intelligence officer's bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake and other contributors

Memoirs

In True Face: A Woman's Life in the CIA Unmasked
by Jonna Mendez with Wyndham Wood
(Basic Books, 2024) 306 pages, index.

Jonna Mendez first came to public attention in 1999 when she was mentioned in her husband Tony's book *Master of Disguise*.[a] Although she was a 27-year CIA veteran, readers gained only a glimpse of her career in that book. *In True Face* reveals an inspiring, atypical story of professional achievement in the world of espionage and a government that was "biased against women" in the workforce. (21)

Born Jonna Hiestand in 1945, in Wichita, Kansas, Jonna left Wichita State University to attend a friend's wedding in West Germany. After some European adventures, she married CIA officer John Goeser and joined CIA as a secretary, "the storied beginning of most CIA women." (45) She quickly encountered unexpected restrictions on her freedom. There was little she "could do without John's written permission or physical presence, including purchasing a movie ticket at the American theater." (20)

While adjusting to these restrictions, she became adept at CIA administrative procedures and was appointed a secretary in CIA's Technical Services Division (TSD) in Europe—the provider of espionage gear, or Q in James Bond's world —as a staff employee. Intrigued by the TSD mission, on returning to the States Mendez requested assignment to TSD headquarters, then located in the old OSS headquarters in Foggy Bottom, Washington. Still a secretary, Mendez sought advice about assignments in a professional track. She was informed that "the only way of moving up in that office was by getting an advanced degree in engineering, physics, chemistry, optics, or some other esoteric technical specialty." (50) Ability was not enough.

A defiant Mendez rejected this option, and *In True Face* she tells how the path she chose allowed her, after training at the Farm, to become an expert photo-operations officer. She would go on to acquire proficiency with secret writing, microdots, low-light-level video, and the use of sophisticated bugs, miniature cameras, covert communications systems, fake passports, and unusual undetectable disguises. (107) The latter ability led to her becoming aide to Tony Mendez, who ran CIA's Graphics and Identity Transformation Group. She would eventually rise to become chief of Disguise. (225) In that capacity, she was taken by then CIA Director Webster to the Oval Office, where she demonstrated how facial masks could conceal true identity to a surprised president.

In addition to the ever challenging operational assignments at home and overseas, Mendez dealt with several unanticipated milestones in the coming years. The first was the amicable end to her 23-year marriage to John. (239) The second, sometime later, was her marriage to Tony. And most unexpected of all, pregnancy at 47 and early retirement at 48. (255)

In True Face reveals an active retirement life that brought good and shockingly bad news. Among the good news was the excitement around *Argo*, the movie version of the CIA's role in helping several US Embassy personnel escape from Iran at the outset of the hostage crisis in 1979. The movie won the Academy Award for best picture in 2012. The bad news was the discovery that Tony had Parkinson's disease. Because the symptoms progress slowly, they maintained considerable activity, including making a presentation at a conference in Venice.

a. Anthony J. Mendez, *Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA* (William Morrow, 1999).

All statements of fact, opinion,or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Since Tony's death in 2019, Jonna has pursued her love for photography and been involved with the International Spy Museum, in addition to writing her memoir in which she emphasizes two debatable points: the CIA is "still steeped in misogyny" (249) and "women make better operations officers than most men." (290)

An awe-inspiring contribution to the intelligence literature. ■

No Cloak, No Dagger: A Professor's Secret Life Inside the CIA
by Lester Paldy
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2024) 283 pages, index.

In 1984 Lester Paldy was one of a group of university professors that spent a day at CIA Headquarters learning about the agency so they could help, where appropriate, in "recruiting talented students for a variety of specialties." (6) The experience favorably impressed Paldy.

Still, four years later Paldy was surprised when CIA officer Arthur Hulnick contacted him to suggest he spend a year as a scholar in residence at CIA. (8) From CIA's perspective, Paldy was a good choice. He had been a Marine officer and a full professor (physics) at Stony Brook University, where he taught arms control and national security issues. He was also a member of the university's Arms Control and Peace Studies Center, editor of a college science teaching journal, and, most important, he enjoyed teaching physics to liberal arts majors.

No Cloak, No Dagger tells how Paldy persuaded Stony Brook to grant him a leave of absence and how, after completing standard new employee entry processing, he stretched his leave out to 25 years with CIA.

Expecting to work on arms control issues, Paldy was "disappointed when I realized my first assignment was going to be with the Center for the Study of Intelligence [CSI]." (11) After discussions with his superiors, he was reassigned to the Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS). Later he notes that "the Agency's journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, which anyone can access online ... represents an Agency effort to offer the public some measure of accountability." (82–83). The journal is produced in CSI.

