorandum to the Director

contact a list of persons in the Government who were Communists or pro-Soviet and that this list had been on the President's desk for several weeks but nothing had been done about it. (100-25824-2)

The New York Office was advised on May 16, 1941, that you had no recollection of ever having been approached by any intermediary who discussed some type of immunity guarantee which could be given to an agent of the GPU if he were willing to expose himself. The New York Office was instructed to obtain from Ludwig Lore the identity of the former GPU agent. (100-25824-2)

On August 3, 1941, the New York Office advised that Ludwig Lore had identified the individual to whom he had referred as Whittaker Chambers, an associate editor of "Time" magazine. (100-25824-5)

On August 18, 1941, Assistant Director E. J. Connelley in New York was instructed to institute a detailed investigation regarding Chambers to determine his character, background, activities and affiliations in a highly discreet and tactful manner. At the completion of the investigation the feasibility of openly interviewing Chambers would be considered. (100-25824-6)

During the conduct of this investigation Mr. Will Allen of the "Washington Daily News" contacted Assistant Director L. B. Nichols during October 1941 and advised that Ludwig Lore, a former Communist in New York City, knew an individual familiar with OGPU activities whom Allen subsequently contacted. Allen obtained from this person the names of three alleged OGPU agents - Hyman Kalodny, Helen Kalodny and Sophie Menken. Investigation was immediately instituted by the Bureau on the three individuals named. (100-25824-18)

Allen was again interviewed by a representative of the Washington Field Office on November 26, 1941, but stated that he could not under any circumstances divulge the identity of his informant in New York City. Allen was again interviewed by Assistant Director Nichols on January 28, 1942, at which time he stated that his informant's initials were W.C. (obviously Whittaker Chambers) (100-25824-19)

On February 11, 1942, the New York Office advised that Ludwig Lore did not introduce Allen to Chambers, but Lore claimed that Allen had been introduced to Chambers by Isaac Don Levine. (100-25824-20)

Memorandum to the Director

The logical leads in the investigation into the background of Whittaker Chambers having been completed, the New York Office advised the Bureau on March 4, 1942, that an effort would be made to interview Chambers. In this regard a follow-up letter was sent to New York on April 30, 1942. (100-25824-21)

It will be noted that there was an investigative delay from August 18, 1941 until March 4, 1942, in conducting the necessary investigation into the background and activities of Chambers for the purpose of laying the proper predication for an interview. The Field was followed by the Bureau on this matter in October, November and December, 1941, and in January, 1942, as new information was received or investigative suggestions made. (100-25824-8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19)

It is possible that this investigative delinquency was a reflection of the general investigative delinquency in the Field during the period immediately prior to and subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

Chambers was interviewed by Special Agents John E. Paul and E. J. Greenwald, Jr. of the New York Office on May 13, 1942, the results being transmitted to the Bureau by letter on May 14, 1942. Chambers advised that he had given all of the information which was in his possession to Mr. A. A. Berle of the State Department in Washington, D. C., in September, 1939, and before discussing any of the matters with the Agents put through a long distance call to Mr. Berle at the latter's home.

Chambers advised Berle in the presence of the Agents that there were present in his office two FBI Agents who wished to secure the information that he, Chambers, had given to Berle and asked if this would be all right. Apparently Berle was in accord for Chambers thanked him and thereafter supplied considerable information which he indicated had been furnished previously to Mr. Berle in September, 1939. (100-25824-22)

During the course of this interview Chambers denied that he was directly connected with the OGPU and stated that he was in the underground movement of the Communist Party, USA as a kind of "morale officer" to guide recruits in the Party's policy. He denied that he had ever been to the USSR. (In this regard the investigation conducted by the Bureau prior to the interview failed to disclose any indications of travel by Chambers to or residence in the USSR as originally alleged by Ludvig Lore, who you will recall died shortly after the conclusion of this investigation, and so was not available to recheck allegations made by him concerning Chambers.) (100-25824-22)

Memorandum to the Director

As will be seen from the foregoing, the first knowledge the Bureau had that Chambers had been interviewed by Adolf Berle on September 2, 1939, in Washington, D. C., came to us as a result of our interview with Chambers May 13, 1942. You will recall in connection with this matter SAC Carson was brought up from Miami to interview Berle on September 3, 1948, regarding the latter's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in order to clarify the ambiguities in Berle's testimony and to cause a correction in the inference left by Berle's testimony that he had advised the FBI in 1939 of Chambers' allegations. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson that his recollection being refreshed, he could state that he does not recall or have any record of any prior conversation with the FBI prior to March, 1941, concerning Chambers and that he does not recall having furnished to the FBI in 1941 any information concerning Chambers' interview with him. Mr. Berle advised SAC Carson on September 3, 1948, that in 1939 (and by inference in 1941 as well) he did not feel free to divulge the content of Chambers' conversation to the FBI inasmuch as Chambers had indicated that he did not so desire and had further indicated that he would not back up the story and also did not desire the information furnished to the FBI, particularly if the source was to be revealed. (100-25824-50)

The Bureau may have been delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of the Chambers interview regarding the data which Chambers had furnished the Bureau and to Berle, in order to make sure that it was the same. However, Chambers when interviewed on May 13, 1942, had indicated that what he was furnishing to the Bureau at that time was the substance of what he had given to Mr. Berle in September, 1939.

An analysis of the Bureau's action with regard to individuals mentioned by Chambers in the 1942 interview shows that 21 persons were already subjects of Bureau investigations, as well as two organizations, namely, Amtorg Trading Corporation and Tass News Agency. On five other persons, investigations were instituted on the basis of Chambers' allegations. These persons were: ~~Arimov; Harry Fweit, with aliases; Paul Massing; Hedl Massing; and Helen Ware (Cappel).~~ Two individuals, Ralph Bowman and Margaret Browder, became the subjects of investigation at a later date on the basis of information developed through other sources, data furnished by Chambers in each instance already appearing in the Bureau files. With regard to Bowman, it was noted that he was established to be identical with the person mentioned by Chambers as Rudy Baker but Chambers was never able to identify Bowman's photograph as Baker.

Regarding those individuals mentioned by Chambers, concerning whom no investigative action was undertaken, Mrs. Lila Field and Harold Ware were

Memorandum to the Director

dead and the Bureau files contained considerable information regarding Ware. Gertrude Schilbach, a German Communist involved in the murder of Ignace Reiss in Switzerland, was not indicated to be in the United States. Isidore Miller was not alleged to be either a Communist or an espionage agent. The circumstances regarding the disappearance of Juliet Poyntz were generally known to the Bureau and Chambers' suspicions contributed nothing to the picture at that time. Chambers mentioned one Post who "was obtained from the underground movement of the Party" and, according to Chambers, became a co-editor of a State Department publication. He has subsequently been identified as Richard Howell Post, a State Department employee and a Loyalty investigation has been conducted concerning him. Chambers mentioned an unnamed individual "connected" with the Communist underground who was in the Trade Agreement Section of the State Department. This person has been identified as Henry Julian Wadleigh, who was formerly employed by the State Department and who was recently interviewed in connection with the most current allegations of Chambers. As to the latter two individuals, Chambers' statements with regard to them were less positive than as to other persons and he did not state in unequivocal language that they were Party members at the time he left the movement in 1938, as he did in the cases of many of the individuals discussed.

It should be noted that subsequent to the Chambers interview on May 13, 1942, Bureau files on numerous individuals were reviewed, certain investigations were opened, and efforts were made to identify persons named by Chambers, the principal one of which was his superior "Peter." In a report dated December 1, 1942, in the Chambers file, the New York Office identified "Peter," the reputed head of the underground movement of the Communist Party, as J. Peters, author of "The Communist Party, A Manual of Organization." (100-25824-25)

Whittaker Chambers meanwhile had been bedridden with angina pectoris from November, 1942 until March 5, 1943, when Agents of this Bureau were able to interview him for a period of five minutes. At this time Chambers identified a photograph of Alexander Stevens, with aliases, as "Peter" his superior in the Communist Party underground. (100-184255-67)

Thereafter, the desirability of determining whether the information furnished to Mr. Berle was identical with that furnished to the Bureau by Chambers became apparent and subsequent to Mr. Berle's recovery from an illness which had afflicted him in May, 1943 (94-4-3869-8) the Liaison Section of the Bureau obtained Mr. Berle's notes of the 1939 interview, which were very

Memorandum to the Director

sketchy and disjointed in June, 1943. Copies of these notes were placed in the Whittaker Chambers file. (100-25824-27)

The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, for any independent recollection which he might have had to explain or clarify the ambiguities in his notes, although it is probable that Mr. Berle not having reduced these notes to a memorandum would have been unable to contribute materially to the matters under investigation after a lapse of almost four years since the date of his interview with Chambers.

DELINQUENCIES NOTED

1. The Bureau did not press Mr. Berle for information which he might have had concerning Whittaker Chambers at the time he made his inquiry in March, 1941, concerning the Bureau's possible interest in Chambers. The files do not indicate a definite explanation, but if one exists it might be that the Bureau did not feel that it was desirable to press the Assistant Secretary of State for information which he did not see fit to volunteer concerning a subject which had been raised by him.

2. There was an investigative delinquency in the period required for investigation of the background and activities of Whittaker Chambers from August 18, 1941 to March 4, 1942. An explanation, if such exists, might be the general investigative delinquency in the Field immediately prior to and subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

3. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not contacting Mr. Berle immediately upon the conclusion of our interview with Whittaker Chambers on May 13, 1942, to determine the substance of the information which had been furnished by Chambers to Berle in 1939. The Bureau waited until June, 1943 to obtain Berle's notes concerning the interview. The only possible explanation for this delinquency was that Chambers' telephone conversation with Berle and his interview with the Agents indicated that he was furnishing the Bureau in May, 1942, the substance of what he had given to Berle in 1939.

4. The Bureau was probably delinquent in not pressing Mr. Berle in June, 1943, at the time his notes were obtained, for any independent recollection which he might have had of the 1939 conversation in addition to the

Memorandum to the Director

notes. The Bureau files do not indicate what if anything Mr. Berle said at the time the notes were obtained by the Bureau, but it is doubtful that he would have been able to contribute materially to a clarification of the notes in 1943 after a lapse of almost four years from the date of his original interview with Chambers. ✓

Attachment

of course hind-sight is better than fore-sight but we should learn from this incident & not have any recurrence in other cases & situations.

d.

24. Tom C. Clark, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev," 16 March 1949.



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1949:

*Filed  
3.28.49.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Proposed deportation of Valentine A. Gubitchev

*U. I.*

*x v. c.*

*x v. c. Justice*

As you know, Valentine A. Gubitchev and Judith Coplon have been jointly indicted in New York City for violation of the espionage laws.

Gubitchev was an ordinary employee of the United Nations, not entitled to diplomatic immunity. Coplon was an employee in the Alien Registration Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.



This charge is one of conspiracy between the defendants to se-  
cure and deliver to a foreign government secret papers of the Depart-  
ment of Justice concerning national defense. The charges carry pos-  
sible penalties against Coplon of a total of 35 years imprisonment,  
on all counts; against Gubitchev, 15 years.

The case is due to be tried in the lower court within 30 to 45 days.

On March 16 Coplon was indicted alone in Washington, D. C., on a charge of violating the espionage laws and removal of certain records of the Department of Justice, carrying on the first count a possible penalty of 10 years, and on the second of 3 years. This case should be tried in 90 days.

In view of the recommendation of the State Department, a copy of which is attached hereto, that Gubitchev be deported to Russia rather than stand trial with Miss Coplon, I desire to submit the following reasons why I think that Gubitchev should be retained in the United States at least until after the trial of the New York case, for the following reasons:

1. Successful prosecution depends on his presence, for he is one of the principals of the case and his absence affords vast opportunities to Coplon in her defense.

*x562  
x220  
x L. F. Loyalty Program*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
Authority 89-3  
By CS NIS Date 4/2/91



- 2 -

2. Coplon has pleaded innocent and in the event we deport Gubitchev she will claim it was done to prevent her from having his testimony in defense.

