

THE SOLDIER-STATESMAN IN THE SECRET WORLD

George C. Marshall and Intelligence in War and Peace

DAVID ROBARGE

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GEORGE C. MARSHALL AND INTELLIGENCE IN WAR AND PEACE

DAVID ROBARGE

Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
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Introduction

In July 1918, George Catlett Marshall—the future Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of State and Defense—was a 37-year-old brevet[1] lieutenant colonel (his regular rank was captain) serving in France with the 1st Army Division of the American Expeditionary Force under the command of Gen. John J. Pershing. He had been there for just over a year, and in late May his unit had seized and held the village of Cantigny, the westernmost point of the German front line during the war. Marshall had helped plan that action, and it furthered his ambition to lead troops in combat. He requested a battlefield command but instead received orders to leave the 1st Division and report to the Operations Section at Pershing's headquarters. Although he had used tactical information from reconnaissance patrols and prisoner interrogations to prepare the attack at Cantigny, he had not been involved with intelligence in his previous Army assignments since he had been commissioned nearly 20 years before, nor had he dealt with a command-level intelligence operation until then. In a memorandum to the head of Army intelligence in February 1942, he described that first encounter with the research and analysis element of Pershing's intelligence staff, which was sophisticated for its time.

> *I was called away from the First Division to GHQ [General Headquarters] in July 1918 and given the task the night of my arrival to work out a plan for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. The following morning at 8:00 o'clock, I was taken through the G-2 [General Staff intelligence] Section by [Brigadier] General*

1. A brevet is a commission giving a military officer higher nominal rank than that for which pay is received.

[Dennis] Nolan and Colonel [Arthur] Conger [two of Pershing's senior intelligence officers] personally. They had maps and data stacked on shelves to the ceiling, so much in detail, such as plan directeur maps on a large scale, that as a result they gave me nothing, and I left the Section after a two-hour visit without any specific data on which to base a plan. I therefore left Chaumont and visited the headquarters of the 2nd and 8th French Armies and from them obtained the data on which my work was based.

The following winter I was relieved from duty as Chief of Staff of an Army Corps and drawn into GHQ and that evening given a job of preparing plans for the further advance of our 3rd Army into Germany because of the failure of the Germans to carry out the Armistice terms imposed at Spa [Belgium]. Again I visited the G-2 Section the following morning at 8:00 o'clock, this time in company with Colonel Conger only. Again I found a mass of material and again I left that Section with nothing but a pre-war Baedeker on which I did my planning.[2]

* * *

Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff during 1939–45 and Secretary of State and Defense during 1947–49 and 1950–51, respectively, is best known as the Allies' "true organizer of victory" during World War II[3] and steward of the economic recovery program named after him—the Marshall Plan—that helped stave off communist-incited instability in postwar Western Europe as it started to rebuild from wartime

2. Marshall memo to Maj. Gen. George Strong, 22 February 1942, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, ed. Larry I. Bland et al., 7 vols. (The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981–2016; hereafter *PGCM*), https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-strong-5/. (Citations with URLs refer to the on-line versions of the published Marshall Papers; citations with volume and page numbers refer to the hardcopy editions.) Marshall also recounted this incident in his *Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917–18* (Houghton Mifflin, 1976), https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCM_Memoirs_WWI.pdf. Marshall wrote it during 1919–23 but left it unpublished. A relative found a copy in 1940, and it was printed 36 years later. Ibid., vi.

3. Winston Churchill's accolade given in a message to Field Marshall Henry Wilson on 30 March 1945 after Allied forces crossed the Rhine River: "Pray further give him my warmest congratulations on the magnificent fighting and conduct of the American and Allied armies under General Eisenhower, and say what a joy it must be to him to see how the armies he called into being by his own genius have won immortal renown. He is the true 'organizer of victory.'" *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol05.pdf, 3. In the fourth installment of his multivolume history of World War II, Churchill added to the encomium by calling Marshall "a magnificent organizer and builder of armies—the American Carnot." Lazare Carnot was the Minister of War under Napoleon, who dubbed him "the organizer of victory." Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 813.

destruction. Marshall's illustrious reputation as one of America's greatest 20th-century leaders rests almost entirely on his achievements in wartime and the immediate postwar cold peace.

In contrast to that familiar heroic narrative, an examination of Marshall's far less-well-known engagement with the world of intelligence during those years reveals a significantly more complicated picture. The episode he described above was the only noteworthy experience he had had with intelligence before he was assigned to lead the US Army into global war. That previous unfamiliarity notwithstanding, a thorough review of the resources at the George Marshall Research Library,[4] official records, and a large body of primary and secondary sources reveals that between 1939 and 1951, Marshall was much more involved in intelligence affairs than has been indicated in the extensive literature about his role in World War II, his diplomatic mission to China, and his service as head of the State and Defense Departments. His sterling reputation as a "soldier-statesman" and "the military equivalent of a corporate manager"[5] is well deserved, but his record as an "organizer of intelligence" during World War II is much more nuanced and has only been superficially examined up to now. The same observation applies to his postwar activities in China and at the Departments of State and Defense, where he grappled with difficult issues concerning intelligence capabilities and authorities, security matters, and political and bureaucratic conflicts that have not gotten the full attention they deserve. Although Marshall's engagement with intelligence dates to as long ago as eight-plus decades, the interagency rivalries, conflicts of authority, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and security concerns he encountered then persist today in the US Intelligence Community. How he approached these issues can provide insights for current intelligence leaders and practitioners as they confront those historically enduring problems.

4. The Library's website is https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/, which serves as a portal to a vast amount of archival and published research material.

5. Mark A. Stoler, "The Marshall Legacy," in *George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation*, ed. Charles F. Brower (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 194.

Chapter 1: Managing Wartime Military Intelligence

Figure 1: Gen. John Pershing and Lt. Col. George Marshall in France, 1919. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Born in 1880 in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, George C. Marshall graduated from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1901 and received a commission as a second lieutenant of infantry in 1902. In the decades after, he served stateside and overseas in positions of increasing rank and responsibility that entailed mobilizing and training combat units and planning their operations. During World War I in France, serving under Gen. John J. Pershing, Marshall "had solidly built his career and his reputation as a staff officer," his official biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, wrote. "In both tactics and logistics—in the planning of battle and in the organization and maintenance of large bodies of troops—he had developed a competence probably unexcelled by any

other officer of his age in the Army."[1] As an aide-de-camp to Pershing in 1919–24 (Pershing became Army Chief of Staff in 1921), Marshall worked in a number of positions that involved training and teaching modern mechanized warfare. After a three-year tour in China, he was assigned as Assistant Commander of the Army's Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1927, where he modernized command and staff processes in ways that proved beneficial in World War II. The cadre of some 200 officers who attended during his tenure or taught under his direction became known as "Marshall Men" in their future leadership positions.

In the early 1930s, Marshall commanded various infantry, National Guard, and Civilian Conservation Corps units in different regions of the United States. Following his promotion to Brigadier General in 1936, he was assigned to the War Plans Division on the War Department staff and later became the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff and then Chief of Staff in 1939. President Franklin Roosevelt's personal choice for that position, he was sworn in on 1 September, the same day that World War II began in Europe. As Chief of Staff, Marshall organized the largest military expansion in US history—from around 175,000 soldiers and airmen in 1939 to over eight million by 1945—and coordinated Allied army operations in Europe and the Pacific until the end of the war. Along the way, *Time* named him its "Man of the Year" for 1943, and he was promoted to the new five-star rank of General of the Army in 1944.[2]

Much Work Ahead at G-2

When the 59-year-old Marshall became the Army's top officer just as World War II started, he was an intelligence neophyte. One of his biographers, Mark Stoler, observed that when he became Chief of Staff,

1. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939* (Viking, 1963), 189. See also Mark Grotelueschen and Derek Varble, "Colonel George C. Marshall," in *Pershing's Lieutenants: American Military Leadership in World War I*, ed. David T. Zabecki and Douglas V. Mastriano (Osprey Publishing, 2020), 113–26.

2. Marshall appeared on the cover of *Time* five other times: in 1940 after he was named Chief of Staff, in 1942 in recognition of his wartime leadership to that point, in 1946 during his mission to China, in 1947 after his appointment as Secretary of State, and in 1948 for being the architect of the Marshall Plan (his second "Man of the Year" honor).



Figure 2: Marshall as Army Chief of Staff, September 1939. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

he "had little if any background in strategic planning, the uses of airpower, the nuances of presidential and Congressional relationships, or international relations."[3] Intelligence could be added to that list.

The first place to begin in assessing Marshall's engagement with intelligence is where he exercised the greatest span of control, his own intelligence apparatus—G-2, comprising the Military Intelligence Division (MID), the Military Attache Section, the Corps of Military Police (renamed the Counterintelligence Corps, CIC), and, later, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS). Three perspectives on Marshall's overall approach to management—two from scholars and one from himself—can serve as a backdrop for examining how he approached G-2. Stoler has written that before becoming Chief of Staff, Marshall "exhibited brilliance as a modern, professional staff officer . . . in his

3. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Twayne, 1989), 66; John Patrick Finnegan, *Military Intelligence* (Army Center of Military History, 1998), 32–38; Marc B. Powe and Edward E. Wilson, *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence* (US Army Intelligence Center and School, 1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/evolution.pdf, 23–28. Useful general assessments of Marshall's leadership skills, which do not touch on intelligence, are Jack Uldrich, *Soldier, Statesman, Peacemaker: Leadership Lessons from George C. Marshall* (American Management Association, 2005); and Andrew Roberts, *Leadership in War: Essential Lessons from Those Who Made History* (Viking, 2019), chapter 6.

ability to plan for, understand, move, control, and supply very large bodies of troops within the new general staffs that had emerged to do just that."[4] As Chief of Staff, Marshall "valued teamwork, responsiveness, efficiency, and initiative" and "wanted a command and staff structure that centralized decisionmaking at the top and decentralized the execution of policy to subordinates," according to a recent biography of Walter Bedell Smith, one of his senior lieutenants.[5] Speaking to an audience of Veterans of Foreign Wars members in 1940, Marshall observed that

> *the flag-waving days of warfare are gone. The successful Army of today is composed of specialists, thoroughly trained in every detail of military science, and above all, organized into a perfect team. Today, it is imperative that cold factual analysis prevail over enthusiastic emotional outbursts. Sentiment must submit to common sense.*[6]

In various ways, Marshall tried to apply those principles to Army intelligence, but overall he was less proficient in managing that domain than any other area of responsibility he had as Chief of Staff. Compared to the intense scrutiny he gave to other aspects of the Army's wartime mobilization that he had substantial experience in, such as supply, transportation, and training, Marshall's neglect in addressing the shortcomings of G-2 stands out. Ironically, he made more progress in promoting intelligence collaboration with the Navy—the Army's longtime inter-service rival—than in running the component over which he had direct authority.

When Marshall inherited G-2, it was, in the damning recollection of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower in 1948, in a parlous state:

> *Within the War Department, a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning existed in the field of intelligence. The fault was partly within and partly without the Army. The American public has always viewed with repugnance everything that*

4. Stoler, "Marshall Legacy," 194.

5. D.K.R. Crosswell, *Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith* (University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 205.

6. "Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars," Akron, Ohio, 19 June 1940, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-to-the-veterans-of-foreign-wars/.

> *smacks of the spy: during the years between the two World Wars, no funds were provided with which to establish the basic requirement of an intelligence system—a far-flung organization of fact finders.*

Eisenhower enumerated the problems he saw plaguing Army intelligence at the time: overreliance on attaches for foreign intelligence (" . . . estimable, socially acceptable gentlemen; few knew the essentials of intelligence work"); G-2's personnel policies (" . . . the situation was not helped by the custom of making long service as a military attache, rather than ability, the essential qualification" to be appointed as G-2's chief); the shortage of intelligence officers ("we had few men capable of analyzing intelligently such information as did come to the notice of the War Department"); inadequate training in the service schools ("the broader phases of the work [of intelligence] were almost completely ignored"); and, lastly, G-2's own ineptitude ("initially the Intelligence Division could not even develop a clear plan for its own organization . . . [its chief] could do little more than come to the planning and operating sections of the staff and in a rather pitiful way ask if there was anything he could do for us").[7]

Then-Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley echoed Eisenhower's observations in his 1951 memoir:

> *The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings. For too many years in the preparation of officers for command assignments, we had overlooked the need for specialization in such activities as intelligence. . . . Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties, and in some stations G-2 became the dumping ground for officers ill-suited to line command. I recall how scrupulously I avoided the branding that came with an intelligence assignment in my own career. Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Army would have been pressed.*[8]

7. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Doubleday, 1948), 32.

8. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (Henry Holt, 1951), 33. A good brief description of G-2's prewar condition is in Finnegan, 42–46.

From an insider's perspective, Alfred McCormack, a civilian lawyer who served during the war as Deputy Chief of a cryptanalytic unit in G-2, had similar criticisms of the component's leadership:

> *One of the bothersome characteristics of G-2 was a certain supine attitude toward intelligence. Everyone knew the classical Army doctrine that the three steps in intelligence are collecting, evaluating, and disseminating, but nobody seemed to give much thought to the fact that evaluation and dissemination are worthless if what is collected is worthless. The attitude was in part a reflection of the viewpoint of the G-2 colonels, who regarded it as their function to make predictions. They operated in the manner of soothsayers. They showed no indication that their information might be inadequate. They seemed to think that they already knew enough to answer whatever questions might be put to them concerning the enemy countries.*
>
> *In the upper echelons of G-2, there were some able officers, but most of the regular ones knew that their futures depended on their getting assignments in the field, and of those who were willing to remain, because they realize the importance of good intelligence work, many became discouraged and obtained overseas jobs. Their replacements were often men with no better qualifications than that their shoulder insignia fitted the job; and thus from 1942 to 1944 a law of natural selection worked against G-2 adversely.*[9]

In large measure, G-2's sorry condition can be attributed to the historical connection in the United States between active warfare and regard for intelligence. During hostilities, intelligence gradually became more important; when the guns fell silent, interest and resources went elsewhere. The Army had not been in combat for 20 years when Marshall became Chief of Staff, and in previous conflicts, his predecessors had not given much thought to the intelligence elements they commanded. Marshall initially was no different, but the exigencies of

9. "War Experience of Alfred McCormack," Special Research History (SRH) 185, 6, 16. The SRHs are a large and valuable collection of previously classified histories that various US Military organizations prepared soon after World War II. Searchable PDFs of almost all of them are available at the website https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1jQ64F-fsqBCZDV6_ErtQ4zCiVqw_VXWy. Many have been excerpted in *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History*, eds. James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan (Army Center of Military History, 1993).

global war forced him to give intelligence at least a partial portion of his much-divided attention.

In his first years as Chief of Staff, Marshall generally recognized that G-2 had serious problems. He said in a 1956 interview that he should have made necessary changes because he was dissatisfied with how it functioned but "didn't know enough about where they were wrong to relieve them." In 1940 he told G-2's chief, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, that he was "not intimately familiar with your set-up" and thought about replacing Miles several months before Pearl Harbor but did not do so.[10] Marshall subsequently wrote to Miles several times about taskings, minor administrative matters, and officers' deployments but did not provide strategic guidance to G-2.[11] In July 1941, Miles expressed to Marshall his concern that President Roosevelt and the Secretaries of War and the Navy were seeing so little intelligence production that they had scant reason to concern themselves with what G-2 and its Navy counterpart, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), were doing; Marshall's response to this serious shortfall is not documented.[12] Miles recalled that aside from communications intelligence (COMINT), Marshall did not take much interest in G-2's work. "He assumed it was going all right, I suppose. . . . intelligence wasn't his game . . . I don't remember that he gave me any particular instructions . . . . he perhaps cared less about military intelligence, certainly, than operations or personnel or supply—he sort of took it for granted. . . . I used to wish that he cared more."[13] Marshall had replaced G-2's head four times by 1944—Col. E. R. Warner McCabe preceded Miles, and Brig. Gen. Raymond Lee, Maj. Gen. George Strong, and Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell followed him—but none of them were intelligence specialists, and those changes did not lead to Marshall's greater substantive engagement with the unit's work. Most

10. Marshall memo to Miles, 14 May 1940, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-miles-g-2/; Forrest C. Pogue, *George Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* (Viking, 1966), 200–201.

11. See references to their correspondence in *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol02.pdf.

12. Miles memo to Marshall, "Appreciation of Military and Naval Intelligence," 2 July 1941, in G-2 Historical Branch, "Materials on the History of Military Intelligence, 1885–1944," 20 January 1944, copy in author's possession.

13. Pogue interview with Miles, 6 October 1959, transcript from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

of his documented interactions with his intelligence chiefs concerned ad hoc developments and managerial problems, but he did not provide high-level direction. Marshall was known for his hands-off approach to management, allowing his deputies to run their components without interference as long as he thought they did their jobs well. However, his overall dissatisfaction with G-2's performance and his admitted inability to address it satisfactorily require other explanations, which are addressed in this study after Marshall's record is laid out.

Administrative Changes With Varied Results

Marshall took two early positive steps to augment the Army's intelligence collection capabilities after Germany invaded Poland in September 1939. First, he directed that the chiefs of all the arms divisions (infantry, cavalry, field artillery, coastal artillery, engineers, and signals), the Command and General Staff School, and the War College intensify their observation of the activities of the Allied and Axis belligerents.

> *It appears that we should start at once to examine into the details of the tactics and techniques of the arms as employed by the belligerents. To do this, we should send to our military Attaches, or with missions which we may send, a list of specific questions regarding which we desire detailed information.*

The intelligence collected from those taskings went to G-2, which relayed it to the appropriate Army components. Officers returning from missions abroad filed supplementary reports to Marshall on topics he was interested in. As necessary, he passed on some of this intelligence to his subordinates for action.[14]

Second, on the recommendation of George Strong, then a Brigadier General and senior officer in the War Plans Division, Marshall in mid-September 1939 directed the expansion of the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), which intercepted and decrypted foreign radio and telegraphic messages. He told Maj. Gen. Joseph Mauborgne, the

14. Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Department of the Army Historical Division, 1950), 47, quoting Marshall memo to G-2, 7 September 1939.

Figure 3: The War Department General Staff, November 1941. Left to Right: Brig. Gen. Leonard Gerow, War Plans; Brig. Gen. Raymond Wheeler, Supply; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Intelligence; Maj. Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, Air Corps; Marshall; Brig. Gen. Wade Haislip, Personnel; Brig. Gen. Harry Twaddle, Operations and Training; Maj. Gen. William Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

head of the Signal Corps where SIS was located bureaucratically, to outline a program to augment the service's personnel, equipment, and facilities. Mauborgne executed Marshall's order expeditiously. Within weeks, he added 26 civilians and eight recalled reservists to work against German, Italian, Japanese, and Mexican cryptosystems and ordered that an abandoned hospital building at Fort Hunt, Virginia, be converted into a COMINT monitoring station.[15] As will be seen, Marshall took more interest in COMINT—particularly its security—than any other aspect of military intelligence.

Less productively, Marshall's shakeup of what he considered the Army's antiquated and inefficient staff system in early March 1942 did not help the intelligence process. He started from the perception that the staff had "lost track of its purpose or existence. It had become a huge, bureaucratic, red-tape-ridden operating agency. It slowed

15. David Alvarez, *Secret Messages: Codebreaking and American Diplomacy, 1930–1945* (University Press of Kansas, 2000), 59–60.

everything down."[16] "We must fight the fact that the War Department is a poor command post," he told his staff two days after the Pearl Harbor attack. To streamline the Army's management, reduce the number of direct reports—Marshall alone had over 60—tighten the chain of command, and break up the arms divisions' fiefdoms, he divided the Army into Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Services of Supply (renamed the Service Forces in 1943) and replaced the War Plans Division with the Operations Division (G-3). The reorganization also removed the secretary of war as the president's adviser on military strategy, reserving that role for the Army chief of staff—potentially a major source of contention between Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, but their close working relationship prevented a falling out over the matter. Such a massive overhaul while a world war was under way against much better-armed and battle-tested enemies was daring and unprecedented. However, Marshall recognized that Great Britain surpassed the United States in wartime administration and that shaking up the Army bureaucracy was vital to efficiently prosecuting the war effort. In Senate testimony on 6 March 1942, Marshall's Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Joseph McNarney, explained why the changes were needed:

> *The War Department General Staff must be a planning and policymaking Staff. Rather, it must not operate and be bothered by minor details. This reorganization, the basic purpose of this reorganization, is to effect that very thing, by creating three large commands with responsible commanders to which administration and other decisions will be delegated.*

Marshall approved the reorganization plan on 31 January 1942, and a presidential executive order of 28 February put it into effect on 9 March. The reorganization was "the most drastic and fundamental change which the War Department had experienced since the establishment of the General Staff by [Secretary of War] Elihu Root in 1903," according to the definitive account of the War Department's bureaucracy.[17]

16. Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 289.

17. Otto L. Nelson Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 335, 348–50; see 371–89 for the internal implementation memorandum and 395 for McNarney's testimony about the purpose of the reorganization. A good summary of the reorganization is in *PGCM*,



Figure 4: Graphic of G-2 organization in Europe in 1945. Source: US Army Center of Military History.

This new arrangement, which delineated the specific responsibilities of G-2's components—the Administrative, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Operations, and Plans Branches—did not benefit intelligence in the larger bureaucratic scheme. Each combat component now had its own intelligence staff, and each of the Forces was responsible for its own intelligence needs. The MID, which formulated policies and plans and coordinated Army intelligence activities with other US and Allied organizations but had no direct role in field operations, was separated from the MIS, which collected, analyzed, and disseminated military intelligence, screened mail, press releases, and other material for sensitive information, and, in conjunction with British analysts, exploited captured German documents and assessed enemy strength and capabilities. This artificial separation quickly proved unworkable. Planning, field collection, and analysis were so interrelated that designating the first as "policy" and the latter two as "operations" was artificial. Also, although the reorganization elevated the attache section to branch status, it was moved into the MIS, which proved as awkward for the attaches as for most of G-2's personnel (see discussion below). Finally, the creation of the MIS entailed a major shift in personnel to it from the MID. As of 31 January 1942, the MID had 390 officers and 559 civilians working in it; three months later, it had 16 officers and 10 civilian personnel and enlisted clerks. The MIS, in contrast, had 342 and 1,005, respectively. G-2's imperious chief Strong opposed Marshall's change and bureaucratically nullified the separation by treating MID and MIS as one organization until he left his position in 1944; Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy reinstated their separation that same year. Why Marshall did not confront Strong over his obstructionism is not apparent in the historical record.[18]

https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol03.pdf, 127–30; Marshall's quote is at 127.

18. Nelson, 362, 376, 390, 393; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 296; Finnegan, 63–64; Bruce Bidwell, "History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff," Part V: 1941–1945 (unpublished manuscript, US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957–58), I:3–21, XII:25–26; Powe and Wilson, 46–47; G-2 Memorandum no. 18, "Organization of G-2—MIS," 25 January 1943, and Strong memos "Organization of Military Intelligence Division, G-2, W.D.G.S.," 30 August and 22 September 1943, in "Materials on the History of Military Intelligence, 1885–1944."

In a more positive vein, within two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into the war, American intelligence officers arrived in England to work with the British military's escape-and-evasion component, MI9, and Marshall soon became involved in arrangements to set up a counterpart element in the MID. MI9, created in late December 1939, facilitated the escape of British prisoners of war from enemy territory and the return to duty of those who had evaded capture behind enemy lines. Its work included preparing devices such as compasses, maps, saws, telescopes, and secret-writing materials that could be smuggled into POW camps in relief packages from notional charities; setting up ratlines in occupied and neutral territories that escapees and evaders could travel along for eventual repatriation, debriefing, and redeployment; and instructing soon-to-be-deployed soldiers and airmen on escape-and-evasion techniques. In February 1942, Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz of the US Army Air Force met the head of MI9 on a trip to England and was highly impressed with the unit's work. The following month, the British air vice marshal flew to Washington, DC, to brief Marshall and Stimson about MI9's efforts. The meeting resulted in Stimson's approval—encouraged by Marshall, Strong, and Spaatz—to establish the organization known as MIS-X in the MID in October. MIS-X had its headquarters at the secret Army facility at Fort Hunt, where some German POWs were detained. A complementary unit called MIS-Y, also at Fort Hunt, interrogated prisoners of high interest and passed on intelligence to MIS-X that would assist its work. MIS-X undertook activities similar to those of MI9 to orchestrate the return of the more than 95,000 US POWs that the Germans had taken but was much less successful in doing so—only 737 US POWs successfully escaped during the war. Knowledge of MIS-X's efforts nonetheless served as a powerful boost to the captives' morale, and the organization developed such a close information-sharing relationship with MI9 that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described it as an "absolute brotherhood."[19]

19. Helen Fry, *MI9: A History of the Secret Service for Escape and Evasion in World War Two* (Yale University Press, 2020), 61–65; M.R.D. Foot and J. M. Langley, *MI9: Escape and Evasion, 1939–1945* (The Bodley Head, 1979), 46 and *passim*; Ian Dear, *Escape and Evasion: Prisoner of War Breakouts and the Routes to Safety in World War Two* (Arms and Armour, 1997), 70–79; Phil Froom, *Escape & Evasion Devices Produced by MI9, MIS-X, and SOE in World War II* (Schiffer Publishing, 2015), *pas-*

Marshall's last administrative change to G-2 helped resolve a significant obstacle to G-2's ability to effectively exploit the decryption of Axis military and diplomatic messages. Throughout most of the war, the War Department's cryptanalytic element, the SIS, renamed the Signal Security Agency (SSA) in 1943, was part of the Signal Corps in G-3 (Operations), while the intelligence-processing and evaluation component, the MIS, was in G-2 and did not communicate well with its cryptologic counterpart. Alfred McCormack said that service was "simply taking in what the Signal Corps catches and turns in, leaving the Signal Corps the responsibility for determining how much it will catch and turn in, and from what sources." By 1944, the SSA had become the MID's most productive source, furnishing it with 70 percent of its diplomatic intelligence and 80 percent of its information on Japan's military. In August of that year, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy weighed in, favoring the realignment of the SSA into the MIS. The idea appealed to Marshall's penchants for centralized command, intra-agency collaboration, efficient use of resources, and maximum utilization of information. In December 1944, he concurred with G-2 Chief Bissell's recommendation that the bureaucratic anomaly had to end and issued an order that, effective on the 15th of that month, put the SSA's interception and cryptanalytic activities under the MIS's operational control. The head of the Signal Corps retained administrative authority over the SSA, but the MIS dictated its targeting and operational priorities. In September 1945, the SSA was renamed the Army Security Agency, which would comprise all COMINT and communications security units in the Army, completing the centralization that Marshall and Bissell had begun 10 months before.[20]

sim; Powe and Wilson, 47, 56; Robert K. Sutton, *Nazis on the Potomac: The Top-Secret Intelligence Operation that Helped Win World War II* (Casemate, 2021), chapter 8.

