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The Early Evolution of the Predator Drone

An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS

Reviews

Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board

World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence

Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il: Notes from His Former Mentor

Boei Chuzaikan to iu Ninmu: 38-dosen no Gunji Interijensu **[Duties of a Defense Attaché: Military Intelligence of the 38th Parallel]**

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David Robarge for his review of the book and movie on Project Azorian in *Studies* 56, No. 1 (March 2012)

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The Early Evolution of the Predator Drone

Frank Strickland

Editor's note: The author, as a senior officer of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology, was Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey's staff officer for the Predator project. Among his duties was the conduct of a detailed operational evaluation of the Predator's initial deployment. Woolsey served as the DCI from 5 February 1993 to 10 January 1995.

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> **"The history of one government project, the GNAT 750, and its rapid evolution into today's Predator UAV demonstrates that fiscal austerity can be an innovator's opportunity."**

Innovations in national security capabilities need not decrease during times when security needs collide with austere budgets, and government and industry leaders must continue promoting innovation even as budget cuts drive reductions in some capabilities.

The history of one government project, the GNAT 750 and its rapid evolution into today's Predator UAV —America's first operational long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or "drone"—demonstrates that fiscal austerity can be an innovator's opportunity. The opportunity, however, is only recognized and realized by teams of people with extraordinary combinations of leadership, commitments to missions, technical know-how, and bureaucratic savvy.

To examine these principles in practice, one need only look back to the most recent period of substantial cutbacks in national security spending, the early 1990s.[1] The historic image of freedom-loving Germans, making good on President's Reagan's injunction to "tear down this wall," was emblazoned in everyone's memory as the 1990s got underway.

US intelligence, essential to preserving the peace in the decades of Cold War, did not stand down when the Berlin Wall came down, however. In his now often-quoted observation at the time, DCI-designate R. James "Jim" Woolsey, summarized the situation during his confirmation hearings: "We have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."[2]

Woolsey correctly envisioned continued threats to the United States, her friends, and global security and

[1] See www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals for graphic overviews of the immediate post-Cold War budget situation.
[2] Douglas Jehl, "CIA Nominee Wary of Budget Cuts," NY Times, 3 February 1993.

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stability. Nevertheless, political leaders in the White House and Congress were eager for a peace dividend on the tremendous investments made in security during the Cold War.

The "snakes" stirred quickly. In 1990, the six regional republics and two autonomous provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—held together for decades by Tito's rule—began to unravel in a series of secessions beginning with Slovenia in December. Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia soon followed with their own secession referendums in which overwhelming majorities voted to separate from Yugoslavia.

The ensuing war between hostile ethnic and national groups in Bosnia resulted in at least 100,000 people killed, many of them civilians. Ethnic cleansing of entire towns created refugees, forcing perhaps as many as two million civilians from their homes.

When cities, towns, and villages experience war fought not only by uniformed soldiers but also by former neighbors dressed mostly in civilian garb, the result is a complex human terrain that adds to the inherent fog of war. During the war in Bosnia, the US government was challenged to sort out what actually was happening amidst the often conflicting claims of Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim authorities. US government leaders, starting with the president, demanded accurate information on the situation.

Gathering intelligence over Bosnia was complicated by its relative size, roughly equal to the state of West Virginia, mountainous terrain, and heavy cloud cover, especially in the winter months. The most precious intelligence capability needed in Bosnia, however, was the ability to hold specific areas under surveillance for extended periods of time. Continuing coverage was needed of such areas as the safe enclaves created to separate combatants and potential sources of hostile artillery fire.

US satellite reconnaissance capabilities were limited to coverage of only a few minutes each day. Understanding events on the ground required a surveillance capability that could linger or "dwell" over areas of concern for hours. The United States had no such capability and thus the answers to key intelligence questions about Serbian atrocities and military operations would contain a high degree of uncertainty and conflicting information, especially early in the war.

Enter DCI Woolsey

Jim Woolsey was sworn in as DCI a year into the war, but he came with substantial experience in intelligence capabilities, and he was aware of the potential of UAVs. Woolsey's experience in intelligence actually began in the late 1960s when Dr. Alain Enthoven, assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis in the Johnson administration, recruited Woolsey to the secretary of defense staff as an intelligence systems analyst.

As a Yale law student, Woolsey had written an article on systems analysis and program budgeting. Twenty years later he led a panel for DCI Robert Gates analyzing the future of overhead reconnaissance. During the panel's work, several intelligence experts supporting the panel further immersed Woolsey in the capabilities and limitations of reconnaissance satellites and UAVs. Taking his station at CIA, Woolsey knew right off the bat that the United States needed a long endurance UAV over Bosnia, an unmanned aircraft that could loiter over the country with a video camera for hours at a time. Like many innovations, the path to operational success was anything but linear.

The innovation arm of the Department of Defense, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) actually had begun research on endurance UAVs in the 1980s in work that would make Woolsey's vision possible a decade later. DARPA contracted a company founded by legendary aeronautical engineer, Abraham "Abe" Karem, to build several copies of a prototype long endurance UAV. Karem's company would successfully demonstrate that an endurance UAV known as "Amber" could stay aloft for more than 30 hours. Ironically, the company then went bankrupt, and Amber failed to take root in any of the Defense Department's (DoDs) big acquisition programs—a fate faced by many, if not most, disruptive innovations. DoD cancelled Amber, and Karem liquidated his company, selling the Amber to a California defense contractor, General Atomics.

In yet another of the many twists and turns leading to the GNAT's breakthrough, Karem's initial relationship with Woolsey had nothing to do with UAVs but with MX missile basing. While working on a US committee examining options for MX basing, Woolsey heard Karem and a team from Boeing present an idea for a long endurance MX missile carrier that could efficiently loiter over the ocean for long periods of time. Woolsey was surprised by the vehicle's range and payload, but he was even more impressed with Karem's blend of creative engineer-

ing and technical depth. Their relationship would be a spark for the GNAT's success over a decade later.

Apart from his relationship with Karem, Woolsey had first seen video surveillance from a UAV during a trip to Israel's Galilee region in the early 1980s. An Israel Defense Force (IDF) senior officer showed Woolsey a dirt airstrip in the hills of Galilee from which an IDF Air Force unit was flying UAVs collecting video imagery over southern Lebanon. Woolsey knew that US military forces had used a number of drones in prior wars. These drones were primarily designed to fly into an airspace as a decoy or bomb without returning to their launch base.

Former DCI Richard Helms had a tongue in cheek characterization of these missions which he offered to the Woolsey panel: "We flew a lot of drones into China during World War II. I wondered if they all landed in the same pile." The video surveillance and associated operations conducted by the IDF Air Force was fascinating to Woolsey: "I had never seen anything like that before.…I was really taken by their operations and became a big UAV fan."

Woolsey first suggested the use of endurance UAV technology in 1989, when he was the US ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). It was a suggestion that, he told me, led to some good-natured mockery from his staff. Like the requirements for surveillance over Bosnia, the CFE treaty required monitoring of cantonment areas, ensuring that the movement of conventional military forces adhered to the CFE treaty parameters. This required surveillance of areas over long periods of time to monitor hundreds of thousands of pieces of military equipment.

Woolsey thought endurance UAVs were a perfect solution to CFE treaty monitoring. Other parties objected, citing the potential for crashes and other issues. The staff would come to quip, "Whatever the problem, Woolsey thinks a UAV is the solution." The potential benefits of an endurance UAV were certainly rooted in Woolsey's mind.

As DCI, Woolsey was immediately confronted with intelligence gaps on the Bosnia War and, right after taking the oath of office on a Saturday, summoned several people to a meeting in his office. The inability of satellites to persistently stare at Bosnian safe enclaves was not surprising to Woolsey, given his background. Thus, he was convinced that the time for an endurance UAV to prove itself as an intelligence collection platform over Bosnia had arrived.

The Contribution of Abe Karem

For every leader willing to champion innovation, there must be a genius with enough technical know-how and grim determination to deliver results. Abe Karem emigrated to the United States from Israel because he thought the United States would offer a better environment in which to start an airplane company. Karem, an aeronautical genius and hands-on engineer, built the forerunner to Amber in his garage in California.

Karem knew that at the time endurance was the primary limitation of UAVs. He was determined to increase it to tens if not hundreds of hours. While Karem's company and the Amber program may have appeared as failures to some in the late 1980s, Karem had built and sold several working endurance UAVs, later to be known as the GNAT 750, to General Atomics. Hardly failures, these endurance UAVs provided the necessary UAV platform to enable Woolsey's vision to become a reality.

While the GNAT program had a powerful champion in the DCI's chair, successful innovation is rarely driven just from the top. The tributaries leading to the GNAT's success also began inside the CIA, years prior to Woolsey's arrival. For years Agency operators had been experimenting on the technologies and operations concepts that would enable the GNAT system to take flight. With Amber, Karem had built a UAV that could successfully take off, stay aloft for many hours, and safely land.

To be effective as a persistent surveillance platform, however, the UAV also had to be able to receive instructions and deliver its data from places far from its ground control site, hundreds if not thousands of kilometers away. To accomplish this, the UAV needed some type of relay to extend its range beyond the line of sight of its ground station.

Agency engineers and operators envisioned, and went to work on, this need for a relay—completely unrelated to Karem's work on Amber. While establishment of a relay seems straightforward with today's technologies, the software required to safely fly the UAV through a relay, and maintain this relationship among ground station, relay, and UAV, was hardly trivial in the 1980's. Agency employees were working on a cutting edge operations concept using unmanned and manned aircraft for testing, often with risk to the lives of the test pilots.

Ambassador Henry "Hank" Crumpton, former CIA officer and counterterrorism adviser to the secretary of state, once noted that oper-

ational breakthroughs often require people to accomplish heroic feats. Testing the CIA's relay concept required some heroism to persevere through the occasional aircraft crashes, software bugs, and aircraft malfunctions.

The heroes on this team of air operators included a heroine, Jane, a young, talented, multiengine-rated pilot and engineer whose humble demeanor belied her bravery in the cockpit and her determination to see the relay concept succeed. Through relay experimentation, Jane became a believer in the endurance UAV concept of operation. As someone who was hands-on in both the engineering of the system and operating from the cockpit, Jane represented the technical and operational know-how required to achieve success.

Jane and a team of operators and engineers had conducted a survey of industry, seeking new capabilities for the relay concept. Many of the components of the system they were working with were aging and, like many experimental systems, were one of a kind. The team recognized the need to replace these components to continue developing, testing, and proving the relay concept of operation.

With all of its technical and operational know-how, the team happened on a happy coincidence. Jane and her team discovered the Amber vehicles during their market survey. After some investigation with General Atomics, the team defined a more mature concept featuring Amber, or the "GNAT" as it had by then come to be known. The GNAT vehicle provided a much more reliable air vehicle for long endurance missions. The relay concept, and many of its components, enabled the GNAT to fly surveillance missions at extended ranges. Unbeknownst to Woolsey when he arrived at CIA, the pieces had already fallen into place inside CIA to make his UAV idea a reality. However, cultural and bureaucratic obstacles almost prevented Woolsey from learning about Jane and the team's work.

Jane and an Act of Courage

To succeed, innovations in big organizations must overcome not only technical and operational challenges, but cultural and bureaucratic barriers as well. CIA's culture is an interesting paradox of risk-taking and risk-aversion. From its origins in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and on to today, thousands of operators have risked their lives in intelligence operations, and many have lost their lives in the line of duty. At the same time the politics surrounding national security and clandestine operations work to sow risk-aversion in CIA. Moreover, bureaucratic forces operate in the agency as they do in any large public or private enterprise. Risk aversion as well as cultural and bureaucratic forces would come into play as the GNAT moved from concept to operations.

To get GNAT off the ground, Jane had to act courageously to overcome the objections of managers who were dead set against the GNAT concept. It may be difficult to imagine, given the hundreds of Predators and other UAVs flying today, but during this period Jane and her team were suggesting a radically new order of things. There were a number of skeptics and others in opposition.

The fiercest opponent was Jane's own immediate manager. While a clandestine intelligence organization does not operate like a military command, there is a formal hierarchy and bureaucratic consequences for those who go against the grain. Fortunately, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) Ted Price had become aware of Jane's concept and kept it in mind as a new initiative to present to Woolsey upon his taking office at CIA.

Shortly after Woolsey's arrival, Price's office summoned Jane to join the DDO in presenting the extended range UAV concept to Woolsey. This was pretty heady stuff for a CIA officer, but especially so given the open hostility of Jane's manager toward the concept. Price pressed ahead, possibly unaware of the friction within his own ranks, and had Jane brief Woolsey on the concept. Within a few minutes of the briefing, Woolsey leaned forward and exclaimed, "Hey, that is Abe's design," referring to a picture of the GNAT vehicle. Woolsey was excited about the potential to create an operational UAV demonstration in the near term.

Knowing that DoD had an active formal program for developing UAVs, Woolsey reached out to the DoD's UAV Joint Program Office to propose meeting the requirement. After a couple of weeks, representatives of the office came to CIA and offered their response to Woolsey and CIA officers. The office proposed an effort that would require more than a year of development and cost at least $100 million. DoD sometimes has the agility of a DARPA, but at other times it has the inertia one expects from a behemoth. Woolsey—never regarded as unwilling to act when immediate action was required—had a sense of urgency driven by the Bosnia crisis, against which the DoD proposal was deflating.

As the meeting ended and attendees drifted out of Woolsey's office. Jane, who had been a backbencher with no speaking role, lingered. The opportunity to demonstrate her courage was at hand. Woolsey had retreated to his desk as others filed out of his office. Jane approached his desk and said, "Sir, we can deploy the concept I showed you in well under a year." Woolsey asked a couple of questions about schedule and cost, then thanked Jane for the information.

Woolsey had his staff check out Jane's assertion. He also called Abe Karem to ask what had happened to Amber. The information Woolsey received gave him confidence that Jane's team could in fact deploy its system to Bosnia within a few months. Within available funding and authorities, Woolsey directed the CIA's operators to begin work while his staff began informing congressional oversight committees on the project. Woolsey was soon on the phone with one of the General Atomics cofounders, Linden Blue.

Known in some circles as the "Blues Brothers," Linden and his brother Neal had purchased General Atomics from Chevron. They had the foresight to subsequently purchase Karem's Amber UAVs. Linden—a Yale alum as was Woolsey, albeit one who had graduated 10 years later—was a private pilot of some fame. In 1961 Linden was forced to make an emergency landing in Cuba, just before the Bay of Pigs invasion. The accident resulted in a 12-day stay in a Havana jail. Despite this close encounter with a national security issue, Linden was not expecting a call from the director of CIA. He thought Woolsey was someone playing a phone gag. The two men sorted out the misperception, and a straightforward contract was soon closed to fly an endurance UAV over Bosnia.

General Atomics brought Karem in as the expert adviser on the project. Karem was elated: "I finally have the operator as my customer." Karem, Jane, and the entire government-industry team formed the kind of strong partnership essential to moving an innovative concept into operations. Karem would regularly force Jane to think with questions like, "How are we going to fail?" That question would soon prove prophetic.

The team was working feverishly not just to insert the GNAT into the relay concept of operation, but also to further develop the GNAT into a system for long-endurance surveillance operations. Much of this maturation required software enhancements to components such as the GNAT's flight computer. The General Atomics team was making these software enhancements and many other changes to the hardware, while simultaneously test flying the system. Thus, on a clear sunny day one of the two GNATs procured for the operation inexplicably crashed in the California desert (see below). A gloom immediately fell over the team and some critics were visibly pleased.

A meeting was scheduled with Woolsey to review the situation. Jane's risk averse management seized the opportunity to recommend slowing down the deployment. Woolsey was undeterred, however, and reflected Karem's summary of the situation: "No need to notify next of kin for this crash." The team quickly determined that the flight computer software was the root cause of the accident. The technical leaders at General Atomics put tighter configuration control and test procedures into place but did not slow down the pace of development required for a near-term deployment. The CIA and General Atomics reached another agreement on a second aircraft, and the project was back in business.

The ingredients were falling into place—a pressing mission need for information; committed leadership at the top and within the ranks; technical and operational expertise; and a lean government-industry partnership with the desire and resources to get the job done quickly. A CIA and Gen-

eral Atomics team were called on to rapidly implement, test, and secretly deploy the concept of using unmanned and manned aircraft to collect and relay imagery. The DCI, his senior operations officer, and the DCI's staff understood the imperative and employed bureaucratic savvy to make it happen. Within months it was clear that the recipe worked as the United States had real time information that provided greater clarity for the peacekeeping operations.

Watching real-time video from his headquarters in Washington, Woolsey was elated by the program's responsiveness and operational performance in Bosnia. The CIA operators had negotiated rights to operate from a remote airfield for what amounted to a truckload of supplies. Officers deployed with everything required fitting into a single C-130 flight.

An endurance UAV, developed and deployed in roughly six months, was flying over Bosnia providing motion imagery of events on the ground. From his office at Langley, Woolsey watched foot traffic over a bridge in Mostar and communicated with the ground station through an early form of chat software. Woolsey realized that it would not take long before military analysts, operators, and commanders would be able to command motion imagery feeds, such as this one, on targets of interest.

The operational demonstration was accompanied by a partnership with DoD to transition the GNAT to the Defense UAV program office. The Joint Staff J-2, RAdm. Michael Cramer, assigned a UAV expert from his staff, CDR Steve Jayjock, to ensure a close partnership between CIA and DoD. Decades before the GNAT, another major aviation innovation, the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, went through a similar transition. General Curtis LeMay, Commander of the Air Force's Strategic Air Command, remarked on the U-2 development, "We'll let them build it, then we'll take it away from them." While inter-organizational partnerships are rarely devoid of parochialism, especially over a hot new capability, this UAV partnership proceeded more or less smoothly. The operational and technical lessons learned, along with the technology and a mature industrial base, were transitioned to DoD.