3. The jury would be adversely affected by the prosecution of this young woman alone. The absence of Gubitchev would, of course, be known to the jury and persecution against Coplon would be charged.

4. The deportation of Gubitchev would undoubtedly cause many to think and say that the Department of Justice never had an espionage case against him and never intended to prosecute the case to its conclusion.

5. The public reaction to immediate deportation before trial would, in my opinion, be extremely unfavorable. If Gubitchev were deported the result would be that an American citizen would remain to face possible conviction and imprisonment with the alien Russian being excused from even the embarrassment of a public trial.

I cannot, of course, substitute my opinion for that of the State Department in matters of foreign relations. I only wish to state my view of the problems presented.

The Secretary of State has asked that I advise him of the decision in this matter by Friday morning. I have furnished him a copy of this memorandum.

Another alternative exists, i.e., to prosecute Gubitchev and then permit his deportation to Russia. In this event I am advised by the Secretary of State that this decision could not be made known until the conclusion of the prosecution. However, it might be possible to inform the Russian Government that Gubitchev will have to remain in this country for the trial but that the consideration of his ultimate deportation after trial would remain open.

It is my considered recommendation that I be authorized to proceed with the trial of Gubitchev without delay, reserving until a later time the question of deportation.

Respectfully,

*Phillips*

Attorney General.

X10

x 20



25. [Robert J. Lamphere to Gardner], "FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, With Alias,"  
9 May 1949.

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49-005

May 9, 1949

FLORA DON WOVSCHIN, with alias

In connection with the investigation to identify Zora, the person who recruited Judith Coplon and Marion Davis Berdecio in the Fall of 1944 as Soviet espionage agents, an identification has been made which indicates that Zora is identical with Flora Don Wovschin.

Miss Wovschin was born February 20, 1923, at New York City. Her mother, Miss Maria Wicher, and her stepfather, Enos Regnet Wicher, presently reside at 229 East 79th Street, New York City. He is a professor at Columbia University. Mrs. Maria Wicher was born in Russia and became a citizen of the United States in 1922. Flora Don Wovschin's father, Dr. William A. Wovschin (deceased), was born in Russia and became a citizen of the United States in 1914.

Miss Wovschin attended the University of Wisconsin, Columbia University, and received her degree at Barnard College. While at Barnard she was active in the American Students Union and was possibly a member of the American Youth for Democracy. She was acquainted with both Judith Coplon and Marion Davis Berdecio while at Barnard. She was employed by OWI from September 9, 1943, to February 20, 1945, when she transferred to the State Department. She stayed at the State Department until September 20, 1945, when she resigned. Her mother and stepfather reportedly were very active in the Communist movement when they resided in the State of Wisconsin.

We have recently received information to the effect that Flora Don Wovschin went to Russia several years ago, after renouncing her American citizenship, and in Russia she married a Soviet engineer. It is reported that she is unhappy at the present time and would like to return to the United States.

*In 9 Sept 1950 Lamphere stated Wovschin was reported to have died serving as a nurse in North Korea.*

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ON *7-30-96*

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26. Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for the President, 22 March 1949.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1949



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At its 36th Meeting, the National Security Council, including the Secretary of the Treasury and a representative of the Attorney General for this matter, agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend that you approve the enclosed draft directive on coordination of internal security (NSC 17/4).

The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the enclosed memorandum dated March 21, 1949.

  
SIDNEY W. SOUERS  
Executive Secretary

APPROVED:

  
HARRY S. TRUMAN

Date: March 23, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President

NSC 17/4

COPY NO. 1

A REPORT  
 TO THE  
 PRESIDENT  
 BY THE  
 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



on

INTERNAL SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED  
 E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (2)  
 NSC MEMO 5-21-79  
 GPO Form April 5, 1967  
 By NLT-WC, NARS Date 11-5-73

March 22, 1949

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC 17/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1949

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

INTERNAL SECURITY

References: A. NSC 17/3  
B. Memos for National Security Council from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 26, 1948, March 3, and March 21, 1949

At its 36th Meeting, the National Security Council considered the references and agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend to the President that he approve the proposed directive enclosed herewith. The reasons for the dissent by the Secretary of the Army are stated in the Reference memo dated March 21, 1949.

Subject to the approval by the President of the above recommendations, the National Security Council also directed the NSC representative on Internal Security to arrange for the prompt study of the points outlined by the Secretary of the Army in the reference memo dated March 21, 1949, and to submit for Council consideration such recommendations with respect thereto as are deemed appropriate.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS  
Executive Secretary

Distribution:

The President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Chairman, National Security Resources Board

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D R A F T

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act, the following arrangements for the purpose of effecting more adequate and coordinated internal security.

2. The following two permanent committees, together with such secretariat as may be required, shall be responsible for coordinating internal security.

a. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) is responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. It consists of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army; and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force.

b. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) is hereby created and shall be

NSC 17/4

1.

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responsible for coordinating all phases of the internal security field other than the functions outlined in paragraph 2-a above. It shall be composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice and the National Military Establishment.

3. Both Committees shall invite non-member agency representatives as ad hoc members thereof when matters involving their responsibilities are under consideration.

4. In accordance with arrangements to be determined in each case, there shall be transferred to the IIC and the ICIS for incorporation as subcommittees or for the absorption of their functions such existing committees as are operating in their respective fields of responsibility. The two committees shall also establish such new subcommittees as will assist them in carrying out their responsibilities.

5. The IIC and the ICIS will, whenever appropriate, hold joint meetings or establish joint subcommittees.

6. The National Security Council shall designate a representative who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the NSC, shall:

- a. Assist and advise the NSC in coordinating the activities of the IIC and the ICIS;
- b. Assist and advise the IIC and the ICIS in carrying out their respective responsibilities and in collaborating on problems of common interest;
- c. Submit to the IIC or the ICIS questions

which, in his opinion, require their consideration:

NSC/17/4

-2-

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d. As representative of the NSC, participate as an observer and advisor in all meetings of the IIC and the ICIS;

e. Submit for consideration by the NSC problems which cannot be resolved by either the IIC or the ICIS or by the two committees acting together, outlining any divergent solutions which have been proposed and his own recommendations;

f. Report to the National Security Council from time to time, at least quarterly, on progress being made for the provision of adequate internal security;

g. Have no powers of instruction, direction or supervision over either the IIC or the ICIS.

7. The IIC and the ICIS shall prepare and submit for consideration and approval by the National Security Council proposed charters for the IIC and the ICIS respectively. The Department of Justice representative shall serve as the Chairman of the ICIS for this purpose. The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council shall assist the IIC and the ICIS in coordinating the preparation of the proposed charters. These charters shall define, in accordance with the foregoing, the respective functions and responsibilities of the committees and shall provide for their chairmanship and staff.



27. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Anatoli Borisovich Gromov," 12 July 1949.

49-018

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ANATOLI BORISOVICH GROMOV

It appears that Bademus (Vadim) is identical with Anatoli Borisovich Gromov. He arrived in the United States on September 15, 1944. He was designated as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. The early mention in the material of Bademus on July 25, 1944, is not inconsistent inasmuch as it is indicated therein that Bademus was not in the United States at that time. Identifying data concerning Gromov has previously been made available to you.

First Sec'y  
Sov Emb to Soviet  
in 1945.

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ON 7-30-96

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28. [Lamphere to Gardner], "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, a.k.a. Karl Fuchs,"  
26 September 1949.

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47-029

September 26, 1949

EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, aka;  
Karl Fuchs

REST

On June 15, 1944, Rest furnished to a representative of Soviet Intelligence (M.G.B.), Part III of a document now identified as MSN-12. This document dated June 6, 1944 is on file with the Atomic Energy Commission and is entitled "Fluctuations and the Efficiency of a Diffusion Plant", and Part III specifically refers to "The Effect of Fluctuations in the Flow of N<sub>2</sub>." The designation MSN stands for documents prepared by British scientists who were in New York City working on Atomic Energy research. The author of this document is K. Fuchs, who is actually Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, who is usually known as Karl Fuchs. He is a top ranking British Atomic scientist.

Information available concerning Rest indicated that he was a British scientist, inasmuch as he had also furnished to the Soviet Intelligence information concerning British participation in the Atomic Energy development. It was also indicated that he had a sister in the United States. There are indications that Rest was actually the author of the document.

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs also known as Karl Fuchs, was born December 29, 1911, at Russelsheim, Germany. His father, Emil Fuchs was born May 13, 1874, and was a professor in Germany. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs entered the United Kingdom in 1933, and from 1941 to 1943, was a medical physicist at the University of Birmingham, England. In November 1943, he was designated by the British Government to come to the United States as a part of the British Atomic Energy Commission. He arrived at New York City on December 3, 1943, and went to Los Alamos or-to-Oak Ridge, Tennessee in August 1944. While in the United States, Fuchs worked with a group of British scientists in the period of March to June 1944, on the development of diffusional operational processes working particularly with the Kellex Corporation, which was working under the Manhattan

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ON 7-30-96

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Engineering District. Fuchs left for England from Montreal, Canada on June 28, 1946.

In November 1947, Fuchs was back in the United States and visited the Chicago Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. At that time, he attended discussions regarding unclassified and declassified aspects of neutron spectroscopy. He also participated in declassification conferences which were being held between the United States, Great Britain and Canada. Fuchs is presently the senior research worker at the Atomic Energy Commission project at Harwell, England.

Fuchs has a sister, Kristel Fuchs Heineman, who prior to January 1941, resided at 55 Carver Road, Watertown, Massachusetts. From approximately 1941, until about 1945, she resided with her husband, Robert Block Heineman at 144 Lakeview Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. They presently reside at 94 Lakeview Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Robert Block Heineman has been reliably reported as a member of the Communist Party, United States of America in 1947.

The address book of Israel Halperin implicated in the Canadian Espionage network contained the following: "Klaus Fuchs, Asst. to M. Born, 84 Grange Lane, University of Edinburgh, Scotland Camp (possibly comp) N.-Camp L., Internment Operations - Kristel Heineman, 55 Carvel Road, Watertown." The phrase Camp L is encircled.

In addition to the foregoing a captured German document prepared presumably by German Counter Intelligence and which relates to Communist Party members in Germany contains the following:

"Klaus Fuchs, student of philosophy, December 29, 1911, Russelsheim, RSHA-IVA2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel.

"Gerhard Fuchs, October 30, 1909, Russelsheim, student RSHA-IVA2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel."

It is to be noted that Gerhard Fuchs is the brother of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs.

GUS (GCCSE)

In connection with Rest, who furnished the document MSN-12 and who

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is thought to be Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, it is also known that Rest's sister was a contact of Gus (Goose), who has presumably a scientific background. You will recall, Gus contemplated preparing a work on the production method with respect to the thermal diffusion of gases.

You will also recall, Gus, who has not been identified was also a contact of Abraham Brothman, a Consulting Engineer in New York City, who furnished espionage information to Elizabeth Bentley in 1940.

It is thought that Gus may possibly be identical with Arthur Phineas Weber, who is presently an employee of the Kellex Corporation which is engaged in work under the Atomic Energy Commission. Weber was born March 10, 1920, in Brooklyn, New York and is a chemical engineer. From 1941 to 1942, he worked with Brothman for the Henderick Manufacturing Company. From June 1942 to July 1944, he worked with Brothman in the Chemurgy Design Corporation, and according to some information during a part of this period he was also working for the Kellex Corporation. Weber lists employment with Kellex Corporation as a chemical engineer from July 1944 to March 29, 1946, and again from April 8, 1946, to the present. It should be noted that the Kellex Corporation was closely working in 1944 with the British Scientist group which included Fuchs.

