
Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—December 2022

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake, unless otherwise noted.

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The Secret History of the Five Eyes: The Untold Story of the International Spy Network, by Richard Kerbaj

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Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler: The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE, by Eric Lee

The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi Into the Present, by Ralph Hope

Hitler's Spy Against Churchill: The Spy Who Died Out in The Cold, by Jan-Willem van den Braak

Saboteur: The Untold Story of SOE's Youngest Agent at the Heart of the French Resistance, by Mark Seaman

Spies Who Changed History: The Greatest Spies and Agents of the 20th Century, by Nigel West

Soviet Defectors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924–1954, by Kevin P. Riehle

Tunnel 29: The True Story of an Extraordinary Escape Beneath the Berlin Wall, by Helena Merriman

The Unquiet Englishman: A Life of Graham Greene by Richard Greene

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the reviewers. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Contemporary Issues

Spymaster's Prism: The Fight Against Russian Aggression, by Jack Devine. (Potomac Books, 2021) 266 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his memoir *Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story*,^a Jack Devine writes about his impressive CIA career from his entry on duty to the most senior positions in the clandestine service. In *Spymaster's Prism* he provides a different view—from 30,000 feet, to use a popular contemporary term—one derived from his CIA experience and his realization that “Russia never abandoned its spying program or its active measures operations.” (xvi)

The purpose of the book is “to provide a unique spymaster’s analysis of how to effectively respond in light of Russia’s (and others’) ongoing intelligence assaults on the United States.” To accomplish his goal, he proposes “thirteen key intelligence lessons” as a prescription for action to help “navigate the current state of play between Russia and the United States.” (xx)

The first lesson is that Russia is a strategic adversary of the United States. The 13th lesson is “never trust the Russians.” (209) In between, Devine presents background material on CIA and Russian spycraft, Putin as a spymaster, and the problems resulting from Russian agents penetrating elements of the US government. Then he turns to how, within limits, counterintelligence should deal with moles, arguing “it takes a spy to catch a spy.” (85) Acknowledging that the United States needs to develop

its own sources in foreign countries, Devine considers the options associated with this difficult task, whether they be military or civilian.

The often controversial topic of covert action also gets serious attention. Devine contends it is a necessary option because the Russian counterpart, called active measures, has continued unabated since the Soviet Union collapsed. He gives several examples, stressing the need for legality and disruptive penalties when prohibited methods are employed.

As a cautionary comment in support of his final admonition, “never trust the Russians,” Devine points out that Russia ignored Director of CIA John Brennan’s warning not to interfere in the 2016 election. (211) This supports Devine’s argument that it is critical to maintain a strong national security posture that will deter Russia until Putin recognizes the inherent strength and resiliency of US democracy.

Spymaster's Prism adds professional depth to each of his lessons that presents the reader with an important perspective on US intelligence as well as its Russian adversary. A very worthwhile contribution.

Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, by Josh Chin and Liza Lin. (St. Martin's Press, 2022) 310 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

China’s early attempts at societal control were the subject of Geoffrey Cain’s book, *The Perfect Police State*.^b In *Surveillance State*, *Wall Street Journal* correspondents Josh Chin and Liza Lin provide an account of the Chinese Communist Party’s more recent efforts to achieve total societal control in support of President Xi Jinping’s efforts to reclaim China’s lost glory. A key step toward this goal is the modernization of social surveillance, with emphasis

on the Uyghurs, the Turkic Muslims found in the Xinjiang area of Western China, which is twice the size of Texas. This region is part of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative to extend China’s influence beyond its borders.

The authors stress that “Xinjiang had been crawling with surveillance for years, but the old systems required huge amounts of manual labor.” (3) *Surveillance State*

a. Jack Devine, *Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story* (Sarah Crichton Books, 2014), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 58, no. 4 (December 2014).

b. Geoffrey Cain, *The Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey Into China's Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future* (PublicAffairs, 2021), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (September 2022).

illustrates the impact of the new systems on Uyghur life by describing how they were applied to Tahir Hamut, his wife Marhaba, and their two daughters. Detailed descriptions of China's human data collection are provided. First, the face is photographed from several angles. Then skin complexion is recorded, and blood samples taken. Lastly, other distinguishing features such as hair and eye color are noted. In some cases, passports are confiscated and DNA samples are eventually taken. These characteristics—combined with regularly updated collection of information on financial, social, and political behavior—are used to create a numerical measure of an individual's trustworthiness, which is then recorded on identity cards. From then on the ubiquitous city cameras and card readers can track a citizen's every move, almost.

The authors emphasize that the system is “riddled with blind spots. The overwhelming majority of Chinese people can still find refuge from the Party's prying eyes inside their own homes.... Broad stretches of public space

likewise fall outside of the government's field of vision.” Gaps exist in Chinese cyberspace as well. (216) It is for a combination of these reasons that the Tahir family eventually escaped to the United States and experienced freedom for the first time.

Before that happens in their narrative, the authors discuss the political, business, and technical conditions that account for the successes already achieved. Examples on the international front include China's tech companies like Huawei and its role in establishing a Digital Silk Road. (131) Of special interest are China's early dependence on US facial-recognition software and the development of contacts in US universities.

Surveillance State reveals China's new era of social control that has allowed the Communist Party to wrap “its hand firmly around the steering wheel of history.” (251) This condition, the authors conclude, can only be defeated by transparency, however it is imposed. (262)

Intelligence Process/Tradecraft

Lying for Money: How Legendary Frauds Reveal the Workings of the World, by Dan Davies. (Scribner, Kindle edition, 2021; originally published in 2018) 304 pages.

Counterintelligence officers have long known they have much to learn from reading in other areas, such as sociology, economics, and even spy novels.^a To that we can add another, unexpected, field that has plenty to teach us about validating our assets and the information they provide: financial fraud. After all, for an investor to verify the claims of a company about its finances and prospects is a task little different from that of intelligence officers assigned to determine if assets are who they claim to be and whether their reporting is truthful. Both are efforts at risk management, and lessons learned in one endeavor can inform the other.

Fortunately for our purposes, we seem to live in a golden age of fraud. Scams are as old as money and commerce, but today's thefts are orders of magnitude greater than ever before. Localized frauds that stole millions of dollars have been eclipsed by transnational schemes that cost investors billions. One of the biggest scams of the 1960s, for example, involved nonexistent vegetable oil

in New Jersey and cost American Express \$150 million. Some five decades later, globalization made it possible for Sino Forest, a Chinese logging company, to issue \$3 billion in bonds and shares to US and Canadian investors, all of whom lost their money when the company's trees turned out to be fictional. Around the same time, the collapse of Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme cost investors more than \$60 billion, a number likely to be eclipsed by recent tech-enabled crypto collapses. Such frauds are impressive by any standard and, along with many others, provide a large pool of examples for study.

Sorting these frauds is an enormous problem, but Dan Davies's *Lying for Money* is an excellent starting point for understanding the phenomenon. Davies, a former Bank of England regulatory economist, tells us that fraud is about “trust and betrayal,” which should be enough to capture the attention of any intelligence reader. From that starting point, he provides concise typologies that show how various frauds—the “long firm,” in which a crook collects

a. John Ehrman, “What are We Talking About When We Talk about Counterintelligence?” *Studies in Intelligence* 53, no. 2 (June 2009).

money in advance of delivery of goods and then absconds with the funds; various types of counterfeits; cooked books; and so on—work and differ from one another. What is striking, however, is how much they have in common. “Greedy people, desperate people, and people who didn’t know what they were doing” parade through his pages, ignoring red flags or warnings that promised results are too good to be true, only to see their dreams crash and burn. Whether it is the vegetable oil in New Jersey or promises of the riches to be had in far-off (but also nonexistent) lands, there is no shortage of people to be fleeced.