20. Finnegan, 79–80; Robert Louis Benson, *A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II: Policy and Administration* (National Security Agency, 1997), 143–48; *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II*, 6, 10; McCloy memo to Deputy Army Chief of Staff James J. McNarney, 22 August 1944, in ibid., 163–65; Bradley F. Smith, *The ULTRA-MAGIC Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946* (Presidio Press, 1992), 187–88, citing Marshall's order of 10 December 1944, Army Chief of Staff Records, NARA (not in *PGCM*); *History of the Signal Security Agency, Volume 1, Organization, 1939–1945*, https://archive.org/details/history_of_the_signal_security_agency_vol_ISRH364-nsa/page/n415/mode/1up, 284; *Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II*, SRH 349, 8, 10, 85–88; *Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred McCormack*, SRH 141, Part 2, 313–18; *Centralized Control of U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Activities*, SRH 169, 56–63, 79–89; *History of Special Branch, M.I.S., June 1944–September 1945*, SRH 117, 9–10.

Military Attaches Remain a Problem

In contrast to his handling of COMINT administration, at no time as Chief of Staff did Marshall address the poor condition of the Military Attache Section, which provided most of the open source and human intelligence the Army had about the Axis powers' armed forces before December 1941. When war broke out in 1939, the Section had 34 attaches and assistants, 11 of them in belligerent countries. The number swelled until by 7 December 1941, 129 were stationed in 52 countries.[21] The large staffing complement was deceptive, however. A former CIA historian has described the condition of the section and its "routine, tedious, and often unappreciated peacetime collection efforts" that Marshall acquired:

> *During the appropriations hearings for fiscal year 1942, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence), testified that his branch often had difficulty persuading officers that intelligence was a specialized job. Many officers considered Attache duty a career dead end. Lt. Col. Truman Smith, one of the most successful American military attaches in Berlin before World War II, called MID the orphan branch of the General Staff and discovered that attaches "lacked prestige and were little regarded or listened to."*
>
> *Much of the blame for this perception rests with MID and the Army itself, for neither did anything to persuade officers that intelligence work was important and could be a valuable career in its own right. Attaches were on temporary detail from their branch or service and returned when their tour ended. Most talented and ambitious officers sought combat command positions, promising greater chances of promotion, and considered noncombat assignments, like intelligence, obstacles to advancement.*
>
> *General Miles indirectly blamed the Army's promotion policy for G-2's inability to attract talented officers. After the war, he told Congress during the hearings on Pearl Harbor that military in-*

21. Bidwell, "History of the MID," V:1–12.

> *telligence never attracted the numbers [sic] of top-quality officers that he would have liked.*[22]

Presuming Marshall was aware of those shortcomings, the record does not indicate that he made any moves to improve the professionalism and prestige of the attaches, provide them with additional resources and training to be better collectors, or change internal policies that discouraged officers from seeking attache positions. The only useful documented initiative he took was to increase the number of Hispanic attaches in Latin America. He followed up on a suggestion from a former general who

> *represented to me the great importance of having officers from our Army in South American countries who were of Latin blood and temperament. He stated that the natural reaction of the Latin Americans to the United States and our Army was one of a Latin toward an Anglo-Saxon. . . . General [Frank] McCoy's suggestion appealed to me as a wise one, and I set about locating officers who were suited to such duties and at the same time filled his requirements.*[23]

New Leadership but Not Much Change at G-2

Marshall replaced Miles in January 1942, briefly with Brig. Gen. Raymond Lee and then with now Maj. Gen. Strong, because, according to Eisenhower, Strong was "possessed of a keen mind, a driving energy, and ruthless determination" to address G-2's problems.[24] He would seem to be the type of lieutenant Marshall preferred: one who would "get down to essentials, make clear the real difficulties, and expunge the bunk, compliciations and ponderosities [sic]" and be held to

22. Scott A. Koch, "The Role of US Army Military Attachés between the World Wars," *Studies in Intelligence*, 38:5 (1995), 111–15.

23. Marshall tasked Miles with carrying out the idea. Marshall letter to John O'Hara, 22 July 1941, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-john-f-oohara/; Marshall memo to Miles, 2 June 1941, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-miles-2/. On the US military attache service generally during the prewar and wartime periods, see Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attaché* (Princeton University Press, 1967), chapters 4 and 5.

24. Eisenhower, 34.

account for any deficiencies in performance.[25] During Strong's two years heading G-2, Marshall levied taskings, discussed liaison with the Free French in Washington, and complained about some G-2 administrative practices that bothered him. He said in one instance,

Figure 5: Gen. George Strong, 1944. Source: US Army Signal Corps.

> *I spoke to General Strong yesterday about a message General [Hayes] Kroner [head of MIS] had sent to General Bradley in Moscow outlining the military situation in the Pacific. He had gone into details down to the operations of a single plane, and I pointed out that this was an unjustified blocking of communications. Please touch these people up again on unnecessary messages, on too much detail in messages and on the unjustified effort to be told everything from everywhere in the War Department every twenty-four hours.*[26]

On another occasion, Marshall wrote a curt memo to Strong criticizing the five-day delay in G-2's handling of a thank-you message he had given it to send to a Soviet officer (probably the military attache). Marshall's formidable temper, normally well controlled, is barely concealed under his business-like language:

> *So a request from me dictated immediately upon my arrival at the office on December 18th produces the brief attached note for my signature on December 22nd, and then only after I had instituted a telephone inquiry.*

25. Marshall letter to Maj. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman, 4 December 1933, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/GCMPvol01.pdf, 412.

26. Marshall memo to McNarney, 24 September 1942, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-mcnarney-4/.

> *I am certain that this is indicative of too much overhead and, pursuant to my talk with you yesterday, I wish you would make a cold-blooded survey of G-2 to see what reductions can be made. It is very difficult for me to come to definite conclusions on the basis of the superficial data I have at my disposal. However, I am convinced that certain things are symptomatic of definite troubles in definite situations, and this recent incident, together with others in the past that have accumulated in my mind, lead me to feel that you will secure a more efficient result if you make a considerable reduction in strength.*[27]

Marshall also disagreed with how Strong was handling unwanted publicity about the secret atomic bomb development program (see chapter 6). In early 1943, problems had arisen over land acquisition and compensation to local farmers; the issue was linked to the construction of a plutonium production facility in Washington State. Protests were sent to Congressional representatives and the Senate Special Investigating Committee headed by then-Senator Harry Truman (D-MO), which monitored military spending. Strong wrote a memo in mid-June titled "Control of Dangerous Publicity" about how to deal with the fallout, but Marshall thought "the procedure you propose is rather dangerous—too much . . . detail and too many people involved." He told Strong to have the directors of the Office of War Information and the Office of Censorship "suppress any publicity or investigations regarding atomic matters. I shall undertake to reach Senator Truman and have him instruct his counsel to drop any investigation" of the plant in Washington. Truman did so.[28]

27. Marshall memo to Strong, 22 February 1942, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-strong-5/. Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air during World War II and later Marshall's second-in-command at the State and Defense Departments, later said that when Marshall lost his temper, he could be the "most terrifying man you ever saw" and "could burn paint off the wall." Pogue interview with Lovett, 14 October 1957, notes provided by Marshall Research Library, 3.

28. Marshall memo to Strong, 14 June 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-strong1/. Reinforcing Marshall, Stimson met with Senate leaders around the same time to prevent any public discussion of expenditures for the bomb project, known by the code name S-1 in US Government documents. S-1 referred to Section 1 of the National Defense Research Committee, predecessor to the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which oversaw all government science in the war effort. David F. Schmitz, *Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man* (Scholarly Resources, 2001), 174; Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (Simon & Schuster, 1986), 365; Frank A. Settle, *General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb* (Praeger, 2016), 40.

After the Quebec Conference in August 1943, attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King, and the US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff to discuss planning the invasion of France the following year, Marshall had to involve Strong and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. Thomas Handy, in Churchill's preoccupation with codenames for military actions. In June, Churchill had protested that the designation SOAPSUDS for the planned air raids on oilfields in the Ploesti region of Romania (carried out on 1 August) was "inappropriate" (it was redesignated TIDALWAVE). In early August, he wrote to one of his senior military advisers about the "many unsuitable names" for operations that would result in heavy casualties and wanted them replaced with more fitting names of "heroes of antiquity, figures from Greek and Roman mythology, the constellations and stars, famous racehorses, [and] names of British and American war heroes," among others.

Accordingly, Marshall wrote to Strong and Handy:

> *In Quebec the Prime Minister had quite a talk with me regarding the selection of code designations for operations such as OVERLORD, etc. He takes serious exception to the choices made. It is well known that he likes to settle some of these matters himself and there arises a conflict between the aptness of the choice and the security requirements.*
>
> *However, the Minister makes this point which I think is sound: he referred to the importance, the gallantry displayed, and the heavy losses suffered in the Ploesti raid, and then he remarked that he thought it was almost a crime to have such an operation as that characterized as "SOAPSUDS." He mentioned other designations which he felt were unnecessarily unfortunate and he recited a series of categories in which we could find appropriate names.*
>
> *Please have this looked into, and promptly, because he will probably bring it up to me while he is here on the present visit.*

The nomenclature issue appears to have been resolved by a revision of the US military's codename index (based on a British-prepared index) adopted in December 1941, on Marshall's and Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King's approval, to prevent duplication and con-

fusion. Under the arrangement, the United States and Great Britain were each allocated lists of words from the index for their sole use and could only pick codenames from those lists. Handy responded to Marshall's directive by noting that part of the problem stemmed from a growing shortage of new words on the US list. Marshall accepted the Operation Division's recommendations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Secretariat approve the names for future US operations and that the British be asked to modify their codeword book.[29]

The Intelligence-Policy Nexus

On some occasions, Marshall had to walk the fine line between differing with his intelligence experts' assessments and protecting their independence from policymakers' pressures, but he did not always do so consistently. In early 1941, G-2's recurrent and pointed critiques of Churchill's government so incensed Secretary of War Henry Stimson that he asked Marshall to stifle and reconstitute its personnel, replacing the naysayers with officers with "broader vision"; nothing indicates that Marshall complied.[30] When the Germans were making gains in North Africa later in 1941, he disagreed with G-2's conclusion that the Allies' situation was hopeless and instead gave the Germans only an even chance of moving all the way to Alexandria, Egypt. After Stimson complained about what he claimed was G-2's tendency to overrate German military prowess and told Marshall to "tincture up G-2 with some men who have a little broader vision," the Chief of Staff "slammed back," refusing to put forward a more optimistic assessment that he doubted would have any positive effect. The matter got deferred, but Stimson later similarly criticized the same intelligence officers for wrongly predicting that the Soviet Union would quickly collapse after Germany invaded it in 1941. Marshall had that erroneous forecast in mind when G-2 again anticipated a

29. Marshall memo to Strong and Handy, 1 September 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-assistant-chief-of-staff-g-2-strong-assistant-chief-of-staff-opd-handy/, and accompanying notes.

30. Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 43; Stimson Diary, quoted in Edward Farley Aldrich, *The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration That Won World War II* (Stackpole Books, 2022), 235.

British collapse in North Africa in 1942. This time, he decided to get other readings from his Assistant Chief for Operations, Maj. Gen. Handy, and Lt. Gen. Smith from his secretariat. They had far more optimistic views of the British position. Marshall conveyed them to President Roosevelt, who had asked what assistance the United States could immediately send to the Middle East.[31]

In one of the few recorded instances when Marshall took close note of the substance of an analytical product, he—an editorial stickler—complained sharply to Strong about extraneous comment in the text.

> *I noted in J.I.C. [Joint Intelligence Committee] 1 Daily Summary No. 252 of August 19th in paragraph 5 the following comment:*
>
> *"The relief of General [Claude] Auchinleck by General [Harold L.] Alexander [for lack of progress in North Africa], reported in the press, may portend a change in British strategy. Alexander, best known for his retreat in Burma, is said to advocate aggressive tactics."*
>
> *This appears to me to be not only an ill-advised statement but one calculated to make difficulties for us in our future dealings in strategical [sic] and other matters with our British associates. I think the underlined portion is not only a J.I.C. affair but smacks of a columnist in the press.*
>
> *Please look into this and find out who is accountable for such poor judgment, which may have very serious results. It certainly complicates my business with the British.*[32]

Sensitive Matters in the United States

On the domestic front, Marshall got involved in two matters that required careful handling to minimize blowback against his intelligence service. The first concerned a turf dispute with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who always zealously defended his organization's prerogatives and was especially suspicious of the activities of competing

31. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 53–54; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 130–31, 336.

32. Marshall memo to Strong, 26 August 1942, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-strong-2/; emphasis in original.

agencies after President Roosevelt gave the Bureau a foreign intelligence mission in the Western Hemisphere in 1940. In July of that year, G-2 chief Miles advised Marshall that much of the information about that region that the War Department did not know was available in the New York offices of many large commercial firms, and he proposed setting up an MID operation there as had been done in the previous war. The main purpose was to establish relationships with business firms whose employees traveled abroad and could provide information about the foreign scene. The FBI was working with some of the same sources, however, and by early 1941 a bureaucratic tussle had started to develop. Hoover accused the MID of violating a 1939 presidential directive that specified the respective responsibilities of the Bureau and Army and Navy intelligence in the United States and complained to Attorney General Robert Jackson and the White House. Stimson wrote in his diary:

> *I also was much troubled to hear that Edgar Hoover has been making trouble at the White House over General Miles—my G-2—and Marshall is much troubled over it too as Hoover, apparently instead of coming to me, goes to the White House with his complaints and poisons the mind of the President and I am going to have a showdown to it if I know the reason why [sic].*[33]

Marshall went to Stimson the next day "in great perturbation" because he had received a message from the White House through presidential adviser Gen. Edwin M. "Pa" Watson asking who Miles's successor would be. Stimson told Marshall to tell Watson that he, Stimson, was handling the matter now. Meanwhile, Hoover had sent Miles a list of MID's activities he regarded as beyond its remit, according to the "Delimitation Agreement" of June 1940 that apportioned domestic intelligence responsibilities among MID, ONI, and the Bureau, and were disrupting FBI operations. After further intervention by Stimson and Jackson, and with Marshall's evident concurrence, a tenuous modus vivendi among MID, ONI, and the FBI in New York was established; "such cooperation is on the basis of

33. Quoted in Thomas F. Troy, "The Coordinator of Information and British Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence*, 18:1 (Spring 1974), 80.

equality and implies no recognition of the primacy of any agency in responsibility, function, or operation."[34]

The other stateside matter Marshall had to address was far more delicate and caused serious damage to an important arm of G-2, the Counterintelligence Corps. Formed in January 1942 as a successor to the Corps of Intelligence Police, CIC received a domestic counter-subversion role modeled on a similar Army program during World War I. According to the official history of Army intelligence, "the new counter subversive operation latticed the nation's military establishment with 'an elaborate and fine network of secret agents.' Intelligence officers secretly recruited informants within each unit, on an average ratio of one informant to every 30 men, resulting in a program of enormous proportions."[35]

Into that net fell Sgt. Joseph Lash and his friend, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt.[36] Lash, a 33-year-old radical who later admitted he "practically became a member" of the Communist Party, became an object of Mrs. Roosevelt's attention in 1939 when he was an officer of a left-wing student group and frequently visited the White House and Hyde Park. (Lash would later become her biographer.) He was drafted in April 1942, and CIC started watching him because of his politics and potential for becoming a subversive; intelligence reports from March 1943 said he was "suspected of Communist affiliations."

34. Ibid., 81; Bruce Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775–1941* (University Publications of America, 1986), 397, 399–401.

35. Finnegan, 72. For overviews of the CIP and the CIC up to 1943, see Powe and Wilson, 34–36, and *Counterintelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II* (US Army Counterintelligence Corps School, n.d.), https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/cic.pdf, 1–15.

36. Sources for this episode and its aftermath are Finnegan, 74–76; James L. Gilbert, John P. Finnegan, and Ann Bray, *In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Army Counterintelligence* (History Office, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 2005), 32–33; US Army, *History of the Counterintelligence Corps in the United States Army, 1917–1950* (US Army Intelligence Center, 1959), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/hiss/hiss1111.0175.001/69/--general-background-history-of-the-counter-intelligence?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image;q1=roosevelt, 66–77; Powe and Wilson, 50; Joseph P. Lash, *Love, Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends* (Doubleday, 1982), 441–42, 447–51, 454, 459–93, with reproductions of CIC reports and FBI memoranda; Ted Morgan, *FDR: A Biography* (Simon & Schuster, 1985), 669–73; Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (Temple University Press, 1988), 192–93n; Theoharis, ed., *From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover* (Ivan Dee, 1991), 57–63; and Anthony Summers, *Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (G.P. Putnam's, 1993), 145–49, the last three quoting FBI documents from Hoover's "Official and Confidential" file. An unknown individual or individuals—some accounts speculate it was General Strong—shared CIC's First Lady report with contacts in the FBI, and Hoover put it in the most secure part of his personal filing system.

CIC operatives opened his mail, tailed him, searched his footlocker, listened to his telephone conversations, and followed him to Urbana, Illinois, when it learned he was meeting the First Lady at a hotel there during 6–7 March 1943. She was traveling with her personal secretary and reserved an adjacent room for him and paid for it when she checked out. A week later, Lash was at the same hotel with his fiancée, a still-married woman named Trude Pratt, who worked with Mrs. Roosevelt on various matters and who, according to a CIC intelligence report, "had definite Leftist leanings." A CIC agent searched Lash and Pratt's room while they were out and, as the room was bugged, reported that "Subject and Mrs. Pratt appeared to be greatly endeared to each other and engaged in sexual intercourse a number of times during the course of their stay" and mentioned "purely personal conversation . . . involving their physical relationship with each other." The local CIC supervisor contemplated arresting Lash at the time on a morals charge; for unspecified reasons he decided not do so then but planned to the next time Lash and Pratt rendezvoused, possibly in early April. On 27–28 March, Mrs. Roosevelt invited Lash to see her in Chicago, where she was staying with her secretary while on an official business trip. He came up on a weekend pass and again lodged at the same hotel in an adjoining room. According to the FBI, CIC bugged the First Lady's room, and she and Lash "quite clearly . . . engaged in sexual intercourse during their stay in the hotel room." (The CIC report that purportedly states that is not extant.)

For unexplained reasons, in the sizable report CIC submitted to Marshall—over a hundred pages consisting of surveillance reports, facsimiles of letters Mrs. Roosevelt had sent to Lash, and transcripts of other monitored conversations—it conflated the latter two hotel stays and mischaracterized the Lash-Pratt tryst as a Lash-Roosevelt assignation that never happened. According to Lash, when the First Lady found out about CIC's actions from the Chicago hotel's staff, she protested in early April to presidential aide Harry Hopkins, who told Marshall. He was not satisfied that CIC had made an honest mistake. This incident, along with others that indicated CIC had handled some investigations imprudently, prompted Marshall to have the Army inspector general investigate it. Former CIC chief Col. H.R. Kibler later

alleged that Marshall had ordered the investigation "after repeated insistence" from his Deputy, Joseph McNarney, "to stifle one CIC report 'personally embarrassing' to persons high in the government." When asked to elaborate, Kibler refused to say more than that the report concerned "a personal matter unrelated to communism."[37] The resulting highly critical report led to—possibly under President Roosevelt's order—Marshall's disbanding CIC (over Strong's objections), ending the Army's countersubversion program, ordering the destruction of CIC's domestic surveillance files, and dispersing CIC's investigators to a new security element under the control of the service commands. CIC's domestic role was effectively eliminated except for special security assignments, such as with the Manhattan Project, and it was consigned to a tactical support role overseas for the rest of the war, for which it built a commendable record of accomplishment.[38]

Assessment

Overall, Marshall recalled, he was dissatisfied with G-2's performance throughout much of the war. During the Normandy breakout, for example, Marshall later said that "G-2 let me down every time in everything. They never told me what I needed to know. They didn't tell me about the hedgerows, and it was not until later, after much bloodshed, that we were able to deal with them."[39] He attributed the general problem to a lack of qualified officers of sufficient rank and experience.

> *We didn't have nearly enough men in the Intelligence Section. It always got the second deal in it; its head was always a colonel and not a brigadier general, because the brigadier generals went to the other three commanding interests of the General Staff. We were not intelligence wise—I will put it that way. We collected*

37. *History of Counterintelligence Corps in the US Army*, 67.

38. Powe and Wilson, 53; *Counterintelligence Corps History and Mission*, 16–81.

39. *George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, 5 October 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Interview_10-05-56.pdf, 589. Pogue, a US Army historian during World War II, wrote some official Army histories after the war and was for many years the Executive Director of the George C. Marshall Foundation. He interviewed Marshall at great length during 1956–57 before he began writing his four-volume biography of the General.

> *a great deal—mass—of intelligence, but I thought we were a little slow in its interpretation, and the whole section had to be built up. They had a number of "heavy thinkers," but they didn't impress me very much. It was very hard in [a] time of peace to work up to the state of efficiency you want in a service like the Intelligence Service. They either go far too far and exaggerate the thing, or they don't go far enough. Anyway, I was not impressed with so many people in the Intelligence Section, and they led me into some bad pitfalls before I got through.*[40]

Yet, as noted earlier, Marshall's attempts to address these shortcomings were sporadic and inconclusive. A further indication of his preoccupation with other wartime matters is that he did not mention intelligence in any of the three biennial reports about developments in the Army that he submitted to Stimson during 1939-45.[41]

Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney observed that G-2 "was always a headache for the War Department and was reorganized continuously and unsuccessfully throughout the war."[42] Marshall's overall deficiency in dealing with Army intelligence probably can be attributed to his unfamiliarity with the discipline; G-2's relatively low stature in the Army's hierarchy; and the overwhelming military, budgetary, administrative, and political demands placed on him as the imminence of US involvement in the war grew and the tempo of conflict accelerated during 1939–45. As a result, he never made the same organizational improvements in Army intelligence that he did in other areas of the service that he considered more essential to the war effort.

40. Pogue interview with Marshall, 14 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_15.pdf, 439. Marshall was not correct in saying that only a colonel had run G-2. From when it was formally established in 1920 to his appointment as Chief of Staff, four brigadier generals and five colonels headed it. *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 38:3 (July-September 2012), 70–71.

41. *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1939–1945*, US Army Center of Military History, https:history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-57/CMH_Pub_70-57.pdf.

42. Finnegan, 61.

Chapter 2: Encouraging Inter-Service Intelligence Integration

One of Marshall's most productive actions linked to intelligence occurred in November 1942, when he joined a seemingly unlikely ally, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Adm. Ernest King, in arranging closer inter-service intelligence coordination as a result of the Pearl Harbor debacle. Marshall had been interested in Army-Navy collaboration since early in his career. In the 1920s as Pershing's aide-de-camp, he advocated for Army and Navy officers to do an early form of what would today be called joint duty and for the establishment of an inter-service procurement process to cut waste. He also participated in studies about creating an Office of Secretary of Defense that would oversee both services and help coordinate their activities—an idea he would again advocate during and after the war. In a memo to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in October 1945, King wrote that "In November 1942, General Marshall and I directed our intelligence services to explore ways and means of merging their activities in order to eliminate duplication, reduce overlaps, and make headway toward a unified intelligence agency. Thereafter, a number of joint activities were established; also, each of the services undertook the performance of certain intelligence functions on behalf of both. These activities have been successful."[1]

1. Pogue, *Education of a General*, 222-23; Marshall letter to Reed Landis, 17 May 1938, *PGCM*, 1:593-94; "Memorandum from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (King) to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal," 12 October 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Government Printing Office, 1996; hereafter *FRUS-EIE*), Document 27, Enclosure 2. Looking back from the vantage point of the late 1930s, Marshall recognized that then and now he was "out of step with the rest of the world in this particular idea" of joint duty but insisted that "it is fundamental, and the only effective leadup to the proper coordination of the two services." Marshall letter to Landis.

Figure 6: Adm. Ernest King and Marshall, at meeting of American and British chiefs of staff, Malta, July 1943. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Achieving that state was not always easy, given the services' historical rivalry and their two top officers' markedly different personalities. After the war, the usually low-key and self-controlled Marshall admitted that "I had trouble with King because he was always sore at everybody. He was perpetually mean."[2] For his part, the notoriously headstrong and irascible King thought Marshall was trying to dominate the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); appreciated only the capabilities and requirements of the Army ("like all Army officers, he knows nothing about sea power and very little about air power"); and resented that Marshall had avoided punishment for the Pearl Harbor disaster while his Navy counterpart, Adm. Harold Stark, had been demoted to a liaison position.[3] The two four-stars periodically and

2. Pogue interview with Marshall, 5 October 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Interview_10-05-56.pdf, 593.