HEILIG

With respect to No. 1390 of October 1, 1944, the Heilig mentioned is believed to be Theodore Heilig, who was born August 6, 1897 in Jersey City, New Jersey and resides at 128 West Walnut Street, Long Beach, New York. He is married and his wife's name is Lee Heilig. In November 1942, Heilig formed the Tedlee Chemical Corporation. This corporation received Government contracts for the filling of methyl bromide ampoules. In July 1943, Heilig formed the Regal Chemical Corporation which received Government contracts for the filling of aerosol containers with insecticide. The prime contractor was the Bridgeport Brass Company.

In October 1943, Abraham Brothman and Arthur P. Weber became associated with the Tedlee Chemical Corporation doing work for Heilig under a contractual agreement to work on an automatic machine to fill aerosol bombs. In an interview Brothman claims that in April 1944, Heilig offered to ask for a draft deferment for Weber if Brothman would sign over to Heilig the automatic filling machine. Brothman refused to do this and broke up with Heilig.

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29. W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee [H. Marshall Chadwell], "Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value," 9 February 1950.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Executive Registry  
0-9081

9 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee  
FROM: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
SUBJECT: Failure of JAEIC to Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value.

1. It is the opinion of the JAEIC that considerable counter espionage information is and has been available in the files of the FBI and elsewhere which would have been and probably still is of considerable value to the JAEIC in making its estimates of the status of the U.S.S.R. atomic energy program. Some of this information has become available through the investigations conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Canadian Royal Commission; however, essentially all information that has become available is of a peripheral nature, incomplete, and of relatively little value because of the length of time which has elapsed since the incidents occurred. The Nuclear Energy Division of OSI made a request for specific information to the Director of the FBI on 21 September 1949, and while some information was furnished in answer to this request, it was only of slight value.

2. More specifically, if the JAEIC had known of the implications of the Fuchs case in June 1949 at the time when the July estimate was being written, the estimate of the time by which the Soviets could have obtained their first bomb would have been appreciably advanced, as no allowance was made in making that estimate for successful espionage on details of bomb design and construction. Of course, the JAEIC does not know how long Fuchs has been under investigation, but the fact still remains that the JAEIC was not informed until after the man's arrest.

3. If the pattern set forth above is followed, it seems obvious that much counter espionage information will not be made available. The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of the investigations of a Congressional Committee or the arrest of the offenders in isolated instances. This is very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of time, as the information is so old by the time we get it that it is of little value.

4. The JAEIC desires to point out to the SIC this possibly large area of information which is being denied us. Furthermore, in view of the paucity of information from other sources, the elimination of this deficiency is urgently necessary if the JAEIC is to perform its duties adequately.

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Executive Registry  
0-908

5. The JAEIC recommends that this situation be brought to the attention of the IAC as soon as possible in order that remedial action on a high level may be instituted.

*F. A. Valente*  
for  
W. K. BENSON  
Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy  
Intelligence Committee

This document has been  
approved for release through  
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30. Hoover to Souers, 24 May 1950.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

May 24, 1950

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers  
Special Consultant to the President  
Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA LIAISON

My dear Admiral:

I believe the President and you will no doubt be interested in information concerning Harry Gold who has been identified as the individual who received atomic information from Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs in the United States for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

Harry Gold was born December 12, 1910, in Switzerland. In 1914 he came to the United States with his parents, Sam and Celia Golodnitsky, both of whom were born in Russia. At the time of their naturalization as United States citizens their name was changed to Gold. Harry Gold claims citizenship by derivation through his parents. His mother is deceased. Harry Gold resides with his father and his brother, Joseph Gold, at 6823 Kindred Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Shortly after arriving in the United States the Gold family moved to Philadelphia, where, in 1929, Harry Gold became employed by the Pennsylvania Sugar Company in their laboratories. He continued his employment with this company until about February, 1946, at which time he became employed with A. Brothman Associates, Consulting Engineers, New York City. He left this firm in June, 1948. He presently is employed at the Philadelphia General Hospital and is a Civil Service employee of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the hospital he is engaged in the laboratory doing research in connection with serious cardiac cases.

Gold received his education attending night school at the Drexel Institute, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia University. In 1938 he obtained leave of absence from the Pennsylvania Sugar Company to attend Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio, where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree summa cum laude in 1940.

Gold first came to the attention of this Bureau in connection with the activities of Abraham Brothman, concerning whom Elizabeth T. Bentley furnished information. In a signed statement dated November 30, 1945, Bentley advised that in about May, 1940, she was introduced to Brothman, whose photograph she identified, by Jacob Golos, her Soviet espionage superior.

She stated that Golos told her that Brothman would furnish her with certain blueprints. Following that she met with Brothman about ten times in the summer of 1940 until the fall of that year, and obtained blueprints from him for Golos. She said that in the fall of 1940 Golos claimed to have become disgusted with Brothman and told her he was turning Brothman over to someone else.

As a result of this information an investigation of Brothman was conducted, which resulted in an interview of Brothman on May 29, 1947. At first Brothman denied recognizing the name or photograph of Golos. Upon being shown a photograph of Bentley, which he identified as a person whom he knew as "Helen," he then admitted that he did recognize the photograph of Golos.

Brothman related that some time in 1938 or 1939 Golos had come to his office at 114 East 32nd Street, New York City, and advised Brothman that he had contacts with the Russian Government, by reason of which he was in a position to obtain contracts from that government for Brothman if Brothman would turn over to him blueprints of certain products on which Brothman was working at the time. Brothman advised that the blueprints in question were his own property. He said Golos visited his office on several occasions thereafter until Golos introduced him to "Helen." Golos advised that "Helen" would thereafter obtain the blueprints. "Helen" visited Brothman's office over a dozen times during 1938, 1939, and 1940. Some time in 1940 she stopped coming and another individual named Harry Gold appeared at Brothman's office and said that he represented Golos. Thereafter Gold visited Brothman's office on a number of occasions during 1940 and 1941, and obtained blueprints from Brothman. He said the last time Gold picked up the blueprints, according to the best of his recollection, was late in 1941 or early 1942. He was emphatic in stating that Gold was the last individual to pick up any blueprints or material for Golos. He stated that Harry Gold was, at the time of the interview, namely May 29, 1947, employed by him as a chemist in his laboratory at Elmhurst, Long Island. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Brothman.

Upon receiving the information about Gold from Brothman, Gold was interviewed the same day at A. Brothman Associates Laboratory, 8503-57th Avenue, Elmhurst, Long Island. Gold related in substance that he had met Jacob Golos in October, 1940, at a meeting of the American Chemical Society at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia. At this time Golos propositioned Gold, saying that he had connections with individuals in a foreign country, not naming the country, and also had connections with Abraham Brothman in



New York who was turning over certain blueprints. Golos told Gold that he required the services of a chemist to go to New York City, obtain the blueprints from Brothman, and then evaluate them on a chemical basis. Gold stated that about two weeks after this, in November, 1940, he contacted Brothman in New York City and introduced himself as a representative of Golos. For the next six months he made visits to New York City on the average of every three weeks to obtain blueprints from Brothman. He said that during this period he received four or five telephone calls from Golos, who always stated that they would have to get together very soon, but that actually this never happened. He said the last telephone call from Golos was in May, 1941, after which time he had no further word from Golos. He denied that he ever had seen Golos except on the occasion when he met him in October, 1940. Gold claimed that after his second or third trip to New York City Brothman became friendly and exhibited an interest in Gold's career as a chemist. He said that ever since that time Brothman had been interested in having Gold join Brothman's organization, but that it was not until February, 1946, that he could see his way clear to accept such employment, which he did at that time. Gold denied any financial agreement with Golos, and claimed he never received a cent from Golos. He insisted that he stood the expenses for the trips to New York City on the first two occasions, after which Brothman became friendly and furnished him a five-dollar bill to cover expenses. A signed statement to this effect was obtained from Gold.

On July 22 and 31, 1947, Abraham Brothman and Harry Gold, respectively, were called before the Federal Grand Jury, Southern District of New York. Both testified in substance before this Grand Jury to that which they had furnished on interview. The investigation of the Grand Jury concerning the charges of Elizabeth T. Bentley culminated in the finding of a "no bill."

After extensive and intensive investigation which developed information indicating that Harry Gold was very probably the United States contact of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, he was interviewed at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and on May 22, 1950, he furnished a signed statement admitting espionage activity. He admitted that he began the procurement of industrial information for the Soviet Union in the fall of 1936, and continued this activity until 1943, except for the period from 1938 to 1940 while he attended Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Gold advised that very early in 1944 his then superior made arrangements for him to meet Dr. Klaus Fuchs in New York City. This first meeting occurred on a Saturday afternoon in February or March, 1944, on the East Side of Manhattan, from where they took a cab uptown to a restaurant around Third Avenue in the 50's, possibly Manny Wolf's Restaurant. Following the dinner they walked about and completed arrangements for further meetings. Gold recalled the arrangements for actual recognition to be that he was to carry a pair of gloves in one hand, plus a green-covered book, while Fuchs was to carry a handball. He introduced himself as "Raymond" and Fuchs introduced himself as Klaus Fuchs. He said that Fuchs never used the name "Raymond" because he knew it was fictitious.

At this first meeting no written information was passed, but Fuchs revealed that he was with the British Mission working with the Manhattan Engineer Project. He told Gold that the British Mission was working on the separation of isotopes, and Gold believes there was at least implied the eventual utilization of the energy produced by nuclear fission in the form of a weapon. Following this, Gold had about four meetings with Fuchs in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens. During at least two of these meetings Fuchs furnished written information to Gold, who thereafter delivered it to his superior, "John." He said that he had taken a brief glance at the material on one occasion and found it to consist of a number of folded sheets of paper containing mathematical equations which seemed to concern mathematical derivations.

Gold further advised that he lost contact with Fuchs when Fuchs failed to keep a meeting in August, 1944. He stated that "John" obtained the information whereby he was once more enabled to contact Fuchs. "John" gave Gold the address of Mrs. Heineman in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the sister of Fuchs. As a result of this, he met Fuchs at the Heineman residence shortly after Christmas Day, 1944, or early in 1945. At that time Fuchs told him that he was at Los Alamos, New Mexico, a short distance from Santa Fe. Fuchs also gave him written information at the time and the two made an arrangement to meet in June of that year in Santa Fe. Gold stated that on this occasion he had been given a sum of approximately fifteen hundred dollars to offer Fuchs in a very diplomatic manner so as not to offend him. He said that Fuchs "turned it down cold." Gold returned to New York with the money and information which he delivered to "John."

Gold has further advised that he met Fuchs in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in June, 1945, and again in September, 1945. On both of these occasions Fuchs furnished him with written information. He said that during the September, 1945, meeting Fuchs told him that he had been present at the initial large-scale trial of nuclear fission at Alamogordo, New Mexico. He also stated that Fuchs told him at the time that he probably would return to England soon, but that by paying a call to Fuchs' sister he could ascertain just when. Gold said he made one or two attempts to see Fuchs again at the home of his sister, but was not successful. After the possible second attempt, which was either in late January or early February, 1946, Gold missed a scheduled appointment with his superior, "John," and has not seen or heard from him since.

In connection with the current interview of Fuchs in London by representatives of this Bureau, still and movie photographs of Gold were surreptitiously obtained for display to Fuchs. Previously, Fuchs and Robert and Kristel Heineman had failed to recognize a photograph of Gold. On May 20, 1950, Fuchs was shown the new still photographs of Gold and he did not identify them, though he stated he could not reject them.

On May 22, 1950, Fuchs viewed three repeat showings of the moving pictures of Gold, after which he stated that Gold was very likely his contact in the United States. It is most interesting to note that this information was received by cable at 11:08 AM, while Gold had first admitted his espionage activity to the interviewing agents in Philadelphia at approximately 10:45 AM the same day.

On May 23, 1950, a complaint was filed before a United States Commissioner for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, charging Harry Gold and "John" Doe with conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in violation of Section 32, Title 50, United States Code. A warrant was issued and Gold was thereupon taken before United States District Judge James P. McGranery at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for arraignment. Judge McGranery gave Gold the complaint to read and he admitted that he was the Harry Gold named in the complaint. A preliminary hearing was set for June 12, 1950, and bail was set at one hundred thousand dollars, in default of which Gold was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

30. (Continued)

Further information of interest to the President and you will  
be furnished as it develops.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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31. [Lamphere to Gardner], "Study of Code Names in MGB Communications,"  
27 June 1950.