As interesting as Davies’s case studies and examples are, the counterintelligence value of his book lies in what he has to say about due diligence, the financial industry’s term for asset validation. His first major point is that due diligence takes time and money, which are scarce resources and thus expensive, which then forces hard choices about how much to spend on it. “We can’t check up on everything, and we can’t check up on nothing,” he says early on, “so one of the key decisions ... is how much effort to spend on checking. This choice will determine the amount of fraud.” Because wiping out fraud completely would be prohibitively expensive, the “optimal level of fraud is unlikely to be zero” and the world is left to decide how much fraud to live with.

Davies does not see this as a major problem, however. Instead, he suggests, the existence of a certain level of fraud is actually a net positive for society, as it shows that good things are happening overall. In the 19th century United States, he says, railroad and stock-market fraud were endemic, but the “very reason that there was so much dishonesty is that there was so much to steal because so much wealth was being created.” In such a situation, “people don’t find it worth their while to waste time minimizing their fraud losses.”

In that light, a high-performing intelligence service may therefore view the discovery that a certain percentage of its assets are fabricators or double agents simply as the cost of doing business. This is especially so in view of the likelihood that trying to reduce the number of bad agents to zero will entail enormous costs in time, money, and

likely lead to the creation of a risk-averse culture that is unwilling to recruit agents who might have even a slight chance of turning out to be bad. Such a determined effort to eliminate bad assets will send a service down the road to paralysis and irrelevance.

That said, matters might easily get out of hand. It’s one thing for a naïve or hopeful individual to fall prey to a fraud, but why does it keep happening to professional investors and corporate managers? These are the very people whose experience and resources ought to enable sophisticated analysis. The answer, says Davies, is that “vulnerability to crime ... tends to scale with the cognitive demands placed on the management of a business,” especially because managers try to “administer things that are too complicated to be aware of every detail.” For overwhelmed managers to delegate the job to specialists is the obvious solution, but even if a manager is willing to do this, the results will be disappointing. “People who are able to catch fraudsters when they are employed to do so are quite unusual,” and anyone good at the job generally “is an uncommonly persistent and blunt individual and not always necessarily someone who got on well with his colleagues.” A grim situation, indeed, and one that sounds painfully familiar.

There is one approach, however, that Davies believes offers hope. Just as anything that sounds too good to be true inevitably is, Davies says to bear in mind that “anything that is growing unusually fast, for the type of thing that it is, needs to be checked out. And it needs to be checked out in a way that it hasn’t been checked out before.” In other words, when things are going well is the time for maximum skepticism and a good ops test. Not a new point, perhaps, but one that often is overlooked.

Lying for Money by no means is a comprehensive guide to coping with counterintelligence issues. It is, however, a thought-provoking book that makes important points regarding what we can do to improve our processes and, at the same time, the limits of what we can expect to achieve.

The reviewer: J.E. Leonardson is the pen name of a CIA analyst.

Spies on the Sidelines: The High-Stakes World of NFL Espionage, by Kevin Bryant. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2022) 25 pages, bibliography, notes, index.

Those of us who follow NFL football—I am a long-suffering Buffalo Bills fan (Maybe it will be different this year!)—are well aware of the high stakes in its games, seasons that make or break vast fortunes and careers, and the drama that uplifts or crushes the hopes and spirits of fans and the cities or regions these teams represent—now with online gambling applications adding to the mix. Reflecting this, football is often compared to warfare and the strategic competition between nations, so it should come as no surprise that NFL teams have sought to gather intelligence on their competitors, frequently adopting national intelligence tradecraft to do so. Although fans and even casual observers are aware of these efforts, no single publication has explored the NFL's growing use of intelligence—until now.

Kevin Bryant's new volume is an enjoyable, easy read that, for the first time, allows readers to grasp just how important intelligence collection is to the NFL. Bryant frames the work around issues critical to all teams: plays and game strategies, team playbooks that capture those plays, the draft and free agency process in which teams acquire players to suit their strategies. He wraps up with a final case study section that correlates these applications of intelligence to the game. This approach allows Bryant to blend the intelligence and football worlds to show how NFL teams employ intelligence practices across each of these key areas in pursuit of a Super Bowl ring.

The opening section, looking at collecting opposing teams' plays and strategies, includes chapters on information-gathering during practices and in the locker room, obtaining restricted documents, placing listening devices, eliciting information from witting and unwitting sources, developing penetrations of opposing teams, exploiting former players' knowledge, and rapidly gathering and employing intelligence during games. This approach also enables Bryant to share accounts from throughout US football history, and frequently examples from the 1920s are paired with those from the 21st century to show the enduring nature of intelligence within the game. In each chapter, Bryant formats the text into smaller, theme-aligned subsections that help readers move smoothly between examples that otherwise might have seemed to lack coherence or required the author to repeatedly

remind readers why an example has been included in a given section.

The book is replete with examples from throughout football history illustrating the longtime use of intelligence. These are fascinating and often humorous. For example, ahead of the 1994 opening game, Oakland Raiders owner and general manager Al Davis was detected lingering on the opposing San Francisco 49ers sideline, clearly collecting play signals or other intelligence ahead of the opening snap. Coach Mike Shanahan put an end to this by having Steve Young drill a pass right at Davis, sending home his displeasure with Davis's spying and forcing the Raiders owner to dive to the turf for safety.

Ahead of the 1956 draft, the Los Angeles Rams conducted a deception campaign to protect their draft targets that was so successful it fooled the Baltimore Colts into drafting a player sight unseen to deny him from the Rams, only to find in training camp he lacked even basic skills to play at the professional level. Providing counterintelligence measures before a 2013 New England Patriots home game, quarterback Peyton Manning had his Denver Broncos bused to a remote forest for the team's pregame walk-through to deny the undoubtedly watching Patriots any hint of their plans. These stories alone make the book a must-read for football fans.

The book's fourth case-study section adroitly wraps together all the operational tradecraft Bryant has noted throughout the book, showing how important gathering intelligence is for success in today's NFL. Patriots fans, however, should be forewarned that this section will be unsettling because it examines in unflattering terms the team's behavior during the notorious intelligence-driven scandals that rocked the NFL during 2007–15. Bryant weaves a clear narrative of these often-complicated events, explaining the Patriots' filming and surveillance of opposing teams dubbed "Spygate," the ball-inflation tampering and related deception efforts of "Deflategate," tapping of opponents' supposedly secure coach-to-player headsets and subsequent signal jamming, and more.

As with other situations noted in the book, Bryant uses primary sources to illustrate his points, such as quoting

Pittsburgh wide receiver Hines Ward's allegations that during the 2002 AFC championship game Patriots defenders responded to Steelers offensive plays immediately after they had been sent in from the sideline but before his offense had made its on-field adjustments. Such overly aggressive use and exploitation of intelligence by the Patriots had pushed the NFL too far, and some intelligence practitioners will see parallels between this series of events and the Intelligence Community during the Watergate era when, like Coach Bill Belichick's Patriots, overreach exposed intelligence activities to outside scrutiny with painful consequences.

The book would have benefited from illustrations, which curiously it lacks. Similarly, a glossary of football terms would help those readers not familiar with the sport's unique terminology, which Bryant understandably employs throughout. Even so, this is a fun read, both for football fans like this reviewer and for casual readers looking to learn about yet another sphere of modern life that has adopted our intelligence tradecraft and techniques.