The DoD UAV program office, having previously proposed a lengthy and costly demonstration, suddenly was positioned to move quickly on the GNAT's success. An Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) was awarded to General Atomics. The General Atomics team went to work on what would become the Predator UAV system. In just six months, the GNAT's fuselage and wings were extended, and a new engine was installed.

The General Atomics team also achieved another historic first for UAV flight, the use of a satellite communications link between the ground station and UAV. The new UAV would have substantially greater range and payload. This new capability needed a new name. The General Atomics team held a competition among the engineers, and the winner was Predator.

While the initial GNAT deployment produced modest intelligence value, years later the Predator would prove essential in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is fair to say that the Predator's operational successes, and much of DoD's dependence on UAVs for intelligence today, are outgrowths of the GNAT's success over Bosnia.

In Sum

In the face of today's fiscal situation and inevitable budget cuts, many will naturally conclude that fiscal austerity will depress innovations in national security capabilities. The nation's breakthrough in long endurance UAV operations proves that this need not be the case. On the contrary, the GNAT program clearly demonstrated that innovation of historic impact can emerge from austere times such as these.

The global security environment remains highly volatile in many regions and countries. The missions of intelligence, understanding this changing world, warning of impending crises, and supporting a range of security actions are as important as ever. Americans rightly yearn for peace, but history teaches us that we must remain prepared for conflict.

In times of great mission needs and fiscal austerity, innovators can come to the fore through leadership, mission commitment, technical and operational know how, and bureaucratic savvy. The historic innovation that is the UAV is ultimately a story about the power of three leaders working together to bring an idea into operational reality. Asked once whether he was the father of the Predator, Woolsey replied, "No. Karem was the father; Jane the mother; I was simply the *shadchen*."

An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS

Randy Burkett

> ***Today's* [agent] *recruiters must learn and use the significant breakthroughs in understanding of human motivations and the means for influencing them that have occurred since the early 1980s.***

Ask any CIA National Clandestine Service officer what his or her mission is and the likely reply will be "to recruit spies to steal secrets and conduct covert action." This mission has been relatively unchanged since the founding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) on 13 June 1942. What has changed is the profile of the people we ask to become agents to steal the secrets and engage in covert action. In this article I will discuss how we trained OSS and CIA officers to find and recruit the people who became our agents.

The story starts with World War II, when OSS officers were largely focused on appealing to the patriotism of people to resist foreign occupiers. There was no overall strategy for finding the right agents other than linking up with local activists and appealing to their national pride. The paper then moves to the Cold War when the focus for recruitment shifted to state actors who had the placement and access to betray the secrets of the communist governments in power. During the Cold War period and today, agents who agreed to spy are said to do so for reasons that imply weakness or vulnerability: money, ideology, blackmail, or ego. These factors are captured in the mnemonic MICE. It is a framework that I believe has outlived its usefulness. Today's recruiters of agents abroad often pursue non-state actors with complex mixtures of competing loyalties, including family, tribe, religion, ethnicity, and nationalism.

I argue that today's recruiters must learn and use the significant breakthroughs in understanding of human motivations and the means for influencing people that have occurred since the early 1980s. In particular, I will discuss the work of Dr. Robert Cialdini and how his six influence factors, reciprocation, authority, scarcity, commitment (and consistency), liking, and social proof—RASCLS—could be applied to motivate potential agents to agree to spy and to improve the productivity of existing agents.

However, before I look at how we have trained officers to recruit in the past and how we should recruit in the future, I think we should first examine what we are asking people to do when they become spies.

Is Spying Rational in the Face of the Risks?

On the surface, committing espionage appears to be less than rational. Agents risk death, either at the hands of an enemy or by their own legal systems. Even some countries that do not impose the death penalty

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Despite the contributions of OSS psychologists and psychiatrists, there was much more art than science in training OSS officers to recruit and handle agents.

for criminal acts make exceptions for spies.

Spies risk lengthy imprisonment if caught. Even in peacetime settings, if not imprisoned, exposed spies will almost certainly lose whatever job they had, their reputations, and possibly their families and friends. Given these risks, why would a rational person agree to become an agent for a foreign power? Why endure the fear of compromise, make the effort to collect and deliver secrets, and live a double life for years on end when the rewards for your work cannot be openly enjoyed without risking being caught and punished?

Arguably, this question was more easily answered during WW II and the Cold War, when enemies were encountered daily and relatively easily identified. Espionage represented opportunities to strike back. However, even in wartime, it is easier for individuals to sit back, let others take the risks, and hope their work will result in victory and rewards for everyone.

Overcoming this "free rider dilemma" may have been easier for the OSS officer working in occupied countries, particularly as the war appeared to turn against the Axis powers and peer pressure increased on citizens of occupied countries to prove they played some part in resistance movements and were not collaborators. In both war and peace, the potential agent had to come to the conclusion that the potential benefits of agreeing to spy were greater than the potential costs of inaction.[1]

The need to address and minimize risks while maximizing benefits is at the heart of successful agent recruitment. From the beginning, OSS professionals recognized that art and science was involved in recruiting agents for paramilitary and clandestine intelligence missions. The same was true in the training of the OSS officers who would acquire and handle agents.[2] Psychologists in the still developing field of "operational psychology" were integral to selecting OSS officers and teaching them to recruit foreign agents in the field.[3]

Agent Recruitment Training in the OSS

Despite the contributions of the operational psychologists, there was still more art than science in the training OSS officers received in the recruitment and handling of agents.

While most histories of the OSS tend to focus on its paramilitary activities under the Special Operations (SO) branch, the lesser known Secret Intelligence (SI) branch was also a core part of the OSS from the start. The SI branch opened its formal training school in May 1942, when OSS was still the Office of the Coordinator of Information. While SO students focused on learning basic commando skills, leading resistance groups, and penetrating defense plants to collect information, SI students concentrated on less direct measures—agent recruitment, handling, and communications. However, both the SO and SI branches included elements of the others' training.[4]

A review of the syllabi for the Preliminary Training School, the Advanced Training School, and the SI Specialist School of the OSS shows agent recruitment and handling was not discussed at all in the Preliminary Training School. Only two of the 50 blocks of instruction in the Advanced Training School were focused on this subject. SI officers received one additional block of instruction on "rating of sources" in the 10 classes that made up their "Specialist School."[5]

Despite the relatively short time spent on these subjects, OSS offi-

[1] Overcoming the "free rider dilemma" is the reason CIA case officers are taught to "put the benefits up front" in their recruitment pitches, though it is unlikely that more than a handful could justify this approach beyond saying, "That is how I was taught."

[2] The word "agent" was often used in the OSS to refer both to OSS officers and the people they recruited, which can often be confusing. I will only use the word to refer to the person being recruited to obtain secrets or carry out covert activities. I will refer to the person recruiting the agent as either "officer" or "case officer."

[3] For a full account of this process in the early days of the OSS, see OSS Schools and Training Branch, *Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services*, available in GoogleBooks.

[4] For details of OSS training see John Whiteclay Chambers II, "Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II," *Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 2* (June 2010), available on www.cia.gov.

[5] SO Training Syllabus No. 42, approved by OSS Director Colonel Donovan, 30 August 1942. Accessed on CIA FOIA website, June 2012.

cers were instructed that "Recruiting is a very vital operation and requires firstly—good information. Secondly—successful and careful planning."[6] OSS recruiters were instructed to approach recruiting agents along the lines shown below.

This list of suggestions, starting with "survey the pool of potential agents and put quality first" and ending with "Do Not Try to Buy People," constituted the foundation of agent recruitment tradecraft for the OSS officer. While some of the suggestions may sound familiar to current trainees, much of what would now be considered key first steps of the agent recruitment cycle were left to the imagination and creativity of the OSS officer.[7]

OSS Steps to Recruitment

- Survey the locality: state of local opinion, industry, and occupations.
- Consider the types of spies needed—insiders, specialists, cutouts, accommodation addresses, couriers, collectors of imported material, stores of material, headquarters, women.
  - Survey potential agents—It is from ranks of an informant service that first recruits are most likely to be drawn (emphasis added)—many of the remainder will be indicated by the same means.
  - Put quality first—a bad agent will jeopardize an organization. Get full information about a potential agent before approaching him e.g. interests, weaknesses, character, religion, politics, nationality, etc.
  - Approach to potential agents—Get to know your man.
    - Self-introduction
    - Introduction by mutual friend
    - Coming down to business—Change your line of appeal to suit the case, e.g. for a priest, based on religious grounds, etc.
    - Let any concrete suggestions come from him in the first stages.
    - Test reactions thoroughly before coming out into the open.
    - Sound by half-suggestions.
    - Leave yourself a way out in the event of refusal.
    - From the first give him an impression that we are part of a powerful and well organized body—prestige counts heavily.
- **DO NOT TRY TO BUY PEOPLE** (emphasis in original)

The Cold War Perspective

The warning at the end of this list, "Do Not Try to Buy People," marks a sharp distinction between WW II approaches and those of the Cold War, when the injunction lost much of its force. Today, when asked the question "Why do people spy?" the average case officer would respond with four words: "Money, Ideology, Compromise, and Ego"—MICE—and money would be the motive that most quickly comes to mind.

MICE: Money

On the surface, money, or what money can provide (such as security, education for children, a better living standard, or a ticket out of an undesirable environment), seems to be a rational reason to take on the risks of spying. Certainly a long list of individuals who have volunteered to provide intelligence to their country's enemies have cited the need for money as their reason. In a study of 104 Americans who spied and were caught between 1947 and 1989, the majority, indeed an increasing number over the years studies, reported that money was their sole or primary motivator.[8] For example, early Cold Warrior, GRU Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov, sold Soviet secrets to the Americans in Vienna in 1953 in order to maintain both a wife and a mistress. Starting during the Cold War and continuing after the Iron Curtain had fallen, CIA officer Aldrich Ames, arrested in 1994, sold American secrets to Moscow for an estimated $2.7 million.[9]

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[6] Ibid, 4–5.

[7] The agent recruitment cycle will be more fully discussed in the next section. For purposes of this paper it is the process of obtaining HUMINT agents to meet national intelligence needs. The six stages of the cycle are spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, handling/training, and turning over the agent to a new officer or terminating contact with the agent.

[8] Katherine L Herbig, *Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007*, Department of Defense Technical Report 08-05, March 2008. During the initial 32 years of the study, 47 percent of the spies then active claimed to be in it for the money. That percentage grew among those revealed between 1980 and 1989 to 74 percent.

To understand what factors were really at play, we will have to look beyond MICE.

Both men were caught and punished. Popov, who was probably paid a few thousand dollars over the course of his agent career, spent his money carefully and was most likely betrayed by the British spy, George Blake.[10] Ames helped reveal himself by spending his ill-gotten gains openly. As a GS-14 making less than $70,000 a year, Ames not only purchased a house for more than $500,000 in cash, he made the additional mistake of buying a $40,000 Jaguar he drove to work.[11]

Popov's career as an agent ended in 1958 with a bullet to the back of the head, and Ames' employment as an agent ended in 1994 with a life sentence. Looking at the monetary benefits alone, it would be hard to argue that the short-term rewards—five years of the good life in Popov's case and nine years for Ames—was worth the price each paid. However, as we will see, it is likely that money was *not* the only motivating factor in either of these cases. To understand what factors were really at play, we will have to look beyond MICE.

MICE: Ideology

More than the "venal" recruit who pursues money, an ideologically driven agent is seen as a much greater threat by counterintelligence (CI) officers. For CIA recruiters, agents who serve for reasons of belief are the only agents that most officers can truly respect. US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) senior analyst Ana Belen Montes admitted to spying for Cuba for more than 16 years and was paid no salary other than her DIA GS-15 wage.[12] GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, sometimes called "The Spy Who Saved the World" for his contributions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, spied for the CIA and British MI6 jointly between 1961 and 1963, with only the promise of being "taken care of" if he decided to leave the Soviet Union and settle in the West.[13]

One of the most amazing agents of all, MI6's Harold A. R. (Kim) Philby, who was considered a candidate to lead Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in the 1950s, spied for the Soviet Union without compensation from 1933 until he defected to the USSR in 1961.[14] All three agents said they spied for the same reason, ideology.

Clearly an agent committed to an ideology can be a powerful weapon. One wonders how agents like Montes and Philby could not only function year after year while immersed in a political system they opposed but actually thrive and be repeatedly promoted by the very people they were betraying.[15] Both Montes and Philby only ended their spying careers when exposed or about to be exposed. Montes was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long prison term. Philby defected to the USSR, where he lived as a Soviet citizen until his death in 1988. Was it just zealotry that drove individuals like Montes and Philby to live double lives for decades? Or were there other factors at work?

MICE: Coercion or Compromise

Coercion or compromise (blackmail) provide relatively easy-to-understand reasons agents take on the risks of espionage—as seen in countless movies and CI training films.[16] Both factors appear in many past spy cases. Compromise most often occurs when potential agents make mistakes and come to believe they must seek the assistance of a

[9] For good discussions of Pyotr Popov see John L. Hart's, "Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The Tribulations of Faith," *Intelligence and National Security* 12 (1977) or William Hood's, *Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA* (Norton and Company, 1982).
[10] Norman Palmer, *Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage* (Random House Reference, 1996), 446.
[11] Ibid, 22.
[12] See Steve Carmichael, *True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba's Master Spy* (US Naval Institute Press, 2007).
[13] Although Penkovsky was never able to enjoy his life in the West, his family was cared for, both through money banked for him and the proceeds of the commercial sale of a book based on his life. The CIA secretly arranged the publication of The Penkovsky Papers, presented as his "diary" and funneled the bulk of the profits to his family. See the CIA FOIA under "Penkovsky."
[14] An exhaustive study of both Kim Philby and his equally fascinating father can be found in Anthony Cave Brown's, *Treason in the Blood* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994).
[15] Montes received multiple awards for "exceptional analytic work" and was promoted to GS-15. Philby was repeatedly promoted, to the point that he came very close to becoming director of MI6.
[16] A large sample of such films is available on YouTube. One good example is "The Enemy Agent & You," a counterespionage film made by the Department of Defense in 1954 (DOD IS 7).

foreign intelligence agency to avoid punishment.

Compromise and coercion were clearly prime concerns of CI officials during the Cold War. Anyone with a security clearance was warned that any illegal or "deviant" behavior as defined in the day put a person at risk of being blackmailed into spying. Stories abound in both fiction and nonfiction of officials being coerced on account of their illicit sexual behavior, whether it was homosexuality or adultery resulting from being caught in the "honey traps" set by the infamous Soviet "sparrow squads."[17]

In addition to these sordid stories, CIA officers also knew that many of their brethren in the FBI and other US law enforcement agencies regularly coerced informants, often overlooking criminal offenses or working to mitigate consequences in exchange for cooperation.

People coerced into espionage rarely make ideal agents. While FBI and other law enforcement officials may be able to offer a choice between jail and cooperation, it is actively discouraged in CIA training. Coercion often creates agents who are angry, resentful, and only willing to do just enough to avoid whatever punishment may await them. This is not the type of agent a case officer wants to meet in a foreign country, where both may be violating local laws by their interaction and where agents have more opportunities to double cross or take violent action against a case officer.

People coerced into espionage rarely make ideal agents.

MICE: Ego or Excitement

The final letter in MICE can stand for "Ego" or "Excitement." Of the two, ego satisfaction appears to be the more prevalent driver. Spy fiction may portray espionage as an exciting world of gun battles, explosions, car chases, and sexual adventures, but anyone who has lived in this world knows the truth is very different. For every hour spent on a street a case officer will spend many hours more writing up the results of the last meeting, preparing for the next meeting, and endlessly evaluating current cases and constantly looking for new assets. For the agent's part, the life is usually equally dull and demanding. Successful agents must continue to perform in whatever jobs provide them the access for which they were recruited in the first place, all the while meeting the tasks levied by case officers.

Agents must also prepare for and securely move to and from meetings, and, if they are good, they will constantly be looking for new ways to meet the information needs of the organization they secretly serves. A double life is not an easy life as evidenced by the number of agents who burn out, break down, or simply decide they cannot continue, particularly in high risk environments. Agents often either stop producing or start making so many mistakes that case officers must suspend the relationships for the safety of both parties.

Excitement, if it exists, is fleeting, but reinforcement of an agent's self-confidence, or ego, can go a long way toward maintaining the agent's productivity. As part of this dynamic, one often finds a desire for revenge or retaliation as a motivator. Examples include the disgruntled professional diplomat; the passed-over military officer who would not "play politics"; the intelligence officer sidelined for a drinking problem; or the law enforcement official forced to moonlight as a security guard to make ends meet. Under the MICE framework, these are all agents waiting to be recruited. They only need to have egos stroked and to be given the chance to harm a system that has wronged them. Such reasons may provide good beginnings on the road to espionage, but will they keep agents on that road for decades? How then might case officers move beyond MICE to solidify and optimize the long-term commitment of a productive agent?

From MICE to RASCLS

Although MICE provides superficial explanations for spying, it fails to capture the complexities of human motivation. For example, let us return to the case of Aldrich Ames. In 1985, he walked into the Soviet embassy in Washington DC with the stated intent of avoiding bankruptcy by trading information on assets suspected of being double agents for $50,000.[18]

This was to be a one-time only exchange. The Soviet embassy's KGB chief of counterintelligence,

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[17] Even the Russian news organization *Pravda* openly reported on the use of sexual blackmail by the KGB, see "KGB Sex Espionage," *Pravda*, 7 August 2002.

[18] Pete Earley, *Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames* (Berkley Books, 1998), 147.

By subscribing too fully to the limited MICE framework, officers risk misreading their agents.

