

V: The Berlin Tunnel

No single operation more typifies Berlin's importance as a strategic intelligence base than the construction of the Berlin Tunnel. Probably one of the most ambitious operations undertaken by the CIA in the 1950s, it succeeded despite the fact that the KGB knew about the operation even before construction of the tunnel had begun!

The genesis of the tunnel operation lay in Berlin's location in Europe and its prewar status as the capital of a militarily and economically dominant Germany. The largest city on the Continent, Berlin lay at the center of a vast network of transportation and communications lines that extended from Western France to deep into Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe. This was still true in the 1950s; Soviet telephone and telegraph communications between Moscow, Warsaw, and Bucharest were routed through Berlin, for example.¹ This became a factor of crucial importance beginning in 1951, when the Soviets began to shift from wireless communications to encrypted land lines for almost all military traffic.² Land lines existed in two forms: overhead lines strung from telephone poles and underground cables. Both carried encrypted messages as well as nonsecure voice communications.

CIA officers examining this situation in 1952 concluded that underground cables offered the more valuable target, since they were buried and hence not subject to constant visual surveillance. If a tap could be placed covertly, it would be likely to remain in place for some time. Thus was born the idea of tunneling into the Soviet sector of Berlin to tap into Soviet military communications. The concept was tested in the spring of 1953, when an agent in the East Berlin telephone exchange patched an East Berlin telephone line into West Berlin late one night to sample what might be obtained. Even after midnight the communications traffic was sufficiently valuable that CIA Headquarters decided to go ahead with the operation.³

During 1953, CIA continued to gather data and test the idea of tapping communications in East Berlin. By August 1953, detailed plans for the tunnel were completed and a proposal was drawn up for approval by DCI Allen Dulles. After much discussion, this was obtained on 20 January 1954.⁴

Having learned the location of the underground cables used by the Soviets from an agent inside the East Berlin post office, the Altglienicke district was selected as the best site for a cable tap.⁵ Work began in February 1954, using the construction of an Air Force radar site and warehouse as a cover.⁶ The tunnel itself was completed a year later, at the end of February 1955, and the taps were in place and operating shortly thereafter.⁷

Unfortunately, the whole operation was blown even before the DCI approved the project. On 22 October 1953, US intelligence officers briefed a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) audience that included KGB mole George Blake. Blake reported the existence of the tunnel project during his next meeting with his case officer, Sergei Kondrashev, in London the following December. However, a full report was not sent to Moscow until 12 February 1954.⁸

Although the KGB was aware of the potential importance of the tap, its first priority was to protect Blake.⁹ Knowledge of the tunnel's existence was very closely held within the KGB—neither the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) nor the East German Stasi was informed. Rather

than immediately shutting down the tunnel, the Soviets thus implemented a general tightening up of security procedures. A small team was formed to secretly locate the tap, which they did by late 1955. Early in 1956 the Soviets developed a plan whereby the tap would be “accidentally” discovered without putting Blake at risk. On the night of 21-22 April 1956, a special signal corps team began to dig.¹⁰ By 0200 they had discovered the tap chamber. At 1230 the following day they opened a trapdoor leading from the tap chamber down a vertical shaft to the tunnel. By 1420 they had penetrated the tunnel in the full glare of a well-organized publicity coup.¹¹

The digging operation had been seen from an observation post atop the warehouse in West Berlin and the tunnel evacuated long before the Soviets entered the tap chamber. A microphone was left in place to record what was going on.¹² The Soviet publicity coup backfired: rather than condemning the operation, the non-Soviet press hailed it as audacious and well-planned. Of course, at the time, no one knew the extent of Soviet foreknowledge.

Since KGB archives remain closed, we cannot be certain that the Soviets did not exploit their prior knowledge of the cable tap for their own purposes—to plant false information, for example. However, according to former DCI Richard Helms, the possibility that the Soviets used the tunnel for “disinformazia” (disinformation) was closely examined after Blake’s exposure and arrest in 1961. Finally, it was concluded that the intelligence that had been collected was genuine.¹³

The sheer volume of the “take” from the tunnel operation would tend to support that conclusion. In all, about 40,000 hours of telephone conversations were recorded, along with 6,000,000 hours of teletype traffic.¹⁴ Most of the useful information dealt with Soviet orders of battle and force dispositions—information that was invaluable in the days before reconnaissance satellites and other, more sophisticated means of collection became operational. Not until more than two years after the tunnel was exposed and shut down was the task of processing this immense volume of data completed.¹⁵

V-1: Field Project Outline, 16 September 1953 (MORI No. 144126). [PDF Only 496KB*]

This memorandum outlines the basic concept for the Berlin Tunnel project. It was prepared in August and September 1953.

V-2: Memorandum for COM Frankfurt from COB Berlin; Progress Report—28 August through 17 October 1954, 18 October 1954 (MORI No. 144129). [PDF Only 912KB*]

A memorandum documenting some of the problems encountered while excavation of the tunnel was in its early stages.

V-3: Memorandum for the Record, 29 November 1954 (MORI No. 144130). [PDF Only 535KB*]

This memorandum describes some of the security measures in place while the tunnel was in operation.

V-4: Clandestine Services History Program (CSHP) History: Soviet Discovery of the Berlin Tunnel, 15 August 1956 (MORI No. 144132). [PDF Only 804KB*]

The circumstances of the tunnel’s discovery is described in this declassified history. As noted at the beginning of this document, it was prepared before the role played by KGB mole George Blake was uncovered. The description of the tunnel’s actual discovery is accurate, however.

V-5: CSHP History: Soviet Discovery of the Berlin Tunnel, (Tape Transcript) Undated (MORI No. 145737). [PDF Only 1.27MB*]

The entry of the Soviet and East German security forces into the tunnel was monitored by specially concealed microphones. This is a transcript of the recording. Much of it is garbled. The English voices are those of US intelligence officers listening to the activity in the tunnel—their comments were accidentally recorded at the same time.

V-6: CSHP History of the Berlin Tunnel, G. Berlin Tunnel, Undated (MORI No. 144450). [PDF Only 219KB*]

V-7: CSHP History of the Berlin Tunnel, V. Production, [from the Berlin Tunnel Operation], Undated (MORI No. 144445). [PDF Only 132KB*]

V-8: CSHP History of the Berlin Tunnel: Appendix B. Recapitulation of the Intelligence Derived, Undated (MORI No. 145735). [PDF Only 489KB*]

These documents describe the importance of the Berlin Tunnel as a source of intelligence information. The volume and the quality of the information derived suggests that the tunnel was a valuable source despite having been compromised early in the planning process. Until the relevant Soviet records are made available to researchers a comprehensive evaluation of the project will not be possible, however.

Footnotes

- 1** G.J.A. O'Toole, *Encyclopædia of American Intelligence and Espionage: From the Revolutionary War to the Present* (New York: Facts on File, 1988), p. 66.
 - 2** David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 208.
 - 3** *Ibid.*, pp. 208, 211-212.
 - 4** *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213, 219.
 - 5** *Ibid.*, p. 210.
 - 6** *Ibid.*, p. 219.
 - 7** *Ibid.*, p. 222.
 - 8** *Ibid.*, pp. 214-216.
 - 9** *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.
 - 10** *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.
 - 11** *Ibid.*, pp. 230-231.
 - 12** See Document V-5 for a transcript of the recording that was made.
 - 13** Thomas Huntington, "The Berlin Spy Tunnel Affair," *Invention and Technology* (1995), p. 52.
 - 14** See Document V-7, below.
 - 15** G.J.A. O'Toole, *Encyclopædia of American Intelligence and Espionage: From the Revolutionary War to the Present* (New York: Facts on File, 1988), p. 67.
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VIA: (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

FORM NO. 51-28A (Ecl. A)

SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

Copy 1 of 6 copies

TO : Director Central Intelligence
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Special Intelligence
SPECIFIC—

This document has been approved September 1953 through the DISTRICT REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 2/18/96
SRP 95-1

In accordance with our discussion of 28 August the attached field project outline has been prepared and is being forwarded for presentation to you through [redacted] of Staff D.

I am of the opinion that the key to the success of this project is primarily a matter of maintaining the highest possible degree of security. For this reason I am most anxious to confine knowledge of the plan to an absolute minimum; in fact, it is my conviction that only those individuals who can make a specific contribution to the success of this operation should be made aware of its existence.

[redacted]

Considering the tremendous amount of time consuming work that lies ahead of us in this undertaking, it is of the utmost importance that we begin as soon as possible in order to be ready for the final phase which must necessarily be accomplished at the end of the summer of 1954.

[redacted signature]

LUCIAN B. TRUSCOTT

Dist: Copies 1-3 - Wash

17 September 1953

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CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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SECURITY INFORMATION

(Encl 8)

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

FIELD PROJECT OUTLINE

Recommended by: [Redacted]
Approved by: [Redacted]
Cryptonym: [Redacted]

Date: 21/1/95
16 September 1953
SRP 917

1. Pursuant to discussions of 28 August 1953 between COM Germany and the DCI, wherein it was agreed that the intelligence potential of the subject project justified its inherent risk and financial cost, the following outline and plan of action is submitted for approval and the implementation indicated.
2. It should be noted that this project will be developed jointly and explicitly in accordance with existing formal agreements between [Redacted] and [Redacted]. For security reasons resulting from the physical location of the project, [Redacted] participation must be limited during the earlier phases of the operation.
3. In view of the absolute necessity for maintaining complete operational security, all aspects of this project must be handled separately from all Special Intelligence matters. All communications pertaining to this project should be handled on separate and unique intelligence channels. Further, in consideration of the high intelligence potential of the operation and of the considerable risk involved, it is imperative that all other activities in this particular field, both existing and proposed, be kept under constant review to insure that no one of them adversely affects it.
4. The objective of this project is to collect covertly the Soviet intelligence known to be passing over certain underground telecommunication cables that are adjacent to and accessible from the U.S. Sector of Berlin. [Redacted]. From reliable technical information collected over a period of several years, it has been established that these cables carry Soviet Military, Security Service and Diplomatic telephone and telegraph traffic to and from various Soviet Headquarters in Germany and in certain instances between those Headquarters and Moscow. [Redacted]. Access to these cables however can be secured only through the construction of a subterranean passage approximately 1800 feet in length, one half of which will be in Soviet Sector territory.
5. Although the technical and engineering difficulties of this undertaking cannot be minimized, they can for the most part be met with experience developed from similar operations conducted elsewhere. Confining knowledge of this operation in all its phases, however, is

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the greatest problem. In this respect and considering the location of the site of the operation, it is difficult to visualize an installation and activity of the size required being established at this remote spot. It is, nevertheless, reasonable and possible for the U.S. Forces in Berlin to construct a number of warehouses within the bounds of the U.S. Sector. Although such constructions will attract attention, the fact remains that knowledge of what transpires within these buildings is a matter not beyond control. In actuality, therefore, the problem is not so much the establishment of a perfect cover, but more a matter of maintaining absolute internal security within a physically enclosed area housing the operation. To meet these operational construction and security requirements, it is planned to have the U.S. Army activate a plan calling for the construction and maintenance of three warehouses located along the US/Soviet Sector and the US/Soviet Zone borders. These warehouses will for all intents and purposes constitute an emergency equipment dispersal system operated in connection with the security of U.S. Forces in Berlin. Each of these installations will be manned by a carefully hand-picked and screened detachment of 2 officers and 36 enlisted men who will be engaged in the handling of crates and equipment. Actually these detachments will be engaged in the construction of the subterranean passage and the handling of equipment and supplies related to this activity from the one installation which is adjacent to the target. The officers and men of these units will be hand-picked, carefully trained and thoroughly indoctrinated on the requirements of their mission and the maintenance of absolute security. The operation and the inception must be divorced from all intelligence (OPAW) and intelligence activity. (Control and security will be exercised and maintained through properly indoctrinated officers assigned to the units.)

6. Implementation of the above proposed action will be accomplished in four phases and as follows:

A) Initial stage: (1) Collaboration between the appropriate U.S./British engineers will be established for the purpose of preparing an engineering study and training plans. (2) In association with a C.G. USAREUR appointed staff officer, a plan calling for the establishment of an emergency equipment dispersal installation in Berlin will be drawn up. Based on this plan Berlin Military Post will establish a Post engineer project requiring the construction of the three warehouses. (3) Simultaneously and as a part of the above plan the officers and men required to man the warehouses will be recruited and assigned to a newly activated and formally designated Army Service Unit which will eventually be assigned to the Berlin Command.