3. Jonathan W. Jordan, *American Warlords: How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in World War II* (Penguin, 2015), 194, 149, 154; Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1953), 147, 423. After the war, King wrote that "I have never been able to understand how or why FDR could fire Admiral Stark without doing the same to General Marshall. In my opinion, one could not possibly be more suspect than the other." Quoted in Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Admiral Ernest J. King* (Little, Brown, 1980), 330.

vociferously quarreled about their services' respective responsibilities in the Pacific Theater, and sniping from Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Army commander in the region, about the Navy's operations and the services' blame-shifting after Pearl Harbor complicated their relationship. Nevertheless, they reached an understanding there and also found common ground in the area of intelligence integration at a time when inter-service coordination generally was very much a work in progress. Marshall and King "formed if not a friendship at least a working truce" and "tried, at Marshall's initiative, to eliminate mistrust and competitiveness from their own dealings with each other," according to historian Eric Larrabee. After the war, King wrote to Marshall: "We have had our differing points of view—even strong ones—but the end-result of our teamwork speaks for itself."[4]

First Steps

For reasons he did not explain, but presumably because he thought it would be more efficient and evoke less resistance, Marshall preferred to work with King on integration personally rather than through the JCS bureaucracy, even after he reorganized its committee system following the meeting of Allied leaders at Casablanca in January 1943. He wanted to avoid repeating the experience there, where the British, well-versed in using committee planning mechanisms, had embarrassed the understaffed and underprepared US delegation with all the documents and already-thought-out discussion points they had brought with them. Marshall's initiative, however, focused on creating committees that dealt with troop deployments, logistics, and future operations and left intelligence coordination still in the hands of the underutilized Joint Intelligence Committee.[5] Perhaps he found the

4. Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (Simon & Schuster, 1987), 105, including King quote. "They probably did not like one another very much," but "by the bond of necessity and the fear that if they did not unite, the British would exercise undue influence over the President." Ibid., 194, quoting Robert W. Love Jr., *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Naval Institute Press, 1980), 162-63.

5. Steven L. Rearden, *Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991* (National Defense University, 2012), 14.

JCS decisionmaking process too cumbersome to address integration as expeditiously as he and King wanted to.[6]

At a meeting of the JCS in March 1943, King recalled that he and Marshall "for the past year encountered overlaps and wasted effort in the various activities of MIS and ONI" and that the two had discussed the matter "for months."[7] One of the integration efforts Marshall and King undertook was making preliminary moves toward creating a Joint Intelligence Agency (JIA) in which MIS and ONI would carry out functions on behalf of each service. The JIA would eventually consolidate all service intelligence activities and the other intelligence agencies at the time, including the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), under the JCS. Wartime exigencies mooted the JIA initiative, but the services undertook a variety of other cooperative actions—setting up Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies in various theaters, bringing the configurations of ONI and MIS closer into alignment, and placing liaison officers in each other's intelligence components—that ended some of the "overlaps and wasted effort" King noted.[8]

Problems With COMINT

Another of the activities King mentioned above was Marshall and he, following on an accord reached in January limited to Japanese weather intelligence, signing an agreement in February 1944 covering the Washington-area exchange of COMINT on Japan. It was an effort to quell a dispute between their respective services' cryptanalytic organizations over attacking encrypted Japanese messages and sharing

6. Marshall made the JCS somewhat more effective in promoting inter-service collaboration and providing the United States with a counterpart to the British service chiefs' body by suggesting that President Roosevelt appoint Admiral William Leahy, a former CNO and most recently the US diplomatic representative to Vichy France, as its chairman. Stoler, *Adversaries and Allies*, 64-65; Rearden, 7; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 298-300. A recent biography of Leahy unconvincingly plays down Marshall's role in Leahy's appointment, mainly because the author does not sufficiently distinguish it from Roosevelt's near-simultaneous selection of Leahy as his Chief of Staff, with which Marshall had nothing to do. With Leahy soon becoming the President's de facto chief military adviser as well, he held three positions with overlapping responsibilities vis-a-vis the JCS. Phillips Payson O'Brien, *The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt's Chief of Staff* (Dutton, 2019), 178-80, 188-91.

7. Quoted in Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (University Publications of America, 1981), 212, 316.

8. Wyman H. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence* (Department of the Navy, 1996), 226-29.

Figure 7: Marshall meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Left to right: Adm. Ernest King, Marshall, Adm. William Leahy, Lt. Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

the take. In a memo to G-2 Chief Bissell in March 1944, Col. Carter Clarke, the head of G-2's cryptanalytic unit called the Special Branch, assessed the unsatisfactory state of Army-Navy COMINT relations and pessimistically concluded that

> *It is now apparent that the Navy proposes to do business at arm's length. We should accept that attitude and act accordingly, giving the Navy nothing which our agreements do not require us to give and holding strictly to the letter of the agreements. After a year and a half of dealing with the Navy in this field, it is my conviction that you cannot do business with them in any other way, and that you will get more in the long run if you take this viewpoint.*

Whether Bissell showed the memo to Marshall is not apparent, but if he did, the Chief of Staff ignored Clarke's advice and sought additional ways to resolve the inter-service dispute.[9]

The "Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange of Communications Intelligence" set up a liaison officer exchange between the two components in the national capital area and authorized their chiefs to examine the Japanese COMINT that their counterparts had collected.

9. Clarke memo to Bissell, "Army-Navy Agreement regarding Ultra," 4 March 1944, SRH 141, part 2, 282-95.

Figure 8: Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, 1944. Source: US Army.

The Army-Navy COMINT Coordinating Committee came into existence in May 1944 to implement the Marshall-King agreement. The wrangling continued, however, leading Marshall and King to establish the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) in March 1945 to direct a joint effort at improving COMINT collaboration. For security reasons, the board answered only to Marshall and King and was not responsible to the JCS. Bissell opposed the idea, citing incompatible bureaucratic arrangements in the two services. "The Army cannot participate on an inter-service project of this sort as long as its own signal intelligence activities remain as decentralized as they now are." Marshall overrode Bissell's objection, and the ANCIB was established immediately. In a further move toward integration beyond a coordinating committee, Marshall soon after Japan's surrender in August 1945 proposed to King that they direct the ANCIB to examine "the advisability of combining army and navy intercept and cryptanalytic activities under appropriate joint direction or, if this should be impossible for any reason, to recommend procedures to insure [sic] complete integration." Combining the two services' organizations did not occur, mainly due to opposition within the Navy that King chose not to override. In the meantime, the ANCIB facilitated coordination in developing cryptologic equipment, maintaining a united Army-Navy position against other US Government agencies that tried to move into COMINT collection and cryptanalysis, and serving as the framework

for inter-service COMINT cooperation until the Armed Forces Security Agency was organized in 1949.[10]

Throughout the war, Marshall's overriding concern was that the military's various intelligence entities work together in pursuit of victory—an aspect of his stress on unity of command that was evident from his early years as Chief of Staff.[11] He expressed this persistent attitude in June 1942 in a memo to Lt. Gen. Leslie McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces:

> *I have just been hearing from Colonel Fiske [military attache in Rome] the oft-repeated tale of confusion among the various United States Intelligence Agencies in Lisbon. The same confusion exists at other places, and certainly there is no concentrated effort. I wish you would look into this matter, approaching it on the basis of unity of command for Intelligence in various theaters. Where the interests are largely Naval, put all of our Army people in vicinities under Naval direction. In view of the fact that the Donovan organization [OSS] is to act under the Chiefs of Staff, we might put his mission in direct charge of some particular theater. But let us see if we cannot find a solution by utilizing the principle of unity of command, which everyone is being rapidly educated to accept on the purely command basis.*[12]

Two Services, One Department

After the end of the war, Marshall continued to advocate for Army-Navy unification—as he had in 1943-45, when he, his War Department colleagues, and a JCS study committee argued for a sin-

10. Benson, 133-39; *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II*, 12-13, citing Miles memo, "Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board Establishment of (2 Mar 45)"; "Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange of Communications Intelligence," 4 February 1944, in "OP-20-G File on Army Navy Collaboration, 1931-1945 (18 July 1931-31 May 1944," SRH 200, part 1, 245-49; Marshall memo to King, "Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board—Establishment of," 9 March 1945, Marshall-King memo to Director/ONI et al., same title and date, and Marshall memo to King, "Signal Intelligence," 19 August 1945, unpublished documents from Marshall Research Library in author's possession; Finnegan, 80; Packard, 236; Thomas L. Burns, *The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952* (NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 2005), 14, 17-18, 28-29; George A. Brownell, *The Origin and Development of the National Security Agency* (the official "Brownell Report" issued in 1952; reprint ed., Aegean Park Press, 1981), 14-15.

11. Watson, 294-95, 451-52, 458, 461-64.

12. Marshall memo to McNair, 11 June 1942, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-mcnair-5/.

gle defense department—and a concomitant improvement in military intelligence coordination.[13] Testifying before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in October 1945, Marshall supported pending bills for setting up a single American defense establishment. He stated that achieving unity of command was difficult even under the threat of wartime defeat and that the JCS "reached agreements only after numerous compromises and delays." "There has been a natural tendency in each department," he went on, "to aim at self-sufficiency in its own military machine. Duplication and waste are inevitable." "I am strongly convinced," he emphasized, "that unless there is a single department for the armed forces . . . there can be little hope that we will be able to maintain through the years a military posture that will secure us a lasting peace." More specifically, this necessity applied to military intelligence, about which Marshall proposed establishing an interagency intelligence entity that included the Department of State. "Prior to entering the war, we had little more than what a military Attache would learn at dinner more or less over the coffee cups. . . . We should know as much as possible about the intent, as well of the military capabilities, of every country in the world."[14] As will be seen, however, for a time he assumed a somewhat different stance when his position in the national security bureaucracy changed two years later.

13. Editorial note and documents in ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol04.pdf, 416-20; editorial note and documents in ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol05.pdf, 313-15, 327-32; Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 31, 34; Rearden, 40; James F. Schnabel, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume I, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947* (Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 110. On the JCS, Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, head of the Army Air Corps, sided with Marshall, while Admirals King and Leahy disagreed. See King's perspective in *Fleet Admiral King*, 365-66.

14. Frederick R. Barkley, "Marshall Urges Unified War Arm . . . Backs a Joint Intelligence System Covering World," *The New York Times*, 19 October 1945, 3; David F. Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947* (University Press of Kansas, 2000), 94-95.

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Chapter 3: Mixed Relations With Donovan and COI/OSS

Marshall had the regular Army's guardedness toward an unconventional military unit with presidential backing but did not display the same hostility to William Donovan and the Coordinator of Information (COI) and OSS as did G-2 chiefs Miles and Strong and other senior US military commanders. As early as 1939, Marshall and Donovan had corresponded on personal matters, including the tragic death of the latter's daughter in a car accident in 1940. At Donovan's request, Marshall arranged for him to watch demonstrations at two military bases in the United States and directed him to meet with the head of the Army's War Plans Division to discuss his recent trip to the Middle East, where Donovan had met with the senior British commander there, Gen. Archibald Wavell.[1]

Setting Boundaries

After hearing about Donovan's plans to propose a COI to conduct intelligence activities outside normal military channels, Miles alerted Marshall in April 1941: "In great confidence, ONI tells me that there is considerable reason to believe that there is a movement on foot, fostered by Col. Donovan, to establish a super agency controlling *all* intelligence. This would mean that such an agency, no doubt under Col. Donovan, would collect, collate, and possibly even evaluate all military intelligence which we now gather from foreign countries.

1. Miscellaneous unpublished correspondence from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

From the point of view of the War Department, such a move would appear to be very disadvantageous, if not calamitous."[2] Marshall made a counterproposal for a Joint Intelligence Committee, modeled on British lines, comprising the heads of US intelligence agencies (except the FBI) who would meet daily to exchange information. Miles objected, and only an Army-Navy clearinghouse process was established.[3]

"At first we had considerable difficulty in dealing with General Donovan and the OSS generally," Marshall recalled. Later in the war, though, he thought that "the organization he [Donovan] built up was a very efficient one. It had very fine men in it, and they did a very fine job in the end, and they cooperated very completely with the army—largely due to the missionary work of General Smith," whom Marshall assigned to monitor OSS.[4] Marshall's main concern with COI was its placement in the military chain of command and its relationships with other organizations with related responsibilities. He did not want it to have operational autonomy or direct access to the White House and wanted all its reports to go through G-2. On 24 June 1941, he advised Secretary of War Stimson that according to Donovan's plan, COI would supplant the Army chief of staff's responsibility to the president. Stimson, with whom Marshall would enjoy a close working relationship—the interior doors to their adjacent offices in the Pentagon were always open—and who regarded the Chief of Staff with the highest respect, revised Donovan's proposal, making the new office a civilian position. Four days later, Marshall wrote to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, who had helped finesse Donovan's ambitious proposals: "With reference to the attached draft regarding the designation of a Coordinator of Information: While I personally have not had time to inform myself as to the various aspects of the matter, in general I would be opposed to what is proposed in the draft. . . . at the moment I am not interested in the details of the actual organization of this debatable intelligence group or who is to be the head

2. Miles memo to Marshall, "Coordinator for the Three Intelligence Agencies of the Government," 8 April 1941, quoted in Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, 42; emphasis in original.

3. Ibid., 43-44; Finnegan, 62.

4. Pogue interview with Marshall, 15 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_16.pdf, 483, 485; Crosswell, 254-55.

Figure 9: Marshall with Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 1942. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

of it; what I am vitally interested in is where it is to be placed in the national defense scheme."[5]

Donovan secured appointment as the COI in July 1941 but with limitations. Marshall opposed Donovan's more expansive proposals about coordinating all military, naval, and civilian intelligence, seeing behind it "an effort to supplant his responsibilities and duties in direct

5. Marshall memo to McCloy, 28 June 1941, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-mr-mccloy/; Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy: The Making of the American Establishment* (Simon & Schuster, 1992), 130. One of Marshall's biographers commented that his and Stimson's relationship, which dated back to World War I in France, when they rode horseback together and shared a mess, "would be one of the closest and most important in Washington during the war." Stoler, *Marshall*, 73. See also Marshall letter to Stimson, 22 January 1927, Stimson letter to Marshall, 21 January 1928, and Marshall letter to Stimson, 21 January 1929, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol01.pdf, 322; and Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 April 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_7.pdf, 230. Stimson lauded Marshall's leadership and character in his autobiography, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (Harper & Brothers, 1947), 662-64. For more on their relationship, see Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 498-500, 506-07, 603-04; Godfrey Hodgson, *The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867-1950* (Knopf, 1990), 231-32; and Edward Aldrich's book cited in the previous chapter.

connection with the Commander-in-Chief," according to Stimson. Stimson wrote that the ideas had "evidently been worrying him [Marshall] very much and making him extremely angry." Stimson had a few conversations with Marshall to try to placate him—advising "how important it was for his own—Marshall's—sake that there should not be a sharp issue made on this."[6] The executive order creating COI circumscribed Donovan's authority somewhat but still left his organization in an anomalous position in the military chain of command.

When OSS was created in June 1942 and subordinated to the JCS—an arrangement that appeared to satisfy both Donovan and his bureaucratic opponents—Marshall's concerns about OSS freelancing and turf-building diminished. The JCS and Marshall accepted OSS with reluctance and, after some deliberation, had it classified as a military organization under the JCS and not a subagency of the Army or Navy.[7] Possibly Marshall thought he could rely on Strong at G-2, an avowed antagonist of Donovan, to rein in OSS bureaucratically. In July, Marshall disapproved Donovan's proposal that OSS have a direct liaison with Britain's covert action organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), but allowed him to establish guerrilla and commando units if US theater commanders wanted them. Those senior officers would control the units unless they were operating outside a formal theater, in which case Donovan would run them subject to JCS oversight.[8] A directive Marshall signed in October mandated recommendations to the JCS that would "clearly define the functions of the several branches" of OSS: specifically, a discrete boundary between OSS's research unit and that of the Board of Economic Warfare, which advised the president on matters of economic defense; a precise definition, and the assignment to OSS, of those intelligence functions it could perform better than G-2 or ONI; and the identification of any overlap of OSS photographic activities with those of the Army, Navy, or the Office of War Information (the US Government's "white propaganda" element).[9] Marshall later conciliated with Donovan by

6. Stimson Diary, quoted in Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, 66, 68.

7. Ibid., 169.

8. Ibid., 164.

9. Ibid., 169.

writing at Christmas 1942 that OSS had "rendered invaluable service," particularly in North Africa supporting Operation TORCH,[10] regretted that "your organization has not had smoother sailing," and hoped the new arrangement under the JCS would eliminate most of the difficulties between OSS and the service branches.[11]

Watching Over Unconventional Operations

Marshall had a number of interactions with Donovan and OSS during the war that showed the inconsistent nature of their relationship. One point of dispute between them, expressed in late 1942, was their different preferences for where US forces should first engage Germany. Marshall wanted to undertake a cross-channel invasion as part of his Germany-first strategy, but Donovan advocated attacking North Africa instead. Marshall later said that he thought that would waste resources on a sideshow just to "keep the [American] people entertained. . . . People demand action." However, he later admitted that he had failed to appreciate the political imperatives involved, in part because he was reluctant to expend the United States' limited military resources in defending British imperial interests.[12]

Marshall—at Strong's behest and with JCS backing—denied OSS access to decrypted Japanese diplomatic communications (codenamed MAGIC) and other high-grade COMINT because of security concerns, and he and the other Joint Chiefs persuaded President Roosevelt to limit cryptanalytic activities to the Army, Navy, and the FBI, shutting down a small decryption unit Donovan had set up.[13] Mar-

10. Operation TORCH (8-16 November 1942) was the Allied invasion of French North Africa during World War II. It was the first mass involvement of US troops in the European–North African Theater.

11. Marshall letter to Donovan, 23 December 1942, *War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS),* 2 vols. (Government Printing Office, 1949), Exhibit W-34, 1:384. That letter appears to be the only time during the war that Marshall praised OSS's work during TORCH. In early 1942, Donovan had asked Marshall to find him a combat billet. Marshall politely demurred; "Your request for service in a combat capacity is typical of you. I will watch for a suitable assignment, in that area, and will call on you as soon as it develops." It did not. Marshall letter to Donovan, 27 February 1942, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

12. Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* (Simon & Schuster, 2011), 90-91; Pogue interview with Marshall, 13 November 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Interview_11-13-56.pdf, 622; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 314.

13. Finnegan 63; Waller, 118; Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*, Vintage ed. (Random House, 1982), 312-13; JCS untitled memo to Roosevelt, 6 July 1942, SRH 200, part 1, 49.

shall later charged OSS with an unwitting operational blunder that supposedly compromised an important cryptologic breakthrough against the Japanese. In material submitted in 1946 to the joint Congressional committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack, he stated that

Figure 10: Maj. Gen. William Donovan, Director of OSS, 1942. Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

> *some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.*[14]

According to two of Donovan's biographers, Strong fabricated this flap to undermine Donovan by deceiving Marshall. If so, nothing in the record indicates Marshall knew about that ploy; if he had, he would not have told the Congressional committee what he had done. As the incident in Lisbon turned out, the Japanese continued to use the same code, and the United States lost no COMINT access.[15]

On the propaganda front, Marshall and G-2 were unenthusiastic about a plan Donovan as COI had sent to President Roosevelt in January 1942 to convince world public opinion that US entry into the war made Allied victory inevitable. Donovan wrote that the plan "need not wait actual success but can be based upon a negative

Two days later, Roosevelt issued an order "discontinuing the cryptanalytic units in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Strategic Services." Ibid., 47. See also Smith, *ULTRA-MAGIC Deals*, 110, citing in part Marshall's memo to Roosevelt, 18 June 1942, Joint Chiefs of Staff records, NARA (not in *PGCM*). See also Robert L. Benson, "The Army-Navy-FBI COMINT Agreements of 1942," SRH 270.

14. *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Pursuant of S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress…*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1133.

15. Waller, 157-59; Cave Brown, 305-07.

victory," such as getting the Japanese "to commit . . . to some plausible objective that is unlikely to be attained, at least within a definite time limit. Upon the first Japanese setback toward this objective, the failure is to be exploited and dramatized as the turning point in the Pacific campaign, and therefore in the war." Roosevelt found the notion "very interesting" and forwarded it to Marshall and King, who discussed it with Donovan. G-2 commented that "this plan is spurious in its entire conception as it violates the very fundamentals of propaganda." In late January, Marshall asked the representatives of the British chiefs of staff what they thought of Donovan's plan; apparently that was enough to have it shelved.[16]

More supportively of Donovan, Marshall defended OSS when a contretemps developed in Spain that could have impaired its operations elsewhere. US diplomats in Madrid complained about what they considered the service's irresponsible activities there and urged that its personnel be put under the authority of the military attache or pulled out entirely. The JCS investigated and discussed the problem at length during a meeting on 9 April 1943. Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, Adm. William Leahy, used the time to complain about his troubles with COI and OSS while he was Ambassador to Vichy, France, but Marshall and King strongly defended Donovan and his organization, viewing the underlying cause of the dispute as the State Department's caution and OSS's more daring methods. Marshall noted that "some of our ambassadors cannot take things 'on the chin'" and urged that aside from one OSS representative, Donovan's operatives should be taken out of US diplomatic missions and allowed to "run the show from down the street." A few months later, a JCS emissary worked out a new setup for OSS in Spain and Portugal that Donovan and the US Ambassador agreed to: its activities would continue on a reduced scale, and the Embassy would have more authority over them. The Lisbon affair had weakened Donovan's standing, so the JCS had to make some concessions.[17]

16. Marshall memo to representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, 28 January 1942, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession; Marshall memo to Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow, 31 January 1942, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-gerow-9/.

17. Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* (Basic Books, 1983), 218-21; Marshall quote from the JCS meeting minutes, Combined Chiefs of Staff Files, NARA (not in

Possibly as a way to supplicate the British, who were eager for Allied operations to begin in the "soft underbelly" of the Mediterranean, Marshall proposed using OSS in peripheral operations there, for which he opposed involving conventional US forces. In August 1943, he suggested to Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, commander of US forces in the European theater, that OSS and SOE officers be sent to Sardinia "to facilitate an unopposed Allied landing or to seize and defend certain strategic points" and stir up "fifth column" activity in advance of the Allied landing there. The operation would "give Donovan a chance to do his stuff without fear of compromising some operation in prospect. If he succeeds, fine, if not, nothing would be lost." Nothing came of Marshall's idea, as German forces evacuated Sardinia in mid-September.[18] In October 1943, Marshall discussed using Donovan as an emissary to partisan bands in the Balkans to encourage them to work together against the common German enemy. He wrote to his Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations:

> *The most important thing now was to make some effort to compose, at least temporarily, the differences between the various guerrilla bands; that it was probable rather than merely possible, that they would neutralize each other. On the other hand, if for the moment at least they would strive together, along with the supplies that probably now can be given them by plane and by boat, great things might be achieved to embarrass the Germans on their Mediterranean front. . . . [A]pparently we needed another Lawrence of Arabia . . . some man to go in there in the effort to influence these people for the time being. Offhand I proposed that we might send General Donovan. He has been there before and was supposedly partially responsible at least for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. You may remember that he left Yugoslavia just as the campaign began. I don't believe he can do us any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character he might do some good.*

In encouraging OSS intervention in the Balkans, Marshall was ignoring the advice of a JCS strategic planning committee that the Rus-

PGCM).

18. Marshall message to Eisenhower, 23 August 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-general-dwight-d-eisenhower-8/.

sians give prior approval. In any event, nothing happened as British sensitivity to perceived American meddling in the region quashed the idea.[19]

Later in the war, Marshall rebuffed Donovan's request to take over direction of partisan activities in northern Italy. He reminded the OSS Director that the Mediterranean Theater commander had charge of all special operations in that area. He also noted more generally that OSS was to conduct its espionage and propaganda operations in that theater according to a JCS policy decreed in March 1944 to "protect the national integrity of those activities."[20]

Interested in using almost any method for aiding the war against Germany, Marshall supported Donovan's advocacy of an information exchange with the Soviet intelligence service, then called the NKVD and later the NKGB, that included setting up missions in the US and Soviet capitals. Donovan had discussed the idea with US and Soviet officials starting in 1943 and by early 1944 had gotten buy-in from the JCS's Joint Planning Staff. FBI Director Hoover denounced the plan as a "highly dangerous and most undesirable" security risk. At a JCS meeting on 22 February, after hearing Donovan make his case for the new relationship with the NKVD, Marshall opined that the FBI might be alarmist and stressed that he and the other service chiefs would "be denying ourselves possible information from the Soviet[s] if we fail to exchange missions." If Marshall considered that the Soviets might use the liaison relationship to infiltrate operatives into the United States, it is not evident in the historical record. The JCS split on the issue of setting up the exchange, with the Navy members opposed, and sent the matter to President Roosevelt for resolution. On 15 March, he vetoed Donovan's proposal, and the chiefs acceded without contest. Not to be deterred, Donovan informed the JCS a month later that he would continue using the US military mission in Moscow as a conduit for sharing information with the Soviets, as he had been doing for several months. Marshall and the other chiefs

19. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 130; Marshall memo to Gen. Thomas Handy, 20 October 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-handy-12/.

20. Marshall letter to Donovan, 21 December 1944, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

did not object, although Marshall later scolded Donovan for turning over to the NKGB a Nazi spy network targeting the Balkans without consulting US military authorities.[21]

On one occasion, Marshall tried to deflect JCS criticism of OSS by finding a success story he could pass on to his fellow service chiefs. In June 1944, he wrote to Lt. Gen. Joseph Stillwell, commander of US forces in the China-Burma-India Theater:

> *General Donovan has submitted a report on the activities of OSS Detachment Number 101 which operates in North Burma. The report covers the assistance rendered General Merrill's forces in the Myitkyina campaign. It recites the very important services rendered. Please indicate to me your estimate of services rendered. I ask this because there has been much criticism by certain members of JCS of Donovan's activities and this particular report would indicate very valuable services.*

Stillwell replied: "Services rendered by Detachment 101 to Merrill's force in Myitkyina campaign were of great value. . . . Information furnished on routes and enemy locations and strength assisted us greatly. We are further developing this organization because of its future potential value." Marshall followed up with Donovan by telling him that the JCS had seen his report, that Stillwell had remarked on the value of Detachment 101's operations, and that "I am confident that future activities of OSS will be of comparable help toward the successful completion of the war."[22]

On another occasion involving the same general area, Marshall had to disappoint Donovan by restricting OSS activities at President Roosevelt's request. Roosevelt opposed having OSS cooperate with the French resistance fighting the Japanese in Indochina because he did not want the United States drawn into a situation where it would be defending French colonial interests; he said, "I do not want to get

21. Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, 337-46, 358-60; Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (Random House, 1999), 238-48; Hoover's and Marshall's quotes from documents in ABC Files and Combined Chiefs of Staff Files, Modern Military Branch, NARA (not in *PGCM*).