The reviewer: David A. Welker is a member of CSI's History Staff.

History

US Intelligence History

Agent Josephine: American Beauty, French Hero, British Spy, by Damien Lewis. (Public Affairs, 2022) 466 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former BBC correspondent, Damien Lewis, was intrigued when family members told him about the French Resistance Room in the Château des Milandes that had once belonged to Josephine Baker, the famous Black, exotic, and highly paid entertainer in the 1920s and '30s. Seeking the story of the room and Baker's relationship to it, Lewis examined material in European and American archives. *Agent Josephine* reveals what he learned.

A St. Louis, Missouri, native, Freda Josephine McDonald was born in 1906. She married Willie Baker in her teens (her second marriage) and left him forever in 1921, when she abandoned the segregated life in the United States for Paris.

Lewis sketches Baker's rapid rise to international celebrity that led to her acquiring a nightclub in Paris—Chez Josephine—and her denunciation by the fascists internationally. At the height of her fame just prior to World War II, she was proposed for recruitment as an "Honourable Correspondent" by a member of the Deuxième Bureau, the French military intelligence agency.

Baker was initially opposed by some, who thought her too eccentric and well known for clandestine work. After all she danced half-naked and walked the streets of Paris with "her cheetah, Chiquita, on a diamond-studded leash." (24) But she was accepted because who would suspect her? And in that unpaid voluntary position, Baker

collected information from Nazis attending her club in Paris and her performances in other countries. Lewis doesn't provide many details about the specific data collected, but he does discuss the professional background of her French handlers as well as the Allied intelligence officers she supported.

After the Nazis occupied Paris, Baker, at the request of the Deuxième Bureau, entertained German and Vichy French troops, although she had vowed never to do so until the Nazis left France. Using her stardom as a cover she traveled with a large entourage of helpers—Deuxième agents—and "piles of trunks carrying the tools of her trade, plus the hidden, secret contents that might change the course of a war and that might help save an island nation which, under Winston Churchill, was holding out against all odds." Lewis doesn't describe the "secret contents" and his assessment of their impact is overstated, but her efforts are well documented. (117)

Then after the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942 and the Nazi occupation of Vichy France, Josephine was forced to leave for Morocco. She took with her a "thick dossier with the latest intelligence ... with instructions to take the information to Lisbon." (165). By this time she is part of an MI6 pipeline setup by Wilfred Dunderdale, the former head of station in Paris.

For the remainder of the war, Josephine served as a courier and, when not traveling, used her quarters for resistance meetings. When she became ill toward the end of the war, she held clandestine meetings in her sick room.

Curiously, and without explanation, Lewis notes that after her secret work was over she was “drawn into the ranks of the Free French armed services and appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Women’s Air Force Corps, with the role of Propaganda Officer.” (355)

Although the details remain obscure, there is no dispute that Josephine’s wartime exploits earned her the Médaille de la Résistance avec Palme, the Croix de Guerre, and the Légion d’Honneur, France’s highest decoration for civil or military service.

In 1951 she went to the United States to perform at a Miami nightclub, on the condition that her audiences would not be segregated. (369) But she was not treated well and suffered threats from the KKK, while not being admitted to first-class hotels in New York. In 1963, she returned once more to deliver a talk on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, shortly before Dr. King’s historic “I have a dream” speech. (371)

Baker’s senior years saw financial hardship, but she continued performing until overcome by a brain hemorrhage in Paris, where she died on April 12, 1975. Her story is a compelling example of professional ability, patriotic loyalty, social tolerance in Europe, and intolerance in America.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: When Intelligence Made A Difference, by Regis D. Heitchue. (Dorrance Publishing Co., 2022) 243 pages, footnotes, bibliography, photos, no index.

Former CIA officer Regis Heitchue spent most of his 50-year career in the Directorate of Science and Technology, where he observed the Intelligence Community’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. His study of the crisis in retirement convinced him that “a comprehensive account of intelligence activities during the crisis is not to be found.”(1) Thus Heitchue avows that his version “is a unique story of what US intelligence knew, when it knew it, and how it knew what the Soviets were doing in Cuba prior to and during the crisis” because “it is an all-source story.” (11–13)

The uniqueness assertion is likely to be challenged by readers of Dino Brugioni’s *Eyeball To Eyeball*^a and Michael Dobb’s *One Minute to Midnight*,^b since both accounts describe the all-source intelligence contributions to crisis. Dobb was the first to report that the Soviets stored nuclear warheads in Cuba during the crisis, while other evidence—primarily photographic—led Brugioni to presume they had done so. (6)

Heitchue’s narrative covers the crisis from beginning to end, citing reliable open sources supplemented by his own observations. For example, “The single most defining feature of the Soviet adventure in Cuba was the extreme

secrecy ... enveloped by measures to conceal, to mislead, to deceive, to cover up and to lie.” (14)

He is also candid regarding US intelligence acknowledging “that intelligence made a difference, perhaps the difference. At the same time, US intelligence missed and misjudged important aspects of the Soviet venture in Cuba. Those errors did not materially affect the peaceful resolution of the crisis that was accomplished through diplomatic means.” (126)

Nevertheless, he mentions some failures and near-failures to make his point. The most serious is that during the crisis, “intelligence did not confirm the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on the island.” This is followed by his assessment that “the size, composition and organization of Soviet forces on the island was seriously underestimated.” (127)

Later he takes up the nuclear weapons theme again when he notes that “CIA had written in the President’s [Intelligence] Checklist on 27 October that the FROG missile could carry a nuclear warhead.” Then he asks, “Should the Agency have highlighted the possibility of a nuclear warhead ... was there a failure of imagination by the CIA?” (136)

a. Brugioni, *Eyeball To Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Random House, 1991).

b. Dobb, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (Vintage Books, 2009).

In the final chapter, Heitchue discusses why Khrushchev decided to undertake such a risky gamble. He compares the views of established scholars but in the end accepts that the answer will remain uncertain since Khrushchev never explained his reasoning.

Heitchue's judgments regarding both the Soviet and US roles in the crisis are worthy of consideration and constitute the majority of what is new in the book. He has provided a good summary, well-documented, of the crisis.

Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution: The True Story of Robert Townsend and Elizabeth, by Claire Bellerjeau and Tiffany Yecke Brooks. (Lyons Press, 2021) 216 pages, endnote, photo, index.

Historians Claire Bellerjeau and Tiffany Brooks tell two overlapping stories in *Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution*. One summarizes the espionage activities of the Culper Spy Ring that provided intelligence about the British in southern New York to Gen. George Washington during the War of Independence.^a New York City shopkeeper Robert Townsend—alias Samuel Culper, Jr.—was one of the principal agents in the ring, and his role forms the links to the second story in *Enslavement in the Revolution*.

Vanessa Williams tells how she found her own family origins in the region.

When it came to enslavement, the Townsend family was not exceptional as the authors make clear. But their story is a good illustration of the contemporary practice, and they focus on Elizabeth—called Liss—thought to have been born in 1763. (12) When the British occupied the Townsend home, Liss became a favorite of the senior officer, and he took her with him when they left. She somehow escaped—there are hints she might have been a courier for Robert—and later turns up at his door in New York, pregnant. Bellerjeau and Brooks tell of Robert's efforts to help her, but he doesn't prevent her recapture in 1785. Enslaved once more, she never sees her son again.