B) Training stage: (1) During the construction of the required buildings in Berlin the recruited teams will be in training. This training will consist of normal military subjects including driving,

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operation of power tools, tunnel construction, and above all development of personal security. (2) At the conclusion of this training, subject to the completion of the warehouses, the detachment will move into these installations and begin receiving and storing the equipment that will be required for the primary operation.

C) Construction phase: At the appropriate time the units established in the warehouse covering the target site will commence work on the passageway. During the course of this work personnel, equipment and spoil will be moved as required among the three installations. Upon completion of the passageway, specialists will begin work on the critical and hazardous task of constructing the tap chamber and opening of the cables. (The element of hazard is particularly acute due to the fact that the target cables lie only 28 inches from the surface of the earth.) After successfully opening the cables the taps will be led away through the passageway to the U.S. Sector into the recording unit. It is estimated that this construction will require nine months time. In any case the cable tapping can only be attempted during a long dry period (late summer 1954).

D) Operational phase: (1) Installation of terminal equipment, switch boards and recorders. (2) Selection and recording of target circuits. (3) Processing.

~~SECRET~~ This estimate represents the approximate cost of this project. It does not include the cost of warehouse construction, labor costs and an approximation of construction material and equipment costs. It does not include the cost of warehouse construction. It is not possible to schedule exact costs until final arrangements via a U.S. Army support and procurement of construction materials and equipment have been made. In any case, special arrangements for funding this project will be made.

8. In view of the major degree of assistance and cooperation that will be required from USEUCOM, USAREUR and USCOB to fulfill the above plan, national intelligence level support to it will undoubtedly be required. In accordance with the aforementioned DCI/COM German discussion and immediately subsequent to DCI approval of this project, it is recommended that support be obtained in Washington at the highest level and that the Commanding Generals of the EUCOM, USAREUR and USCOB be informed of the project on an eyes only basis and their support to it requested. (See Tab C).

9. It will be necessary for Headquarters to provide the following support to this activity:

A) Full time assignment of a specially qualified engineer with experience in the construction of subterranean tunnels.

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AIR

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HR-A [redacted]

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Page 1 of 7 pages.

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attention: [redacted]

18 October 1954

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Operational [redacted]

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Progress Report - 28 August through 17 October 1954

Date 21/10/54

11154

Synopsis: Set out below is a progress report on developments in the [redacted] operation from 28 August 1954 through 17 October 1954. This dispatch contains no requests for action, all action requests being handled separately as they arise. It is primarily for the purpose of documenting progress and problems to date.

1. On 28 August 1954 the [redacted] detachment took over the site under the command of [redacted]. The basic shipment of equipment began arriving on the site on that date and was completely stowed by the end of the following day, 29 August. The period between 29 August and 2 September 1954 was consumed in shakedown in the new installation. On 2 September [redacted] and his crew began actual excavation. On 7 September the last of the necessary equipment arrived on the site and was securely unloaded and stowed.

2. On 8 September at approximately 8 feet below basement-floor level, i.e., approximately 16 1/2 feet below the surface of the ground, small amounts of water were encountered. This development was completely unanticipated inasmuch as all geologic and other data previously collected reflected that the water table in this area was at approximately 32 1/2 feet. Further investigation reflected that immediately below the water there was a layer of heavy clay almost impervious to moisture which also was completely unanticipated since the geologic data had reflected that the soil composition in the area was composed completely of sand without either clay or rock formations. Pumps were procured and immediately placed into operation, and insofar as could be determined, the water flow was approximately 400 gallons per day in a hole 12 feet in diameter.

3. It being impossible for obvious reasons to conduct test borings outside the installation along the intended route of approach to the target, efforts were made to do as much testing as possible within the necessary limitations of security to determine the exact significance of the water. A test bore hole was sunk at the other end of the warehouse installation which revealed a similar phenomenon, i.e., the presence of water and a clay layer, except that at that location, approximately 50 yards away, water was first encountered at 16 feet instead of 16 1/2 feet. In the

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Distribution:

- 3 - COM (Copies 1, 4, 5) (w/1 attach. a/s)
- 3 - Chief, [redacted] (thru COM - Copies 3, 6, 7)

(Copies 1,3,4,5,6, 7 hand-carried to COM 18 October by [redacted])

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hole where the excavation was originally started and where water had been encountered at 16½ feet, test holes were bored down through the clay layer and a sump hole was sunk for approximately 8 feet additional depth for testing purposes. These test borings reflected that the clay stratum at that point was approximately 6 feet in thickness and that underneath it was located comparatively dry sand, indicating that the true water table was considerably below this point. An examination was made of the cesspool located approximately 50 feet beyond the far warehouse wall and the site of the original excavation, and it was determined that at that point water and the clay stratum apparently did not appear until a depth of approximately 22½ feet.

4. Insofar as it was possible securely to do so, a check was made of the location of water during the drilling of the well, which was completed during the construction period, approximately 30 - 40 yards northeast of the location where the original excavation was started by [redacted]. The record of the well drilling reflected that usable amounts of water were reached at approximately 33 feet. It will be recalled that in the immediate vicinity of the site are located a number of sand pits which on the basis of direct visual observation plus stereoscopic examination of aerial photographs had been estimated at 32 feet in depth. These pits which are in the immediate proximity of the site were again examined and determined to be dry to within a few inches of the bottom, despite recent heavy rains in the vicinity. So be absolutely positive of the depth of these pits, an altimeter was carried concealed to the bottom of one of them resulting in a reading of approximately 25 feet.

5. During this checking period from 8 until approximately 15 September 1954, the pumping of the water from the excavation continued steadily with only a very slight appreciable lessening of the water flow, while there was no indication thereof, the possibility was considered that since the outlet from the pump was being piped into the cesspool system, the pumped out water could conceivably through some old subterranean formation be flowing back into the excavation. Consequently, a quantity of phenothalein dye was procured and in alcohol solution mixed with the pumped out water. Tests over a period of several days clearly established that the pumped out water which had been mixed with phenothalein dye in solution was not flowing back into the excavation and therefore must have been draining off normally at cesspool level (22½ feet) or below.

6. On the basis of all of the above factors, the conclusion was reached that what had been encountered in the excavation was a porched water table caused by the presence of a clay lens approximately 6 feet thick but of unknown dimensions. It was considered probable also that this situation was aggravated by the fact that the summer of 1954 was an unusually rainy period in the area. While without test borings along the target line, which it is impossible to take, no one can be positive of this conclusion, it appears probable that the clay lens does not extend throughout the entire area. This was considered particularly probable in view of the depth of the adjacent sand pits, the fact that geologic data showed no extensive clay formation, and that the water and clay level in the concrete bottle of the cesspool, a short distance ahead of the original excavation, was approximately 6 feet deeper.

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Encountering a clay lens of limited proportions is not unusual, can seldom be predicted, and frequently cannot be forecast in a given area from available geologic data. The presence of clay lenses, particularly those not covering an extensive area, apparently occurs without rhyme or reason very much along the line of the old drillers' adage that "oil is where you find it." It is probable, however, that if clay strata exist under the entire area, the geologic data available would have given some indication thereof, which they did not. It was considered probable also that the clay lens slanted downwards beneath the surface in the direction of the target objective since it was approximately 6 inches higher at the back end of the warehouse and approximately 6 feet lower at the bottom of the concrete cesspool bottle.

7. The unanticipated discovery of water and the impervious clay lens underneath it raised a serious question as to exactly what construction approach should be used. As you will recall, we had originally intended to complete the construction with an overhead cover of approximately 9 feet; however, upon the initial examination of the site and upon determining from the first few feet of excavation that the sandy soil involved was extremely easy to work in, it was decided to drive considerably deeper and to operate with a cover of approximately 16 to 18 feet, which according to the water table level figures available to us would still have been several feet safely above the true water table. This was decided not only because of the ease with which the construction could proceed in the soil involved but also as an additional precaution to cut down the maximum amount of detectable noise. — Approximately 8 to 9 feet of cover would still be possible above the 7 foot diameter tunnel as originally contemplated by driving the construction to the level where water was discovered unless the clay lens and the perched water table rise instead of drop, it being noted as set out above that every indication is that they would drop as the construction progressed. The other alternative is to cut through the clay lens, go underneath into the layer of sand above the true water table, and then drive the construction straight ahead. It is considered that two definite risks exist in this latter course, i.e., at some undetermined point in the future progress of the construction, a sharp drop out of the clay lens above the construction could cause a sufficient flow of water from the perched water table to raise a serious possibility of collapse; or, secondly, if by an chance, the clay lens continues to be present above the construction up to the point of reaching the target objective, it will be necessary to drive the construction and the terminal chamber up through the clay lens, which would cause serious construction problems, particularly if water still exists in a perched water table above the lens. A further complication results from the fact that careful survey of the proposed construction route from the site reflects that the terrain between the starting point of the excavation and the target point contains a definite dip estimated at between 5 and 6 feet over the approximately 1,500 foot target route. This dip or depression reaches its lowest point approximately halfway between the site and the target and rises gradually from that point to the target point.

8. On the basis of the above factors, the following conclusions were reached:

a. What had been encountered in the construction was a clay lens of limited but unknown dimensions approximately 6 feet in depth, sufficiently impervious to water to create a perched water table approximately 16 feet above the true water table.

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b. Below the clay lens there is present additional easy workable sand down to the true water table at approximately 32 feet.

c. On the basis of the test borings, the well data, the geologic data, and the water level in the cesspool concrete bottle, it is probable that the clay lens sinks gradually and perhaps drastically ahead of the original excavation and along the construction route and may, in fact, disappear altogether. In the absence of test borings, which it is impossible for security reasons to take, however, there is no absolute guarantee of this.

d. Initiating the construction by driving beneath the clay lens involves some risk of collapse or cave in if along the construction route a sudden drop off of the clay lens causes sufficient flow of water from the perched water table to saturate the surrounding sand.

e. If carefully done, construction can be effected along the top of the clay lens and the perched water table with sufficient cover that the project will not be detected through noise and will not run substantial risks of collapse or cave in. This was considered particularly advisable in view of the strong indications that the clay lens and the perched water table will sink as the construction progresses. The most serious drawback in driving the construction ahead on the top of the clay lens and the perched water table is the possibility that the clay lens will not sink or will rise again which would mean that when construction reaches a point midway between start and finish at the greatest depth of the terrain depression noted above, the construction would be operating with the benefit of only a few feet of cover which would compound the risk and make the noise factor an appreciable one.

f. At any point in the progress of the construction where the clay lens or the perched water table above it ceased dropping or appeared to rise, it would then be possible to cut through the clay lens and by use of well points, bore holes through the clay for drainage, etc., keep the tunnel dry and still continue progress at greater depth to afford adequate overhead cover without running any greater, if as great a risk of a sudden drop off and water flow as would be run if the construction were originally to begin below the clay lens.

9. On the basis of the above conclusions, it was tentatively decided that:

a. Construction should be commenced above the clay lens and should continue following the level of the clay lens and the perched water table toward the target and that if and as the perched water table and the clay lens dropped, the construction should drop along with them.

b. That at the point of reaching the depression midway between the starting point and the point of completion if the clay lens had not dropped sufficiently to afford the requisite overhead cover, the construction would then drive down through the clay lens taking maximum advantage of drainage pumps, well points, drainage borings through the clay lens, etc., to remove the water as a possible danger to the construction. (It should be noted that in the opinion of REHALFWAY and his crew, this would be entirely possible and should involve no undue construction difficulties or risks.)

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9. In view of the unanticipated discovery of water and the problem of overhead cover created thereby, extreme caution would be used to reduce noise and to key the construction to our visual observation of possible countermeasures to the maximum degree possible.