Victor Cherkashin, accepted Ames' information, paid him the $50,000, and then masterfully ensured that this first encounter would not be the last. Cherkashin did not threaten or otherwise coerce Ames. Instead, he worked to earn his confidence and drew him into a shared effort to protect him:

> *"Look," I continued, exaggerating, but not really dissembling, "our main concern—our one concern—is your security. I want you to know that for certain. Everything else is secondary. You tell me what you want us to do and we'll do it. We'll play by any rules you give us."*

Cherkashin continued:

> *It's in your interest to tell us as much as you can about any of your agents inside the KGB.… How can we protect you if we don't know who's in a position to inform the CIA about you? If you're concerned about your security, it's up to you* and *us to minimize the danger for you. We need to know whom to protect you from.*

With that,

> [Ames] *took out a notepad and paper and began writing down a list of names. He tore out the page and handed it to me. I was shocked. That piece of paper contained more information about CIA espionage than had ever before been presented in a single communication. It was a catalog of virtually every CIA asset within the Soviet Union. Ames said nothing about whether the men he'd listed should be arrested or removed. "Just make sure these people don't find anything out about me," he said.*[19]

What happened here? Was this a simple case of money starting a relationship, with concern about compromise just adding to it? Are these two motives sufficient to explain the actions of Ames? The MICE framework, even allowing for two factors at work, is not sufficient to understand his motivations and behavior.

Human motivations are far more complex. By subscribing too fully to the limited MICE framework, officers risk misreading their agents and take actions harmful to their operations. For example, by attributing an agent's cooperation to a simple need for money, a case officer makes the mistake of causing a committed agent to feel merely like hired help. Post-WW II operations officer Christopher Felix put it this way in his *Short Course on the Secret War*:

> *Time and again I have seen American case officers resort to cutting off funds to enforce discipline over an agent. One effect of this maneuver, if successful, is ultimately to reduce the agent to the status of a mere pensioner. In espionage operations this can, and often does, result in highly unreliable information; in a political operation it can be fatal.*[20]

Case officers who rely exclusively on the MICE framework risk failing to see the full complexities involved in an agent's decision to spy and will miss opportunities to persuade and motivate agents to improve their performance. Instead, they will focus on taking advantage of vulnerabilities to exercise control. Over time, the negative focus could lead case officers to view and treat their agents as fundamentally flawed human beings who need to be punished or coerced into compliance.

The work of psychologist Dr. Robert Cialdini offers more positive approaches. His six "weapons of mass influence"— reciprocation, authority, scarcity, commitment/consistency, liking, and social proof—provide a better foundation for agent recruitment and handling.[21]

Cialdini's Six Principles

To understand why the RASCLS principles are so important, case officers must understand that humans have developed shortcuts to

[19] Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, *Spy Handler, Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of the Man who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames* (Basic Books, 2005), 27–29.
[20] Christopher Felix, *A Short Course in the Secret War* (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963), 54.
[21] Robert Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (Quill/William Morrow, 1984). Cialdini is the source of the six principles of influence, but my friend and colleague Steve Kleinman was the first to codify these principles under the mnemonic RASCLS.

function in a world full of sights, sounds, and other stimuli flooding human senses. These shortcuts Cialdini calls "fixed actions patterns," which are patterns of behavior that occur in the same order and sequence every time a given stimulus is introduced. In the animal world these fixed patterns are easily observed in courtship and mating rituals. They have evolved because humans need them too. Otherwise, as Cialdini observes, "We would stand frozen—cataloging, appraising, and calibrating—as the time for action sped by and away."[22]

The universal human responses to these six principles help people interact with less friction and, for the most part, provide benefits. However, some individuals have become quite skilled in using these principles to manipulate others into acting against their best interests. These "compliance professionals," as Cialdini labels them, are found, for example, among sales people, fundraisers, and "confidence artists." The keys to their success, according to Cialdini, are that they understand the principles of influence and persuasion and they have learned how to manipulate without appearing to be manipulative.

By understanding Cialdini's six principles, case officers could also become, in effect, better compliance specialists, with deeper understanding of their tradecraft and greater ability to see opportunities to find and recruit agents from a population beyond those defined by the vulnerabilities exploitable in the MICE framework.

Some individuals ["compliance professionals"] *have become quite skilled in using these principles to manipulate others into taking actions that are not necessarily in their best interests.*

RASCLS in the Agent Recruitment Cycle

Before diving into the details of RASCLS, we need to understand more deeply how case officers work. The systematic method for finding agents who will meet national intelligence information needs is called the Agent Recruitment Cycle (ARC). It consists of six steps:

- spotting (or identifying) individuals who can meet intelligence needs as identified by analysts or policymakers
- assessing whether the spotted individuals have the placement and access to provide desired information as well as beginning the process of determining their motivations, vulnerabilities, and suitability
- developing a relationship with the individual to further assess the factors above and to explore whether they will be responsive to initial tasking for intelligence information
- the actual recruitment
- training and handling meetings with the agent, including taskings and debriefings
- either turning an agent over to another case officer or terminating the relationship

Successful case officers move agents through this cycle by using many of the principles of RASCLS without realizing the psychology behind their successes. Within the CIA these officers are often called "natural recruiters," and because their skills are not well understood and believed to be inherent, CIA trainers miss opportunities to help case officer trainees develop their potential to become compliance specialists capable of fully applying the RASCLS principles.

RASCLS: Reciprocation

"Always provide amenities." This is one of the earliest lessons taught to case officers in their training. Whether the meeting is to be an extended discussion in a hotel or a quick talk in a moving car, the case officer is told to always have something for the role-player agent to eat and drink. If a student asked "why," (which was never encouraged), the likely reply would be "to build rapport" or the old standby, "that is the way I was taught." It is an honest question that deserves a better response.

The true answer lies in the principle of reciprocation: all humans feel an obligation to try to repay in kind what another person has provided. According to Cialdini, there is no human society that does not abide by this rule.[23] We see the power of this principle reflected in innumerable cultures that insist on sharing tea or other refreshments before "getting down to business." In American cul-

[22] Ibid., 7.
[23] Ibid., 18.

Case officers also must understand the power inherent in their relationships with agents.

ture the counterparts are business dinners, luncheons, or cocktail hours used for rapport-building and development of a shared sense of obligation.

The principle of reciprocation is almost always employed at the beginning of a recruitment cycle. One of the easiest ways for a case officer to initiate and develop a relationship with a potential agent is to fill some small need the agent has revealed. Whether this is help with a visa, information on academic opportunities in the United States, or just advice on a minor problem, by the small gesture a case officer creates a sense of obligation. At a minimum, the gesture provides a reason for further contact and sets the stage for a case officer to seek a favor in return.

A feeling of obligation can be created without actually giving anything of real value. Cialdini calls this psychological concept "reciprocal concessions" or "rejection and retreat." To illustrate this concept, he tells the story of being approached by a Boy Scout. The boy asked Cialdini if he would like to buy a ticket to a "Boy Scout Circus" for five dollars. When Cialdini did not immediately respond, the scout added "Or, you could buy one of our big chocolate bars. They are only a dollar each." As expected, despite the fact that Cialdini claims not to even like chocolate, two dollars and two chocolate bars soon changed hands.[24] By first offering tickets to the circus, and then immediately following up with a different offer—before the first was openly rejected—the scout appeared to make the first concession, which immediately triggered in Cialdini a feeling of obligation to supply a reciprocal concession.

As he did with all the influence principles in his book, Cialdini field tested the theory of reciprocal concessions through a series of well-documented experiments in which unwitting subjects were offered a poor choice and less onerous second choice. In a statistically significant number of the cases, those offered the "rejection and retreat" scenario agreed to the secondary request, while those offered only the lesser choice declined. As a bonus, researchers found that once a commitment was made to the less onerous choice, the subject was even more susceptible to future requests. These phenomena will be further discussed under "commitment and consistency," but the benefits for the case officer are clear: favors or gifts given to a potential agent early in a relationship are more likely to create feelings of obligation. Then as a relationship develops, case officers can use rejection and retreat to make initial taskings seem less burdensome and create an atmosphere in which future taskings will appear to be less onerous.

RASCLS: Authority

The OSS advice, "From the first give an impression that we are part of a powerful and well organized body—prestige counts heavily," still rings true. From childhood we are taught that compliance with authority brings rewards while resistance brings punishment. Most operational cover stories are built to give CIA officers the air of authority—through some official government status or the appearance of a successful businessperson. In both cases, officers are encouraged to "look the part" in their dress or with props.

The air of authority gives case officers advantages in the agent recruitment process. In the development phase, case officers will often demonstrate their authority by indicating they have special positions or powers beyond whatever jobs they claim to hold in the US government or business. These may include, for example, the power to hire and richly reward consultants. This air of authority can be especially magnified in the recruitment phase, particularly if case officers can suggest they have the prestige of the US government behind the developing relationship.

Case officers also must understand the power inherent in their relationships with agents. As Felix pointed out, "The case officer represents the authority which defines the objectives of the operation, and he controls the resources which make the operation possible."[25] Optimally this control will be implicit rather than explicit. Threatening to withhold money to exert control represents a failure to develop optimal influence over the agent. In addition to the authority inherent in a case officer's position relative to an agent, the case

[24] Ibid., 36.
[25] Felix, 47.

By building this sense of urgency, a successful case officer will use scarcity to… get agents to commit to new and deeper relationships.

officer's strongest claim to authority is greater knowledge of the operational environment, of which the agent can only be partly aware. A case officer must be able to convince an agent that, although the agent is a key partner in an operation, the agent is not the case officer's only resource.

Under the MICE framework, case officers too often have gotten caught up in discussions over how much "control" they have over a source, which often has led to attempts to tie control to something measurable, like money. This battle for control is a reflection of the generally negative attributes of MICE. If an agent is only in a relationship for money, then money does represent control. A better discussion would include measures of case officer levels of influence over sources. Measures of influence that are sometimes mislabeled as control include the following:

- Does an agent fully disclose subsources of information?
- Has an agent attempted to established limits to subjects he will and will not report about?
- Is an agent willing to admit when he does not know about a topic and will he take reasonable risks to gain that information?
- Is an agent knowingly providing information that would get him in trouble if discovered?
- How closely does an agent adhere to the directions a case officer gives concerning methods of collecting information and moving to and from meetings?

Authority also plays a key role in the handling, training, and turnover phases of the recruitment cycle. Once recruited, an agent should become both more productive (as a result of more direct tasking) and more cautious (as a result of training). Case officers must appear to be confident and skilled in the tradecraft they impart to their agents and, when the time comes for one officer to move on and another to take over, case officers must smoothly transfer their authority to their replacements.

RASCLS: Scarcity

When an item is less available humans tend to believe it is more attractive.[26] Things that are rarer are normally more expensive, and humans tend to equate expense with quality. Also things that are less available may be rare because many others want the same thing—the concept of social proof plays in here (more on that concept later). On a deeper level, when an item or option is offered and then withdrawn, humans tend to desire that item or option even more. This is the concept of "psychological reactance," or as it is more commonly known, the "Romeo and Juliet effect."[27]

Scarcity is a recurrent element of a successful recruitment. Recruitment pitches should make clear to potential agents that they are being presented with fleeting opportunities to act on statements they have made concerning their beliefs, goals, or ideals. But, by emphasizing that any opportunity is fleeting and urging a rapid commitment, a case officer increases the value of the opportunity to replace words with deeds. Case officers might emphasize, for example, that they have superiors who need proof of their agents' utility or they will order relationships ended.

By building this sense of urgency, a successful case officer will use scarcity to overcome the free-rider dilemma and get agents to commit to new and deeper relationships.

RASCLS: Commitment and Consistency

"Prominent theorists such as Leon Festinger, Fritz Hieder, and Theodore Newcomb have viewed the desire for consistency as a central motivator of our behavior."[28] In short, portraying ourselves as "consistent" speaks to who we humans are at our essence. Society generally seems to spurn members who are inconsistent. They are labeled as "untrustworthy" or, in more current political terms, "flip-floppers." At times we even appear to admire consistency over correctness. However we do not always cling to positions simply because we are stubborn.

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[26] Or, as Cialdini put it, "Opportunities seem more valuable when their availability is limited." Cialdini, 238.
[27] Cialdini, 244 and 248.
[28] Cialdini, 59.

In the agent recruitment process, small commitments in the development phase … can grow into full recruitments.

Studies have shown we actually tend to increase our confidence in a decision once that decision has been made and particularly if that decision has been made publicly. "Public commitments create more lasting change," even more so if those public commitments are written or otherwise recorded.[29]

Researchers studying Chinese interrogation techniques during the Korean War found that the Communist Chinese exploited this quality of human nature to elicit "confessions" from US POWs to back allegations of US war crimes during the war. [30] They found that the Chinese and North Koreans managed to get US Air Force officers to claim on film that they had dropped "germ bombs" and committed other war crimes, not by threats, torture, or offers of rewards for lying, but by getting prisoners to make public admissions that life was not perfect in the United States and then having them write, expand upon, and defend their declarations. Slowly, trying to be consistent, many of these men came to believe, at least for a time, that they had indeed committed war crimes. Going from "there is some racial inequality" to "the United States is committing genocide in North Korea" was not a path every prisoner would take, but it worked often enough for some propaganda gains for the Chinese and Koreans.

In the agent recruitment process, small commitments in the development phase—for example, mutual agreement that two countries often need informal channels to better understand each other—can grow into full recruitments. Additionally, by convincing a prospective agent to provide the first piece of nonpublic information (for example the classic "internal telephone directory"), the stage is set to ask for more closely held secrets and then use this behavior to justify further cooperation through recruitment. This does not necessarily imply setting up blackmail, but rather an appeal to an agent's desire to remain consistent. By highlighting past agreement to "share data" for the good of both countries, the relationship with a case officer can evolve into one seen as rewarding to both and lay the ground for continued "cooperation."

RASCLS: Liking

"We like people who are like us." Every case officer is taught this simple idea in training. The larger lesson is to find ways to connect with potential agents—similarities in background (the case officer and agent are both sons/daughters, husbands/wives, parents, have similar personality traits), shared interests (sports, hobbies), and general outlook (interested in world affairs, background, life-style). Flattery is highly recommended, for virtually everyone enjoys being praised, and future meetings will come more easily. With additional meetings and more "time on target," a case officer will be better able to conduct a sound assessment process. A warm relationship is also likely to give a case officer insight into a potential agent's areas of low self-esteem or feelings of being undervalued—key pieces of knowledge for a recruiter.

Liking matters throughout the agent recruitment cycle. A case officer creates an ever deeper relationship through the process—from becoming an "associate" then a "friend" in the assessment phases and then moving to the role of "sounding board" and "confidant" as development moves to recruitment. A case officer's goal should be to have a prospective agent come to believe, hopefully with good reason, that the case officer is one of the few people, perhaps the ONLY person, who truly understands him. The agent then can look forward to each meeting as a chance to spend quality time with a comrade he can trust with his life.

RASCLS: Social Proof

By observing others, particularly in unfamiliar environments, humans determine what is "correct behavior." This is what Cialdini and other psychologists call "social proof," and it can be seen in long lines behind velvet ropes at the hottest night clubs or, more darkly, in the

[29] Ibid., 76.

[30] Cialdini, 71–72, and Albert D. Bidderman, "Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War," presented at a combined meeting of the Section on Neurology and Psychiatry with the New York Neurological Society at The New York Academy of Medicine, 13 November 1956, as part of a Panel Discussion on "Communist Methods of Interrogation and Indoctrination." The report is based on work done under ARDC Project No. 7733, Task 77314, in support of the research and development program of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Permission is granted for reproduction, translation, publication, use, and disposal in whole and in part by or for the United States Government.

behavior of people in cults.[31] The combined effects of social proof and the power of commitment and consistency can explain tragedies like the mass suicide in November 1978 of the Jonestown cult in Guyana and can also be helpful in understanding why Oleg Penkovsky continued to spy even after it was clear Soviet authorities were closing in on him. Once individuals have invested deeply and sacrificed much, they will go to great lengths to hold on to the beliefs to which they had become committed.

Although we cannot put a velvet rope outside our facilities abroad and have agents line up to provide social proof that spying for the United States is the rage, the principle of social proof does apply to agent recruitment and handling. In directing agents, case officers can say, "Other partners I have worked with have brought out documents by doing X." This both serves to encourage an agent should not only to do "X" but reassures the agent that he is doing what others have done successfully as well. Additionally officers can help agents overcome their understandable anxiety by recalling cases of others who have made similar choices, for example, Ryszard Kuklinski or Istvan Belovai, whose actions helped free their countries. However, the ultimate social proof is the presence of the case officer, and implicitly the organization behind the case officer, who provide constant reminders that an agent is doing the right thing.

It will be up to the imagination and creativity of individual case officers to take the principles and turn them into new approaches for recruiting and handling a new generation of agents.

Agents are RASCLS not MICE

Frameworks for understanding agents have advanced significantly with the science of psychology since the days of the OSS. While advice from that era can still be useful today, we now have a much better understanding of the human mind and motivations. The MICE framework was a good step in trying to understand agent behavior but it has often led officers to unduly focus on vulnerabilities and caused case officers to see their assets in a one-dimensional and somewhat negative light.

I believe the RASCLS model is more nuanced, effective, and founded on empirical data drawn from decades of experiments in the social psychology field.

By employing RASCLS we can see that Pyotr Popov did not just spy for money but because his case officer, George Kisevalter, reminded him strongly of his older brother, who had opposed the Soviet regime (the liking and authority principles). Kisevalter gave him the money he needed, but he also helped him appear to be a competent intelligence officer in post-war Vienna (reciprocation). Finally, his case officer reinforced Popov's feelings that the Soviet state had betrayed Russian peasants and only the United States was strong enough to eventually help these people free themselves from their oppressors (commitment and consistency).

