

IV: Alltagsgeschichte: Day to Day in the Intelligence War

The high level of intelligence activity in Cold War Berlin meant that each side was subjected to constant scrutiny by the other. This not only applied to the kind of so-called “positive” intelligence that might be collected in Berlin—the details of the Western military garrisons, for example, or orders of battle for Soviet military units stationed in East Germany—but also information collected for counterintelligence purposes. Precisely because Berlin was so important as a base for Western intelligence, effective Allied counterintelligence was a vital prerequisite to the collection of the strategic intelligence that was its *raison d’être*. The following documents represent a much larger body of material collected on the Soviet and East German intelligence and security services in Berlin. They presumably would be matched by an equivalent or larger corpus of intelligence reporting collected by the Soviet bloc services on the Western intelligence presence in Berlin.

IV-1: Current Intelligence Weekly Summary (CIWS): The Soviet Establishment in Karlshorst Compound in East Berlin, 7 May 1959 (MORI No. 145728). [PDF Only 359KB*]

This document describes the principal KGB facility in Berlin at the height of the Cold War. The size of the Soviet establishment and the degree to which it was designed to be self-contained contrasts sharply to the Allied presence in West Berlin, where American officers lived in much closer daily contact with the local population.

IV-2: KGB in East Germany, April 1970 (MORI No. 144336). [PDF Only 639KB*]

Although dating from 1970, this report provides details of life in the KGB *Rezidentura* that probably would be more-or-less equally valid throughout the Cold War. Seemingly trivial details of the kind included in this report often were invaluable for operational purposes.

IV-3: Soviet Intelligence and Security: Lt. Gen. Pitovranov, 23 July 1958 (MORI No. 145209). [PDF Only 485KB*]

Appointed KGB Berlin *Rezident* in the summer of 1953, Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Petrovich Pitovranov was brought in to “fix things” following the death of Stalin and the uprising of June 1953. He served in Berlin until 1958, when he was replaced by Gen. Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov, a Berlin veteran.¹ This brief bio on Pitovranov gives an indication of the goldfish-bowl-like environment in which many intelligence officers in Berlin lived, despite the aura of secrecy shrouding their profession.

IV-4: Activities of Gen. Ivan A. Serov in Poland, 8 November 1958 (MORI No. 144168). [PDF Only 281KB*]

SMERSH Chief in Soviet-occupied Germany, General Serov arrived with advancing Red Army in the summer of 1945 and left late in 1947, apparently the victim of political machinations in Moscow.² In 1940–41, during the first Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, Serov had been responsible for the deportation of some 134,000 “class enemies” to slave labor camps.³ A confidant of Nikita Khrushchev, in 1953 Serov engineered the overthrow of Stalin’s Internal Security Chief, Lavrenty Beria. In 1954, Serov was made the first chairman of the newly created

KGB.⁴

IV-5: IR: Organization of the Soviet Intelligence Organs, 24 February 1955 (MORI No. 144214).

[PDF Only 1.07MB*]

This report provides an overview of the changes in Soviet intelligence that occurred near the end of Stalin's life and during the brief period that Lavrenty Beria was in complete control of Soviet intelligence. Note that, although the "Date of Info." given is December 1952-January 1954, the report was not issued until February 1955, by which time the MGB had been replaced by the KGB.⁵

In December 1952, Stalin created a Chief Directorate of Intelligence (*Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye*—the same name as Soviet military intelligence) over the MGB's First Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) and the Second Directorate (Counter Intelligence) in an effort to insure closer coordination between the two directorates. The change was recommended by Ye. P. Pitovranov, who had been Chief of the MGB's counter-intelligence directorate until his arrest in October 1951. He was released by Stalin in November 1952 and made Chief of the First Directorate (Foreign Intelligence). This arrangement lasted only until Stalin's death and Beria's reorganization of the Soviet intelligence establishment in March 1953. Pitovranov was sent to Berlin as head of the Karlshorst *apparat* soon after the June 1953 uprising.⁶

IV-6: HVA Meeting Chaired by [Markus] Wolf, 2 February 1953 (MORI No. 145205). [PDF Only 1.83MB*]

IV-7: HVA Meeting [Sondersitzung] Chaired by [Markus] Wolf, 7 March 1953 (MORI No. 145348). [PDF Only 805KB*]

Western intelligence officers in Germany had to be concerned not only with the Soviet KGB but also with East Germany's highly effective intelligence and security agency, the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*, also known as the MfS or Stasi. The branch of the Stasi responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence was the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA, usually translated as the Main Administration for Foreign Intelligence), known until 1956 by a cover name, *Institut für Wirtschafts-Wissenschaftliche Forschung* (IWF, or Institute for Economic Research). For most of the Cold War the IWF/HVA was headed by the enigmatic Markus "Mischa" Wolf. Widely regarded as Moscow's man, Wolf was appointed to head the DDR's foreign intelligence service in late 1952—on the strength of his Soviet connections, according to the Stasi rumor mill.⁷

Document IV-6 is a transcript of a meeting of IWF Department (*Abteilung*) heads on 2 February 1953. In this, the first meeting he chaired as head of the IWF, Wolf ordered a formal distancing from the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party (SED, or *Sozialistische-Einheitspartei Deutschland*).

Document IV-7 describes a special meeting held on 7 March 1953, the day after Stalin's death was announced. Here the principal concern was that the West might somehow exploit the demise of the Soviet leader to mount an assault on the Soviet bloc. The agent reporting on this meeting describes an atmosphere of deep depression in IWF headquarters: "The women personnel appeared in black clothing and behaved as if their own mother had died. The men were similarly affected, but were less demonstrative."

IV-8: Pictures of Mischa Wolf, 9 April 1959 (MORI No. 145204). [PDF Only 292KB*]

IV-9: IR: Markus Johannes Wolf, 11 October 1973 (MORI No. 144083). [PDF Only 541KB*]

Markus Wolf, who became the head of the DDR's foreign intelligence service late in 1952, cloaked himself in anonymity. However, as this first document shows, by 1959 he had been singled out and identified in photographs taken during the 1946 Nürnberg trials. In fact, Western intelligence probably knew as much or more about Markus Wolf than it did about many Eastern Bloc senior intelligence officers, as the second document included here, a brief biography, would suggest. The report is, nonetheless, inaccurate in some of its details. According to Wolf's memoirs, he began work for the IWF when he was recalled to Berlin in August 1951, not in 1952.⁸ Wolf does not mention "Department XV" in his memoirs, but recounts that the IWF was absorbed by the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* in 1953. In 1956 the IWF cover was dropped and the German foreign intelligence service became the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA).⁹

Wolf was a highly effective intelligence chief and the HVA prospered under his leadership.

IV-10: IR: The Supply and Distribution of Foodstuffs, 3 December 1952 (MORI No. 145223). [PDF Only 432KB*]

IV-11: IR: 1. SED Proposal of Restrictions on Escape from East Germany/ 2. Plants Guards, 5 December 1952 (MORI No. 145224). [PDF Only 68KB*]

IV-12: IR: Establishment of Farm Cooperatives, 10 December 1952 (MORI No. 145225). [PDF Only 138KB*]

IV-13: IR: SED Directives on Refugees... 4 March 1953 (MORI No. 145227). [PDF Only 63KB*]

In the winter of 1952-53, even as Stalin was publicly holding up the prospect of German reunification, the East German regime proceeded with a program of ruthless Sovietization, as these intelligence reports show. At the same time, the DDR moved to tighten controls at the border in a vain effort to halt the flood of refugees. Reporting like this highlights the degree to which the East German regime depended upon diverse organs of control, deeply ramified into German society.¹⁰ It also gives some idea of the difficulties faced by Western intelligence officers in penetrating a highly regimented, tightly controlled police state.

IV-14: Memorandum to the DDI; Subject: Soviet Interference with Berlin Rail Access, 24 November 1956 (MORI No. 6496). [PDF Only 101KB*]

Although the Soviets never again repeated their efforts to isolate Berlin from the outside world, they continued to interfere occasionally with Allied ground transportation. Each incident (such as the one described here) had potentially serious implications for the Allied garrison in Berlin, but Moscow did not allow such small-scale confrontations to escalate into a major crisis.

Footnotes

¹ David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 285-86.

² Murphy, et al., pp. 31-32.

3 Georg von Rauch, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence, 1917-1940* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 228.

4 Murphy, et al., pp. 154, 277, 289.

5 See above, p. 119.

6 These paragraphs are based on information contained in a letter to the editor from David E. Murphy, 29 June 1999.

7 Murphy, et al., p. 138.

8 Markus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, *Man Without A Face* (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 44

9 Wolf, p. 46.

10 On this, in detail, see Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

7 May 1959

PART III

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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES


THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IN KARLSHORST COMPOUND IN EAST BERLIN

The main symbol of the Soviet occupation of Berlin is the Kommandatura--the headquarters of the USSR's Berlin garrison--headed by Maj. Gen. Nikolai Psodorovich Zakharov in the 180-acre Karlshorst compound in East Berlin. Also located there are the headquarters of the Soviet state security organization (KGB), the KGB communications regiment, certain Soviet military intelligence (GRU) units, and housing for all major Soviet units stationed in East Berlin, including elements

of the embassy and trade delegation. The Soviet Embassy itself is not in the compound but is located on Unter den Linden near the Brandenburg Gate. Responsibility for the over-all physical security of the compound is vested in the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS).

Kommandatura

The Kommandatura exercises all Soviet quadripartite responsibilities over Berlin and



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access thereto, including control of the checkpoints at Babelsberg and Marienborn at the eastern and western ends of the autobahn. Its withdrawal from the city would therefore presumably indicate that the Soviet functions there were being transferred to the East Germans and might be the prelude to the legal incorporation of East Berlin into East Germany.

Soviet staff headquarters is located in the so-called Marshal House. Nearby are the Kommandatura communications center, administrative and supply offices of the garrison, and a field branch of the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank). A Military Prosecutor's Office is also attached to the Kommandatura. Outside the compound there is a Soviet officers' club; inside, there is a stadium, a swimming pool and gym facilities, and an officers' mess.

In addition, a military clinic under the general direction of the Central Military Hospital at Berlin-Oberschoene-Weide provides medical care not only to Soviet troops but to members of the embassy and trade delegation. The Kommandatura also maintains a hotel, a bachelor officers' quarters, and an apartment building, and there is a hunt club for military and civilian personnel.

The group of Soviet military advisers to the East German People's Army residing in the compound has been in the process of dissolution in recent months, and most of these officers reportedly have returned to the USSR. Similarly, the group of Soviet Ministry of Interior (MVD) officers attached to the MFS is being disbanded.

Guard functions for military headquarters are furnished by the Soviet 133rd Independent Guard Battalion, which also provides guards for Spandau prison

and for maintaining control on the US-Soviet sector border.

In recent months Moscow has made various preparations which will permit the withdrawal of the Kommandatura with little or no further notice. It has, however, also taken steps to provide cover under which certain Soviet units--notably the KGB and GRU--could continue to function within the compound. Military units have not withdrawn, and construction in progress outside the city--such as the high-priority building project in the neighborhood of Bernau and Wandlitz--has not been specifically identified for the use of Kommandatura elements. On the other hand, the units have not yet received their 1959 funds for the maintenance of property and housing, and even the commanders reportedly do not know what to expect.

Soviet long-distance telephone exchange facilities in Karlshorst, operated by Soviet military personnel, reportedly are to be dismantled in the near future and removed to an unidentified location. There is some evidence that the Soviet Embassy expects to take over this function from the Kommandatura when the withdrawal occurs.

Soviet Military Intelligence

Since 1957 the USSR has sharply cut the number of GRU installations in Karlshorst, until at present the only major units remaining are the Agent Operations Section and what are believed to be combined elements of the Strategic Intelligence Residentura, naval intelligence, and an intelligence advisory group. GRU reportedly intends to move part of its staff to the headquarters of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany (GSFG) in Wunsdorf but will leave as many operational personnel as possible under cover of the military attaché section of the Soviet Embassy.

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Embassy and Trade Delegation

The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, while outside the compound, has several installations and extensive housing facilities inside. These include the Lux Hotel, used for VIP housing; the Volga Hotel; a motor pool; a house of culture, which supervises the Dram Theater; an amusement area in Letny Park; a film storage and distribution center; and a library. Headquarters of the Soviet Communist party and trade-union organizations, both embassy connected, are also located here. In addition, the embassy maintains an elementary and secondary school outside the compound and a kindergarten and vocational schools inside.

The trade delegation, like the embassy, has its main offices on Unter den Linden and, with the exception of the liaison office of the Wismuth uranium-mining company, only housing and support units are located within the Karlshorst compound. The liaison office's function is to assure swift and uninterrupted deliveries from the Wismuth mines to the USSR.

There is every indication that these civilian installations will remain in the compound, although certain changes may be made in physical arrangements. For example, the Volga Hotel reportedly was released to East German authorities on 1 March, but its restaurant still functions under embassy management. Furthermore, the Dram Theater has ordered an expensive new movie projector, suggesting that there is no intention of withdrawing. Finally, there have been reports that the trade delegation is to be merged with the embassy's economic section. The delegation's motor pool has already been consolidated with that of the embassy inside the compound.

KGB Rezidentura

KGB installations dot the Karlshorst compound. The four-story Rezidentura--the former St. Antonius Hospital--houses all the elements necessary for a self-contained intelligence unit. It is surrounded by a special fence and is under the surveillance of KGB-controlled Soviet guards. Subsidiary to this headquarters are various other KGB administrative and housing units, including a clinic, a hotel, and a motor pool.

KGB counterintelligence headquarters, located adjacent to the Military Prosecutor's Office, includes a section responsible for the loyalty and security of Soviet forces in the Berlin garrison. Certain KGB advisers attached to MFS headquarters also maintain offices there and live in the compound. KGB communications installations are believed to be housed at three points, one within the Kommandatura headquarters area, another on Ehrenfelstrasse, and the third in the KGB administrative section on Frankestrasse.

There have been reports that the KGB will vacate the Rezidentura and move its headquarters and all administrative, technical, and communications sections out of Berlin to nearby areas. A German source recently stated that communications personnel had been moved out of the Frankestrasse unit to an unidentified location. Furniture from several housing units reportedly was recently removed on KGB trucks--in two instances to Bernau. This suggests that at least some KGB facilities may move to the Bernau-Wandlitz site.

In recent weeks, the KGB appears to have taken steps to place some of its services under cover. Effective 1 April

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the administrative section reportedly instructed German firms and public utilities to address bills to the Soviet Embassy but gave an address in the compound. During the first quarter of 1959, some 35 apartments were released by the KGB to the MfS. Since there was no indication that the Soviet families had moved out, it appears that some KGB personnel, at least, may continue under MfS cover.