10. Upon the completion of all of the above steps and upon reaching the above conclusions, this matter was discussed in detail by [redacted] and [redacted] with [redacted] of [redacted] who was requested to arrange for the immediate TTY to Berlin of the [redacted] consulting engineer, [redacted] for the purpose of having [redacted] examine the site and add his technical opinion to that of [redacted] on the question of exactly how the construction should proceed. Unfortunately, [redacted] was not immediately available in view of other commitments, and one of his assistant engineers arrived in Berlin on 21 September to make a complete examination of the site and to discuss the attendant problems in detail with [redacted]. [redacted] left Berlin after completing this assignment returned to London on 22 September 1954, and on the night of 4 October 1954, [redacted] arrived in Berlin for a personal examination of the premises and discussions with [redacted]. These were completed by the afternoon of 6 October at which time a detailed discussion of the operation and particularly of the construction approach that should be used took place between [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] findings and his analysis of the engineering construction factors, together with this discussion, confirmed completely [redacted] analysis and the original conclusions which had been reached, and at this meeting the following decisions were made:

- a. Construction will proceed at the level immediately above the clay lens and the perched water table.
- b. The excavation will be kept dry by continual pumping and as construction progresses, drainage holes will be bored through the clay lens and test borings regularly conducted to determine the exact depth of the clay lens and the perched water table.
- c. The construction will follow the clay lens and the perched water table down as far as they recede, maintaining at all times a minimum overhead cover of 8 to 9 feet. If at any point in the progress of the construction the perched water table and clay lens rise or do not sink sufficiently to afford necessary cover, then the construction will drive into or through the clay lens in order that necessary cover will be possible.
- d. The construction will be conducted with maximum caution to avoid detection through noise or through any unfortunate subsidence of the overhead soil.
- e. Well point data is being procured and well points will be used to drain the soil ahead of the shield if it becomes necessary and advisable to do so.

11. As a result of these discussions, construction was recommenced on 11 October, and on 11 and 12 October the shield was employed and construction started at the level of approximately 15 1/2 feet. The next several days up to 17 October were consumed in establishing the position of the shield and in driving the construction to and through the concrete foundation of the warehouse wall.

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12. Attached is one copy of a drawing made by [redacted] at the construction site which shows in exaggerated profile the depression which reaches its deepest point approximately halfway between the start of the construction and the target objective and which shows other pertinent terrain factors, including the known clay level at various points. Only one copy of this is available, and if it is desired by COM to forward a copy of this to Headquarters, it is suggested that copies be made by COM since it is not desired to duplicate this drawing here. No copy of this drawing is being retained in BOB files.

13. In connection with the progress of this operation, the following additional steps have been taken in connection with general operational security and related factors which are of sufficient interest to be briefly summarized:

a. Twenty-four hour observation was instituted beginning on the day the site was taken over of the target area of the entire area between the site and the target and all movements of personnel and vehicles, including Vopo patrols in the neighborhood. A daily log is being kept of all movements and developments in this connection, including a pedestrian and vehicle count of traffic along the road adjacent to the target site. [redacted] crew has been supplied with a pair of 12 x 60 Ialtz night binoculars and with an infra-red binocular viewing kit. Through the use of this equipment excellent night observation is possible and except on nights when there is heavy fog, it is believed it will be impossible for substantial activity to take place in the target area without our being aware thereof. The log which is being maintained is being periodically reviewed to be certain that there is no gradual change in traffic or observation patterns. There has been no indication of the use of infra-red light against us for observation purposes.

b. A considerable amount of interest, curiosity, and observation of the installation has been noted on the part of Vopos, apparent civilians, and individuals believed to be Russians in civilian clothes, but the interest exhibited and the observation noted do not appear to be more intensive or any more unusual than would normally be expected in connection with an installation of this type located where it is.

c. We have every indication that the cover story used has been effective, not only from the exterior appearances of the installation but from what we have been able to gather concerning the reaction in the Berlin Command to the installation. In fact, the acceptance of the installation in the role paraded for it has, we believe, been even better than we had hoped.

d. A careful review has been made of the guard system, the security precautions, and the preliminary instructions as to what is to be done in case of emergency, and they appear to be excellent. [redacted] has been furnished with two Schaeferhanden for warning and guard purposes. Emergency two-way radio communications are in the process of being set up. In addition, we are supplying [redacted] with microphone installations to be concealed on the fence which, it is believed, may pick up Vopo conversations in the immediate vicinity. On 15 September the premises were completely

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ECRA - [redacted]
Page 7
17 October 1953

except for the presence of microphones, telephone taps, or other listening devices without detecting any indications of the presence of any such coverage. It is of interest to note that the three large diesel generators at the installation create such noise that it would be extremely difficult to install effective audio surveillance of any kind, and, in addition, create sufficient ground noise and vibrations to assist greatly in concealing construction noise.

13. Secure clandestine arrangements have been effected for contacts between [redacted] and [redacted] as necessary, and visits to the site by all individuals other than [redacted] assigned crew have been kept to an absolute minimum. All such visits that have been made have been made by the individuals concerned traveling to and from the site in a closed three-quarter ton truck where they have been subject to no outside observation whatever.

[redacted] and his officers who as necessary proceed to downtown Berlin in civilian clothes have been issued short-barreled .38 special revolvers for concealed carrying and through secure channels between COM and Heidelberg have been furnished permits therefor.

14. Considerable thought has been given to the problems involved in establishing a firm SOP for the action to be taken in the event of an unfortunate detection of this operation and the problems involved in the establishment, cover, and operation in Berlin of the proposed forward processing unit. These problems have been discussed in detail by [redacted] and also with [redacted] and [redacted] C [redacted]. Specific recommendations concerning these two points will be made formally within the immediate future.

15. It is impossible to estimate with certainty the completion date of [redacted] phase of this project. Such an estimate depends too completely upon future contingencies to be exact at this point; however, [redacted] most conservative estimate at the present time is that he should complete his phase of this project by approximately 22 January 1953 unless we encounter the remote possibility that the clay lens and the perched water table site instead of drop and do not disappear so that it is necessary to drive below them at or about the location where the depression midway between the site and target reaches its greatest depth. If that contingency does occur, the time for the completion of this phase of the project will be appreciably longer.

16. This is the first progress report that has been submitted on this operation since the occupation of the site on 28 August. Documentation of this operation is for obvious reasons being kept to the barest necessary minimum as previously discussed with [redacted]. It was felt, however, that in view developments and the necessary construction decisions resulting therefrom, a progress report in some detail should be submitted at this time.

W. K. HARVEY

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Date 2/18/45

HRP 911

1. In order that there will be a complete and detailed record of the specific precautions, policies and courses of action authorized by the DCI in connection with the above project there is set out below a resume of the decisions reached and approved by the DCI at the conference held in his office on 18 November 1954 which was attended by the DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, C/OPS, ADCO, CFI, C/STD and [REDACTED] *H. K. HARVEY*

2. At all times during the construction phase and after the completion of this project, the target objective and the surrounding area will be kept under constant visual observation.

3. The following physical precautions will be taken within the tunnel and the site itself, each one being put in place as soon as the construction permits it to be safely and efficiently installed:

a. On the near side of the pre-amp chamber a heavy steel door set in substantial concrete slabs will be emplaced with an adequate lock and bar on the inside and wired with an alarm system against tampering. This door will be locked at all times except when individuals are actually inside the pre-amp chamber. Telephone connections will be established between the pre-amp chamber and the site.

b. An area forty feet long, ten feet on the near side of the demarcation line and thirty feet on the far side of the demarcation line will be mined as soon as the construction has progressed sufficiently to permit. It will be mined by using C-3 plastic in sealed garden hose threaded behind the liner plate in sufficient quantities that when exploded

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it will collapse the tunnel without causing a major surface explosion. After mining, the necessary caps and fusing for arming this mined area will be fixed and secured in the immediate area but the mined area will not be armed except in case of emergency, and no effort will be made to lay in the explosives on a "push button" basis.

c. The near end of the tunnel at the building line will be closed by a second steel, concrete emplaced door.

d. The entrance to the shaft from the basement floor will be covered and concealed as well as possible.

e. The ramp leading from the basement to the first floor of the warehouse will be covered and concealed as well as possible and equipped with a locked steel door.

4. In the event enemy action is observed which could logically be construed as possibly leading to discovery of the project, i. e. at the target objective or between the target objective and the installation, the following steps will be taken:

a. Simultaneously, and as rapidly as possible all personnel will be removed to the site and the Chief, BOB, will be immediately notified. Emergency two-way radio communications will be provided for this purpose in the event telephone service fails at any given time.

b. If the enemy action observed is such that time permits, there will be immediate consultation between the Chief, BOB, and the Commanding Officer of the site as to further steps.

c. If time permits, consideration will be given to removing as much of the equipment as possible.

d. Coincident with the removal of the personnel, the steel doors will be appropriately secured and if discovery appears really imminent, the mined area will be armed and blown when it appears necessary to prevent entry or progress of enemy personnel through the tunnel.

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e. Under no circumstances will the installation be precipitately abandoned.

f. In the event there is any imminent move against or attempt to gain entry to the installation, regardless of by whom or under what circumstances such occurs, the Commanding Officer of the installation will have orders to resist entry with all means at his disposal notifying Chief, BOB, and USCOB immediately.

g. In the event of discovery and any possible protest the official American reaction is to be flat, indignant denial ascribing any such protest to a baseless enemy provocation. Further possible policy and propaganda maneuvering in such an event cannot be decided upon at this time.

5. With specific regard to Paragraph 4 above, the question of whether or not Ambassador ~~Conant~~ should be briefed was again brought up and reconsidered by the DCI. After considerable discussion and careful reconsideration it was the DCI's decision that ~~Conant~~ should not be briefed and that he did not desire to re-raise this issue with the highest policy levels with whom it had been previously discussed.

6. After discussion it was decided that the personnel for the forward processing unit would be covered by preparing and processing them in the States and sending them to Berlin in the normal manner as members of the 9539th TSU, Signal Corps, the present cover organization of the site. These personnel will at not point appear as KUBARK personnel.

*the
any further
reason
[redacted]
[redacted]*

his
done
*see any
reason*
[redacted]
[redacted]

Chief, ~~[redacted]~~

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APPENDIX A

Tunnel Project

NOTE: This assessment was prepared by the () staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent information available. At the time the report was prepared BLAKE's activities had not been surfaced.

15 August 1956

DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF *THE TUNNEL*

Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on the target cables, conversations recorded from a microphone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the site - indicates that the Soviet discovery of *the tunnel* was purely fortuitous and was not the result of a penetration of the () agencies concerned, a security violation, or testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. A description of the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this paper.

Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of telephone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 1956. The first major fault was discovered on cable FK 151 at Wassmannsdorf on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing a 3000 meter length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22

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continued. This general situation was noted by personnel at the site who checked the tap on the morning of 19 April and found it to be in good condition with no faults present. Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of 20 April, noting, "available precautions taken including primary one of crossing fingers."

Throughout 20 April Soviet operators at Karlshorst, the Mahlow cable chamber, and Zossen/Wuensdorf checked FK 150 pairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made switches where necessary or possible. Nothing was said concerning the testing being conducted to discover the faults or work being done by a Soviet labor force lent to the Germans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On 21 April a Karlshorst technician told a colleague in Zossen/Wuensdorf the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days' work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble. Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the evening of 21 April, and the Soviets showed considerable concern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph channel which had been transferred to FK 150 on 17 April. Lt. Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf, telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center, at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air Warning circuit. They agreed that communications had to be

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established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty station.

There is no significant information available on the actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from 0300 hours on 20 April to 0050 hours on 22 April. On the basis of available information, however, it seems probable that (a) the testing program continued north until a fault was located near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire section of cable which embraced the tap site; or (b) the repeated faulting coupled with the age and physical condition of FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only effective remedy was to replace the cable, section by section, and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our site and continued northward until the tap was discovered.

At approximately 0050 hours on 22 April, 40 or 50 men were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed along the entire area observable from our installation, digging at three to five foot intervals over the location of the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At approximately 0200 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered, and at 0210 Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap chamber. The first fragments of speech indicated that the discovery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among those present. A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof

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permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a Soviet captain ^{2/} was brought to the spot. After some discussion all agreed that the discovery was a manhole covering a repeater point, and the working crew began enlarging the hole to gain access to the "repeater point."

While the working party was uncovering the tap chamber, Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the communications situation in a rambling telephone conversation at approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at the restoration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow, and Vyunik went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on FK 150. In context it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up the difficulties on FK 150 once and for all. In any event, Alpatov clearly did not share his colleague's doubts. The general tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom we know well. The conversation appears to be a clear indication that, as of 0230 hours on 22 April, neither of these responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap.