In the same way, Cherkashin expertly turned Ames from a one-time contact in need of money into a productive agent by flattering him (liking) and telling him the two men were partners in keeping Ames safe—a partnership that relied on Ames's help (authority, reciprocation). It was a partnership that would allow Ames to enjoy the compensation Cherkashin was ready to supply on a steady basis (commitment and consistency). In the light of the RASCLS model, the actions of each of the spies discussed in this article, Philby, Montes, Ames, and others become more understandable, with lessons that can be applied to other cases.

The above suggestions for using Cialdini's six principles, in my judgment, only touch on the ways in which these principles could be employed in operations. As always, it will be up to the imagination and creativity of individual case officers to take the principles and turn them into new approaches for recruiting and handling a new generation of agents.

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[31] Cialdini, 152–56.

Operation Argo in Book and Film

Argo: How the CIA and Hollywood Pulled Off the Most Audacious Rescue in History, by Antonio Mendez and Matt Baglio (Viking, 2012), 310 pages, notes, bibliography, no index.

Argo, produced by Ben Affleck, George Clooney, and Grant Heslov; directed by Ben Affleck; screenplay by Chris Terrio (GK Films and Smokehouse Pictures, 2012).

Reviewed by David Robarge

CIA's daring and imaginative operation to exfiltrate six US diplomats from Tehran after the takeover of the US embassy there on 4 November 1979 has become one of the Agency's best-known success stories since its acknowledgement in 1997. Using an elaborate deception that included a fake movie production company, forged passports and travel documents, cover stories, and disguises, two operatives from CIA's Office of Technical Service (OTS)—Tony Mendez and "Julio"—took the Americans from the residences of the Canadian diplomats, where they had been hiding for nearly three months, to Mehrabad Airport on 28 January 1980. After several increasingly tense hours as they went through security checks and waited through a flight delay, the eight boarded a Swiss Air jet to Zurich. The US diplomats—or "houseguests," as they came to be known—arrived in the United States a few days later to a boisterous welcome.

The CIA's role in the Americans' escape remained secret for nearly 18 years. According to Mendez, "the only leak of any significance came shortly after the story broke, when Jack Anderson said on his syndicated radio show that two CIA officers acting as 'mother hens' had led the six through Mehrabad Airport. We assumed that Anderson had a source inside the CIA, but the story never gained traction."[1] Instead, the Canadian government got all the credit, courtesy of reports by Jean Pelletier, the Washington correspondent for Quebec's *La Presse*, who later wrote a book about what would be dubbed "the Canadian Caper."[2] Meanwhile, in a secret ceremony at CIA Headquarters in May 1980, Mendez and "Julio" received Intelligence Stars—the Agency's second highest honor.

CIA decided to reveal its hand in the rescue in 1997 during its 50th anniversary commemoration when it designated 50 officers as Trailblazers, who "by their actions, example, and innovations or initiative, have taken the CIA in important new directions and helped shape the Agency's history."[3] Tony Mendez was one of them. His citation did not mention the Argo operation,[4] but Tim Weiner of the *New York Times* soon asked for an interview because, according to Mendez, someone had leaked details about the exfiltration to him. Agency leaders decided to have Mendez go public with the story, and David Martin interviewed him about it on the *CBS Evening News*. Mendez's account first appeared in a classified issue of this journal in 1998. It was reprinted in the 1999–2000 unclassified

[1] Mendez and Baglio, 294.

[2] Jean Pelletier and Claude Adams, *The Canadian Caper* (William Morrow, 1981). A movie on Canadian television, *Escape from Tehran: The Canadian Caper*, followed later that year. Pelletier found out about the missing Americans soon after they went into hiding but agreed to the Canadian government's request that he hold the story until the danger to them had passed. When he learned on 28 January 1980 that the Canadian embassy in Tehran was going to close, he concluded that the Americans had gotten out, and his paper published his report the next day. Historian Robert Wright, in *Our Man in Tehran: Ken Taylor, the CIA, and the Iran Hostage Crisis* (HarperCollins, 2010), provides a comprehensive account of the Canadian government's indispensable part in the exfiltration.

[3] "CIA to Mark 50th Anniversary, Honor 'Trailblazers,'" https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1997-1/pr091097.html.

[4] "Mr. Mendez is recognized for founding the development and engineering capability in the Agency's operational disguise program. His ideas led to the design and deployment of a series of increasingly sophisticated tools that enabled operations officers to change their appearance convincingly. "'Trailblazers' and Years of Service," https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1997-1/trailblazers.html.

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edition of *Studies*.[5] He later wrote about the operation in the first of his two memoirs, *The Master of Disguise,*[6] and then in the book under review. In the meantime, the story had also been picked up in a *Wired* article in 2007.[7]

Mendez's previous versions are better. His article in this journal is the most thorough, and the account in *The Master of Disguise* is the most readable. Its breezy writing aside, *Argo* is too long and has too many digressions, which are especially noticeable in the audiobook version. Mendez may have tried too hard to use *Argo* as an all-purpose publication: an autobiography with personal details not found in his other books, an insider memoir about life as a CIA officer, and a thorough recounting of the planning and execution of the escape. The result is an unbalanced story. The tale of the exfiltration itself takes too much time to get going; Mendez and "Julio" do not arrive in Tehran until page 231 of the 298 pages of narrative. Once they get there, the pace accelerates so quickly that the crux of the operation takes only three of the book's 18 chapters.

The movie *Argo* is one of only two nonfiction films about CIA's history—the other is *Charlie Wilson's War*—and is such a departure from Hollywood's usual outlandish portrayals, some of which stretch credulity in proclaiming themselves to be based on actual events, that it merits attention for that reason alone.[8] It also deserves the acclaim it has received, including Academy Awards for best film, adapted screenplay, and film editing. Ben Affleck has put together a well-shot, fast-paced thriller that effectively mixes contemporary news footage and reenactments and, at least for about the first hour and a half, stays reasonably close to what happened—by cinematic standards, anyway.

Affleck's professed interest in historical accuracy is underscored in the montage at the end of the movie: a series of juxtaposed look-alike images of the real houseguests and the actors portraying them, and the true and staged events. The interior sets, clothes, eyeglasses, cars, and other lifestyle paraphernalia are generally true to life, in large measure because Affleck used Tony Mendez as a technical adviser and consulted with other current and former CIA officers (including this reviewer) to make sure he got the look and feel of the Agency in the late 1970s correct.

As detailed on IMDb.com (the Internet Movie Database), however, many errors in history and production slipped through.[9] Some stand out, like misstating the political dynamics in Iran in 1953 that prompted the CIA-led covert action to remove Prime Minister Mossadegh from power and bring the shah back into the country; showing Ted Kennedy's victory speech in the March 1980 presidential primaries speech two months before it occurred; claiming that British diplomats turned the Americans away, when in reality they harbored them initially but judged the location unsafe and agreed with the escapees that they should approach the Canadians; and having an Iranian official write in Farsi in the wrong direction. Other flaws are trivial, like misplacing two *Star Wars* figures in a display in Mendez's son's bedroom or putting a record player needle on the wrong album cut to play the song that is heard.

The movie-in-a-movie sequences in *Argo* are played mostly for laughs—they are Affleck's mild satire on the business that has brought him so much success. The Hollywood environment he depicts reeks of opulence, shallowness, and hypocrisy. Actors John Goodman and Alan Arkin give memorable performances as, respectively, the make-up genius John Chambers, with whom Mendez had worked before, and "Lester Siegel," the made-up producer who embodies a composite of stereotypical moviemaking personalities who routinely bite the hands that make them rich. For the Argo operation, however, the cover production company called Studio Six (named for the number of houseguests) proved indispensable. It provided all the off-screen accoutrement needed to backstop the phony movie just in case some inquisitive Iranian checked: an office, phone numbers, business

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[5] Antonio J. Mendez, "CIA Goes Hollywood: A Classic Case of Deception," *Studies in Intelligence* 42 No. 2 (June 1998), 1–16; reprinted in *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1999–2000, 1–16 available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art1.html.

[6] Antonio J. Mendez with Malcolm McConnell, *The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA* (William Morrow, 1999). Reviewed by Jim Steinmeyer in this journal: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article09.html.

[7] Joshuah Bearman, "How the CIA Used a Fake Sci-Fi Flick to Rescue Americans from Tehran," *Wired*, on-line edition, 24 April 2007.

[8] Pseudohistories like *The Good Shepherd* and historical fiction productions like *The Company* do not count. Wikipedia, "CIA in Fiction," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_in_fiction. The article is mistitled, as it deals only with television, movie, and video game portrayals and does not mention novels.

[9] Internet Movie Database, "Argo" page, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1024648/trivia?tab=gf&ref_=tt_trv_gf.

cards, posters, ads in trade papers, and staged events like a publicized script reading. The ruse was so successful that Studio Six received proposals from legitimate producers, among them Steven Spielberg.

Inevitably, "Hollywoodisms" appear throughout the film, mainly to simplify the plot and make it more compelling to moviegoers. After they fled the embassy compound, the Americans did not stay together but split into two groups. Initially, there were only five—one who worked elsewhere joined them later—but six are seen from the outset. Most of them stayed with the Canadians' chief immigration officer—the late John Sheardown, who is not shown—rather than with Ambassador Ken Taylor, whose part gets less attention than it deserves. At previews, Canadian critics complained that their country got short shrift, and Affleck had to make some adjustments.[10]

The atmospherics of the experience of the houseguests were very different from what is seen on the screen. They experienced far more boredom than tension, they never had to hide in a crawl space, and they never went to the bazaar or anywhere else outside the residences. No Iranian officials were aggressively pursuing them, and their pictures were never reconstructed from the mass of shredded documents taken from the embassy. After Mendez meets the Americans—"Julio" never appears—they received his plan with excitement and optimism, not fear or resignation. Overall, the rescue operation, from planning to execution, went far more smoothly than is portrayed. The Mendezes' marriage was not strained, so the scenes with Tony and his son and wife—especially the implied reconciliation at the end—are pure sentimentality.

The most egregious departures from reality come in the latter part of the movie. The White House role is seriously misrepresented; President Jimmy Carter, who approved the operation on 23 January, never changed his mind, and the scenes when Mendez "goes rogue" and his boss has to make a trick call to presidential advisor Hamilton Jordan to get last-minute reapproval are fanciful. Most of what happens at the airport after the Americans arrive is contrived. They did not have problems obtaining their tickets or get stopped at security checks, and the ever-skeptical Joe Stafford did not become the hero of the hour by using his fluent Farsi to win over a group of suspicious guards. An Iranian official, hot on the Americans' trail, did not call the bogus production company in Hollywood to verify the Argo cover story. Lastly, the outrageously unrealistic chase scene on the runway never took place; the laws of physics would not have allowed it anyway.

Mendez's book collaborator, Matt Baglio, justified these inventions in an interview:

> *There were some tense moments in the airport. There were some times when* [the Americans'] *documents were inspected, and there were some questions about photos, their flight was delayed. I think the film was very truthful....There wasn't this chase, as is portrayed in the film...but it captures the tension. I think it's very truthful in the sense that when you're making a movie in a cinematic way you need to portray the inner tension that these people were dealing with. Audiences aren't going to be satisfied with checking documents. One of the fascinating aspects of the real world of espionage is that it's really all about the details. And there can be a lot of drama in a guy checking a cache or an ink, the quality of a paper or a document, but that's just not going to translate very well on the big screen. So you've got to look for ways to engage the audience.*[11]

Viewers who have appreciated quality espionage and counterintelligence movies like the BBC production of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* and the French film *Farewell*, which place a premium on sophisticated character development, low-key taut action, clever staging, and steadily building suspense, will differ with Baglio on what will keep audiences' attention.

Argo could have been more accurate and more entertaining if Affleck and his associates had not missed opportunities to add truthful substance, drama, and a little humor to the plot. We first see Mendez asleep in an unkempt room amid Chinese carry-out containers and empty beer cans. We might better understand his slovenliness if we knew that he and some OTS colleagues had been working practically nonstop for days on ideas to help free the American hostages in the embassy. One of them was a complicated effort to create a body dou-

[10] An e-book self-published by one of the houseguests, now retired Foreign Service officer Mark Lijek, equally credits the Canadians and the CIA. See *The Houseguests: A Memoir of Canadian Courage and CIA Sorcery* (Amazon Digital Services, Inc., 2012).

[11] Matt Baglio interview on National Public Radio, 25 December 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/12/25/167537259/fact-checking-argo-a-great-escape-that-takes-some-leaps.

ble of the shah, whose entry into the United States for medical treatment had incited the embassy takeover. The plan was to have the fake shah leave the United States for a third country for long enough to enable the Carter administration to negotiate the hostages' release. The White House did not approve the seemingly far-fetched concept, but it is part of the back story to the Argo operation and could have enriched the script.

The same goes for Mendez's successful exfiltration of an Iranian asset codenamed RAPTOR out of Tehran soon before the hostages were taken. Mendez tells the story in detail in both his books, and he says that what he learned in getting the Iranian out made him confident he could do the same for the houseguests. In the movie, even with a brief flashback sequence, he could have allayed their concerns far more readily if he had mentioned that he had just done a similar operation in the same place instead of just giving vague assurances that "This is what I do." No wonder Joe Stafford had doubts.

The episode in which Mendez discovers that the Canadians had misdated the visas of their guests could have led to some scenes of technical suspense reminiscent of the old *Mission: Impossible* television series. Likewise for the activities of the Canadian government back in Ottawa—the hurried, closed-door meetings, the passage of special legislation to provide the forged passports, the efforts to keep Pelletier from running his scoop—none of those politically interesting scenarios made the script. Back in Tehran, the mock interrogation of the Americans by the Canadian official dressed in military garb and carrying a swagger stick might have been played as the seriocomic incident it was. Instead, the one-dimensional Affleck again gets to monopolize the action. Finally, the impromptu break from the group in the airport waiting room of one of the houseguests to stand in the shorter nonsmoking line for the first document inspection showed that the Iranians were not bothering to match the two parts of the entry-exit documents—one of the potential hitches in the escape plan that had potential for true-to-life tension in the movie.

It is encouraging that Hollywood may be more willing to consider making films that depict the reality of CIA's history and are not just the usual fiction fodder of renegade operatives and incoherent conspiracies.[12] The genesis of the movie *Argo* demonstrates that screenwriters, producers, and directors hungry for ideas for true, audience-engaging stories don't really have to look that hard to find them.

[12] For an overview of the subject, see the recent survey of CIA's relationship with the entertainment industry by Tricia Jenkins, *The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television* (University of Texas Press, 2012). The book is reviewed in the "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" in this issue.

Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board

Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk, (The University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 515 pp., endnotes, appendices, index.

Reviewed by Samuel Cooper-Wall

The authors of *Privileged and Confidential* have performed a great service to intelligence professionals in producing a thoroughly researched and well-crafted treatment of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB).[1] This subject has been largely neglected by historians, and the necessarily secretive nature of the board has increased the odds that its rich history could fade into the ether. Having now served 10 presidents by examining nearly every major US intelligence matter since 1956, the board has a story worth telling. While most intelligence professionals are unlikely ever to interact with this small and obscure part of the Intelligence Community (IC), the PIAB has a reputation for providing insights into National Security decisionmaking and producing useful assessments on the future of intelligence. *Privileged and Confidential* brings out the importance of the PIAB while giving it a fair and thorough appraisal.

Apart from the lack of prior scholarship, the authors had to overcome the assumption that there is little about the PIAB that is worthy of study—a hypothesis even they admit is not completely unfounded. Indeed, there exists a somewhat compelling narrative on the lack of accomplishments of the PIAB; it was not uncommon for the board to find that its influence was limited or that it was the subject of controversy. Most notably, the unauthorized disclosure of the board's assessment of the Team A/Team B competitive analysis program rocked the Ford administration and reportedly caused Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George H.W. Bush to storm into PIAB Chairman Leo Cherne's office and accuse the board of being the source of the leak. Jimmy Carter went on to shut the board down entirely during his presidency.

However, the authors indicate there are two more common inhibitors to the success of the board. First, presidents such as Reagan and Clinton have undermined the board by appointing many political allies who had limited familiarity with intelligence. Second, lack of access to the president has posed a significant impediment, as was the case most recently after PIAB Chairman Brent Scowcroft had a falling-out with the George W. Bush administration over the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Such challenges, taken collectively, create a negative picture that is difficult to overcome, but the authors are quick to counter this view. They start with a central factor in any and all success the board has: its membership. The board's rosters of capable and powerful members alone indicate the influence it has held in Washington. Clark Clifford is an ideal example. Prior to becoming secretary of defense, he served on the board during much of the 1960s and used his frequent contact with President Lyndon Johnson to ensure the PIAB's recommendations were heard, even though the board itself had very little direct access to the president at the time.

The board has had a measurable impact via numerous recommendations that were later enacted, most notably the establishment of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology. Many board products have earned

[1] The board was designated as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Affairs (PBCFIA) from 1956 to 1961 and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) from 1961 to 2008. In the interest of simplicity, this review will refer to the body under its current name, the PIAB.

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praise, including an extensive 1976 report on the future of intelligence and technology, primarily authored by board members Edward Teller, Cherne, and William Casey. It was considered by CIA seniors to be incredibly helpful, and labeled as "one of the most thoughtful and perceptive papers to be produced on the intelligence community." In the same vein, the board's charter defines it as a resource for intelligence professionals, mainly because unlike the Intelligence Oversight Board and congressional committees, the PIAB was designed not to oversee or investigate the IC, but to help improve it. At the presidential level, Eisenhower and Kennedy each accepted the vast majority of recommendations from their respective boards, and thus the precedent was set for future presidents to entrust their significant intelligence initiatives to the PIAB for review.