22. Marshall note to Stillwell, 28 June 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-lieutenant-general-joseph-w-stilwell-13/, and accompanying notes; Marshall letter to Donovan, 8 July 1944, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession. Detachment 101 was OSS's highly successful unit in the China-Burma-India theater.

mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation of Indochina from the Japanese." Accordingly, in February 1945, Marshall directed his principal commander in India, Gen. Daniel Sultan, that "OSS personnel not be employed in Indochina at present" to assist the French directly in fighting the Japanese or by providing them arms and equipment. OSS could, however, give food and medical supplies (it also provided radios and weapons) and was allowed to collect intelligence in the area. Toward the end of the war and after Roosevelt had died, OSS operated more freely in Indochina, including briefly aiding Communist insurgent leader Ho Chi Minh, with whom it had previously established contact, against the Japanese by sending in a special operations unit (the Deer Team) and providing more weapons. Marshall made no other recorded comments on these activities.[23]

In a memorable incident of unknown date but probably in early 1943, Donovan and his tradecraft technology wizard, chemist and inventor Stanley Lovell, brought Marshall to the Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland, where OSS operatives trained, to demonstrate the power of "Aunt Jemima," an explosive powder that looked like flour. Donovan's biographer, Douglas Waller, describes what happened: "A batch of the deadly dough was placed under a thick armored plate and detonated. Ordnance officers, however, misjudged its explosive force. Shards of steel flew in every direction. One crashed through the window of Marshall's car. Another chunk narrowly missed Donovan's head and embedded into a tree behind him." Marshall's reaction was not recorded.[24]

As D-Day approached, Marshall denied Donovan's entreaties to join the Normandy landing, stating that America's top intelligence officer had no business being part of an invasion force. Donovan ignored his Chief of Staff's order and connived with some commander friends

23. Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, 323-28; Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage* (Random House, 2001), 413, citing Marshall message to Sultan, 9 February 1945, OSS Director's Office Records, NARA (not in *PGCM*); Dixee R. Bartholomew-Feis, *The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War against Japan* (University Press of Kansas, 2006), 130 and *passim*; Bob Bergin, "The OSS Role in Ho Chi Minh's Rise to Political Power," *Studies in Intelligence*, 62:2 (June 2018), 41-56. Marshall's engagement with the OSS in China in 1945 during his postwar diplomatic mission there is discussed in chapter 7.

24. Waller, 101.

and others to come ashore at Utah Beach on 7 June. Nothing indicates how Marshall reacted to Donovan's defiance.[25]

Whither OSS

As early as 1943, Donovan began maneuvering to keep OSS in business after the war and later sought to cultivate Marshall's support. In an August 1944 memo about "the carrying on of intelligence activities in Europe during the period following the cessation of hostilities," he offered to have OSS analyze "American security interests in the European settlement." Marshall's staffer tasked with preparing a response noted that Donovan's request "would tacitly acknowledge a postwar mission for OSS" and urged Marshall to make a "non-committal and innocuous" reply.[26] Marshall agreed and in a letter to Donovan pointed out that the War Department did not make assessments pertaining to foreign policy, that he could not on his own task an organization that reported to the JCS, and that he was referring Donovan's request there—where nothing happened.[27]

In early 1945, when Donovan's campaign to keep OSS during peacetime evoked powerful opposition from various quarters, including some senior military intelligence officers and J. Edgar Hoover, Marshall and the JCS decided to temporarily back away from advocating a postwar central intelligence organization, as they had before, and wait for a politically more favorable time. Donovan's proposal, Marshall wrote to the service chiefs, "normally would have had merit for establishing at this time a central intelligence agency. The honest differences of opinion, adverse publicity, critical opposition and ridicule, the injection of political issues, [and] charges of 'Gestapo' and 'super spy agency' make it inexpedient and undesirable to take action now." Any such step would lead to Congressional hearings and could only post "a hazard to our best sources of intelligence." Marshall thought it unwise to get in the middle of the "controversial issue" because no

25. Ibid., 239-44.

26. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, 219.

27. Rudgers, 20; Marshall letter to Donovan, 14 August 1944, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

reorganization of US intelligence or the military was likely to occur soon enough to have any bearing on the war effort. He also thought that the JCS should avoid "placing the President in an embarrassing position." He thus advised the JCS that they should recommend to President Roosevelt "that further consideration of and action on this proposal be deferred." They agreed and informed Donovan on 28 February that his plan would not be considered. A formal JCS policy paper issued on 2 March, JCS 1181/2, incorporated Marshall's views.[28]

At least for the duration of the conflict, Marshall and the JCS wanted to keep OSS alive. In May 1945, in a letter (which Marshall heavily edited) to Representative Clarence Cannon (D-MO), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, the JCS wrote:

> *The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Office of Strategic Services will continue to be useful in the conduct of the war. Replies from various theater commanders have been forwarded to your committee. In the areas where OSS has been utilized, there is agreement as to the value of its contribution to the war effort. It appears desirable that the OSS be permitted to continue its operations in accordance with the desires of the responsible commanders.*[29]

On 28 August 1945, however, soon after the Japanese surrender, Marshall requested that the JCS immediately withdraw all military personnel from OSS and order a significant reduction in its civilian staff and remaining budget allotment.[30]

Marshall's last documented dealing with Donovan occurred in 1949 when the latter tried to involve him with the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE), a private American organization founded in 1948 to counter Communism in Europe by promoting European political integration. ACUE's members came from the American

28. Smith, S*hadow Warriors*, 400, citing Marshall and Leahy memoranda, 22 and 8 March 1945, JCS Files, NARA (not in *PGCM*); Marshall memo to the JCS, 22 February 1945, quoted in Troy, *Donovan and CIA*, 260, and Rudgers, 29.

29. JCS letter to Cannon, 29 May 1945, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/draft-letter-to-clarence-cannon1/.

30. Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, 405, citing Combined Chiefs of Staff files, NARA. On 1 October 1945, OSS was disbanded by presidential order.

foreign policy and business establishment and included persons with past, current, or future connections to US intelligence. Among them, Donovan was its first Chairman, Allen Dulles was its Vice-Chairman, and Walter Bedell Smith was a board member. Marshall, who had stepped down as Secretary of State earlier in the year, asked Dean Acheson, his successor, if he planned to participate in an ACUE event in New York to which Donovan had invited Marshall. "What is your view of the matter? Do you think I should commit myself?" Acheson said he had declined Donovan's invitation on policy grounds. Marshall then told Donovan that he did not have the "time and energy required for the preparation of an address appropriate to your organization" and that although he was not in public office, he still had to exercise "extreme care . . . regarding any expression relating to our foreign relations. . . . Also, I find that quick overnight trips are most enervating."[31]

31. Donovan letter to Marshall, 28 June 1949, bearing Marshall's handwritten note to Acheson; Acheson letter to Marshall, 11 August 1949; and Marshall letter to Donovan, 20 August 1949; all unpublished documents from Marshall Research Library in author's possession. For details about the ACUE's American supporters and financial benefactors, see Richard J. Aldrich, "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948-60," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 8:1 (March 1997), 184-227.

Chapter 4: Marshall and the "Special Sources"

As Army Chief of Staff, Marshall was privy to three of the four most important cryptologic secrets of World War II—the decryption of Japanese diplomatic and naval codes and German diplomatic and military communications, respectively codenamed MAGIC, JN-25, and ULTRA. No records indicate that Marshall knew about the decryption of Soviet diplomatic and intelligence traffic to and from the United States that would later be called VENONA, even though the Army SIS, which did the cryptanalysis beginning in 1943, fell under his overall command. Why he was not told that a component he was in charge of was spying on a wartime ally is not known. Neither, apparently, were Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Whatever the reason, the project's first breakthroughs did not occur until 1946, after Marshall had resigned as Chief of Staff, and revealed the first hints of Soviet espionage in the US atomic bomb project.[1] As the following discussion shows, Marshall took more interest in MAGIC, JN-25, and ULTRA than any other aspect of intelligence with which he dealt. He was particularly concerned with keeping the cryptologic breakthroughs secure because of the grave damage their compromises would cause to Allied military and naval operations.[2]

1. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (Yale University Press, 1999), 15.

2. For a thorough and accessible survey of World War II cryptology, see Stephen Budiansky, *Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II* (The Free Press, 2000).

MAGIC

In 1940, after SIS cracked the Japanese diplomatic encryption system that used what it called the PURPLE machine,[3] the volume of its cryptanalytic production—codenamed MAGIC—rose immensely from one solution a day in the first half of 1937 to 50 to 75 a day in the last half of 1941. Marshall was greatly impressed with a demonstration in October 1940 of the PURPLE device that SIS had reverse-engineered and had the demonstration repeated for Stimson and McCloy. G-2 chief Miles recalled that Marshall "had a very keen appreciation of the value of MAGIC . . . that was one of the few things that MID was engaged in that he took a very personal, direct interest in."[4] When Marshall's office began receiving MAGIC material in October of that year, Miles notified him that his staff's security practices were lax and had to be tightened: "very secret papers, such as reports of Japanese diplomatic conversations, were being circulated in this office on an ordinary buck slip." After getting the warning, Marshall directed that special leather folders labeled "Secret Documents" be used to distribute MAGIC intercepts to his staff.[5]

The MIS's Special Branch, created in May 1942 and headed by Col. Carter Clarke, processed the burgeoning amount of Japanese traffic and prepared several products for cleared War Department and administration customers. The most sensitive was the "MAGIC Summary" (later called the "Diplomatic Summary"), initially delivered only to Marshall, Stimson, the Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans, the head of G-2, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State who followed SIGINT, and to the Navy Department for further distribution to a limited set of senior customers. By June 1944, the

3. The PURPLE machine was the Allied codename for a cipher machine the Japanese used during World War II to communicate with Tokyo's most important embassies and consulates around the world, especially in Washington, Berlin, and London. PURPLE was used to encrypt Japanese diplomatic information from the inquisitive eyes of foreign governments.

4. David Sherman, *The First Americans: The 1941 U.S. Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park* (National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2016), https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/wwii/sherman-the-first-americans.pdf, 16; Frank B. Rowlett, *The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer* (Aegean Park Press, 1998), 170-73; David Kahn, "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor," *Foreign Affairs*, 70:5 (Winter 1991), 143; Pogue interview with Miles.

5. Marshall memo to Gen. William Bryden, 25 October 1940, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-bryden-4/.

Figure 11: The PURPLE machine. Source: National Security Agency.

distribution had expanded to include the President; his Chief of Staff, Leahy; CNO King and several subordinates; Chief of the Army Air Forces Arnold and some of his staffers; the British representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and several British officials in the Foreign Office and other departments.[6]

Although President Roosevelt was receiving MAGIC through Navy channels, Marshall on at least one occasion brought an important decrypted message directly to his attention. In August 1942, G-2 informed Marshall that "the Japanese Government has instructed its Ambassador in Berlin to inform the German Government that Japan will not undertake military operations against Russia at this time. After careful evaluation and checking with all other information on this subject available to G-2, this Division is convinced that the above information is authentic." G-2 recommended that Soviet Premier

6. David Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA," *Cryptologia*, 16:4 (October 1992), 294-304; *History of the Special Branch, M.I.S., War Department, 1942-1944*, SRH 035, 18, 30. Examples of the summaries and excerpts of MAGIC traffic that Marshall saw are in *"MAGIC" Diplomatic Extracts,* July 1945, SRH 040.

Joseph Stalin be informed "with the object of strengthening overall Russian resistance to Germany." In keeping with his strategic interest in concentrating force against Hitler's Germany, including sharing sensitive intelligence with the Soviets, Marshall agreed, writing to the President: "I suggest the advisability of transmitting this information to Premier Stalin, if it has not already been done, as at least some encouragement in the present desperate Russian situation." Through the US Ambassador, Roosevelt did so the next day without specifying the source of the information, only affirming that it was "definitely authentic."[7]

Later in the war, the Director of Naval Intelligence, R. Adm. Hewett Thebaud, informed Marshall, King, and Arnold that military operations in the Pacific were reducing the availability of Japanese transmissions for cryptanalysis by destroying radio stations and capturing communications centers. Worse, as a result of the latter, the Japanese were changing their encryption systems. Besides requesting that advancing US forces be more circumspect in targeting communication facilities, Thebaud encouraged attacks on underwater cables and landlines to force the Japanese to use radios so more transmissions could be intercepted and to coordinate jamming operations so interception operations would not be disrupted. Consequently, Marshall (through Bissell) directed Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander in the Southwest Pacific Theater, to take appropriate action to address Thebaud's concerns.[8]

In addition to dealing with the strategic and tactical import of the MAGIC messages, Marshall also wanted to ensure that President Roosevelt appreciated their value and could make use of them. After discovering in February 1944 (seemingly late for unexplained reasons) that an officer at the White House screened the MAGIC ma-

7. Marshall memo to Roosevelt, 5 August 1942, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-president-46/; "The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)," 6 August 1942, *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Volume III, Europe*, Document 510, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v03/d510. Roosevelt's message read in part: "Knowledge has come to me which I feel is definitely authentic that the Government of Japan has decided not to undertake military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at this time. This, I believe, means postponement of any attack on Siberia until the Spring of next year."

8. *Military Intelligence Service War Department—Special Security Officer and Other Correspondence Relating to Special Intelligence in the Pacific Ocean Area*, SRH 119, 42-43.

terial that the War Department sent before it reached the President's office, marking only "a very few portions for Admiral Leahy's attention," who then "very seldom sends the booklets in to the President," Marshall wrote directly to Roosevelt about a new procedure:

> *I have learned that you seldom see the Army summaries of "Magic" material. For a long time, the last two months in particular, I have had our G-2 organization concentrating on a workable presentation on "Magic" for my use as well as for the other officials concerned, particularly yourself. A highly specialized organization is now engaged in the very necessary process of separating the wheat from the chaff and correlating the items with past information in order that I may be able quickly and intelligently to evaluate the importance of the product.*
>
> *Recently I have had these summaries bound in a Black Book both for convenience of reading and for greater security in handling. Sometimes two or three of these booklets are gotten out in a single day. I think they contain all of the worthwhile information culled from the tremendous mass of intercepts now available and that are accumulated each twenty-four hours. The recent discovery of the Japanese Army machine code has added a tremendous amount of such material and will continue to give us a great deal from day to day. The problem is how to avoid being buried under the mass of information, and I think the present arrangement satisfactorily meets that difficulty.*
>
> *I am attaching two of the current booklets which I hope you will glance through in order to familiarize yourself with the manner in which the information is presented. I should like to send these booklets each day direct to the White House and have them delivered to you by [Vice] Admiral [Wilson] Brown [Roosevelt's naval aide].*[9]

The Deputy Chief of the Special Branch, Col. Alfred McCormack, said that the President and his advisers "read them [the MAGIC summaries] avidly" and remarked that "the fight for personnel was made

9. Frank McCarthy (aide to Marshall) note to Marshall, 12 February 1944, and McCarthy memo to Leahy, 14 February 1944, unpublished documents from Marshall Research Library in author's possession; Marshall memo to Roosevelt, 12 February 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-president-110/.

easier by high praise which the [Special] Branch received from time to time by General Marshall and other high officials, and occasionally from the President."[10]

On the security front, Marshall wanted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to investigate possible leaks of MAGIC—"frequent rumors, and in one case direct reports to me, of gossip here in Washington regarding the fact that we had intercepted Japanese codes."

> *I was told in each case Mr. Hoover was very reluctant to engage his personnel in investigating any Government agency for the reason that he did not wish to be put in the position of running a sort of Gestapo. . . . FBI did assist us in checking conversations going around Washington in the various hotels, dinners, and so forth, in an effort to find out how serious this matter was, and particularly for the purpose of my making an example of somebody which would discourage further indiscretions by Army officers. We received no conclusive case. I think we had one that we finally could not try under some legal technicality which would have prevented a conviction.*[11]

In September 1944, amidst the presidential election campaign, the assiduously apolitical Marshall had to address a serious security issue involving MAGIC that could have been politically and militarily explosive had the parties involved handled it differently. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal had warned the White House that an Army officer had told the campaign staff of Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey, the Governor of New York, that the administration knew of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in advance and that the candidate's first major speech would be about that supposed foreknowledge and subsequent costly inaction. Marshall had to quietly implore Dewey not to disclose any information about MAGIC in the course of publicly criticizing Roosevelt for allegedly having had warning of the attack and not doing more to prevent it. The leaked information "was going to be used as a threat against Roosevelt, I believe, to prove that he allowed the war to develop with his knowledge or with his assis-

10. Quoted in Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA," 311.

11. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1208-10.

Figure 11: Thomas E. Dewey. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

tance," Marshall recalled. "[I]t was of tremendous importance to us to keep this code business quiet because if we lost it, we lost the most valuable thing we could possibly have gotten regarding the Japanese operations. It was the same code that they had at the time of Pearl Harbor."[12]

Marshall asked his intelligence advisers to draft a message to the Governor beseeching him not to mention MAGIC publicly. "This letter of course puts him [Dewey] on the spot, and I hate to do it, but see no other way of avoiding what might well be a catastrophe to us . . . but at least he will understand what a deadly affair it really is." The whole business, Marshall told King, "is loaded with dynamite but I very much feel that something has to be done or the fat will be in the fire to our great loss in the Pacific, and possibly also in Europe."[13] King agreed with Marshall that Dewey needed to be squelched because public disclosure of MAGIC would harm the Navy most of all.

Marshall faced his own quandary in dealing with the potential leak. He could neither tell the President after the fact about his approach to Dewey—which might draw Roosevelt's ire because of the unauthorized contact—nor do anything else that looked like he was acting on the President's behalf to muzzle a political opponent, such

12. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945* (Viking, 1973), 471; Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/tape-14-ultra-leak-dewey-1944-dill-marshall-relationship-politics-jcs-relations-fdr-atomic-bomb-development-use/. In 1946, Marshall testified about the Dewey episode to the joint Congressional committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack. See *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1124-39, 1156-57, discussed in chapter 5.

13. Marshall memo to King, 25 September 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-admiral-king-26/. At the National Governors Convention earlier in the year, Dewey, a former prosecutor, and other governors had pointedly questioned Marshall and King about the course of the war. According to King, the two "agreed that they had been through a wringer" during the event. King, 334.

as telling Dewey he was acting for Roosevelt. Moreover, the MAGIC issue arose in the midst of official investigations into the Pearl Harbor surprise that might damage the President by accusing him, Marshall, and other US leaders of having had warning of the attack but failing to respond adequately, giving Dewey further political ammunition. "This was an audacious and unprecedented plan," wrote a historian of the political aftermath of Pearl Harbor; "if poorly executed, it could damage the Roosevelt campaign and make the Chief of Staff appear to be a Democratic partisan who was abusing his high position of authority."[14]

In late September 1944, Marshall twice secretly dispatched Colonel Clarke to deliver remarkably detailed private letters to Dewey emphasizing the sensitivity of MAGIC and urging him in the strongest terms not to disclose what Marshall elsewhere called "our most secret source."[15] Excerpts from the second letter largely duplicate the first:

> *[Y]ou have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. . . . I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment.*
>
> *. . . the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from [Japanese Ambassador to Germany] Baron [Hiroshi] Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.*

14. Martin V. Melosi, *The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Political Controversy over the Surprise Attack, 1941-1946* (Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 84.

15. Marshall memo to Truman, 17 April 1945, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-president-136/.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing [to be] available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap [sic], any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.[16]

Clarke, directed to wear civilian clothes, first met Dewey in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where the candidate was giving a campaign speech after a rousing event in Oklahoma City.[17] Marshall had told Clarke to give the letter to Dewey only if the two were alone. Dewey was uncooperative and refused to read past the first part of the letter that, in current terminology, required him to assent to a nondisclosure agreement. According to Clarke, Dewey said, "Marshall does not do things like that. I am confident that Franklin Roosevelt is behind this whole thing." He must have sensed that a vital campaign issue was being

16. Marshall letter to Dewey, 27 September 1944, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-thomas-e-dewey1/.

17. Clarke's account of his meetings with Dewey is in "Statement for Record of Participation of Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, GSC in the Transmittal of Letters from Gen. George C. Marshall to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, the Latter Part of September 1944," reprinted in *Cryptologia*, 7:2 (April 1983), 119-31. Clarke had been promoted by the time his statement was deposited in the National Archives.

snatched from him under the guise of national security. He also realized that Marshall's entreaty had put him in an indefensible position. If he disclosed anything about MAGIC, the White House would fight back with charges that he was abetting the Japanese.

Figure 12: Col. Carter Clarke. Source: US Army Center of Military History.

Marshall sent Clarke to meet with Dewey again two days later in Albany, New York, after Dewey had returned to the Governor's Mansion. With vociferously expressed reluctance, including insistence that he be allowed to inform his trusted campaign manager and keep a copy of the letter under lock and key, Dewey dropped the matter. In late October, Marshall informed Roosevelt's aide Harry Hopkins, his longstanding entreé to the White House, about his letters to Dewey. Hopkins in turn told the President. Even though Roosevelt said that "Governor Dewey would not, for political purposes, give secret and vital information to the enemy," Marshall's bold move had potentially prevented a dire security breach and a highly contentious political dispute.[18]

18. Richard Norton Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times* (Simon & Schuster, 1982), 425-30; Ronald Lewin, *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan* (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1982), chapter 1; David Roll, *George Marshall: Defender of the Republic* (Dutton Caliber, 2019), 343-46; Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 471-73; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (Harper & Brothers, 1948), 827. On his relationship with Hopkins, Marshall said in a 1957 interview that "He was invaluable to me. I didn't see Hopkins very often, because I made it a business not to go to the White House. . . . But whenever I hit a tough knot I couldn't handle . . . I would call him up and he would either arrange a meeting with the President for me, or he and I would see the President. He was always the strong advocate, it seemed to me, for almost everything I proposed." Pogue interview with Marshall, 14 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_15.pdf, 433. See also Marshall's letter to Hopkins in May 1945 after hearing of the latter's intention to leave government service: *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-harry-l-hopkins-3/. Hopkins was one of the very few people the reserved

News of the Dewey affair did not appear in the American press until September 1945. At the time, Marshall wrote to President Truman: "There is, of course, a very heavy pressure from the press and others for the release of the letter or some statement by me. It is my view that at best only a partial release could be made, as there are certain paragraphs in the basic letter involving British interests which I feel we have no right to disclose." Truman wrote back: "Dear General: As you know I have the utmost confidence in you & your judgment. I suggest you give both of these—memo and letter to Dewey to the press for tomorrow. It will stop all the demagogues." Marshall then sent copies of his memo to the President and the letter he gave Dewey to Admirals King and Leahy but not to the press.[19]

In 1946, the joint Congressional committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack examined the issue of Marshall's letters to Dewey at length. Marshall told the committee that after Dewey's defeat, he tried to more fully explain to the Governor what lay behind the messages Clarke had delivered:

> *. . . I thought it was due him that he should know more the basis of this letter, so I had General Bissell proceed to Albany, gain an audience with the Governor, and General Bissell took with him a number of copies of MAGIC showing at that time the movements of the various Japanese convoys, and of the Japanese naval craft on which we were basing our operations, so that the Governor could gather some idea of just how important the matter was. As far as I know, he was greatly interested. It was more or less in appreciation of the action he had apparently taken.*

After seeing the MAGIC material, Marshall testified, Dewey said he

> *understood there was going to be a further discussion in the near future in the Congress regarding Pearl Harbor and he, Governor*

Marshall ever allowed to call him "George"—a favor he did not accord even to the President. For his part, Hopkins said, "The only thing I really want to do, as my contribution to the success of the war, is to arrange for General Marshall to establish and maintain free access to the President." Quoted in Stanley Weintraub, *15 Stars: Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall: Three Generals Who Saved the American Century* (The Free Press, 2007), 92. The two men's only serious disagreement came when Marshall had to rebuff Hopkins's amateurish attempt to meddle in military strategy in China. David Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 239.

19. Marshall memo to Truman, 22 September 1945, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-president-143/, and accompanying notes.

> *Dewey, inquired of General Bissell to me as to whether I desired him to intervene to the extent that he might be able to suppress such debates. . . . I told him [Bissell] to tell Governor Dewey that I had already embarrassed him with requests which had affected his personal actions and that I would not make any further request of him. I told General Bissell that Governor Dewey would probably say that didn't matter, that he would be interested in the conduct of the campaign, the successful conclusion of the war, and if he said that to again repeat that I had anticipated that response and that I still had no request to make of him. That is exactly the way it took place. General Bissell told him what I had said. He replied that that was not the point, it wasn't a question of personal embarrassment, it was a question of the progress of the war.*

In addition, Marshall described his first face-to-face encounter with Dewey about the MAGIC episode, which indicated the Governor had put it behind him:

> *I saw Governor Dewey for the first time in connection with this incident at the funeral, I think, of Mr. Roosevelt [in April 1945]. At the end of the funeral services, we were thrown together there, and I asked him to come to the War Department with me. He did, and we showed him the situation out in the Pacific. Showed him also the current MAGIC, giving the Japanese movements at that time, and made as plain as we could to him just what the importance of these matters were. His attitude was very friendly and very gracious.*[20]

Over Marshall's objections, the joint committee voted to release the letters to the public, and Marshall had to read their contents into the record. The letters were then widely published in the American press.