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June 27, 1950

STUDY OF CODE NAMES IN MGB COMMUNICATIONS

Reference is made to the memorandum dated June 23, 1950, bearing the above caption.

Since the referenced memorandum was prepared it has been determined that one JULIUS ROSENBERG is probably identical with the individual described as ANTENNA and LIBERAL in that memorandum. It is also believed now that DAVID GREENGLASS is identical with the individual described as KALIER, and that RUTH PRINTZ GREENGLASS is identical with the individual known under the code name OSA.

From the information available to date it is believed that ANATOLI ANTONOVICH YAKOVLEV is identical with the individual described under the code name ALEKSEY in the referenced memorandum.

More complete details concerning these individuals will be furnished to you at a later date.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 CLK/um  
ON 7-30-96

32. Hoover to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, 18 July 1950.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

July 18, 1950

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison  
Naval Aide to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral:

I thought the President and you would be interested in the attached memorandum which sets forth information concerning Julius Rosenberg, who was arrested on July 17, 1950, for conspiring to violate the Espionage Statute.

As further pertinent information regarding this matter is received you will be advised.

This information has been made available to Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President, and Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure





July 18, 1950

JULIUS ROSENBERG

ARREST

Julius Rosenberg was arrested by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the evening of July 17, 1950, in New York City. On arraignment before Federal Judge John F. X. McGohey, he was charged with espionage conspiracy in violation of Section 34, Title 50, United States Code.

BACKGROUND

Julius Rosenberg was born May 12, 1918, in New York City, the son of Harry and Sophie Rosenberg, both born in Poland. He graduated from the College of the City of New York in February, 1939, receiving a B.S. Degree in Electrical Engineering. He also claims to have attended courses at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and at the Guggenheim Aeronautical School, New York University. He married Ethel Guggenheim on June 18, 1939, and has two sons, Michael Allen, age 7, and Robert Harry, age 3. His wife, Ethel, is the sister of David Greenglass who was arrested on June 16, 1950, for conspiring with Harry Gold and Anatoli A. Yakovlev in violation of Section 34, Title 50, United States Code.

Julius Rosenberg was employed by the War Department, Signal Supply Office, New York General Depot, Brooklyn, New York, beginning on September 3, 1940, as a Junior Engineer, Radio. On October 14, 1941, he was transferred to the Signal Corps, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was promoted to Assistant Engineer, Inspection, on January 1, 1942, and on January 13, 1942, was transferred to the Newark Signal Corps Inspection District of the Philadelphia Signal Corps Procurement District, Newark, New Jersey. He was again transferred on October 4, 1942, to the Newark Signal Corps Inspection Zone, Newark, New Jersey, and on February 16, 1943, was promoted to Associate Engineer, Inspection. As of February 9, 1945, he was suspended indefinitely pending a decision by the Secretary of War on the recommendation of his commanding officer for removal by the demands of national security on the basis of information indicating Communist Party membership. His employment by the Signal Corps was terminated as of March 26, 1945. Prior to the



above employment, Rosenberg worked for various firms in the New York City area and for his father-in-law, Barnett Greenglass. He has reported that he worked for Barnett Greenglass from 1936 to 1938 as a part-time draftsman, machinist and junior engineer. Subsequent to his release from the Signal Corps Rosenberg has principally engaged in his own businesses under the trade names of the G and R Engineering Company and the Pitt Machine Products, Inc., 370 East Houston Street, New York City. He was also employed for some months in 1945 by the Emerson Radio and Phonograph Company, New York City. At the time of his arrest Rosenberg was residing at 10 Monroe Street, New York City.

#### ESPIONAGE

David Greenglass has stated that in 1944 his wife, Ethel, at the request of Julius Rosenberg, traveled to Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he, David, was then residing in connection with his employment at Los Alamos. Further, and also at Rosenberg's request, she asked David Greenglass to provide information concerning the atomic bomb. This, David Greenglass said, he agreed to do. Subsequently, in January, 1945, Greenglass, while on furlough in New York City, contacted Julius Rosenberg. On that occasion Rosenberg described to Greenglass the "naval type" bomb which was, Greenglass later learned, used at Hiroshima. Greenglass stated that he provided Rosenberg, during this meeting, with the names of personnel at Los Alamos whom he, David, believed were ideologically suited for recruitment to furnish information to the Russians.

In June, 1945, David Greenglass was contacted by Harry Gold in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Gold identified himself by his possession of a half of a Jello box top, the connecting piece of which was in Greenglass' possession. David Greenglass has stated that the box top originally came from Julius Rosenberg, and the latter cut it in half, gave one half to either him, David, or his wife Ruth, and retained the other half. Rosenberg told him that the person who would contact him for information would present the other half of the cover, which Gold did. Greenglass said he provided Gold with information concerning the Los Alamos project, the names of individuals working there, and a sketch of a high explosive lens mold, or something of that type.





In the Fall of 1945 Greenglass was in New York City on furlough, at which time he saw Julius Rosenberg. On this occasion he provided Rosenberg with considerable technical data concerning the construction of an atom bomb. He also believes that he gave Rosenberg some sketches having to do with a part of the bomb. Greenglass does not recall if Rosenberg looked at this information, nor does he know what disposition Rosenberg made of it. During this meeting Rosenberg requested Greenglass to remain at Los Alamos following his discharge from the Army, but Greenglass stated he refused.

David Greenglass was discharged from the Army on February 26, 1946, and from that time until September, 1949, was associated with Rosenberg in the G and R Engineering Company, and the Pitt Machine Products, Inc. Greenglass said that when Klaus Fuchs was arrested in England, Rosenberg told him, Greenglass, to leave the country but he refused. On the arrest of Harry Gold, Rosenberg pointed out to Greenglass that Gold was the person who contacted him in Albuquerque. Rosenberg told Greenglass that he must get out of the country. To this end he gave Greenglass five hundred dollars, which sum Greenglass said was not enough. Later, on May 28, 1950, Rosenberg gave Greenglass four thousand dollars in twenty-dollar bills. He told Greenglass to leave the country, taking his wife and children with him. He also provided Greenglass with certain instructions as to how he should travel. Rosenberg indicated to Greenglass that more important people than he, Greenglass, had already left the United States, and he, Rosenberg, intended leaving. Greenglass said that he indicated to Rosenberg that he would leave, but actually he and his wife planned to go to the mountains in New York State until Rosenberg left, and then return to New York City. Greenglass assumed that Rosenberg had been unable to effect his departure from the United States due to his being under surveillance by the FBI.

Ruth Greenglass has stated that Julius Rosenberg, prior to requesting her to approach her husband, David, for information, pointed out to her that he, Julius, and his wife Ethel, had discontinued their open affiliations with the Communist Party. Julius also told her that he always wanted to do more than merely be a Communist Party member, and that he had searched for two years to contact the "Russian underground" in order to do the work for which he felt he was "slated."

33. Armed Forces Security Agency, "Russian Cryptology During World War II," undated [ca. 1951] [Excerpt].

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By AT NARA Date 5-26-94

RUSSIAN CRYPTOLOGY DURING WORLD WAR II

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[48 Pages plus  
Appendix 3 Pages]

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RUSSIAN CRYPTOLOGY DURING WORLD WAR III. SOURCES OF INFORMATIONA. Captured German Documents

The information presented in this paper is based solely on a study of relevant documents issued by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA-14) in their TICOM Document Folder (DF) Series. The great majority of these documents are translations from the German of material pertaining to signals communications which the Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) was able to salvage as cryptologic targets in German and German occupied territories on the continent of Europe were overrun by the advancing Western Armies in 1945. In addition to the discoveries of important Axis cryptologic caches, the interrogations of Axis cryptologic experts and the treatises written by some of them in the postwar era concerning their wartime activities have added to the amount of valuable documentary material.

B. Home-Work of Former German Cryptologic Experts1. Importance of These Men

Of the treatises written in the postwar era, those written by the following cryptologic experts were found to be the most useful sources of information on Russian Cryptology:

Alex Dettmann, the former chief of the Russian Section of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the German Army High Command (OKH/Gd NA).

Kurt Friederichsohn, a linguist and cryptanalyst with the German Army Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA 6).

Adolf Paschke, the last head of the German Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers ZS).

Wilhelm Fenner, the former chief of cryptanalysis of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command German Armed Forces (OKW/Chi).

Wilhelm Flicke, formerly chief evaluator and the officially designated historian of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command German Armed Forces (OKW/Chi).

These men were key figures in the various German Signal Intelligence Agencies and there is no question but that they can speak with authority on the subject.

2. Reliability of Their Evidence

A general agreement regarding the details of many Russian systems is evident in these treatises. Only in a few instances may discrepancies be found. The information on the whole seems to be authentic and there is little reason to question the sincerity of these men. While these sources of information are often not as

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III. ORGANIZATION OF CRYPTOLOGY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

A. The Vastness of the Apparatus and the Consequent Need for a Communications System

Before presenting the few details that are known concerning the organization of Cryptology in the NKVD (Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs) it might be well to stress the importance of this organization in the political, military, and economic life of the Soviet Union.

The basic task of the NKVD was to assure the continuance of the political structure of the USSR. To carry out the necessary measures the NKVD had at its disposal various types of troops of its own - NKVD troops - which were assigned and employed according to need by the Central Office in Moscow (GUP NKVD, Central Administration of NKVD Troops).

From an evaluation of the results of traffic analysis and cryptanalysis on Russian traffic the Germans were able to establish the following categories of NKVD troops:

Troops of the Interior - The "Political Section NKVD" has an extensive network of agents to note any trend hostile to the Soviets. The actual combatting of any such movements is by contingents of these "Troops of the Interior." When there was an occupation of foreign territory during the war, the number of political sections increased materially with consequently a very great increase in the number of contingents of "Troops of the Interior" NKVD.

Escort Troops - The sending away of politically unreliable elements, surveillance, and control of concentration camps as well as the setting up of penal camps and penal battalions fall in the province of the "Escort Troops" NKVD.

Frontier Troops - Because of the special political structure of the USSR, it was necessary to provide for sealing the country hermetically from the outside world. This is the function of the "Frontier Troops" NKVD. Corresponding to their task, these troops have aircraft available and along the water boundaries, appropriate watercraft. Before the war these troops were deployed along the actual frontiers but with the outbreak of hostilities regiments of "Frontier Troops" NKVD were employed some 30 to 60 kilometers behind the combat units of RKKA (Red Worker and Peasant Army) to form an unbroken, very mobile, and deeply deployed security zone. NKVD forward staffs controlled the employment of these regiments; these staffs were located in the immediate vicinity of the forward staffs of the Army but received their orders from NKVD headquarters in Moscow. The task of this security zone was to prevent desertion and infiltration of enemy agents by sealing the sector of the front from the rear area; by mopping up pockets, and clearing areas near the front of cut-off enemy troops and bands; by removal or resettlement of the populace for political reasons; by return of population for repair or new construction of roads, defense installations, air fields, and plants of value to the military economy; by guarding supply; and by collecting and transporting prisoners to the rear.

Railway Troops - The entire economy of the Soviet Union, in particular the military economy and transportation system are under very sharp control and thus under the influence of the NKVD. Whereas before the war this control could be exercised through the local organs of the NKVD, after the outbreak of hostilities it became necessary to take over also the protection

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of the railroads along with their control and for this purpose especially trained troop contingents, "Railway Troops" NKVD were formed. They guarded transports, depots, bridges, junction points, and important as well as threatened stretches of railway track.

**Operative Troops** - In various phases of the war the need appeared for very daring and reliable units at danger points in the line or at points of concentration. Such elite troops were formed by the NKVD and assigned to divisions of the RKKA armies as "Operative Troops" NKVD.