^{2/} Presumably Captain Bartash, an engineer who later received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the discovery of the tap.

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Meanwhile back at the site the work of enlarging a hole to give full access to the tap chamber continued. At approximately 0250 hours an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scene, presumably in response to a request for guidance by the working party. The Colonel did not appear to be a signal officer since he took no active part in the investigation and remained on the scene only for a short time. Having enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of the chamber. They assumed the trap door to be "some sort of box" and had no suspicion of the true nature of the installation. At approximately 0300 hours barriers were erected to keep inquisitive onlookers away from the excavation and it was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate, presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same time the first German voice was heard, in conversation with a German-speaking Russian. The German stated that two trucks must have passed the spot without locating it. The Russian answered that "Soviet troops are coming as well," and added that they must wait "until morning" for the decision as to what further work would be undertaken.

While these developments were taking place, Vyunik held a telecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he referred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center and

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discussed, in detail, communication arrangements necessitated by this move. This revealing teleconference tends to support other evidence indicating that as of 0300 hours the true nature of the installation had still not been established.

The work of excavation continued, and fragments of conversation connected with it were picked up by the tap chamber microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that "somebody has come from there and there are fewer workers there," suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point. The Russian gave instructions that nothing in the installation was to be touched. A German remarked that the chamber might be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities. The Russian answered that they already had this information and that the plans showed "that chamber" to be 120 meters away from this point. At about 0320 hours, when still more of the tap chamber was revealed and a better view of the interior obtained, those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the time of its construction. One of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might have been built during the war, possibly for "Vhe Che" (Russian abbreviation for "high frequency transmission," but used loosely to denote anything connected with secure communications.) Shortly after 0330 hours, the Soviets left the site by motor

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vehicle, presumably to report their findings. For approximately one and one-half hours - from 0330 to 0500 - no sounds or voices were recorded.

At approximately 0415 hours Vyunik telephoned Alpatov's apartment in Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov said that he had, that he was getting dressed, and that he would go to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame room at Zossen/Wuensdorf, adding, "When we speak we must do so carefully. We know what the matter is, so we will speak carefully." This indicated clearly that by 0415 hours the GSFG Signal Directorate and General Dudakov, the Chief Signal Officer, had been informed of the discovery of the ~~()~~ ^{tunnel tap} chamber, viewed it with extreme suspicion, and planned to re-route circuits passing over the target cables. This coincides neatly with the departure from the tap site of the Soviets at 0330. At 0630 Vyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel Zolochko, Deputy Chief of the Lines Department, GSFG, had left Wuensdorf at 0625 to go "there." Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit and wait.

In due course Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site, accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the

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Commander of the working party. By this time the Soviets apparently had brought circuit diagrams to the site and were aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables. There was considerable discussion of the discovery, and one of the crew actually entered the chamber and made a superficial and inconclusive examination. Shortly afterwards the statement, "the cable is tapped," was made for the first time on the scene.

At about this time (0635 hours) Lt. Colonel Vyunik telephoned Major Alpatov and asked whether he had received the "task" and whether its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignment. Speaking in unusually vague terms, Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take over two low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the KGB signals organization. (These channels would provide telephone communications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technical discussions on the new facilities.

Although teletype traffic continued until the tap wires were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon - the last telephone call of any interest was placed sometime between 0800 and 0900 hours on 22 April, when an agitated General speaking from Marshal Grechko's apartment attempted to contact Colonel

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Kotsyuba, who was then acting for General Dibrova, Berlin Commandant. Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to Colonel Pomozanovskii, Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison, stressing the urgency of his call. Pomozanovskii promised to find Kotsyuba at once and get him to return the call. The return call was not intercepted, but there appears to be no doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this time been informed of the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonel Kotsyuba. A few telephone calls were attempted after this, but the operators refused to place the calls, and in one case a Karlshorst operator said, "I won't put you through to anyone. Don't ring, that's all. I won't answer you any more. It's in the order."

Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation, including Colonel Gusev of the KGB Signals Regiment. A Russian-speaking German was heard to remark that a "commission" was expected, and a Soviet officer said that they would await the arrival of this commission before making a decision as to what the next step would be. In answer to a question as to whether anything should be disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing should be done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added, however, that the hole providing access to the chamber should be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out. The general discussion continued, and the possibility of some

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form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was discussed at some length. There was widespread belief that the trap door, which in fact provided access to the tunnel proper, was a "box" or "battery box" possibly involving a booby trap. One of the Soviet officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after everything had been carefully noted and recorded, a grappling iron could be attached to the "box" in order to tear it away. "If there is no explosion," he said, "then we can calmly go ahead and deal with it."

Several individuals, presumably German cable splicers, agreed that the cables were fully tapped and discussed the method employed. They agreed that it must have been done in such a way as to render the tap undetectable by measurements, although one of them failed to understand why the actual cutting of the cables was not detected. He added that at that time "everyone must have been quite drunk." The Germans continued to speculate on the nature of the "box" and about the means of access to the tap chamber. One of them said, "They themselves must have some means of entering this place, but naturally it's highly improbable that they have constructed a passage for getting from here to there!"

Some of those present apparently believed that the tap was an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults on the cable. During this discussion the microphone was

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twice noted, but was not recognized for what it was. In the first instance the speaker said, "That is not a microphone," and in the second it was described as "a black ball."

The general discussion continued, with speculation as to the nature of the "battery box" and with several comments that it should be possible to identify the tappers "from the make of the materials" and the techniques employed. While the Germans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable as "not ours," indicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to "check how far it goes from here" - probably by means of electrical measurements. It is evident that at this time (approximately 1130 hours) the Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or those responsible for the tap.

At approximately 1145 hours one of the German crew was heard to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a shaft!"

From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seem that a small hole had been made near the still-intact trap door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but continued to work at and around it despite the alternate

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suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until we reach the cable or the shaft." By approximately 1230 they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of the tap chamber. The padlock which secured the trap door from below was examined and was identified as "of English origin." Failing to open the door separating the tap chamber from the equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximately twenty minutes, broke a hole through the wall and gained visual access to the equipment chamber, which they described as "a long passage." By 1300 they evidently had enlarged the access hole and described "a completed installation - a telephone exchange. . . . An installation for listening in Abhoeranlage."

Additional motion pictures were made and frequent exclamations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet Colonel, probably Zolochko; a person addressed as Nikolai Ivanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a Captain, presumably Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used by the tappers in gaining access to the cables. Zolochko evidently still believed that this was done "from above." Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German commission, mentioned earlier, had already visited the site and established the nature of the installation without going into technical details.

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Measurements of parts of the interior were then taken, discussion of the installation became general, and the participants clearly indicated that the means of access and full implications of the operation were finally appreciated. Conversations reflected that all present realized that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables must have necessitated a very detailed study of relevant maps and plans. The stress to which the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand were mentioned, and a German was heard to exclaim, "It must have cost a pretty penny." A Russian-speaking German added, admiringly, "How neatly and tidily they have done it." It was decided that work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise, whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between one and two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight."

One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed, "What a filthy trick. And where you would least expect it." -- to which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for oneself, nobody would believe it."

Between 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut, and at about 1545 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate on the microphone itself. One of them assumed it to be an "alarm device - probably a microphone," to give warning of

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approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be photographed. At 1550 hours work began on dismantling the microphone. Shortly afterward the microphone went dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational phase of ^{THE TUNNEL} [REDACTED] was completed.

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0300-050

Reel starts with 8 minutes of noise, as of falling debris,
pounding shoveling, intermingled with muffled voices and the sound of
passing motor vehicles. This period is followed by approximately two
hours of relative silence punctuated by the sound of passing traffic,
occasional pounding and muffled voices.

SOUND OF SOMEONE ENTERING/ GARBLED SPEECH, MUFFLED VOICES.

(6) RUSSIAN

NOISE -- RUSSIANS' LEAVE.

SOUND OF PASSING TRAFFIC: MUFFLED VOICES.

SOUND OF SOMEONE ENTERING. (10 MINUTES AFTER ABOVE)

GARBLED SPEECH: MUFFLED VOICES.

NOISE OF WORKMENT GARBLED AND DISTORTED SPEECH.
(RUSSIAN)

(5) ((XQ) DIE LAMPE DA HUNTER GEBEBEN (MG)?)

SOUND OF HEAVY BREATHING: WHISTLING.

SEVERAL SENTENCES OF RUSSIAN

HA, SIESTE (MG)

SOUND OF WORKMENT. GARBLED SPEECH: NOISE.

RUSSIAN -- SEVERAL SENTENCES.

NOISE OF WORKMENT GARBLED SPEECH.

NOISE OF WORKING: SHOVELING. SOUND OF PASSING TRAFFIC, BARKING DOG.

SEVERAL MINUTES OF RELATIVE SILENCE.

SOUND OF ENTERING: MUFFLED VOICES. ('ABSTURTE') ('KABEL')
UND. DANN KABEL. IST [2M]

GERMAN TECHNICIAN OR OFFICIAL: DAS KABEL GERT NACH DRUEREN BERGE IN

AND DEN SCHACHT ***** EINFACH DIE KABEL *** UND HABEN *4YMJ
LIM SECRET LIM

DOCUMENT NO. 74
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
EXPIRY DATE: 2011
AUTH: 28/1/84 REVIEWED: 008632

SAG MAL WIE GEHT DENN DAS ~~HEER~~ DA DURCH, JA?
(GABELE) (war?) schon ~~so~~ so lang (hier durch?)?
(WORKMEN) SHOUTING DROWNS OUT PORTIONS OF CONVERSATION)

NICHT HIER ZU KOENIGT
(XG) ** DASS-ES-HEER-KEEN (IM) UND DIE STRASSE (MG)

SEVERAL PERSON SPEAKING AT ONCE, INCLUDING WORKMEN, RUSSIANS,
AND GERMANS.

GERMAN OFFICIAL OR TECHNICIAN EXPLAINING SETUP: "

DIESE LEITUNGSTRÄGER (SEV. M) SIE HABEN (SEV.M) RUNTER (SEV.M)
UND ES GEHT DANN RUNTER (SEV.M) ^[LM] (NUR ICH) WEISS, DASS DIESE (GEHT) NICHT DURCH & U
(SEV.M) (ES GEHT NOCH EINER NACH) (MG) (SHOUTING OF RUSSIANS AND WORKMEN)
DROWNS OUT PASSAGES OF CONVERSATION.)

GARBLED AND MUFFLED SPEECH. SEVERAL PERSONS SPEAKING AT SAME
TIME IN BOTH RUSSIAN AND GERMAN.

(4/5) RUSSIAN

GERMAN OFFICIAL, APPARENTLY SPEAKING TO WORK BOSS:

^[LM]
"HABT IHR WAS DAGEGEN / WENN ZU DIE GENOSSEN, DIE GENOSSEN ANFANGEN
HIER EIN BISSCHEN ZU UNTERSUCHEN? (MG)"

"ABSOLUT NICHTS!"

RUSSIAN

GERMAN OFFICIAL SPEAKING: "(MG) DA UNTER (SEV.M) ABGESCHNITTEN (MG)

REST OF STATEMENT DROWNED OUT BY MIXED GERMAN AND RUSSIAN.

NOISE; SHOVELING, FALLING DEBRIS, ETC.

WHISTLING.

GARBLED AND DISTORTED SPEECH: APPARENTLY GERMAN WORKMEN.

SOUND OF MEN WORKING: SHOVELING, FALLING DEBRIS.

WORKMAN SPEAKING: ("FAENGT HIER IN (IM) AUF.")

SOUNDS, AS ABOVE, CONTINUE FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES.
(RUSSIAN)

SILENCE, AS WORKMEN LEAVE. SOUND OF PASSING TRAFFIC, ROOSTER

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CROWING.

LAST 15-20 MINUTES OF REEL DEAD.

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WILST DU MAL LANGSAM (X) SCHALLSCHUTZ
 TUN?
 WARS?
 2 B
 SCHALLSCHUTZ
 OR IST HIER DAUNTER
 M.V. (LAUGHTER)
 ES MUSS JETZT HIER DIE, DIE
 M.V.
 HANS!
 M.V.