In early 1945, with the German army caught between the advancing Allied forces on both the western and eastern fronts, Marshall and his British counterpart, Sir Alan Brooke, agreed to increase the flow of high-grade intelligence to the Soviets, including MAGIC and ULTRA, without disclosing the sources. After talking to Marshall,

20. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1136-37. The only time Marshall went to Hyde Park was to attend Roosevelt's funeral. Pogue, *Education of a General*, 324.

Brooke informed the British Joint Intelligence Committee "that at the present critical stage of operations on the Russian front, we are no longer justified in withholding from the Russians intelligence, however gained, of major strategical importance affecting their front." Higher authorities in both countries concurred with the generals, and the US and British missions in Moscow began receiving MAGIC and ULTRA information for passage to the Soviets without revealing the sources. Most of the material had little or no strategic content; the ULTRA material made available so far was mostly tactical about German military movements.[21]

In April 1945, Marshall had to disclose the MAGIC secret to the Soviets to placate Stalin during a dispute over US efforts to arrange a German surrender in Italy. Earlier that year, a number of slightly disguised MAGIC messages were sent to Soviet authorities in Moscow under Marshall's authority. One dated 20 February dealt with Hitler's plan to transfer an SS Panzerkorps unit to the eastern front. The Americans regarded the information as highly reliable because it was in a MAGIC intercept of a report from the Japanese Ambassador to Germany to Tokyo soon after he had met with Hitler, but it turned out to be incorrect—Hitler had changed his mind and ordered the armored unit to Hungary instead. When the United States began negotiating with German commanders in Italy to surrender, the ever-suspicious Stalin interpreted those discussions as making a separate peace with Hitler behind his back and accused Washington of duplicity, citing the MAGIC intercept as evidence of bad faith. At that point, Marshall intervened to ease the tension and defend the United States. He revealed that the information about the Panzerkorps unit had been "intercepted from Japanese sources in Berlin" who mentioned what the Germans had told the Japanese Ambassador. Marshall did not explain his action, which breached the security rules he had instituted; presumably he wanted to avoid antagonizing the Soviets, whose Red Army operations he considered essential to ending the war with Germany. The Soviets now knew from official Allied sources that German and Japanese encryption systems had been

21. Bradley F. Smith, *Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945* (University Press of Kansas, 1996), 236-37.

broken and conveyed their appreciation for being let in on the secret. On 12 April, the Soviet liaison officer in Moscow, Gen. A. I. Antonov, asked the head of the US military mission there, Maj. Gen. John R. Dean, to "express his greeting to him [Marshall] and thank General Marshall for the regular information which he keeps supplying."[22]

JN-25

Marshall had to deal with another potential security problem after the US Navy's victory over the Japanese at the island of Midway on 4-7 June 1942, made possible by the Navy's break into the JN-25(b) encryption system that the Japanese navy had instituted in December 1940. The decryption achievement enabled US Navy forces to spring an ambush on the approaching Japanese flotilla and, as events turned out, change the course of the war in the Pacific theater.[23] On 6 June, Marshall told King that the publicity resulting from the Midway operation, which was still under way, was

> *likely to have a very important effect on future operations. I strongly recommend that this publicity treat the operation as a normal rather than an extraordinary effort on our part. In other words, we should strive to create the impression that the enemy attempted a surprise attack on a large scale, but found our forces on the alert in all sectors and as a result, sustained losses entirely disproportionate to ours.*

King replied that he doubted that "communiques along this line will be sufficient to explain away obvious facts to the satisfaction of the Japanese. I think it will be necessary to plant explanations of our preparation in the form of surmises by the Press."[24]

22. Ibid., 237-38, citing in part a document dated 12 April 1945 in Meetings with the Soviets file, Military Reference Branch, NARA; idem, *ULTRA-MAGIC Deals*, 199-200, citing in part a Marshall memo to Soviet Gen. A. I. Antonov, 10 April 1945, Military Reference Branch, NARA; neither is in *PGCM*.

23. JN-25(b) was a more complex version of JN-25, which the Navy had already cracked. For US efforts against the Japanese naval encryption systems, see Frederick D. Parker, *Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941, Series IV: World War II, Volume 6*, 3rd ed. (National Security Agency, 2013); and John Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II* (Random House, 1995).

24. Marshall memo to King, 6 June 1942, and King memo to Marshall, 6 January 1942, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol03.pdf, 228 n.1.

On 7 June, the anti-Roosevelt *Chicago Tribune* carried a front-page story headlined "Navy Had Word of Jap [sic] Plan to Strike at Sea." The equally anti-administration *Washington Times–Herald* ran a similar article titled "U.S. Navy Knew in Advance All About Jap [sic] Fleet." Citing reliable Navy intelligence sources, the story said that the strength of the Japanese force had been well known in US naval circles and that "The information in the hands of the Navy Department was so definite that a feint at some American base, to be accompanied by a serious effort to invade and occupy another base, was predicted." The sensational scoop forced the JCS into action. On the same day, Marshall advised King to avert the potential compromise of the JN-25(b) decryption success by immediately holding a press conference

> *to give you an opportunity, in a seemingly casual impromptu fashion, to offset the possibility of the Japanese suspicioning [sic] that we had broken their code. It would be a simple matter to plant the question, following your general statement referred to above, "You weren't caught by surprise this time, were you?" Your answer, I think, might well be somewhat as follows:*
>
> *"No, and for a very good reason. We were morally certain that after the surprise raid on Japan proper [the Doolittle raid on 18 April 1942], we would be subjected to some sort of reprisal operations. This belief, coupled with the fact that after the fighting in the Coral Sea we lost the location of the Japanese task forces, made us extremely watchful. Accordingly, ever since the raid on Japan, we have materially reinforced our outposts at Midway and Dutch Harbor and instituted a system of extensive patrol. It was this estimate and this action that enabled us to detect this latest movement of the Japanese fleet and to deal with it effectively."*

Later that day, King held his first press conference since becoming Fleet Commander and closely followed Marshall's suggested line:

> *It was apparent shortly after the Coral Sea action that the Japs [sic] would have to go somewhere and do something. Looking at the map, almost anybody could see that among our various important outposts, Dutch Harbor and Midway offered them the best chance of an action either in the nature of a raid or an invasion with some hope of success, or of a nature that in case of*

a reverse would allow them to retire without too great a loss or complete annihilation. . . . So to this extent, we were prepared for the assault upon Midway. . . . [25]

Marshall's and King's actions helped dissipate public discussion of what lay behind the victory at Midway and contributed to further cryptologic breakthroughs against the Japanese Navy's encryption systems. Marshall feared that those successes might be imperiled, however, when he heard that later in June 1943, Maj. Gen. Alexander Patch had openly discussed the assassination of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet and leader of the Pearl Harbor attack, the previous April. Army Air Force fighters, acting upon intercepted Japanese communications that used a naval code broken in 1942, shot down Yamamoto's aircraft in the northern Solomon Islands. After the Japanese Government announced the Admiral's death in late May, several accounts about the operation appeared in the American press. The Japanese later changed the broken code, and Navy Department investigators began looking into whether rumors and leaks had caused that alteration. They found that Patch, one of the Army commanders in the Southwest Pacific Theater when Yamamoto was killed, had discussed the operation at a luncheon in Washington, DC. Marshall sent Colonel Clarke to get Patch's explanation for what happened. In a memo to Marshall, Patch agreed with the investigators' report except for its statement that he had taken credit for the shootdown. Marshall peremptorily dismissed Patch's memo:

Except for the first line "Paragraph 2 is correct in every particular" there is nothing in the statement that bears on the issue which is your alleged indiscretion. Our concern is not over who receives the credit for the enterprise but solely the fact that a secret so dangerous to our interests should be publicly discussed.

25. "Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Subject, Publicity on Pacific Operations," 7 June 1942, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-commander-in-chief-united-states-fleet-king/ and accompanying notes. King's biographer gives an account that downplays Marshall's role in the episode. Buell, 185. King did not mention it in his memoir. In his book cited above, on 342, Prados says that the Navy traced the leak to an officer who let a *Tribune* reporter see classified dispatches, but he does not provide a source.

> *If you have any statement to make to me regarding the foregoing send it by air mail. The subject under discussion should not be mentioned except inferentially in the statement in order to avoid further compromise or disclosures.*

After some delay while he underwent treatment for pneumonia, Patch replied that use of messages based on decrypted COMINT was well known in the South Pacific region and that he "was unaware or unconscious that there was any further need for absolute secrecy regarding an enterprise which had occurred many weeks previously" and was widely discussed in the theater. Notwithstanding the obvious security breach by a senior commander, Marshall sent King a copy of the memo quoted above along with Patch's replies, noting recognition of the potential for blowback: "Disciplinary action in the case of a corps commander inevitably involves publicity which would make matters worse. Without publicity the deterrent effect on others, which is desired, would be lacking. I am puzzled as to the course to follow. However, it is clearly evident that additional instructions are necessary regarding secrecy in such matters." Any such instructions that followed are not apparent in the record.[26]

ULTRA

Marshall's involvement with ULTRA—decrypted messages the Germans sent using the ENIGMA machine—resembled what he had with MAGIC: a combination of security concerns and, somewhat less so, substantive engagement. Among his main actions were working out protocols with the British about intelligence sharing and allaying their intense fears about ULTRA's security. He and his War Department colleagues had to overcome several formidable obstacles, as historian Stephen Budiansky has enumerated:

> *British concerns over lax American security; American suspicions that the British would exploit cryptologic cooperation to*

26. Marshall memo to Patch, 29 June 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-major-general-alexander-m-patch-2/, and accompanying notes. Patch, by this time a corps commander in Washington State, did not suffer from his misstep. He later was promoted to lieutenant general, commanded the army involved in the invasion of southern France in August 1944, and joined in the final assault against Germany in spring 1945. When he died from illness in August 1945, he was a four-star general.

gain access to American codes in order to read confidential US diplomatic communications; Britain's strong desire to maintain its monopoly over the distribution of intelligence derived from the breaking of the German Enigma ciphers, which could have far reaching consequences for its ability to influence military decisions within the alliance; and last, simple cultural differences that tended to produce misunderstandings and enmity.

Figure 13: The Enigma Machine. Source: National Security Agency.

Marshall also had to factor in the US Navy's adamant resistance to any cryptanalytic cooperation with Britain, potentially complicating his efforts at encouraging inter-service collaboration.[27]

Marshall's initial engagement with the cryptologic liaison issue occurred in 1940, when Strong, at the time the Army representative to joint US-UK talks in London on various military issues that included COMINT and cryptanalysis, sent a radiogram (apparently on his own initiative) requesting that the Chief of Staff agree to exchange with the British intercepts of important Axis traffic, as well as information about the cryptographic systems used. Miles concurred with Strong, and on 11 September, Marshall approved Miles's recommendation that cryptanalytic information should be exchanged with the British but that they should receive nothing about US encryption methods. Stimson subsequently concurred. Little happened for the next several

27. Stephen Budiansky, "The Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Cooperation," *Intelligence and National Security*, 15:2 (Summer 2000), 50, 52.

months until a four-man group of Army and Navy cryptanalysts went to England on a productive mission in January 1942. The arrangement for access to the content of German military decrypts—but not the raw intercepts—was a major step forward for the SIS; at the time, Japanese traffic was its only gainful source of intelligence. In addition, a series of cryptanalytic exchanges followed. In the summer of 1942, Marshall looked into Churchill's complaint that the US-UK armies' collaboration was not as intimate as that of the navies' and assured Roosevelt such was not the case. Based on a report from Strong, Marshall told the President in mid-July that "an interchange of cryptanalytic information [with the British Army] has been in progress for over a year and appears to be satisfactory to both services."[28]

As the Allied offensives advanced in 1942-43, the British shared raw ULTRA intelligence with the Americans on a case-by-case basis, such as with Eisenhower and TORCH, but a more extensive, formalized agreement seemed increasingly necessary from the War Department's perspective.[29] G-2 chief Strong in particular resented that he had been excluded from bilateral discussions about sensitive cryptologic technology and ULTRA decrypts so his division could make its own evaluations of their import. As Marshall put the problem to Sir John Dill, the senior British military liaison officer in Washington: "G-2 tells me that we have been unable to get from your people any detailed information on German Army field traffic, or clandestine traffic, although the latter has been promised, or on cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations. We have also been unable to get complete details of your so-called high speed analyzer [the bombe devices used at Bletchley Park to speed decryption of ULTRA messages]."[30] A

28. Ralph Erskine, "Churchill and the Start of the ULTRA-MAGIC Deals," *Cryptologia*, 10:1 (1997), 58-64, citing Strong memo to Marshall, "Directive to G-2 Covering Interchange of Secret Intelligence Information with Representatives of British Government," 6 September 1940; Lee Gladwin, "Cautious Collaboration: The Struggle for Anglo-American Cryptanalytic Co-Operation, 1940-43," *Intelligence and National Security*, 14:1 (Spring 1999), 119-26; Sherman, 10, 12, and *passim*; John Ferris, *Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 328-34; Alvarez, 77-79, 83-90, 131; Marshall memo to Roosevelt, 11 July 1942, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

29. Benson, chapter 4; Smith, *ULTRA-MAGIC Deals*, chapter 6; Ferris, 335-36; Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored History of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (William Collins, 2019), 41-42; idem, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America, and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 242-43; SRH 141, Part 2, 181-86.

30. Smith, *ULTRA-MAGIC Deals*, Marshall quote at 138.

squabble over a British request to allow one of its cryptanalysts access to a secret US communications research facility complicated the dispute (see page 83 of this study for discussion). Marshall conceded that sharing ULTRA more broadly with G-2 "does actually involve increased hazard" and accepted that "your people should not release to us more detailed data of this kind than they do at present."[31]

Throughout this period, for security reasons, the British remained unalterably opposed to enabling G-2 to build an independent decryption capability against ULTRA traffic, but the war in the Atlantic and Allied military progress and US cryptologic accomplishments in both the European and Pacific theaters in 1942-43 increased the need for some US-UK intelligence-sharing accord. Following negotiations between Strong from G-2 and Capt. Edward Hastings from Britain's Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS, later the Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ), the wide-ranging pact known as the BRUSA agreement was reached on 17 May 1943 and soon ratified by the senior authorities at Whitehall (British Government offices) and the War Department, with Marshall concurring on 10 June and Stimson signing it five days later. The agreement

> *covers the production, exchange, and dissemination of all special intelligence derived by cryptanalysis of the communications of the military and air forces of the Axis powers, including their secret services. It does not cover traffic from non-service enemy or neutral sources. It provides for complete interchange of technical data and special intelligence from the sources covered, through liaison officers stationed at Washington and at London, and for dissemination of such intelligence to all field commanders through special channels and subject to special security regulations. Provision is also made for United States personnel to obtain experience by engaging in the independent solution of keys in Great Britain.*
>
> *The United States assumes as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese military and air traffic; the British assume a like responsibility for German and Italian military and air traffic.*[32]

31. Marshall memo to Dill, 6 January 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-field-marshal-sir-john-dill-9/.

32. "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department in regard to certain 'Special Intelligence,'" 10 June 1943, at

BRUSA concentrated on sharing finished intelligence rather than raw intercepts and created a system for disseminating SIGINT to field commands. Historian Bradley Smith described BRUSA as

> *a model of good sense and a spirit of compromise. ULTRA's security was protected by the agreement, while Bletchley's ENIGMA decryption monopoly was not disturbed. The US Army not only had its needs for Special Intelligence [SIGINT] satisfied, but its long-term interests were safeguarded because through BRUSA the Americans would, in the words of General Strong, "gain the experience required for achieving independence in this field."*[33]

BRUSA laid the foundation for the longer-term, farther-reaching SIGINT accord signed in March 1946 that came to be called UKUSA.[34]

The British sent the first signal containing ULTRA-derived information in late August 1943. As mentioned previously, Marshall had regular contact with ULTRA reporting through a daily publication called the "Military and Naval Supplement to the Magic Summary," prepared by the War Department's Special Branch. Inside the department, the very tightly held document initially went only to Marshall, Stimson, and the heads of the Army's intelligence and operations divisions. Marshall either mandated or ratified that restricted circulation, which eventually expanded to include 11 recipients in the department and four outside (mostly senior Navy commanders). In addition, he was on the highly restricted distribution list for ULTRA material emanating from Bletchley Park's Hut 3, whose more strategically oriented products were based on a broader range of sources than those from the other Huts. Officers in Hut 3, according to an

https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/spec_int_10Jun43.pdf. As Budiansky notes, the agreement "discreetly sidestepped the issue of diplomatic traffic . . . the British drew a line at providing Washington with copies of neutral countries' diplomatic messages sent via cables that the British controlled. . . . The United States for its part ceased sending Berkeley Street [GC&CS headquarters] information about Latin American countries' codes in September 1944. And when Arlington Hall [the SIS] began work on Russian diplomatic codes in 1943, it went to great lengths to conceal the fact from the British, ensconcing the Russian section behind a plywood partition and keeping it off limits from the British liaison officer. . . . Only after the war did America and Britain let each other know that each had in fact been working on Russian traffic—projects codenamed VENONA in the United States and ISCOT in Britain." Budiansky, "Difficult Beginnings," 66-67.

33. Smith, *ULTRA-MAGIC Deals*, 156-57.

34. "British-U.S. Communications Intelligence Agreement," 5 March 1946, https://web.archive.org/web/20130817205443/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf.

official GCHQ history, were "carrying on a wide variety of intelligence analysis functions and producing an equally wide range of product . . . lifting GC&CS from the position of merely a decryption and translation service to the status of what would be considered in more modern terms an 'intelligence agency' in its own right."[35] Marshall also received information from ULTRA and other intelligence sources at a morning briefing from the head of G-2 accompanied by the counterpart from G-3 (operations) to provide a global picture of developments. According to MAGIC and ULTRA historian Ronald Lewin,

> *By a regular routine, carried out at Marshall's request, the Order of Battle section made its summaries of the previous day's intelligence, mainly CX/MSS [ULTRA], and passed them on to the specialists for comment and amplification. They in turn briefed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who then conveyed the most significant points to Marshall at his morning conference.*[36]

After resolving the intelligence-sharing issue with Britain at the headquarters level, Marshall had to provide guidance to his principal field commanders, Eisenhower and MacArthur, about how to implement the agreement. In March 1944, he wrote a letter to "My dear Eisenhower"—at the time the overall commander of the Allied forces destined for Normandy three months later—spelling out the functions of the special security officers (SSOs), representatives of

35. Ferris, 219, 221-22.

36. "Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the United States War Department, 1943-1945," SRH 005, 9, 12, 13, 23; Lewin, *Ultra*, 259-61. The CX prefix also appeared on British HUMINT reports to give the impression to unindoctrinated consumers that the ULTRA intelligence came from agents and not intercepts. David Kenyon, *Bletchley Park and D-Day: The Untold Story of How the Battle for Normandy Was Won* (Yale University Press, 2019), 87. Each workday morning, after taking care of overnight traffic, Marshall had two meetings—the first with his chiefs of operations and intelligence, the second with his Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Support. Then he met with Stimson to discuss high-level affairs. On Marshall's morning briefings, see *PGCM*, 4:173, notes 2 and 5; Croswell, 207-08; Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 65-66; Thomas Parish, *The Ultra Americans: The U.S. Role in Breaking the Nazi Codes* (Stein and Day, 1986), 231; Pogue interview with Marshall, 21 November 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_12.pdf, 352-53; "War Experience of Alfred McCormack," SRH 185, 33-39. On the role of Hut 3, see Gordon Welchman, *The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes* (McGraw-Hill, 1982), 93-94, 159-61; Michael Smith, *The Secrets of Station X: How the Bletchley Park Codebreakers Helped Win the War* (Biteback, 2011), 57-74, 200-01, 234-36; Peter Calvocoressi, *Top Secret Ultra* (Pantheon, 1980), *passim*; Kenyon, 77. No one in the United Kingdom knew at the time that one of the officers in Hut 3, John Cairncross, was passing information about its work to the Soviets. Smith, 234-36; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (HarperCollins, 1990), 304-05; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives* (HarperCollins, 1998), 218, 220.

special liaison units responsible for the security and dissemination of ULTRA information to field commands. The arrangement was modeled after the British system, which had similar units that liaised with field elements. Marshall's directive clearly indicates that he appreciated the importance of that "special source" and the need for US commanders unfamiliar with it to have dedicated intelligence officers serving at their sides as collators and evaluators.

> *Their primary responsibility will be to evaluate Ultra intelligence, present it in useable form to the Commanding officer and to such of his senior staff officers as are authorized Ultra recipients, assist in fusing Ultra with intelligence derived from other sources, and give advice in connection with making operational use of Ultra intelligence in such fashion that the security of the source is not endangered.*[37]

Marshall sent similar guidance to MacArthur in May 1944 regarding the use of "Japanese ULTRA"—information about Japanese capabilities and plans gleaned from decrypted messages from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin to Tokyo sent via the ENIGMA machine and also decryptions of high-level Japanese communications.[38] This was the latest of Marshall's mostly ineffective efforts to impose outside controls on MacArthur's largely autonomous signals interception and cryptanalysis unit, the Central Bureau, activated in Melbourne, Australia, in 1942. As US Army historian Edward Drea has observed:

> *Centralized procedures had long governed the use and dissemination of ULTRA in the European war. . . . This was not the case in the Southwest Pacific theater where MacArthur consistently rejected War Department initiatives to institute similar controls over his ULTRA. He thwarted successive attempts by Washington to dominate Central Bureau, insisting that the theater command-*

37. Marshall letter to Eisenhower, 15 March 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2015/03/Xerox3325PartA.pdf; "History of the Operations of Special Security Officers Attached to Field Commands, 1943-1945," SRH 033, *passim*; Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents* (McGraw-Hill, 1978), 249-51; Michael Paterson, *Voices of the Codebreakers: Personal Accounts of the Secret Heroes of World War II* (David & Charles, 2007), 130-36.

38. Marshall letter to MacArthur, 23 May 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2015/03/Xerox3325PartB.pdf. As US-British cooperation increased during the war, the United States started designating high-level Japanese decryptions as ULTRA.

Figure 14: Gen. Douglas MacArthur (right) meeting with Marshall in New Guinea, 1943. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

er needed the independence to "produce intelligence from sources that are available locally."[39]

G-2 security officers dispatched to Central Bureau fell under the control of MacArthur's intelligence subordinates; MacArthur refused to allow Col. Clarke to inspect the unit to see that it had established a requested new secure communications channel for transmitting locally produced COMINT material to Washington; and MacArthur's own Chief of Staff, the belligerent Richard Sutherland, amended the above-mentioned ULTRA guidance to conform to existing policies in the Southwest Pacific Command. Marshall's demurral to MacArthur's running of the Central Bureau as he saw fit was much in keeping with the Chief of Staff's mostly hands-off treatment of the thin-skinned

39. Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945* (University Press of Kansas, 1992), 28.

four-star in the interests of encouraging aggressive action in the theater. After the war, Marshall said MacArthur was "conspicuous in regard to temperament," had a "very independent nature," was "hopelessly involved with politics," and "supersensitive to everything."[40] Marshall biographer Pogue noted that

> *In no other theater of war did Marshall have the constant challenge to War Department policy that he sensed in messages from the Southwest Pacific. That no angry showdown came in the course of the war was due largely to his own forbearance and the conviction that MacArthur was especially fitted for the Pacific Command. However, his attitude was misunderstood; some of MacArthur's staff apparently concluded that Marshall was afraid to go to the mat with his former superior.*[41]

When Bissell in late 1944 drafted a letter to MacArthur explaining new strict guidelines for handling sensitive COMINT in overseas theaters, Marshall had it toned down. According to Drea, Marshall

> *agreed that unclear lines of authority and duplication of code-breaking efforts necessitated an independent cryptanalytic agency directly under the Chief of Staff's control but postponed its effective date until after the defeat of Japan. Only MacArthur's stature stood in Marshall's way, but that enormous shadow allowed Central Bureau to maintain its peculiar relationship with the War Department throughout the war in the Pacific.*[42]

Whatever went on between their commanders, the SSOs deployed to MacArthur's command defied Sutherland and carried out their responsibilities as Marshall and the MIS directed them to do.[43]

40. Pogue interview with Marshall, 29 October 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Interview_10-29-56.pdf, 608-09.

41. Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 374. MacArthur was Army Chief of Staff in the early 1930s when Marshall was only a lieutenant colonel and then colonel; biographers of each have indicated that this earlier relationship tinctured their subsequent interactions.

42. Drea, 30. See also Lewin, *American Magic*, 149-51, 268-71, and "History of the Operations of Special Security Officers," SRH 033, 3-4, which state that Marshall had a bit more success in imposing his will on MacArthur.

43. Benson, 142. Many SSOs filed after-action reports that were collected in *Reports by U.S. Army ULTRA Representatives with Field Commands in the Southwest Pacific, Pacific Ocean, and China-Burma-India Theaters of Operation, 1944-1945*, SRH 032.