Paldy mentions the types of work in which he was involved but never any specifics. For example, he was "part of a CIA team seeking ways to prevent the Soviets from cheating on their nuclear treaty commitments," and he later briefed senior officials and national laboratory directors on the outcome of the last negotiating round in Geneva. In neither case does he offer are any details. (4) Likewise, he recounts frequent travels, commenting mostly on his accommodations but little about the reasons for his trips. During the latter part of his intelligence career, Paldy began lecturing on counterintelligence at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, but, again he offers no details on how the assignment came about or what his course looked like. (153) The pattern is repeated when he mentions teaching tradecraft to CIA scientists. (177)

Although Paldy describes his overall favorable impression of the agency and his work, he comments candidly on problems he observed. Examples include "weak diversity—women and minorities—too much bureaucracy, the use of torture and occasional weak leadership." (178) He comments that he "never attended a meeting where managers sought new ideas, welcomed departures from operational orthodoxy, or encouraged junior officers to take risks" are not detailed or documented. (251)

No Cloak, No Dagger presents an interesting view of CIA by an officer who worked hard to help his colleagues. He retired suspecting that "only a small percentage of my training efforts enabled case officers to recruit agents." (269) He doesn't explain how he reached that conclusion. ■

Biographies

Agent Link: The Spy Erased from History
by Raymond J. Batvinis
(Roman & Littlefield, 2024), 325 pages.

Sometime in 1934, William Weisband, a clerk working for the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York was recruited by the KGB and given the codename LINK. Fifteen years later another KGB agent he turned him in to the FBI. Although his codename appeared in the VENONA traffic, he never spent a day in jail for his spying. Espionage historian and retired FBI special agent Raymond Batvinis tells this unusual counterintelligence story in *Agent Link*.

That Weisband was a KGB agent during World War II is not a revelation, but many details of his life and espionage operations have not been reported because his FBI, NSA, US Army, and KGB files were unavailable until recently. Some remain classified, but Batvinis acquired enough new material to provide a more thorough, although still incomplete, account of Weisman's life.

The files say he was born Wolfe Weisband in Alexandria, Egypt, on August 28, 1908, although later in life he would say he was born in Russia. His parents had emigrated to the United States to escape persecution there. In 1925, the family moved to New York City, where Wolfe soon became William. He would quickly become enamored of a libertine lifestyle in the city. Trying to support what became expensive habits, he took a series of clerical jobs in hotels. Batvinis estimates that during his six-year stint at the Waldorf Astoria, he began to work for the KGB, but exactly when and under what circumstances remains classified (or lost) in Russian files. Although Moscow's new agent had no technical expertise, Batvinis suggests he was just right for service as a courier. In any case, his immediate financial problems were solved.

Agent Link follows Weisband's courier and later agent-handling career in the 1930s and early 1940s, when he moved to California and began running agents, including Jones Orin York, who would betray him to the FBI after the war. Batvinis also describes Weisband's military career, which began when he was drafted into the US Army on September 1, 1942. Mainly because of his linguistic skills, he was eventually commissioned, sent to signal school at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, and then served overseas, all the while still serving as a KGB agent. Returning to the States in late 1944, he was assigned to Arlington Hall Station, where Army Signal Corps code-breaking was headquartered. It was there that he would do the most damage, translating what came to be called the VENONA messages and, of course, informing the KGB that its messages were being decoded. Batvinis stresses that Weisband didn't know to whom the traffic referred, since codenames were used. That revelation was provided by Kim Philby. Thus, Batvinis concludes, by 1949, "there was nothing that American code breakers were doing that Moscow didn't know." (253)

On February 2, 1948, after Meredith Gardner, the VENONA codebreaker, discovered that a KGB spy codenamed NEEDLE was Jones Orin York, Weisband's days were numbered. Batvinis describes what happened after York identified LINK and why Weisban eventually served a year in jail for contempt of court. Once free, he had periodic, troubled contacts with the FBI and NSA as he tried to support his family. He died on May 14, 1967, with his wife Mabel and their children at his side.

Agent Link features an unusual literary style that gives the reader a broad view, not only of Weisband, but of the many intelligence officers and agents with whom he had direct and indirect contact. For example, in addressing the defection of GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko, Batvinis provides a short biography of Gouzenko before addressing his impact on LINK. Likewise with Philby, Eliza-beth Bentley, Anatoli Golitsyn, Alexander Feklisov, and many FBI special agents.

Batvinis has provided a more comprehensive account of the William Weisband case. A welcome and valuable contribution. ■

Beverly Hills Spy: The Double-Agent War Hero Who Helped Japan Attack Pearl Harbor
by Ronald Drabkin
(William Morrow, 2024), 256 pages.

When author Ronald Drabkin was searching FBI files for material on his father, who had connections with US Army counterintelligence during World War II, he came upon references to Frederick Rutland, a former British pilot also known as Agent Shinkawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Shinkawa had lived well in exclusive Beverly Hills, California, and entertained celebrities of the day like Charlie Chaplin, Boris Karloff, Nigel Bruce, Amelia Earhart, Douglas Fairbanks, and the father of Yoko Ono. (4) His reporting as a Japanese agent had led to redesign of the aircraft carriers that carried out the Pearl Harbor attack and improvement of the famous Japanese fighter plane, the Zero.

Rutland's story takes an unexpected turn when he becomes a double agent for US Naval Intelligence. Anticipating the attack on Pearl Harbor, he informed the FBI, but he wasn't believed and, according to Drabkin, the FBI on Hoover's orders covered up his report. Returning to Britain after nine years in the United States, he reported to UK Naval Intelligence and was debriefed by its director and Ian Fleming. His request to return and spy on the Japanese in the United States and Mexico was denied.