(? SCHALLSCHUTZ)
 NOISE
 (SCHALLSCHUTZ - SCHALLSCHUTZ)
 STATIC, MUFFLED VOICES

recovery 1200
 when finally
 broke through
 wall started to
 speak clear.

(XO) UND-DENN (4-5 G) UND-DENN EINSCHUTEN SCHALLSCHUTEN
 M.V.
 UND HIER IST EIN UNTERSCHACHT UND

HIER DURCH
 NOISE, BELL.
 (L1102)
 JA B:714

ALSO IAI JETZ GET'S WEITER, JAI ES-HAT (4-6 G) HIER EINMAL 'N APPARAT
 (L1102) hat sie denn?
 JA Lich wollte sagen wir haben ein anderen Apparat
 ANGESCHLOSSEN.

(English Comment: ... other machinery)
 NA JA HIER BRAUCHT MHN (M)
 NOISE. MUFFLED VOICES. GUGHERN ("VERBINDUNG")
 COUGHING
 M.V.

SO'S OUT.
 M.V.
 (ENGLISH) COMBETTI WALKED PAST -
 NEVER EVEN FAZED HIM.

PICK AND SHOVEL NOISE
 ABER WARUM STEHT IHR NUR DA?
 (XG) - SCHAUFEL - XG

MUFFLED VOICES. NOISE
 FAIRLY QUIET
 M.V.

JAI ES-OHNT-TIMER NOCH (4-6 G) DAUNTER, HAL.
 (L1102) M.V. ABER SIE HIER (M) DAUNTER, JA?
 M.V.

FALLING DEBRIS. PANTING
 WER IST DENN DA? (X) MUSS MAL NACH DER ANDEREN SEITE RUEBER.
 JA, JA
 GRABLE

NA, RUNTER, RUNTER!
 (GRABLE)
 MUN, RUEBER! WEITER!
 SO-WEITER

WASS IST DENN DASS? (X) MANN MUSS SICH HIER JA RUNTER LASSEN, NICHT? (4-6 G)

NOISE. FAINT ENGLISH COMMENT. NOISE. MUFFLED VOICES
 FAIRLY QUIET
 RUNTER! (XG)

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NOISE. FALLING DEBRIS. LAUGHING. MUFFLED VOICES.
 RUSSIAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(2)

ALSO, DAS BING ZEIGT GLEICH WIE ES DA WEITER GEHT.

EINER VON EUCH MUSS IMMER UNTEN BLEIBEN.

MUFFLED VOICES.

RUSSIAN

(XG) ~~(IN-DIE-DUFF-VERSCH)~~ (3 0) --- IN STUECKCHEN WEITER.

HANS! HANS!

DU SOLLST ^{mal} ~~mal~~ ~~eben~~ DAS TELEPHONE DURCH ZIEHEN --- STEHT VON UNS.

WAT? HAENGT 'N MIT REIN (XG)

o b e n v i e g

KURT!

(WAT?)

MUFFLED VOICES. NOISE.

JA! WILLST DU ANSETZEN DA UNTEN, JA?

JAI

JA, NUR DAS PASST NICHT.

KEINE PAUSE.

RUSSIAN

PAUSE. DIGGING

HAST DU DAS GEGEHEN?

NEIN (XG)

LAUGHING.
HIER DURCH, HIER GEHT ES DURCH.

RUSSIAN

(XG) DAS DAS DRECK DAVON WEGKOMMT. (M/G)?

NOISE.

SAGEN SIE (M/G)

WHISTLING.

WILLSTE ASSEN [GHEHT]?
[X] M

WRTN MAY. 1944

~~SECRET~~

3

(XG) [2M] AUSSEN GEHEN.

~~SECRET~~

(3G) MAL HINTER.
LXM] ERST MAL 'RUNTER

(XG) RAUS GEBEN (H) GEGEBEN.

(NOISE)

KOMMTE DURCH? (XG)

(NOISE)

DONNERWETTER! MAL DEN (BAU?)
GUCK DOAH BLOSS MAL HINI

LXM] UNTER

ES LAUFT DA UNTER DER STRASSE. -- WIE HANSE DAS JELEISST?

'S IST JA FANTASTISCH!

GEHT'S NOCH? NICHT ?

JAI BITTE?

HALLO!

HALLO!

HALLO!

(G) MEISTEN (MG)

M. VOICES.

G.M. ... DA HINTEN [1M]

HALLO! HALLO! LXM] JA FANTASTISCH [3M] GEHT.

JAI

[3M]
HIER

GIB MIR MAL 'NE GROSSE BRECHSTANGE MAL.

PARS MAL AUF, WIR BRAUCHEN 'NE BRECHSTANGE MAL

HALLO!

DIGGING. OTHER NOISES.

HALLO!

MUFFLED VOICES.

[? WER IST DANN DAS?]? HANS?

(XG) HA?

HALLO!

LXM]

JA

HALLO! GIB SE MAL 'NE GROSSE BRECHSTANGE HER.

EINE BRECHSTANGE? BRAUCHE NOCH MAL.

WAT MIT GIB MAL WEG DAVON VOR DE BRECHSTANGE.

WANT G'MAL IK GIB MAL WEG [XM]

HA, HA.

(MG)

~~SECRET~~

(4)

DIGGING.

(2G)

DIGGING. MUFFLED VOICES. COUGHING.

[DA ERSTICHT MAN.]

DIGGING.

(4G)

MUFFLED VOICES. BELL.
GEM MAL WEG

[PASS OPI KRIEG'S NEHEE IN DE AUGEN. (MG?) NICHT.?)

JAI

(NG)

JA. _____ ZEIG DAI
DA HABEN 'SE DA: BRIN [2M] EINE GANZE [2M].

DIGGING.
WART EIN MAL, WART EIN MAL
ES GEHT SCHON
VORSEHEN!

(MG)

VORSEHEN! VORSEHEN!
GIB MIR MAL DAS DICKE HER
FALLING DER RIS.

NA, DA KOMMT SIE SCHON RAUS.

(NOISE)

KOMMSTU?
SO, DU GEHST MAL 'RUNTER
AUGENLICK!

HO, HO, HO

(MG)

HIER 'RUNTER
HIER RUM-MAL, 'RUNTER
[LM] HIER 'RUNTER

DIGGING. OTHER NOISES.

(XG)

DA MAL VORSTEBENE

(M.V.) (ICH NEHM MIR GLEICH MIT?)
(ALSO, ZURUECK MIT DAS DING?) JA?

TA TA TA

(NOISE) several
minutes

(HIER BRAUCHEN WIR NICHT MACHEN?)

NEE, NEE, NEE
(X) DIE DREI KABEL DA
(DIE SOLL IN DE SOLE.
(X) DIE SOLE, SOWIE DIE SOLE}

~~SECRET~~

IHR MACHT DENN HIER WEITER. (M)

SO NICHT IN DER ECKE? (M)

(GARBLE)
BLOSS NICHT SO DICHT DA UNTER (M) NICHT DEN KABEL NICHT
JA, JA IST DA NOCH ... (X) DA IST ES SCHWARZ, SCHWARZ
JA, JA ... DA IST NICHT EIN KABEL, NICHT? (X)
WHISTLING.

ALSO GEHT ES DENN (M)

COUGHING. DIGGING.

HIER IST ES NUN 2-METER NICHT ALSO UBER'S JAHR, ZWEI
METER, NICHT?
(GARBLE) JA.

FUENF METER HIS UNTER, HIER 2 METER HER (X)

DREI METER
NOISE, DIGGING.

ALSO BRAUCHES -- 4 3 0)

(NOISE)

(X)

DAS GENUEGT (O) SO.

(X)

(NOISE AND PANTING)

HOL ES MAL RAUS.

JAI

HO. (M)

(? (X) ES MUSS HIER (X) ES JA LIEGEN (X) HAI (X) NEE (X) ?)

WIR MUESSEN [HIER?] NOCH WEITER GEHEN

SO, JOSTI (M)

(X) ANDERE MENSCH
(GARBLE) PHRASES: "AUFMACHEN" AND "ZWEI ANDER HALB
SIE LASSEN SICH (M) METER HIN)

(GARBLE) UNTEN
(BUCK MAL?) WIE SICHER, MIT ZEMENT. (X)

MUFFLED VOICES.

(NOISE - POUNDING) ES SIND DUCH DREI, ZWEI (M) ZUS

ES IST HIER NOCH ANDERES HIER, (A) SIEHST DU DAS NICHT HIER?

(GARBLE AND NOISE) ("BREINSTANGE")

(M) NOCH GANZ WEG (M)

(NOISE)

SAMMEL'S RAUS.

(X) - FICHT (X) -

IN DER ECKE DA, BITTE

~~SECRET~~

6

~~SECRET~~

DER GANZE FEATIG
(NOISE + GARBLE)
GEBEN SIE'S MAL AUS DER BEKE. (MG)
(NOISE + GARBLE)
ES MAL HIER SCHAUFELN WEG!
[YM] JETZT MAL WEH SCHAUFEL (LM)
DINGING + NOISE
(GARBLE)
(?)(X) DAS WERKZEUG (X)?

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NU SIEHST DU MAL HIER? (X)
[YM] GANZSTE HIER RIMMAL HIER
(NOISE + M.V. + GARBLE)
HIER WAS. ABER DAS NICHT. (X)
D. HIER
HIER (NOISE + GARBLE)
(A) ABER GROSS, JA?
M.V.
FALLING DEORS
VORSICHT! VORSICHT!
(NOISE)
(30) DAS (X)
(NOISE)
VORSICHT!
(NOISE)
DIE (30)

(X)

DIE (10) DA WEG KOMMEN.
(NOISE)
DAS GEHT (4-60)
(GARBLE + NOISE)
WILLSTE NICHT HOCH? WILLSTE NICHT HOCH?
(NOISE)
T JETZT
[?] DA HINNEHER DAS (10) HIER HINTER DE IQGE RAUS NEHMEN.
(M.V.)
(10) RAUSNEHMEN
(NOISE)(GARBLE)
HIER IS DE DRECK UNTER GEWESEN. (X)
[YM] DRECK! (GARBLE) ("LEITER"?) GIB MIR'S RUNTER
NICHT DAS MUSS UNTER HIER. (X) JA!
(GARBLE) POEM NUNTER
DRTN
HIER IST DIE LEITUNG DRUNTER.

HIER IST DIE LEITUNG ANGESCHLOSSEN.
WO WELCHE LEITUNG?
HIER, DIE, DIE
RUSSIAN.

[?] HIER IST DIE BRUECKUNG.
[YM] DIE BRUECKUNG [YM] [DA KOMMT?] EIN ANDEREN
NER, NER, NIMT EIN ANDEREN
GARBLE
DAS HABEN DIE GEMACHT
[YM] LEITUNG
GARBLE
WELTLING.
(GARBLE)
... WAR DENN ...
DAS IST DIE VERBUNDUNG. (JA DAS IST UNS GALT?)
GARBLE
SECRET

3

(GARBLE) + (POUNDIR)

~~SECRET~~

(MG) MUSSTE (MG)

KOMM MAL HER.

KOMM HIER IS JE (MG)
(POUNDIR)

DE ZEMENT DA (XG) DE ZEMENT DA (SNEEZES)
(POUNDIR)

(MG) FEST DA (MG)

JUT!
(H.V.)

[NA, JETZT WISSEN SE] WIE SE DA REIN KOMMEN, NEE

[2M] NICHT RUNTER, SCHEISSEN! NICHT RUNTER SCHEISSEN!
WAS?
[2M] SAHMES SIE NICHT 'RUNTER, NICHT WAHR? [3M]
J.K. (GARBLE)

SEHSTE HIER WAS?

WO?

NACHSTE HIER NICHT RECHT.

SAGEN SIE WIE, BITTE? (MG)

WAT IS DENN LOS? (MG)

SEHSTE DASS ALLES RAUS IST. (MG)

WAT HAMER?

(MG) MIT?

(MG) DRUFEN (MG) DARAN!! JUT!

(MG) MASCHINE (XG) MASCHINEN.

NUR, ALLES RAUS NEHMEN. RAUS NEHMEN.

DAMIT SIE BESSER REIN (XG)

POUNDIR.

GARNISCHT.