Concurrently, in order to tighten security, the KGB offices have dismissed their German employees. Some of the work formerly done by Germans in the motor pool will be performed by Soviet personnel, and cleaning and janitorial responsibilities are to be carried out by Soviet rather than German women.

Security Precautions

Karlshorst compound is surrounded by a fence six feet

high which was repaired last year at considerable expense; this fence is patrolled by well-armed MfS guards. At night these guards extend their patrols into the compound area, but they no longer are accompanied by dogs. The compound can be entered through either the main vehicle entrance on Waldow Allee or through certain other approved gates; a pass is required with a different document for the various categories of Soviet and East German personnel.

An intensive screening of all East German employees was begun last year, and in recent weeks Soviet authorities have been sharply reducing the number of German employees in the compound. Some individuals who had worked for Soviet authorities since 1945 have been dismissed, and a well-integrated system of MfS informers has been established among the remaining German employees.
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Soviet Intelligence

THE KGB IN EAST GERMANY—
AN AGENT DEFECTOR SUMMARY OF
FACILITIES, TARGETS & TRADECRAFT

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PART III. KGB FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY (DDR)

SOVIET INSTALLATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE KGB

The Karlshorst Rezidentura

The Karlshorst *Rezidentura* is located in a building inside a compound which is bound by four streets: Bodenmaiser Weg, Zwieseler Strasse, Dewetallee and Arberstrasse. There are two entrances to the compound, one on Dewetallee, the other on Bodenmaiser Weg. One may drive into the area through Dewetallee and, from the south, through the entrance at the control point on the Rheinstrasse. This latter entrance is directly at the intersection of Rheinstrasse and Koepenicker Allee. The building itself is multi-storied and gives the appearance of a barracks or caserne. There are a number of high antenna masts on the roof, all connected to each other by cables; thus, the building is easily recognizable and the masts are visible from afar. (*Source Comment:* He has never entered the building and therefore can provide no description of the interior.) Before moving into the present *Rezidentura*, the KGB had offices in the large building located on the corner of Frankestrasse and Koepenicker Allee.

The regular office hours at the *Rezidentura* are from 0800-1300 hours, 1400-1600 hours. Evidently there is a rotating duty roster which all KGB case officers are subject to since each case officer serves periodically as Duty Officer and remains in the *Rezidentura* overnight. Even though a KGB officer works the evening before, he is in the office punctually in the morning. Source frequently called about 0800 hours and found his KGB contact already at work. An agent (such as Source) wishing to contact his case officer after hours does not call the Duty Officer at the *Rezidentura*, but contacts his case officer directly at the latter's home, no matter what the hour. (*Source Comment:* The Duty Officer's function is not to serve as a communication channel between the *Rezidentura* and the agents. The Duty Officer is probably in charge

of the physical security of the *Rezidentura*.) Every Monday morning, KGB case officers meet for their weekly political discussion. Party meetings take place on an irregular basis.

Many of the KGB case officers who were working in the Karlshorst *Rezidentura* had identity documents issued by the DDR Foreign Ministry which stated that the bearer was a member of the USSR Embassy in the DDR.

The Soviet Hospital in East Berlin

There is a Soviet hospital, used by both Soviet Embassy personnel and the KGB, which is located in the area bounded by Rummelsburgerstrasse, Hermann Duncker Strasse, and Am Walde. The hospital entrance, which is on Hermann Duncker Strasse, is guarded at all times by a Soviet soldier.

The Motor Pool in East Berlin

The motor pool and repair facilities for vehicles used by all Soviet installations in East Berlin, including the KGB, is located at the intersection of Rummelsburger Landstrasse and Grenzweg on the pre-war property of the *Allgemeine Elektrizitaets Gesellschaft* (AEG). Its official designation is "Motor Pool of the Soviet Embassy." The entrance, which is always guarded by an armed Soviet soldier, is on Grenzweg. There is a formal control point through which visitors must pass. Although Source never actually entered the motor pool, he did notice in passing that most of the cars are of Western manufacture. The majority are Volkswagens, but there are some Moskvich cars and a few Wartburgs. Source saw no Skodas. Soviet army mechanics work on the cars.

Vehicles used by the KGB bear regular East Berlin registrations which are issued by the MfS. Prior to the end of 1968, all Soviet vehicles were licensed through the Soviet Embassy. Toward the end of 1968, vehicles of all embassies in the DDR were issued red license plates to differentiate the

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embassy vehicles from regular DDR cars. Thus in order to remain anonymous, the KGB had to change the system of registering their cars through the embassy.

Shopping Facilities in East Berlin

The Soviets do not have exclusive shopping facilities similar to some of the Western countries, which provide their personnel with goods in exchange for the respective Western currency. However, there is a store, stocking mainly Soviet goods, located in Andernacher Strasse where Soviets do shop. Anyone, including West Berliners, DDR citizens and members of the Allied military from West Berlin, may shop there. All the employees of the store are Soviet nationals and can speak only Russian.

Rest Homes in the DDR

Source was aware of the existence of only one KGB vacation facility—a house located on a lake near Neustrelitz. KGB case officers and families usually use vacation and recreation facilities which belong to the MFS. One such MFS house is located on a lake east of Berlin. Also, there is an MFS vacation house in Masserberg, Thuringia. Source never used any of these facilities.

KGB District Offices in the DDR

KGB District Offices are located in Soviet *Kommandatura* buildings. Each Soviet *Kommandatura* is well known in the headquarters town, and directions for finding it can be easily obtained by inquiring on the street. Each KGB District Office, depending upon the size of the district, contains from five to twenty KGB officers. While Source was not permitted entry to the Karlshorst *Rezidentura* building, he could walk directly into any KGB District Office. Although Source has not visited all of the District Offices, he has dealt with the KGB chief or other KGB officers of the following District Offices: Leipzig, Gera, Magdeburg, Neustrelitz, Frankfurt/Oder, Suhl, and Rostock. KGB District Chiefs maintain close contact with the Karlshorst *Rezidentura* and frequently travel to East Berlin. KGB case officers from Karlshorst also frequently visit KGB District Offices.

Source did not notice any radios or tape recorders in any of the KGB District Offices he visited. Neither did he see any Soviet females in these offices.

(1) *The District Office in Magdeburg:* This KGB District Office is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura*, a large building. There is a fence around the building and an armed Soviet soldier stands guard in an anteroom just inside the entrance. Source, who visited the Magdeburg District Office only once, in 1957, could not pinpoint the location of the KGB offices in the building because there were so many hallways and turns involved in getting to the KGB section. He saw only one room of the KGB section. A relatively small room, it contained a safe with a key lock, one desk, and a long conference table which was pushed against the desk in T-formation. He is certain that there were other KGB rooms in this building, since the KGB case officer he dealt with at the time would leave the room, walk a few paces, and, judging by the sound of opening and closing doors, enter another room.

(2) *The District Office in Gera:* The KGB office is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura*, a three-story building which is opposite (kitty-corner) to the railroad station. There was no guard posted outside the building. However, in an anteroom just inside the entrance to the building, there is a small guard room, with a glass window, where a visitor was required to report on entering the building. The KGB occupied several rooms on the top floor. Source saw only one room in the KGB section. The room was small. It contained a safe with a key lock, a desk, and a conference table which was pushed against the desk in T-formation. Source believed, but is not certain, that the door to this room was padded on the inside.

(3) *The District Office in Neustrelitz:* The KGB District Office in Neustrelitz is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura*, a three-story building. The building is surrounded by a brick wall. In outside of the wall, there is an iron gate through which cars may drive into a courtyard. The KGB office which Source visited was located on the second or third floor. The room was a very large one and contained a safe with a key lock, a desk, and large conference table which was pushed against the desk in T-formation.

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(4) *The District Office in Suhl:* The Suhl KGB office is located in the Soviet *Kommandatura* building and is approximately a five-minute walk from the Suhl Railroad Station. Across the street from the *Kommandatura* is a small hill with a building which may be either a church or a government office. The *Kommandatura*, a two-story building, is about the size of a four-family house. It sits directly on the street and is surrounded by a metal fence. There is a yard which contains a front garden. There is no space inside the yard for automobiles, which must be parked on the street. The gate through the metal fence is always kept locked. Entrance is gained by ringing a bell. The visitor must then state his business to an armed Soviet soldier who comes to the gate. Source was never confronted with this situation, since he was always in the company of a KGB case officer who would take care of any explanations to the soldier.

Source was in only one room of the KGB section. This office was located on the top floor, on the right hand side as one faces the building from the street. The room contained two desks, a metal safe with a key lock, a table, and a picture of Lenin. There was a telephone in the room, telephone number unknown. However, the telephone number was an extension from the MFS District Office. The entrance door to the room was padded on the inside. Source believes that this one room housed the entire KGB District Office in Suhl. Source knew of two KGB officers there: a Colonel (name unknown) whose private residence was located in Suhl at Schmiedefeldstrasse 83, first floor left, and another officer known as Gennady.

TELEPHONE AND POSTAL SERVICES IN THE DDR

Telephone and Telegraph Communications

Only local calls can be made from the telephone booths located on the sidewalks in East Berlin.

Long-distance telephone calls can be made from all Post Offices in East Berlin. Each has a "Long-distance telephone section" from which one may place a long-distance call. Before placing the call, the caller must deposit DME 5 or DME 10 with the clerk as insurance that the caller will not disappear without paying the bill. The caller, after placing the deposit, gives the clerk the telephone number to be called and the city wherein it is lo-

cated. He then waits in the lobby of the Post Office until the clerk pages him and assigns him to a telephone booth. The booths are numbered and have doors to insure privacy. No identification documents are required to place a long-distance call. Telephone calls to most countries, including the United States but excluding West Germany, can be put through in less than ten minutes' time. Telephone calls to West Germany can take as long as five or six hours because there are so few lines available, and many calls are continuously placed between East and West Germany. The DDR Government refuses to install additional lines, thus the delay in telephone traffic. (*Source Comment:* In placing some long-distance calls, he would wait only a few minutes, then cancel the call, since any delay in completing the call might indicate the possibility that, either routinely or for some specific reason, the call was being monitored.)

Long-distance calls can also be placed from one's own home or from a public place, such as a hotel or restaurant. These latter have the facilities and permit the placing of calls, knowing the caller will remain to pay the costs.

Telegrams can be sent from Post Offices or by private telephone, in which case the cost of the telegram is charged to the telephone owner. No identification documents are required to send a telegram from the Post Office. While there is a section on the telegram which the sender has to fill in regarding the sender's name and address, one may use any name and address, or even no name and address, except that the latter would look suspicious.

Postal Services and Censorship

Postage stamps can be purchased at Post Offices, stationery stores, hotels, and newspaper stands. Registered letters can be sent only from a Post Office. No identity documents are needed to send registered letters. When registered letters are delivered to the addressee's home, no identity document need be shown to take possession of the letter, but the addressee must sign for it. If the addressee is not at home, the mailman leaves a slip of paper notifying the resident that there is some registered mail for him, whereupon he must go to the Post Office to pick it up. When picking up registered letters at the Post Office, the addressee

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must show identity documents. Identity documents must also be shown when picking up money orders or packages at the Post Office.

Source had no information concerning routine censorship imposed on domestic mail within the DDR. International mail is censored on a spot-check basis. The exception to the aforementioned is mail addressed to or sent by individuals whose names are placed on a "Watchlist."

Post Office boxes can be rented by going to the postmaster's office, filling out a form requesting the rental of a Post Office box, and producing identity documents. No reason need be given for wanting to rent the box. The box rental is due and payable quarterly at one of the Post Office windows. No identity documents need be shown when paying the rental. The payer merely gives his box number and pays the fee.

LIAISON BETWEEN THE KGB AND THE MfS IN THE DDR

In 1953 Source's KGB case officer told him that the top echelon of the MfS knew of Source's employment as a full-time KGB agent in the DDR, presumably as Karl HAGER.

Source has little knowledge of the MfS since he never worked with the MfS on any operation. Only once was an MfS agent turned over to him by an MfS officer.

From the time of Source's arrival in the DDR in 1953 until the early 1960's, he noted that the KGB had appeared to have sufficient money at its disposal for conducting any type of intelligence operation. Additionally, the KGB received whatever operational support (e.g., name checks, documentation, backstopping, etc.) it required immediately from the MfS whenever that was considered necessary. During this period, it appeared to Source that the KGB pretty much ran things in the DDR as far as intelligence matters were concerned. In 1963, however, Source learned from three friends who were also full-time agents of the KGB that all of the KGB *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter* in the DDR, with the exception of Source, were to be dismissed from the KGB. This was confirmed to Source by his KGB Section Chief. Source was told that he was too valuable to the KGB and thus would not be released. Those *Hauptamtlicher*

Mitarbeiter who were dropped by the KGB were picked up by the MfS, according to statements later made to Source by one of his subsequent KGB case officers and by a former *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter*. As far as Source could determine, this mass dismissal of *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter* was due to the probability that the KGB apparently no longer had sufficient funds for salaries. In this regard, Source believed that some of the KGB budget in the DDR was derived from occupation costs levied on the DDR (a treaty was apparently reached between the USSR and the DDR, reducing the latter's occupation payments). This loss of revenue to the Soviets in the DDR might have caused the dismissal of Source's colleagues. Source also noted that after 1963 the KGB was not nearly as generous with its gifts and bonuses as it had previously been. Another factor, in Source's opinion, was the growing feeling of independence and national sovereignty of the DDR. One of Source's KGB case officers and a KGB officer from one of the District Offices told Source independently, and at different times, that "now we are only guests here . . . we can only request things from the MfS, not demand." Additionally, a former *Hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter* told Source in about 1967 that the MfS no longer did things the way the Soviets wanted.

It is a basic rule of the KGB in the DDR that the MfS should know as little as possible about KGB activities. This rule was repeatedly violated, as Source notes. Many of the leads he worked on came from the MfS, and considerable operational support was afforded by the MfS even in those cases where they did not supply the leads. Sometimes they helped Source make an initial contact. Additionally, the MfS is evidently aware of all the leads which are followed up by the KGB Liaison Officer to the MfS. (Comment: A Colonel LESSIN, first name unknown, is the KGB Liaison Officer who is called by the MfS border guards whenever persons of operational interest pass through the East/West Berlin border-crossing point.)