Rutland is not the only spy featured in Drabkin's book. Cdr. Itaru Tachibana of the Imperial Japanese Navy was

very active in southern California and Mexico, and he had contacts with Rutland in Beverly Hills. Tachibana became controller of Toraichi Kono, formerly Charlie Chaplin's valet—whom Kono tried unsuccessfully to blackmail—and who in turn recruited an actor friend, Al Blake, to collect intelligence at Pearl Harbor for Japan. But Blake only pretended to cooperate, and he reported Kono and Tachibana to the Office of Naval Intelligence, which recruited Blake to report on his putative colleagues.

Drabkin's account of how these spies worked and interacted with US and British intelligence services is based on recently released FBI and MI5 files—none of which is cited! He does provide an interesting bibliography, but sorting out sources is a task left to the reader.

Although *Beverly Hills Spy* is well written and tells us about interesting pre-war operations, intelligence scholars will be disappointed. ■

The Eagle In The Mirror: In Search of War Hero, Master Spy and Alleged Traitor Charles Howard 'Dick' Ellis

by Jesse Fink
(Citadel Press, 2024) 319 pages, index.

A casual query from his father led Australian biographer Jesse Fink to examine the career of Charles Howard 'Dick' Ellis. He quickly discovered that Ellis was well known to some retired World War II intelligence officers and intelligence historians, though their assessments of his career differed in important ways.

There was agreement that Ellis was born in Australia on February 13, 1895, and died on July 5, 1975, in Eastbourne, England. He had enlisted in the British Army, was wounded in France, then was sent to officers' school before returning to the continent, where he was wounded again. After recuperating in England, he was assigned duties that involved Russia and soon learned the language. Eager to return to action, he joined the intelligence corps in Persia and Transcaspia where he learned Farsi and Urdu. He later added German, Turkish, Manadarin, and some Italian and Spanish to his linguistic skills. It is not surprising that after the war Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) recruited him.

In the interwar period, Ellis studied at Oxford—and briefly at the Sorbonne—then served MI6 in Geneva, where he wrote an impressive scholarly account of the origins of the League of Nations,[a] while working undercover as a journalist.

In mid-1941, Ellis was sent to the United States. After Pearl Harbor, he joined the MI6 element in New York City, the British Security Coordination office headed by William Stephenson, as liaison to OSS. He returned to London in 1944 and began a series of important assignments in Western and Asian countries, including Australia, where he was involved with establishing their intelligence services. Although Fink provides no source, he notes that "Ellis personally sent George Blake, later exposed as a Soviet mole, to Seoul, Korea" as head of station (121) before retiring in 1953.

Then in 1979, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher exposed Sir Anthony Blunt as a Soviet agent and left the impression that he was the only example of MI5 being involved in a case in which British secrets were provided to Britain's enemies. Retired MI5 officer Peter Wright disagreed and told his story in three books, one with journalist Chapman Pincher, a second with intelligence historian Nigel West, and a third his own, *SpyCatcher*, with Paul Greengrass.[b] In short, Wright charged that Ellis, in need of money, had sold secrets to the Germans before the war and that he had confessed to MI5. Later, suspicions arose that he had also been working for the Soviets, allegations Ellis denied.

Fink challenges the assertions of espionage and those made by other publications and intelligence historians. He even suggest the possibility that Ellis was acting under MI6 orders. This approach is technically conceivable because no written confession has been produced; the charges were based on Wright's memory and "corroborated" to West by unnamed MI5 sources. Fink goes on to assert that Ellis's record of working "behind the scenes in some of the biggest conflicts and events of the 20th century," including "the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor … the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and Kim Philby's defection," (xvii) supports his innocence. But he cites no evidence Ellis was involved in these events.

Three other sources are worth remembering. *The Eagle In The Mirror* relies heavily on the questionable reasoning

a. C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations* (George Allen & Unwin, 1928).
b. Chapman Pincher, *Their Trade Is Treachery* (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981).

of William Stevenson, the discredited biographer of Sir William Stevenson. (198) CIA historian, Thomas Troy, who knew Ellis well, concluded that Ellis "was widely believed to have been both a Nazi and a Soviet agent." (xvii) This author is also quoted as considering it likely but unproven that Ellis served both the Nazis and Soviets. (200)

Ellis was never charged with any offense. He died in 1975 at his home in England. Of necessity, Fink leaves readers uncertain of where Ellis placed loyalty, but he has provided a fine summary of a controversial case. ■

Ian Fleming: The Complete Man
by Nicholas Shakespeare
(Harper, 2023) 831 pages, index.