In February 1944, Marshall informed President Roosevelt of an intercepted and decrypted German military message about a disastrous friendly fire incident that might have compromised ULTRA if it leaked. The message described how American bombers had attacked a train in Italy and inadvertently killed around 500 British POWs. When he learned of this catastrophe, Churchill directed MI6's chief to inform Marshall and Roosevelt about it in a "Most Secret" message with the instruction that the "information should not (repeat not) be made available to any other person." Before Marshall passed on Churchill's message to the President, he added this note: "The reason British authorities are so insistent that no other eyes than yours, mine, and Bissell's see this, as a leak would point directly to British control of German code." The friendly fire incident was hushed up, and ULTRA remained secret.[44]

As the Allied front advanced into Germany, the British organized a program to track down German encryption equipment and cryptologic and COMINT personnel before the Russians could loot, destroy, or capture them. When Marshall heard about the initiative, he wanted the Army to get involved, in part to encourage further Anglo-American cooperation in this vital area, and on 7 August 1944 ordered Eisenhower to detail personnel to participate in the venture. A joint unit called the Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) resulted. TICOM's mission involved sending units of cryptologic experts into Germany beside the frontline troops to seize documents, technology, and personnel of German COMINT organizations before the Russians could get to them—similar to the ALSOS atomic intelligence missions the US Army had deployed earlier (see chapter 6). Marshall, King, and the chairman of the London SIGINT Board defined four objectives for the TICOM mission: "to learn the extent of the German cryptanalytic effort against England and America; to prevent the results of such German effort from falling into unauthorized hands as the German Armies retreated; to exploit German cryptologic techniques and inventions before they could be destroyed by the Germans; and to uncover items of signal intelligence value in the war against Japan." TICOM, with units that at

44. Persico, 289-90, citing Marshall memo to Roosevelt, 15 February 1944, Record Group 457, NARA (not in *PGCM*).

various times included US Army and Navy personnel as well as British assignees from Bletchley Park, achieved most of these goals, interrogating around 200 German communications officers and collecting five tons of documents and numerous pieces of signals and cryptographic equipment. Most notable among the latter was a teletype machine, codenamed FISH, that the highest-level Third Reich leaders used for their most sensitive communications and the intercept machine, codenamed Russian FISH, that the Germans used to collect similar high-grade Soviet messages. The information TICOM obtained gave the United States and Great Britain highly valuable insights into German as well as Soviet military, diplomatic, and cryptologic activities during the war, which were useful later.[45]

In case crucial ULTRA information arrived while Marshall attended the Yalta Conference with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February 1945, he brought along an officer from the German Military Reports Branch of the War Department's Directorate of Intelligence to pass on to him any items that warranted his attention.[46] Marshall spent most of the conference with his military counterparts from Britain and the Soviet Union planning military operations; it is not known if any ULTRA messages came his way during those sessions. On 17 April 1945, five days after Truman assumed the presidency upon Roosevelt's death, Marshall told him about ULTRA, describing it as "a purely British source, which incidentally involves some 30,000 people, and we have bound ourselves to confine its circulation to a specific and very limited number of people. Therefore I request that this [memorandum] be 'For Your Eye [sic] Only.'"[47]

45. On TICOM, see Army Security Agency, *European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II As Revealed by TICOM Investigations and by Other Prisoner of War Interrogations and Captured Material, Principally German*, 9 vols. (Army Security Agency, 1946), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/european-axis-sigint/; Marshall's directive to Eisenhower and follow-on implementing orders in https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/european-axis-sigint/Volume_8_miscellaneous.pdf, 55-62; *TICOM Archive: Secret Intelligence in Nazi Germany*, http://www.ticomarchive.com/home/origin-of-ticom; Randy Rezabek, *TICOM: The Hunt for Hitler's Codebreakers* (self-published, 2016); idem, "TICOM: The Last Great Secret of World War II," *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:4 (August 2012), 513-30.

46. Lewin, *Ultra*, 262; SRH 005, 20-21.

47. Marshall memo to Truman, 17 April 1945, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-the-president-135/. Truman was similarly unwitting of MAGIC when he became President.

A month after the Germans surrendered, the BRUSA pact provided the basis by which Marshall sought access to British SIGINT on the Soviet Union. As early as 1942, Marshall had mentioned to Sir John Dill that the SIS wanted "cryptographic material derived from Slavic Nations"; Dill replied that Britain had shared what it knew about Soviet cryptosystems up to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, when it stopped intercepting Russian communications. Perhaps in recognition of probable future conflict with that ally (but not knowing about VENONA), Marshall noted in a memo to King three years later that "It appears that the British are in a more favorable position than the United States with respect to Rattan [codename for the Soviet Union]" and that "It is desirable that the United States obtain the benefit of all work done by the British on Rattan matters; for this purpose, full exchange with the British of all Rattan intercept material, recoveries, collateral aids and results is authorized." Marshall got King's concurrence for having the ANCIB approach the British to accomplish that intelligence exchange. The matter was to be very closely held. The ANCIB would receive no formal instructions about pursuing it; Marshall told the Army officer dispatched to the ANCIB to convey the directive informally and then "burn the paper."[48] What Marshall learned about Soviet plans through that arrangement is not in the officially disclosed record.

Other "Special Sources"

Marshall had two personal channels of information that provided him with confidential insights, not about his wartime enemies but about his most important allies—senior British military officers and President Roosevelt. He learned about thoughts those leaders did not express in official settings or private meetings in part from Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, representing the British Chiefs of Staff and Churchill in his capacity as the United Kingdom's Minister of Defence. After meeting at the Atlantic Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941,

48. Alvarez, 207; Marshall memo to King, "Signal Intelligence Activities," 5 June 1945, with accompanying note from Bissell, 6 June 1945, unpublished document from Marshall Research Library in author's possession.

Marshall and Dill developed a close friendship; according to Stimson, they would "talk over all kinds of things that representatives of different countries are not apt to talk about so freely."[49] Their relationship gave Marshall privileged access into what the President was telling the Prime Minister in private until Dill died in November 1944. Marshall described the communication problem he was having with his Commander in Chief to Harry Hopkins in 1942:

> *You are familiar with the troubles we get into when we are not aware of what has happened between the President and the Prime Minister, except as we learn of it through the British here who are immediately informed of every detail. Furthermore, we may get into very serious difficulties in not knowing the nature of the President's revisions of the drafts of messages we submit to him. All of these things may easily lead to tragic consequences.*[50]

After the war, Marshall recalled that

> *Mr. Roosevelt was always very sensitive about the reports on the conduct of his own affairs. He didn't want a record of cabinet meetings. He didn't give us the messages he was sending half the time. He would communicate with Churchill . . . and I would be wholly unaware of it, though it directly affected the affairs of the army and the air [force] and maybe the navy.*

Marshall found out what Roosevelt was telling Churchill through Dill, who would pass on what he saw in copies of the President's telegrams that the Prime Minister gave to Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke—Marshall's British counterpart—who then sent them to Dill.

> *Dill would come over to my office, and I would get Mr. Roosevelt's message. . . . Otherwise, I wouldn't know what it was. I had to be careful that nobody knew this . . . because Dill would be destroyed in a minute if this was discovered.*

To protect himself, Dill did not hand over copies of the messages to Marshall but instead sat across from him at his desk and read their contents.

49. Stimson Diary, quoted in Aldrich, *Partnership*, 264.

50. Marshall memo to Hopkins, 4 November 1942, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-mr-hopkins-3/.

> *This was quite a risky thing for Dill, but he realized that we just had to have the information. Why should the British Chiefs of Staff have it—it was from our President—and the American Chiefs of Staff not have it? It was just Mr. Roosevelt's desire for secrecy.*

The irregular arrangement worked both ways:

> *Dill would frequently get messages from Mr. Churchill and ask him to ascertain General Marshall's possible view of this. Dill would come over and read me Mr. Churchill's communication. Then he and I would make up the reply.*[51]

Military historian and biographer Andrew Roberts aptly described Dill's delicate position vis-a-vis his military and political superiors: "Without telling Brooke . . . Dill had consented to be Churchill's go-between with Marshall behind Brooke's back, while he was also Brooke's long-term go-between with Marshall behind Churchill's." Marshall's situation was equally fraught, though, as historian Thomas Parrish observed:

> *. . . Dill was not the only person at risk. Because the whole procedure had been created to thwart "Mr. Roosevelt's desire for secrecy," Marshall's standing with the Commander-in-Chief would hardly have benefited from discovery. Yet he simply had to have the information; more than Roosevelt, he felt, he knew how important it was for the War Department to know not only what was happening but why it was. The risk of discovery had to be run. If the President would not conform to traditional lines of information and responsibility, then Marshall would devise his own unorthodox methods.*[52]

51. Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_14.pdf, 413-14; Marshall interview with Pogue, 13 November 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Interview_11-13-56.pdf, 622-23.

52. Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945* (HarperCollins, 2009), 480; Thomas Parrish, *Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in Politics and War* (William Morrow, 1989), 283. See also Alex Danchev, "Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and General George Marshall," paper presented at the 10th annual conference of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, August 1984. Albert Wedemeyer of the War Plans Division and the Operations Division that superseded it in the 1942 staff reorganization thought Marshall had gotten too close to Dill "and provided the British chiefs and the PM [Churchill] with information on Marshall's thinking which Marshall shouldn't have given him." Quoted in Leonard Mosley, *Marshall: Hero for Our Times* (Hearst Books, 1982), 227. Mosley claims (on 273) that Marshall put Dill on the restricted list of recipients of MAGIC, suggesting a private and irregular

Figure 15: Marshall with Sir John Dill. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Marshall and Dill had a rare disagreement once concerning cryptographic security and intelligence-sharing reciprocity that occurred amidst the above-mentioned dispute over War Department access to ULTRA traffic. Dill had written to Marshall in early December 1942 that Alan Turing, the brilliant cryptanalyst at Bletchley Park and the leading British authority on voice-scrambling devices, had been denied permission to visit the Bell Telephone Laboratories to inspect a new telephone-scrambling device under development there (codenamed "Sigsaly" by the Army) and asked Marshall to allow Turing's visit. In the background lay the issue of whether the United States and Britain were sharing COMINT sufficiently. Marshall told Dill that "I find that this involves other interests than the War Department, and I have been unable to clear it in Dr. Turing's favor." Dill replied that his government was willing to share most COMINT with the United States inside British territory, but that "It appears, however, from the refusal to permit Dr. Turing to have access to the scrambling device experiments at the Bell Laboratory that the U.S. wish to reserve the right not to show our people everything even in this country quite apart from the question of permitting parallel experiments in the U.K. This is a new principle contrary to the spirit of existing agreements." Marshall told Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney to discuss the issue with Secretary Stimson, and in early January McNarney notified the British that Turing's visit could proceed but

arrangement, but sharing that sensitive information went through the more formal channel of the British ambassador in Washington. Lewin, *American Magic*, 47.

that "the War Department must also reserve the right to refuse to permit the 'exploitation' of these secret devices by the British unless such use is approved in each instance."[53]

As an indication of how much Marshall valued his tie to Dill, after the Briton's recall to London was floated, Marshall intervened to burnish Dill's reputation by arranging for him to receive an honorary degree from Harvard or Yale that would generate so much favorable press coverage that Churchill would have to reconsider pulling him back. Yale went further and awarded Dill the Howland Memorial Prize, described in the press as "the highest special award within the gift of Yale University." Marshall delivered highly laudatory remarks about Dill at the ceremony. William and Mary and Princeton followed with degrees, garnering much positive publicity for Dill. Churchill conceded that "Dill must be doing quite a job over there" and left him in Washington. After Dill died, Marshall (with assistance from Stimson) arranged for him to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery, the first non-American so honored, to have an equestrian statue placed in his honor (dedicated in 1950, it is only one of two such monuments there), and for Congress to issue a joint resolution praising him, which President Roosevelt signed in December 1944.[54]

Marshall's other, more dubious, intelligence confidante was the aforementioned Albert Wedemeyer (footnote 52 on page 82). In his memoir, the Anglophobic Wedemeyer wrote that

> *I was having my own troubles with the British planners [of Operation TORCH] at this time. On one occasion, I was apparently misquoted to Sir John Dill, who reported it to Marshall. I told Marshall that Dill's information was not correct. I received*

53. Marshall memo to Dill, 6 January 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-field-marshal-sir-john-dill-9/; Benson, 97-102; Gladwin, 130-34.

54. Marshall remarks at Yale University, 16 November 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/remarks-at-yale-university/; Marshall letter to Amb. John G. Winant, 5 January 1945, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol05.pdf; Marshall letter to Clyde A. Lewis, 10 May 1950, and "Remarks at the Unveiling of the Sir John Dill Memorial," 1 November 1950, ibid., 7:87-88, 222-23; Jordan, 329-30; Parrish, 469; Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 482; John Kelly, "Sir John Dill Fought for Britain. Why Is He Buried at Arlington Cemetery?," *The Washington Post*, 11 November 1918, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/sir-john-dill-fought-for-the-british-army-why-is-he-buried-at-arlington-cemetery/2018/11/09/e7097ac0-e2bb-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html; "Sir John Dill Memorial Grave," https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Monuments-and-Memorials/Dill-Memorial.

> *Marshall's permission to wire my room so that I could make a recording of conversations held with my British opposites in the future. From that time on, whenever I had occasion to discuss official matters of importance with any foreign representative, I could turn on a recording machine with my knee and catch everything that was said. On one occasion I played back a recorded conversation with the British planners for General Marshall so he could hear them making unreasonable demands, while using big names like Roosevelt and Hopkins to intimidate me or influence my action. Marshall was extremely interested and advised me to record all future discussions, which I gladly did. Later, when I explained to Sir John Dill what I had done, he was surprised, but sympathetic, too.*[55]

As Andrew Roberts observed, Wedemeyer's freelance collecting and Marshall's condoning of it were extremely dangerous.

> *Perhaps it was true that the British took advantage of the fact that American planners were not always au fait with* [knowledgable of] *presidential intentions over grand strategy, but it was a devious thing for Wedemeyer to have done, and if the British had discovered it before the end of the war, it would have wrecked Anglo-American trust, especially if it had been revealed that Marshall had not forbidden such disgraceful behaviour.*[56]

That Dill knew what Wedemeyer had done and did not tell his superiors shows how much he valued his personal and professional relationship with Marshall, and also how far Marshall would go to keep the British from gaining an advantage over him—especially after the Casablanca conference, when their British counterparts had embarrassingly outperformed his intelligence and planning staff.

55. Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (Henry Holt, 1958), 164-65.

56. Roberts, *Masters and Commanders*, 223-24.

Chapter 5: Postmortems on Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor

Six of the eight investigations into the Pearl Harbor attack conducted during 1942–46 examined Marshall and his handling of MAGIC and other intelligence. The two investigations Marshall did not participate in were Navy Department inquiries respectively led by Adm. Thomas Hart, held between July and October 1944, and Adm. Henry Hewitt, held during May–July 1945. The Hewitt panel looked into the "Winds code" issue (see below), but Marshall was not called to testify about it.[1]

The Roberts Commission

The first inquiry, the Roberts Commission, chaired by Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen Roberts, met from late December 1941 to late January 1942. Marshall's statement to the commission generally described several messages he and the CNO had sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during July-November 1941. He also "spoke at some length" about his message to that commander on the morning of 7 December regarding the deadline Tokyo had set that day at 1300 for some as-yet-unknown action. The message was delayed in transmission and did not reach Hawaii until after the attack. The commission's report did not implicate Marshall or any senior US leaders in any shortcomings and blamed the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii for assorted lapses.[2]

1. For a concise overview of all the investigations and the political factors surrounding them, see the Melosi book cited in the previous chapter.

2. The Roberts Commission's proceedings can be found at *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol22.pdf; Marshall's statement is at Joint Committee Exhibit

The Army Pearl Harbor Board

Congressional, media, and public dissatisfaction with the Roberts Commission's conclusions prompted the Army and Navy to convene their own inquiries. The Army Pearl Harbor Board met from July to October 1944 and heard from Marshall three times. The first meeting was held in his office, lasted less than an hour, and was mostly off the record so he could apprise the board about MAGIC. The summary of his testimony was that he did not know from MAGIC or any other source about a pending attack on Pearl Harbor but that the Army commander in Hawaii, Gen. Walter Short, had been sufficiently warned as of 27 November 1941 of a possible Japanese strike there.[3] Marshall said he was not aware that Short had put his command on alert only against sabotage operations and not a conventional attack and that the War Department had not tried to find out the state of readiness in Hawaii. Marshall admitted that he could have securely given all of the Pacific Theater commanders more details of Japanese actions gleaned from MAGIC but thought it unwise and unnecessary to do so. He praised the "astonishing" efficiency of the military's small cryptanalytic elements but lamented the "tragic part that a message which became available—that is, monitored, transmitted, deciphered, and translated, pertaining directly to Hawaii and the Harbor—was not available, did not come into us until the following day."[4]

No. 143, 1. The commission's report and conclusions can be found at ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol39.pdf, 1-21.

3. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, CNO Stark, and Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow, head of the Army War Plans Division, composed the message sent on that date (Marshall was away watching Army maneuvers). It read: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken . . ." Ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1032. On the same day, G-2 in Washington sent this brief message to its unit in Hawaii: "Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only." Ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol14.pdf, 1329.

4. "Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board," http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol27.pdf, 11-34, and http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol29.pdf, 2307-30 and 2400-13, quote at 2408.

The board, consisting of three generals Marshall selected because they were available but who might have been biased against him,[5] released its report to the War Department in early November 1944. It sharply criticized Marshall for not promptly sending important information to Short and for his "admitted lack of knowledge" about the state of readiness of Short's command. The report did not suggest that Marshall knew ahead of time that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor—consistent with G-2 assessments from September through November that Japan would take advantage of continuing German victories in Russia to attack Siberia and that it was in a position to strike at the Philippines, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies, or Singapore. Marshall had concurred with G-2 Chief Miles and War Plans Division head Gerow, who disagreed with the Navy's view that an attack on the United States was an early possibility.[6]

Marshall later said he was "implicated in the statements of the board for various derelictions."[7] Major Clausen, an officer in the Judge Advocate General's Corps who helped Marshall prepare for the board's investigation, thought that the General could have acquitted himself much better.

> *He was not fair to himself in the way that he handled this whole business. His approach was naive. . . . He failed to make the answers which he could have made to the Board's criticism. He preferred to leave it to History. He should have had proper counsel and have hammered home his points.*[8]

5. MacArthur had relieved the board's president, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, from a command in the Philippines at Marshall's request, and the board's recorder, Maj. Henry Clausen . . . believed that Grunert "had no love for Marshall." Clausen also claimed that another member, Maj. Gen. Walter Frank, believed Marshall had denied him a third star, and that the third member, Maj. Gen. Henry Russell, thought Marshall had kept him from accompanying the regiment he had trained when it deployed overseas. Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (McGraw-Hill, 1981), 619.

6. The board's report is at *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attacks*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol39.pdf; the references to Marshall are on 144-45. Miles's and Gerow's views are noted in Watson, 496. See also Melosi, 89-98. After the war, Miles defended G-2's assessments in "Pearl Harbor in Retrospect," *The Atlantic*, July 1948, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archives/1948/07/pearl-harbor-in-retrospect/305485/.

7. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attacks*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1345.

8. Pogue notes of interview with Clausen, 27 October 1960, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/06/Clausen-26N-Final.pdf, 3.

After reading the board's evaluation of Marshall, President Roosevelt called the report "wicked" and ordered it sealed until after the war, according to Stimson.[9] It was released in 1946 as part of the joint Congressional investigatory committee's published exhibits (see below). Marshall, wrote Stimson, "admitted to me that he thought his usefulness to the Army had been destroyed by this board's report" and contemplated resigning. "I told him that was nonsense, to forget it."[10]

The Army board failed to turn up one particular piece of possibly incriminating evidence against Marshall. An Army intelligence officer at the Pentagon who monitored MAGIC traffic later told the joint Congressional committee that in October 1941 he saw an intercept showing that Japanese intelligence officers in Tokyo were mapping the locations of warships docked at Pearl Harbor, probably for a future air attack. The Army officer had no authority to alert Short and Adm. Husband Kimmel in Hawaii and could only route the message to Marshall, Stimson, and Gerow. None of them took note of it at the time, and Marshall later testified that he "had no recollection" of seeing it.[11] As Marshall's most recent biographer notes, "If Dewey or the Army board had known about and followed up on this particular intercept, the election of 1944 might have turned out differently. Certainly those who read this message in the fall of 1941 would have come in for much greater criticism by the Army board than they did."[12]

The Navy Court of Inquiry

The Navy Court of Inquiry, which also met during July-October 1944, questioned Marshall mostly about military preparations and procedures but also about how important messages dealing with diplomatic developments and warnings to the US military in Hawaii were handled at the War Department. Marshall repeated much of what he had told the previous inquiries but also answered many questions with "I

9. Stimson Diary, quoted in Prange, 656.

10. Ibid., quoted in Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 430.

11. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, https://archive.org/stream/investigationofp00unit/investigationofp00unit_djvu.txt, 188, 266-F.

12. Roll, *Marshall*, 347.

do not recall," "I have no recollection," and similar vague responses. At one point he stated that after the attack his "whole attention was turned to other things . . . and I didn't see a record or look at a thing until, as a matter of fact, the last day or two, trying to get something for this board—so I haven't probed into this matter. I was busy with something else. That was water over the dam." When asked where he was on the evening of 6 December—a point of interest in the joint Congressional investigation the following year—he replied somewhat dismissively, "I don't know where I was. I never thought of it until this instant."[13]

The Clarke Inquiry

To address concerns that some sensitive Pearl Harbor–related documents were mishandled around the time of the attack or later destroyed in the War Department as part of a blame-shifting effort, Marshall, on the recommendation of G-2 chief Bissell, ordered his own inquiry, run by Col. Clarke during September 1944 and July-August 1945. Marshall later told the joint Congressional committee that

> *there was so much confusion over the handling of the records and what the records were with regard to the times of receipt, transmission, and so forth, that he [Bissell] thought it was advisable to have an investigation to reduce this down to as exact a statement as they could get and, therefore, was recommended to me and I agreed to the procedure to direct Colonel Clarke to carry it out.*

A number of Army intelligence officers testified, and the most contentious point addressed was a vague, hearsay allegation through a convoluted sourcing chain that Marshall had ordered the destruction of the "Winds execute message"—the supposed communication from Tokyo on 7 December, using the "winds code" described in a message three days before, that indicated a Japanese attack had been ordered somewhere. Clarke concluded that no one could have ordered the document's destruction because Army intelligence never had it: "no

13. Marshall's testimony is at "Proceedings of Naval Court of Inquiry," http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol32.pdf, 553-66, and http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol33.pdf, 819-31.

written message implementing the Winds code was ever received by G-2 . . . no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or anyone connected with G-2."[14]

The "winds code" mentioned above referred to words in a message that the Japanese Government sent to its diplomatic facilities worldwide on 4 December warning that relations with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were about to be broken and directing that sensitive documents and cryptographic material and equipment be destroyed upon receipt of a subsequent order—the "Winds execute message." "East wind rain," "West wind clear," and "North wind cloudy" were the respective phrases for each country. The message was sent in "open code," a technique by which a secret message is hidden in an innocent-appearing en clair communication—in this instance, a weather report—the meaning of which is known only to the sender and recipient. Persistent controversy later ensued inside the US Government and among scholars over whether US military cryptanalysts had intercepted and passed on the "Winds execute message" to higher authorities before the Japanese attack. The Navy's Hewitt board assessed that the intelligence staff of the Navy Department had not received it, despite the assertions of Cmdr. Laurence Safford, the service's chief communications security officer.[15] Historians at the National Security Agency's Center for Cryptologic History concluded in 2008 after a thorough investigation that no such message was sent before the attack and that only the phrase referring to Great Britain was sent afterward. They dismissed the significance of the "winds code" messages as a war-warning indicator and considered the whole disputation surrounding them "an artificial historical phenomenon" that "created a conspiratorial aura around the purported Execute message that had nothing to do with events as they actually transpired at the time."

14. The Clarke inquiry report is at *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol34.pdf; Clarke's findings are on 75-76. Marshall explained why he authorized Clarke's investigation at Bissell's suggestion; ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1333-36. See also Melosi, 115-17. After reading memoranda about Clarke's report, Marshall wrote to Bissell with some factual corrections that did not change the report's overall assessment. Marshall memo to Bissell, 22 September 1944, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-bissell/.

15. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attacks*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol39.pdf, 523.

[W]hatever information could have been gleaned from the open code phrases or words themselves added nothing concrete to an understanding of the grave situation that existed between both countries. Nor could these phrases or words have provided any clue whatsoever to specific Japanese plans or intentions in the pacific region. . . . there simply was not one shred of actionable intelligence in any of the messages or transmissions that pointed to the attack on Pearl Harbor . . . these discussions often paid little attention to the context of all of the diplomatic messages during the crisis period before 7 December; it was, at times, as if the Winds message existed in a separate reality.[16]

The Clausen Investigation

On 1 December 1944, Secretary of War Stimson, possibly to offset the Army board's negative conclusions and protect the reputations of his department and Marshall, instituted an investigation by the above-mentioned Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Clausen to look into "a number of unexplored leads" raised in the Army inquiry that touched on Marshall's role in the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure.[17] Some of those leads involved how MAGIC was processed and evaluated and the significance of other Japanese intercepts that the board did not examine. Marshall submitted an affidavit dated 28 August 1945 in which he stated that Short's replies to various War Department assessments before 7 December 1941 "indicated that he was alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against Pearl Harbor."[18] Clausen's report, submitted on 14 September 1945, concluded that the War Department did not have any information it did not give to Short that would have prompted him to do anything different, although such information "might have sharpened General Short's

16. Robert J. Hanyok and David P. Mowry, *West Wind Clear: Cryptology and the Winds Message Controversy—A Documentary History* (National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2008), quotes at 100, 95, xi; see 58-61 and 75 on Marshall and the Clarke Report. The preface to the publication has a succinct summary of the "winds code" debate, emphasizing the evidentiary inadequacies of previous analyses.

17. "Report of Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, Supplementary to the Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board," http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol35.pdf., especially 5-7, 13-19. See also Melosi, 112-15.

18. Ibid., 104-05.

attention or emphasized further the imminence of war."[19] In a statement accompanying the report, Stimson said it explicitly exonerated Marshall of any mistakes and attributed the Army board's criticism of him to a "fundamental misconception" of the chief of staff's duties, which did not include managing the administrative functions of subordinate components.