It is Source's opinion that the KGB and the MfS have agreed that operations in the DDR involving the American target are to be handled by the KGB. Source bases this opinion on the fact that all of the leads, either offered or supported by the MfS, invariably dealt with the American target. He does not know whether there is a similar agree-

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ment whereby the West German target is handled solely by the MfS. He doubts that such an agreement exists since he knows that the West German target is also worked on by the KGB. He knows of no case involving a West German citizen that the KGB developed itself and then later exposed to the MfS or for which any operational support was requested from the MfS. Once the KGB had a unilateral operation going, it was kept unilateral. There were no restrictions or prohibitions whatsoever on the KGB in regard to its recruitment of DDR citizens. However, Source was emphatically convinced that the MfS, in turn, was not allowed to recruit or otherwise make any operational use of a Soviet citizen without the knowledge, consent and assistance of the KGB.

At the District-Office level of the KGB, liaison between the KGB and MfS personnel was usually on a very close and personal basis. For example,

Source knows that the KGB Chief in Suhl and the KGB Chief in Neustrelitz often went hunting with their MfS counterparts. The KGB Chief in Neustrelitz once turned down Source's offer for lunch, saying that he felt he should go hunting with his MfS colleague to cement their rapport and relationship.

As stated above, KGB officers and families usually use vacation and recreation facilities which belong to the MfS. Apparently, since Source was told about it by his KGB case officers, neither the KGB nor the MfS had any qualms about mixing a large number of their staff officers and families at the vacation home in Masserberg, Thuringia. Source had no information regarding its administration, since he was never there, but he presumes that the MfS and KGB officers using the Masserberg facility went there under some kind of alias.

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23 Jul 58

... has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 3/29/58

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ERP 95-1

Lt Gen E.P. FITOVRANOV

Source: A clandestine source of established authenticity

Date of Information: May 1955 - April 1956

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report, based on information available from this source as of 22 Jul 58, is one of a series on senior military intelligence and KGB officers in East Germany.

II. BACKGROUND

2. Full Name: Evgenii ("Zhenya") Petrovich FITOVRANOV

Rank: Lieutenant General

Assignment: Chief KGB Residentura, BERLIN, and concurrently, Senior Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, BERLIN.

Date of Birth: Estimated between 1910 - 1915.

Residence in USSR: MOSCOW (Tel No K-4 1751)

3. Wife: Elisaveta Vasil'evna FITOVRANOVA

Children: Daughter (first name possibly Gavrilova). There were other children in the household in BERLIN but it is not known whether they were FITOVRANOV's children or grandchildren (see paras 6 and 7).

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Other Relatives:
PITOVBRANO Dr Natalya Vasil'ovna PETROVA, probably PITOVBRANO's sister-in-law. (This relationship was not conclusively established, but is based on her sharing the same patronymic with his wife, and a request by PITOVBRANO to his wife, after a family conversation, to "kiss Natalya and Mama for me"; on 11 Mar 56 PITOVBRANO booked a private telephone call to Dr PETROVA of the "First Surgical Section" of a hospital in MOSCOW, Tel No K-6 8974; (the only N.V. PETROVA listed in the 1954 edition of the MOSCOW Telephone Directory resided at 6, Shohusova Ulitsa Tel No K-4 6696).

4. Education and Accent: No information is available from source material on PITOVBRANO's educational background other than that he speaks as a well-educated man with a Great Russian (MOSCOW) accent.

III. OTHER PERSONAL PARTICULARS

5. Details of Family:

Mme PITOVBRANO's rather listless and apathetic manner during her telephone conversations gave the impression that she was either a sick person or one of negative personality. She seemed unable to raise any enthusiasm when appealed to by her husband on 20 Oct 55 to fly back from MOSCOW to BERLIN on the following day. She agreed only after much prompting, despite the fact that her younger children (or possibly grandchildren) appeared to be in Germany. (Her reaction may have arisen from the fact that she had just suffered the loss of her mother, Elisaveta Ivanovna (anu), who died on 17 Oct 55). PITOVBRANOVA was noticeably apathetic, however, in a February 1956 discussion with a staff officer of Marshal A.A. GHECHKO (Gins, GSFG) on the question of certain domestic transactions for Mme GHECHKO.

6. Mme PITOVBRANO was in MOSCOW again in December 1955 and flew back to BERLIN with her granddaughter on the 24th or 25th of that month. On 10 Jan 56 she flew again to MOSCOW, this time with her daughter, and possibly granddaughter, but was present in BERLIN on 23 Feb 56 when she attended the Red Army Day reception at the Soviet Embassy.

7. An exact identification of the junior members of the family was not possible from the few passing references available in source material. PITOVBRANO once said, in answer to his wife's telephone enquiry from MOSCOW, that "the children are doing their lessons" and mentioned "Serzha" (Sergei) by name. Other references to a daughter and granddaughter, however, made in connection with bookings of plane flights, leave the question open as to whether they were in fact PITOVBRANO's children or grandchildren.

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8. Recreations: Shooting, fishing, and tennis.

IV. CHARACTER AND EFFICIENCY

9. There is evidence that PITOVANOV was quick and incisive when making decisions and was esteemed as a man who backs up his subordinates. If it is assumed that the efficiency of his unit reflected his own capabilities, then on at least one occasion he was awarded a considerable compliment by a military intelligence colonel who had recourse to PITOVANOV and his organization for help with an operation.

10. Col M.G. BELOV (Chief of an element in BERLIN subordinate to the Intelligence Directorate, HQ, GSFG) approached the KGB Residency for help and co-operation with some agent activities on 17 Dec 55. This involved calling on the chiefs of five departments and finally discussing the matter with PITOVANOV. The results, as described by BELOV to Col VI.I. SMIRNOV and Lt Col Yu.F. BUIKOV (both of the Operations Department, Intelligence Directorate, HQ, GSFG), were that PITOVANOV had "stated his decisions swiftly" and had said that he would "give the order immediately."

11. Later, in reply to SMIRNOV's query as to the success of the operation, BELOV said that it had gone excellently - in fact, he had been told that it was "as quick as lightning" and nobody had noticed anything. PITOVANOV's people had made all the security arrangements, as well as directing the affair, and had done it very well.

12. A tribute to PITOVANOV was paid by M.I. MARCHEKID (Deputy Chief, Department 2, KGB Residency element, KIDGMAR-SCHENAU) while discussing pressure of work with a friend: he said that things were so hot it was "like sitting on a powder barrel," but it was very good working with PITOVANOV as "he is a fighter and stands up for his people."

13. Source has provided some indication of PITOVANOV's standing with senior officers outside the KGB. In brief talks with Maj Gen MAINT (Chief, Frontier Control Directorate, HQ, GSFG) and Maj Gen P.V. VASHURA (Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, HQ, GSFG) it was clear that they both treated him with every respect. PITOVANOV in his turn spoke quietly and politely but with noticeable firmness and authority.

14. Maj Gen P.A. DIEROVA (Commandant, Soviet Garrison, BERLIN) was somewhat disdainful about PITOVANOV's plan for hunting wild boar at night with the use of boaters and infra-red telescopic sights. DIEROVA commented to Lt Gen A.Ya. KALZAGIN (GSFG liaison with DDR), that PITOVANOV was a fool to introduce a system which reflected on his hunting ability; he was also concerned over the danger of some of the local population getting killed in the process.

V. MOVEMENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

15. PITOVANOV flew back from MOSCOW to Germany on or about 14 Aug 55. This was revealed in a conversation on 13 August with Maj Gen VASHURA who, having just returned from MOSCOW himself, advised PITOVANOV to fly back with an aircraft which was available on the following day. The reasons for this visit to MOSCOW, and its duration, .../...

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are not known to source.

16. There is evidence that PITOVBRANOV paid a visit to STAHNSDORF between 23 and 27 Jan 56. Capt M.T. KOZYREV (KGB CI officer with 260 Independent Line Construction Battalion, then at STAHNSDORF) on 30 January tried to contact his superior officer, Col G.V. SHATALOV (Chief, KGB CI Department, in BERLIN). Failing to do so, he gave Lt Col V.M. SPIVAKOV (SHATALOV's deputy) the news that PITOVBRANOV had come "here to me", but he did not know on what business. SPIVAKOV replied that KOZYREV, if invited by PITOVBRANOV, was to go to the Residentura and tell him all he wanted to know. The purpose of PITOVBRANOV's visit may have been to investigate personally the after-effects of the defection of Lt I.V. OVCHINNIKOV from the 28 Special Purpose Radio Regiment (BQ, STAHNSDORF; subordinate to the GSFC Intelligence Directorate); STAHNSDORF was also the location of a KGB Radio Intercept Station.

17. On 28 Jan 56 PITOVBRANOV flew to MOSCOW and on 6 February an aircraft was sent from East Germany to MOSCOW to bring him back. The take-off for the return journey was to be at PITOVBRANOV's convenience. G.M. FUSHKIN (Soviet Ambassador to the DDR) wished to be given the place of landing in MOSCOW so that he could inform PITOVBRANOV.

18. On 12 Feb 56 he flew again to MOSCOW, this time in the company of Marshal GUSCHKO and Ambassador FUSHKIN, presumably for the Twentieth Congress, CPSU. His date of return is not known to source, but his presence in BERLIN again was confirmed on 12 Mar 56.

19. PITOVBRANOV paid a visit to KARL-MARK-STADT (CHEMNITZ) on 11 or 12 Apr 56. This was stated by BEDIK (fnu; KGB advisor to the East German Ministry for State Security) when receiving instructions for submitting to PITOVBRANOV a report on an industrial explosion.

VI. FRIENDS AND CONTACTS

20. In view of PITOVBRANOV's status, those personalities who appear to have connections with him only as a result of working relationships have been included, as also those whose identity and therefore importance could not be defined by source.

B.S. ALEKSEIKO

21. The wife of Boris Sergeevich ALEKSEIKO, (Head, 'Soviet Export Film' office, BERLIN) was able to supply the BERLIN home telephone number of the PITOVBRANOV's at the request of Maj Gen G.K. TSEINOV (Chief, KGB Third [CI] Directorate, POTSDAM).

S.T. ASTAVIN

22. The "Sergei Timofeevich" who called on PITOVBRANOV on 18 Oct 55 was probably Sergei Timofeevich ASTAVIN (Chief, Political Department, Soviet Embassy, BERLIN, who dealt with WISMUT affairs). On this occasion he went to the cinema with PITOVBRANOV and the latter's deputy, Col M.N. GOLOVKOV, the wives of both then being in the USSR.

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A. A. GRECHKO

23. The FITOVRANOV's relationship with Marshal Andrei Antonovich GRECHKO and Mme GRECHKO were friendly, as far as can be judged from source material, but there is no evidence that they extended beyond a sympathetic regard for each other in their appointed spheres. GRECHKO sent a telegram of congratulation to "Evgenii Potzovich" on the anniversary of the October Revolution, wishing him success in his activities "from the bottom of my heart", and Mme GRECHKO selected Mme FITOVRANOV as the most suitably prominent escort for her daughter at the Red Army Day reception in 1956. Mme GRECHKO was also concerned with Mme FITOVRANOV in transactions involving the selection of a watch for the former and the selling of skins or furs.

V. V. NARUDDINOV/NARUETINOV and Ya. S. NARRIDDINOVA

24. Viktor Vasil'ovich NARUDDINOV was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet and First Secretary of the TASHKENT City Party Committee. He was member of a delegation of deputies to the Supreme Soviet which was touring the DDR in November/December 1955. On 4 December he was in KARL-MARK-STADT (CHEMNITZ) and telephoned his wife Yadgar Sadykova NARRIDDINOVA from the Soviet Consulate. NARRIDDINOVA was in MOSCOW and had just attended a birthday party given by FURTSHEVA (presumably E. A. FURTSHEVA of the Central Committee). They discussed political matters in both the Russian and Turkmen languages. NARUDDINOV also told his wife that "many of the comrades" who knew her sent their greetings, and mentioned FUSEKIN (see para 25), FITOVRANOV, KISELEV (w/i) and GUSEV (w/i, at KARL-MARK-STADT) in that order.

Comment: Another source has confirmed that a Ya. S. NARRIDDINOVA was a member of the Central Committee elected at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. Despite the discrepancy in names there is considerable evidence that the speakers were husband and wife.

G. E. FUSHKIN

25. FITOVRANOV's official position (Senior Counsellor) with the Soviet Embassy in East BERLIN appeared to involve some degree of active partnership with Ambassador Georgii Maksimovich FUSHKIN. Source was unable to determine FUSHKIN's exact position vis-a-vis FITOVRANOV, i.e., whether he played a role more significant than acting as a "front" for the latter.

FUZANOV (fmu)

26. On the orders of FITOVRANOV, a message was relayed on 7 or 8 Dec 55 to the Frontier Control Directorate, HQ, GDRG, on the subject of FUZANOV and his wife, who apparently had recently arrived in BERLIN. They were leaving BERLIN the next day via the same check point on route for BAD BRAMBACH (Bezirk KARL-MARK-STADT, on the borders of Czechoslovakia), and they would arrive at the

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frontier at 1600 hours. They would be escorted by N.M. GALUSHIN (Chief of KGB Residentura Secretariat) and would call at LEIPZIG on the way.

P.V. VASHURA

27. Some degree of familiarity was shown by Maj Gen Petr Vladimirovich VASHURA when, addressing PITOVORANOV by first name and patronymic, he explained why he had been unable to fulfill an arrangement to travel together with the latter on a return flight from MOSCOW to Germany (see also para 14). Since neither used the intimate form of speech and since VASHURA showed a marked deference to PITOVORANOV, this was, presumably, a friendly working relationship. (Subsequently, according to other sources, VASHURA was promoted to become Chief of the GSPG Political Directorate).

Antonina Pavlovna (anu)

28. A lady of this name wished the news of the death of PITOVORANOV's mother-in-law to be passed to him by his deputy, Col GOLOVKOV, should he not already have heard from Mme PITOVORANOVA. This message was relayed to GOLOVKOV by his wife, who was in MOSCOW at that time.

Newspaper Editor

29. On 14 Sep 55, PITOVORANOV booked a telephone call to "the editor of the newspaper TESNYA in RIGA." No information is available from source to identify the editor or to explain this action.