Since the Culper Ring story is well-known it is not surprising that the authors do not dwell on it, although they do sketch some operations and other agents serving Washington. The surprises come when the authors reveal the story of Robert Townsend and his family: slaveholders all. In the process they provide a seldom discussed tutorial on the extensive slavery in the North—the buying, selling, and giving—prior to and during the War of Independence.

Fortunately, she escapes again and returns to New York. Just how this was accomplished is not revealed. But in the end, Townsend finally helps her gain her freedom.

The Townsend family lived in the Town of Oyster Bay, which stretched across Long Island from the North Shore to the South Shore. Slaves and former slaves had lived in the area since 1640. In her foreword to the book, actress

Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution reveals a little known side of Robert Townsend and his family. Its timeline is at times difficult to follow but the story adds much needed historical background to a familiar but heretofore incomplete account of intelligence operations during the War of Independence. A valuable contribution.

The Liar: How A Double Agent in the CIA Became the Cold War's Last Honest Man, by Benjamin Cunningham. (Public Affairs, 2022) 268 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his 1988 book, *Spy vs. Spy*, Ronald Kessler tells how Karl Koecher, a Czechoslovakian intelligence agent, penetrated the CIA in 1973 as a translator. He would go on to provide his service and the KGB with enough data

to compromise a Soviet official, Aleksandr Ogorodnik, as a CIA agent. More recently Koecher was the focus of a book by Howard Blum,^b who makes unsupported claims that Koecher was a key KGB mole helping to protect

a. See, for example, Lynn Groh, *The Culper Spy Ring* (Westminster Press, 1969).

b. Howard Blum, *The Spy Who Knew Too Much: An Ex-CIA Officer's Quest Through a Legacy of Betrayal* (Harper, 2022), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (September 2022).

high-level KGB penetrations in the CIA. In *The Liar*, Benjamin Cunningham, former editor-in-chief of the *Prague Post*, supplements Kessler's version with much new material that counters the alternative account.

After reviewing Koecher's early life and his troubled encounters with the Czech security service (StB), Cunningham describes his paradoxical recruitment by the StB. Preferring counterintelligence to reporting on colleagues in Prague, the persistently irascible Koecher bargains with his considerable language skills—Russian, German, English, and French. He was initially assigned to spy on Germans and other foreigners, although as a new recruit he kept his other jobs as night watchman and at the local planetarium. It was then, in 1963, that he met and married Hana Pardamcová.

As his StB duties became full time, Koecher again complained that his abilities were underused and he was astounded when the StB assigned a new mission: "Go to the United States.... What should I do there?" he asked. "You are going to penetrate the CIA." "How?" "That's up to you." (61) Cunningham attributes this unorthodox assignment practice to an inexperienced StB, the first of several surprises offered by *The Liar*.

The next surprise comes after the Koechers are accepted in the United States as defectors from communism and

Karl spent two years acquiring a doctorate. Then after some time with Radio Free Europe, Koecher did some work at Columbia University's Russian Institute, then run by Zbigniew Brzezinski. While there he became a US citizen in 1971. While the StB attempted to maintain contact and assign other tasks, Koecher often resisted. Then in 1972 he applied to the CIA without informing the StB. It was only on one of his frequent trips to Czechoslovakia that he informed them he had penetrated the agency, and in their astonishment they informed the KGB.

At this point Cunningham introduces another surprise: KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin, who visits Koecher in Prague to take advantage of his unexpected CIA access. Their relationship is choppy, and Cunningham hints that Kalugin was a CIA agent himself and may have been the source that informed the FBI of Koecher's StB/KGB operations. In any case, the Koechers were arrested, imprisoned, and eventually exchanged for Russian dissident Anatoly Scharansky.

Cunningham's thorough documentation includes lengthy interviews with Koecher and access to his StB file plus interviews with many of the other principals involved. This is the best account of the case to date, although it leaves two issues unanswered: Who was the liar—the word doesn't appear in the text—and why is the last honest man never identified?

Last Call at the Hotel Imperial: The Reporters Who Took On a World at War, by Deborah Cohen. (Random House, 2022) 557 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Northwestern University professor and author Deborah Cohen has crafted an inviting premise for *Last Call at the Hotel Imperial*. She chronicles the careers of five prominent foreign correspondents from the United States who, she argues, pioneered the art of international muckraking during the middle of the 20th century. She admits her subjects—John Gunther and his wife Frances, H.R. Knickerbocker, James Sheean, and Dorothy Thompson—are "largely forgotten today." Cohen fixes her gaze, however, on an era when their names were common currency to millions of Americans and international statesmen. "They began the decade [of the 1930s] by reporting the story, but by 1939, they were the story," she writes and, if nothing else, the book credibly supports this claim. Regrettably, *Last Call* falls short of its considerable potential because of poor stylistic and narrative choices.

This same subject, detailing past generations of reporters, should supply a more thought-provoking work with applicable lessons for today.

Real stylistic and thematic problems emerge and grow acute from the outset. Strangely, she has decided to refer to her main protagonists and many of their associates by their first names. She calls Knickerbocker "The Knick" and, while that may have been the nickname used by his friends, this choice creates a clubby tone suggesting that Cohen also considers herself to be on friendly and decidedly partial terms with her subjects. Simultaneously, *Last Call* dwells at unnecessary length on the often sordid personal lives of its subjects. Peppered throughout are long-winded, often embarrassingly detailed accounts of failed marriages, drug taking, alcoholism, abortions, and every type of illicit affair. Cohen dedicates considerable time to

discussing Frances Gunther's psychiatric treatment and childhood trauma, neither of which apparently helped her overcome her writer's block or marital frustrations.

The focus on such prominent journalists provides a wealth of source material that seems at times to overwhelm the author. These individuals left behind not only a wealth of books, articles, and interviews but also private papers and voluminous correspondence. Cohen occasionally uses this material to spectacular effect when, for example, she details atmospherics on their meetings with Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Trotsky, and Jawaharlal Nehru. Mussolini, for example, had himself worked for the Socialist newspaper *Avanti!* and founded *Il Popolo d'Italia* in 1914; Cohen deftly demonstrates how he understood the art of manipulation during interviews, which he used effectively to generate positive coverage for his regime.

Frances Gunther's emotional affair with Nehru is also an interesting look at the way that personal feelings threaten to cloud political judgments and media coverage. Such anecdotes are too rare, however. They strike

suddenly like flashes of light before the narrative returns back to the seemingly unending, often scandalous soap opera that was each journalist's personal life.

Cohen acknowledges that her subjects ultimately became the story but fails to explore the implications of this trend. For example, Sheean openly sympathized with the Bolshevik regime and Thompson repeatedly pushed policy proposals to Franklin Roosevelt privately and publicly. Cohen never authoritatively addresses how these reporters reconciled the need to win the trust of their audiences with their poorly concealed politicking. She also seems reluctant to consider the possibility that her protagonists might have left a more lasting legacy had they more faithfully adhered to journalistic principles of balanced reporting. That these issues remain salient in the modern media makes Cohen's reluctance to address them all the more frustrating for a curious reader in the contemporary world.

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a member of CSI's Lesson's Learned program.

Scorpions' Dance: The President, the Spymaster, and Watergate, by Jefferson Morley. (St. Martin's Press, 2022) 326 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Former *Washington Post* journalist Jefferson Morely's 2008 book, *Our Man in Mexico*,^a was well received despite some questionable comments about Kim Philby and hints of CIA involvement in the JFK assassination. Morely's 2017 book about James Angleton, *The Ghost*, departed from that precedent.^b It scorned journalistic integrity and was a monument to inaccuracy.^c *Scorpions' Dance* combines the negative features of both books, while raising undocumented speculation to a new level.