James Bond, or secret agent 007, is the avatar of the modern fictional spy hero. He may also be more widely known than his creator, Ian Fleming, even though many details of Bond's life were never reduced to paper. Not so with Fleming, who has been the subject of considerable literary scrutiny, including the 1966 biography by John Pearsona and the more recent study focusing on his James Bond books, *Ian Fleming's Inspiration: The Truth Behind the Books*, by Edward Abel Smith.[b]

Given this history, British biographer Nicholas Shakespeare's initial reluctance to accept an offer to write another biography of Fleming is understandable. But his doubt was based on a different reason: He didn't much like his subject. In fact he thought Fleming a "moody, harsh and withdrawn person, habitually rude and often cruel." (xiv) And some of Fleming's friends felt similarly; "You're the epitome of the English cad" said one, and Fleming agreed. (xv)

But since he had not known the man himself, Shakespeare did his homework and, with the incentive of access to family papers not seen before, changed his mind. *Ian Fleming: The Complete Man* is the stunning result.

The story is presented in two parts. The first tells of Fleming's birth in London on May 28, 1908, his influential wealthy Scottish family and friends, his hobbies and troubled education, and failure to complete Eton and Sandhurst. He also started a lifelong rare-book collection and worked at journalism, publishing, and finance before his military service. The second part deals with his postwar life including his marriage and the history of the James Bond books and movies. Several other topics are dealt with in both parts because they reflect his persistent personal idiosyncrasies, such as his dalliances, the real-life model for Bond, his friends and adversaries—many names came from friends—and some behavioral myths.

An example of the latter occurred when author Edward Abel Smith suggested Fleming left Eton—where he overlapped for a year with Guy Burgess—early because of a sexual encounter. Shakespeare cites a letter from Eton authorities stating that it is "entirely false to say that Ian was sent away from Eton for spending the night with a girl." (77) That he did leave prematurely is clear and several reasons are discussed. Like Burgess, "[he] sported an Old Etonian tie all his life." (56) Transferring to the military academy at Sandhurst, Fleming soon acquired a case of gonorrhea and left on "his own accord." (84) His older brother Peter graduated and served in the Special Operations Executive.

That Fleming joined the Office of Naval Intelligence is well known and Shakespeare explains how that happened. But he never makes clear why Fleming, with his lack of experience, achieved the position as the chief's principal assistant. That he performed well is not, however, in dispute, though sometimes surprising. For example, although a staff officer with no command authority, he managed to establish an operational "intelligence-gathering commando unit, 30AU." (58)

Shakespeare also discusses the lingering controversy around Fleming's contributions to the formation of US intelligence organizations. He concludes: "The magnitude of his assistance to Donovan has been rated high by British authors" and historians who exaggerate [his] contribution. American historians view his efforts as minimal since Fleming had so little experience. Shakespeare concludes "the truth lies in between." (279) Perhaps so, but no COI/OSS documents are cited that attribute key formative decisions to Fleming or other British officials.

After the war, Fleming moved to Jamaica where, according to Shakespeare, "the idea for Bond came to him as he swam in his bay." (445) However, the writing of his Bond novels would not begin until he had married and spent several years at the *Sunday Times*, where he established a network of correspondent agents. He would

a. John Pearson, *The Life of Ian Fleming* (McGraw Hill, 1966).
b. See Hayden Peake's review in *Studies in Intelligence* 65, No. 4 (December 2021).

later write his only children's book, *Chitty Chitty Bang Bang,* for his son Casper. (617)

Then in 1952, Fleming began his first Bond novel, *Casino Royale*, and Shakespeare adds interesting background to its creation. For example, in the original typed version of the book, the main character was James Secretan. (115)

Fleming would write his 14 Bond novels during the next 12 years. None of the first five sold well in the UK or US in hardback, and Fleming came close to killing off Bond. Friends persuaded him to continue, and sales increased after Fleming's dinner with Senator John F. Kennedy, in which Fleming gave Kennedy "the benefit of his wartime experience in suggesting how to deal with Fidel Castro." (xxvi)

Interspersed with his literary efforts, Shakespeare writes, Fleming continued a colorful lifestyle that involved frequent travel, dealing with movie rights to his books, his encounter with the real Dr. James Bond, the author of bird books, and the influence of many famous people. The latter category includes Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Sean Connery, and the traitors, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, whom Shakespeare suggests provided "strong motivation when Ian created James Bond … to repair the damage they had done.' (403)

Ian Fleming: The Complete Man is the story of two men, one real, one fictional. The former became so well known before he died on August 12, 1964, at Canterbury, that "Question 12 of 24 in the 2020 test for British citizenship" is "Who first introduced James Bond?" Shakespeare has revealed much of his life story with all its complicated relationships. And he has shown how the iconic Bond has had a continuing impact on the world's culture and the image of secret espionage agents. A superb book by any measure. ■

The Spy Who Came In From The Circus: The Secret Life of Cyril Bertram Mills
by Christopher Andrew
(Biteback Publishing Ltd., 2024) 322 pages, index.

He is not mentioned in J. C. Masterman's precedent-setting 1972 book, *The Double Cross System*, although he was part of the operation. In 1982, intelligence historian Nigel West noted only that he was the MI5 representative in Canada in 1945.[b] Then in Juan Pujol's 1985 wartime memoir, *GARBO*,[c] came the startling news that Cyril Mills had been GARBO's first case officer. Little new appeared in print about Mills until the publication of *Stars & Spies* in 2021 by Christopher Andrew and Julius Green.[d] But Professor Andrew wasn't stopping there. *The Spy Who Came In From The Circus* completes the story.