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

USSR/Poland

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

Activities of General Ivan A. Serov
in Poland

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

1060 has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

1944 - 1945

Date 8/23/94
GRP 94-1

Q. Germany

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

[REDACTED SECTION]

1. Source first met General Ivan Aleksandrovich SEROV in the fall of 1944 in Wolomin, Poland, where SEROV, who was then head of all Soviet SMERSH operational groups in Poland, had his headquarters. SEROV was introduced to source as General IVANOV, and this is the only name source knows him to have used while in Poland. From other Soviets source learned soon after this meeting that IVANOV's true name was SEROV. Source has also positively identified photographs of SEROV as the man he knew under the name of IVANOV. Source does not know the name MALINOV and has never heard this name in connection with SEROV. Source states the following facts from very close personal association with SEROV during 1944-1945, and from information obtained from other Soviets attached to SMERSH, with whom source lived and worked during this period.
2. SEROV arrived in Poland with the advancing Red Army in 1944 as the head of SMERSH ("Death to Spies," Soviet Military Counter-Intelligence). His first headquarters were in Lublin, then these were transferred to Wolomin, then - about early 1945 - to the Warsaw suburb of Praga on Sieradzka Street. About May 1945, sometime after the fall of Berlin, when the headquarters of the Soviet Army were transferred to Germany, SEROV also transferred to Germany, and after that date had nothing more to do with Polish affairs and as far as source knows never returned to Poland.
3. Successors to SEROV as top Soviet security officer in Poland were the following generals, all of whom are believed to have been officers of the NKVD: Nikolay Nikolayevich SELIVANOVSKIY (1945 - for unknown period), DAVIDOV (unknown period up to ca. 1951-1952), Nikolay Kuzmich KOVALCHUK (ca. 1951 to 1953), and LALIN (from ca. 1953 for an unknown

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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period). During SEROV's tenure of office as chief of SMERSH in Poland (1944-1945), one of his subordinates was a General MEINIKOV, also personally known to source. Source at no time has heard the name MALINOV, or of anyone else, other than the above named generals, who was the chief Soviet security officer in Poland.

4. During SEROV's stay in Poland he was exceedingly active in all security matters. He personally planned, directed, and was informed of all security cases of significance. No operations were run, or prominent individuals arrested, without his knowledge and approval, and, according to source, "all security actions were under his personal supervision and personal care." SEROV was responsible for counterespionage in Poland, and personally saw all interesting documents and reports, personally attended portions of most interesting interrogations, etc. According to source, he personally had his hand in almost every case, and knew most details of everything that was being done in counterespionage in Poland. He had the overall direction of all operations against the AK (Home Army, non-Communist underground), the SN (Peasant Party), etc. He devised the plan for the arrest of Wincenty WITOS, leader of the Peasant Party. He personally recruited many agents, including Boleslaw PIASECKI, now chairman of the PAX organization of proregime Catholics; BIENKOWSKI, AK leader who was later in the Polish Parliament; Tadeusz REK, who was Vice Minister of Justice in 1953; one unidentified agent with the pseudonym ATAMAN; and an unidentified woman from Lublin who had been active there in the AK and who identified to him all AK personnel in that area.
5. SEROV was unusually energetic and worked very long hours. He often woke source in the middle of the night to arrest a particular individual of interest to him in an investigation. He also took one of source's agents, a woman, GRUBER (fmu), born ca. 1918-1919, with him to Germany when he left to use her in operations there. An insight into SEROV's operational mentality can be had from the following incident. Source first met SEROV at a meeting which had been arranged in Wolowin in order that SEROV express his views regarding the future of a certain case. The case was that of the AK leader of the Warsaw district, Colonel "ALEKSANDER", who had been arrested by the MO (Citizens Militia), and whom the leader of the MO for the Warsaw district, Grzegorz KORCZINSKI - today head of Polish Military Intelligence (Q-II) - wanted to liquidate on the spot. SEROV rejected this proposal, and ordered the case taken over by the Soviets, pointing out to KORCZINSKI that "ALEKSANDER" could and should be made to talk, thereby being much more useful in the OE investigation than if he were dead.
6. Source believes that SEROV was unquestionably the motivating force behind the arrest of the 16 Polish underground leaders in 1945 who reported themselves to the Soviets after being

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NOFORN/COMINT CONTROL

Page 3

located at Pruszkow under the command of the Soviet officer PIMONOV. These and all other SMESH units were directly responsible to SEROV. Most or all of these units were involved in operations against the AK in their area, and there was close coordination of these operations from Wolomin, i.e., by SEROV. PIMONOV somehow got in touch with an underground general and offered him and others safe conduct if he and others would reveal themselves. This was obviously done with SEROV's knowledge and approval, since nothing of this magnitude was ever done without his approval. The underground leaders were then arrested by PIMONOV and his men. SEROV probably planned this betrayal himself, but the operation was actually carried out by his subordinate PIMONOV.

7. Source knows nothing further about SEROV's activities. He has very great respect for him, considering him extremely intelligent, a very hard worker, with great experience and knowledge in the field of intelligence work, capable of making decisions whenever necessary and not afraid to accept responsibility. Source states that SEROV was not only highly respected by his subordinates for his ability, but was very well liked for his human treatment of subordinates - knowing, for example, when they had earned a rest from the intense pace of operations at that time, and showing appreciation when work was well done. Source believes that SEROV must have had a high protector in Moscow because of his complete self-confidence and willingness to assume responsibility in the direction of these CE operations. Source believes that he is probably also a completely convinced Communist.
1. Headquarters Comment: It is believed that SEROV was not merely head of SMERSH in Poland but had wider responsibilities for intelligence and counterintelligence activities in Poland.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

43

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

9/58

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COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJECT: Organization of the Soviet Intelligence Organs
REPORT NO.: CS [redacted]
DATE DISTR.: FEB 24 1955
NO. OF PAGES: 9
DATE OF INFO.: December 1952
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REQUIREMENT NO.: RD
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Date 10/21/94

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPEARANCE OF "S" IS TENTATIVE.
FOR KEY SEE REVERSE

SOURCE: Reliable source (U) with access to this information. Appraisal of Content: 3.

The Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the KGB:

1. The Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) of the KGB was created by a directive of the Council of Ministers, USSR, in December 1952. The directive was signed by Stalin. (Lieutenant General) Sergey Ivanovich Goltsov was appointed as Chief of the GRU, MVD, which was composed of two directorates: the First Directorate (Intelligence) and the Second Directorate (Counterintelligence).
2. The First or Intelligence Directorate (Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) carried on active intelligence and counterintelligence work abroad. The directing body of the First Directorate was:
 - a. Chief - (Major-General) Yevgeniy Petrovich Pitovranov.
 - b. Deputy Chief - (Lieutenant General) Petr Vasilyevich Fodotov.
 - c. Deputy Chief - (Colonel) Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Bakharovskiy.
 - d. (Colonel) Andrey Makarovich Guroshchenko - Although Guroshchenko, as a former Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate of the MVD, for pay and prestige purposes hold the title of Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, he was actually a section chief, possibly for Near East affairs. Guroshchenko is 45 to 47 years old. He is of average height (170 cm) and weighs approximately 90 kg. His build is heavy and he has a large punch. He has a dark complexion, dark eyes, and thin dark hair, which he wears brushed straight back. He has a round, puffy face and a large bulky nose. He speaks in a husky voice and has a slow, ponderous walk. He has been in important positions for at least 15 years, almost always in high positions. Until 1951 he had been a member of the Advisory Board (Politya) of the Committee of Information (KI) and a deputy chairman of the KI for the Near East.

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AIR/OSI														

1. Washington distribution indicated by "E". Field distribution by "B".

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2. The Intelligence Directorate was composed of the following sections:
- a. American Section or Section of the Principal Enemy (Glavni Givnyye Protivnik). This was the First Section and was responsible for the United States, including Alaska, and all of Latin America, but not Canada.
 - b. English (British) Section - England, its colonies, and the members of the Commonwealth, except Australia, India, and Pakistan.
 - c. Anglo-German (Third) Section - Germany and Austria. As the section was originally organized, Colonel Goryun Stepanovich Yevdokimov was Chief of Section. Yevdokimov, born in 1915, had worked in London to late 1949 or early 1950, was an advisor in Hungary in 1950, and in 1950-51 was Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Army HQ. Colonel Mikhail Nikolayevich Kostalov was Deputy Chief for Germany, and Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Yemolynovich Slesniak was Deputy Chief for Austria. Slesniak had worked in Austria until 1952. He had had experience in diversion and partisan activities. During the war he had trained saboteurs and partisans and had made jumps himself behind the German lines in Kiev and Nijmegen. He is about 40 years old and an engineer by profession. He is married and has one child. Yevdokimov was later transferred to be a Deputy Chief of the Advisors' Section and Chestnikov was sent to Rumania. Goryun (fnu) became Deputy Chief for Germany and, in effect, acting chief of the section.
 - d. European (Fourth) Section - France, Benelux, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Yugoslavia. (Colonel) Ivan Ivanovich Agayants was section chief and Colonel Yuzubek (fnu) was his deputy.
 - e. Scandinavian Section - Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden. (Colonel) Tarasov (fnu) was section chief.
 - f. Near East Section - Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Ethiopia. The chief of the section was (Colonel) Yel'nyoyev.
 - g. Asian Section - India, Pakistan, the countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, Indonesia.
 - h. Far East Section - Japan, South Korea, China, Philippines, Hong Kong, Australia.
 - i. Counterintelligence (Hathi) Section (Kontroversnoyevnyy Otdel) - The section chief was (Colonel) Sergey Mikhailovich Podocoyev.
 - j. Advisors' Section (Sovetskoye Otdel) - Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, China, North Korea, Mongolia. The section chief was (Colonel) Sergey Nikolayevich Kartanov and his deputy was Colonel Chestnemykh.
 - k. "G" Section - Soviet colonies abroad. The section chief was Colonel Koshevnikov.
 - l. "E" - Migration (Emigratsiya) Section. The section chief was Lieutenant Colonel Yuzubek. Yuzubek is 40 to 42 years old. He is short and has a normal build except for a small paunch. His hair is dirty blond and he has light eyebrows and lashes. His complexion is light. He does not wear glasses.
 - m. Deep Cover Section (Otdel Kulemlov) - The section chief was Colonel Aleksandr Nikolayevich Korotkov.
 - n. Scientific-Technical Intelligence Section (Otdel Nauchnoy-Tekhnicheskoy Razvedki) - The section chief was Colonel Krasnikov.
 - o. Cipher Section
 - p. Operational Registry and Archives (Operativnyy Uchet i Arkhiv) or 16th Section - Section Chief, (Colonel) Polynkov (fnu). Colonel Polynkov has been with the security services for more than 25 years and in June 1953 was sent to China as

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an INW advisor.

9. Personnel Section (Otloel Kadrov) - The section chief was Colonel Boris Petrovich Sorogin.
- r. Secretariat - The section chief was (Lieutenant Colonel) Fedor Yakovlevich Gubarenko.
- g. Finance Section - The section chief was (Colonel) Tarakanovskiy.
- t. Foreign Language Courses - This unit was not formally a section, although in also it approximated one. The unit was headed by a major who knew four or five languages. He was about 50 years old, was tall, and tried to create the impression that his linguistic accomplishments were more than they were in fact. The major had a large staff of instructors under him, as well as a regular administrative staff. At the beginning of each training year, in the fall, various sections of the directorate submitted to the language training unit the names of persons selected for language training. The language unit then organized small groups of two, three, or four persons. Each group met three times a week for two hours each session. Since the working day was from 1130 to 1100 and the language groups met from 0900 to 1100 or 1000 to 1200, alternatively, part of the instruction was on the student's own time and part on government time. Some groups met from 2000 to 2200. Those taking language training were not excused from their normal duties. Language instruction was usually provided for officers who would need the language in their work. In the case of a transfer from one geographical area to another, however, an officer would be permitted to complete a course already begun in a language even though he might no longer need to know it.
4. The Second (Counterintelligence) Directorate was responsible for counterintelligence in the foreign embassies and other foreign installations located within the USSR. Among the personnel were:
 - a. Chief - (Lieutenant General) V.S. Ryamov. In early March 1953, Ryamov became chief of the GRU, MVD. Ryamov is a Great Russian, about 50 years old. He is 161 cm tall, stout (weighing about 70 kg), and has a noticeable pouch. He has a pale, round face, a long nose, brown hair and yellow (sic; possibly hazel) eyes. He is a heavy smoker.
 - b. Deputy Chief - (Colonel) Gribanov, who later became chief of the Second Directorate of the GRU.
 - c. Chief of the American Section - (Colonel) Kozlov. His deputy was (Lieutenant Colonel) Gribanovskiy.
 - d. Chief of the German (Fifth) Section - (Major) Parfilyev. This section was responsible for operations against the DDR and its representatives in the Soviet Union.
7. When the MVD and the MVD were merged in March 1953, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MVD ceased to exist. The First (Intelligence) Directorate of the GRU, MVD, became the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD, and the Second (Counterintelligence) Directorate of the GRU became the First Chief Directorate of the MVD.
6. Interim to Organizational Chart of the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD after March 1953 (see page 6):
 - (1) Chief of the Second Chief Directorate - (Nachalnik Vtorogo Glavnogo Upravleniya, MVD, SSSR).
The Second Chief Directorate was composed of the following sub-divisions:
 - (a) The Secretariat - (Lieutenant Colonel) Gubarenko was chief. This section served

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the needs of SCD personnel in both the top and the working echelons. Specifically, it was responsible for the checking and registry of secret and top secret documents of the SCD, the operation of the typing pool, the providing of stenographic help, the receipt and dispatch of diplomatic mail, and the handling of incoming correspondence and its distribution to the appropriate sections. Within the secretariat there was also a Housekeeping (Khozvyatvornaya) Subsection which was charged with the custody of living quarters of the employees of the SCD while on duty abroad. Members of the secretariat also might be given various non-operational tasks by the chief of the directorate or his deputies. In addition, the chief of the secretariat kept the duty officer roster and appointed operational and staff duty officers for nights, non-working days, and holidays.