In addition to the major tasks already outlined the NKVD was charged with the carrying out of the following supplemental tasks: (1) The political training of the RKKA by means of political units, political commissars, etc. (2) The training of a number of military specialists, such as sharpshooter units; selection and training of all replacements for medium and high-grade officers in the RKKA, and all technical signal personnel including those engaged in cryptographic work. (3) The conduct of training schools for dogs and carrier pigeons. (4) The combatting of espionage, sabotage and the activity of enemy agents. This work was done by the SMERSH (Death to Spies), an agency under the control of the NKGB (Peoples Commissariat for the Security of the State). (5) Direction of the activities of partisans and the training of agents for work behind the German front. (6) Mobilization and drafting of recruits for the RKKA. (7) Recruiting workers from among the people of occupied areas into labor battalions. (8) Integration of armies and units of foreign nationality into the framework of the RKKA.

With such a powerful organization having tentacles which reach into the furthestmost crevices of the political, military and economic life of the Soviet Union, it is obvious that the NKVD must also have possessed a far-flung communications complex and cryptographic systems of its own.

#### B. The Centralization of the Productions of Cryptographic Systems

It is said that the Central Office for the cryptographic service of the NKVD organs was located with the GUP NKVD (Central Administration of NKVD troops) in Moscow. Organization and functions of this section in the field of cryptology are not known. In contrast to the cryptographic systems of the Army and Air Force, no cryptographic systems of the NKVD were ever captured by the Germans while they were still in use. At various points on the front 4-figure NKVD codes did fall into the hands of German troops, but either they were then no longer in use or they represented reserve systems which, due to their capture, were not put into use. Consequently there was never the urgent need which brought about the decentralization already noted in the case of RKKA cryptography but instead the NKVD Cryptographic Central Office in Moscow was able to retain the method of centralization for the production, issue and recall of cryptographic material throughout the entire war. For this reason the Section of GUP NKVD corresponding to the 8th Section of the General Staff of the RKKA in Moscow was not obliged to make any radical change in the further development of cryptographic systems but allowed them to remain substantially unchanged from the time the Germans began systematic observation down to the day of capitulation. Therefore in spite of the great number of different NKVD organs there was only a very limited number of NKVD cryptographic systems in use and it was also true that these were valid for a relatively long time, often more than two years. Consequently there was the chance

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for the German cryptanalysts to do extensive work on great amounts of homogeneous material and to accomplish more with far less personnel against NKVD cryptographic systems than was the case with RKKA systems.

All internal radio circuits of the USSR were not only monitored and controlled by the NKVD but in many cases were directed by it and in all probability the GUP NKVD was also responsible in large measure for the issue of any cryptographic material which might be used for encipherment of such internal radio traffic. The Germans of necessity gave some attention to the interception and decryptment of this traffic. Among other things, special units were devoted to the reception of the Baudot traffic passed on many of these circuits by high-speed transmitters. It is reported that of the entire traffic monitored at great expense by the Germans, at best only 10% was useful for economic leaders while military-political matters constituted hardly 1%. From this traffic German evaluation results lay almost exclusively in the economic field.

C. The Decentralization of Production of Cryptographic Systems for use of Agents

The NKVD also had an important share in the preparation and issue of cryptographic materials for partisan organizations and for the agents and espionage service. In view of the initial multiplicity of partisan groups which operated independently and of the often very extensive employment of agents and spies in the enemy's rear, it was necessary to provide for current replacement of cryptographic systems, in which connection it was of primary importance that these should be convenient, simple to use, and yet secure. This responsibility could not be met by a single central unit, however large; therefore the individual partisan staffs, which for the most part were located in the immediate vicinity of army front staffs, were assigned the task of producing and distributing such cryptographic systems, although all of them were subject to the guidance and control of the NKVD. Although the systems used in partisan, scout, and agent traffic, from the simplest to the most difficult, included some which were neither theoretically or practically capable of solution, it can be stated with good reason that in many respects much latitude was afforded the individual imagination and discretion. A norm, similar to that in the SUV systems of the RKKA, did not exist. The structure and use of cryptographic means had to be adapted here to the momentary needs of agents who often worked alone.

D. The High Sense of Responsibility of Personnel Handling Cryptographic Material

Considering the vastness of the NKVD apparatus and its consequent use of a complex communications system, one unique characteristic was noted by the Germans during the war. This is the high degree of training and the sense of responsibility of NKVD personnel which prevented any cryptographic systems of the NKVD which were still in use from falling into the hands of the Germans during the entire period of the war. This is indeed amazing since the Germans proved conclusively time and again throughout the course of the war that the complete destruction of all secret documents of a nation is a practical impossibility. According to the German account of their experiences in the Balkan Campaign, the Greek and Yugoslav Governments had obviously issued orders for the destruction of all secret documents, yet the amount of captured material was so enormous that it had to be shipped in barges up the Danube to Vienna and from there to Berlin in freight

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NEVER TO BE SEEN BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS.

cars and nearly two years elapsed before a systematic evaluation of these documents was finally concluded by the Central Evaluation Section in Berlin. But during the German advance into Russia, up to the siege of Stalingrad in 1942, the operational area of the Frontaufklarung (military intelligence in the operational area) comprised upwards of 3 million sq. kilometers of Russian soil and although many, many documents had been abandoned by the Russians in the battle and contrary to orders, over 3,000 comprising only the most important ones having then been registered at Walli III (the German center for tactical counterintelligence on the Eastern Front), still no live cryptographic material of the NKVD was found at this time or even during the entire period of the war. In this connection it might be mentioned that our own TICOM effort against the Germans which saw the first exploitation team dispatched in April 1945 was able to salvage approximately 4,000 separate German documents with a weight of about 5 tons and this does not include materials captured in the heat of battle and passed to military intelligence for immediate processing.


E. Lack of German Knowledge Regarding a Russian Organization for Cryptanalysis

Not a thing is known about the possible activities of an agency of the NKVD in the field of cryptanalysis. The subject has already been touched on above in the discussion of a similar function being exercised by the 8th Section of the General Staff of the RKKA. The conclusion is that the NKVD is active, whether in absolute control or merely maintaining its customary surveillance in a more subtle way, it matters little.

- 20 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUEDE



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUEDE

NEVER TO BE SEEN BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF CRYPTOLOGY IN OTHER AGENCIES:A. The External Communications

In the organization of cryptology in the Soviet agencies so far mentioned we have been concerned for the most part with strictly internal communications. When we come to an examination of the external communications of the USSR, at least three agencies are mentioned by the Germans as using cryptographic materials during this period. In the diplomatic field we have the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in the commercial field the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and in the communist-international field the Comintern as it was called at that time.

B. The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

No mention is found in these sources regarding the authority for the compilation, issue and recall of the cryptographic materials used by the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. But in view of what has already been elucidated with respect to the activities of the NKVD it seems probable that here too they exercise some sort of control. The use by this Commissariat of the one-time additive pad for re-encipherment of its code is exactly the means employed by the RKKA for the re-encipherment of its operational 5-figure Chiffrecode.

C. The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Trade

The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Trade also uses an additive pad system for re-encipherment of its communications. In fact each Commissariat has its own code book and the pad system is generally used for the re-encipherment of the external communications passing to or from the head offices in Moscow.

D. The Communist-International

Only in the cryptographic systems of the Comintern for its signal communications with the Communist parties in foreign countries is there an exception in the use of the additive pad, as such, -- here the most essential parts, the keys for the encipherment, are not outwardly to be recognized as cryptographic material, the necessary digit sequences being derived from a book text by means of a mnemonic key. This development corresponds to the introduction by the NKVD of similar systems in their agent organizations and in point of fact one of the functions of the Comintern is espionage, political, economic or military according to opportunity. While little is known regarding the chain-of-command for issue and usage of cryptographic materials in the foreign services of the USSR, the logical surmise is that the NKVD through some of its many organs exercised its usual surveillance.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SUEDE



34. No author [Washington Field Office, FBI], "William Wolf Weisband,"  
27 November 1953 [Excerpt].

film #6  
WFO 27 Nov 53  
121-13210

WFO 121-13210

ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

On October 6, 1953, JONES ORIN YORK was interviewed by SA WILLIAM L. BYRNE, JR. and SA FRANCIS D. COOLEY, at which time he submitted the following signed statement:

"Burbank California  
October 6, 1953

"I, JONES ORIN YORK, make the following voluntary statement to WILLIAM L. BYRNE, JR. and FRANCIS D. COOLEY, who are known to me to be Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I know I do not have to make any statement, have the right to consult an attorney before making a statement, and that my statement may be used against me in a court of law.

"I was born August 5, 1893, at Bushnell, Illinois, and attended school at Western Illinois Normal School until 1910. After spending approximately one year in Hagan, Nebraska, with my parents I came to Berkeley, California, arriving on December 11, 1911. I worked as a clerk, telephone switchboard installer, and for two automobile agencies. Since 1910 I have been interested in the aviation field; I learned to fly an airplane in 1919 and since that time I have been employed in occupations relating to the aircraft industry. I am presently self-employed as an aircraft engineer, consultant and fabricator of special aircraft apparatus at 2630 North Naomi Street, Burbank, California.

"In 1935 I was employed as an aeronautical engineer at Douglas Aircraft Corporation, El Segundo Division; at that time I met a group of Russians who were touring aircraft plants in the Los Angeles area as representatives of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. One of these Russians was STANISLAU SHUMOVSKI. He was identified to me as a technical representative from the Central Hydro-Aerodynamics Institute of Moscow, USSR.

"STANISLAU SHUMOVSKI indicated interest in an airplane engine I was designing and gave me \$200.00 as evidence of his interest in my work, with the idea that eventually I might develop something that the Russians would actually purchase. Later, in 1935 or 1936, SHUMOVSKI asked me to furnish him information from Douglas Aircraft Corporation, El Segundo Division, which I did and he furnished me various sums of money.

"About the first part of 1936 SHUMOVSKI introduced me to a man using the name of 'BROOKS' and I continued furnishing information and receiving money from 'BROOKS' until January, 1938, when 'BROOKS' arranged to put me in contact with a man named 'WERNER.' I continued to furnish material to 'WERNER' and receive money from him until about January, 1939. At that time I lost contact with 'WERNER' but in about February, 1940, he recontacted me and I agreed to continue to furnish information to the Soviets. 'WERNER' told me that a new contact had been arranged for me, and it was agreed that my new contact to identify himself would inquire regarding a violin which I owned. Also, 'WERNER' took a picture of SHIRLEY TEMPLE, tore it in half, and said my new contact, upon contacting me, would present the half which 'WERNER' was retaining in order to identify himself.

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ON 8/6/96

WFO 121-13210

"The next individual who contacted me and to whom I furnished information was known to me as 'BILL' and I understood his last name was VILLESBEND. I cannot recall when 'BILL' first contacted me, but I believe it was about two months after I moved into 1301 1/2 North Harper Avenue, Los Angeles, California. I don't know when I moved into that address, but do recall that I obtained a telephone very shortly after I rented the premises. 'BILL' came to my Harper Avenue address and produced the half of the picture of SHIRLEY TEMPLE that had been previously retained by WERNER. 'BILL' also told me he was supposed to tell me the birthdate of my mother, but I said this was unnecessary as I was satisfied he was my new contact.

"At this first meeting 'BILL' asked if I could obtain information, and I said that I could, but advised him that I needed a camera. 'BILL' said that he would furnish me money for this purpose. 'BILL' gave me about \$250.00 to purchase a camera, I believe at our second meeting, which occurred about a month after he first contacted me. I purchased a Contax No. 3 camera with an F1.5 Sonnar lens at 'The Dark Room,' a camera shop, located on Wilshire Boulevard, about two blocks west of La Brea Avenue, in Los Angeles for about \$250.00, paying a substantial down payment and the balance in monthly installments. I used this camera to photograph information on airplanes being produced at Northrop Aircraft Company, Hawthorne, California. In particular I remember photographing specifications of the P-61 airplane, also known as the 'Black Widow,' and delivering the film I had taken to 'BILL.'