The central theme of the book, writes Morley, is that "Without Helms, Nixon would not have had his burglars. Without Nixon, Helms would not have occupied the director's suite in Langley for nearly seven years." (8) Morley attempts to validate that proposition by alternating discussions of the careers of both men from World War II to their retirement, while misinterpreting instances of routine

contact, for example, Helms's discussion of Watergate with Nixon. Then, Morley replays the familiar planning and execution of the Watergate operation, including the roles of all the participants, trying to contradict Helms's assertions that the CIA was not officially involved.

In a final example he digresses into Nixon's role in Vietnam and claims, without any evidence, that Helms and the CIA supported his policy: "With Helms's support, Nixon escalated war." (7) And amongst all the speculation, Morley manages to return to his favorite topic: the CIA had something to do with the JFK assassination. (54)

Scorpions' Dance has numerous factual errors. A few examples: Walter Pforzheimer was not "a career analyst" (78); William Hood did not write "several books about the CIA" (66); CIA Headquarters is a bit more than

a. Jefferson Morley, *Our Man In Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA* (The University Press of Kansas, 2008).

b. Jefferson Morley, *The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton* (St. Martin's Press, 2017).

c. See, for example, the detailed review by CIA Historian David Robarge, *Studies in Intelligence* 61, no. 4 (December 2017), 77–81.

“five miles north of the White House”; the CIA did not “mark” Gen. René Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean military, for death; and Helms “didn’t wage war in Vietnam.” (88)

Perhaps most significantly, Morley fails to document or demonstrate that Nixon and Helms had a relationship

The Secret History of the Five Eyes: The Untold Story of the International Spy Network, by Richard Kerbaj. (Blink Publishing, 2022) 402 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

In his semi-autobiographical account, *Between Five Eyes*,^b Anthony Wells tells about 50 years of the informal intelligence relationship between the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, commonly referred to as the Five Eyes relationship. In *The Secret History of the Five Eyes*, Australian investigative journalist Richard Kerbaj takes a longer view, with roots planted before World War II, when Britain and the United States began cooperating in intelligence matters. At the end of the war, the relationship was formalized in the BRUSA agreement. Renamed UKUSA in 1953, membership was gradually extended to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Kerbaj writes that the term “Five Eyes” was first “publicly declared in 2010, though he does not cite a source and its precise genesis remains ambiguous. (ix) In any event, *The Secret History of the Five Eyes* attempts to track its origins, beginning with wartime SIGINT collaboration and its variations currently in effect. Other operations that justify its continuing existence include espionage cases, the VENONA project, defector contributions, post-9/11 cooperation, and the impact of the Snowden treachery.

Although Kerbaj correctly identifies the joint efforts, he has difficulties with the supporting details. For example, when discussing William Stephenson’s pre-war intelligence contributions to British intelligence, Kerbaj refers to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 30 years before it was created. (26) Another pre-war case involved GRU/KVD defector Walter Krivitsky. Kerbaj says Krivitsky defected to the United States at the beginning

that consciously or not led to Watergate and operations in Vietnam and enhanced both careers.^a *Scorpions’ Dance* does demonstrate that Jefferson Morley’s grasp of intelligence is weak and will only confuse and mislead readers. *Caveat Lector!*

of World War II; actually, Krivitsky had defected first in France in February 1937, and then to the United States, arriving in 1938.

In his treatment of the VENONA project, Kerbaj states that the Soviet message traffic had been intercepted when, in fact, copies of all foreign traffic were supplied to the US government by Western Union.

The inclusion of the Cambridge spies as a topic of Five Eyes concern is curious. While it is true that all but Blunt had served in the United States, the treachery was a British problem. Even so, Kerbaj has trouble with the case details. Thus, Philby was not recruited by Guy Burgess around the same time as Donald Maclean at Cambridge or anywhere else. (100) That honor goes to Arnold Deutsch, in London, after which Philby mentioned Maclean to Deutsch. Similarly, Cambridge spy John Cairncross was not compromised as a Soviet agent in 1979, although Anthony Blunt was. And Blunt’s MI5 superior, Guy Liddell, was never a “Scotland Yard detective.”

In his discussion of the postwar case of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs, Kerbaj names Ursula Beurton (SONJA) as Fuchs’s NKVD handler in London. SONJA was GRU and never met Fuchs in London. Another GRU officer, Oleg Penkovsky, was never a defector and the secrets he provided did not “provoke the Cuban Missile Crisis.” (142) More recent cases suffer similar deficiencies. For example Oleg Gordievsky (177) and Sergei Skripal were not double agents. (277)

a. See also Peter Usowski, “The White House, Richard Helms, and Watergate: A Clash between Executive Power and Organizational Responsibility,” *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 2 (June 2022).

b. Anthony R. Wells, *Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing* (Casemate, 2020), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 1 (March 2022).

While many of the other cases reviewed were of interest to Five Eyes members, some were unilateral, not jointly run, a distinction the narrative doesn't make. The Ghost Stories operation (FBI arrest and exchange of 11 Russian

agents) is an example: it was not "a joint operation by the Five Eyes agencies." (277)

The Secret History of the Five Eyes tells no secrets and is feeble history based on poor scholarship. Read with care.

Wise Gals: The Spies Who Built the CIA and Changed the Future of Espionage, by Natalia Holt. (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2022) 382 pages, endnotes, index. and details.

In 1953, a group of women in CIA came together as the Committee on Professional Women, dubbed the "Petticoat Panel," with the goal "to strip away the inherent sexism that plagued the institution they loved." (1) Despite this lofty goal, for four women their achievements over the next 20-plus years would always be overshadowed by their gender.

Natalia Holt's *Wise Gals* is the latest in the genre of books sharing the stories of female officers in OSS during World War II and their subsequent careers at CIA. The preceding issue of *Studies in Intelligence* alone reviewed three books and a PBS documentary on the stories of women in intelligence during World War II.^a Holt tells the tales of five women: Eloise Page, Gen. William Donovan's secretary turned officer; Adelaide (Addy) Hawkins, a pioneer in covert communications; Jane Burrell, a photointerpreter who quickly rose to be a counterintelligence officer in Western Europe; Elizabeth (Liz) Sudmeier, a leading expert and officer for the Middle East; and Mary Hutchison, a highly educated "contract wife" who was an exemplary officer in the field. Their espionage stories are told in parallel with key events, from World War II to Nazi hunting to the Cold War.

Holt has been publicly pushing to have Jane Burrell awarded a star on CIA's famed Memorial Wall inside the foyer of the Original Headquarters Building. Returning from a trip to Brussels on January 6, 1948, Burrell died when the plane she was traveling on crashed on approach to the Le Bourget Airport near Paris, and there has been debate around whether or not Burrell was on official CIA business or on holiday. When *Wise Gals* was released on September 22, 2022, Holt tweeted, "There's a woman you've never heard of, who sacrificed her life for her country, and she needs your support." Holt followed up

with a series of tweets with pictures of Jane Burrell's story and has continued to advocate for her quest in her subsequent book talks.