The following were operational sections performing regular intelligence functions:

- (3) First Section - American Section.
- (4) Second Section - Great Britain, its colonies, and the Commonwealth.
- (5) Third Section - Intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany and Austria.
- (6) Fourth Section - Continental Europe and Scandinavia, except Germany, Austria, and the satellites. Colonel Tsybal was chief of this section. Tsybal was approximately 40 years old, was short, and had red hair.
- (7) Fifth Section - Emigration. This section was responsible for placing agents within emigre groups.
- (8) Sixth Section - Near and Far East, except China, North Korea, and Mongolia. The chief was (Lieutenant) Colonel Vortiporokh.
- (9) Seventh Section - The Advisors' Section. Heled, and exercised control over the state security organs of the European satellites, China, North Korea, and Mongolia. The chief was (Colonel) Aleksandr Mikheylovich Sakharovskiy, with Colonel Chistyovskiy as deputy.
- (10) Scientific and Technical Intelligence Section. The section chief was Kvanikov (fnu).
- (11) Ninth Section - The Illegal Section (Otdel Nelegalov) - A section for the selection, preparation, and dispatching of deep cover agents for deep cover work abroad.
- (12) Tenth Section - Delegations and Merchant Seaman. The chief was Colonel Shorkin. This section handled the agents within Soviet delegations sent abroad and also directed the agents on Soviet merchant ships sailing to foreign ports. The network covered all vessels sailing abroad, and agents would be, as a rule, under cover as members of the crew. There was a regulation which stipulated that, when members of the merchant marine were abroad, they could go ashore alone and must go in groups of not less than three persons. While there would not necessarily be an INW man in the group, agents were alerted to keep an eye on shore parties. If one member of the group should break away, even for a few hours, he immediately would become suspect and would not get a second chance either to go ashore or to sail abroad again. For three persons to go ashore and get drunk together was not considered a serious offense. When a ship was bound for a foreign port, the resident of that country was notified by telegram from the Second Chief Directorate as to the date of the ship's arrival.
- (13) Information Section (number of section not known) - The chief of the section was (Colonel) Novoselov. Novoselov had been Chief of the Directorate of Information under the KT. In 1951, this directorate was known as the Fifth Directorate. When the GRU was established it became the Information Section and continued as a section under the Second Chief Directorate of the INW. All intelligence information from abroad was forwarded to this section, where it was processed, put in report form or summarized, and then forwarded to the appropriate ministries or other government agencies which would be interested in

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it, if it warranted being so sent.

The following were so-called non-operational sections:


- (14) Code Section (Shifrovodnyy Otdel) - This section was actually subordinate to the chief of the Second Chief Directorate; but, at the same time, organizationally, it was also under the chief of the Eighth Directorate ("D" on the chart), i.e., the Code Directorate. Physically, it was located next to the offices of the Second Chief Directorate, while the Eighth Directorate was located in a suburb of Moscow. The chief of this section, while nominally subordinate to the chief of the Eighth Directorate, was not allowed to show to the latter, or to other workers in the Eighth Directorate, any of the code messages he received for the Second Chief Directorate.
- (15) Operational Registry and Archives Sektor (Sektor Operativnaya Recheb i Arkhiva) - Registry of active and of former agents; personnel composed of foreign nationals working abroad; registry of deep cover agents (palatnyy) and of prospective agents being considered for or actually in the process of recruitment; custody of operational and personal agent files. This Sektor was also subordinate to both the chief of the Second Chief Directorate and the chief of the First Special Section, MVD, USSR ("C" on the chart). The official designation of this unit was "Fifth Sektor of the First Special Section, MVD, USSR." Its chief was Colonel Andreyev.
- (16) Finance and Disbursing Sektor (Finanovo-Valyutnyy Sektor) - The section chief was Colonel Varakovsky. This unit also had dual subordination: to the chief of the Second Chief Directorate and to the chief of the Finance Section, MVD, USSR ("D" on the chart).
- (17) Personnel Section - Also subordinate to both the chief of the Second Chief Directorate and to the chief of the Personnel Directorate, MVD, USSR ("E" on the chart).
- (18) Courses of Foreign Languages - The instructors in this unit gave language instruction to the members of the Second Chief Directorate only. However, in academic matters, methodology, and guidance in the use of text books and training aids, they were subordinate to the chief of the Department of Foreign Languages of the Higher School of the MVD, USSR ("F" on the chart), at the present time called the Law Institute (Yuridicheskiy Institut).
- (19) The Party Committee (Partkom) - The Party Committee was not formally subordinated to the chief of the Second Chief Directorate. It was directly under the Party Committee, MVD, USSR ("A" on the chart). However, it was responsible for a joint, consultative effort (with the chief of the Second Chief Directorate) directed toward the improvement of Second Chief Directorate work in general.
- (20) Komsomol Committee - Supervised the Komsomol work in the directorate. However, since there were comparatively few members of the Komsomol in the directorate, and these were almost exclusively from among the ancillary and support personnel, the secretary of this committee performed these duties in addition to his other normal work and not on a full-time basis.

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Organizational Chart of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB after March 1973



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Proposed Reorganization of the Second Chief Directorate

7. Approximately in the middle, or the beginning, of August 1953, Fuyushkin called a meeting of all chiefs of sections and the secretaries of the Party Bureaus of the Second Chief Directorate. The agenda of the meeting required that all of those present put forth their proposals on the subject of how to improve the organization of the work of the Directorate. Each one was requested to submit his own proposals on how to revamp the structure of the Directorate for greater effectiveness. This question was posed on the grounds that Boriya, during his tenure as Minister (MD), disrupted the work of the Second Chief Directorate, unnecessarily discharged a large number of Second Chief Directorate employees, and put through a completely faulty reorganization of the Directorate.
8. The following is a list of specific proposals presented during the described meeting:
- a. The American Section was to be made into two separate sections, i.e., one section to work against the United States only, and the other to work against Latin America.
 - b. The British Section was to be left without a change, except that Australia was to be transferred to the Far East Section.
 - c. The Austro-German Section was to remain as it was, but to be strengthened by the addition of four or five more workers.
 - d. With regard to the European Section, a proposal was made to break it up into three sections, i.e.:
 - 1) France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg;
 - 2) Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark;
 - 3) Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
 - e. The Belgian Section was to remain as it was, but with an addition of five or seven more employees.
 - f. With regard to the Sixth (Near and Far East) Section, there was a proposal to break it up into three separate sections, namely:
 - 1) Iran, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt;
 - 2) Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India;
 - 3) The Far East Section, to include Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Indo-China.
 - g. No changes were proposed with regard to the Advisory Section, except that the chief of section asked for an increase in his T/O of five or six people.
 - h. No changes were proposed with regard to the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Section.
 - i. There were two major proposals with regard to the Deep Cover Section. One proposal was to make the section into a Deep Cover Directorate, within the Second Chief Directorate, to comprise three sections, which would be charged with all deep cover activities. The second proposal had in view the creation of three independent sections, as follows:
 - 1) A section charged with the selection and training of agents for deep cover work.

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- 2) A section charged with the legalization aspects of deep cover work, to include the documentation of agents and their dispatch or infiltration into foreign countries for deep cover work.
 - 3) A section charged with the actual running of deep cover operations and the maintenance of contact with deep cover agents.
- J. No changes were proposed with regard to the 10th (Delegation) Section.
- K. With regard to the Information Section, it was proposed that it be considerably enlarged and that the Translators' Sektor be removed from its jurisdiction, since the direction of the work of translators required entirely too much time and effort on the section's part.
- L. The next question raised at the meeting dealt with the proposal to return to Second Chief Directorate organizational control the subdivisions removed from the direct control of the former First Chief Directorate. Specifically:
- 1) The Code Section - It was proposed that it be returned to full Second Chief Directorate control.
 - 2) Registry and Archives Sektor - The proposal called for its return to full Second Chief Directorate control and again raising it to a section.
 - 3) Finance and Disbursing Sektor - It was proposed to return it to full Second Chief Directorate control as a section.
- M. No objections were raised with regard to the dual subordination of the Personnel Section (to the Second Chief Directorate and to the Personnel Directorate, MVD).
- N. No changes were proposed with regard to the status of the Foreign Languages Courses.

The measures listed above were not put into effect as of February 1954, i.e., before the Committee for State Security (KGB) was established. However, while probably not all of the proposals were finally adopted and implemented, it is fairly certain that some of them were carried out, especially those referring to the breakup of the Bureau and the Near/Far East Sections. Such measures were necessary since the sections had grown too unwieldy to be run efficiently.

The First Chief Directorate of the MVD after March 1953

- The First Chief Directorate was a CE Directorate which was responsible for all foreigners within the Soviet Union. Its specific responsibilities were as follows:
- a. Counterespionage work against all foreign diplomatic installations and all foreigners legally in the Soviet Union. This work was handled by sections which were broken down by country as in the Second Chief Directorate.
 - b. Apprehension of all foreign agents dispatched into the Soviet Union. This work was handled by the 11th Section, known as the Section for the Search of Parasitists (Отдел по Разысканию Паразитов).
 - c. Operational direction of the cases of all foreign agents apprehended in the Soviet Union. This may have been part of the work of the 11th Section or there may have been a special section just for this purpose.
- The work of the 11th Section was a continuation of the work of the old wartime Fourth (Parasitist) Directorate. This section inherited the Parasitist Directorate's name but it probably was much smaller now than it was during the war. The 11th Section may have had a small group in each oblast and kray MVD Directorate.
- The First Chief Directorate did not maintain personnel abroad. The only circumstance under which a First Chief Directorate case officer might have gone abroad would have been operational necessity. For example, if a case officer of the American Section of the First Chief Directorate became friendly with an American in the Embassy and the American returned to Washington, this case officer might have been transferred to

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Washington if they thought that a continuation of the friendship might have valuable results. However, under such circumstances the case officer would have been temporarily transferred to the Second Chief Directorate and the case would have become a Second Chief Directorate case. Source knows of no foreign operations in which First Chief Directorate personnel have actually participated.

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Approved for release through
the CIA's CONTINUING PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency

2 Feb 53

(Der Tagesordnungspunkt 1 hatte besonders die Arbeit in allgemeinen, Lieferfragen und organisatorische Fragen zum Inhalt)

Zeit der Sitzung:

Die Sitzung begann 10:30 und endete etwa 15:30 Uhr

Zu Tagesordnungspunkt 1 und 2:

Der Leiter des INF, Micho Wolf, eröffnete die Dienstbesprechung und fuhrte aus: Die Arbeitspläne fuer das I. Quartal 1953 habe er nicht restlos fertig gemess erhalten. Einen Teil der erhaltenen Pläne habe er storniert geben müssen, da sie formell waren. Ueberhaupt sei der grösste Teil der Pläne des Hauses formell. Die Arbeitspläne müssten operative Pläne sein und alles beinhalten. Ferner müssten verstehen, alle Kräfte unserer Abteilung richtig zu mobilisieren. Viele Mitarbeiter des Hauses wurden bei ihren tæglichen Arbeiten sich verzettelt und die Massnahmen zur Erreichung der gesteckten Ziele ganz vergessen bzw. acht lassen.

Unsere wichtigste in unserer Arbeit sei der Kontakt der Residenturen, bei der Suche nach dem Will der Residenten wurde man zur die Ausbildung sehen. Die Voraussetzungen fuer eine Einschleusung zur Erlangung fuer eine Spionagearbeit wurden viele Mitarbeiter bei ihrer Auswahl ganz vergessen. Erst wenn die Ausbildung laufe konnte man dahinter, dass die Einschleusung schon erhalten bereits und der gesetzte Termin nicht eingehalten werden konnte.

Bei ausgebildeten und eingeschleusten Residenten soll man nicht den Fehler machen diese sich 3 Wochenlang legalisieren lassen. Die eingeschleusten Residenten sollen sofort anfangen sich legalisieren, sofort anfangen sich legalisieren. Bei der Organisation von Residenturen soll man sich nicht zu sehr um die Bereitstellung von Quellen durch die Zentrale verlassen. Es sei der Fehler gemacht worden, dass bei der Ausbildung der Residenten gesagt wurde, die erforderlichen Quellen werde die Zentrale bereitstellen. Dies sei in Zukunft zu unterlassen. Die Residenten sollen in der Suche nach Quellen selbst aktiv sein. Selbstverantwortlich müssten wir von der Zentrale um auch nach Quellen schauen, um sie zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt einer Residentur anschliessen. Grundsatz sei aber, dass sich die Residenten selbst bemessen.

Die Arbeit der Abteilungen und der Mitarbeiter müsse systematischer gestaltet werden. Das heisst, dass das zu bearbeitende Objekt studiert werden muss. Dies sei Voraussetzung in der Schaffung von Anhaltspunkten fuer die Werbung von Quellen wie weit in den Ministerien der Bonner - Regierung.

Z.Zt. besitze das INF wenig politische Nachrichten und fast keine oekonomische Nachrichten. Die wenigen Nachrichten, die uns z.Zt. zur Verfügung stehen reichen nicht, um unsere Regierung und Fuehrung ausreichend zu informieren. Weltweit deshalb nochmals, dass die Herausarbeitung von Schwarzpunkten in unseren Arbeitsplänen äusserst notwendig sei. Z.Zt. berichte ferner, dass bei der Durchfuhrung der Arbeit ein Teil der Mitarbeiter keine Kompetenz bestuende.

Um in Zukunft schneller und besser vorwärts zu kommen, bzw. den Sicherheitsfaktor starker wahren zu lassen, sei folgendes notwendig:

a) Konkrete Arbeitspläne, einschliesslich gut durchdachter Legenden, dies ist die Grundlage unserer Arbeit. Die gemachten Fehler der Vergangenheit zeigten dies eindeutig.

(Ich spreche hierbei an folgende Vorkommnisse erinnern: Fall Planert / 1. Abteilung, Verhaftung eines Beauftragten der 2. Abteilung durch die VP an der Grenze, Beschuldigung eines Grenzküriers der 2. Abteilung durch die Grenzpolizei der DDR, Verhaftung der Agenten der ISHA im vergangenen Jahr, der Fall Weis - 1. Abteilung, die...

b) Die Partei SED ist bei unserer Arbeit aus dem Spiel zu lassen.