(GARBLE).

[2M] BESSER REIN UND RAUS KLETTERN.
(GARBLE)

SIN JA SOWIESO (MG) (drei?) [2M]
(GARBLE) Rist nur eins raus (schon schullen?)
(MG) (Habt Ihr eins?) oder nicht mehr?
HIER DA NOCH DAS KEINE.

geht los
wie?
geht's ja los.
[2M] sie mit
[2M] bis die eine raus ist.
[2M] hinter geht
(M.V.)
(GARBLE)
[2M] [anderen Seite?] dreht sich nicht
Nee
(M.V.)
[2M] mit!
kann schon liegen, kann schon liegen
geht da [Draht?] noch
(GARBLE)
geht da drunter
(GARBLE) (wort-likes "Proschin"?)
(Wollte Ihr nur?) eins ausnehmen?
Eins doch
[2M] raus kommen
(GARBLE)
eins
(GARBLE)
(POUNDIR)

~~SECRET~~

9

~~SECRET~~

PASS MAL OP.

(GLASS MAL DEN HANDSCHNEIDER (SEHEN), DA LAEFT MIR DIE SAURE RAUS.
(GABBLE)
KURT, WALTER! MAL HIN.

COUGHING. (SCRAPING SOUNDS.)

(M.V.)
(GABBLE)
ACH, JO.

ES GEHT DA WEITER RUNTER (M.V.) Ach da gehen'se mal hinter durch weiter.

ALLES STAHLERSTEIN (BELL)
(FAINT ENGLISH COMMENT)
ENKLEINERHEIT

UN? DA HAMRE SCHRAUBEN HINGEROERT. (NG)
(Traffic)
(GABBLE)

ICH BIN SPRACHLOS, MENSCH, ICH BIN SPRACHLOS.
(M.V.)

WAS? (NG)

LYD (M.V.)
LYD kommen gegangen
WOHIN?

(GABBLE)
WAS SIND DENN DIE SCHON DRIN?
(GABBLE)
LYD die oder die.

WOHIN HIND DE-RUSSEN-GEANGEN? (M.V.)
- ... MUESSEN GEGANGEN.
(M.V.)

BITTER

(M.V.)

UND DA MUESSEN WIR DIE (??SKRUEFFEN??) DA SCHON JAHRELAND (NG)
(M.V.)

HIER IS WAT VOR.

(GABBLE)

JUT, JUT!

(GABBLE)

(XQ) HIER (ZG) APPARAT NOCH (NG)

(ENGLISH COMMENT. FAINT)

(XQ) SOUNDS OF SHOVELING.

UND NIE (M.V.) KOMMT ALLES (X.M.)
- ALLE WEG (GABBLE) (SHOVELING SOUND)
DAS SIE HIER JETZT (L-G-O) (NG) (L-RÄUMEN) JA?
GUT (GABBLE) (WOHS "ZWEI MAN)

SOUND OF PASSING CARS. CLANKING OF SHOVELS. NEAR SILENCE.

APPROACHING VOICES.

7/ RUSSIANS

(ENGLISH COMMENT: — GET A WORD NOW AND THEN. YES, SOUNDS LIKE

RUSSIAN. THEY'RE OUTSIDE THE HOLE NOW.)

~~SECRET~~

THESE'S A LOW
(THOSE RUSSIANS ARE GIVING INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO DO WITH THE CABLES.
THEY'RE NOT TO CUT THEM YET.

(NO. HE'S ONLY A MAJOR.)

(FAINT VOICE.

(THE COLONEL IS OUTSIDE THE HOLE. ---

COUGHING

(THERE ARE QUITE A NUMBER OF RUSSIANS THERE)

RUSSIAN.

WAS? (X.M.) JA, JA (GARBLE). DIE HABEN JA
BIST DU DA? WILSTU HUNTER? DE-MAL RAUS. (XG) DAT IS LOGISCH. ICK
(GARBLE) (WORDS "KISTE" AND "SPRENGSTOFF")
HABE OK DAT (MG) FEHLLEICHT (2G) SEY SPRENGSTOFF HIEREIN GETAN
SO EBEN GEDACHT. DASS (RM) INR SPRENGSTOFF (X.M.)

RUSSIAN.

4ING DA DURCH!
JA, DIE KABEL IN (ITTEGKISCHL) DAS IS ALLES (MG)
(M.V.) (GARBLE) JA? (RUSSIAN?) (M.V.)
[NA, DU BIST] HANG TIEF DRINT RECHTS, ALSO AN (DEIN RUECKEN) ZU.
(M) dritte
DASS SIND KLEINE (TIDREPPERT)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: COME ON, SPEAK UP BOY!)

NOISES. SOUND OF STEPS, HAMMERING.

HIER MUSS (MG) JEMAND (DURCH?) ..
(GARBLE)

(MG) IST DER OBERFUERER (MG) NIEMAND HIER AUFTRIIT (X.M.)
(GARBLE)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: HE'S COMING IN. IT'S RUSSIAN AND GERMAN BOTH AT

THE SAME TIME.)
(GARBLE)

JAI JAI

PAUSE.

7-8 RUSSIAN.

HUNTER?

NOISES

(MG) DAS KABEL (MG) JA.

~~SECRET~~

17

~~SECRET~~ LXM] 1000 W0115

(MG) GRUNDWASSER. (MG) UEBERBRUECKT, UEBERBRUECKT, NICHT WART/ UND DANN DURCH-
GESCHNITTEN (XG) UND DANN DIE (XG)

MU ^{Hier}
HIER IST JA PLATZ, NOCH ZUM (??HAAR??)

[WIE] HANSE HIER LUFT (UNTER?)]?

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

[~~BERECHNE DEN KRAM. WAT KOST DAT NOGH ALLES!!!~~]

(CAUGH)
8. (RUSSIAN.)

SOUND OF TRUCK PASSING.

(LM) ^{wurde}
DURCHGESCHNITTEN.

RUSSIAN.

DER UBERGANG IST JA ZIEMLICH ENG.

^{LAUCH}
JETZT GEHT'S RUNTER.

VOICE OF OFFICIAL APPROACHING: ABER DAS KOENNST DU NICHT, ERLAUBEN, ^{WIEDER}

WEIL SIE SAGEN DANN KRIEDEN SIE ZU SCHWERE -- LAST! (DASS HABEN SIE) ABER

ZIEMLICH STARK GEMACHT. ^{HIER} [WAS SIE] DA ZUM STUETZEN GEBRAUCHT, ^{GERIEGT HAT} DASS ES

D] NICHT EINBRACH.

RUSSIAN.

JA JA NE, ^{HAT LXM]}
[WAS IST HIER RUM] [WART HIER NICHT RUM.] (MG)

MIXED VOICES. (TRUCK APPROACHES)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.)

JA, WAS WIR ALLES MACHEN DA (MG)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.)

GARBLE
STRECKEN DIE OSEN....
SO! [LM] HOCH GEHEN
[GARBLE]
[LM] ALLES MAIHEN, ALLES MAIHEN
[GARBLE]

RUSSIAN.

SOUND-OF-PASSING TRUCK. (TRUCK APPARENTLY LEAVES)

RUSSIAN.

HIER IST (2G) RAUS. DAS MACHT SICH BEQUEM (BETRIEBEN LASSEN?).

JA.

~~SECRET~~

(whispering)

~~SECRET~~

112

WISPERING: (HIER IST WASS. SEHEN, HIER (MG) ?)

WISPERING:

(HO, DA NICHT SCHNEIDEN. ?)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: A LITTLE LOUDER. 'SO I CAN HEAR' 'I-DIDN'T-HEAR THAT')

MIXED GERMAN AND RUSSIAN VOICES.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.)

RUSSIAN.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THEY'RE NOT IN YET.

(GARBLE (M))

(MG) HOER ZU MACHEN, NICHT WART? UEBERBRUECKEN, UEBERBRUECKT, JA. (XG)

NEIN, UEBER BRUECKEN, NICHT WART.

JA, ALSO JETZ? GARBLE (HEUTE) BIS (GARBLE) DIE SACHE (SEVERAL G) LASSEN SIE ALSO (JA) BIS ALSO (MG) (DAS HIER >)

HEER 'NE SCHRAUBE IST.

(GARBLE)

DAS-PASST-HEER-ALSO.

JA, JA, (SEVERAL G) GEARBEITET AUF: DANN WIRD'S JA BALD (DIE MASCHINE IST BEGIBEN)

SCHON JETZ JETZ. (MG)

M.V.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: HE'S RECOGNIZING THE (FADES OUT)

(SEIN) (3M)

JA, DAT (JETZ NIT. ?)

ICH BIN DER MEINUNG, MAN SOLLTE NOCH WARTEN MIT DEM, (DEM DRUEBEN (MG) ?)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: I'M OF THE OPINION WE COULD MANAGE IT TODAY.

NOISE. SHORT SILENCE. NOISE AGAIN.

9; RUSSIAN.

NA, SO, SIE HABEN HIER GROSSE SCHULDEN, HAT? (MG) (IMMER) (NICHT?) (M.V.)

DAS IST JA DAS SELBE VERFAHREN.

(GARBLE)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

(QUIET)

(GARBLE)

(1M) SIE HABEN, SIE HABEN SEHR LANGE DAVON (MG) (M.V.)

HIER IST UEBERBRUECKT, ALLES HAMSE, ALLES HAMSE GESCHNITTEN (GG)

SEHR, SEHR, SEHR, SEHR SAUBER. (REL)

~~SECRET~~

13

WAIRSCHEINLICH [XFM] WAS-NUR NUR ALLES NACHTS,,NACHTS --

[XFM] NACHTS [XFM] NACHTS SCHLIEFFEN WIR ALLE!

JAI LAUGHTER. M.V.

(SIEHST DU DAS HIER?) [HABEN SIE NUR] NACHTS MIT DER BETRIEB GANZ, GANZ WIE (??GEMAHLES??), JA? WEINER [WENN SO ETWAS?] WAS, WAS ((??UHR??) IST [BRAUCHEN?] SIE'S GEMACHT (MO)

WISPERING. (RVSS/AV) (ENGLISH COMMENT: SOMETHING GOING ON. (GARBLE)

LAUGHTER. (M.V.)

HIER IST SO KNAP, JA? SO KNAP M.V. OR TRUCK TOLLING. BACKGROUND NOISES. TRAFFIC, SCUFFLING. QUITE LOUD. PLEASE QUIET AGAIN.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: EAST (GERMAN)?

VOICES, TRAFFIC SOUNDS. DISTANT VOICES. (NOISE)

[XFM] VORSEHEN DA (MO)

JAI

STEPS. VOICES. (NOISE)

WENN SIE BIS SO EIN (20) DAS WAR ABGEDECKT (SEVERAL 0) (OB DAS EBEN (WAS SIE NICHT??)?

VON HIER AUS ZU (2-0) DAS DAS DURCH [WIEDER(S).]

[XFM] IST (DAS ABGESTELLT? (HAB??)

ABGESTELLT, JA. (GARBLE)

JA, KONNSTE HIER DENN DURCH? M.V.

[XFM] (GEHT'S] DENN UNTER? M.V.

(XG) DIESEN (STROM, STUNDE) NEM ICH DEN STROM WEG. JA WIR WAREN ALSO [WIE? NICHT WAHR?] JA, ALSO [XFM]

JA, ALSO, SIE HABEN LICHT ANGEHABT HIER. UND DEN SCHEINWERFER, IST ER (MO) (ENGLISH COMMENT) (GARBLE) [XFM] JA,

HIER, IST UNGEFÄHR 1/2 METER TIEF MIT ALLEN KANALEN. /UND ZWAR, HIER GEHT'S JETZ

UNGEFÄHR 1/2 BREITE VON SOCH MAL 40,50 CM BEE TIEFER SCHACHT. RINGS [XFM]

~~SECRET~~

19

VFR
HERUM MASSIV GEKLEIDET. UNGEFAHR 4 - 5 - 6 METER VON DER ABRUNDUNG,
UNGEFAHR 4-6 METER RUNTER.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

NOISES. (HUMMING SOUND?)

DER GANG SELBST IST DANN HOEHER, JA?

M.V. BELL

TRAFFIC NOISES. A DISTANT VOICES.
(GABBLE)

IMMER WEITER, KOMM IMMER WEITER.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

(BELL RINGS (3 SEPARATE TIMES)

JA, WAS IST?