The book is based on Holt's research from "diaries, letters, interviews, reports, memos, scrapbooks, and photographs" as well as Freedom of Information Act requests. (xii) She also notes that when she could not find support for material obtained from an interview, she would weigh other evidence from her research to determine if it should be included. Holt also states that "thoughts and feelings of individuals in the book were obtained through their personal materials and author interviews with those who knew them." (xiv)

At times, *Wise Gals* almost feels like fiction as Holt recounts stories from the women's histories. She attempts to bring her readers into the mind and emotions of the women while making the case that they struggled due to their gender and society's opinion of the role of women. When the book started to feel fictitious, this reviewer repeatedly returned to the sourcing notes and was sometimes left wondering what was historical research and what was storytelling to fill in the book.

The way Holt interweaves the stories of the women over chunks of time is a bit complicated and confusing, causing this reader to lose track of who's who. The intent seemed to be to show the uniqueness of each woman's situation compared to the other women during a particular era. For example, Addy stuck in Washington, D.C., divorced with kids, versus Mary a CIA wife trying to prove herself as an officer, versus Eloise who is single for life and desperate to be a station chief, versus Liz and the danger of being an active case officer in the Middle East. The writing style can leave the reader wondering just how

a. See *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (September 2022), for reviews of *The Codebreaker* (PBS documentary), *The Girls Who Stepped Out of Line, A Spy Called Cynthia*, and *The Woman All Spies Fear*.

well the women actually knew each other and how often their paths crossed. All were on the Petticoat Panel in 1953 and there is a brief mention of their getting together for lunch, but it is unclear when that took place or if it was a reference to the panel. (310)

Aside from trailblazing the role of women at CIA, a theme that jumps out is that Addy, Mary, Eloise, Liz, and Jane loved and believed in the CIA's mission and were willing to take assignments and learn new skills to have a lifelong career. This is especially evident in the stories of Eloise and Addy. They may not have gotten every assignment or position they wanted and there may have been supervisors or coworkers who wanted to hold them back because of their gender, but these women displayed steadfast loyalty to intelligence and national security.

Intelligence History Abroad

Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler: The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE, by Eric Lee. (Greenhill Books, 2022) 200 pages, endnotes, appendix, no index.

In 1998, the British National Archives (then called the Public Record Office) published a facsimile reproduction of *Operation Foxley: The British Plan To Kill Hitler*, with a foreword by historian Ian Kershaw and an introduction by Mark Seaman, then a historian with the Imperial War Museum. *Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler* contains the same facsimile reproduction of the plan and the same foreword by Kershaw, plus 63 pages of prefatory comments written by historian Eric Lee in place of Seaman's 32-page introduction.

Lee's comments contain new material released since 1998. Of particular interest are the plans to assassinate Hitler formulated by Soviet (NKVD and GRU), British (SOE), and American (OSS) intelligence organizations. The Soviets first considered killing Hitler in the late 1930s, with a special military force and later with Alexander Foote, a British-born GRU agent handled by Ursula Kuczynski, aka SONJA.

Britain's Operation Foxley was formulated in mid-1944 after a French colonel reported that "Hitler was hiding in a chateau in Perpignan, in southwest France" (1) and was vulnerable to assassination. Neither was true, but as Lee describes, SOE set about considering the pros and cons of carrying out the task some other way. At times, Lee points out, their planning was less than thorough, as for example

Setting aside some shortfalls, *Wise Gals* is an inspiring story of women who made major contributions to the creation of the CIA, executed operations with impact, pioneered intelligence work, and made lifelong careers at the agency. As for Jane Burrell, the CIA public website observes, "We know nothing about Jane's activity at the time of her death. She was returning from a trip to Brussels on January 6—traditionally the end of the Christmas season—and despite speculation that she was on an operational mission, the limited documentation sheds no light." At least for this reviewer, Jane Burrell deserves the star.

The reviewer: Janice A. Felt is a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency officer serving in CSI's Lessons Learned Program.

when they proposed using a sniper and selected a British captain who was not sniper qualified, suffered from astigmatism, and was a poor shot.

In the event the sniper plan didn't work out, poisoning Hitler was seen as a kind of Plan B, and SOE selected thallium as the means. (20) Difficulties arose when selecting the means of application, and it was never tried. The most unusual plan considered involved hypnotizing Rudolf Hess, Hitler's former deputy who had defected to Britain, and sending him back to do the job.

The development of OSS schemes to assassinate Hitler was assigned by Director William Donovan to his "Professor Moriarty" and gadgets man, Stanley Lovell. (52) Lovell considered "adding female hormones to the Führer's carrots and beets" (62) as well as a variation on the British plan, in this case hypnotizing a marksman who would then shoot Hitler. Lee evaluates these and other potential solutions that were considered and rejected as operationally impractical.

In conclusion, Lee indulges in some counterfactual speculation on the likely result of a successful attempt on Hitler's life. He notes that senior SOE officers were sharply divided on the answer, with several suggesting that it would ensure his martyrdom while others argued

that Hitler's bungling of the war made him worth more alive than dead.

The facsimile Foxley operation document reveals the options formally considered by SOE. Lee's narrative explains why the operation was never attempted.

The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi Into the Present, by Ralph Hope. (Oneworld Publications, 2021) 319 pages, reference notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former FBI Special Agent Ralph Hope served much of his career overseas as deputy head of the FBI office covering the Baltic states and as head of FBI operations in 11 West African countries. *The Grey Men* makes occasional reference to the African assignments, but its main focus is on the German Democratic Republic and its security police known internationally as the Stasi and "to many East Germans as the Grey Men." (7)

Hope begins his account by addressing the magnitude and nature of Stasi operations. He portrays a more familiar Stasi behavior than was presented by Alison Lewis in her study of the almost tolerant Stasi handling of East German writers and media professionals.^a Hope documents the Stasi's monitoring of a country of 16 million citizens, with one Stasi officer for every 180 persons. If the informers or agents are included, it becomes one for every 63 persons. This works out, according to Hope, to maintaining files on 6 million citizens. In addition to their informers, information was acquired from surveillance, wiretapping, hidden microphones, mail opening, and interrogations conducted in the 17 secret prisons the Stasi maintained. (8)

In a compelling but chronologically and geographically disjointed narrative, *The Grey Men* tells how the Stasi applied these techniques before and after the Wall was erected. After the Wall came down, Hope reveals the turmoil that resulted when Stasi files became available to the public and other countries. Then he describes how former Stasi officers maneuvered to survive in a reunited Germany, ultimately adopted a "Lost Cause" rationale: "The GDR failed only because the political will was lost. We could have taken care of it." (255)

To help the reader understand the effect on German citizens, Hope introduces the story of Hubertus Knabe and follows his life from birth to his appointment as historian and scientific director of the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Memorial—formerly the notorious Stasi torture prison in Berlin. Hope shows how Knabe's refusal to remain silent about Stasi abuses led to his eventual dismissal due to revisionist Stasi influence. It is that influence that Hope admonishes readers to be aware of and resist. A valuable account of secret police dominating society in a communist country.

Hitler's Spy Against Churchill: The Spy Who Died Out in the Cold, by Jan-Willem van den Braak. (Pen & Sword Military, 2022) 289 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

J. C. Masterman's book, *The Double Cross System*, revealed that, with one exception, the British Security Service captured, turned, or executed the Nazis agents sent to Britain on espionage missions. Only a few sentences mention the exception, who was found dead on April 1, 1941, in a Cambridge air-raid shelter "where he

had committed suicide." (54) His identity card gave his name as Jan Willem Ter Braak.^b

Dutch author Jan-Willem van den Braak was initially intrigued by the Ter Braak case after reading a brief comment about "Englebortus Fukken, alias William Ter Braak," in the 2012 Dutch edition of *Agent ZIGZAG* by

a. Alison Lewis, *A State of Secrecy: Stasi Informers and the Culture of Surveillance* (Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2021).

b. J. C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System: In the War of 1939 to 1945* (Yale University Press, 1972), 54.