"I also recall that 'BILL' gave me a list of material in which the Russians were interested. When he gave me this list, 'BILL' said that there was some hesitancy about furnishing me this list as it might reflect that the Russians lacked information on those subjects. I don't recall the items on the list, but it was very broad and included many matters on which I had no information and was unable to obtain information.

"I met with 'BILL' about ten times over a period of about one year and I believe that during this time he paid me approximately \$1,500.00; during these contacts, I turned over to 'BILL' airplane specifications, the details of which I cannot now recall. I am not certain that these documents were all classified as confidential data but am sure some of them were so classified. I never gave 'BILL' any actual documents but when I gave him the film I would prepare a summary of the information the film contained and any suggestions I had concerning the information. During the course of our meetings, 'BILL' came to my home three or four times, and recall on one occasion, I showed 'BILL' a copy of a poem I had written entitled, 'The Vandal's Doom,' which dealt with the German attack on Russia. 'BILL' stated he liked this poem very much and asked if he could make a copy of it. I agreed and the next time he came to my home he typed out a copy on my typewriter and indicated that his superior would like the theme of this poem, and that he would forward it to him.

"I recall meeting 'BILL' on one occasion at the Florentine Gardens in Hollywood, and on another occasion at a bar near the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Fairfax Avenue in Los Angeles. At one of my meetings with 'BILL' I recall

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"that he drank two scotch and sodas and I noticed that he was making some marks on the edge of a newspaper. 'BILL' explained that these marks were in Arabic and indicated the time of our next meeting. He said that anyone could take this newspaper and they would not know what these marks signified. 'BILL' also told me how to say some simple greeting phrases in Arabian such as 'Salaam Al'echiem,' meaning 'Peace Unto You,' and the reply, 'Alechiam Salaam.'

"In the early part of our contacts I received a telephone call from 'BILL.' The operator said the call was from Pendleton, and I presume she meant Pendleton, Oregon. 'BILL' said he would not be able to keep a scheduled meeting, and would contact me when he returned to Los Angeles.

"In the latter part of 1942 I met 'BILL' near the Garden of Allah on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles, and he told me he would no longer contact me, that my next contact might possibly be a woman, and that the new contact would inquire about my violin. It was arranged that I would meet my new contact at a status in Westlake Park in Los Angeles on a date I cannot now recall.

"During my meetings with 'BILL' no one else was ever present, and I never met any person with whom he was associated. I did ask 'BILL' about SHUMOVSKY and from what 'BILL' told me I gained the impression he was personally acquainted with SHUMOVSKY. I remember that 'BILL' told me SHUMOVSKY 'was fine,' and that he was 'not in this country.' I remember that 'BILL' was very much concerned over the suffering of the Russian people because of the war and mentioned the sacrifices being made by the Russians.

"I subsequently met my new contact whose name I cannot recall in accordance with instructions I had received from 'BILL' and continued furnishing information to this new contact until the latter part of 1943, when he told me the information he had been receiving from me was unsatisfactory and then did not appear for a scheduled meeting. I have had no further contact with Soviet representatives since that time.

"After the last contact with 'BILL' in the latter part of 1942, I did not see him again until August, 1950. At that time I was at the Federal Building, Los Angeles, having just testified before a Federal Grand Jury. I was standing on the front steps of the Federal Building and I observed 'BILL' walking along the sidewalk about 75 yards away. With me at this time were Special Agents THOMAS E. BRYANT and FRANCIS D. COOLEY and I pointed 'BILL' out to them.

"I have read the foregoing statement consisting six and one-quarter pages and it is the truth.

"/s/ JONES GRIN YORK

Witnessed:

s/ FRANCIS D. COOLEY Special Agent, FBI Los Angeles 10/6/53

s/ WILLIAM L. BYRNE, Special Agent, FBI, Los Angeles, Calif. 10-6-53."

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On August 16, 1950, SAs FRANCIS D. COOLEY and THOMAS E. BRYANT of the Los Angeles Office were standing on the steps of the Federal Building in Los Angeles, California, with JONES ORIN YORK. At that time, YORK pointed out the subject, who was then about seventy-five yards away as the individual he knew as BILL VILLESBENT and to whom he furnished information for transmission to the Soviets.

It is noted that YORK placed the date he first met the subject as approximately one month prior to the time he purchased a Contax Camera at "The Dark Room," a camera shop located on Wilshire Boulevard about two blocks west of La Brea Avenue in Los Angeles.

BENJAMIN HUBSCHMANN, owner of "The Dark Room," 5370 Wilshire Boulevard, advised that his records reflected that J. O. YORK, 1301 1/2 North Harper Avenue, Los Angeles, telephone number, Gladstone 8346, purchased a Contax Camera, number 86, and a Sonnar Fl.5 lens on October 15, 1941, for \$257.70. The down payment of \$157.70 was made at the time of purchase, and payments of \$50.00 each were made on January 7, 1942, and March 9, 1942. The lens number on this camera was 1826645 and the book number was B-50419. The records further reflect that on January 25, 1943, YORK purchased lens, Zeiss lens number 1065110, for \$133.90.

With regard to the estimate by YORK that he believes subject first contacted him about two months after he moved into 1301 1/2 North Harper Avenue in Los Angeles, California, it is observed that the application records for the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company for the years 1941 and 1942 have been destroyed; however, telephone directories for those years reflected that J. O. YORK was listed as residing at 1300 1/2 North Harper Avenue, telephone - Gladstone 8346, in directories dated from September, 1941, until June, 1942.

WEISBAND was interviewed by Washington Field Office agents on May 9, 1950 and May 13, 1950, and by Los Angeles agents on August 16, 1950. When interviewed, WEISBAND denied being implicated in Soviet espionage. He said that to the best of his knowledge, he had never been acquainted with anyone in the Communist Party nor did he know anyone who had been engaged in espionage. He denied ever having removed any documents or material from AFSA nor had he ever advised any unauthorized person any operations being carried on at AFSA. Subject declined to furnish a signed statement denying that he had been involved in espionage activities.

On July 1, 1953, a photograph of JONES ORIN YORK was exhibited to WEISBAND and he stated he recognized the photograph as being that of "YORK," an individual with whom he was acquainted, but he declined to answer any further questions concerning JONES ORIN YORK.

On July 1, 1953, WEISBAND also said he would not admit nor deny he had ever been involved in Soviet espionage activities.

Mrs. PATRICIA BAUMANN, formerly 1952 Marengo Avenue, South Pasadena, California, was interviewed by Los Angeles agents on May 12 and 13, 1950. Mrs. BAUMANN has recently been remarried and is now known as Mrs. ROBERT F. CALLICOTT,

35. Hoover to Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA, 23 May 1960 [Table of Contents and Appendixes not included].

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

May 23, 1960

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
VIA LIAISON

Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, USA  
White House Staff Secretary  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



Dear General:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a document entitled, "Expose of Soviet Espionage, May 1960," which we prepared in the FBI and copies of which have been furnished to the Vice President, the Attorney General, Under Secretary of State Dillon, and Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The material contained in this document is unclassified and was prepared for use by the State Department in case it desired to use any portion of it before the United Nations or for public release.

I thought that you might desire to have a copy of this in the event there is any portion which you consider should be called to the President's attention.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,

*J. Edgar Hoover*

Enclosure

Exposé of  
SOVIET ESPIONAGE  
May 1960



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
J. Edgar Hoover, Director

SOVIET-BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION:

Recent Soviet propaganda has denounced the United States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception which President Eisenhower might expect on his visit to Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on May 11, 1960, as wondering what would have been the reaction of the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the United States on the eve of his visit to this country.



The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, two Soviet espionage agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield, Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A. Kirilyuk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting to induce this American to furnish information regarding United States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a vital United States Government agency where he could obtain classified information for the Russians. While this meeting was taking place Kirilyuk and the American were under observation by Leonid A. Kovalev, another Soviet employee of the United Nations who was conducting a countersurveillance. Unknown to the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians.

Not only did these Russians stoop to spying, but they callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy in the most reprehensible manner -- the subversion of an American on American soil.

Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photographed the Russians, no publicity was given to this incident in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace.

And this is not an isolated incident - nor has the target always been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against this country, and through the years have procured a volume of information which would stagger the imagination. This information includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major

*U.S. cities and vital areas which have given the Russians the product of aerial reconnaissance just as surely as if Soviet planes had been sent over this country.*

2. ACQUISITION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:



*In a free country such things as aerial photographs are available to the public and can be purchased commercially. The Soviets have been fully aware of this and throughout the years have taken full advantage of this free information, collecting aerial photographs of many areas of the United States.*

*For example, during October, 1953, two Soviet officials visited Minneapolis where they purchased fifteen aerial photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In October and November, 1953, two Soviets traveled in Missouri and Texas and obtained aerial maps of Dallas, Tulsa, Fort Worth and the surrounding areas covering a Naval air station, an Army airfield, and an Air Force base. In April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased aerial photographs of five Long Island communities. Also, in April, 1954, a Soviet official purchased three aerial photographs of Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas. In May, 1954, three Soviets traveled to California where they ordered from a Los Angeles photography shop \$80 worth of aerial photographs covering the Los Angeles area.*

*However, they have not been content with acquisition of publicly available data. For example, on May 3, 1954, Leonid E. Pivnev, an assistant Soviet air attache stationed in Washington, who had previously traveled extensively throughout the United States and had obtained commercially available aerial photographs of various areas of this country, requested a Washington, D. C., photographer to rent an airplane to take photographs of New York City which were not commercially available. He specified the scale to be used and the altitude from which the photographs were to be taken. He offered \$700 for this activity. Obviously the photographs which he requested would depict vital port areas, industrial facilities, and military installations in the New York area.*

*For this brazen abuse of his diplomatic privileges Pivnev was declared persona non grata on May 29, 1954, and departed from this country on June 6, 1954.*

*But this did not stop the Soviets. They continued their systematic program of collecting aerial photographs of major cities and vital areas of the United States. On January 19, 1955, the State Department sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador placing restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of data*



by Soviet citizens in the United States. These restrictions were comparable to restrictions on American citizens in Russia and in part prohibited Soviet citizens from obtaining aerial photographs except where they "appear in or are appendices to newspapers, periodicals, technical journals, atlases and books commercially available to the general public."

Soviet reaction to the restrictions was typical of their philosophy. They began circumventing the restrictions by subverting Americans to purchase aerial photographs for them. One month after the restrictions became effective, Nikolai I. Trofimov, a Soviet official in Mexico, began negotiations for a resident of the west coast of the United States to obtain aerial photographs of 45 major United States cities. Nineteen of these cities are located near Strategic Air Command bases. The remaining 26 are all strategic cities in or near which are located air bases, naval bases, research or training stations, atomic energy installations or important industrial facilities.



During April, 1958, Vladimir D. Loginov, a Soviet employee of the United Nations used the same technique to obtain an aerial map of New York City. At 10 p.m. on April 26, 1958, Loginov secretly met an individual in a darkened parking lot at the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York, where this map was delivered to Loginov. Months later on November 15, 1958, this same parking lot was again utilized by the Soviets to obtain aerial photographs of Chicago, Illinois. On this occasion, the photographs were turned over to Kirill S. Doronkin, another Soviet employee of the United Nations. In this same operation, the Soviets attempted to obtain aerial photographs of Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and San Diego and San Francisco, California.

Circumvention of the restrictions also took the form of trickery and deceit. For example, on July 17, 1959, Viktor V. Fomin, assistant Soviet military attache and Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the Soviet Military Attache in Washington, D. C., obtained an aerial photograph of the Glasgow Air Force Base in Montana from the local Chamber of Commerce by posing as tourists without identifying themselves as Soviet officials. On July 24, 1959, they obtained an aerial photograph of Thermopolis, Wyoming, by bullying the clerk at the Chamber of Commerce in an arrogant and insistent manner, again posing as tourists. They were given the photograph in spite of the fact that such a photograph is not normally given to tourists.