IV-6: (Continued)

(Page 2 missing from the original document)

Der Grundsatz hier ist Mitarbeiter des Hauptabteilungsmittels, die Partei kompromittiert. Sie haben sich unter anderem in der Arbeit der SED legitim und zwar bei Vorkommnissen hierüber nicht geeignet, veräußert, viele Mitarbeiter reisten auf Kosten des ZK, der SED, als Legende, obwohl Walter Ulbrich streng verboten hat, dass wir die Partei fuer unsere Arbeit nutzen, bzw. die Organe der Partei betreten. Nur einer sehr geringen Anzahl - ca. 6 - Mitarbeitern stunden ZK-Ausweis mittels Unterschrift von Otto Schoss von Wartungsmitteln. Diese hinaus fügen, dass 1952 ca. 12 - 15 Mitarbeiter ZK-Ausweise besaßen. Ende März 1953 wurde hiermit radikal Schluss gemacht.

c) Alle angeworbenen Agenten, Residenten, Kuriers, Ablagestellen, Treffwohnungen, Deckrede usw. müssen ausserhalb gelassenhaft und genau überwacht werden. Nicht nur eine ausserliche Beobachtung durchzuführen, so fern tief in das Innere eindringen. Verwandtschaft, Umgebung, Frau und Kinder besonders der Verkehr usw. ausserdem sehr gewissenhaft abgeklärt werden. Wenn wir alles sehr gewissenhaft durchzuführen, so koemten wir gewiss sein, dass wir sehr wenig Rückschlüsse erlangen würden. Nach schlaege sei ueberwiegend die Ursache leichtsinniger Arbeit.

d) Die Verantwortung fuer die Arbeit traegt den Hauptabteilungsleiter sowie der Abteilungsleiter. Wolf fragte hier hinzu, dass Ansicht verschiedener Abteilungsleiter, dass die Verantwortung fuer die Arbeit bei der Leitung liegt. Wichtig sei Verantwortung ist. Der erste Linie der Abteilungsleiter mit dem die Leitung ebenfalls fragte jeder Mitarbeiter fuer eigenmaechtige Arbeit die Verantwortung. Die Mitarbeiter mussten so erzogen werden, dass Anfuhrerschaft in allen dienstlichen und privaten Angelegenheiten aussererats Grundsat ist.

e) Ausnutzung aller sich ergebenden Moeglichkeiten fuer unsere Nachrichtensarbeit. Wolf ging hierbei nochmals auf die Ausarbeitung guter Legenden ein. Abteilungsleiter musste alle objektiven und subjektiven Moeglichkeiten beinhalten. Z.B. nicht nur reine Lebenslegende sondern auch Fragen wie Verhaftung, Befragung, politische Auseinandersetzungen usw. Hierher gehoert auch das Verhalten bei Begegnung mit westlichen Agenten, z.B. in der Absicht, in der Zusammenarbeit mit Agenten der westlichen Parteien usw.

f) Agitation/ Werbung von Quellen durch die Residenten. Wie bereits zum Ausdruck gebracht, sollen die Residenten sich nach Moeglichkeit an der Suche nach Quellen stark beteiligen. Wenn der Resident nach Westdeutschland eingeschleust wird und in der DDR der SED angehört hat, die Vertriebung von Agenten nicht durchzuführen. Alle uebrigen Residenten, die nach Westdeutschland eingeschleust sowie in Westdeutschland angeworben koemmen nach Bestaetigung durch die Zentral von Fall zu Fall Werbungen durchzuführen. Eingeschleuste SED-Residenten haben nun mit zugeordneten Quellen zu arbeiten.

g) Die Anfuhrung der Mitarbeiter durch die Abteilungsleiter. Das Benehmen der Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter gegenueber den Mitarbeitern muss korrekt und diszipliniert sein. Es darf sich kein Kampelium entwickeln. Die Mitarbeiter müssen untereinander und auch gegenueber den Abteilungsleiter Achtung haben. Alle Vorhaben und Arbeiten müssen mit den Mitarbeitern durch den Abteilungsleiter gruendlich besprochen werden. Die Abteilungsleiter sind fuer Arbeit und fuer die Sicherheit ganz und gar verantwortlich. Letzteres nicht nur fuer die Arbeit in der Abteilung sondern auch fuer die Mitarbeiter. Es muss in der Abteilung eine schoepferische Arbeit entwickelt werden.

Die Punkte a - g stellen Ergaenzungen zu den bereits bekannten Methoden dar.

Micha Wolf fuhr sodann in seiner Anfuhrungen wie folgt fort:

Zu den wegfallenden Aufgaben... (Wolf sprach...)

1. Abteilung

Über die Arbeit der 1. Abteilung... (Wolf sprach...)

2. Abteilung

Wolf brachte zum Ausdruck... (Wolf sprach...)

Der Abteilungsleiter der 2. Abteilung... (Wolf sprach...)

Die Abteilung müsse aber Verständnis... (Wolf sprach...)

3. Abteilung - Kaderabteilung... (Wolf sprach...)

Man machte Willi Wohl den Vorwurf, dass er zu burokratisch sei. Wohl verteidigte sich damit, dass er zu Ausdruck brachte, die Mitarbeiter wüssten nicht, wer die Verantwortung bei Einstellungen Kaderfragen usw. wäre. Wenn eine Arbeit bei Kaderfragen nicht erledigt ist, so hat Wohl zu seiner Verteidigung ferner an, dass die Betriebe, Verwaltungseinheiten, sonstige Institutionen nicht für die Kaderarbeit eufallen und dadurch bei Kadersuche sich grosse Schwierigkeiten zeigen. Wie schwierig es ist, geeignete Kader zu finden, koenne man sich kaum denken. Es sei ja alles schon abgegruet. Wohl bat in diesem Zusammenhang alle Hauptabteilungen - u. Abteilungsleiter ebenfalls in der Kadersuche behilflich zu sein, denn und wurden auch viele Kader lediglich durch die Finger gehen. Besonders bat er um geeignete Vorkader zu finden.

In der Kaderfrage ergriiff sodann Zsinda das Wort und erklarte, dass die Kaderabteilung Verständnis fuer die operativen Abteilungen haben wuesse. Seine Hauptabteilung besesse fuer 7 operative Mitarbeiter eine Sekretaeerin. Bei einem derartigen Zustue musste die Arbeit darunter leiden. Ebenfalls bekame er eingereichte Kadervorschlaege an die Kaderabteilung ueberhaupt nicht zurueck. Entscheidungen wuerde die Kaderabteilung ueberhaupt nicht faellen. Die Abteilungen wollten doch vorallen wissen, wie sie sich in bestimmten Kaderfragen zu verhalten haben. Die Kaderabteilung wuesse nun endlich dazu uebergehen, schnell Entscheidungen zu treffen. Wie sei doch den Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen gleich, aber sie wuessten wenigstens voran sie sich wenn eine Entscheidung infolge der Verantwortung, nicht gleich moeglich ist, so soll man doch wenigstens Zwischenbescheid geben. Diesen Standpunkt teilte sodann auch Henschke. Nach dieser Diskussion erhielt Wohl vom Leiter des IWF den Auftrag, die Arbeit in seiner Abteilung zu aendern. Ziel muss sein, schnellere Entscheidung in allen Kaderfragen.

4. Abteilung - Archiv
 Wolf machte alle HI und Abteilungsleiter darauf aufmerksam, dass die Aktenfuehrung in vielen Faellen noch zu wuenschen uebrig lasse. Dies kaeme auch fuer die Registrierung von Mitarbeitern in Frage. Ein Mangel bestuende auch in der Uebergabe von Akten an andere Mitarbeiter innerhalb der Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen. Die fehlte sehr oft die Registrierung sowie die Anfertigung des erforderlichen Protokolls. Kontrollen der Genossin Emmi Becker haetten dies fast ueberall geseigt. Wolf erteilte hierauf Emmi Becker das Wort. Sie sagte:
 In fuer die Leitung und die Freunde - Mussen jederzeit einen ueberblick zu haben, ist es einfach eine ausserst dringende Notwendigkeit, dass die operativen Mitarbeiter ihre Aktenfuehrung in Ordnung haben. Sie betonte ferner, dass sie in Zukunft des ueberoffentlicher in den Abteilungen Kontrollen durchfuehren werde, um zu sehen, ob alles den Anordnungen entsprechen gemacht wird. Becker ging dann zu der Frage von Registrierung von Kader mit operativer Interesse ueber. Ich woenchte erlaeuern, hinzu fuege dass es sich hierbei um Kader handelt, die fuer die Abteilungen von besonderer Interesse sind, aber noch keine Werbungsabsichten bestehen. - Fuer derartige Kader sollen die Abteilungen eine sogenannte Hinweisakte fuehren. In dieser Hinweisakte soll auch die Registrierung erfolgen, also innerhalb der Hauptabteilung bei den Abteilungen sowie bei den selbstaendigen Abteilungen. Kader fuer die kein Interesse mehr besteht, sollen in das Archiv abgegeben werden. Das Archiv wird ebenfalls eine derartige Hinweisakte (Akten) fuehren ohne dabei eine Sperrkarte oder sonstige Karte anzuheften. Die Kader werden wie bei den Abteilungen innerhalb der Hinweisakte gefuehrt. Man sei noch bei der Ueberlegung, ob man fuer derartige immerhin wichtige Kader eine besondere Karte anlegen soll. Die Freunde seien jedoch dagegen und vertreten den Standpunkt, entweder ist der Kader so wichtig, dass man mit ihm arbeitet oder aber er ist ein Agent. In beiden Faellen wuessten ja sowieso Sperrkarten angelegt werden. Die uebrigen Kader seien nicht so wichtig, dass man eine Karte anlegt, selbst wenn sie einmal fuer das IWF von operativen Interesse waren. In der darauf folgenden Diskussion brachte vorallen Zsinda zum Ausdruck, dass die die Burokratie verwendet wird. (Zsinda war sehr gegen Emmi Becker eingestellt).

Micha Wolf bekräftigte die Ausführungen der Becker und machte darauf aufmerksam dass wir in unseren Abteilungen auch auf dem Gebiet der Arbeitseinteilung freundlich sein sollen. (X)

Die Gehaltsregelung ist ein organisatorischer Prozess und steht im Zusammenhang mit der Gehaltsregelung die ganz hohen Gehälter werden vermutlich etwas gedrückt die mittleren Gehälter bleiben im grossen und ganzen auf ähnliche Hoheinstufungen die niedrigeren Gehälter wie Referenten usw. werden teilweise etwas steigen.

Die Gehaltsregelung erfolge nach ganz anderen Richtlinien als bisher. (Ich komme hierauf zurück)

Ende Februar 1953 bekommt das INF für die Hauptabteilungsleiter, Abteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter die Staatsangehörigkeitsausweise. Diese Ausweise dürfen nur für den Dienstgebrauch benutzt werden und nur dann wenn es die Lage erfordert. Nicht jeder Beamtenausweis muss von diesem Ausweis Gebrauch gemacht werden. Die Beamtenausweise sollen ohne grosser Legitimation unserer Mitarbeiter gearbeitet werden und nicht zufallen. Die Ausweise des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit haben auch bei den Hauptabteilungsleitern zu liegen. Die Ausweise wurden unsere Dienststellung entsprechend der Neueinstufung ausgestellt werden. Die übrigen Mitarbeiter des INF bekommen ebenfalls im März 1953 Dienstausweise der Kripo. Diese Ausweise ersetzen zusätzlich gewisse Dienstausweise von der L. Ausweislich werden wir auch nochmals darauf aufmerksam dass diese Ausweise teilweise als Legitimationsunterlagen für unsere Personenkarte sind und nicht als Legitimationen zu betrachten sind.

(X) Erweisung zu Abteilung 2 - siehe oben

Für alle neu eingestellten Genossen will Ewald Becker die Belehrung über die Arbeitseinteilung übernehmen. Die Abteilungsleiter brauchen sich dem damit darauf hinzuwirken dass diese neuen Mitarbeiter ihre Arbeitseinteilung richtig aufnehmen.

Zu Tagesordnungspunkt 3 - Ansprache des sowjetischen Charberaters Eugen

Obochi Eugen ist ein sowjetischer Dolmetscher in der Abteilung für die Hauptabteilungsleiter als Dolmetscher fungieren.

Das INF sei verantwortlich für die Parteiführung und die Staatsführung der DDR. Alle Vorgänge politisch, ökonomisch, wissenschaftlich und technisch, militärisch und allgemein in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik zu unterrichten. Diese Aufgabe hat die Nachrichtendienststelle der Partei und die Regierung wichtige Beschlüsse fassen und in der Praxis der Sowjetunion eine richtige Politik betreiben. Es sei die Aufgabe jedes einzelnen Mitarbeiters und besonders der Hauptabteilungs- und Abteilungsleiter sowie der Leitung des INF die ganze Arbeit darauf einzurichten. Bei jeder Arbeit die wir entfassen, muss jeder Mitarbeiter das oben Angeführte klar als Ziel vor sich haben und die ganze Arbeit darauf einrichten. Dies muss in allen Fragen und Arbeiten der Ausgangspunkt sein wenn es auch hier und da noch Schwächen und Mängel gibt. Die Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen müssen sich in ihren Plänen konkrete Aufgaben stellen wie z.B. was wirklich zwischen dem USA-Aussenminister John Foster Dulles und Glienke nach dem Deutschlandbesuch von Dulles besprochen usw. Ein Teil der Mitarbeiter des INF beschäftigen sich überlegend mit organisatorischen Aufgaben. Derartige Org. auf müssen ebenfalls erledigt werden. Das INF habe erst die ersten Stufen der Nachrichtendienststelle über Westdeutschland zu wissen, aber es wird nur noch eine kurze Zeit dauern und wir werden das systematische Arbeit gut voran kommen. Es muss unsere Aufgabe sein in Westdeutschland alles durcheinander zu bringen auf in und guter Nachrichten. Es soll nicht nur unsere Arbeit betrachten sondern die Auswertung unserer Nachrichten. Wir sollen schon die Auswertung der Nachrichten mit einbringen. Die Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter hatten bereits eine gute Nachrichtenerfahrung. Diese Erfahrung

müsse jedoch in Zukunft besser als in der Vergangenheit ausgemittelt werden. Alle un-
 denkbaren Möglichkeiten müssen für unsere Arbeit ausgemittelt werden. Wir können
 damit uns Deutsche - können doch die deutschen Verhältnisse besser als die, wenn
 ihnen möglich ist in Indien, Süd-Amerika, USA usw. einzudringen, so wird es uns als
 Deutsche doch möglich sein in die Bundesrepublik einzudringen. Für die Hauptabteil-
 leiter und Abteilungsleiter darf nicht nur die Frage der Erziehung unserer Mitarbe-
 iten stehen, sondern es muss gleichzeitig die Arbeit durchgehend sein. Wenn das ist,
 an erster Stelle. Die Genossen Zschinda und Henschke haben unsere Erfahrungen bei
 offenen Diskussionen in den monatlichen Sitzungen die Konspiration verurteilt. Die
 Konspiration sei außer Haus richtig, aber bei derartigen Sitzungen, wie die im
 des IMF selbst, solle man die Konspiration nicht überbetonen. Bei Einzelgesprächen
 man in derartigen Besprechungen wie heute, die Probleme die Schwierigkeiten bereits
 ruhig behandeln, man brauche ja nicht das Letzte in allen Fällen zu sagen. Ein
 Mangel im IMF bestehe darin, dass die Leitung selbst keine Aufgabenverteilung vor-
 nimmt. Nicht nur in den Arbeitsplänen der Hauptabteilungen und Abteilungen müssen
 Aufgaben und Schwerpunkte stehen, sondern die Leitung des IMF muss den Hauptabteil-
 und Abteilungen bestimmte Aufgaben und Schwerpunkte stellen. Die Durchführung der
 Kontrolle von der Leitung über die Hauptabteilungsleiter und Abteilungsleiter bis
 zu den Mitarbeitern müsse auch noch besser durchgeführt werden, als es jetzt noch
 schwach ist. Kritik und Selbstkritik müsse auch im IMF noch besser durchgeführt werden.
 Erst durch eine gesunde Kritik und Selbstkritik könne es zu einer gesunden und ent-
 wicklungsreichen Nachrichtenarbeit kommen. Man solle den Beschlüssen des ZK der SED über
 Entwicklung von Kritik und Selbstkritik nochmals durcharbeiten. Es müsse sein
 Anstrengungen, indem er nochmals darauf aufmerksam mache, dass für alles daran sein
 müssten, die Parteilinie und die Staatsführung mit den besten Nachrichten zu
 sehen, um eben eine richtige Politik zu betreiben. Unsere Arbeit würde nicht nur
 "DDR" stärken sondern die gesamte Welt. (Lied anläßlich)

Zu Punkt 4 der Tagesordnung - Diskussion und Schlusswort.
 Die Diskussion habe ich bereits in den Tagesordnungspunkten 1 und 2 eingebaut, so
 ich hierauf nicht noch einmal eingehen brauche. Nebensächliche Diskussionen habe
 ich weggelassen.
 Micha Wolf brachte abschließend zum Ausdruck, dass er hoffe, dass auch die heutige
 Sitzung dazu beigetragen habe, die Arbeit in Zukunft zu verbessern und vor allem vor-
 zutreiben. Hauptaufgabe in den letzten Quartalswochen sei die Erfüllung des Arbeit-
 planes. Alle Möglichkeiten müssten restlos ausgenutzt werden um unsere Pläne zu
 füllen. Er stünde allen Hauptabteilungsleitern und Abteilungsleitern zur Verfügung
 um sich zeigende Schwierigkeiten operativen und formellen Charakters zu helfen.
 Die Wachsamkeit lege er allen nochmals sehr nahe.