Ben Macintyre.^a He decided to learn what else had been written about Ter Braak and discovered that in 1979 British author Richard Deacon had included a discussion of him in his book, *The British Connection*.^b Drawing on multiple sources, Deacon included a more detailed summary of the case and gave his full name as Jan Willen (sic) Ter Braak. Deacon also noted that his sources left many questions unanswered. For example: was Ter Braak Dutch, as his name suggested, and was that his real name? Was the radio transmitter found among his belongings ever used to communicate with the Abwehr? How long had he lived in Cambridge, and did he work to survive? Why wasn't he caught like the other Double Cross agents? And then Deacon raised two surprising outliers: Was Ter Braak ever a Soviet agent and did he attempt to kill Churchill?

Drawing on recently released material in British and Dutch national archives and on interviews with members of Fukken's family, *Hitler's Spy Against Churchill* addresses these and related questions.

Van den Braak gives a detailed account of Fukken's unsettled and often problematic early life that included two short stints in prison for check forgery. Once free, he

became engaged to a young Dutch girl and secretly joined the Dutch equivalent of the Nazi Party. That decision led to his recruitment as one of several Dutch Abwehr agents trained to conduct espionage in France and England as part of Operation LENA.

Here the story of Fukken's espionage in Britain devolves into speculation, which Van den Braak makes clear, in some instances by using italics. He does explain how Fukken was finally identified. A passport photo of Fukken's fiancée, found among his belongings, was sent to the Dutch intelligence service, and they learned his name from her.

The final chapters of the book present Van den Braak's often lengthy comments regarding the questions posed above, which amount to qualified conjecture. His strongest arguments debunk Deacon's account that Ter Braak (Fukken) was a Soviet spy. Similarly he does the same for the charge, made by E. H. Cookridge (alias), that he was sent to murder Churchill. Thus while *Hitler's Spy Against Churchill* clarifies some details of the Ter Braak case, many critical questions remain consigned to the domain of speculation.

Saboteur: The Untold Story of SOE's Youngest Agent at the Heart of the French Resistance, by Mark Seaman. (John Blake Publishing, 2020) 350 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Before Mark Seaman became the British Cabinet Office historian, he was a historian with the Imperial War Museum. It was there in 1983 that he met, worked, and became friends with Tony Brooks, whose wartime exploits with the Special Operations Executive (SOE) he grew to admire. Brooks was one of a select few the government had permitted M. R. D. Foot to interview for his official history, *SOE in France*.^c Yet even that account contained some inaccuracies, Seaman says, although not as many as he found in other books. Thus, when Brooks asked Seaman to write his biography and put things right, he accepted the challenge and began the interviews and archival research that resulted in *Saboteur*.

Due to family circumstances, Tony Brooks spent much of his early years in France and Switzerland before attending college in Britain. He was back in France at the start of World War II and volunteered for the Royal Air Force but was rejected because he was just 17 years old. After the surrender of France, the bilingual Brooks unintentionally began his clandestine career when he helped a British soldier escape France to Spain. He continued to help others until his own situation demanded that he too escape to England. After being detained by Spanish authorities in less than desirable conditions that aggravated his chronic psoriasis, Brooks made it to England where, after lengthy processing, he joined the SOE when still 19.

a. Ben Macintyre, *Agent ZIGZAG: A True Story of Nazi Espionage, Love, and Betrayal* (Harmony Books, 2007), 69.

b. Richard Deacon, *The British Connection: Russia's Manipulation of British Individuals and Institutions* (Hamish Hamilton, 1979) 189–94.

c. M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France* (London HMSO, 1966).

Drawing on SOE archival records and memoirs, plus documents provided by and interviews with Brooks, Seaman describes Brooks's training, his bureaucratically bumpy assignment-preparation process, and his deployment by parachute to the unoccupied area of France. Once operational, Seaman writes, Brooks, even at his very young age, built the PIMENTO network or circuit that accomplished its D-Day sabotage and delay mission. In achieving that objective, Brooks overcame galling communication and control problems with London, issues with safe-house and landing-site selection, threats from the Gestapo and suspected double agents, all the while conducting local sabotage operations. Perhaps most surprising and impressive, was Brooks' handling of

relations with other circuits while successfully maintaining PIMENTO security and traveling under cover with false documents. At one point he was wounded in the leg by a grenade fragment and later arrested by the Germans, but he was released when his cover story checked out.

Brooks avoided the bureaucratic turmoil created by Charles de Gaulle in France after the war—described by Seaman—and returned to England where he eventually did some work for MI5 and became a staff officer with MI6. Seaman leaves that story for another time. With *Saboteur* he has done justice to a long-overlooked, genuinely successful SOE officer and made a fine contribution to SOE history.

Spies Who Changed History: The Greatest Spies and Agents of the 20th Century, by Nigel West. (Frontline Books, 2022) 221 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

When published in 1981, Nigel West's *MI5*^a drew critical attention for two reasons: its espionage revelations and its lack of source notes. Paradoxically it was also cited frequently by journalists and academics writing on the subject. Since the mid-1980s, as circumstances evolved, West has included source notes on most important issues in the more 30 non-fiction books he has written on intelligence. Both precedents are followed in the 14 case studies in *Spies Who Changed History*.

Before considering some examples, it is worth noting that many familiar espionage cases—e.g., Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs, Penkovsky, Nosenko, Kuklinski, Gordievsky, Mitrokhin, Tolkachev, to name a few—are not included, since they have been written about in great detail.

Three of the 14—Walther Dewé, Christopher Draper, and Richard Wurmman, will be unfamiliar to most, though aspects of their intelligence activities may not be. For example, Dewé was in charge of the White Lady train-monitoring network during World War II that received much public attention. A more obscure case describes the contributions of Christopher Draper, the colorful Royal Air Force pilot and British agent who worked for MI5. Perhaps the least known was the troubled defector Richard Wurmman, who made an immense contribution before he was sent to a POW camp in the United States.

The names associated with several cases will be familiar to many readers of the intelligence literature, but they should not be overlooked because West has added new detail. Best known for his recruitment of Kim Philby, Arnold Deutsch is a case in point. West adds much new about his personal life and his NKVD career, especially his tour in the UK where he recruited 16 other British agents. Of extraordinary interest are the quotations from Philby's confession obtained from MI5 files made public for the first time. West demonstrates that Philby lied in an attempt to protect Soviet agents still alive and unknown to the authorities at the time.

And then there is the case of the double agent Ashraf Marwan who was compromised when his name appeared by accident on the internet. Marwan played a key role in the 1973 Yom Kipper War and, West writes, both the Israelis and the Egyptians claim he was their agent. The controversy continues after Marwan fell to his death from his fifth-floor flat in London. West tracks the complicated investigations that followed and have yet to assign accountability.

The sourcing quandary surfaces again in the final chapter, "Gennadi Vasilenko." Here West describes how CIA and the FBI learned that Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen were Soviet/Russian penetrations. West names Russians that he asserts provided the clues that led to their identification and arrest, but he does not give a source for

a. Nigel West, *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909–1945* (The Bodley Head, 1981).

this knowledge. Hopefully, as with his MI5 book, time will reveal the missing names.