Soviet activities did not stop there. At the present time, a Washington, D. C., photographer is under the instructions

of Petr Y. Ezhov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, to take flying lessons at Soviet expense. Ezhov has indicated that the Soviets will purchase a plane for the photographer's use after he obtains his pilot's license. That aerial reconnaissance is the Soviet objective, is amply proven by the fact that this photographer has been requested to obtain aerial photographs of the East Coast from Boston, Massachusetts, to Jacksonville, Florida. He has already been sent on reconnaissance trips throughout the southern states under Soviet instructions to photograph military installations with telephoto lenses. The information obtained on one of these reconnaissance trips including photographs of United States military bases was to be delivered on September 17, 1959, to Vladimir Glinka, an assistant Soviet naval attache who originally recruited the photographer. At 7 a.m. on that date, however, Glinka contacted the photographer by telephone and cancelled the appointment, explaining, "my boss is here." Premier Khrushchev on that morning was winding up his first visit to Washington on his tour of the United States. These photographs were subsequently delivered on October 2, 1959.

It is apparent from the examples cited that the Soviet Union reaps the benefits of aerial reconnaissance of the United States just as surely as if planes were sent over this country.

### 3. RECRUITMENT OF AMERICANS:

The acquisition of aerial photographs is only one phase of Soviet-bloc intelligence activity in the United States, but the manner in which it has been done illustrates two basic Soviet intelligence concepts; namely, to exploit the weaknesses of Americans whenever possible and to take full advantage of all the freedoms of our democratic society.

Following these concepts, the Soviets through the use of such devices as entrapment, blackmail, threats, and promises have exploited human frailty. The record is replete with examples of such exploitation of Americans throughout the years following the Russian Revolution in 1917. For example, Nicholas Dozenberg, a naturalized American, first became associated with the communist movement about 1920. In 1928 he was recruited into Soviet espionage activities with the approval of the Communist Party. He was recruited by one Alfred Tilton, who was an illegal agent of Soviet Military Intelligence, posing as a Canadian citizen and in possession of a Canadian passport. One of the early assignments given to Dozenberg was the sounding out of other Americans for later recruitment by Tilton. Dozenberg, after pleading guilty to violations of the passport laws, served a term in prison in 1940 and thereafter prior to his death cooperated with United States Government agencies.

Simon Rosenberg, another naturalized American of Polish background, during 1931 was sent to Russia by his employer. While there, he met representatives of a Soviet intelligence agency and under threats of reprisals to be taken against his sister who was then living in Russia, he agreed to work in behalf of the Russians upon his return to the United States. His principal assignment in this country was to obtain technical and industrial information. Rosenberg, who is now deceased, also cooperated with agencies of the Government, prior to his death, as have many other Americans who have been involved in Soviet intelligence activity.



Another example is the case of Hafis Salich, a naturalized American employed by the Office of Naval Intelligence in California who met Mikhail N. Gorin through a mutual acquaintance in 1937. Gorin was then the Pacific Coast manager of Intourist. By advancing Salich money, Gorin ultimately persuaded him to furnish Office of Naval Intelligence reports for which Gorin paid \$1700. Gorin and Salich were found guilty of espionage in 1939 and Salich was sentenced to four years imprisonment, which he served. Gorin appealed his conviction and sentence of six years to the Supreme Court of the United States which unanimously upheld the conviction in 1941; however, the trial judge suspended execution of the sentence and placed him on probation provided he would pay a \$10,000 fine and leave the United States, never to return.

The decade of 1950 - 1960 has been no exception. It began with the trial and conviction of Valentin Gubitchev, a Soviet employee of the United Nations who had obtained information from Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice. This conviction was soon followed by convictions of several Soviet agents in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg network in 1951; by the sentencing of Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger in 1953 after they pleaded guilty to espionage; by the guilty pleas of espionage by Jack and Myra Soble and Jacob Albam in 1957 and later in the same year the conviction of Colonel Rudolf Abel, a Soviet illegal agent in this country.

These prosecutions, although they clearly establish the nature of Soviet espionage activities against this country, involve only a part of the Soviet-bloc espionage attack which has included numerous Soviet attempts to penetrate United States Government agencies. For example, the prosecution of Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice in early 1950 was followed in October, 1950, by a Soviet assignment to Boris Morros, an American motion picture producer who was cooperating with the FBI, to revive his acquaintance with a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; to obtain compromising

information concerning this individual; and to carefully explore the possibility of placing a secretary in his office who could furnish information to the Russians. Morros previously in 1948 had been given the assignment to attempt to obtain information which could be used by the Russians in an effort to compromise United States General Clay in Germany.



Another example occurred during 1954 when Soviet intelligence officers in Germany approached an American Army officer stationed in Germany who was soon to be retired. They propositioned him to work for the Soviets after his return to the United States and set up a schedule for meetings in New York City. Pursuant to the arrangements, Maksim G. Martynov, counselor of the Soviet Representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, carried out a series of clandestine meetings in New York with a person whom he believed to be the Army officer. As a result of his indiscreet abuse of his status, Martynov was declared persona non grata on February 21, 1955.

Another example is that of Eugeny A. Zaostroutsev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy who was declared persona non grata on May 13, 1959, for attempting to subvert a State Department employee to obtain information from State Department files.

A more recent example has been previously cited involving the attempt by Vadim Kirilyuk, an employee of the United Nations, to penetrate a vital Government agency by instructing an American to obtain employment in that agency.

Soviet attempts to recruit Americans during this period have not been confined to attempts to infiltrate Government agencies. For example, in February, 1954, Igor A. Amosov, assistant Soviet naval attache, was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain information concerning radar and United States naval vessels from a businessman who had commercial dealings with the Russians and who was in a position to obtain such data.

In June, 1956, Ivan A. Bubchikov, an assistant Soviet military attache was declared persona non grata for attempting to obtain data regarding radar, guided missiles, jet fuels and atomic submarines from an American businessman who during World War II had extensive contacts with the Russians on both private and United States Government business. The Soviets attempted to exploit his World War II friendliness.

In August, 1956, Viktor I. Petrov, a Soviet translator at the United Nations, was released from his employment for recruiting an employee of an American aviation company to obtain classified data regarding United States aircraft.

*This activity has continued throughout the decade into 1960, as illustrated by the case previously cited where a Washington, D. C., photographer has been utilized for the purpose of photographing military installations.*

4. THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE OF THE SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIALS

*Only a few of the many examples of abuse of their diplomatic privileges by Soviet-bloc officials in the United States have been mentioned. In the more flagrant cases, the United States Government has asked the offending officials to leave this country. During the decade, 1950 - 1960, 19 Soviet officials have been asked to leave. Many more have been engaged in intelligence activities throughout the years.*

*The Soviet Union has maintained a large staff of officials in this country since its first recognition in 1933. These officials have been assigned to Soviet embassies, consulates, trade delegations, news media, the United Nations, and the Amtorg Trading Corporation. It is from these installations that the primary intelligence activities are directed against the United States. A former Soviet intelligence officer who defected from the Soviets has estimated that from 70% to 80% of the Soviet officials in the United States have some type of intelligence assignment. Other defectors have confirmed that a high per cent of the officials are intelligence agents. As of May 1, 1960, there were 328 Soviet officials stationed in this country. They were accompanied by 455 dependents, many of whom are also potential intelligence agents.*

*Nor is this the full strength of Soviet-bloc intelligence. As of May 1, 1960, there were 272 satellite officials stationed in the United States accompanied by 435 dependents. This almost doubles the potential of Soviet intelligence services. The satellite intelligence services have been developed according to the Soviet pattern, their personnel selected or approved by the Soviets and they are trained and guided by Soviet policies and procedures. Recent defectors from satellite intelligence services have advised that the Soviets have access to all data obtained by the satellites and, in fact, maintain an advisor system at headquarters level to make certain that the satellites operate consistent with Soviet interests.*

*This coordination is not limited to headquarters' levels. Beginning in November, 1958, the Soviet and satellite military, naval and air attaches stationed in the United States began a series of monthly meetings under the guidance of the Soviet military attache. During this*



initial meeting the satellite representatives were given specific target assignments for the collection of information desired by the Soviets and arrangements were made for the over-all correlation of their activities.

5. INDUSTRIAL SPYING AND CIRCUMVENTION OF REGULATIONS:

This large group of Soviet-bloc officials stationed in the United States has systematically over the years developed a most important part of the modern intelligence machine which was referred to by one Soviet official as the best industrial spying system in the world. Volumes could be written as to the techniques used and the ways and means developed by the Soviet bloc to obtain information regarding the industrial potential of the United States often with the use of subterfuge and deceit as well as deliberate circumvention of Customs regulations.

The following examples illustrate this activity:

In 1924 the Amtorg Trading Corporation was organized in New York for the purpose of acting as an importer and exporter on the North American continent for official trusts of the Soviet Union. Amtorg continued to operate during World War II, although in 1942 the Soviet Government created the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., to purchase war material. This Purchasing Commission was dissolved after the end of World War II, and its activities absorbed by Amtorg. Since its organization, Amtorg Trading Corporation has been staffed primarily by representatives of the Soviet Government who have official status. Former employees of Amtorg have advised that it was standard practice for Soviets attached to Amtorg to request permission for Soviet officials to visit industrial facilities throughout the country on the promise of orders to be forthcoming if the products were found satisfactory. In many instances the officials of the companies would later be advised by Amtorg that Moscow would have to approve the order. In instances where a contract was given to a particular company, Amtorg consistently demanded blueprints of the particular product and other data to which it was not



entitled by normal business practices. Amtorg officials also consistently insisted on a clause in the contract which would give Soviet inspectors the privilege of inspecting all of the merchandise before it was shipped to Russia.

Another device utilized by Amtorg officials was to gain the confidence of some employee in a plant which had a contract with the Russian Government and, through this employee, obtain blueprints which were copied in the Amtorg office and the copies forwarded to Russia. Amtorg officials would also advertise for employees who, when they appeared for an interview at the Amtorg office, would be instructed to bring proof of their ability in the form of blueprints of former projects. When the applicants for employment later showed up with the blueprints, the blueprints would be photographed and the photographs forwarded to Russia.



Amtorg has also followed a practice of preparing detailed catalogues concerning American industry. Congressman Mundt on January 29, 1947, described one of these catalogues as "a manual for bombing America." It was pointed out that the book contained detailed information including many photographs and maps of vital areas of the United States. In this connection Amtorg Trading Corporation during the 1940's prepared a monthly magazine called "American Engineering and Industry" and an annual guide called "Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry." This latter publication in 1946 was described as a three-volume, 5,000-page document.

In August, 1956, Milos Prochazka, a Czechoslovakian official assigned to the Commercial Office at the Czech Embassy, furnished to an American the specifications for the components of 2 steel mills to be purchased in the United States for the Czechs. He outlined a plan whereby the American would act as an exclusive agent to purchase these mills ostensibly for a private concern in a Western country. He would obtain estimates and if the estimates were approved, the Czechs would furnish the name of the purchasing company, a power of attorney and the necessary bank credit. Thereafter, the mills would be shipped to the Czech agent in the Western country and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia.

6. EXPLOITATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION:

It is no secret that one of the results of the freedom of our democratic society is the availability of voluminous information to members of the public merely for the asking. Some of the cases previously cited clearly indicate that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are aware of this fact and have taken full advantage of this democratic freedom; however, it remains for former Soviet-bloc intelligence officers to testify as to its real significance and importance to the Soviet-bloc intelligence services. One defector has stated that the ease with which information is obtained in this country has resulted in a reduction of the hazardous and time-consuming clandestine operations which would otherwise be necessary. Another has estimated that the Soviet Military Attache's office in the United States is able to legally obtain 95% of the material useful for its intelligence objectives. He stated that, in fact, 90% of an intelligence agent's time in any other country in the world would normally be consumed clandestinely obtaining information which is readily available in the United States through Government agencies or commercial publishing houses. He pointed out that Polish military intelligence obtains more technical data in the United States than from all the other countries in the world combined.