Privileged and Confidential is an insightful and interesting read; however, at times one senses that the authors are still fighting an uphill battle to defend the PIAB. As they put it, "[t]he PIAB is the part of the intelligence community that is the least in the thrall of preconceived ideas or captured by organizational biases and so can be of great use in thinking through these issues." Yet, while one can certainly endorse the premise that an unbiased panel, often stocked with those capable of offering great perspective, can be an incredible resource for the president, it remains unclear as to whether the board is truly an essential enterprise. The answer to this lingering question almost certainly lies in the sheer volume of reports PIAB has produced throughout its existence that remain classified and thus inaccessible to the authors of *Privileged and Confidential*. An internal, classified assessment of the PIAB is needed. In the interim, this book will serve as the cornerstone and benchmark of this history. [2]

[2] See also Hayden Peake's review in this issue's "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf."

World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence

James L. Gilbert (The Scarecrow Press, 2012), 272 pp.

Reviewed by Terrence J. Finnegan

James Gilbert's new book is a welcome addition to the material that has been published in recent years on the evolution of US intelligence processes and organizations during the 20th century.[1] *World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence* contains much that is new and intriguing, especially about the ways information was collected and then used to make a difference on the battlefield during the period of American involvement in the final year of WW I. A good example is Gilbert's revelation of how the downing of a zeppelin carrying incredibly lucrative material helped put at risk one of the greatest German threats—the U-boat. That story alone is worth the price of the text, though I would have suggested opening the book with it as a way of capturing the reader's interest and effectively showing how intelligence can be acquired through the most unlikely sources.

Although the title suggests the book will address US military intelligence broadly, Gilbert really only focuses on the evolution of intelligence in the Army and the domestic and military applications of that intelligence. By making no mention of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the oldest member of the US Intelligence Community, Gilbert fails to live up to the promise of the title. Insights into ONI's diverse efforts throughout the war, e.g., the novel use of archaeologist Sylvanus G. Morley to spy in Central America, would have rectified that shortcoming and complemented the work.

Full appreciation of the material in Gilbert's book requires an understanding of the realities of America's entry into the conflict, a topic on which he might have offered more. As a relative amateur in the business of military intelligence on the scale the war required, the United States had to depend on the experience of its allies, Great Britain and France. The influence of both brought US forces up to par in acquiring and disseminating intelligence to leaders and combatants alike. My research shows that the French did the most to influence the American understanding of military intelligence at this early stage of development. *Service des renseignements de l'observation du terrain* (SROT), *service des renseignements de l'artillerie* (SRA), and *section photo-aerienne* (SPAe) were French operations that collected military intelligence to support American infantry and artillery in all the battles in which they engaged. As to aerial reconnaissance, the majority of US Air Service intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination was accomplished according to French standards.

The ultimate product, missing in James Gilbert's book, is that important deliverable—the *Plan Directeur* map. Almost all intelligence targeting in sectors occupied by the Americans aimed at getting the latest information applied to the *Plan Directeur*. The positional warfare of the period depended on the map, and intelligence provided the information that made plans for artillery targeting and infantry assaults credible.

Indeed, given the importance of such maps, their absence from this book is a most glaring oversight. Thus the book fails to help readers follow the "where" and "when" of the events it describes. Maps might have helped convey how the order of battle facing American forces was portrayed to commanders. Maps would have been invaluable in helping readers visualize the locations of countless places and to know their names, not to mention their pronunciations. Maps go with the subject.

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[1] By way of full disclosure, I must note that my work is cited and complimented in Gilbert's book, and I am grateful for his praise.

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One final observation: The book suffers from an insufficiency of source notes, which intelligence specialists immediately gravitate toward for deeper understanding. Numerous paragraphs contained quotations and specific details that were not attributed. Such details allow readers to dive beyond the published work. I, for one, would revel in carrying on such a search.

World War I is full of opportunities to expand knowledge of the intelligence business. As much as Gilbert has added to our knowledge of the subject, he really has just scratched the surface. There is still much to learn and reveal.

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Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il: Notes from His Former Mentor

John H. Cha with K. J. Sohn, (Abbott Press, 2012), 175 pp.

Reviewed by Soo Kim

Long shrouded in mystery and subject to strict control of information, North Korea intrigues many scholars, and its workings remain largely an uncracked code for policymakers. Of particular interest to outsiders have been Pyongyang's eccentric leaders, the late Kim Jong-Il and his successor Kim Jong-Un.[1] John H. Cha and K.J. Sohn's work, *Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il,* traces the life of the former leader from birth to death. It attempts to do so in a novel way, purporting to follow Kim's development through the eyes of Hwang Jang-yop, Kim's former mentor, the highest-ranking North Korean defector, and originator of the North's *juche* (self-reliance) philosophy. Hwang, by virtue of his lengthy, high-profile access to the North Korean leaders and his expertise in Pyongyang's ideology, is an authoritative voice providing insight into the workings of the country and the sentiments of the North Korean people.

The book's biographical sketch of Kim Jong-Il is presented within a fairly comprehensive historical and political context. As a result, it offers readers a holistic understanding of North Korea, and thus it is, at a minimum, useful reading for those interested in a quick history of the country or a closer look at Kim's personality. A flaw, however, is that although the book claims to be told from Hwang Jang-yop's vantage point, in fact, the narrative is in Cha's voice, making it difficult to distinguish Hwang's insights from Cha's interpretations and analyses.

Cha is a biographer who has written several books on Korean leaders and translated Korean literature into English. K.J. (Kwang-joo) Sohn is the editor in chief of the Seoul-based online journal *DailyNK*, which reports on current issues related to North Korea. *DailyNK* gets its material from a network of informants in the North, who communicate with Chinese cell phones from along the North Korea-China border; it also reports on North Korean defectors and escapees. Prior to his time at *DailyNK,* Sohn worked as a research fellow at South Korea's National Intelligence Service and served as Hwang Jang-yop's secretary when Hwang defected to the South in 1997. *Exit Emperor Kim Jong-Il* combines Cha's biography writing expertise with Sohn's access to Hwang, other North Korean defectors, and insiders with knowledge of Pyongyang's leadership and politics.

Cha sets the tone for the book in the first chapter with a discussion of the 2000 inter-Korean summit between Kim Jong-Il and South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung. The description of the event provides context for the current situation in North Korea, but more importantly, it sheds light on Kim Jong-Il's character as seen through Hwang's eyes. It also contrasts the personalities of mentor and mentee. Kim is an unpredictable, skillful manipulator faithful to his own interests. Hwang, on the other hand, is shown to be one who has made the difficult decision to leave his family in the North in an attempt to bring an end to starvation there and to warn the world about the rise of militarism in the North.

Cha draws on an excerpt from Hwang's memoirs to illuminate Hwang's motivations for defecting: "A family's life is more important than an individual's life; a nation's life is more important than a family's; the human race is more important than a nation." Having thus set readers up in the first chapter to expect to hear more of Hwang's voice in later chapters, the book goes on to focus primarily on a biographical assessment of Kim Jong-Il, written not in Hwang's voice,

[1] This review employs the book author's choice of transliterations for Korean names.

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but in Cha's. Which insights belong to Cha and which originated from Hwang is left unclear.

Subsequent chapters follow Kim Jong-Il's development from a little boy who sought his father's attention, to a manipulative, scheming young man, to a dictator who would do anything to eliminate obstructions to his retention of power. In the chapter on Kim's youth, we see a child who lacked patience and struggled with his studies. He didn't have the patience to finish a book or to solve a math problem, according to Hwang.

The young Kim did, however, enjoy looking after his father and "practicing" being a ruler. When Kim was 17 years old, he would gather his father's assistants, doctors, and nurses, ask for a report on the day's events, and give instructions on dealing with his father's health. He sometimes would even give instructions to Central Party politicos on state matters, a role well beyond his purview. What this showed was Kim's ambition and his ability to exercise power.

Kim Jong-Il's manipulative nature is illustrated throughout the book—from the manner in which he eliminated his uncle Kim Young-ju from the line of succession to the creation of the young Kim's network of supporters and a vigorous idolization campaign intended to lay the groundwork for succeeding his father. Cha suggests Kim proactively, prematurely, and discreetly paved the way to his own rise to power. Presumably Kim Il-sung had designated Jong-Il to be his successor, but the son seized the opportunity to ensure his inheritance on solid, unchallengeable grounds.

The book was published in early 2012, but the author spends little time discussing Kim Jong-Il's death in December 2011 and the subsequent transition to Kim Jong-Un. This is understandable because the book's primary focus is on Kim Jong-Il, and so little about Kim Jong-Un is known with certainty. Cha and Sohn do, however, dedicate the last sections of the book to several possible scenarios for the long-term transition to Kim Jong-Un. These range from a more secure and stable dynastic succession to a collective leadership. These same questions on regime stability and Kim Jong-Un's authority are being asked by scholars, journalists, and policymakers alike.[2]

One of this book's strengths lies in its use of primary sources to illuminate Kim's personality and eccentricities in fine detail. It draws on the memoirs of Hwang Jang-yop, Song Hye-rang (she is the elder sister of Song Hye-rim, who was Kim's mistress and mother of Kim's eldest son, Kim Jong-Nam), Kim Jong-Il's nephew, and other North Korean insiders and defectors. Hwang can speak with relative authority and authenticity on the subject and the country's political, economic, and humanitarian situations.

Unfortunately, because Hwang's voice appears so rarely, the book does little to distinguish itself from other published literature on North Korea. Furthermore, the book's organization and the author's facts and conclusions are little different from those found in the majority of North Korea-related books. What the authors initially alluded to as the purpose of the book—to tell the story of Kim Jong-Il's life and personality through the eyes of his mentor—gets lost for the most part. Although the last chapter and the epilogue are dedicated primarily to Hwang's political convictions and his insights into Kim Jong-Il's dictatorship, the material comes too late in the narrative and does little to enhance the book's driving purpose.

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[2] See also in this issue Stephen Mercado's review of *Boei Chuzaikan to iu Ninmu: 38-dosen no Gunji Interijensu* [Duties of a Defense Attaché: Military Intelligence of the 38th Parallel] in which a former Japanese defense attaché offers another perspective on the succession.

Boei Chuzaikan to iu Ninmu: 38-dosen no Gunji Interijensu [Duties of a Defense Attaché: Military Intelligence of the 38th Parallel]

Fukuyama Takashi, (Wanibooks Plus, 2012), 252 pp., illustrations, photographs.

Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

Japanese journalists writing about intelligence can catch one's attention, but truly worth a read is a Japanese general who draws back the curtain on his duties as defense attaché in Seoul and calls for ending Tokyo's postwar "semi-independent" status by developing Japanese intelligence capabilities.[1 2] In this book, perhaps intended for publication during the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, a retired general contributes to the literature of Japanese intelligence by recalling his tour of duty in Seoul and explaining what a Japanese defense attaché does, which turns out not to be too different from the work of US military attachés. In advocating greater Japanese independence from the United States through intelligence and military power, the book is the latest in a growing number of works on intelligence in recent years by retired Japanese professionals who show unease over what they present to Japanese readers as Tokyo's disadvantage in intelligence compared to other major powers, especially in light of the security risks they perceive Tokyo faces in the region.

Apart from the importance of its message about Japanese security policy, this book is valuable for the details the former military attaché offers concerning a career largely spent in military intelligence. Written in straightforward Japanese and unburdened by complex endnotes and academic jargon, the book should be readily accessible to those with a good command of the language. For those without the language skill, the summary offered below may be worthwhile.

An officer of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and a graduate of Japan's National Defense Academy (NDA), Fukuyama served as defense attaché in Seoul from 1990 to 1993. He also directed the Ground Staff Office (GSO) 2nd Intelligence Division (Foreign Intelligence) and became the first chief of the Directorate for Imagery in the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH). Outside intelligence, he commanded the 32nd GSDF Infantry Regiment in decontaminating the Tokyo subway system after terrorists killed a dozen people and injured thousands with sarin gas on 20 March 1995.[3] He ended his career in 2005 as the chief of staff of the GSDF Western Army, with the rank of lieutenant general. He then spent two years at the Harvard University Asia Center as a visiting researcher before parachuting into Japan's private sector as a corporate executive.

The Security Concerns. Fukuyama prefaces his book by analyzing current events of key importance to Japanese security—those pertaining to the Korean peninsula and Japan's southern islands. Of concern in the first case is Pyongyang under the leadership of the inexperienced Kim Jong-un. The author sees a threat that the People's Republic of China (PRC) in time will take over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) like a "second Tibet." Fukuyama turns to Jap-

[1] Names of Japanese and Koreans are written in this review in conventional order (given name following family name). Apart from Seoul, Korean names in this review are rendered in the conventional McCune-Reischauer system, minus the diacritic marks.
[2] For example, former Kyodo News Agency Washington Bureau Chief Haruna Mikio has written extensively on the CIA, NSA, and other US intelligence organs, including a two-volume history of alleged CIA activities against Japan, *Himitsu no Fairu* (2003). See my review, "A Japanese View of the CIA," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 182–85.
[3] Fukuyama wrote of that in *"Chikatetsu Sarin Jiken" Senki* ["Subway Sarin Incident" Battle Record] (Kojinsha, 2009).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

anese history in likening the young Korean leader and the "regents" around him, including his uncle Jang Song-thaek, to the doomed child warlord Hideyori and the regents put in place at the end of the 16th century by his dying father to guarantee his succession as Japan's ruler.[4] The author also worries about the security threat to Japan's many small islands that extend south from Kyushu to the disputed Senkaku islets. With shrinking Japanese resident populations and a rising China challenging Japanese territorial claims, the author proposes securing the area by promoting tourism, settling the islands with soldiers and militia, and hiring mercenaries. Turning to foreign security corporations, he suggests with sarcasm, would not be too different from Tokyo's general reliance on Washington for defense.

The Route to Becoming a Defense Attaché. In the first chapter, the author defines what a defense attaché is and recalls how he became one. He touches on the problems of postwar Japanese defense attachés operating overseas with meager resources and under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—military attachés of Imperial Japan acted independently of the diplomats and enjoyed far greater resources. Fukuyama writes of how his path to Seoul passed through Columbus, Georgia. After graduating from the NDA, he studied English at the GSDF Intelligence School[5] before entering the US Army's Infantry Officer Basic Course at Ft. Benning. Sent later to the Security Division of the MFA North American Bureau, he came to a professional fork in the road when given the choice of serving as defense attaché in Cairo or Seoul. With his wife preferring to stay nearer to their children, whom they would leave in Tokyo for their education, Fukuyama chose Korea over Egypt.

In the Attaché Corps. In the second chapter, Fukuyama recalls how he prepared for Seoul and what he did once there. In 1988, he returned to the GSDF Intelligence School to study Korean for a year, followed by further training specific to his assignment. His readings included materials on military attachés of Imperial Japan. He found of particular interest the memoir of Onodera Yurie, wife and code clerk of the famous military attaché Maj. Gen. Onodera Makoto, in which she described their service at Baltic posts from the latter half of the 1930s until the end of the Second World War.[6]

Fukuyama also studied current materials, compiled by the GSDF Central Intelligence Service Unit and other sources, regarding the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and the DPRK's Korean People's Army (KPA). Once in Seoul, he gathered intelligence and reported to Tokyo, acting on oral and written taskings from the Defense Agency's Internal Bureau, the staff offices of the three military services, and elsewhere. He watched for signs of collapse from Pyongyang and indications of Seoul and Washington's responses, and he planned for the evacuation from Korea of Japanese residents.[7] He spent much of his time shepherding visiting Japanese VIPs, drinking heavily with his Korean hosts, and seeking intelligence from them on local golf courses.

The author devotes his third chapter to a defense attaché's military duties in general and his in particular. In his last year in Seoul, he led the defense attaché corps at the request of his Korean hosts. He writes of an ROK military official urging him to take the position rather than leave it to the US defense attaché, whom the Korean described as uncooperative. Fukuyama recalls speaking at military events in Korean, with a Korean-American assistant defense attaché interpreting his remarks into English. Responding to critics in the corps who thought he should have spoken in English, Fukuyama writes that his aim was to please his hosts, not foreign military officers.

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[4] The warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi brought Japan's warring states under his rule but died when his son Hideyori was still a child. Before his death he had his most dangerous rivals swear loyalty and agree to serve as a council of regents to protect his son, but the warlord Tokugawa Ieyasu outmaneuvered the others and destroyed the Toyotomi clan to rule Japan as shogun.

[5] Fukuyama describes the GSDF Intelligence School as the postwar version of the Imperial Japanese Army's Nakano School for intelligence officers and commandos. For more on the Nakano School, see my book, *The Shadow Warriors of Nakano* (Brassey's, 2002).

[6] Her memoir, *Baruto-kai no Hotori ni te: Bukan no Tsuma no Daitoa Senso* [By the Baltic Sea: A Military Attaché's Wife and the Greater East Asian War], first appeared in print in 1985, with publisher Kyodo Tsushinsha releasing an updated version in 2005. A Stockholm publisher produced a Swedish translation in 1993, and a German academic society in Tokyo put out a German translation in 1999. See also a review of her book in the *Journal of Intelligence History* 2, no. 2 (Winter 2002), at http://www.intelligence-history.org/reviews2-2.htm#Yuriko.

[7] At the end of the Cold War, analysts and policymakers in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo had doubts that the Pyongyang regime would survive the Soviet Union's end and the PRC's opening to the West.

Assessments of Relationships. In his third chapter, Fukuyama offers the reader several candid assessments. Writing that the GSDF and the ROKA share "common DNA," i.e., both trace their roots to the Imperial Japanese Army, he opines that Japan's military is a better model than the US Army for the ROKA. He recalls a colonel from United States Forces Korea (USFK) telling him, "We are watching Korea every minute," as well as a British colonel remarking to him that the US Army sends officers to the ROK Military Academy to develop intelligence sources. Both comments are part of a section on US monitoring of ROK internal developments, including the oft-told tales of Washington detecting and halting Seoul's secret nuclear weapon program and of the CIA saving the life of dissident (and later president) Kim Tae-jung after the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) abducted him in Tokyo.