Cyril Mills, the son of Betram Mills—founder of the popular Bertram Mills Circus—was educated at Harrow and Cambridge (Corpus Christi), which he entered in 1920. Andrew proudly notes that Mills followed the footsteps of Corpus Christi's first spy, Christopher Marlowe.

After graduating Cambridge with honors in engineering, Mills studied oil refining in the United States and Burma, where he also acquired acts for the circus he would take over on the death of his father. The circus was a hit in Europe and the United States, and Mills used it to develop friendships with notables such as Winston Churchill.

Andrew explains how his circus work in Europe led to Mills' work for both MI6 and MI5. Mills found it easier to fly and soon earned his license and bought a plane. Flying over Germany in the late 1930s, he noticed airfield construction that exceeded civilian requirements. Using his university connections, he reported his observations to MI6; MI5 was alert to the chance that Mills was a German provocateur. Eventually convinced Mills was loyal, they continued to accept his reporting until the phony war ended. Too old to be a bomber pilot, Mills went to work for MI5 and joined the Double Cross operation.

After working with several double agents, Mills was posted to Canada in December 1942 and put in charge of

a. J. C. Masterman, *The Double Cross System in th4e War from 1939-1945 (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1972).*
b. Nigel West, *A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945–1972* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), 26.
c. Juan Pujol with Nigel West, *GARBO: The Personal Story. of the Most Successful Double Agent Ever* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985).
d. Christopher Andrew and Julius Green, *Stars & Spies: Intelligence Operations and the Entertainment Business* (The Bodley Head, 2021), 268-69.

the Double-Cross System there. He had frequent contact with William Stephenson and his British Security Coordination operation in New York, and Andrew makes it very clear that Mills's view of Stephenson and his friend William Donovan of OSS was "uncharacteristically, ungenerous." (152)

Mills was also very critical of how the RCMP handled espionage cases and early in the Cold War considered MI6 "a ghastly mess as a result of the stupidity and incompetence of Menzies," its chief at the time. (220) He did allow that things improved after his close friend Dick White took over.

Mills' career as MI5 representative in North America ended at the end of August 1945, and he returned to London. While resuming his circus business, he continued working parttime for both MI5 and M6 during much of the Cold War. For 15 years he maintained a home across from the Soviet Embassy that allowed the British to monitor KGB/GRU comings and goings. The value of the operation is in question as the Soviets were aware of his role.

The Spy Who Came In From The Circus presents much that is new about Cyril Mills' intelligence career and in several instances raises doubts. One concerns Mills's claim to have recruited GARBO. (274) Andrew writes on page 131 that "they recruited him as a double agent codenamed BOVRIL" in Europe. (131) Mills did not go to Europe. GARBO met him as "Mr. Grey" after he arrived in England. (132) And the statement that the Abwehr codenamed Pujol ARABEL (131) is incorrect; that was the name of the network. More generally, Andrew refers to B "Branch" throughout, as he did in his official history of MI5, but according to the Liddell diaries the correct term was "Division" until Dick White became director.

Mills kept his intelligence work secret even from his family for most of his career. But late in his life circumstances changed, and MI5's existence was publicly acknowledged, allowing Mills to meet with former colleagues for reunions. Cyril Mills died, aged 89, on July 20, 1991. Chris Andrew has made sure his contributions will be remembered. ■

Histories

The British and American Intelligence Divisions in Occupied Germany, 1945–1955: A Secret System of Rule

by Luke Daly-Groves
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2023) 398 pages, index.

This review contains a substantial contribution from US Army Intelligence Historian Thomas Boghardt.

When Luke Daly-Groves began his PhD program at the University of Leeds, his thesis topic concerned Anglo-American intelligence rivalry surrounding the employment of ex-Nazis in postwar West Germany. As his research progressed, he encountered occasional references to an "Intelligence Division" (ID) accompanied by little or no further comment. Intrigued, he turned to US and British national archives and discovered extensive ID files that filled a large historiographical gap. He then changed his thesis topic, and this book is the result.

The IDs, as he calls them, refer to the British and US Intelligence Divisions of their respective military headquarters in West Germany. Their primary mission, Daly-Groves contends, was Anglo-American intelligence liaison in occupied Germany. He writes that

> *despite at times being larger than more well-known and studied intelligence organisations such as MI5, MI6 and the CIA, the IDs have hitherto remained one of the most secret and misunderstood elements of even the secret histories of America, Britain and Germany.* (4)

The IDs were staff organizations, not operational elements, and this distinction largely accounts for historians having paid them little attention. Daly-Groves does not seem to recognize the difference. He implies the IDs had operational or command (318) functions as he discusses their liaison work in five key areas: military, scientific, security, political, and state-building intelligence. In fact, much of the operational work in these areas was carried out by subordinate field agencies, such as the US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps. Daly-Groves references CIC operations and records throughout the book but does so without clarifying the CIC's relationship to the ID.