> *His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and make plans for and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army in a global war . . . [and] to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.*[20]

The Joint Congressional Investigatory Committee

The last Pearl Harbor inquiry Marshall was involved in was the joint Congressional investigatory committee chaired by Senator Alben Barkley (D-KY), the majority leader in that chamber, which began holding hearings in November 1945 and concluded by issuing majority and minority reports in July 1946. The committee was convened because aside from the Roberts Commission, the military services had conducted all the other inquiries and might have been inclined to reach conclusions that protected their interests. The committee's members consisted of six Democrats and four Republicans, five from each chamber. Historian Gordon Prange described them this way:

> *Although no member of the committee was a military expert, the group was as well qualified as one might expect under the circumstances. All were experienced legislators; all were lawyers, half of them former prosecutors. Nor were they prejudiced against*

19. "Report of Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen," 16.

20. Ibid., 18-19.

> *the military. Of the selectees who had been in Congress when the draft bill came up for vote in 1941, only one . . . had voted against it. Three members . . . had been department commanders of the American Legion for their respective states.*[21]

Coming last, the joint committee had access to all seven previous inquiries' testimony, exhibits, and findings and conducted the most comprehensive examination of the evidence, taking around 15,000 pages of testimony and collecting 9,000 pages of documentary exhibits that filled 40 volumes.[22] The breaking of Japan's codes and its implications for US foreknowledge of the attack received extensive attention. The investigation also was the most contentious of all. "Almost every issue raised had its political antecedents; every point of contention had its partisan overtones. . . . With this political schism shrouding the proceedings, the interrogation of almost every witness became a forum for political bickering," wrote the historian of the investigations.[23] The sometimes tense reception Marshall received markedly contrasted with the congenial welcome he got when testifying at Congressional hearings on the defense buildup in 1940. At that time, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) recalled, "Congress always respected him. They would give him things they would give no one else."[24]

One reason for the joint committee's tougher treatment of Marshall was that his glowing reputation had dimmed somewhat since President Truman released the Army board's report to the public in August to quell allegations of a coverup. The disclosure did not accomplish that and caused popular opinion of Marshall to decline. An Office of War Information summary of press reports issued then stated: "There is no getting away from the fact that the public reputation of General Marshall has been smirched [sic] . . . his name has been bracketed with Kimmel and Short, the two men whom the American public has long been led to believe were primarily responsible for the Pearl Harbor tragedy." Rumors circulated that because of the report's

21. Prange, 678.

22. All the volumes are available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/.

23. Melosi, 143, 149. See generally chapter 9 of his book.

24. Quoted in Stoler, "Marshall Legacy," 177.

disclosure, Marshall planned to retire and ask for a court-martial to clear his name. The rumors were not true, but the serial investigations troubled Marshall very much despite the backing he received from Stimson and Truman.[25]

Marshall appeared before the committee eight times for a total of 24 hours, mostly during December 1945 but also in April 1946. The questions and his responses filled 407 pages of the printed record. Marshall later said that at the time he did not discuss anything related to the Pearl Harbor attack with anyone involved in it so "that there [would] be no possibility of a claim or assertion being made that I had connived with other leading witnesses to present a story more favorable to me than the facts might justify"; nor did he examine his previous testimony in other investigations because he "did not wish to be influenced, possibly subconsciously, in what I recalled regarding the occurrences at that time."[26] The editors of Marshall's papers characterized his testimony this way:

> *Marshall's brief time for preparation (two days) and his attempts while testifying to distinguish between what he knew at the time from what he later learned, unwillingness to express certainty of recollection when he was unsure, and frequent assertions that certain facts could best be obtained from the written records or that other persons would be more appropriate witnesses on a particular point lent an air of tentativeness to his testimony. . . . Moreover, his press-inflated reputation for having a phenomenal memory may have worked against him.*[27]

Pearl Harbor scholar Gordon Prange further observed that "[i]n some respects," Marshall "was not a good witness. He had a rather rambling style and did not express himself well. He knew that he was not at his best when testifying. . . . Marshall gave many monosyllabic answers and replies of the 'I-do-not-recall' variety. These do not cre-

25. Melosi, 129.

26. Marshall letter to Cordell Hull, 14 December 1945, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-cordell-hull-2/.

27. Ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GC-MPvol05.pdf, 378.

Figure 16: Marshall testifying before the Joint Congressional Investigatory Committee. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

ate trust and confidence, although they may well represent the exact truth."[28]

Throughout his testimony, Marshall was cautious about relying on what he termed "back sights" (hindsight) and insisted that he, G-2, and Stimson had no specific advance information from any source before 7 December 1941—including MAGIC—that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor on that day. He stated several times that he thought Japan would first strike at Singapore and the Philippines and did not anticipate an assault against Hawaii. "I thought they [the Japanese] would not hazard that." On other occasions, he deflected the inference of a serious intelligence failure by saying that other MAGIC messages from early October to early December indicated that Japan

28. Prange, 689.

showed a similar degree of interest in attacking locations other than Pearl Harbor.[29]

Both committee reports levied general and specific criticisms against Marshall for how MAGIC was processed and disseminated. The majority report, which eight of the members signed, assessed that "the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault" and that US leaders in Washington should have "possessed unusually significant and vital intelligence. Had greater imagination existed, concentrating and applying it to particular situations, it is proper to suggest that someone should have concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack." However, "so closely held and Top Secret was this intelligence that it appears that the *fact* the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more importance than the *information* obtained from decoded traffic"—which the majority report called a "rather specious premise."[30]

The majority report devoted detailed attention to how Marshall and other US leaders responded to crucial MAGIC traffic: the 14-part message Tokyo sent to the Japanese Embassy in Washington on 6 and 7 December, the "pilot message" from earlier on the sixth that notified the Embassy of the longer communication to come, and the two messages later on the seventh that respectively told the Embassy to deliver the 14-part cable to the US Government at 1300 (referred to in committee documents as "the one o'clock" or "the 1 o'clock") and to begin destroying classified documents and cryptographic materials.[31] The pilot message was distributed to the War Department on the afternoon of the sixth, but the record does not indicate that Marshall

29. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, quote at 1149. Marshall's full testimony is at ibid., 1049-1439 and 1499-1541, and http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol11.pdf, 5175-5200. Miles admitted that MAGIC information had not been directly provided to Short and that Army-Navy coordination on intelligence matters was not well integrated at the time. He defended G-2's performance, however, and blamed Short and Gerow for the Army's inadequate preparations at Pearl Harbor. His testimony is at ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol02.pdf, 777-982, and http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1360-75, 1541-83.

30. Ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf, 257, 259, 261. Aegean Park Press published the committee reports in book form in 1994.

31. The messages are in Department of Defense, *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*, 8 vols. (Government Printing Office, 1977), appendix to vol. 4, A-129-35. In the so-called bomb-plot message, sent on 24 September, the Japanese Government directed its consulate in Honolulu to divide Pearl Harbor into a grid—presumably to facilitate targeting—but it was not translated until 9 October and did not attract any interest at the time. Prange, 249. The message is in *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor,* appendix to vol. 3, A-189-90.

saw it. He testified that he did not remember his whereabouts at the time and later in the day but that he probably was at home. Miles knew about the first 13 parts of the long dispatch on Saturday evening but was not alarmed sufficiently to tell Marshall, who did not see them until late the following morning after he went to his office following his usual Sunday morning horseback ride. The 14th part, in which Japan announced it was breaking diplomatic relations with the United States, reached the War Department at around 0900 on the seventh.

Marshall testified that after he read them, he concluded that "the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as [was] the 14th part." "[T]he particular part which affected me and caused me to act was not the 14 parts. It was the one o'clock, which, unfortunately, they [his assistants] put on the bottom of the pile, and I read through everything before I came to that." The "one o'clock" was decrypted at around 0700 and delivered to the War Department between 0900 and 1000. Marshall, notified at home, got to his office between 1115 and 1130 and saw the 14 parts for the first time. He then drafted a warning message to the Western Defense Command in San Francisco, the Panama Canal Command in the Canal Zone, the Hawaiian Command, and the Philippine Command that went to the War Department message center at 1150. He was the only official in Washington with access to MAGIC who alerted US commanders in the Pacific after seeing all the intercepts.[32] Marshall's alert message was sent to Hawaii 80 minutes before the first Japanese planes struck at Pearl Harbor, but it was not received until at least 70 minutes after the attack had begun because the Army communications system was down, and slower commercial channels had to be employed instead. Marshall said he did not use the telephone because it was not fully secure and he did not want to do anything that might divulge MAGIC or "precipitate the whole business"—i.e., start a war. Moreover, he said the meaning of "one o'clock" in the message was not

32. The message Marshall sent read: "Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication." *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*..., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf, 1112. As Forrest Pogue noted, "By the time he [Marshall] saw the intercepts, they had been seen and discussed by the President, the Secretaries of State, Army, Navy, the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence, the Chiefs of Army and Navy War Plans Divisions, and the Chief of Naval Operations." *Ordeal and Hope*, 228.

clear and could have meant either the timing of a diplomatic break or a Japanese military move in Southeast Asia. In any event, Marshall said he would have called the Philippine and Panama Canal Commands first, not Hawaii. He then went home for lunch and did not return until he heard news of the attack—adding to his critics' impression that he had comported himself somewhat lackadaisically that day up until then.[33]

One committee member who signed the majority report, Congressman Frank Keefe (R-WI), took Marshall to task for not trying to find out why he was not immediately informed of the receipt of the first 13 parts of the Japanese dispatch, which O'Keefe termed a "colossal breakdown" of communication on the eve of war. He further asserted that the pilot message, available to Marshall on the afternoon of the sixth, obliged him to make himself available to promptly receive the forthcoming traffic. Marshall "did not do so. In placing himself outside of effective contact with his subordinates for several hours on Sunday morning, he failed to exercise the care and diligence which his position required."[34] Keefe also questioned Marshall about why he had not tried to ensure that Short had made all necessary preparations to defend against a Japanese attack and had not just instituted countersabotage measures. Marshall replied: "that was my opportunity to intervene, and I did not do it." (He used almost the same words when Barkley earlier questioned him about the same lapse.) After several days of intense questioning, the normally stoic witness displayed testiness in some of his further answers:

> *I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not a bookkeeping machine, and it is extremely difficult, it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had merited.*

33. Later that afternoon, Marshall directed that a message be sent to the head of the Western Defense Command to "round up all suspicious characters listed on the round-up list" in cooperation with the FBI. He sent a similar message to the Panama Canal Command. Maj. Maxwell D. Taylor communication to Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, 7 December 1941, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol03.pdf, 8-9.

34. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf, 266-H.

> *Now, in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff, I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself.*[35]

When Keefe expressed dissatisfaction with Marshall's inability to remember exact details of policies and the substance of numerous meetings held several years earlier, Marshall replied, with evident exasperation:

> *You gentlemen are bringing up things to me that have been, to a large extent, rubbed out by four years of global war. I have not investigated these things to refresh my memory until the past few days, and so I think it not unduly remarkable that I would not remember the detailed conversations and the frequency of conferences [or] at which one we discussed this and at which one we discussed that. At the time, of course, I would have had a lively recollection. But there are some rather great events that have intervened. I think I have a fair memory, and I am giving you the best I can under the circumstances.*[36]

The minority report, signed only by Senators Homer Ferguson (R-MI) and Owen Brewster (R-ME), Roosevelt administration critics who were Marshall's most dogged questioners, was even harsher. It called the majority's findings and conclusions "illogical and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee" and by name charged Marshall, Gerow, Stimson, Roosevelt, Kimmel, Short, Stark, and Knox with "failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential to the defense of Pearl Harbor." "There is no excuse for General Marshall and Admiral Stark not to be on the alert on early Sunday morning or for their failure, after they did meet in the middle of the morning, to reach the outpost Commanders with a definite war-warning message before the Japanese attack. . . ."[37] Ferguson, in nine and a half hours over two days, asked very detailed questions about military plans and dispositions, intending to show

35. Ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol03.pdf., 1421, 1422.

36. Ibid., 1406-7.

37. Ibid., http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf, 493, 540, 573.

serious gaps in the Army's and Navy's strategy and deployments that MAGIC decrypts in the weeks before the Japanese attack supposedly should have helped prevent. Miles, who also testified at length before the committee, later described Ferguson as a "rough fellow, but very clever and very intelligent. His questions were extraordinarily intelligent. . . . he gave me a rough time, and he gave Marshall a very rough time."[38] Marshall later reflected that overall the joint committee's investigation "was intended to crucify Roosevelt, not to get me."[39]

One element of blame can possibly be laid on Marshall: the extremely tight restrictions on MAGIC's dissemination came from him. He allowed only the secretaries of war and the navy, the heads of MID and ONI, the CNO, the Chief of the Navy's War Plans Division, the Secretary of State, the President, and himself to receive its messages comprehensively. The joint committee noted that theater commanders could receive MAGIC information only at the principal consumers' discretion and that the Navy did so occasionally, but the War Department (meaning Marshall and Stimson) did not send any to the field because it did not consider the Army code to be as secure as the Navy's.[40] The committee's majority judged that practice to be "reasonable," but military historian Ronald Lewin has concluded otherwise: "A misconceived and misapplied sense of security—stemming from the Chief of Staff himself, George Marshall—meant that those on the MAGIC list sometimes received information too late and sometimes not at all, while others who should have been on the list never had a chance of being informed."[41]

Marshall revisited the Pearl Harbor issue briefly in 1954 after one of Kimmel's key subordinates, R. Adm. Robert Theobald, charged in his just-published book, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*, that Marshall and Stark must have had orders from President Roosevelt not to alert the commanders in Hawaii of the pending Japanese attack. *New York Times* reporter Hanson Baldwin wrote to Marshall asking two ques-

38. Pogue interview with Miles.

39. Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 431.

40. *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol40.pdf, 180-81.

41. Lewin, *Ultra*, 234. In his book on MAGIC, Lewin describes an "obsessive regard for security, stemming from General Marshall." *American Magic*, 67.

tions about Theobald's allegations: whether Marshall ever received "direct or indirect orders or intimations directing you to withhold intelligence information from the commanders in Hawaii or from our commanders in any others areas" and whether he ever got "any direct or indirect impression that President Roosevelt or anyone else in the United States Government planned deliberately to expose the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor and our military installations in Hawaii to Japanese attack." Marshall replied that "I have declined to a large number of press inquiries to make a statement beyond saying that I would rest the matter on the record." He did not want Hanson to quote him but said, "My answer would be an emphatic 'NO' in both instances." A year later, a rumor circulated in Washington that the Navy's official history of Pearl Harbor would blame Marshall and the Army for delaying communications that could have warned of the attack. An Army official informed Marshall that a Navy spokesman told him the rumor was erroneous and that no such contention would appear in any official history.[42]

42. Marshall letter to Baldwin, 15 April 1954, and editorial notes, *PGCM*, 7:828-29.

Chapter 6: Intelligence and Marshall's Views on the Atomic Bomb

Marshall knew about the war's biggest secret, US development of the atomic bomb, in 1941, and knowledge derived from intercepted Japanese communications almost certainly influenced his conclusion that it had to be used against Japan to end the war.[1] He was the only member of the JCS apprised of the work on the bomb from the start because the Manhattan Project administratively fell under the Army Corps of Engineers in the War Department to help conceal its huge cost within the Army's budget.[2] In October 1941, President Roosevelt appointed a policy committee to expedite work on the bomb. Known as the Top Policy Group, its members were Vice President Henry Wallace; Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research

1. Unbeknownst to the United States, Stalin knew about the US program as early as 1943 from Italian physicist Bruno Pontecorvo and German physicist Klaus Fuchs, both Soviet spies in the British atomic project that was melded with the United States' Manhattan Project in August 1943. "By the beginning of 1945, Soviet intelligence had a clear general picture of the Manhattan project," saving between one and two years of development time, wrote historian David Holloway in *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1936-1956* (Yale University Press, 1994), 105, 222. US officials were unaware of Soviet atomic espionage until Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko defected in Canada in September 1945, just over two months before Marshall stepped down as Army Chief of Staff, and later identified British scientist Alan Nunn May as a Soviet agent. No records indicate that Marshall knew of that episode while he was still head of the Army. The first VENONA break indicating Soviet espionage in the US atomic program did not occur until December 1946, and Fuchs was not identified in VENONA until late 1948. Pontecorvo defected to the Soviet Union in September 1950, eight months after the British arrested Fuchs. Frank Close, *Half-Life: The Divided Life of Bruno Pontecorvo, Physicist or Spy* (Basic Books, 2015), *passim*; Nancy Thorndike Greenspan, *Atomic Spy: The Dark Lives of Klaus Fuchs* (Viking, 2020), *passim*; Haynes and Klehr, 33, 304-07; *The Gouzenko Affair: Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage*, eds. J.L. Black and Martin Rudner (Penumbra Press, 2006), *passim*; *VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957*, eds. Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner (National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), xix, xxi, xxv-vi, 141-43, 383-84.

2. The Manhattan Project eventually became the largest scientific undertaking in history, employing an estimated 500,000 people during 1942-46 and costing $2.2 billion dollars ($33 billion in 2022 dollars). *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940*, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz (Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 58.

and Development (OSRD); James Conant, head of the National Defense Resources Committee; Secretary of War Stimson; and Marshall. In March 1942, the President accepted Bush's recommendation made the previous December that the Army take over the program from OSRD, putting Marshall in overall charge. After discussions with Bush and senior Army officers, Marshall approved the selection of the hard-charging Col. Leslie Groves, then overseeing the construction of the Pentagon, to direct the project and had him promoted to brigadier general. In characteristic style, he monitored Groves's overall progress and assured that he had enough money and personnel but otherwise left him largely on his own. Over time, largely for operational security reasons, Marshall gave Groves additional responsibilities over atomic intelligence operations and target selection for the atom bomb. Groves later credited Marshall's detached management style with helping the project succeed: "General Marshall never interfered with anything that was going on. He didn't ask for regular reports; he saw me whenever I wanted to see him, and instructions were very clear. Never once did I have to talk about the approval of money appropriations."[3]

Impeding the German Program

While the American atomic bomb was under development, Marshall was involved in three intelligence-related undertakings to try to foil Germany's work on its own atomic weapon. He fully supported using raids by Norwegian saboteurs and Allied bombers against German heavy-water plants in Norway and approved giving priority to the Vemork facility near Rjukan. He wrote to Dill in April 1943,

3. Rearden, 47; Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., *The New World, 1939-1946: Volume I, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/HewlettandAndersonNewWorldNoBookmarks.pdf, 46, 51, 71-74; Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_14.pdf, 421; Vincent Jones, *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb* (Army Center of Military History, 1985), https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-10/CMH_Pub_11-10.pdf, 76; Settle, 23-25; Robert S. Norris, *Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project's Indispensable Man* (Steerforth Press, 2002), 188, quoting Groves interview with Fred Freed, n.d., Groves Papers, NARA. Marshall admitted that the science behind the atom bomb was beyond him. "I would spend so much time with the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and the dictionary trying to interpret . . . that I finally just gave it up, deciding that I never would quite understand." Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1949* (Viking, 1987), 11.

two months after a partly successful commando raid on it, that the site should be bombed "at the earliest opportunity" and backed recommendations to Roosevelt from Bush and Groves that an air assault be carried out. Groves later wrote that two massive attacks involving 176 Army Air Force bombers the following November set back the German atomic program significantly:

> *Although this mission was not particularly destructive, it apparently led the Germans to believe that more attacks would follow. This belief, together with the problem of constant sabotage by workers in the plants, and probably a lack of appreciation at high government levels of the possible value of the product, caused the Nazis to give up their attempts to repair the damage done by the saboteurs in February. All apparatus, catalyzers, and concentrates used in the production of heavy water were ordered shipped to Berlin. Norwegian guerrillas interfered with every step of the transfer, successfully destroying much valuable equipment and even going so far as to sink the ferry which carried a large part of the heavy water.*[4]

Marshall also authorized the mobilization of US Army intelligence resources to try to find out what progress the Germans were making on their bomb. In December 1942, Vannevar Bush, in his capacity as chairman of the Military Policy Committee on Atomic Fission Bombs, told Marshall and the other Top Policy Group members that "almost no real information is available" on the German atomic program and that "It is entirely possible . . . that [Germany] may be six months or a year ahead in the over-all program due to the head start." US intelligence at the time was inadequately equipped to find out that crucial information. In addition to the bureaucratic problem of the requirement being divided among G-2, ONI, and OSS, as Bush later observed, "Scientific intelligence is not conducted well by Mata Hari methods or through agents who know no science. . . ." Samuel Goudsmit, an atomic physicist who would soon play a major role in the collection effort, later noted that "Only scientifically qualified per-

4. Pogue, *Statesman*, 12; Marshall memo to Dill, 3 April 1943, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-to-field-marshal-sir-john-dill/; Leslie M. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (Harper & Brothers, 1962), 189; Norris, 281-85; Neal Bascomb, *The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler's Atomic Bomb* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016), for a detailed account of all the efforts against Vemork.

sonnel could get us that [intelligence], and a Mata Hari with a Ph.D. in physics is rare, even in detective fiction."[5]

Accordingly, in the fall of 1943, Marshall asked Groves to take over intelligence collection on that requirement and approved G-2 chief Strong's plan (requested by Groves) to send American scientists and military personnel into liberated Italy to gather documents and interview Italian scientists about what they knew of Germany's program. This initiative was the genesis of the Alsos Mission, which later had the broader remit to follow close behind the Allied front lines in Italy, France, and Germany and secure valuable technical resources before they could be destroyed or the scientists could escape or fall into Soviet hands. Although Alsos accomplished relatively little in its first foray into Italy, Marshall agreed with recommendations from Bush, Groves, and Bissell that the initiative should continue and disapproved a proposal from several members of the Army General Staff that effectively would have taken atomic intelligence away from Groves. In May 1944, Bissell informed Marshall that Alsos's revised mission was to "follow the advance of Allied forces into occupied territory, remaining the necessary time after the enemy's defeat and making necessary visits and contacts in order to collect intelligence of the enemy's scientific developments." By November 1944, after seizing documents from offices and laboratories in Strasbourg, Alsos concluded that Germany had no atomic bomb and would not be able to produce one before the end of the war. The military chief of Alsos, Col. Boris Pash, wrote in his memoir that "Alsos exploded the Nazi super-weapon myth that had so alarmed Allied leaders. The fact that a German atom bomb was not an immediate threat was probably the most significant single piece of military intelligence developed throughout the war."[6]

5. Vince Houghton, *The Nuclear Spies: America's Atomic Intelligence Operation against Hitler and Stalin* (Cornell University Press, 2019), 36-38; Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy* (Simon & Schuster, 1949), 135; Samuel A. Goudsmit, *Alsos: The Failure in German Science* (Sigma Books, 1947), 11. Stimson also was concerned about the split responsibilities for collecting intelligence on foreign atomic developments and expressed such to Marshall. Stimson Diaries, cited in Norris, 639 n.26.

6. Houghton, 80-81, 84, 99, citing Bissell memos to Marshall, "Investigation of the Enemy's Secret Scientific Developments," 1 April 1944, and "Mission Organized in MID for the Collection of Scientific Intelligence," 11 May 1944, Manhattan Project records, NARA; Boris T. Pash, *The Alsos Mission* (Award House, 1969), 9, 157-58; Leo J. Mahoney, "A History of the War Department Scientific Intelligence Mission (Alsos), 1943-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University, 1981), 87-88, citing

Marshall endorsed one of Alsos's more politically sensitive operations—moving into the German city of Hechingen in what would be the French occupation zone ahead of French troops in April 1945 to seize and exploit any atomic-related resources there. Because this mission might require assistance from US troops, Marshall told Groves to coordinate the activity—codenamed HARBORAGE—with the War Department's Operations and Plans Division and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. On 23 April 1945, Groves wrote to Marshall that Alsos's recent seizure of the bulk of German uranium supplies—approximately 1,100 tons of ore—"would seem to remove definitely any possibility of the Germans making use of an atomic bomb in this war."[7]

Marshall also was witting of and, by tacit assent, appears to have approved of the OSS's efforts—coordinated with Groves—to kidnap and, if necessary, kill Werner Heisenberg, a Nobel laureate and Germany's preeminent physicist, but he deliberately avoided knowing the operational details. As Groves recalled:

> *At one time during the war, I think it was in late 1943, it was suggested to me by someone in the Manhattan organization, I think a scientist, that if I was fearful of German progress in the atomic field, I could upset it by arrangement to have some of their leading scientists killed. I mentioned this to General [Wilhelm] Styer [Chief of Staff to Groves's superior officer, Gen. Brehon Sommerville, head of G-3] one day and said to him, "Next time you see General Marshall, ask him what he thinks of such an idea." Some time later, Styer told me that he had carried out my wishes and then General Marshall's reply had been, "Tell Groves to take care of his own dirty work."*[8]

Strong memo to Marshall, 25 September 1943, Modern Military Records, NARA. See also Goudsmit, 70-71, about the find at Strasbourg: "The conclusions were unmistakable. The evidence at hand proved definitely that Germany had no atom bomb and was not likely to have one in any reasonable time. There was no need to fear any attack either from an atomic explosion or from radioactive poisons. . . . In short, they were about as far as we were in 1940, before we had begun any large-scale efforts on the atom bomb at all."

7. Groves, chapters 13, 15, and 17; Settle, 59-61; Pogue interview with Groves, 7 May 1970, 16-17 of transcript provided to author by Marshall Research Library; Jones, 280-91; Norris, 287, 303; Houghton, 112-16; Pash, 199; and Rhodes, 613, quoting Groves memo to Marshall, 23 April 1945, Manhattan Project records, NARA.

8. Settle, 56, quoting Groves memo to Marshall, 16 October 1963, in Groves Papers, NARA; Thomas Powers, *Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb* (Knopf, 1993), 257. Groves later



Figure 17. Werner Heisenberg. Source: Department of Energy.