Fukuyama also worries that Washington's planned transfer of wartime operational command from USFK to the ROKA in 2015 could raise doubts about the US security commitment and, consequently, encourage Seoul to hedge its bets by forging an alliance with Beijing. He follows this with a section on Korean anti-American sentiment. Fukuyama concludes that, given its proximity to China, and its long history of subordination to the Middle Kingdom, the ROK "over time is certainly going to fall under Chinese influence."

Intelligence Gathering. Fukuyama's fourth chapter covers the spy scandal that erupted in Seoul on the heels of his departure in June 1993. Korean authorities arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison an ROK military intelligence officer, Navy Lt. Cmdr. Ko Yong-chol, and Fuji Television Seoul Bureau Chief Shinohara Masato after Shinohara published (in Japan) classified information given him by Ko. The Korean press depicted Fukuyama as the controller of the arrested men. He admits that he received information from Shinohara during his customary trading of information with Japanese reporters in Seoul,[8] whom he calls his "comrades in arms" in gathering information on the Korean "front line."[9] Denying any active role and claiming to have met Ko only once before his arrest, Fukuyama describes the incident as part of an effort by then President Kim Yong-sam—newly in office as the first civilian to hold that post after decades of military dictatorships—to use the civilian Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) to purge the military of threats to his administration.[10] Fukuyama concludes his case by noting that he later received in Tokyo the ROK Order of National Security Merit in recognition of his work as defense attaché and that the Japanese MFA and Defense Agency's Internal Bureau judged that he had acted within the bounds of his position.

In this chapter, the author also writes on how to gather intelligence in Seoul. For starters, Korean and English are useful tools. Eliciting information from ROK officials and fellow defense attachés by provoking debates and listening carefully to their responses is a sound method. The "power of alcohol" in loosening tongues has been known for years; hard drinking is the norm among Korean officials, and not a day passed without Fukuyama drinking as part of his work as defense attaché. He considers meeting officials by scheduled appointments as the best way to gather intelligence without raising the suspicions of counterintelligence (CI) officers. Assuming his telephone conversations monitored, he would speak at length in ways to put ROK CI at ease.

The Intelligence Deficit. Near the end of the fourth chapter and in his afterword, Fukuyama complains of an intelligence deficit with the United States and calls for developing Japanese intelligence capabilities to make Japan less dependent on the United States. He recalls a meeting with a USFK J-2 in which he felt a "sixth sense" that USFK had been watching him—he suspected the United States had decrypted his cables to Tokyo as part of what he assumes is a general

[8] Fukuyama describes Shinohara as well-read in history and military affairs, an accurate description for a journalist who has written several military histories of Imperial Japan and has served for some years as a director on the board of the Clausewitz Society of Japan (www.clausewitz-jp.com).
[9] Japanese reporters, either "loyal to their embassy comrade" or simply acting in line with guidance from above, merely repeated Korean accounts of the incident, conducting no investigations of their own and obscuring Fukuyama's identity by reporting him only as "F."
[10] Fukuyama's description of Ko's arrest as part of President Kim's campaign of using the civilian NSP (first known as the KCIA, now the National Intelligence Service) against the military follows Ko's own account in a book published in Japan: *Kitachosen Tokushu Butai: Paektusan 3-go Sakusen* [North Korea's Special Forces: Operation Paektusan No. 3] (Kodansha, 2007). Ko in recent years has built a new career as an expert in intelligence and Korean affairs. In another work, he joined popular former Japanese MFA analyst Sato Masaru in penning *Kokka Joho Senryaku* [National Intelligence Strategy] (Kodansha, 2007).

practice of intercepting Japanese communications. He likens the situation to Washington examining Tokyo with an electron microscope while Tokyo squints through a telescope at its ally. For Fukuyama, the intelligence imbalance makes Japan a US "poodle" rather than a partner. In his afterword, he argues that Japan remains today in a "semi-independent" state due to the postwar constitution and bilateral security alliance with the United States. Fukuyama calls for revising the constitution to make clear the military's role in defending the nation and for "establishing powerful intelligence organs" as "minimum conditions" to make Japan more independent.

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics

The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television, by Tricia Jenkins.

General

Spy the Lie: Former CIA Officers Teach You How To Detect Deception, by Philip Houston, Michael Floyd, and Susan Carnicero, with Don Tennant.

US Historical

Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men He Betrayed, by Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille.

Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated al-Qaeda, by Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach.

Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004, by John L. Helgerson.

Pinkerton's War: The Civil War's Greatest Spy and the Birth of the U. S. Secret Service, by Jay Bonansinga.

Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, by Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk.

The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran, by David Crist.

Memoir

Good-bye Dracula!: The Story of a Transylvanian Defector, by Traian Nicola.

Intelligence Abroad—Current

Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad, Second Edition, by Gordon Thomas.

Indian Intelligence: Missing In Action, edited by M.K. Singh.

Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars, by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman.

Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, by Stephen Tankel.

Intelligence Abroad—Historical

Agent Garbo: The Brilliant, Eccentric Secret Agent Who Tricked Hitler and Saved D-Day, Stephan Talty.

Guy Burgess: Revolutionary in an Old School Tie, by Michael Holzman.

The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I, by John Cooper.

The Spy Who Loved: The Secrets and Lives of Christine Granville, Britain's First Female Special Agent of World War II, by Clare Mulley.

The Young Kim Philby: Soviet Spy & British Intelligence Officer, by Edward Harrison.

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Current Topics

The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television, by Tricia Jenkins. (University of Texas Press, 2012), 167 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Tricia Jenkins is an assistant professor in the Film, Television, and Digital Media Department at Texas Christian University. She has published two articles on the relationship between Hollywood and the CIA and now returns to that topic in *The CIA in Hollywood*. The book's title accurately reflects the theme of the book. Her documentation relies heavily on what journalists and scholars have written about movies and TV dramas that depict the CIA and on interviews of some former intelligence—mainly CIA—officers.

The outcome is a six-chapter book that tracks the CIA's initial Cold War contacts in Hollywood and follows their evolution into the digital era. The theme of each chapter is how the agency goes about influencing to its advantage the "texts in both the production and preproduction stages of filmmaking." (11)

Chapter five is of particular interest. It scrutinizes the legal and ethical issues associated with CIA-Hollywood collaboration. Here, Jenkins writes that "the Agency refuses to assist any filmmaker depicting it in an unfavorable light." (97) And while she discounts agency claims that "the CIA frequently stresses that its work in film and television serves to educate the public about the role of intelligence and the mission of the CIA. It also claims to increase the 'accuracy' of texts." But she goes on, "By using this rhetoric the CIA evades the fact that its efforts amount to propaganda that is frequently self-aggrandizing." (104) She argues that CIA cooperation should not depend on the subject matter or whether or not a script is favorable to the CIA. Jenkins acknowledges that others hold different views, and she quotes several authorities who present forceful arguments. (135)

Another chapter of contemporary interest analyzes the contributions of former CIA officers to Hollywood's products. Here she is most concerned about the factual accuracy of films versus their box-office appeals. She discusses the CIA's reaction to *The Good Shepherd* and includes a chart from an article in *Studies in Intelligence* that compares fiction and fact.[1] In the end, though, her preference for "Oliver Stone history" shines through.

As to documentation, secondary sources predominate. They offer some interesting anecdotes, with many familiar names describing the CIA-Hollywood relationship. But not all of her claims about particular "CIA agents" are accurate. At one point she writes about "the CIA's 1950s *recruitment* of [Luigi] Luraschi, the head of domestic and foreign censorship at Paramount Studios" (7) and cites a lengthy article in a scholarly journal to support her point.[2] (emphasis added) But that source does not mention recruitment. And her reference to the Office of Policy Coordination as "a think tank housed at CIA" is inaccurate. The office was the CIA component that conducted covert actions under the direction of the State Department from 1948 to 1951, when it was brought fully under CIA supervision.

In her conclusions, Jenkins returns to her theme that although the CIA seeks to influence Hollywood to create propaganda for moviegoers, scripts that present the CIA negatively should not prevent the Agency from cooperating. She does present alternative views but is not persuaded by them. The CIA in Hollywood is an interesting account of one author's point of view.

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[1] David Robarge, et al., "The Good Shepherd: Intelligence in the Public Media," *Studies in Intelligence* 51, No. 1 (2007): 47–54.
[2] David Eldridge, "'Dear Owen': The CIA, Luigi Luraschi and Hollywood, 1953," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 20, No. 2 (2000): 154.

General

Spy the Lie: Former CIA Officers Teach You How To Detect Deception, by Philip Houston, Michael Floyd, and Susan Carnicero, with Don Tennant. (St. Martin's Press, 2012), 258 pp., index.

The primary authors of *Spy the Lie* are former CIA polygraph examiners. Philip Houston is the principal originator of a methodology for detecting deception in human subjects, and he claims it "can be employed with a degree of effectiveness that equates to or even surpasses what is achieved by means of a polygraph." (3) Does that mean the end of polygraph examinations for certain government employees? The authors don't say, but probably not. They do present a model based on their methodology and then illustrate its use in the field of security and in everyday situations.

After reviewing some general guidelines for trying to detect deception and stressing "that there is no such thing as a human lie detector," (29) they describe "the model." It has one—not immediately intuitive—strategic principle and two specific guidelines. The principle is: "if you want to know if someone is lying, you need to ignore, and thereby not process, truthful behavior." The examples make clear how the principle is applied and why. The two guidelines are *timing* and *clusters*. *Timing* imposes the rule that the examiner "*look* and *listen* for the first deceptive behavior to occur within 5 seconds" (31) after the stimulus question is asked. *Clusters* are two or more deceptive indicators, which may be verbal or nonverbal. (32)

The authors provide specific examples and conditions for the method's application, and graphics to show how these techniques are performed. Casual social interaction on the job is not likely to produce results. Houston provides an example of this when he notes that he worked with Harold Nicholson for more than two years and got no indication that he was a KGB agent. (37–39)

Most of the examples deal with a specific point. But the case of former Congressman Anthony Weiner is presented as a "textbook case study of many of the deceptive behaviors" the authors have discussed. (159ff.)

The authors conclude with a list of questions designed for everyday practical situations, each with some explanatory narrative. (201ff.) A final illustration applies "the model" to the Bob Costas interview of Jerry Sandusky, with analytical comment by the authors.

Spy the Lie will make you think about deception in new ways. It is an interesting, provocative, and valuable contribution to the security profession.

Historical

Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men He Betrayed, By Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille. (Naval Institute Press, 2012), 240 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Jeanne Vertefeuille (pronounced: ver-te-fay), who died on 29 December 2012, began her CIA career in 1954 and specialized in counterintelligence (CI), working the Soviet account.[3] Sandra Grimes, a 26-year veteran of the clandestine service, spent much of her career working against Soviet targets. Their book, *Circle of Treason,* is the first published work that truly offers an insider perspective on the mole hunt that identified Aldrich Ames as a KGB agent. [4]

In the first two chapters of the book, the authors summarize their CIA careers and explain how they came to

[3] Jeanne Vertefeuille died on 29 December 2012. See https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2013-press-releases-statements/message-vertefeuille.html for a statement by the Acting DCIA concerning her death and a link to an article about her on the same site.
[4] The hunt has been analyzed in a number of books, most of which were written by authors with no direct contact with the case, although Pete Earley's *Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames* (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997) benefitted from CIA briefings as well as the author's interviews with Ames himself.

be assigned to the mole hunt. The next four chapters provide background about how the CIA worked against the Soviet target. They also discuss how the Angleton era influenced CI operations and affected subsequent CI procedures. Detailed attention is given to the case of Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov, a Soviet military intelligence officer and the "highest-ranking spy ever run against the Soviet Union during the Cold War." (26) This case introduces the reader to how agents are run by both the FBI and the CIA and does not avoid the controversies that arose between those two agencies.

Having laid the groundwork, Grimes and Vertefeuille then discuss the extraordinary number of agents that were compromised—discovered by the KGB—in the mid-1980s. They identify the key players—including their codenames—and the CIA, FBI, and KGB organizational elements involved. The reader gets a good idea of the complexities of agent handling in the field—especially in Moscow—and how they were supported at CIA Headquarters.

When a series of compromises occurred in relatively quick succession for no obvious reasons during 1985 and 1986, CI alarms went off. Grimes and Vertefeuille learned that some of the cases ended for explainable reasons—the agent, Aleksey Kulak, for example, died of natural causes, and another agent, Sergey Bokhan, was exfiltrated from Athens in May 1985 after he concluded he was under suspicion. (72) Some of the other compromises were eventually explained by KGB defector Vitaliy Yurchenko. He exposed former CIA officer Edward Howard, who defected to the Soviet Union and gave up the prized agent Adolf Tolkachev.[5] Similarly, Czech intelligence officer Karl Koecher, who had penetrated the CIA as a translator, identified Aleksandr Ogorodnikov. But many more losses appeared inexplicable. It was at this point that the CIA formed what came to be called "the back room" group—which included Grimes and Vertefeuille —and the mole hunt began.

Circle of Treason looks at what was done—and by whom, and when—and includes operational details. These range from the formation of databases of thousands of reports, to the creation of detailed chronologies, to the handling of KGB deception ploys that at first glance seemed to be promising explanations for the losses. Grimes and Vertefeuille explain the other possible causes that were considered. Throughout this process, bureaucratic factors complicated matters, including disagreements with the FBI and reassignments of back-room group members. When new compartmentation measures were established to protect new recruitments and the losses stopped as suddenly as they had begun, it appeared that the worst was over, although the original compromises had not been explained. The authors persevered and devised extraordinary measures to finally expose Ames.

Grimes and Vertefeuille's discussion of these matters helps explain why Ames was not identified until 1992 and not arrested until 1994. Only one issue is not dealt with directly: why a list of officers with knowledge of all the compromised cases was not compiled until 1991.

Grimes and Vertefeuille conclude their narrative with some candid comments about the aftermath of the case. They are critical of the FBI public statement "that gave the impression that they [the FBI] had done all the real work while we [the CIA] had provided cooperation and support." (149) The authors are equally hard on themselves in their discussion of the lessons learned—failure to keep Congress informed and poor documentation in terms of periodic progress reports are but two examples. On the positive side, they note that generally excellent cooperation with the FBI at the working level was an important factor in the group's eventual success.

The endnotes do not refer to primary source documents, as this is a firsthand account. The authors do comment critically on other books on this and related cases, and they include a useful chronology that aids in following events.

Circle of Treason is an enormously important account of a complex, often frustrating case, written by those who did much of the work to solve it.

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[5] See Barry Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky: An Exceptional Espionage Operation" in *Studies in Intelligence* 47*, no. 3.* This article is accessible online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no3/article02.html.

Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated al-Qaeda, by Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach. (Public Affairs, 2012), 308 pp., endnotes, appendices, index.

The concept of "find, fix and finish" will be familiar to those who have served in the military and have studied its history. The authors have used it here as a guide for thinking about how the United States has functioned in the war on terror. They show with many examples how the concept was used before 9/11 and how it has been adapted since then to deal with key members of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Throughout, they demonstrate the key role of intelligence as it has adapted to the anti-terrorist mission—including the use of rendition and various collection and interrogation techniques, the controversy surrounding them, and the use of intelligence obtained through these methods.

Their examples include operations in war zones and in "friendly" countries—Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia—to capture or kill wanted terrorist leaders, and against homegrown terrorists. Each case illustrates the complex legal conditions that must be met to pursue the target, whether overseas or in the United States. The successful hunt for Abu Zarqawi, one of the last important figures to be killed in an F-16 strike, shows what it takes to operate in a war zone. The case of Najibullah Zazi, who pled guilty to planning to blow up New York City subways, is an important domestic exemplar. On the joint action front, the authors examine at length the British-US efforts—Operation Overt—that caught UK homegrown terrorists planning to place bombs on aircraft flying to America. And then there is a special category of the bumbling terrorist—the "shoe bomber" and the "underwear bomber," whose bad luck acted as wake-up calls.

There is a chapter on the killing of Bin Laden, in which the authors summarize how the evolution in tactics since 9/11 made success possible. They do not dwell on the assault itself, but rather discuss the clues and miscues that led to the operation. They also explain why the SEAL team was placed under the authority of the CIA, rather than that of the Defense Department.

The final chapter covers 13 lessons and succinctly re-emphasizes points touched on earlier. Most are straightforward. A few examples will establish the tone. First, "too much bureaucracy impedes counterterrorism and harms national security." And the characterization of Pakistan as "a critical but deeply unreliable ally" points to the difficulty the US government faces. A more controversial point is the authors's recommendation that all captured terrorists be tried in US courts. Also really tough is their suggestion that we need a narrative to counter the jihadi message and persuade less-than-fully dedicated radical Islamists to change sides.

Find, Fix, Finish is documented by well-known, mostly secondary sources, so there is little new in it. Still, the insights and context the authors provide make this a thoughtful, worthwhile contribution.

Getting To Know The President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004, by John L. Helgerson. (Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 2012), 208 pp., footnotes, photos, index.

Ten days after the 1992 presidential election, John Helgerson, then serving as deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, briefed President-elect Clinton and his staff on the *President's Daily Brief* (PDB) and other intelligence matters. While preparing for the briefing, Helgerson discovered that the "CIA had provided pre-inaugural support to all eight presidents elected since the Agency was founded but had no systematic records of those efforts." (3) After reviewing what material was available, Helgerson determined to create a record of past briefings and make sure detailed records were kept in the future. Drawing on these data in the mid-1990s, Helgerson wrote a summary of the arrangements made with and the general topics briefed to all the presidents—and some candidates—from Truman through Clinton. That work was published in 1996 as *Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1992.*[6] The present work updates that edition to include the George W. Bush administration.