Although Daly-Groves affirmatively and repeatedly asserts the IDs played a "crucially important role" in the occupation of Germany, (13) he provides few specifics. He does show they produced influential finished intelligence based on input from various national operational

organizations such as the CIC and then CIA, MI6, and MI5. But his evidence indicates they analyzed and often shared their results, which others used.

A key feature of the IDs relationship, according to Daly-Groves, was the "junior" status of the Americans and their "dependence" on the British (86, 103, 120, 256, 260). The notion of "British brain" vs. "American brawn" goes back to the pioneering work of British codebreakers in World War II. It gained traction and came to encompass intelligence at large during in the early Cold War, as Britain sought to compensate for imperial decline by hewing closely to the United States and emphasizing a "special relationship" between the two nations. But if anything, a careful reading of the evidence in postwar Germany suggests a rather different dynamic.

For example, Daly-Groves maintains that the British stole a march on the Americans by selecting the pro-British Otto John as the first director of the West German security service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). That John, an anti-Nazi who had fled to Britain in 1944, was London's man rather than Washington's, is true as far as it goes. Left unsaid is that the Americans had already installed their own candidate, Reinhard Gehlen, as head of the far more powerful West German foreign intelligence service—the Gehlen Organization or Bundesnachrichtendienst—and ceded the directorship of the minuscule BfV to the British as a sop. Only in passing does Daly-Groves mention John's defection to East Berlin in 1953, leaving the BfV in shambles. What this says about the British wisdom of choosing John in the first place is not discussed.[a]

A similar pattern emerges in the career of Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of West Germany. Identified by US intelligence as a potentially valuable postwar ally, the US military government appointed him mayor of liberated Cologne in 1945. The British promptly deposed him when they assumed control of the city as part of their occupation zone. Adenauer never forgot this slight. For the duration of his chancellorship from 1949 to 1963, he aligned West Germany with the United States and kept London at arm's length.

This "unparalleled example of Occupational buffoonery," as a British official quoted by Daly-Groves aptly called it, (294) casts British decisionmaking—and the intelligence that informed it—in a dim light. In view of these and other blunders, it is hard to disagree with the assessment of British intelligence historian Stephen Dorril that the "British were often out-gunned and outclassed by the Americans" in postwar Germany.

The insignificance of Berlin, as compared to West Germany, as an intelligence center constitutes another central theme of the book. But here too the evidence is shaky. While the IDs were headquartered in West Germany and operated a sprawling apparatus in their respective zones, Berlin occupied a unique position, located as it was deep inside the Soviet Zone. The Berlin blockade of 1948–49; the closure of the intra-German border in 1952; the 1953 uprising in East Berlin; espionage, counterespionage, and signals intelligence operations across the sectoral borders; and the work of the US and British military liaison missions in Potsdam constitute key features of early Cold War intelligence. Notably, Daly-Groves references them only in passing. The fact that fewer British intelligence officers operated in Berlin than in West Germany *as a whole*, can hardly be taken as evidence of the city's irrelevance to intelligence, as the author argues. (324)

Daly-Groves' treatment of the IDs discusses their many sub-elements, which often had confusing designations. He tends to overwhelm the reader with acronyms, at times cramming over a dozen into a single paragraph, (198) and he does not always seem to grasp their meaning: For example, he frequently refers to the "DAD," an initialism spelled out in a list of abbreviations as "Department of the Army Detachment." But the list fails to add that this designation served as a cover name for CIA, leaving the reader with the impression that the DAD was simply another Army field agency. (xvii) The organizational charts may or may not be helpful in sorting out individual agencies and their relationships to each other. (45–47)

The author conducted extensive archival research, but his sources are sometimes hard to trace. For example, on page 219, footnote 329, he lists: "NARA II, RG 319, UD1075, Box 28, 26861603, Typed Notes, 'Germany, 1948-1949,' Undated." But the listed NARA reference refers to a file unit (folder 'agents') and not a series. Surely, the cited document exists somewhere, but it could not be found in the place indicated.

Daly-Groves somewhat selectively covers the works of other scholars. Thomas Boghardt's book on Army Intel-

a. Daly-Groves does not cite the standard works by Michael Wala on the early years of the BfV and John's defection: *Keine neue Gestapo* (2015) and *Otto John: Patriot oder Verrater* (2019).

ligence in postwar Germany, *Covert Legions,* is cited for the most part only in support of the author's own theses. Paul Maddrell's work on Allied intelligence exploitation in postwar Germany comes in for harsh criticism for supposedly overemphasizing this aspect of Allied intelligence over other areas. (122, 255, 315–320) Publications that directly contradict the author's findings are sometimes ignored altogether, as is the case with Sarah Douglas's masterful deconstruction of the self-aggrandizing account of the British intelligence officer and later historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, one of the "heroes" of Daly-Groves's narrative.

Overall, *The British and American Intelligence Divisions in Occupied Germany* is a mixed bag. Daly-Groves has indeed written a comprehensive history of the Intelligence Divisions, but he has not shown that they operated "a secret system of rule that was the real backbone of the occupation of Germany." (2) That credit must be shared with their headquarters, the field agencies, and military government. ■

Eyes On The Enemy: U.S. Military Intelligence in World War II

by Chris McNab
(Casement, 2023) 198 pages.

