Selected Bibliography of Intelligence Integration Literature

Gary B. Keeley

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The very first call for CIA to reform came in April 1948, just a year into its existence, in the wake of the murder of a leading Colombian presidential candidate and large riots that left much of central Bogotá in ruins. Included in the fracas was Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who had traveled to Colombia for the Pan-American Conference. US government officials, politicans, and the press assailed first the newly established CIA and then the Department of State for having failed to predict the violence, but the charges were unwarranted.[a]

The issue faded when CIA was able to demonstrate that it had warned of potential unrest, but the specter of "intelligence failure" has followed the IC since its early days, sometimes unfairly, as with Bogota, at other times justifiably, like 9/11 and Iraq WMD. So too have commissions, panels, and blue-ribbon reports aimed at improving the IC's capabilities and performance. Since 1948, there have been at least 40 major reviews of intelligence practices and organization, along with about 300 high-level reform initiatives, many of which were similar in intensity, depth, and

public profile to the 9/11 and WMD Commissions' recommendations.[b]

Moreover, internal efforts have often occurred in parallel with external reviews. IC agencies have sponsored innumerable working-level, departmental, and agency investigations; conducted investigations by inspectors general and other internal watchdogs; and commissioned countless studies by outside experts. Some have made headlines, but most have been unpublicized.

Intelligence Integration

Although there were many precedents for diagnosing and remedying the IC's shortcomings, the recommendations that coalesced in the wake of 9/11 and Iraq WMD would differ in an important way: the focus on intelligence integration. Comparing periods is always challenging, but Google's Ngram data shows the phrase "intelligence integration"—virtually unheard of until World War II and still rare through the 1990s—would grow about 400 percent from 2001 to 2019, the latest available year for Ngram data.[c] To be sure, some of this reflects a change in jargon. The IC now uses "integration"

a. See Jack Davis, "The Bogotazo" in *Studies in Intelligence* 13, no. 4 (Fall 1969).
b. Michael Warner, Six Decades of Intelligence Reform (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007).
c. Google Ngram is a search tool that shows the frequency of case-sensitive blocks of words, or ngrams, in approximately 8 million books in several languages published from 1500 to 2019 and stored in searchable Google Books.

For intelligence practitioners and scholars, making sense of this ever-growing library is daunting. What follows is a selection from the extensive literature on intelligence integration over the past two decades.

to describe inter- and intra-agency collaboration, but cooperation, coordination, joint-duty assignments, and community staffs existed long before IRTPA. What is different is the DNI's authorities and IC structures that make integration the default rather than one-off arrangements.

For intelligence practitioners and scholars, making sense of this ever-growing library is daunting. What follows is a selection from the extensive literature on intelligence integration over the past two decades, much of which has been reviewed, summarized, or published in unclassified issues of *Studies*.[a] For both relevance and accessibility, I focus on English-language publications, principally from US imprints. I have excluded the many memoirs by former White House, defense, intelligence, and foreign policy leaders, which offer a complementary if often highly personal perspective on intelligence integration since 2001.

Phases of Intelligence Integration

There are three general phases in the literature of intelligence integration, although the lines between them are blurry because they reflect an interplay of events over time (like Iraq's descent into civil war after the US invasion, the successes and missteps of US counterterrorism capabilities, or the long hunt for Usama bin Ladin), formal evaluations that offer

retrospective looks and forward-looking recommendations (like the 9/11 and WMD Commissions), and executive or legislative actions with long-lasting effects (like IRTPA). These phases include:

- ***Early reactions to 9/11***, including the US military response in Afghanistan and the preparations for and eventual invasion of Iraq. This shaped the commentary through the mid-2000s. Much of this initial phase played out in traditional print publications authored by familiar names, rather than argued on the internet (Twitter, for example, did not exist until July 2006).

- ***The implementation period***, roughly the decade beginning in the mid-2000s through the mid-2010s. This reflects the impact of the 9/11 and WMD Commission findings and recommendations, passage of IRTPA in December 2004, and the stand-up of the ODNI in 2005, which saw a growing body of commentary and advice from current or former policymakers, intelligence officers, and outside experts. Many identified problems, with or without offering solutions, but most demanded change.

- ***The post-reform era***, reflecting progress toward intelligence integration led by a maturing ODNI structure, but also unauthorized disclosures of US intelligence collection activities; criticism of CIA detention and interrogation

programs; the emergence of new threats, like Russia's meddling in the 2016 US presidential election; and the rapid development of new technologies, like artificial intelligence and machine learning.

Early Reactions.
From 2001 through about 2007, much of the external commentary focused on potential correctives to the structural and cultural impediments that contributed to the IC's poor performance before 9/11 and in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, as documented elsewhere in this edition. Some observers, like former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council Gregory Treverton [*Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge University Press, 2001)] and Arthur Hulnick [*Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century* (Praeger, 1999)] were calling for reforms even before 9/11, but the floodgates opened wide in its aftermath.