Although such information is collected in a number of ways, the following techniques in addition to those previously mentioned have been most productive.

One of the most useful techniques is attendance at conventions of American organizations by Soviet-bloc officials. During the year preceding Khrushchev's visit to this country, Soviet officials alone attended approximately 30 conventions covering various fields of endeavor including aeronautics, electronics, plastics development, education and others. Typical were the activities of 2 Soviets who attended the Western Electric convention held in Los Angeles during August, 1959. As usual, at the inception, they began to collect voluminous literature. When the volume became unwieldy one Soviet left the material at a check stand and resumed his collection activities. It was estimated that the literature picked up by these Soviets at this one convention weighed approximately 250 pounds.



Another technique utilized is correspondence with chambers of commerce and industrial facilities throughout the United States through which voluminous information regarding transportation systems, major industries, etc., is obtained. In many instances useful maps of the areas are also secured.

Still another technique is the subscription to American publications and collection and review of United States Government documents. For example, during June, 1959, it was ascertained that the personnel of the Soviet Military, Naval and Air Attache Offices subscribed to 44 newspapers and 58 magazines of a technical, scientific, military and general news nature. It is apparent that the Soviets have a definite program of subscribing to newspapers published at or in the vicinity of vital United States military bases.

Purchases from the United States Government have long been a productive source for Soviet-bloc intelligence. For example, on December 28, 1944, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., ordered copies of 5,810 patents. On the same date the New York office of this Commission purchased two copies of 18,000 patents. On January 1, 1945, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington again ordered copies of 5,342 different patents. On January 12, 1945, copies of 41,812 patents were ordered. The next order was for 41,810. The acquisition of copies of patents has been continued throughout the years as illustrated by the fact that in early 1959 Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache, requested an American to instruct him in the use of the "Search Room" of the United States Patent Office so that he could locate patents in which he was interested.

The Soviets have, of course, not restricted themselves to the acquisition of patents. For example, on March 10, 1954, an Assistant Soviet Air Attache purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for the East and West Coasts of the United States from the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Department of Commerce. On March 12, 1954, a chauffeur of the Soviet Air Attache purchased "The Pilot's Handbook" for Canada and Alaska. Six days later an Assistant Soviet Attache ordered "The Pilot's Handbook" for the Far East and Europe. These handbooks contained

diagrams of all of the principal airfields and the approaches used in landing planes.

In April, 1954, Soviet officials stationed in Washington obtained from the Map Information Office of the U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, topographic maps covering North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Kentucky, and an area within a 50-mile radius of Washington, D. C.

This collection activity has continued unabated up to the present time. Literally thousands of similar documents are obtained in this country every year by Soviet-bloc officials assigned in this country and through registered agents such as the Four Continent Book Corporation and the Tass News Agency.

A statement of a satellite defector illustrates the value to the Soviet-bloc of United States Government publications. He stated that on one occasion, Polish military intelligence obtained an 18-volume edition prepared by the United States Army Engineers regarding United States port facilities. It was purchased from the Government Printing Office at nominal cost, but its estimated value to the Polish military intelligence was placed at \$50,000.



Not content with the large volume of publicly available material, Soviet-bloc officials have resorted to deceit. For example, on November 5, 1958, Ion Dubesteanu, an assistant military attache of the Rumanian Legation in Washington, D. C., was declared persona non grata for activity beyond the scope of his official duties. Using a false name and identity, Dubesteanu had corresponded with U. S. military installations soliciting material and had rented post office boxes at North Beach, Maryland, under assumed names to which such material was to be sent.

Reconnaissance trips by Soviet-bloc officials have been a most productive source of intelligence. The officials have been observed to carefully prepare for such trips by reviewing publications collected in this country, doing research at the Library of Congress, et cetera. Exclusive of trips from Washington, D. C., to New York City, officials of the Soviet Military Office alone took 16 trips

to various areas of the country in 1958 and 1959. They visited 26 states in 1958 and 37 in 1959. They covered most of the strategic areas of the country and covered some areas as many as four times. During these trips they followed a definite pattern of visiting chambers of commerce, driving around the perimeter of industrial facilities and wherever possible circled military, naval and air installations in the areas visited. They collected all available literature and maps relating to industrial facilities, transportation systems, power plants, dams, chemical factories, et cetera, and wherever possible took photographs in addition to making extensive notes.

7. PROPAGANDA AND PERSONAL APPEARANCES

Exploitation of our freedoms has also taken the form of propaganda. Not content with the distribution of over 20,000 copies of the illustrated monthly magazine, "USSR," which is in reciprocity for distribution of a similar American magazine in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy has a carefully planned program of distributing press releases. As of February, 1960, the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy was distributing press releases to almost 7,000 individuals and institutions in the United States, including newspaper editors, business leaders, radio stations, public libraries, television stations, teachers, labor leaders, scientists, and leaders in trade and commerce.

In addition, since January 1, 1959, 30 different officials attached to the Soviet Embassy have made, or were scheduled to make, 74 public appearances (not including 7 additional invitations for appearances by the Soviet Ambassador) before various groups in this country. Nineteen other Soviets attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, employed by the United Nations Secretariat or assigned to Intourist, made, or were scheduled to make, 39 public appearances during the same period.

These public appearances normally involved speeches or participation in forums on the part of the Soviet officials and were made before various types of groups, including high school, college, and university groups, parent-teacher associations, advertisement and civic clubs, fraternities, professional associations or clubs, religious and cultural groups, travel clubs and community centers. Some of these were television appearances. It is apparent that the Soviets are taking every opportunity to spread the gospel of communism by exploitation of the intense desire of Americans to learn more about the Soviet Union.



8. USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Attention is called to the fact that many of the incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated to the concept of fully exploiting the freedoms of the countries they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they would not prostitute the United Nations.

9. "ILLEGAL" OPERATIONS

Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in addition, operated a parallel clandestine espionage system known as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920's. Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making full use of secret communications channels and other clandestine techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic relations.

It is apparent that during the decade 1950-1960 the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that a special directorate was created in 1947 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told, while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has advised that as early as June, 1952, an order was sent to intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal" organizations which could function without interruption under any conditions.

That this policy was followed with respect to the United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 1956, a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from

Canada at Detroit using an authentic copy of a birth certificate previously issued to an American. Detected by the United States border screening process, she was refused entry. Less than a year later, Rudolf I. Abel, a colonel in the Soviet Committee of State Security, was arrested in New York City where he was posing as an American photographer under the name Emil R. Goldfus. Abel had entered the United States in 1948 using a passport issued to a naturalized American in 1947 to visit relatives behind the Iron Curtain and who never returned to this country. Abel was subsequently convicted of espionage and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, which sentence he is now serving.

It is interesting to note that in October, 1952, the Soviets sent Reino Hayhanen to the United States to act as Abel's assistant. Hayhanen, prior to leaving Russia, had been given instructions by Mikhail N. Svirin, a Soviet intelligence officer. After his arrival in this country, Svirin, who had become First Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, met with Hayhanen and subsequently, during the period 1952-1953, Hayhanen operated under his supervision. It was not until 1954 that Svirin gave instructions for Hayhanen to contact Abel and to act as Abel's assistant.

The case involving Abel and Hayhanen is a striking example of Soviet use of "illegal" agents against the United States. In dispatching such agents to this country, we can be certain that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services will, as they have with their representatives who are dispatched to this country as diplomats, take full advantage of the freedoms of this country which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

#### 10. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE

The United States has not been the only target of the Soviet-bloc intelligence organizations. Many other countries of the world have felt the barbs of the Soviet espionage attack. The disclosures of the Royal Commission in Canada which followed the 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet code clerk, revealed a Soviet espionage apparatus which on a broad scale had recruited and subverted Canadian citizens while seeking to infiltrate the Canadian Government and drain off its secrets. The admissions of Klaus Fuchs in 1950 that he betrayed the free world when, as a member of the British Atomic Energy Team, he passed atomic secrets to the Russians clearly indicate the Soviet designs on information in possession of the British Government. The flight of the British scientist Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in 1950 and the British diplomats Guy



Burgess and Donald MacLean in 1951 behind the Iron Curtain adds additional proof. The report of the Royal Commission of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1955 following the defection of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Soviet espionage agents assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Australia, disclosed an extensive Soviet espionage apparatus directed against Australia. Many similar examples could be cited to illustrate that Soviet espionage is international in character and the expulsion of two Soviet officials from Switzerland during the past month clearly indicates that Soviet espionage is currently international in character.

Practically every one of the cases cited above, although based in other countries, had ramifications in the United States. For example, information furnished to the Russians by Dr. Allan Nunn May, who was uncovered by Gouzenko, had been obtained when May visited a laboratory in Chicago in 1944. Klaus Fuchs worked on atomic energy in the United States from early 1944 through September, 1945, and supplied information to the Russians while in this country. The British diplomats Burgess and MacLean had been stationed in the United States prior to their disappearance behind the Iron Curtain. In spite of the use of third countries by the Soviet Union to commit espionage against the United States, Premier Khrushchev has made strong threats of reprisal against his neighboring countries which he assumes have been used as bases for United States aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.

#### 11. AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The world-wide espionage networks of the Soviet Union are an essential and integral part of the over-all communist plan to completely dominate the world. However, to understand the significance of the intelligence activity, it is necessary to examine the basic aims and principles of communism.

The highly authoritative "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" summarized the teachings of Marx and Engels on the question of force and violence. It stressed that Marx and Engels taught the impossibility of establishing a communist state by peaceful means, emphasizing that this could be achieved only through a proletarian revolution through which a dictatorship could be established and all resistance crushed. V. I. Lenin gave practical application to the teachings of Marx and Engels. Through the application of such principles the Bolsheviks seized power

in Russia in 1917 and under Lenin's guidance, established a dictatorship through which all resistance was systematically crushed. The success of the movement led Lenin to reiterate in later years that "The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution."



Joseph Stalin followed the Marxist-Leninist principles. The Communist Party in the United States, since it was organized in September, 1919, and throughout the years of Stalin's rule in Russia, was unalterably bound to Moscow. In the earlier years, Party leaders openly, boastfully and defiantly proclaimed their allegiance to and support of Soviet objectives. The nature of the Communist Party, USA, was exposed in 1949 and its leaders convicted in a court of law where the evidence laid out before the jury constituted irrefutable proof that the Communist Party, USA, advocated the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence. The policies and activities of the Communist Party, USA, have not changed to date. The current leaders of the Communist Party, like their predecessors, unflinchingly follow the lead of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Time and again, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has claimed that the Soviet Union does not and will not interfere in the affairs of other nations. Yet, in practically every country in the world to date the Soviet Union has established fifth columns in the form of Communist Parties which are under the complete domination and control of the Soviets and are sworn to uphold and aid the Soviet dream for world conquest. Through the directives it furnishes to these subversive forces, the Soviet Union clearly interferes with the political, social, and economic affairs of other nations on a continuing basis in the relentless drive toward world domination.

Today, the rallying cry of world communism is "peaceful coexistence." However, on May 5, 1960, Premier Khrushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paid tribute to V. I. Lenin and stated "The Soviet people are proud to know that the cause of our great leader and teacher lives and triumphs and that Lenin's dreams are being translated into reality by hundreds and millions of people--builders of socialism and communism--and that Lenin's cause is winning all upright men on earth." Referring to the triumph of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Khrushchev went on to reaffirm "Marxist-Leninist ideas" as the guide to the ultimate triumph of world communism.

*Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, demanding the use of force and violence, represent the guides for communism to achieve world conquest. The extensive espionage activities directed against the United States which, in the past, have utilized communists and communist sympathizers in this country as well as other individuals who could be subverted, can be better understood when regarded as essential tools in the relentless and fanatical drive of international communism to conquer the world.*