President Truman originated the briefings because, as he recalled, "there were so many things I did not know

[6] John L. Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1992* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1996). This publication is available online from the Center for the Study of Intelligence at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-briefings-of-presidential-candidates/index.htm.

when I became President." (10) Helgerson describes the Eisenhower briefings, some given by the DCI, Gen. Walter Smith, who had been Ike's wartime chief of staff. Helgerson doesn't include much on the substance of the briefings, but there is a good deal on the atmosphere and the effort to establish a sound relationship. He takes this approach throughout the book, showing how each president and vice president viewed intelligence and the need for briefings differently. Some wanted direct contact with the CIA's briefer, as was the case with George W. Bush. Others—Carter and Reagan, for example—preferred to read the material in private or be briefed by the national security advisor. In any case, the agency had to accommodate these varying desires and the challenges of time and travel.

From the CIA's perspective, an ancillary purpose of the briefings was to take advantage of the opportunity to establish a relationship with the president for continued briefings. As Helgerson relates, however, the relationships with Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter were never what agency leaders had hoped, though each for different reasons.

In the final chapter, Helgerson presents some observations of his own and many from presidents he interviewed for the study. These add immensely to the value of the book because they include comments about the relationship between the CIA and the president when he was in office. In an overall assessment, Helgerson concludes that the relationship "went downhill after Truman" (178) for the next 25 years. How and when it was improved makes interesting history.

Getting To Know The President is a historical treasure for those interested in intelligence and the presidency.

Pinkerton's War: The Civil War's Greatest Spy and the Birth of the U.S. Secret Service, by Jay Bonansinga. (Lyons Press, 2012), 235 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

The Civil War sesquicentennial is an appropriate time to publish tributes to those who made major contributions to the war effort. Jay Bonansinga has attempted to do just that with *Pinkerton's War*. The book covers all the usual topics: Pinkerton's Scottish origins, his role in getting Lincoln safely through Baltimore, and his service as General McClellan's intelligence officer. The narrative is replete with exciting stories and reconstructed conversations. It is a genuine entertainment.

Unfortunately, Bonansinga relies on some mediocre secondary sources and embellished, firsthand accounts. The best source on Civil War intelligence was written by the late Edwin Fishel, a retired National Security Agency analyst.[7] Using primary source documents, Fishel presented an accurate story of Pinkerton's role. He also discussed the many fictional accounts that have contributed to the persistent myths surrounding Civil War espionage. Pinkerton's memoir, *The Spy of the Rebellion*,[8] heads the list of largely fictional, embellished accounts, followed closely by Rose Greenhow's memoir, *My Imprisonment.*[9] Bonansinga relies heavily on both and on other undocumented accounts that repeat the same stories.[10] Thus his unsourced statement that "Lincoln and his top men agreed to establish a new agency to be known as The Secret Service of the Army of the Potomac—under the management and control of one Allan Pinkerton" (143) is at best exaggeration and, at worst, fiction. Similarly, his account of Greenhow's espionage, based on her discredited memoirs, should be discounted.

In short, Allan Pinkerton was not the Civil War's greatest spy, nor did he have anything to do with the US Secret Service. Readers desiring to know about Civil War intelligence should look elsewhere.

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[7] Edwin C. Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War* (Houghton Mifflin, 1996).
[8] Allan Pinkerton, *The Spy of the Rebellion: Being a True History of the Spy System of the United States Army During the Late Rebellion, Revealing Many Secrets of the War Hitherto Not Made Public* (Samuel Stodder, 1883).
[9] Rose O'Neal Greenhow, *My Imprisonment and the First Year of Abolition Rule at Washington* (Richard Bentley, 1863).
[10] Arthur Ormont, *Master Detective: Allan Pinkerton* (Julian Messner, 1965).

Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, by Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk. (The University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 515 pp., endnotes, appendices, index.

The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) was established in 1956 by President Eisenhower. (1) It was renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1961 by President Kennedy. (52) It acquired its present name, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) under President George W. Bush in 2008. (310) With one exception, the board has served every president since its establishment. The exception was Jimmy Carter, who did not activate the board. The bipartisan members are appointed by the president and have varied in number from eight to 12, except during the Reagan administration, when there were 19. Members serve part-time without pay (expenses are reimbursed), meet about twice a month, and have a small permanent staff in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building by the White House. The board conducts studies at the request of the president, though it can choose topics on its own.

Privileged and Confidential, the first history of the PIAB, tells the story of this "smallest and most obscure part" (1) of the Intelligence Community. The authors note at the outset that the PIAB "has developed something of an inconsistent reputation among the intelligence cognoscenti as either a cushy 'do-nothing' panel that simply offers additional slots for the 'plum book'[11] with which to reward political cronies or a highly politicized cabal that can meddle in Intelligence Community affairs to the annoyance of the director of central intelligence (DCI), the director of national intelligence (DNI), and even the president." They go on to stress, however, that it has also "made some signal contributions," especially in the technology area. (1)

The book has a chapter on each administration, describing how and when the board was reconstituted and employed. The narrative includes descriptions of the studies, the turf battles, the advice given the president, and the authors' assessments of its overall contribution. Appendices at the end list the members, meeting dates, and reports produced. The chapter on the Reagan administration exemplifies PIAB operations, both helpful—as in its study of CIA security practices (251)—and irritating to the DCI, as in its unwanted examination into the "Year of the Spy" cases.

The documentation for *Privileged and Confidential* is excellent, even though most PIAB files are exempted from normal FOIA rules. There have been enough files declassified to provide basic details, and the balance of the story has been acquired through interviews and reliable secondary sources.

A chapter of conclusions is well worth close attention. The authors summarize the PIAB's record, comment on its bumpy contributions, and make recommendations for improvement. The final portion of the book contains biographical sketches of the PIAB members. *Privileged and Confidential* fills an information gap, one many didn't know existed.[12]

The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran, by David Crist. (Penguin Press, 2012), 637 pp., endnotes, photos, maps, index.

The mention of Iran today brings to mind its nuclear enrichment program, Western sanctions, the antics of its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Stuxnet, the cyberwarfare weapon. These issues have increased tensions between Iran and the United States, which have existed since the Iranian revolution in 1979. In *The Twilight War*, David Crist, a Defense Department historian with a PhD in Middle East history and former Marine intelligence officer who served in the Middle East, examines the history of the entire postrevolutionary period with a view to understanding the bilateral relationship and the efforts of both sides "to bridge their differences." (572)

[11] So called because of the color of its cover, the Plum Book—*United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions*—is published just after every presidential election, alternately, by the Senate and the House and identifies by name the presidentially appointed positions within the Federal Government.

[12] See also in this issue a review by Samuel Cooper-Wall.

Crist notes that after the 1979 revolution, the United States only gradually realized its Cold War policies toward prerevolutionary Iran no longer applied. He cites a CIA officer's summation: "We now had a plan to defend those who don't want to be defended against those who are not going to attack." (81) New plans were required. Crist describes how they were developed and applied at both the strategic and tactical levels. And, as a subtheme, he explains the supporting role of the intelligence agencies.

Many of the events Crist covers—the hostage crisis, the Iran-Contra affair, the Iran-Iraq War, and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon and the Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia—will be familiar to most readers. Others—for example, Iran's ship-mining operations and the actions in Iraq of its Quds force, the extraterritorial operations unit of the Revolutionary Guard—have received less media attention. Of particular interest are the shooting engagements between US units and Iranian naval, air, and ground forces in the Persian Gulf during and after the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). These Crist describes in vivid detail from two perspectives. The first is that of the participants themselves—the pilots, ship crews, and Special Forces units involved. The second considers the command structure—civilian and military—at CENTCOM and in Washington. Crist reveals an illustrative bit of spiteful intra-Navy flag officer rivalry during the 1980s that involved his father, Marine Corps Gen. George Crist, then the commander of CENTCOM. But the book's primary emphasis is on the prickly military issues and the foreign policy aspects of these engagements.

With regard to US intelligence and Iran in the postrevolutionary era, Crist begins the story with a chapter titled "A Den of Spies." Here we read of CIA efforts to rebuild its spy networks in the 1980s despite Director of Central Intelligence Casey's primary concern with the Soviet threat. The focus was on agent recruitment and handling, and the results were mixed. Crist notes that "the agents did provide useful information that helped Washington undermine Iran's military adventures." (76) One agent reported an attempt by Iran to purchase Exocet missiles. Another provided coordinates for command and control facilities. And Reza Kahlili, a member of the Revolutionary Guard, alerted the CIA to a planned Iranian attack in Saudi Arabia that was brutally thwarted.

On the negative side, after a failed recruitment attempt was reported to the MOIS—Ministry of Intelligence and Security—most of the agents were arrested and, by 1989, executed. Thus Crist concludes, the "final act of the Reagan Iranian saga turned into one of the biggest disasters in the history of American intelligence." (373) Crist describes attempts made during subsequent administrations to neutralize the MOIS in Iran, the contribution of defectors, and the struggle by Special Forces units to shut down the Quds Force operations. (536)

In the end, Crist concludes that despite attempts by both sides to "bridge their differences…distrust permeates the relationship. Three decades of twilight war have hardened both sides." (572) Crist provides a fine account of US Iranian relations since 1979, but he holds out little hope of a solution any time soon.

Memoir

Good-bye Dracula!: The Story of a Transylvanian Defector, by Traian Nicola. (Outskirts Press, 2012), 178 pp., photos, no index.

Traian Nicola and his family defected to the United States in December 1979 while he was stationed in Islamabad as an officer of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Department (Departamentul de Informatii Externe [DIE]). They settled in Virginia, where he is now retired. Nicola decided to write his memoir for two reasons. The first was to show what life was like in communist Romania even for members of the elite DIE, whose officers had privileges most others did not. The second was his impression that "nostalgia for Communist times is increasing in the former Soviet Bloc countries as well as in Russia." (1) He writes that he hopes his story will be a reality check for those inclined to return in that direction. There is at least one other reason for giving the book attention: Nicola is the only former DIE officer to publish an English-language memoir with firsthand insights into Cold War counterintelligence history.

Nicola's story of his childhood and education under the strict Romanian communist regime is typical of the period. He attended university and graduated with an economics degree, although music had been his first choice. On graduation, he was assigned to Chimimport, an export-import organization connected to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. A brief trip to West Germany gave him a taste of the West, and foreign travel became his career goal.

Just over a year later, he was asked to join the DIE. He jumped at the chance—especially since foreign travel was a real possibility. He describes the DIE and military training that prepared him for recruiting Romanian citizens who traveled overseas. Eventually, he was selected to serve as a press attaché in the Romanian embassy in Japan. By then, he was married with children. The family spent two happy years in Japan. Nicola describes his activities there in some detail. Then, in May 1978, he and his family traveled to Bucharest on vacation. Before Nicola could return to Japan, Maj. Gen. Ion Pacepa of the Securitate (the moniker for Romania's domestic security agency, Departamentul Securitătii Statului) defected, and all assignments for DIE officers were put on hold. Told he was being reassigned to Islamabad, Nicola at first refused to go. When the pressure became too great, he accepted, only to be told he would have to leave his baby daughter behind in Bucharest. Faced with that condition, he again refused. In the end, he was given a waiver and allowed to bring his family to Pakistan, a decision the DIE would regret.

Good-bye Dracula! is a moving story and an impressive reminder of what life was like for anyone seeking freedom in a Soviet Bloc nation during the Cold War.

Intelligence Abroad—Current

Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad, Sixth Edition, by Gordon Thomas. (Thomas Dunne Books, 2012), 756 pp., bibliography, index.

Welsh author Gordon Thomas has written more than 50 books, several of them on the British, American, and Israeli intelligence agencies.[13] His books on these agencies share features that, for serious readers of intelligence literature, have become Thomas's trademark: they are well written, badly documented, and packed with errors. The revised and updated edition of *Gideon's Spies* does not disappoint.

The first 405 pages are the same as the 2005 edition, errors included. For example, Thomas repeats his claim that the man who assassinated Georgi Markov with a poison pellet shot from an umbrella was "a KGB agent" rather than a Bulgarian. (128) The new edition has 12 new chapters (296 pages) that update selected topics and add new ones. An example of the former is an update on agent MEGA, the purported Mossad penetration (never identified) of the White House during the Clinton administration. According to Thomas, the FBI got it wrong in the first place now says that the penetration occurred during the George H.W Bush administration. (453) One new item deals with the death of Usama bin Ladin; Thomas notes that "on 2 May 2011, *technology* led the US Navy SEALs to bin Ladin's redoubt in Pakistan." (723, emphasis added) Another new case is the account concerning Ashraf Marwan, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's son-in-law. Mossad claimed him as a critical agent. The Egyptians said he was their double agent. Thomas doesn't present the arguments for either position but adds, without documentation, that Marwan was "cultivated [by] the KGB, MI6, and the CIA." (702) Finally, Thomas's judgment can be called into question for the comment that Mossad is "the one service that still insisted [sic] on a prime role for its human spies." (723)

The problem with these and all the other cases discussed in *Gideon's Spies* is that old errors persist, new ones have been added, quotes are not sourced, and there is no other documentation. The work is entertaining but not reliable.

[13] See for example: Gordon Thomas, *Secrets & Lies: A History of CIA Mind Control & Germ Warfare* (Octavo Editions, 2007); *Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence Inside MI5 and MI6* (St. Martin's Press, 2009); *Gideon's Spies: Mossad's Secret Warriors* (Macmillan, 1999).

Indian Intelligence: Missing In Action, edited by, M.K. Singh. (Prashant Publishing House, 2012), 280 pp., bibliography, index.

M.K. Singh, a social science graduate from Delhi University, is a scholar of India's intelligence system. The subtitle of his book sums up his belief that the intelligence profession occupies a secondary position in India's government. It is, he suggests, subordinated in terms of advancement to all other professions. Thus, he argues, "it is only the second grade that thinks of gravitating towards intelligence," a field that requires the highest-quality personnel. (4)

To put the present situation in perspective, Singh reviews the four intelligence agencies that comprise India's intelligence community—the Intelligence Bureau (IB), responsible for domestic security and modeled after MI5; the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which functions like Special Branch of Scotland Yard; the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which conducts foreign intelligence operations like MI6; and Military Intelligence, which is under the Army.

Indian Intelligence has a chapter examining each agency in detail. These are followed by chapters on intelligence failures caused by leaks to the media, inadequate training, technical deficiencies, poor performance by clandestine personnel, and the agencies' failure to cooperate with one another and with other nations' services. Examples are provided.

Having defined the problem, Singh proposes reforms, the principal one being legislative charter and oversight. An entire chapter is devoted to how these should be applied to RAW operations. A final chapter looks at the intelligence community from the top down, with emphasis on knowledge management, essential leadership characteristics, and recommendations for a "new intelligence system." (259ff.)

Indian Intelligence has no source notes and thus must be used with caution. But for those interested in studying foreign intelligence services from an organizational and operational perspective, it provides a good starting point.

Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars, by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman. (Levant Books, 2012), 353 pp., endnotes, index.

CBS journalist Dan Raviv and Israeli journalist Yossi Melman published their first book on Israeli intelligence, *The Imperfect Spies,* in 1989 in the United Kingdom.[14] A revised version, *Every Spy A Prince*, appeared in the United States in 1990.[15] *Spies Against Armageddon* is an update of both, with some excisions and much new material. The book treats the three principal agencies—Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman (military intelligence)—as seen through the eyes of their directors. The Lakam, or the Science Liaison Bureau, the agency that recruited Jonathan Pollard, the authors note, has been disbanded, although they state that another unnamed group—responsible for "Israeli's deterrent capability"—has taken its place. (x) Two other agencies have been added to Raviv's treatment: Malab—Security of Defense Information—and Nativ, which is responsible for Jewish immigration.

Spies Against Armageddon begins with an account of how Israel has dealt with its most important external threat, Iran. The story focuses on the changes Mossad Director Meir Dagan made during his tenure (2002–2010) and addresses the mostly covert political, diplomatic, economic, and psychological operations the Israelis have conducted. (4ff.) According to the authors, Israel employed Iranian Jews, who had fled to Israel after the 1979 revolution, to undertake risky missions in Iran. (14)

The balance of the book covers Israeli intelligence operations from the early 1950s to the present. Some will be familiar, for example, the capture of Adolf Eichmann in 1960, the aftermath of the killings of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, battles with the PLO, and the Pollard affair. Many are new to this book. Take for example, the honey trap run in 1954

[14] Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *The Imperfect Spies: The History of Israeli Intelligence* (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989).
[15] Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy A Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community* (Houghton Mifflin, 1990).

against Avner Israel, an immigrant to Israel from Bulgaria who had decided to work for Egypt. (21–23) Another new case is the recruitment of Otto Skorzeny while he was assigned to train Nasser's bodyguards. (92–93) The assassination of various terrorists receives considerable attention. One operation employed "death by chocolates," a case in which Wadi Haddad's favorite chocolates were poisoned, leading gradually to his death. (220) The Dubai operation (302–307) in which the Israelis used false passports while following their target created an international incident. The failed attempt to kill Khaleid Meshaal in Jordan (293) is also included.

There is also an account of raids in 1981 on Osirak (the Iraqi nuclear facility) (223–24) and in 2007 on a Syrian nuclear reactor. (316–18) The unusual case of double agent Ashraf Marwan, Nasser's son-in-law, is of interest since the Egyptians say he was really their mole in Mossad. (165–68) One recent story may have solved a mystery. According to the authors, the Israeli ambassador in Washington called a colleague on an open phone and mentioned MEGA—the Israeli name for the United States. The call was intercepted by NSA and passed to the FBI, which concluded MEGA was an Israeli agent. The hunt was on. A number of Jewish Americans associated with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were surveilled, and several were indicted on unrelated charges before the FBI learned the meaning of MEGA. (244–45) British author Gordon Thomas heard a different version of the story and wrote in *Gideon's Spies* (a book also reviewed here), that the Israelis had an agent code-named MEGA in the White House. Thomas still insists he is correct. Unfortunately, neither book cites a source.