Significant contemporaneous or retrospective assessments—many by knowledgeable observers or practitioners like Roger George, Rob Johnston, Richard Posner, and Amy Zegart—during this period include:

- William Odom, *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America* (Yale University Press, 2002)

- Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005)

- Melanie Gutjahr, *The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community's Struggle to Reform in the Global-*

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a. Martin Petersen, "Reflections on Readings on 9/11, Iraq WMD, and the Detention and Interrogation Program," *Studies in Intelligence* 61, no. 3 (September 2017).

ized Era (Joint Military Intelligence College, 2005)

- Richard Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005)

- Michael Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails* (Potomac Books, 2005)

- Richard Posner, *Uncertain Shield: The US Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006)[a]

- Richard Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (Columbia University Press, 2007)

- Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.), *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (University of Texas Press, 2007)

- Roger George, "Building a Global Intelligence Paradigm," *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 3 (September 2007)

- Ted Gup, *Nation of Secrets: The Threat to Democracy and the American Way of Life* (Anchor Books, 2008)

- Athan Theoharis, *The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among US Intelligence Agencies* (Ivan R. Dee, 2007)

- Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of*

> ### *Recommendations for reform echoed ideas that had long been debated inside the IC, and indeed the focus of many external blue-ribbon panels beginning in 1945.*

9/11 (Princeton University Press, 2007)

Recommendations for reform echoed ideas that had long been debated inside the IC, and indeed the focus of many external blue-ribbon panels beginning in 1945, including the need to separate the duties of leading the CIA (technically, there was no statutory position of the "director of CIA") from the DCI's role leading the entire foreign-intelligence enterprise.

Reviewing William Odom's *Fixing Intelligence* for *Studies in Intelligence*, for example, Hayden Peake observed that "Odom makes a strong, though not necessarily compelling, case for separating the currently 'double-hatted position of Director of Central intelligence and the so-called 'director of the CIA.'"[b] Odom's concept was not new—it had surfaced regularly since the 1970s—but the calamity of 9/11 and Iraq WMD would lead Congress to finally adopt the solution with the creation of the Director of National Intelligence. The DCIA would lead CIA; the DNI would manage the IC.

A second aspect of reform that occupied the attention of many authors, particularly academics, was structure and organization. Some advocated combining the separate activities of analysis and counterintelligence that was then spread across a dozen IC entities and place them instead into

centralized national endeavors. Others wanted to remake the IC entirely according to any number of civilian or military models. While reorganizing is never a cure-all, it was abundantly clear that the structural factors—silos of information, lack of integration between and among collection and analytic components, the divide between law enforcement and intelligence, and the DCI's weak authorities, among them—had to be addressed.

Implementing Intelligence Reform.
With the establishment of the ODNI in 2005, many authors focused on analytic culture and IC leadership as challenging aspects of intelligence reform. Sometimes critics linked analytic failings to organizational shortcomings, while others treated them as separate challenges. Calls came from many quarters (mirroring discussions that were occurring inside the agencies) for increased analytic rigor, including more frequent use of structured analytic techniques and a closer review of analytic papers. Some suggested adopting a lessons-learned protocol and adjustments to the intelligence cycle. Day-to-day work practices (such as the need for more open-source information) were questioned, too.

Key publications include:

- Ronald A. Marks, *Spying in America in the Post 9/11 World: Domestic Threat and the Need for Change* (Praeger, 2010)

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a. A worthwhile companion to *Preventing Surprise Attacks* is the review by the late Stanley Moskowitz, who wrote Posner "brings a fresh and welcome perspective to hoary intelligence issues, drawing on mathematics, economics, and organizational theory." *Studies in Intelligence* 50, no. 3 (September 2006).

b. Hayden Peake, "Review: Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America," by William Odem, *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 2 (June 2004).

The maturation of intelligence integration under a DNI-led IC has occurred in parallel with rapid advancements in information technology

- David Omand, *Securing the State* (Columbia/Hurst & Co., 2010)

- Hamilton Bean, *No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence* (Praeger, 2011)

- Sarah Miller Beebe and Randolph H. Pherson, *Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action* (CQ Press, 2011)

- Joel Brenner, *America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011)

- Thomas Fingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford University Press, 2011)

- Joshua Rovner, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence* (Cornell University Press, 2011)

- Adam D.M. Svendsen, *The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method Out of Mayhem* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)

- Mark Phythian, *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* (Routledge, 2013)

Postreform Realities

The maturation of intelligence integration under a DNI-led IC has occurred in parallel with rapid advancements in information technology: big data, ubiquitous technical surveillance, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and social media, among other advances. Collectively they have increased the IC's capabilities, raised concerns in some quarters about privacy and government overreach, and intensified calls for further adaptation.

A number of important works, many by intelligence veterans, some by investigative reporters, have explored those themes:

- William Lahneman, *Keeping US Intelligence Effective: The Need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs* (Scarecrow Press, 2011)

- Paul R. Pillar, *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (Columbia University Press, 2011)

- Dana Priest and William Arkin, *Top Secret America* (Little, Brown, 2011)

- Anthony Olcott, *Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World* (Continuum, 2012)

- Paul Rosenzweig, *Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace are Challenging America and Changing the World* (Praeger, 2013)

- Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong, and Joop van Reijn (eds.), *The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century* (Routledge: 2014)

- Brent Durbin, *The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform* (Cambridge University Press, 2017)

- Herbert Lin and Amy B. Zegart (eds.), *Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimension of Offensive Cyber Operations* (Brookings Institution Press, 2018)

- Ben Buchanan, *The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics* (Harvard University Press, 2020)

Conclusion

Intelligence officers accept the truism that their successes are secret, their failures are public. Over the IC's seven-plus decades, real and perceived intelligence failures have animated public debates over intelligence reform much more so than its many achievements. Whether intelligence integration as we presently envision it will enable the IC to navigate the challenges ahead must be left to historians of the future, who will have access to more of the record than is available now. In the meantime, intelligence professionals will vigorously apply themselves to integration initiatives to ensure that reliable intelligence is available to their customers, wherever they might be. Reform has always been woven tightly into the fabric of US intelligence.

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