M.V.

NUN, DA MUSS MAL HEUCHMANN KOMMEN. (GABBLE)

XM DAS MAL ES FINEN NACH DEN ANDEREN
JA, DESHALE SPRECHT ES MAL MIT IHM AB, DASS MAN MAL EINMAL (MG)

(XM) M.V.

(HUMMING SOUND. COUGHING.

M.V.

- IST... IST... SCHRAEG (MG)

DISTANT VOICES. WISPERING (GERMAN)

DAS IST UNSERE WOHNE (MG)

SCHRAEG... WIE IMMER

(XG)

M.V.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: - VERY FAINT.

STEPS, NOISE. LOUD NOISES.

WA? WAT?

(XG)

SOUND OF HEAVY BREATHING.

NA, HEINZ?

JA, KOMM...HEIN!

HEAVY BREATHING

(WIE GEHT'S DANN? [YM]?)

SECRET

SMALL NOISES.

~~SECRET~~

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THAT'S NUMBER ONE, EH?
M.V.)

(MAYBE. ?)

JA, JA
(M.V.)

(HE SAYS (MG) ?)

GAR NICHT IN ERSCHEINUNG

ASS DIE " " IN " GETRETTEN

DA SIND WIR (20) GANZ KURZ. [LM] RICHTIG SPRECHEN
GARBLE
[FM] GANZ KURZ

SOUND OF PASSING TRAFFIC.

M.V.

HIER IST DIE EINE.

M.V.

(X0)

[LM]

MUSS-MAN-MAL ZURUECK WO ES RAUSKOMMT, [LM], NICHT WAHR ?

MUFFLED VOICES.

[BITTE] DA

GENAU

(X0) RUNDSTUECK, HABEN SIE HIER DIE SCHWARZE [X0] GEHABT. SIND SIE HIER

RANGKOMMEN WAHRSCHEINLICH UND [LM]

M.V. (GENAU SE HEIN)

[ACHTUNG] ^{EINE} EINE UND ZWEI (X0)

NOISES. SOUND OF HEAVY BREATHING. LOUD NOISES. COUGHING.

JAI DA WIEDER.

MUFFLED VOICES.

10. RUSSIAN

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

[BELL])

MAN MUSS NICHT VERKEHRT RUMDREHEN.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THERE IS SOMEBODY IN THERE NOW.

(THINK THEY MAY BE INSIDE?)

RUSSIAN.

(X0) HAT DAS VERKEHR-SIGNELETT (X0) (GARBLE)

JA. BITTE?

HOEHR MAL ZU. IST DA VON I.I., JAI

AUGENBLICK MAL. HIER IST FEUERWEHR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

^{N/A} 2. JA
1. NA, IST EGAL. PASS MAL AUF. A IHR SOLIT MAL VON UNTEN AUS OEGEN DIE
[UNTERSCHACHT?][XPM]
DECKE KLOFFEN, DAMIT SIE OBEN BEIM (3-4 G). PASST IHR MALL AUF, OB IHR DAS
KLOFFEN VON OBEN HERKETT HOERT.

RICHTIG.

UND DANN SAGT MAL DURCH.

JA.

WEITER RECHTS, WEITER LINKS.

JA.

^{ES} ^{JEMAND}
SO UNGEFAEHR. , BLEIBT STAENDIG AM APPARAT AN.

JA (2 0)

MUMBLING; REPEATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

FOUNDING. MUFFLED VOICES. SOUND OF TRAFFIC.

[HANGLOST?]
HABSE SCHON (2-3) DAS HEISST (XG) [DER SCHWEIZER SO KURZ, JA?]
HOLEN SIE MAL 'RUNTER.
VARIOUS NOISES.

HALLO!

JAI

(XG)

JA. ^{JA} [IM][? DU DEN GANZE HER?]
(GARBLE) BRAUCH -- BRAUCHEN WIR NUR
SOUND OF FOUNDING.

HOEH-HOEH-ICH IRGENDWAS. HOERT IHR ETWAS (VOICE IN THE DISTANCE)

(XG)

^{ABSOLUT}
ESWES NICHTS ZU HOEHREN.

NICHTS ZU HOEHREN.

NEIN.

JUT!

~~SECRET~~

(17)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

~~SECRET~~

NICHTS ZU HOEREN.

NOISES. MUFFLED VOICES.

LIM] ZUEMLICH TIEF, JA
JA, BIS HIER, HIER HOEHER.
[WIRD ES DENN?] HOEHER
UND DIE RICHTUNG IST RICHTIG, JA?
JA

DIE RICHTUNG HIER.

JA

(XG)

TRAFFIC NOISES. HUMMING SOUND. DISTANT VOICE.

(XG) [DIE HOEHE HINEIN] (XG)

(XG) GEHT DANN RUNTER, NICHT RUNTER.

(XG) HAUPTSAECHLICH [GLEICH GENAU]

HIER, HIERVON, BITTE.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

11. RUSSIAN.

M.V.

SOUND OF POUNDING. DISTANT VOICES.

ALSO, DAS SIND UR.
ES GEHT DUAH [GARBLE]
(ENGLISH COMMENT: THROUGH. THROUGH.
UND EINMAL HIER ES GEHT SCHON DURCH ZWO METER DAS
SIND SATZ ZWO METER FUERZIG ... UND NOCH EINMAL...
... VIER METER ... FUENF METER. (M.V.)
STELL DICH NICHT SO WEIT DARUEBER, WELT DAS AUF DER HOEHE SITZ...
(XG)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

(GARBLE) (ARBEITEN)

(M) TECHNICH, GUCK DAS MAL. ACH SO IST DAS DENN.

[M] NOCH MAL RUNTER

NOCH-MAL. [M] NOCH EINMAL DRUNTER
[M] NOCH EINMAL RUNTER

DIE-ARBEITEN-NOCH. (M.V.)
ALSO, WIR HABEN EINE [M]

GUCK ENER DA MAL HINI
(GARBLE)

SO IDEAL DURCHGEGANGEN. [M]

M.V.

WO IST DAS DENN [ABGELASSEN]

[HIER IST JA] EINFACH DER KABEL [HINGELEGT.]

(XG)

~~SECRET~~

(GARBLE)

SO, WO KOMMT DENN DAS JETZT?

DAS IST NOCH [VON UEBER.]
[3M]

DAS IST WAS DENN UNTEN?

VON WESTEN (XG)
(GARBLE) GORUBBEN IST WESTEN SCHON)

BELL RINGS.
M.V.

NA DER KABEL GEHT SO (MG)
GARBLE

DAS IST DOCH DER KABEL HIER (2 G)
JA, SA.

HIER ABGEGRAPPT
(XN)

SCHON GEMACHT.
(GARBLE)

(XG) DISTANT VOICES.

HIER HABEN SIE DEN KABEL GELEGT. ICK HABE GEGESSEN. SIE HABEN HIER GEGRABEN, FRISCH
GEGRABEN (GARBLE) HIER (GARBENEN?) [XM]

DURCH-GEGRABEN (XG) JA DIE HABEN FRISCH GEGRABEN.
D'ARAN (GARBLE) M.V.

WO DU GERADE VON DENKST. (2 G) WENN MAN EINE DAS NICHT SEHRST SIEHT, JA?

WUERDE MAN NIE GLAUBEN, DASS ES [HEHT?] [1M].

DISTANT VOICES.

[DOCH HAST RECHT?] KOMME HIER
DA HINTER -- WANN KOMM HIER SIEHST DU GANZ DEUTLICH, SIEHST DU GANZ BEE
DEUTLICH.

MUFFLED VOICES: RUSSIAN AND GERMAN TOGETHER.
[1M] WIR WISSEN JA GENAU WIE ... [1M]
M.V.

VONDA HIER, VON DER KARTE HEHT ES.]

(XG) (GARBLE)

(XG) DIE ANDEREN VERBINDUNGEN.
M.V.

HALLO!
(PAUSE)

HIER WIRD GERUFEN?

HALLO M.V.
(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.
WASSER! WASSER! WASSER
M.V.)

1. HALLO.

1. JA

1. (XG) GLEICH OB (XG)

~~SECRET~~
Cable from [unclear] (unclear)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20

ES GEHT NICHT GERADE AUS. ES WEICHT NACH DER (20) IN UEBER.
(GARBLE)

ES WEICHT AB.

(XG)

NA, DA WIRD GESTOPFT. (DAS IST MIR) JA JANZ EJALLE.

DIESER, DIESES: M.V.
HIER DEISS-DING-HIER. DING DA.
(VM).....VIER METER

ES SIND SCHON VIER METER.

(VM) FUEHF METER.

" "

(VM) DIESER, JA.

(XG)

(XG) MUSS MAN IHN
NEH-MOELL-MAL JENAU MESSEN.
-MUSS MAN GENAU MESSEN

(XG)

GANG JENAU - MESSEN
(GARBLE)

NOCH?

NOCH!

(XG)

IST DAS DIE WAND? SO!

HINTEN RUNTER.

VIER METER, JA. VORSICHTIG (VM)

FUEHFUNDSEBZIG
SECHSENFUNDSEBZIG

VIERFUEHFUNDSEBZIG.

(XG)

EAST MAL MESSEN.

VIERFUEHFUNDSEBZIG!

(VM) JA, (VM) WAS DURCH

NA JA: HIER MAL RUNTER, EAST N' MAL VIERFUEHFUND ZIEBZIG
(GARBLE)

MEMENT.

JA MOMENT MAL

JA, ICH KOMM DA MIT 'N KOMPAS.

(PAUSE)

SO!

~~SECRET~~

20

~~SECRET~~

MUFFLED VOICES.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: (M/G US GOVERNMENT PROPERTY M/G ?))

NAJA KUCK MAL... [LM] KIES KEIN MEHR

MUFFLED VOICES. POUNDING. HEAVY BREATHING. (KIES KEIN MEHR)

HALLO, HALLO, HALLO

(30)

[LM] MUESSEN ZURUECK

NOISES AND MUFFLED VOICES. ^{M.V. WITH} DISTORTION IN TAPE.

(LAUGHTER) [LM] 'RUNTER KOMMT?' (M)

JA GEH MAL VOM LOCH WEG. (GARBLE)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THEY'RE ALL THE WAY DOWN.

(NO, NOT YET.

WENN (SOPHT?) KOMMT (M/G)

MICROPHONE DISCOVERED AT THIS POINT.

yes, but not recognized as such

ARI DAS IST MOEGLICH. (M.V.)

[LM] GEH MAL WEG!

(TAPPING ON MICROPHONE)

DIESEN!

JA!

ES GENT HIER IMMER? HIER.

NA JA. [LM] DING ES PASST JA D'KAN

ES IST NUN JETZT (DEN ART DER) [LM]

SIST DAS EIN MIKROFON?
DAS IST WAHRSCHEINLICH

KOMM MAL RUNTER, [LM]

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THEY'RE NOT QUITE SURE OF IT.

M.V.

GLAUBST DU?

SMALL BACKGROUND NOISES.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: I DON'T KNOW. NOTHING IN PARTICULAR. HUH? NO.

(THEY'VE FOUND THE MICROPHONE BUT ARE NOT SURE YET. THEY THINK

IT'S A MICROPHONE.

NOISES. POUNDING, TEARING SCRAPING.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

MUFFLED VOICES.

(GARBLER)

GLAUBST DU?

MOEGLICH.

~~SECRET~~

GARBLE ("ABSCHIESSEN")

SCHRAUBENZIEHER!

MOGLICH, JA

~~SECRET~~

(2)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: CAN'T UNDERSTAND THIS.

(THEY'RE CUTTING WIRE -- ITXN I THINK.

(I THINK THEY'RE IN PROCESS OF CUTTING WIRE. LT. BECK IS IN THERE.

(TURNED OFF, ISN'T IT.

VOICES. SOUND OF LAUGHTER.

(THEY'VE TURNED OFF ALL THEIR ~~...~~ [2M]

SMALL NOISES. (GARBLE)

[MM] HIER IST
ES IST JA EBEN VIER METER FUERNZIO [KM]

WIE GROSS BIST DU?

[YM] ICH BIN EINSECHSUNDSTUEZIG.