In *Eyes On The Enemy,* military historian Chris McNab, author of many books on weapon systems and military campaigns, has turned his attention to US military intelligence prior to and during World War II.

McNab's approach to this rather imposing task is straight forward and inadequate. He first reviews the circumstances facing the Army, Navy, and OSS intelligence organizations before the war, resulting in the Pearly Harbor surprise. Unfortunately this includes a description of the MAGIC codebreaking machine that confuses it with the PURPLE decoded traffic it produced. While his primary "focus is on combat intelligence," he does comment on intelligence support to special intelligence missions in Europe and the Pacific. (x)

The balance of *Eyes On The Enemy* is presented in five chapters that discuss (1) organizations, objectives and training; (2) combat and human intelligence; (3) signals and cryptography; (4) aerial and naval reconnaissance; and (5) intelligence and counterintelligence. McNab introduces each chapter with explanatory comments, but most of the text consists of extracts from Army field manuals published during the war. These manuals present the military way of accomplishing missions and, as any former intelligence officer knows, are of little direct use in the field, where each command has its own way of accomplishing its mission. Thus *Eyes On The Enemy* comments on what needs to be done, but gives no examples of how the problems are solved in practice. This omission and the absence of source notes and an index seriously weaken the value of the book, although it may be of use to someone unfamiliar with the subject. ■

Non-US Intelligence

Lifting The Fog: The Secret History of the Dutch Defense Intelligence and Security Service (1912–2022)

by Bob de Graaff
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2024) 637 pages.

The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (*Militaire Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst* (MIVD), created in 2002, is the new name for the Military Intelligence Service (MID that consolidated the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In 2019, the Utrecht University professor of intelligence and security studies, Bob de Graaff, was asked by the Netherlands Institute for Military History (*Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie*, NIMH) to write the history of the MIVD and its predecessor organizations. The book would cover the institutional development of the military intelligence services since the establishment of their foundational organization, the Studiebureau Vreemde Legers ("foreign armies research office") in 1912. De Graaff was granted "unfettered access to the service's archives," although not everything he discovered could be published. *Lifting The Fog* presents his results in chronological form, supplemented by case studies and suggestions for MIVD's future.

Because the Netherlands remained neutral during World War I, military intelligence focused on the security needs of the individual services and progressed little from its 1912 origins. This created a significant gap between the other European nations, and de Graaff recounts how the Dutch corrected the imbalance as the interwar world situation worsened.

A detailed case study of the Venlo Incident[a] from the Dutch point of view, illustrates how in 1939 the Dutch had developed a flawed intelligence liaison relationship with MI6. (49) De Graaff's account includes some names not previously associated with the case and adds documentary support to the view that the Abwehr, not the SS/SD under Walter Schellenberg, was the originator of the plot to kidnap the two MI6 officers, as often reported. (33)

De Graaff tells how during the war the Dutch government, then in exile in London, formed a resistance organization to conduct operations in the Netherlands. A Bureau of Intelligence (*Bureau Inlichtingen*, BI) was created under the Minister of War in the government-in-exile that coordinated all Dutch intelligence contacts with MI6—but not SOE, to which, despite Dutch reticence, agents were seconded for training and dispatched to the Netherlands. In what came to be known as Operation Englandspiel, the Germans compromised the operation for two years and nearly 50 men were lost. Lesson learned: always control your own agents. (56)

After the war, the Dutch reevaluated their intelligence threat. In de Graaff's discussion of the issue he notes—without explanation—that "CIA had largely overlooked the threat of a nuclear war." (129) He does admit the nuclear threat was not of great concern to Dutch intelligence until 1983, but he never clarifies what is an obvious error.

During the Cold War the Dutch military intelligence agencies gained considerable experience in counterintelligence operations involving the Soviets and Warsaw Pact nations, and de Graaff deals with them in some detail. (385) Of particular interest is the assistance the Dutch rendered when the Polish CIA agent Ryszard Kuklinski made contact with Dutch Army intelligence. (136)

De Graaff describes Dutch efforts after the Cold War to refine their intelligence program. He devotes a chapter to the role the services played in the fall of Srebrenica, emphasizing its long-term impact on the military intelligence process in the Netherlands. (263) Although MIVD was never intended as a major source of intelligence for NATO ground forces, de Graaff makes a strong case for its international successes—especially in the areas of HUMINT, SIGINT, and cyber, where *Lifting the Fog* demonstrates MIVD punches above its weight.

MIVD's vision for the future assumes a situation of "fundamental uncertainty," in which early warning is an important mission, particularly in the cyber domain. (419) More generally, de Graaff suggests the need "for an overarching philosophy of military intelligence that not only can be a starting point" but adapts well to political and security demands while shifting from "need to know … to the "need to share, and from early warning to early action."

Lifting The Fog is a thoroughly documented account of an impressive intelligence service—though the lack of an index is annoying—and a major contribution to the intelligence literature. ■

In the Labyrinth of the KGB: Ukraine's Intelligentsia in the 1960s–1970s
by Olga Bertelsen
(Lexington Books, 2022) 370 pages.