In the end, *Spies Against Armageddon* returns to the topic of the Iranian nuclear threat, one that is now complicated by new political uncertainties in the Middle East and by the emergence of cyberspace as a new theater of war. Relying mainly on interviews, many unattributed, the authors present a balanced, often exciting view of Israeli intelligence.

Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, by Stephen Tankel. (Columbia University Press, 2011), 352 pp., endnotes, index.

In November 2008, 10 terrorists conducted an attack in Mumbai, India. They struck 2 hotels—setting one on fire—as well as a restaurant filled with foreign tourists, a railway station busy with travelers, and a Jewish community center. One hundred and sixty-six people died. Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure) was responsible. Stephen Tankel, an assistant professor at American University, had been studying the group before the attacks, and he continued his research in Pakistan and India after they occurred. Tankel argues that Lashkar promotes its own version of Islam and at the same time "is both a proxy used to further Pakistan's national interests against India *and* a pan-Islamist group dedicated to waging jihad against all enemies of Islam." (2) *Storming the World Stage* presents his case.

Tankel begins with a historical review of Pakistan as the defender of Islam against Hindu India. This mission becomes the fundamental element of Lashkar ideology, its reason for waging jihad. Tankel discusses at length Lashkar's rise in importance, its organizational base in Pakistan, its finances, and its implementation of various social programs that promote its ideology in Pakistan. But most important to its long-range survival is its complex relationship with Pakistan's government and its institutions, particularly the military and its intelligence service, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

As Tankel shows, Lashkar also deals with competing militant groups and their frequently shifting alliances. By the end of the 1990s, Lashkar was the best-trained group fighting in the Hindu-Muslim struggle in Kashmir. It was also supporting militant groups in India proper. (61, 183) And though its links to al-Qaeda remain obscure, after 9/11, the idea of contributing to the global jihad became a major goal. The attack in Mumbai "launched Lashkar onto the world Stage." (205).

Much of what is known about the planning for the attacks comes from a Pakistani-American—David Headley, born Daood Galani—who was arrested by US authorities in connection with another terrorist plot (221) and gave up information as part of a plea agreement. He said had been recruited to do the site surveillance for the Mumbai attack, and he had records to back up his story. Tankel used media accounts, interviews, and court documents to piece together the gruesome story. Among the many details he provides is how their leader in Pakistan directed the terrorists in Mumbai by

cell phone. Sadly, India was warned of the attacks beforehand but was unable to react in time.

In his analysis of the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks Tankel examines the actions taken by both India and Pakistan. He concludes that Lashkar will survive, as its links to the Pakistani government and its institutions are firm, and the group's infrastructure is well established. And more importantly, he answers yes to the question, "Does Lashkar threaten the United States and its Western allies at home and abroad?" (266) *Storming The World Stage* is sobering analysis.

Intelligence Abroad—Historical

Agent Garbo: The Brilliant, Eccentric Secret Agent Who Tricked Hitler and Saved D-Day, Stephan Talty. (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 301 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The story of WW II double agent Juan Pujol—codenamed GARBO—is so well known that the first question that comes to mind is, what more can be said? Author Stephan Talty has found some new material, based mostly on family letters and US National Archive documents, that does add a bit to Pujol's personal story. He tells more about Pujol's origins in Spain than has been revealed previously, including the comment that he "had failed at almost everything he'd tried in his thirty-two years: student, businessman, cinema magnate, soldier." (xv) Only after WW II began did Pujol find his calling—espionage.

Talty tells how MI6 and MI5 came to accept Pujol after repeatedly rebuffing his attempts to volunteer his services. Talty goes on to recount how Pujol—as GARBO, a name he chose for himself—helped convince the Germans that he was a valuable agent. When he reported that the main D-Day invasion landing would be at the Pas de Calais, not Normandy, the Germans accepted his assessment.

After the war, writes Talty, MI5 gave Pujol half of the £17,554 (nearly $1 million in today's currency) he was paid by the Abwehr—money MI5 held during the war —and sent him on his way. (236) His marriage disintegrated, and Talty adds some details to what is known of this phase of Pujol's life. When it became too much to bear, Pujol, with the help of MI6, was declared dead and disappeared into South America. In the early 1980s, he was found there by author Nigel West, a story West and Pujol tell in their book, *GARBO: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent Ever.*[16] Based on interviews with Pujol's family, Talty tells of their life following his faked death and of their surprise when they learned he was still alive.

Talty's *Agent GARBO* is a good portrait of Pujol the man, weaknesses and all.

Guy Burgess: Revolutionary in an Old School Tie, by Michael Holzman. (Chelmsford Press, 2012), 386 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, appendix, index.

Hundreds of books have been written about the so-called Cambridge Five—Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross and Guy Burgess. Philby and Cairncross wrote memoirs. The careers of Maclean and Blunt were recorded in biographies. Only Burgess escaped the attention of historians.[17] Michael Holzman has now filled that gap.

Drawing on correspondence, diaries, and secondary accounts, the book reveals something more than was previously known about his family background and his education at Dartmouth Naval College, Eton, and Cambridge Trinity. At each venue, we learn about the friends who would play roles later in his life. Then, as if to explain or justify Burgess's turn to communism, Holzman comments at length on Britain's class structure and the social and political conditions of the era.

[16] Juan Pujol with Nigel West, *GARBO: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent Ever* (Grafton, 1986)
[17] For an annotated bibliography of many of the books, see Rufina Philby et al., *The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years* (Fromm International, 2000), 297ff.

But as Holzman points out, Burgess was a member of the upper class and took full advantage of that condition. At Trinity, he was considered a brilliant, if eccentric, student. Later, at the BBC and the Foreign Office, he did well.

This is the reputation Holzman clearly thinks should be Burgess's legacy. Thus, early in the book, Holzman says that his reputation as a "traitor, exceptionally alcoholic, a homosexual [with its then negative implications], dirty and so forth. A person of no importance" should be balanced against his entire life. (9) But with the exception of his importance as a Soviet agent—which few have discounted—Holzman's views notwithstanding, the narrative does go on to point out that Burgess possessed all the negative characteristics and displayed them without apparent regret. (282)

The balance of the book follows Burgess's social and professional life after Cambridge including his travels, his work with the BBC, MI5 (171), Section D of MI6, and the Foreign Office. The subplot during these episodes is his recruitment by the NKVD and his relationships with the rest of the Cambridge Five. To all this, Holzman adds some new items about Burgess's health and his expertise in Far Eastern Affairs, (279, 281) but there is little new, if anything, about his espionage.

From time to time, Holzman adds an interesting item without any documentation. For example, a footnote that alludes to difficulties Burgess suffered from a case of the mumps leaves readers wondering how Holzman could know such an intimate detail. (19) In another instance, while discussing a British military plan to attack the Soviet Union at the end of WW II, Holzman writes that "Burgess was best positioned to obtain it" for the Soviets, but he does not provide a source or explain why, since Burgess worked in the Foreign Office at that point in time. (220)

There are several errors worth noting in the book. Philby was not in MI5, as stated, though this may have been a typo since he gets it right elsewhere. (221) More important, Holzman's claim that Burgess "maintained the network initiated by Arnold Deutsch" is incorrect. There was never a network, and Burgess was an independent agent, as were the other four. Likewise, Holzman claims that Burgess facilitated the work of "Blunt, Cairncross and Philby" (349)—not so for the first two, and only occasionally for Philby, whom he served as a courier from time to time.

Guy Burgess: Revolutionary in an Old School Tie argues that Burgess was a dedicated communist and notes that he claimed to be happy in Moscow. But for some readers at least, the opposite impression is created, perhaps unintentionally. One question that Holzman does not address is why Burgess defected when he did. That is left to the next biographer.

The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I, by John Cooper. (Pegasus, 2013), 448 pp., endnotes, photos, map, index.

Sir Francis Walsingham's modern reputation, writes British historian John Cooper, "depends more than anything on his work as a spymaster, his ability to infiltrate and expose Catholic plots which were attempting to dethrone Elizabeth I." (92) And while it provides historical background that tracks Walsingham's rise to power and his life at Elizabeth's court, *The Queen's Agent* focuses on his role as spymaster.

Cooper is by no means the first to follow this path, and he draws heavily on his predecessors. His treatment of the Throckmorton and Babington plots to overthrow the queen and put Mary, Queen of Scots, on the throne offer nothing new, though the tradecraft employed by Walsingham's agents makes for interesting reading. The same is true of Cooper's discussion of Walsingham's role in detecting the Spanish Armada.

Cooper does offer a new interpretation of the Ridolfi plot, one of the three main conspiracies that Walsingham and his colleagues managed to thwart. Cooper's account is notably different from that provided by Conyers Read in his three-volume biography of Walsingham. That Ridolfi, an Italian Catholic banker in London, had plotted against the crown was well documented. It was the failure to put him in prison after interrogation that raised questions. Read notes that "it is a little hard to understand why Ridolfi got off so easily."[18] Derek Wilson suggested that Ridolfi may have been "turned" but does not pursue the matter.[19] Stephen

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[18] Conyers Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* (Harvard University Press, 1925), Volume 1, 67.

Alford hints that Ridolfi was a plant.[20] Cooper, on the other hand, makes a plausible case that Walsingham, in conjunction with William Cecil (his boss) and the Queen, recruited Ridolfi as a double agent.

In the chapter titled "Security Services," Cooper reviews the development of Walsingham's unique espionage network. He also describes the network's similarities and differences when compared to modern services. He adds that "if the Elizabethan security services had a headquarters then it was at Walsingham's own house." (167) The details surrounding some of the agents mentioned—for example, Christopher Marlowe—are a mix of fact and myth, as Cooper points out. (179)

The Queen's Agent tells a famous story well, while adding some new ideas.

The Spy Who Loved: The Secrets and Lives of Christine Granville, Britain's First Female Special Agent of World War II, by Clare Mulley. (Macmillan, 2012), 426 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Krystyna Skarbek, the daughter of Count Jerzy and Countess Stefania Skarbek, was born in Warsaw (part of Russia at the time), on 1 May 1908. Her British death certificate records the passing in 1952 of one Christine Granville, age 37, a "former wife." *The Spy Who Loved* is the story of why she changed her name, cut 7 years off of her age, and became a British subject, (2) only to be stabbed to death by a would-be lover in a cheap London hotel.

British author Clare Mulley is not the first to write about Granville. Madeleine Masson and one of her former resistance colleagues penned a 1975 biography that was considered hagiographic, as was a similar treatment by another of Masson's wartime colleagues that was never published.[21] Granville is also mentioned in many accounts of wartime resistance operations. All agree about her courage—"steady nerve, feminine cunning and sheer brass."[22] But the details of her life vary, in many cases thanks to her own embellishments, which obscured her promiscuity and the reality of her accomplishments. *The Spy Who Loved* sets the record straight.

Mulley follows Christine from her society-loving days in prewar Warsaw (where she was crowned "Miss Ski" in a Polish beauty contest), through two marriages, (23) to her travels with her second husband in Europe and South Africa. In Cape Town when Poland was invaded in 1939, they boarded a ship bound for Southampton, England. From then on, the story focuses on Christine's wartime exploits as a British agent, her many affairs, the awards she received, and her attempts to adjust to civilian life after the war.

After the fall of Poland, Christine decided that she wanted to help her native country by returning clandestinely with documents that would show the resistance movement developing in Poland and that Britain had not forgotten them. The story of how she convinced the Secret Intelligence Service to let her join Section D, its prewar covert action arm, and conduct several extremely difficult missions into Poland from Hungary is exciting reading.

But Christine's adventures didn't end there. When the Germans were about to occupy Hungary in 1944, she induced, if not seduced, the British ambassador in Budapest to issue her a British passport with the name Christine Granville—her name from then on—and escaped to Cairo via Bulgaria and Turkey. It was in Cairo that she joined the SOE and was made a FANY (First Aid Nursing Yeomanry), a distinction that gave her the official status used by female SOE agents. While she waited for an assignment, the war in North Africa ended, and after an extended period of inactivity, Christine decided she could be of service to the resistance in occupied France.

How Christine managed to gain approval, be promoted to honorary captain in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), and be dropped by parachute into France is an extraordinary adventure in itself. Her operations in France, using her fluency in French and Ger-

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[19] Derek Wilson, *Sir Francis Walsingham: A Courtier in an Age of Terror* (Carroll & Graf, Publishers, 2007), 69. For another interpretation, see Stephen Budiansky, *Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of Modern Espionage* (Viking, 2005), 74–75.

[20] Stephen Alford, *Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I* (Yale University Press, 2008), 168.

[21] Madeleine Masson, *Christine: a Search for Christine Granville, OBE, GM, Croix de Guerre* (Hamish Hamilton, 1975).

[22] M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France; 1940–1944* (HMSO, 1966), 363.

man, were the highlight of her career. At one point, she entered the prison camp where the leader of her resistance group was awaiting execution, contacted the Gestapo, and persuaded the officer in charge to release the leader and surrender to the resistance. When the Germans were driven from France, she arranged to be sent back to Poland to join the resistance there, but the war ended before she could undertake that mission.

Christine Granville thrived on excitement and danger and never adapted to a postwar life in which women were expected to return to homemaking, secretarial, or administrative avocations. Mulley explains how Christine tried to do so while keeping in touch with various lovers from her days in the resistance. Her final job as a stewardess on a cruise ship led to her murder.

The Spy Who Loved is very well documented and a pleasure to read.

The Young Kim Philby: Soviet Spy & British Intelligence Officer, by Edward Harrison. (University of Exeter Press, 2012), 232 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The first book about Kim Philby, the Soviet agent in the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), was published in 1968.[23] Since then, more than 150, including Philby's memoir, *My Silent War* (also published in 1968), have dwelled on various aspects of the case. These include his adoption of communist ideology at Cambridge, his underground activities in Vienna after graduation, his recruitment by the Soviets, his time in Spain as a journalist reporting on the Franco side for *The Times*, and his career in the SIS.

In *The Young Kim Philby*, British historian Edward Harrison also covers these topics, but with a difference. Using newly discovered letters and diaries, recently released archival documents, and interviews with former acquaintances and colleagues, he fills in some gaps in Philby's career. For example, he reveals that Philby's socialist ideas were first instilled at his prep school, Westminster, and not at Cambridge, as others have suggested. (174) With respect to Philby's reporting from Spain and France for *The Times,* Harrison has provided lengthy quotes from the articles themselves. These show that Philby was a talented reporter.

Turning to Philby's service in the SIS, Harrison reports new details on how the organization functioned during the war, with emphasis on its personalities and bureaucratic struggles. Harrison adds considerably to the understanding of Philby's personal relationships, his use of ULTRA material, and the operations he ran while in charge of counterintelligence in the Iberian section.

Harrison's treatment of how and why Philby was selected as head of Section IX, the element in charge of dealing with Soviet espionage overseas, is particularly interesting. As Harrison does with other events elsewhere in the book, he compares what Philby wrote in his memoir with what the documentary evidence shows. In several cases, Harrison demonstrates embellishment on Philby's part—his description of his selection to head Section IX is good example. In that instance, the evidence strongly suggests Philby was at best misleading, if not deceptive, in his exaggerated claim that he manipulated his superior out of contention. Harrison concludes that Philby was promoted because he was the best fit for the job.

There are several instances in which Harrison resorts to questionable speculation in interpreting events. For example, his description of Philby's introduction to his recruiter, Arnold Deutsch follows Philby's own account,[24] but Harrison speculates that if MI5 had been following Philby's escort, known communist Edith Tudor-Hart, his career in espionage would have ended before it started. True enough, but Tudor-Hart, an experienced agent herself took a very roundabout route, much to Philby's annoyance—which Harrison acknowledges—to the meeting. Harrison does not allow for the likelihood that she would have noticed any surveillance and aborted the meeting. (33) Then there is the relationship between Philby and his father. Harrison's claim that Philby's examination of his father's papers as requested by his handler amounted to "betrayal" and was "utterly sordid in its subservience" (4) to the cause is a bit strong. Likewise, Harrison suggests that Philby chose communism at Cambridge to "escape

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[23] Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, *PHILBY: The Spy Who Betrayed A Generation* (Andre Deutsch, 1968).
[24] Rufina Philby, *The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years* (St. Ermin's Press, 2003), 220ff.

from St. John's [his father's] hegemony," (15) but Philby's reasoning is open to other interpretations.

There are a few errors worth noting. The definition of a double agent as one "controlled by the service which employs him secondly" (3) is incorrect. Control could be by either service. Passport control officers were posted to all British embassies, not just to those in countries with reciprocal arrangements. (90) Deutsch was not branded a traitor, nor was he the cause of NKVD suspicion that Philby was an SIS provocation. (156–57) The statement that the KGB had about 250 agents in Britain (177) should have read that the KGB knew the identities of about 250 British undercover intelligence officials in Britain.[25] In regard to Philby's service in Washington, he did not assume "joint command of an SIS/CIA operation to subvert the communist regime in Albania"—he merely participated in the early planning. (179) The VENONA traffic did not commence in 1939, (181) and Anthony Blunt did not search Burgess's flat before MI5 did; it was a simultaneous effort. And finally, Nicholas Elliott was not the obvious choice to interrogate Philby once the SIS finally realized the truth; that would have been Arthur Martin, but he was replaced by Dick White of MI5. (183)

Overall, *The Young Kim Philby* is a positive contribution to a familiar topic—solidly researched, well documented and informative.

[25] The figure of 250 British employees was provided by a would-be defector, Konstantin Volkov, in 1944. His original statement is reproduced in Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence* (Scarecrow Press, 2007), 359–61.