[3M]

UND 170 - 170 - 170 120 UND NOCH MINDESTENS EIN METER ZUM RAHMEN A FUERNF METER
(ENGLISH COMMENT: CITING FIGURES IN ENGLISH

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THEY'RE CUTTING IT OFF.

[YM] MUFFLED VOICES
EINE SPRING KLIPPE
JA HIER?

(ENGLISH COMMENT: SPRING CLIP.

JA DA KANNST DU NAENLICH [XM] WAHRSCHENLICH
HOECHST WAHRSCHENLICH

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

MUFFLED VOICES. (ENGLISH AND GERMAN)

JA, ICH WIRD SIE HIER INS LAPP ZIEHEN.

WART, EINMAL
[1M] MAL WEG (GARBLE)
DAS IST OFFER (1 G)
M.V.

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT. THEY'RE CUTTING WIRE

DAS MIKROPHON (M/G)

DOCH JA

SOUND OF FILING OR SCRAPING.

MUFFLED VOICES.

[SCHRAUBENZIEHER!]

~~SECRET~~

(ENGLISH COMMENT: CAN HEAR WIRE CUTTERS.

~~SECRET~~

(YA, THEY'RE CUTTING THEM.

[M] BITTE HIER (20)
(GARBLE)

ICH WILL'S HIER ABSCHNEIDEN. [X M]

(ENGLISH COMMENT: NEVER MIND, CUT THEM ALL.

ACH, ES IST ANGESCHRAUBT.

NA, WER DAS GARBLE ("BLOSS AUFGEZWICKT HIER")
MUFFLED VOICES = MUFFLED VOICES.

IST MOEGLICH.

MUFFLED VOICES. WHISTLING.
(NOISE RIGHT AT THE MICROPHONE)

EIN KLEINEN SCHRAUBENZIEHER MAL.

(N/O)

EIN KLEINEN SCHRAUBENZIEHER. MAL "N-GROSSEN"
GARBLE ("BLOSS ZWICKT")
MUFFLED VOICES. GARBLE (ENGLISH COMMENT:)

(XO) DAS GEHT.
(GARBLE)

KOMM HER, KOMM HIER, (IM) HIER WART ANDERS

MAL SEHEN, (WAT IT IS?)
GARBLE ("BISSEHEN WEITER?")

MUSS 'N GROSSEN SCHRAUBENZIEHER.
"IM GROSSEN "

[ES GIBT] HIER POTENZIAL.

GARBLE
[WIR WOLLTEN DAS, WIR WOLLTEN DAS NOCH FINDEN?]
DER IST ZU GROSS. 'N MITTLERE. GARBLE
HABE ICH NICHT

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT. GARBLE

SMALL SOUNDS. BREATHING.
(pounding + whistling)

HAST 'N SCHRAUBENZIEHER MITGEBRACHT? SEHNT NOISE
WIE?
HAST DU 'N "

kommt GLEICH.
(whistling)

TAPPING SOUND ON MIKE.

SOI

MUFFLED VOICES.
GARBLES

(HIER GEHT ER.)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

23

(MAL HIN.)

MUFFLED VOICES.

DAS GIBT JA HIER HOEBER.
JA, JA JA, JA

GARBLE
WAS HAT MAN 'DRAN? WAS HAT
MAN 'DRAN? [YM]

(ENGLISH COMMENT: THEY'RE TAKING THE LAST ONE AWAY FROM US NOW.

(TRYING TO FIND OUT WHERE IT IS, TOO.

(GARBLE) ('SCHWEINEREI') } several seconds
(SOUND OF TOUCHING MIKE)
SOUND OF TRAFFIC.

WISPERING -- GERMAN.

HIER IST ER. HIER
DER TRAFIC 'LUTNANT 157 NOLW UNTEN

[2M]

WAS IST DAS. SOLL DAS DAS DING SEIN?
NEIN, NEIN

JA=JA1

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

WAS IST DAS HIER?

WOLL' MAL SEHEN? [YM]
[2M] MIKROPHON DRIN. HANSE 'N ANDEREN SCHRAUBENZIEHER DAT

~~GARBLE~~
ER, DA ANSCHLIESSEN. 157 DER ANSCHLIESSEN [YM]

JA, ER IST DA DRIN.
(SOUND OF something touching mike)

SOUND OF LAUGHTER. SMALL SOUNDS.

DA IS 'N MIKRO DRIN.

(M/Q)

(ENGLISH COMMENT: VERY FAINT.

HEUSCHENSKIND!

(X) DAS IST EIGENTUEMLICH, JA?
M.V.

AUCH DIE KAPSEL HIER. DAS IST [YM].
KEINE KAPSEL [YM] 19 BINEN SIE 30-
GAK, MEINEN SIE NUR 30 GAK [YM]

SMALL SOUNDS.

ES KANN WAS ANDERES
M.V.

(X) UNGEFAHR 219 METER

SMALL SOUNDS

30!

ER WILL
SCHLICH DEN APPARAT MIT NEHMEN?
M.V. + SMALL SOUND

UEBER DA EINSTECKEN.

MUFFLED VOICES.

JA, WILL 'N ANDERS (10)

SMALL SOUND

MUFFLED VOICES.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(24)

MUSST DA NOCH SCHRAUBEN ZIEHEN?
Z^A (GAABLER) ('KLEINER')

SCHRAUBENZIEHER DER NICHT ZU GROSS IST.
NEE, NEE, NEE
(GAABLER)

HALLO,

NEIN, DER IST ZU KLEIN KLEIN. [YM].
MOISC F.H.V.

ENGLISH COMMENT: IT'S GONE JOHN!

~~SECRET~~

app 3/9

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Date 4/15/94

WRP 94-1

G. Berlin Tunnel

Soviet discovery of a tunnel in the Altglienicke section of East Berlin allegedly on 22 April 1956 put an end to a most imaginative CIA-MI-6 operation against the RIS. CIA and MI-6 personnel had tapped into the main telephone and telegraph lines of the Soviet forces between Moscow and Berlin and trunk lines between Berlin and major East German cities. The tunnel was about 500 yards long and was constructed from a position just inside the US sector in extreme south Berlin.

[REDACTED]

Mr. George Blake, the MI-6 officer and KGB agent, admitted at his investigation that he had informed his KGB principals of Allied planning for the tunnel in which he was a participant prior to his early 1955 departure for Berlin. Because of the worthwhile information developed from the operation on the Allied side, it is presumed that the Soviets were faced with either stopping a potentially harmful operation and losing a valuable penetration

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

agent in Blake or else in protecting Blake and risking unauthorized disclosure of classified information. They chose the latter course and allowed it to run apparently unimpeded from May 1955 to April 1956 when a Soviet maintenance crew "found" the tunnel.

Analysis of the telephone traffic soon revealed that of the telephone lines tapped, 25 carried RIS conversations, mostly of the GRU and of the RU units attached to various units of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFC). The CI product from the operation consisted primarily of the identifications of over 350 GRU and RU officers in East Germany, another 300 KGB officers in East Germany and the USSR, and GRU officers in the USSR. The operation developed a total of about 2,000 names of CI interest. The tap also had the effect of identifying Soviet intelligence units by number and location in East Germany.

FI/D initially was responsible for processing the voice circuits containing RIS conversations. In January 1958 the [redacted] component was formally attached to SR/CI/ Research and Support (R&S) where

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~~SECRET~~

reports on the RIS were issued and summaries were made of RIS information for the SR/CI/R&S files.

The project was completed in late 1958.

Aside from the large number of RIS officers exposed as a result of the Tunnel operation there was also developed direct information on Soviet intelligence organizations. For example, lengthy collated reports were disseminated as a result of the Tunnel operation on: KGB radio intercept capabilities in the Berlin area; personnel of the GRU headquarters in Moscow; telephone numbers, addresses, and field post numbers of RIS units in East Germany; personnel and organization of the Potsdam headquarters of the KGB's Third (Counterintelligence in the Soviet Armed Forces) Directorate; and organization, cases, liaison, security, tradecraft, and administration of the Operations Department of the KGB's Directorate of Special Departments in Potsdam. There also was produced a collated study of the organization and personnel of the KGB headquarters; the organization and activities of the KGB advisors to the MfS Main Department I; personnel and location of GRU and GSFG RU communications units; and Soviet

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~~SECRET~~

civil installations in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) including a report on the handling of Soviet repatriates at the Berlin consulate. This information was of course all current to April 1956.



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~~SECRET~~

Date 3/6/90

HRP 2-1

App 5/1

V. PRODUCTION

The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating the project:

a. Three cables were tapped. They contained 273 metallic pairs capable of transmitting a total of approximately 1200 communications channels. The maximum number of channels in use at any one time approximated 500. On the average 28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits were recorded continuously. Approximately 50,000 reels of magnetic tape were used - some 25 tons.

b. The ^{voice} ~~(transmission)~~ processing center employed a peak number of 317 persons. Twenty thousand Soviet two-hour voice reels containing 368,000 conversations were fully transcribed. In addition, 13,500 German two-hour voice reels were received and 5,500 reels containing 75,000 conversations were processed. Seventeen thousand of these conversations were fully transcribed.

c. The ^{teletype} ~~(transmission)~~ center employed 350 people at its peak. Eighteen thousand six-hour Soviet teletype reels and 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels were completely transcribed. It should be borne in mind that many of these reels contained as many as 18 separate circuits, some of which utilized time-division multiplex to create additional circuits. The potential of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately 216 hours of teletype messages. Both plain text and

25

~~SECRET~~

(S E C R E T)

encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was about 4,000 feet of teletype messages. Printed in book form, these messages would have filled a space ten feet wide, 15 feet long, and eight feet high.

d. A small processing unit (two to four persons) was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington and London were produced.

e. Processing of the backlogged material continued until 30 September 1958 and resulted in a total of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages or conversations.

f. The total cost of the project was \$6,700,000.

The information from this material was disseminated in a closely controlled system called [REDACTED] Appendix B consists of a summary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments. Despite our knowledge of the fact that certain elements of the Soviet Government were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception material through this source.

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(S E C R E T)

4, 5, 6, 78

App 5/4

(S E C R E T)

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APPENDIX B.

RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED

Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the ^{funnel} material and some typical consumer comments.

GENERAL

The operation provided the United States and the British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948. Responsible officials considered ^{the funnel} during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items of intelligence for which ^{the funnel} was either a unique or most timely and reliable source.

POLITICAL

Throughout the life of source (11 May 1955 - 22 April 1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in Berlin; ^{the funnel} provided the inside story of every "incident" occurring in Berlin during the period - a story which was in

(S E C R E T)

(S E ~~C~~ R E T)

each case considerably at variance with accounts of the same incident as reported by other sources. ^{The tunnel} () showed that, contrary to estimates by other sources, the Soviets at that time did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vis-a-vis the other three occupying powers despite continually increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert their sovereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany. ^{THE TUNNEL} () provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers.

The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by ^{the tunnel} () in October 1955, in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect.

^{the tunnel} () provided a detailed account of the Soviet program for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin.

The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces (which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in ^{tunnel} ()

2

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material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956.

Tim funnel
(~~redacted~~) provided considerable intelligence on the relationships between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland.

MILITARY

General

- a. Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.
- b. Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Pact by increasing Soviet-Satellite military coordination.
- c. Implementation of the publicly announced intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.
- d. Identification of several thousand Soviet officer personnel.

Air

- a. Development of an improved nuclear delivery capability in the Soviet Air Army in East Germany.
- b. Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Army in East Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability.
- c. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division.

3

(~~SECRET~~)

(~~SECRET~~)

d. Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR, East Germany, and Poland, including a number of key aircraft factories.

Ground Forces

a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within the USSR not previously identified or not located for several years by any other source.

b. Soviet training plans for the spring and early summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland.

c. Identification of several thousand Soviet field post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of battle intelligence).

Navy

a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength of the Soviet Naval Forces.

b. Organization and administrative procedures of the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet Naval Bases on the Baltic Coast.

SCIENTIFIC

Identification of several hundred personalities associated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.

Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE activities.


⁴
(~~SECRET~~)

(~~S E C R E T~~)

Organization and activities of Wismuth SDAG (mining uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).


OPERATIONAL

Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East Germany and Moscow.



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6
~~SECRET~~