Handwritten text, heavily obscured by noise and artifacts. The text is illegible due to the quality of the scan and the presence of a large black mark at the top center.

FROM Chief, EE

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Pictures of Mischa WOLF

REFS: A. BRLE
B. DIR

6/34

ACTION REQUIRED: Verification of Identification per Paragraph 3 below.

1. Forwarded herewith are 3 copies of a photo of picture of Mischa WOLF, which has been identified by [redacted] as a [redacted] of [redacted] representatives attending the Nuremberg trials in 1945. This picture was found by supplying a brief description of WOLF to an [redacted] in the National Archives and selected 16 pictures [redacted] which were identifiable as WOLF. These pictures were sent to [redacted] and that the attached picture is without a doubt [redacted] of the age of 22-23.

2. In addition to identifying the picture, [redacted] has following information about WOLF which may aid in identifying [redacted] fictions. The picture shows WOLF wearing his hair [redacted] longer and fuller than known to [redacted] in 1953. [redacted] states that WOLF did not always wear glasses, although [redacted] eyeglasses indicated in the picture is typical of WOLF. WOLF should be about 35 at present; height [redacted] 5'10"; [redacted] built; long face and long nose with a slight hump (nose is slightly bent) although his eyes probably from wearing glasses. Eyes, nearly dark brown. Both eyes are not exactly in line, that is, he is slightly cross-eyed, however, one does not always notice this. Dark-brown, almost black hair, with a part. His mouth is rather [redacted] not abnormal. His manner is sometimes rather casual, even aloof; he result his hair often hangs in his face and is uncombed. He speaks clearly and intelligently. [redacted] has never seen him really [redacted] although it is [redacted] opinion that he is probably more lively and energetic than indicated. He does not always exercise 100% self-control. He often left [redacted] on his desk and [redacted] room, even overnight.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-29
MAY 1962

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 2/23/95

HRP 75-1

WOLF

Robert KORB told [redacted] once, before WOLF became head of the IMF, that WOLF still had a great deal to learn, because he was too irresponsible. WOLF wears dark horn-rimmed glasses, and he was often seen by [redacted] without glasses. In general, he makes a pleasant and intelligent impression. For example, there is no comparison between WOLF and [redacted]. [redacted] believes also that he would not be brutal, but sensitive. [redacted] told [redacted] that as a result of the Nazi rise to power, [redacted] grew up with his father and went to the Soviet Union, where he received [redacted] and higher education. He is married and, according to [redacted], must have a very nice wife to whom he was quite attached. She should have two or three children. [redacted] does not know whether he was married in Germany or in the Soviet Union. According to comments which he made, he did not always enjoy his stay in the USSR. [redacted] does not know what is bothering him, but something appeared to be bothering him in this respect. [redacted] his wife's mother was imprisoned for a long time in the Soviet Union in the 1930's. WOLF's facial make-up does not appear to be totally German. It could be that he is Jewish. This is particularly evident in his brown eyes and black-brown hair, as well as his nose and mouth.

In 1953 WOLF drove a small Soviet automobile, which was probably a 1952 model.

Anton ACCONANNI told [redacted] a great deal of WOLF, and so did the Russian according to [redacted]. [redacted] HECKER told [redacted]. However, [redacted] UERICH was not in favor of his appointment as head of the IMF. [redacted] and the Russians, however, were able to overrule UERICH. He was known in the IMF as "Genosse Mische".

3. In addition to the above picture and identifying data from [redacted] we are sending two sets of 4 pictures each of other persons who, according to [redacted] are not WOLF, but also attended the Nuremberg trials. These may be used to bury WOLF's picture when testing [redacted] and [redacted] for further identification of present and past activities of WOLF.

9 April 1957

- 2 - Attachments: 1. Picture of WOLF
- 2. Sets of 4 other persons who attended Nuremberg trials.

Distribution:
 [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

[redacted]

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17 OCT 73

D Markus Johannes WOLF

6/29

Chronology

19 January 1923, Markus Johannes WOLF was born in Hechingen, Wuerttemberg. His father was Dr. (of medicine) and author Friedrich WOLF, born 23 December 1888 and died 5 October 1953 in Lehnitz, Oranienburg. Friedrich WOLF was a well known Communist and East Germany's first postwar ambassador to Poland. Markus' mother and Friedrich's second wife was Elisabeth WOLF.

June 1931, Markus WOLF and his mother moved from Hechingen, Germany to Frankfurt, Germany. Markus' mother was Elisabeth WOLF.

March 1934, Markus WOLF and his mother moved to the USSR.

1934-1935, Markus WOLF attended the Moscow School of Journalism and Propaganda. He moved from Moscow to Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, USSR.

1935-1936, Markus WOLF worked for the Communist Party of Germany in the German Democratic Republic in East Germany.

March 1937, Markus WOLF was arrested in East Germany. He was held in a prison in East Germany. Markus' mother and Friedrich's second wife was Elisabeth WOLF.

1942-1945, Markus WOLF worked for the Communist Party of Germany in East Germany. He was arrested in East Germany. Markus' mother and Friedrich's second wife was Elisabeth WOLF.



1944. WOLF married Emma, nee STENZER, in Moscow. She was born on 21 October 1923 in Munich but, like her husband, had become a Soviet citizen. Her mother was imprisoned in the USSR for a long time, but no further information is now available. Her father was a minor KPD functionary. He may well have been the Franz STENZER who appears in footnote 8, pp. 102-103 of *Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945*; Horst Duhake, Klepenheuer U. Witsch, Cologne, 1972. LEONHARD, cited above, says (p. 467) that WOLF married "Emma STENZER, the blonde, blue-eyed girl from the Comintern school . . . who had reported my remarks to the school supervisor . . ." The STENZER girl, whose father was murdered by the Nazis, used the cover name STERN at the Comintern school.

Late May 1945. WOLF and his wife arrived in Berlin. He appeared in the uniform of a Russian colonel and wore a uniform when traveling, although he usually wore civvies. They moved into an apartment at Bayernallee 44, Berlin/Charlottenburg, in the American sector and near the communist-dominated Berliner Rundfunk (radio station). They lived at this address from 23 June 1945 to 15 November 1949. They were Soviet citizens and hence were not subject to German registration laws. Neither did they need food ration cards.

19 November 1945. WOLF went to Nuremberg to serve as an assistant to Prosecutor General Roman Andreyevich RUDENKO, the chief Soviet prosecutor, and as a special reporter. He remained at Nuremberg or went there periodically until early 1946.

28 June 1946. The WOLF's first son was born in Berlin/Charlottenburg. They may have had two other children. The first son was named Michael.

Ca. 1946. LEONHARD (p. 467) wrote, "Upon my return [to Germany] I visited my former friend Mische WOLF, whom I had known in the Comintern school. He was now commentator on foreign policy for the East Berlin radio and was using the name Michael STORM. . . . Mische, who had excellent relations with the highest Soviet officials, lived in a luxurious five-room apartment in Bayernallee. . . ." By August 1947 WOLF also owned a fine villa near Lake Glienicke.

All manuscripts prepared for use by Radio Berlin had to be countersigned by WOLF. He also edited all interviews.

[]

April 1948. By this time WOLF had become a member of the SED, the East German Communist Party. In April 1948 he travelled to Poland as a member of the first delegation of East German journalists to go there. In June 1948 he was in Prague, working as a reporter.

16 October 1949 - 1952. The East German government announced the appointment of Markus WOLF as first councillor (Erste Missionrat) to the first East German mission in Moscow. His primary duties, however, were those of a cultural and press attache. During this period he was also given basic training in intelligence. While Markus was in Moscow, his father Friedrich served as the chief of the first East German mission to Poland.

August 1951. Markus WOLF returned on a visit to Berlin to attend a conference of chiefs of DDR diplomatic missions.

1952. WOLF returned from Moscow and joined the Institut fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung (IWF, Institute for Economic and Scientific Research), a cover organization for East German (and hence Soviet) espionage. It had its headquarters in East Berlin at Klosterstr. 59. In late 1952 WOLF, not yet 30 years old, succeeded Anton ACKERMANN as chief of the IWF. ACKERMANN had had a nervous breakdown. Walter ULBRICHT opposed WOLF's appointment, but the Soviets rode down ULBRICHT's objections. WOLF worked closely with Gustav SZENDA in setting up Abteilung (Section) 1 a, which had as its mission the penetration of the West German government, specifically including the police and the judiciary. At this time WOLF lived at Heinrich Mann Platz 16 (probably Prenzlauer Berg).

1953. An IWF official defected, and the IWF was disbanded. WOLF, by now a brigadier general, became chief of Department XV of the MfS (Ministry of State Security). His mission was unchanged.

1957. By this date WOLF, still chief of Department XV, was also a deputy Minister of the MfS.

December 1958. WOLF participated in a conference in Moscow, attended by Soviets and Poles.

June 1960. By this time WOLF was the chief of the HVA (Hauptverwaltung A) of the MfS. The HVA is charged with conducting foreign intelligence. With a Polish intelligence officer he discussed the organization of aid for Cuba. He also discussed, with UB staff members, operations against the Irish.

a. General population

5. The supplying of the distribution points is done in the following order:

- a. the HO
- b. the "Konsum" (consumer cooperative).
- c. private business

The wholesale trade is conducted by the DEZ Foodstuffs in accordance with directives of the Main Department for Provisioning of the State Planning Commission.

6. In spite of the strenuous efforts of and the large investment of money by the DDR government, the planned peacetime agricultural yield per hectare has not yet been reached. In 1951, 142,500,000 east marks were invested, of which 26,800,000 was spent for improvements and 32,400,000 for machine lending stations (Haf). The plan for 1952 calls for an investment of 184,300,000 east marks, of which 63,700,000 is for the construction of 25 machine lending stations. The machine lending stations are being expanded considerably. This is attributable to a dearth of draft animals and to the great strategic importance of the HAF.

7. The DDR balance sheet for supply and distribution in 1951 showing imports and home-grown foodstuffs is as follows. The amounts are in tons.

Product	Home-grown	Imported	Total 1951
Meat	582,600	79,500	662,100
Fish	84,200	62,000	146,200
Animal fats	48,700	36,200	84,900
Butter	76,600	32,300	108,900
Oil	54,200	16,200	70,400
Flour	1,246,100	346,000	1,592,100
Sugar	807,800	-	807,800
Potatoes	4,726,300	86,500	4,812,800

8. The following is the 1955 plan for foodstuffs in the DDR according to records of the State Planning Commission. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Product	Production	Import	Total
Meat	924	26	950
Fish	212	74	286
Animal fats	245	-	245
Butter	100	28	128
Oil	88	17	105
Flour	1,900	-	1,900
Sugar	888	-	888
Potatoes	17,000	-	17,000

In 1951, foodstuffs were imported in part from the free world, but by 1953-1954 it is expected to import such items only from the East Bloc states.

9. The total supply of foodstuffs consists of inventories at the beginning of the year in processing plants, enterprises, and dealers' stocks, and also of production and imports. The distribution of the total supply is made in accordance with a priority schedule set up by the SED economic planning commission in early 1949. Since the middle of 1951, this distribution of the state reserve (called the plan reserve in official terminology) has assumed greater importance.

The priority schedule is as follows:

- a. Quota bearers (Kontingenträger)
 - b. Reparations
 - c. GSOV
 - d. Export
 - e. Plan reserve
 - f. Material reserve
- c. Inventory 31 December 1951

10. In 1951, the foodstuffs were distributed to the "quota bearers" - that is, the DDR population, as follows. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Meat	434.6
Fish	103.9
Animal fats	60.8
Butter	72.4
Oil	39.6
Flour	1,080.9
Sugar	423.9
Potatoes	3,413.2

True distribution figures cannot be arrived at from these amounts because the differentiation in the distribution to the population is too great. There are three groups supplied in the DDR: party and government functionaries, the RO, the FAD and VEB plant cafeterias, and the normal working section of the population. Moreover substitutes are supplied to the third category in place of the meat and fat rations found on the ration cards.

11. In 1951, the foodstuffs were exported and delivered as reparations as follows (The amounts are in thousands of tons):

Product	Export	Reparations	Total
Meat	3.8	-	3.8
Fish	2.4	-	2.4
Animal fats	-	-	-
Butter	-	-	-
Flour	62.4	-	62.4
Sugar	104.3	82.7	187.0
Potatoes	426.3	134.2	560.5

The amounts under sugar reparations were not sent to the USSR but were used by the Russians in barter dealings with the West. The potatoes delivered as exports and reparations were mostly seed potatoes or were used to make up for poor harvests (in this case Poland).

12. In 1951, the foodstuffs were delivered to the Russian army as follows. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Meat	96.7
Fish	18.6
Animal fats	8.6
Butter	28.4
Oil	3.1
Flour	275.2
Sugar	76.4
Potatoes	604.5

13. If part of the foodstuffs delivered to the Russian army in the Russian Zone exceed the requirements of the several troop units, it is sold to regional Russian zone authorities, or sales cooperatives (Konsum and HC). Other foods or consumer goods are purchased with the proceeds. The deliveries to the GSOV are credited as occupation costs.