Whether the cases presented in *Spies Who Changed History* live up to the subtitle—*The Greatest Spies and*

Agents of the 20th Century—is debatable, considering those West felt obliged to omit. But they are worthy of attention, while being interesting and informative, even allowing for the sourcing challenges. Overall, a positive contribution to the literature.

Soviet Defectors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924–1954, by Kevin P. Riehle. (Edinburgh University Press, 2022) 326 pages, end-of-chapter notes, index.

After more than 30 years as a counterintelligence analyst assigned to various elements of the US government, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Kevin Riehle (pronounced “real”) taught at the National Intelligence University before joining the University of Mississippi’s Center for Intelligence and Security Studies as an associate professor. In *Soviet Defectors*, Riehle presents the results of a study of nearly 100 Soviet intelligence officers who defected to various countries during the Stalin era.

The cases discussed are separated into five periods: 1924–30, 1937–40, 1941–46, 1947–51, and 1953–54. He explains the gaps in defections between the first and second periods as a consequence of the harsh measures employed in response to Stalin’s anger and then publicly announced as a warning. It is true that there were some defections in the early 1930s, but these are defined by Riehle as “non-returnees” and included businessmen, academics, or military personnel and not intelligence officers.

With one exception, the defectors included in the first period will be unfamiliar to most readers. The exception is Georgi Agabekov who published a book about his service in the Joint State Political Directorate, known by its Russian acronym OGPU, which was established in 1923

to persecute the opponents of the Bolsheviks.^a Succeeding periods included many less-well-known defectors, particularly those who went to non-English-speaking countries. Although Riehle doesn’t treat each case in detail, he does discuss the forms of intelligence most often obtained from defectors—documents, technical expertise, and operational case details—and the limitations on the shelf life of the knowledge of the defectors. He also comments on the motivations, working conditions, and the prevailing political circumstance that contributed to the defections. And very valuably, Riehle provides a table at the beginning of each period listing the defectors, including their true and cover names, where known, and other background data.

As to the Soviet intelligence services, military and civilian, Riehle draws on defector debriefings to get a unique assessment of their growth, organization, priorities, operating procedures and the Soviet views of the Western powers.

Soviet Defectors is an important contribution to the literature that will leave the concerned reader in a state of anticipation awaiting a companion volume covering defectors in the post-Stalin era.

Tunnel 29: The True Story of an Extraordinary Escape Beneath the Berlin Wall, by Helena Merriman. (Public Affairs, 2021) 318 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Joachim Rudolph was 80 when BBC broadcast journalist Helena Merriman climbed the eight floors to his Berlin apartment to begin a series of interviews about a tunnel he and his compatriots had dug under the Berlin Wall some 60 years earlier. Joachim, as she refers to him, had detailed memories of the event and of the accompanying circumstances that led to the successful escape of 29 East

German citizens into West Berlin. *Tunnel 29* tells that story.

Merriman begins Joachim’s story when he was six and living on a farm in eastern Germany. After a failed attempt to avoid the Russian army, he and his mother made it to what became East Berlin where he grew up. As a teenager

a. Georgi Agabekov, *OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror* (Brentano’s, 1931).

he augmented the family income by smuggling coffee and other luxuries from West to East Berlin. When the Wall went up and entry to West Berlin was denied, Joachim and some friends spent hours searching for a way to escape to the West. Remarkably, they were successful and Joachim became a West German citizen, attended university, and enjoyed limited rights to visit East Berlin, where his girlfriend and mother still resided. Soon Joachim was thinking of ways to help both to escape.

To accomplish his goal, he created an escape organization to consider the options. When members demanded their loved ones be included, a tunnel became the only practical solution. Merriman explains how a group of amateurs implemented their decision.

The first operational issue they had to deal with was security. Contacting potential escapees in the East ran the risk of alerting Stasi informers. Their solution was careful selection of personnel who knew how to construct a tunnel and others who were willing to dig one: Joachim met

both conditions. Then they set about securing financing and, with CIA help, eventually concluded an arrangement with NBC TV producer Reuven Frank—later president of NBC—on the condition that NBC cameramen be allowed to film the digging to document the operation for TV.

Tunnel 29 is an engrossing account of failure and success. The principal failure occurred when Joachim's crew was persuaded to stop digging their tunnel and start digging another that was compromised by a Stasi informer. The success story describes how they returned to the original dig, overcame construction problems and got their loved ones to the West. After debriefing by CIA and MI6 officers at the Marienfelde Refugee Camp in the US sector, the escapees begin their life in freedom.

Merriman concludes her story with a summary of how the principals reacted to life in the West. A moving and rare firsthand contribution.

The Unquiet Englishman: A Life of Graham Greene, by Richard Greene. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2020) 591 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Richard Greene (RG) is a poet, biographer, and professor of English at the University of Toronto. His recent biography of Graham Greene (no relation) is an objective, yet friendly, chronological account of Greene's public and private life. After acknowledging the other biographies of Greene, RG justifies his efforts, which are based on "thousands of pages" of newly discovered documents and letters to Greene's "family, friends, publishers, agents, and close associates" to which RG gained access. (xiv) The result is a view of Greene amid several intersecting themes that begins with his family life, education, and search for a vocation at Oxford. After settling on a writing career, he supplemented marriage with several mistresses and an intense pursuit of Catholicism. These attributes become an integral part of the dogged travels that augmented his World War II service with MI6 and his career as a successful screen writer, journalist, and novelist.

Prior to joining MI6 with the help of his sister, who worked there before him, Greene served in the Ministry of Information and as an air-raid warden during the Blitz. MI6 needed an officer with experience in West Africa and Greene had traveled there in the mid-1930s. Before his departure, he returned to Oxford for operational

training to support his cover as a military officer. After a tour in Freetown, Sierra Leone, Greene was reassigned to London in late 1943. There he worked for Kim Philby as a counterintelligence analyst. RG explores the lasting, though controversial, relationship that developed following Greene's writing the introduction to Philby's memoir and his visits to Philby in Moscow.

As was typical of Greene, he continued writing during the war and published *The Ministry of Fear*—a Nazi spy novel—in 1943. As is typical of RG, he uses Greene's books as chronological benchmarks while exploring his life and those who were a part of it, such as Ian Fleming and his brother Peter. Many of the best novels as viewed by both Greene and RG involve spies. This includes *The Quiet American* (1955), whose central character, Alden Pyle, is a CIA officer. Written long before the massive US military involvement of the 1960s, many viewed it as perceptive and it stirred controversy by making clear that Greene disliked the United States and its foreign policy, which he saw as a threat to the whole world. (xvi)

Greene drew on his own experience in MI6 and his travels to revolutionary Cuba for *Our Man In Havana* (1958),

which he thought was funny and which some later viewed as anticipating the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. One MI5 officer thought it revealed too much and recommended Greene “go to prison,” but he was overruled. (297)

Adopting a more serious tone, *The Human Factor* (1978) is considered by many professionals to be Greene's best spy novel, and it is said to have been used in counter-intelligence classes in Western agencies. Although some saw it as a version of the Philby saga, RG says it was not, despite obvious parallels. Each of these novels and many others were made into films as Greene became world famous.

One of Greene's most well-known writings was *The Third Man*. RG notes it was not a spy story and was first

written as a screen play. Published later as a book, it lacked the film's most famous lines—“In Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred years of democracy and peace—and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.” Orson Welles wrote those lines. RG points out that the cuckoo clock was invented in Germany. (185)

The Unquiet Englishman merges Greene's adventurous, interesting, and sometimes atrocious behavior to produce a valuable review of his literary legacy. It is a good read by any measure.