After practicing medicine and dental surgery in Ukraine, Dr. Olga Bertelsen earned a PhD at the University of Nottingham—where she focused on Soviet/Russian history and intelligence. She went on to teach and study at several US universities. She is currently an associate professor of global security and intelligence at Tiffin University in Ohio.

In the Labyrinth of the KGB is the story of the Kharkiv intelligentsia, multiethnic writers who after Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech revealing the true Stalin, explored the limits of free expression. Bertelsen uses the "labyrinth" to refer to the many paths of expression writers attempted to pursue only to be blocked by the KGB in the 1960s and 1970s.

This opposition to free expression was not new. As Bertelsen shows, attempts to eradicate Ukrainian nationalism and Zionism, its two major targets, had a long history under Stalin. Ukrainians took what came to be called the "Khrushchev Thaw" after de-Stalinization as an opportunity to revive their national culture and consciousness, but the Soviets viewed this as a threat to national identity. By the second half of 1958, the crippling reality of re-Stalinization had set in.

a. Two British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) agents were abducted on the outskirts of Venlo, the Netherlands, on November 9, 1939.The incident was later used by the German Nazi government to link Britain to an attempted ssassination of Hitler on November 8, 1939, and to help justify Germany's invasion of the Netherlands, while a neutral country, on May 10, 1940.

Bertelsen gives examples, as told by the Kharkiv writers themselves, about how they were forced to comply with KGB rules that left no space for artistic or creative expression on particular matters. The topic of the *Holodomor*, the Stalin enforced famine in Ukraine during 1932–33, is a good illustration. Official opposition to treatment of this topic was well known and yet the authors found ways of mentioning it. Among other responses, the KGB resorted to what Bertelsen calls "memorycide" and "burning approximately 600,000 volumes of ancient prints, rare books, and manuscripts." (204)

Most of the time, Bertelsen uses the term "local" KGB or just KGB to identify those trying to enforce policies, but she notes that in July 1967,

> *The KGB created special counterintelligence departments to combat the ideological sabotage.… The Fifth Directorate and its subordinate departments were charged with the mission to conduct surveillance of the most active dissidents or individuals who attracted the KGB's attention by their nonconformist behavior. Each Fifth Chief Directorate operative used seven to 10 informers who methodically listened to the writers' conversations in cultural institutions, the Writers' Union, and its literary sections, conveying their content to their handlers. (30)*

In the Labyrinth of the KGB is based largely on interviews with surviving authors and KGB operational documents found in the central (Kyiv) Security Services archives (former KGB archives) in Ukraine. They document the story of Kharkiv writers who endured the policies and penalties implemented by an authoritarian regime and forecast what is likely to occur if the current Russian government is successful in Ukraine. ■

The Russian FSB: A Concise History of the Federal Security Service
by Kevin Riehle
(Georgetown Univ. Press, 2024), 197 pages.

The acronym "KGB" was consigned to history with the demise of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991. The security and intelligence functions it performed were not. Retired US intelligence analyst Kevin Riehle, a lecturer in intelligence and security studies at Brunel University in London, has written an excellent account of the struggles of the Russian Federation to create intelligence successor organizations.

The Russian FSB begins with a capsule history of Russian security elements and their frequently changed names from tsarist times to the present. Some missions changed over time, but one did not: protect the "tsar." (7)

In the early 1990s, a number of new security organizations were created, each quickly succeeded by variants until the reorganization in 1995 when the Federal Security Service (FSB) officially founded. At first glance, it resembled the old KGB because it absorbed three of the KGB's four main directorates. Only the KGB's First Chief Directorate, responsible for foreign intelligence remained independent of the FSB; that was the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

In practice much had changed. The FSB was given expanded responsibilities in law enforcement, intelligence collection—including HUMINT—covert action, and border security in Russia, along with the authority to operate in the former Soviet republics, especially for counterterrorism liaison purposes. Riehle concludes that this makes the FSB Russia's "primary clandestine service within the former Soviet space." (2) FSB authority increased further in 2003 and 2004, when the SIGINT elements and border guards directorate were subordinated to the FSB. Since then, the FSB has been Russia's foremost security and intelligence service.

Riehle describes the new organization, its functions and leadership, especially its dependence on President Putin. He suggests the FSB was at least partially responsible for an erroneous assessment that a quick victory could be achieved in Ukraine—a conclusion that took a toll on the leadership and trust. (157) Although less is known about personnel issues, training, assassinations, and digital warfare elements, Riehle mentions them while acknowledging source limitations. His main Russian sources—Agentura.ru and the Dossier Center—are posted by Russians living in the West. He does rely on Russian media for information on FSB corruption, which has gotten ample attention.

The FSB has made many enemies within the Russian ruling elite and society. The former from current practices discussed in the book, the latter from the fearful burden of the KGB's second chief directorate, whose legacy of domestic counterintelligence and the gulag is not forgotten. *The Russian FSB* sees little hope for improvement in the Putin era. A valuable contribution to the intelligence literature. ■