14. Material reserves in the Russian Zone refer to those foodstuffs which are stored for further processing. As of the end of 1951 the material reserves in the plants were on hand in the following amounts. The amounts are in thousands of tons.

Meat	22.5	
Fish	-	
Animal fats	2.4	
Butter	-	
Oil	7.4	
Flour	46.2	
Sugar	35.7	
Potatoes	158.7	(mainly for processing into potato starches and dried potatoes)

15. The state reserve of foodstuffs, officially designated the plan-reserve, is subordinate to the DDR cabinet and the GCO. Some state reserve depots are under the People's Police. The state reserves can only be used by permission of the DDR cabinet, the GCO, or the People's Police.

16. The can containers necessary for the storing of foodstuffs are given production priority. The iron industry must give priority to the rolling of the needed strips and sheets. The following allocation of the sheet for tin can production was made in 1951. The amounts are in tons.

State reserve	7,240
Reparations	1,950
Civilian requirement	1,080
Export	2,160
Total	12,430

A total production of 18,700 tons is planned for 1952.

SAG Thale/Harz, the VEB Kaltwalzwerk Bad Salzungen, and the VEB Kaltwalzwerk Oranienburg are producing the sheet for the most part.

17. In 1951, the following foodstuffs were stored in the state reserve. The amounts are in tons.

Meat	108.5
Fish	22.0
Animal fats	11.0
Butter	8.2
Oil	18.6
Flour	203.5
Sugar	115.0

In addition 8,500 tons of dried potatoes were stored.

18. The following is a list of the principal state reserve storage depots.

Place	Product Stored	First Quarter 1952, Amounts in Tons	Maximum Capacity in Tons
Eastock-Marlenehe	Fish, canned	4,250	6,700
Erstfeld-ibranco	Grain	18,700	40 -43,000
Sasquitz-Lanoken	Fish, canned	8,700	11,300
Lauterbach on Rügen	Fish, canned	13,200	15 -18,000
Nürzen/Saxony	Flour	32,650	40,000
Trietschmühle			
Oschata/Saxony, right by Southern Railroad	Butter	1,760	4 - 5,000
Line Nürzen-Müsa	Flour	19,700	4 -21,000
Dresden, Harbor basin SSW	Meat	6,400	7 - 7,500
from Wettinerstr. railroad station	Fats	2,135	3,650
Hagelburg, Lieb- fnechtstr.	Fats and oils	7,630	11 -13,000
Burg, northwest of the railroad station near the Thielinsel	Butter and other Fats	2,840	4 - 6,000
Applau/Neckburg	Sugar	7,360	12,000
Mutakusterstr.			
Waltow/Brandenburg	Dried potatoes	8,500	
Berlinerstrasse			
Gotha/Thuringia	Oil and animal fats	4,520	6,300
Parlstrasse			
Noehlen/Saxony	Sugar	21,600	25 -26,000
Zuckerfabrikstr.			
Chernitz, Alt Chernitzerstr.	Butter	3,725	5,800
Lins/Saxony			
Ancheraleben- Bif. Nord	Meat	24,250	30 -32,000
Riesa/Saxony	Meat	17,300	30,000
Eastock, Worfstr.	Oil and animal fats	15,200	19 -21,000
Dessau, August-Bebel- Strasse	Butter	2,870	5,500
Genthin/Saxony-Anhalt	Sugar	42,700	50,000
Dresden-Stockyard	Sugar	20,360	26,400
Ostberlin, Bahala	Meat	21,200	40 -45,000
Osthafen, near the Harschauer Brücke	Grain	14,200	20 -25,000
Zwickau-Eckersbach	Meat		
Leipzig-William	Meat	6,240	6,500 - 7,000
Ostberlin	Meat	8,530	11 -14,000
Slaughterhouse			
Erfurt-railroad station area	Meat	7,200	9 -10,000
Halle-Trotha	Meat		
Halle/Saxony- Anhalt	Meat	8,560	10 -11,000
Prottewitz near Liebenwerda	Sugar	11,750	14,600
Halle, Raffinerie- strasse	Sugar	2,760	3,200
Hagelburg-Sudenburg	Sugar	4,200	5 - 7,000
Zeitz/Saxony- Anhalt	Sugar	7,460	9 -11,000
Wesitz/Thuringia	Sugar	5,240	8 -10,000
	Sugar	2,830	10 -11,000
	Sugar	4,500	4,600

19. The following is a list of newly constructed cold storage plants.

Berlin, slaughterhouse	2,300 ton capacity for meat
Frankfurt/Oder freight station area	4,000 ton capacity for meat and fat
Dresden-Trachau	3,150 ton capacity for butter, fats, meat, and eggs

Prenslam at the corner of 109
and 198 streets

2,600 ton capacity for meat
and fats

These cold storage plants are for the use of the People's Police exclusively
and are managed by it.

20. The following are 1951 balance sheets for supply and distribution. The
amounts are in thousands of tons.

a. Supply of Meat		
Inventory 1 January 1951		12.4
Production		582.6
Import from USSR	46.4	
elsewhere	33.1	
		<u>79.5</u>
		674.5

Distribution of Meat		
Quota bearers	434.6	
Reparations	-	
GSOV	96.7	
Export	3.8	
Plan reserve	108.5	
Material reserve	22.5	
Inventory 31 December 1951	8.4	
		<u>674.5</u>

b. Supply of Fish		
Inventory 1 January 1951	6.8	
Production	84.2	
Import from USSR	8.8	
elsewhere	53.2	
		<u>62.0</u>
		153.0

Distribution of Fish		
Quota bearers	103.9	
Reparations	-	
GSOV	18.6	
Export	2.4	
Plan reserve	22.0	
Material reserve	-	
Inventory 31 December 1951	6.1	
		<u>153.0</u>

c. Supply of Animal Fats		
Inventory 1 January 1951	3.5	
Production	48.7	
Import from USSR	24.1	
elsewhere	22.1	
		<u>36.2</u>
		88.4

Distribution of Animal Fats		
Quota bearers	60.8	
Reparations	-	
GSOV	8.6	
Export	-	
Plan reserve	11.0	
Material reserve	2.4	
Inventory 31 December 1951	1.6	
		<u>88.4</u>

d. Supply of Butter		
Inventory 1 January 1951	4.6	
Production	76.6	
Import from USSR	26.1	
elsewhere	6.2	
		<u>32.3</u>
		113.5

IV-10: (Continued)

- 7 -

Distribution of Butter.		
Quota bearers		72.4
Reparations		-
GSOV		28.4
Export		-
Plan reserve		8.2
Material reserve		-
Inventory 31 December 1951		<u>7.5</u>
		113.5
e. Supply of Oil		
Inventory 1 January 1951		5.1
Production		54.2
Import from USSR	12.7	
elsewhere	<u>3.5</u>	
		<u>16.2</u>
		75.5
Distribution of Oil		
Quota bearers		39.6
Reparations		-
GSOV		311
Export		-
Plan reserve		18.6
Material reserve		7.4
Inventory 31 December 1951		<u>6.8</u>
		75.5
f. Supply of Flour		
Inventory 1 January 1951		183.5
Production		1,246.1
Import from USSR	297.5	
elsewhere	<u>48.5</u>	
		<u>346.0</u>
		1,775.6
Distribution of Flour		
Quota bearers		1,080.9
Reparations		-
GSOV		275.2
Export		62.4
Plan reserve		203.5
Material reserve		46.2
Inventory 31 December 1951		<u>107.4</u>
		1,775.6
g. Supply of Sugar		
Inventory 1 January 1951		112.4
Production		807.8
Import		-
		<u>920.2</u>
Distribution of Sugar		
Quota bearers		423.9
Reparations		82.7
GSOV		76.4
Export		104.3
Plan reserve		115.0
Material reserve		35.7
Inventory 31 December 1951		<u>82.2</u>
		920.2
h. Supply of Potatoes		
Inventory 1 January 1951		107.5
Production		4,726.3
Import from USSR		-
elsewhere	86.5	
		<u>86.5</u>
		4,920.3

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Distribution of Potatoes	
Quota bearers	3,417.2
Reparations	134.2
GSOV	604.5
Export	426.3
Plan reserve	
Material reserve	158.7
Inventory 31 December 1951	<u>183.4</u>
	4,920.3

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7/13

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT
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REPORT NO. SC
CD NO.

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COUNTRY East Germany

DATE DISTR. 5 December 1952

SUBJECT 1. SED Proposal of Restrictions on Escape from East Germany This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. Plants Guards

NO. OF PAGES 1

DATE OF INFO. 1 to 27 September

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany, Berlin

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY CREDIBLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAMILY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE A minor official of the SED, most frequently employed as a courier.

- At a 27 September 1952 meeting of the German Socialist Unity Party (SED), in East Berlin, a bill about the introduction of capital punishment for those who attempt to escape from East Germany, was discussed. This bill, if passed, will bear the name Republik-Flucht-Gesetz (law concerning flight from the Republic).
- On 1 September 1952, two new guard organizations were established in all of East Germany. In cities, towns, and villages, an Objektschutz (plant guard) has been organized to guard plants, public buildings, etc., and in the country the Flurerschutz (field guard) has been set up to guard agricultural equipment. Participation in the organizations is compulsory and there is no salary. In the plants, all personnel are organized, after the Soviet pattern, into "workers' defense forces", and must guard the plants day and night. In the country, the farmers are organized in a similar way by the village mayors.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 50

CD NO.

COUNTRY East Germany

DATE DISTR. 10 December 1952

SUBJECT Establishment of Farm Cooperatives

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany, East
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NO. OF ENCLS. (Listed below)

DATE OF INFO. 9 August 1952

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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- At a conference of chief editors held in the office of the Central Committee of the G.D on 7 August 1952 Albert Schaefer, a member of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee, stated that more than 100 cooperative farms had been established and that several hundred organizational committees were working on the establishment of more such farms. Schaefer said that many of the people still believe that there is a difference between these cooperative farms and the collectivization of farming. This opinion must not be attacked in the East German press. However, the party must be aware that this opinion is erroneous and that the same development is now taking place in East Germany that took place in the U.S.S.R. in 1927. According to Schaefer, the only difference between conditions which existed in the U.S.S.R. in 1927 and those prevailing now in East Germany lies in the fact that farmland in the U.S.S.R. was nationalized prior to collectivization whereas in Germany it will be nationalized only in the normal course of the collectivization. In this connection Schaefer denounced Slansky who had stressed the national form of farm cooperatives which had been organized in Czechoslovakia.
- In addition, Schaefer made the following statements:
Meetings, which envisage the establishment of farm cooperatives, must be approved by the Kreisrat, which will screen the members of the founding committee. Access to these meetings will be only by invitation. In several cases, expropriated farmers of large estates tried to become members of the executive board of farm cooperatives. No farmers of large estates or innkeepers must be admitted to meetings held in connection with the organization of farm cooperatives even though they be members of the SED. All the members of farm cooperatives will have the same standing. The wives of the farmers must also acquire membership. There will be no hired farm hands in the cooperatives. Former farm workers, who became cooperative farmers, ceased to be members of the Union of Farm Workers within the FDGB. The former property of farmers, who were expropriated in the border zone for political reasons, became state property. Farm workers, who were put on these farms, had to turn over their property to the farm cooperatives except for some livestock. Taking workers previously employed by farmers of large estates members of farm cooperatives represents political progress and a set-back for capitalism in the country. On the other hand, farm

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hands of nationalized estates must not become cooperative farmers, as this would mean a step in the wrong direction. The shortage of labor in the country must not be discussed in the press, as this is an argument put forth by the enemies of the working class. By a mechanization of farming methods, it will become possible to release even more farm workers for industrial production.

3. SED cadres will have to be formed in farm cooperatives. However, they should become active only after a certain stabilisation period. Committees of women are also to be organized. They should assume their activities without delay, as clergymen oppose the farm cooperatives from their pulpits and try to influence the farmers' wives especially.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 7/13
 INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY: East Germany
 SUBJECT: SED, Deutsche Demokratische Republik
 DATE OF INFO: 10 February 1953
 PLACE ACQUIRED: Germany, East

REPORT NO.: CS
 DATE DISTR.: 4 March 1953
 NO. OF PAGES: 1
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BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Unidentified source (F); supposedly based on a copy of the directive.
 Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. The Politburo of the SED issued a directive to the East German press on 10 February 1953, giving the following instructions:
 - a. Refugees fleeing from East Germany are to be described as "fugitives from the Republic (republikfluchtige)". Only in exceptional cases is the term "deserter (Ueberlfluer)" to be applied.
 - b. Propaganda for the return of the refugees is to be increased.
 - c. Particular emphasis is to be placed on the danger facing young male refugees that upon their arrival in the West they may be shanghaied by the French Foreign Legion.
2. The directive declared that the fact that every such person returning to East Germany is immediately arrested and confined for a period varying from two weeks to three months must be kept quiet. This imprisonment is considered to be for "re-educational purposes", while allowing sufficient time for an investigation of the person's activities during his stay in the West. In case of acquittal, the confinement is to be regarded as a police punishment for failure to register the change of address with the local police.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
24 November 1956

250

TO : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Soviet Interference with Berlin Rail Access

The Soviet commander at the East German check point at Marienborn has informed the British that Soviet authorities intend to start exercising their "right" to board Allied trains running between Berlin and West Germany on the night of 25-26 November. Another threat to start boarding trains on the night of 23-24 November apparently was not carried out.

Colonel Kotsiuba, the Soviet acting commandant in Berlin, asserted on 22 November it would be necessary for Soviet authorities to board trains in order to inspect passengers' documentation. He also asserted the Soviet right to pass judgment on whether specific individuals should be authorized to travel under orders issued by Allied authorities. These are the two major points of Soviet-Allied disagreement.

Allied officials in Bonn decided on 24 November to send a further protest to Colonel Kotsiuba, stating that Allied train commanders would not permit Soviet authorities to board the trains. On 24 November the Allied ambassadors agreed that trains should turn back rather than permit Soviet authorities to board them or take off passengers.

Soviet authorities appear to be testing Allied reaction to pressure, and may impose further restrictions on surface travel if successful at this. They claim that persons have been traveling on military trains, and under military orders on the autobahn, who are unauthorized because they are not directly connected with the military garrison in Berlin, while the Allies claim the sole authority to decide who has such travel rights.

If the Soviet authorities do not yield and the Allies are forced to send trains back to prevent their being boarded, the Allies might find themselves maneuvered into becoming the victims of a self-imposed partial blockade of Berlin.



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