The principal agent in the scheme would be former Major League baseball catcher Moe Berg, who joined OSS in 1943. Berg had orders to kidnap Heisenberg or, when he attended a lecture the physicist gave in Switzerland in December 1944, to shoot him if his remarks indicated that Germany was close to completing an atomic bomb. They did not, so Berg left Heisenberg alone. Other than the above quote, nothing in the record indicates that Marshall knew anything about Berg or this specific plot or an earlier one to kidnap Heisenberg while lecturing in Zurich.[9]

More definitive is Marshall's similarly tacit approval of the collective targeted killing of German scientists. In August 1943, a supportive Strong passed on to him a recommendation from Groves and Bush that laboratories and research institutes associated with the German atomic program be bombed. Strong bluntly stated in his memo to Marshall that "the killing of scientific personnel employed therein would be particularly advantageous." The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in

observed that "Any OSS assistance [to the Manhattan Project] was carefully coordinated and was invariably in accordance with our request." Norris, 293, quoting Groves's comments on David Irving's book about the German atomic program, *The Virus House*, in Groves Papers, NARA.

9. Louis Kaufman et al., *Moe Berg: Athlete, Scholar, Spy* (Little, Brown, 1974), 194-98; Nicholas Dawidoff, *The Catcher Was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg* (Pantheon, 1994), 199-207; Powers, 190-94, 313-14, 384-86, 388-405; David C. Cassidy, *Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics, and the Bomb* (Bellevue Literary Press, 2009), 360-61.

Berlin would be the principal target "to drive German scientists out of their comfortable quarters," as Groves later put it. Nothing in the record indicates that Marshall opposed the action. The mission was carried out in mid-February 1944, when American bombers flying from Britain bombed the section of the German capital where the Institute was located. Some physical damage resulted, but no scientists were killed.[10] In another atomic-related operation that also potentially involved mass casualties, Marshall is on record as authorizing an aerial strike on 15 March 1945 against the town of Oranienburg—about 15 miles north of Berlin in the proposed Soviet occupation zone—the location of a German industrial plant that, Groves reported to Marshall, was "manufacturing by highly secret processes certain special metals to be used for the production of as yet unused secret weapons of untold potentialities." The point of the bombing mission was to keep the Soviets from getting atomic-related resources from the Germans. Because Oranienburg had no strategic importance to Allied war aims, the attack had to be covered with a simultaneous strike against Zossen, located south of Berlin, where the German army had its headquarters. After Groves recommended that Marshall approve that attack, he told Gen. Carl Spaatz of the Army Air Forces that the mission "is of the utmost secrecy" and directed Spaatz not to tell his commanders its true purpose. A massive force of over 600 US bombers, escorted by nearly 800 fighter aircraft, dropped up to 1,700 tons of incendiary and high-explosive munitions on Oranienburg, completely destroying the targeted factory there. Around the same time, more than 700 bombers struck at Zossen, incapacitating the Chief of the German General Staff, Gen. Heinz Gudarian.[11]

Deciding To Use the Bomb Against Japan

On 30 December 1944, Groves informed Marshall that the first bomb, "Little Boy," with the explosive power of 10,000 tons of TNT,

10. Norris, 294, quoting Strong memo to Marshall, 13 August 1943, Manhattan Project records, NARA, and Groves file memo, 7 October 1963, Groves Papers, NARA; Powers, 210-11, 337-39.

11. Houghton, 108-10, citing Groves memo to Marshall, 7 March 1945, Marshall memo to Spaatz, 7 March 1945, and Spaatz memo to Marshall, 19 March 1945, all in Manhattan Project records, NARA (Marshall's memo is not in *PGCM*); Groves, 230-31.

would be ready for use by 1 August 1945. Marshall thought the new weapon might help shorten the war, but at first he was not sure that it alone would compel the Japanese to surrender, in part because of the initial low estimates of its destructive power. Moreover, he had moral qualms about using such a destructive device on a civilian target. He had not objected to the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo with conventional weapons that killed tens of thousands of noncombatants, and he had contemplated the use of poison gas, maintaining that "the character of the weapon was no less humane than phosphorous and flame throwers."[12] He believed, however, that the atomic bomb put warfare into an uncharted ethical realm. In addition, he had known through MAGIC reports from May 1945 that the Japanese were putting out feelers concerning a negotiated settlement and feared the effect of Soviet intervention in the war.[13]

As the time neared for a determination on whether to use the bomb, Marshall appears to be the only member of the JCS who openly expressed concern that the United States should try to avoid killing innocent civilians with it. He initially thought a demonstration of the bomb's explosive power should be staged to awe the Japanese but then changed his mind and proposed that it first be dropped on a military target. If that did not prod the Japanese into surrendering, then one of several large manufacturing sites or ports should be hit next, with the civilian population warned ahead of time to evacuate the areas. "[E]very effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. . . . We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force." However, he did not press the point with the Interim Committee, the Stimson-led group that decided on 31 May to drop the bomb without warning. Groves, not Marshall or Stimson, planned the

12. McCloy memo of conversation with Marshall, 29 May 1945, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-of-conversation/. According to McCloy, Marshall "spoke of the type of gas that might be employed. It did not need to be our newest and most potent—just drench them and sicken them so that the fight would be taken out of them—saturate an area, possibly with mustard, and just stand off. He said he had asked the operations people to find out what we could do quickly—where the dumps were and how much time and effort would be required to bring the gas to bear. There would be the matter of public opinion which we had to consider, but that was something which might also be dealt with. The character of the weapon was no less humane than phosphorous and flame throwers and need not be used against dense populations or civilians—merely against these last pockets of resistance which had to be wiped out but had no other military significance." See also Settle, 99-102.

13. Lewin, *American Magic*, 280-82, 287.

Figure 18: Gen. Leslie Groves with map of Japan, 1945. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

bomb drops (at Marshall's request) and picked the targets, although the Secretary of War asserted his right to veto a target selection. He ruled out Kyoto, the ancient imperial capital, because of its historical and cultural significance. Marshall did not disagree, but, according to Groves, "it was my impression that he believed it did not make too much difference either way." Army Air Force commanders wanted Tokyo as an alternate target to Nagasaki, but Marshall and Truman thought that was unacceptable, possibly because they wanted to avoid killing the Japanese Emperor and did not want to further ravage the fire-bombed city.[14]

Once President Truman—who first learned of the existence of the bomb project after his first cabinet meeting on 12 April 1945—decid-

14. Pogue, *Statesman*, 16-18; Roll, *Marshall*, 363-65; *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol05.pdf, 247 n.2; McCloy memo of conversation, 29 May 1945, ibid., 205-06; Barton J. Bernstein, "Looking Back: General Marshall and the Atomic Bombing of Japanese Cities," Arms Control Association, November 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-11/features/looking-back-gen-marshall-atomic-bombing-japanese-cities; Norris, 379-80; Groves, 267; Groves interview transcript, 24-25; Schmitz, 182; Settle, 123.

ed to use the bomb on major Japanese cities (Marshall and Stimson signed the order), Marshall did not argue against it, later strongly defended the decision, and did not oppose dropping other atomic bombs when they were built. He would have agreed with Stimson's later characterization of using the bomb as "our least abhorrent choice" and that a quick conclusion to the war was necessary. He stated in late June that "Economy in lives and material as well as the psychology of the American people demand that we mount a swift, powerful offensive forcing a victory at the earliest possible date." He did not believe that more heavy bombing or an economic blockade would achieve that. The solution had to be either an invasion or the use of the bomb.[15]

Two developments influenced Marshall's thinking toward preferring the latter. First, intercepted communications indicated that Japan's will to resist was stiffening despite the conventional bombing and naval blockade and that it was planning an all-out defense of the home islands. COMINT—the key source on the Japanese military and leadership at the time—informed Marshall's thinking about both the strategic and tactical use of the atomic bomb against Japan. As former CIA officer Douglas MacEachin has written:

> *Knowledge of the strength and disposition of Japanese defenses that would be encountered in an invasion was heavily dependent on intercepted communications. Allied intelligence services had no effective agents or spy networks in the homeland, nor were there Western sympathizers with access to this kind of information in any detail.*
>
> *Aerial reconnaissance played an important role in detecting force movements and identifying physically definable targets such as aircraft, airbases, and concentrations of weapons and vehicles. Its overall utility, however, was constrained by weather, darkness,*

15. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harper's*, February 1947, 11, at https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-harpers-magazine-article-from-1947-the-decision-to-use-the-atomic-bomb-by-henry-stimson-to-accompany-peter-frosts-article-teaching-mr-stimson/; Settle, 89, 91. If consensus developed around dropping the bomb, Marshall knew that President Truman had to make the final decision. He told McCloy, "Don't ask me to make the decision." McCloy later stated: I can recall as if it were yesterday his insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question. . . . the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of military decision." Ibid., 116.

> *and technology. Prisoner-of-war interrogations had been a source of intelligence for Allied forces throughout the Pacific campaign, but prisoners available as of the spring of 1945 had little if any knowledge about measures being undertaken for the defense of the main islands.*[16]

This COMINT was available to all of the JCS, and Marshall received it through the daily MAGIC summaries and also assessments of it from G-2 and MacArthur's Central Bureau. According to historian Edward Drea, the intercepts

> *did portray a Japan in extremity, but [they] also showed that its military leaders were blind to defeat and were bending all remaining national energy to smash an invasion of their divine islands . . . . [I]t was not difficult for American military planners and political decision makers to believe that the Japanese stood ready to defend their sacred homeland with equal or greater suicidal ardor than the Emperor's soldiers throughout the Pacific war.*

The intercepts revealed the vast extent of Japanese defensive measures: massive troop movements, aircraft deployments, formation of new army and navy units, construction of antiaircraft and artillery installations and concealed facilities for men and equipment, evacuations of civilians from coastal areas, logistical activity, construction of coastal defenses, and preparations for suicide attacks.[17] MAGIC also gave Marshall insights into Japanese leadership dynamics that stiffened his resolve to take the harshest action available against the enemy. He recalled that he "had been reading all the prime minister said to the various ambassadors of Japan, and he was unable at that time to direct the army. The army was dominant in these matters, and they could only be slugged into submission."[18] What Marshall later called the "last-ditch tactics of the suicidal Japanese" would exact such an

16. Douglas J. MacEachin, *The Final Months of the War with Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision* (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), 5.

17. Drea, 203-22, quote at 204; MacEachin, 6-9.

18. Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_14.pdf, 425.

extremely high cost in American lives that dropping the atomic bomb was necessary "to shock them [the Japanese leadership] into action."[19]

On 13 July, an analysis of intercepted Japanese Foreign Ministry cables by the top G-2 officer in the Pacific theater was forwarded to Marshall while he was at the Allied conference in Potsdam, Germany. The assessment downplayed Emperor Hirohito's reported desire for peace and concluded that "quite probably" the Japanese Government "is making a well-coordinated united effort to stave off defeat" in the belief that "Russian intervention can be bought for a proper price" and "an attractive Japanese peace offer will appeal to the war weariness of the United States." Marshall's reaction to the analysis is not recorded, but it likely reinforced his conclusion that using the bomb was necessary to end the war and save American lives.[20]

Second, the very high casualties (105,000) Japanese defenders at Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa had inflicted on US troops in early 1945 would undoubtedly be far greater in the two planned assaults on Japan's main islands of Kyushu and Honshu in November 1945 and March 1946, respectively, by much larger units numbering up to a million Americans. Marshall told President Truman at the Potsdam conference in July that a minimum of a quarter-million casualties might result from Operations OLYMPIC and CORONET, which together comprised Operation DOWNFALL.[21] As he later said:

19. Pogue, *Statesman*, 17; Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, 423, 425.

20. John Weckerling memo to McNarney, "Japanese Peace Offer," 13 July 1945, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 162, "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II," Document 40, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-08-04/atomic-bomb/end-world-war-ii.

21. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945*, volume 5 in *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (University of Chicago Press, 1953), https://archive.org/details/Vol5ThePacificMatterhornToNagasaki/page/n783/mode/2up, Truman letter to Cate, 12 January 1953, reproduced between 712 and 713: "I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokyo plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one-quarter of a million casualties and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed." At Truman's request, a White House "fact checker" made some corrections, emendations, and deletions to the President's handwritten reply to Cate, which is reproduced in MacEachin, 515-18. The revised version of Truman's letter appears in the Craven and Cate book, and it also is in MacEachin, 524-25. The definitive treatments of the planning for the invasion are Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Code-Name DOWNFALL: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* (Simon & Schuster, 1995); and D.M. Giangreco, *Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-47* (Naval Institute Press, 2009).

> *We had just gone through a bitter experience at Okinawa. This had been preceded by a number of similar experiences in other Pacific islands down north of Australia. The Japanese had demonstrated in each case they would not surrender and they would fight to the death. And even their civilians would commit suicide rather than to be taken under the control of the American forces. . . . With this knowledge, particularly of Okinawa, where I think we killed 120,000 Japanese without a surrender . . . it was to be expected that the resistance in Japan, with their home ties, would be even more severe.*

Moreover, Marshall's experience with airpower in Europe had shown him that heavy bombing had stiffened German civilians' resistance rather than sapping it, and that a similar result was occurring in Japan. "We had had one hundred thousand people killed in Tokyo in one night of [conventional] bombing, and it had had seemingly little effect whatsoever. It destroyed Japanese cities, yes, but their morale was not affected as far we could tell, not at all."[22]

Marshall believed that two bomb drops would be enough to persuade the Japanese to surrender. After hearing of the successful test at Alamogordo while at the Potsdam conference, Marshall told Generals Maxwell Taylor and George Patton: "Gentlemen, on the first moonlight night in August, we will drop one of these bombs on the Japanese. I don't think we will need more than two."[23] After the first two drops, Groves, thinking the Japanese were considering surrendering, advised Marshall that a third bomb not be used and, without explicit instructions, so directed the air unit involved. Marshall followed with an order that a third bomb not be dropped without specific orders from the President.[24] Beyond that, he also considered how the weapon could be used tactically to support the invading US forces, possibly drawing on an assessment from Groves in late July. After the two

22. Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, 423. For years since 1945, historians have debated, often heatedly, whether one of Truman's motives in ordering the bomb's use—if not the main one—was to intimidate the Soviet Union with a display of unprecedented military power. That purpose does not appear to have factored into Marshall's calculations.

23. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (Harper & Brothers, 1960), 3.

24. "Lt. Gen. Grove's Atomic Decision: The Paper Trail," George C. Marshall Foundation video, 19 September 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jEC6uMzzkmA&eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=53274a93-b6c8-43d0-9cfc-032d21487f4e.

fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he wanted all future bombs available by November 1945 to be retained for tactical use on Kyushu. Nine of them—three for each of the three US corps landing on the island—would be dropped before and during the assault to help secure the beachhead, target Japanese forces, and repel reinforcements, thus reducing American casualties. In an interview with Pogue, he explained the rationale for using the bombs that way:

> *I had gone very carefully into the examinations out in New Mexico as to the after-effects of the bomb. . . . It was decided then that the casualties from the actual fighting would be very much greater than might occur from the after-effects of the bomb action. So there were to be three bombs [to support] each corps that was landing. One or two, but probably one, as a preliminary, then the landing, then another one further inland against the immediate supports, and then the third against any troops that might try to come through the mountains from up on the Inland Sea. That was the rough idea in our minds.*[25]

Historian Barton J. Bernstein called Marshall "the dominant figure before the end of the war in thinking about tactical use [of atomic weapons]. . . . For Marshall, tactical use had become a substitute, not a supplement, for strategic use."[26]

Employing the atomic bombs tactically would entail six detonations in a triangular zone 65-by-40-by-45 miles, with possibly as many as three more blasts in that area or toward the north. Marshall's nonchalance about the effects of radiation on US troops seems startling now, but little was known then about that subject, and the War Department at the time assessed that "[p]ractically all the radioactive products [from an atomic bomb explosion] are carried upward in the ascending column of hot air and dispersed harmlessly over a wide area."[27] In addition, although Groves had informed Marshall of radiation's possible effects on the Normandy invasion force, he now mini-

25. Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, 424.

26. Bernstein, "Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *International Security*, 15:4 (Spring 1991), 150.

27. Giangreco, 286-87; Settle, 57-59; Sean Malloy, "'A Very Pleasant Way to Die': Radiation Effects and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb against Japan," *Diplomatic History*, 36:3 (June 2021), 535, 539-40, 543.

mized the threat, so Marshall was not told of the risk US troops faced when attacking Japan. (Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, and Stimson similarly knew little about the danger).

Marshall was at home at Ft. Myer on Sunday, 5 August (6 August in Japan), when he heard that the first atomic bomb had exploded over Hiroshima. He received a detailed report about it from Groves several hours later at the Pentagon. Tense days followed the second drop of "Fat Man" on Nagasaki three days later. The Japanese Government did not appear to be moving toward surrender, and MAGIC intercepts picked up signs that they were scheming to ignore or evade any terms of capitulation and building up forces on Kyushu and that the Japanese Army leadership was determined to fight on.[28] An assessment from G-2 on 12 August concluded that protracted negotiations would strengthen the Japanese's position and "be interpreted in Japan as a victory for Japanese diplomacy and as an indication of weakness on the part of the Allies."[29] Marshall agreed with Stimson that the United States should withdraw its demand that the Emperor abdicate; he did not believe American lives were worth insisting on that perceived humiliation. The Allied governments agreed, the demand was removed, and on 15 August Tokyo time, the Emperor decreed that the fighting must end. In retrospect, Marshall said in 1957,

> *There were hundreds and hundreds of thousands of American lives involved in this thing, as well as hundreds of billions of money. They [the Japanese] had been perfectly ruthless. We had notified them of the bomb. They didn't choose to believe that. And what they needed was shock action, and they got it. I think it was very wise to use it.*[30]

After the war, following on his previous experience, Marshall opposed the adoption of a no-first-use policy, supported international controls over atomic energy and sharing of research, and approved building up the United States' atomic capability and continuing weap-

28. Lewin, *American Magic*, 290-91; "Magic Diplomatic Summary," 13 August 1945, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 162, Document 88.

29. Bissell memo to Marshall, "Estimate of Japanese Situation for Next 30 Days," 12 August 1945, ibid., Document 85.

30. Pogue interview with Marshall, 11 February 1957, 424-25.

ons testing with the caveat that the new weapons did not eliminate the need for a large conventional army. Groves had told Marshall and Stimson in late July 1945 about the feasibility of building a bomb that was much more destructive than an atomic weapon. "Such a bomb might introduce the possibility of world destruction if the theories of some scientists are correct that the explosion could ignite the entire world's atmosphere." Yet even after the two atomic bombs showed how devastating a much weaker weapon could be, Marshall did not indicate any aversion to the United States retaining all secrets about atomic weapons and moving ahead with its development programs as a deterrent to the Soviets at any time while in any of the high-level positions he held. Although Marshall did not call for using tactical atomic weapons in Korea, the war probably reinforced his view that a strategic arsenal was needed. He did, however, want the JCS to assess the military implications of using the bomb:

> *The development of the atomic bomb presents far-reaching implications and problems. What the potentialities of this weapon are and what effect it will have on warfare are problems whose solution must be in the future. At the present time, discussion is going in press, scientific, political, and public circles generally on this subject. It is desirable that a concerted viewpoint of the military on the over-all effect of this new weapon on warfare and military organization be developed as soon as possible in the light of the information now available to the event practicable.*[31]

Marshall did not elaborate on what role US intelligence would have in acquiring that information. He received the new Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) assessments and National Estimates as Secretary of State and Defense, but how or whether they influenced his thinking is not evident. They were notable both for their starkly pessimistic judgments about prospects for peace with the Soviet Union and their candor about how little the United States knew about the Soviets'

31. Schnabel, 120, 127; Robert Ferrell, *George C. Marshall as Secretary of State, 1947-1949* (Cooper Square, 1966), 221, 230-31; Settle, 172-73; Doris Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume II, The Test of War, 1950-1953* (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), 456 ff.; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume II, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), 271 ff., 532 ff.; Groves memo to Marshall and Stimson, 27 July 1945, quoted in Gregg Herken, *Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller* (Henry Holt, 2002), 138.

military plans and intentions.[32] Probably with other pressing matters diverting his attention, such as the Marshall Plan and the Korean war, he did not get to urge CIA to develop its nascent capabilities to acquire details about the Soviet atomic program.

32. CIA, "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948," ORE 22-48, 2 April 1948; "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948-49," ORE 22-48 (Addendum), 16 September 1948; "Threats to the Security of the United States," ORE 60-48, 28 September 1948; "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," NIE-3, 15 November 1950; "Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation," NIE-11, 5 December 1950; "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation," NIE-15, 11 December 1950; in CIA Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, www.cia.gov/readingroom/

Chapter 7: Bureaucratic Tangles, Liaison Tensions, and Collection Problems in China

On 18 November 1945, Marshall retired from active service in the Army. The next day, President Truman appointed him as a special envoy to China, partly to mitigate a political flap that the intemperate resignation of the blustery US Ambassador, Patrick Hurley, had caused. President Roosevelt had sent Hurley to China in 1944 to stop the feuding between Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) and Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party. Hurley angrily resigned on 6 November 1945 after his negotiations failed; he blamed "communist sympathizers" in the State Department. Hoping for a respite at his home in Leesburg, Virginia, from the strains of running the Army in the just-won war, Marshall instead reluctantly embarked on an unsuccessful, 13-month-long mission to parley a rapprochement between Chiang and Mao. Truman recalled his brief telephone conversation with Marshall: "Without any preparation, I told him: 'General, I want you to go to China for me.' Marshall said only, 'Yes, Mr. President,' and hung up abruptly."[1]

Marshall left on 14 December, one day after finishing his lengthy testimony before the Congressional Pearl Harbor committee, for a multistop, five-day airplane journey across the Pacific. Notwithstanding the administration's overt assertions, he was not charged with being a neutral arbiter. Recounting a private conversation with Truman, Marshall "stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of his

1. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 2, Years of Trial and Hope* (Doubleday, 1956), 66.

desires in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China—through the Generalissimo within the terms of the announced policy of the U.S. Government. The President stated that the foregoing was a correct summation of his direction regarding that possible development of the situation."[2]

Marshall brought with him some experience in the complexities of China's domestic scene gained while he was stationed there in 1924-27. Just over two years into his tour, he wrote to Pershing:

> *How the Powers should deal with China is a question almost impossible to answer. There has been so much wrongdoing on both sides, so much of shady transaction between a single power and a single party; there is so much of bitter hatred in the hearts of these people and so much of important business interests involved that a normal solution can never be found. It will be some form of an evolution, and we can only hope that sufficient tact and wisdom will be displayed by foreigners to avoid violent phases during the trying period that is approaching.*[3]

Marshall was determined to employ that tact and wisdom in his attempt to secure an accord between the KMT and the CCP. Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, who had replaced Gen. Joseph Stillwell as commander of the China theater, greeted Marshall with the dismal assessment that

> *he would never be able to effect a working arrangement between the Communists and the Nationalists since the Nationalists, who still had most of the power, were determined not to relinquish one iota of it, while the Communists for their part were equally determined to seize all power, with the aid of the Soviet Union. General Marshall reacted angrily and said: "I am going to accomplish my mission, and you are going to help me."*[4]

2. "Memorandum of conversation by General Marshall," 14 December 1945, *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume VII, Far East, China*, Document 557, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v07/d557.

3. Marshall letter to Pershing, 26 December 1926, *PGCM*, 1:294.

4. Wedemeyer, 363.

Figure 19: Marshall with Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer in China, December 1945. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

At the time, the United States found itself, in the words of influential commentator Walter Lippmann, in "a horrible dilemma—to become entangled by intervention in China's civil war, or to get out of China in such a way as to leave China hopelessly divided, and dangerously weak."[5] Operating, as Marshall put it, "between the rock and the whirlpool," and with only a small support staff, he participated in 300 meetings with leaders of the rival forces in an immensely frustrating attempt to end a civil war, eliminate the CCP army, and prod both sides to build a coalition government.[6] Despite exceptional effort and after some early, sporadic successes—most notably, arranging a cease-fire after only a few weeks—Marshall failed to achieve what he had set out to do. Chiang and Mao were both obdurate negotiators, but Mao, at least superficially, showed more flexibility, and Chiang knew that Washington would support him against the Maoists in the end, so he had little reason to make needed compromises and reforms. Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 with very little to im-

5. In addition to the coverage in the Marshall biographies, see also Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, *The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947* (W.W. Norton, 2018; Lippmann quote at 37); Barry F. Machado, "Undervalued Legacy: Marshall's Mission to China," in *Marshall: Servant of the American Nation*, 117-28; the essays in *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, eds. Larry I. Bland et al. (George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998); Katherine K. Reist, "To Mediate Civil War: Marshall and the Mission to China," in *George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War: Policy, Politics, and Society*, ed. William A. Taylor (University of Oklahoma Press, 2020), 38-59; *The China White Paper, August 1949* (originally issued as *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, August 1949), 2 vols. (Stanford University Press, 1967), 1:127-220; Marshall, "Memorandum for Harry S. Truman on China," 18 May 1954, *PGCM*, 7:833-40; and *FRUS, 1946, Volume X, The Far East: China*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v10, Documents 1-723.

6. Marshall message to Marshall Carter, 6 December 1946, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-colonel-marshall-s-carter-18/.

mediately show for the stressful time he had spent in China—"a tale of earnest perseverance and ultimate disillusionment," wrote one historian.[7] The lack of proximate accomplishments notwithstanding, another historian called Marshall's mission "one of his greatest services to the American people." In part because of the firm stand Marshall took with Chiang and his resistance to pressure from certain conservative politicians, media outlets, and business and religious leaders in the United States, the Truman administration did not intervene to aid Chiang's KMT, which, despite its apparent military superiority over the CCP, was "busily digging their own graves and trying to pull us in with them."[8]

The American Intelligence Muddle

While in China, along with the rigors and vexations of mediating with the warring adversaries, Marshall also had to deal with some serious matters concerning US intelligence services' activities and their clashing authorities. He assumed his position soon after Truman had dissolved OSS on 1 October and its espionage and counterintelligence elements were placed in the War Department in a new component called the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The China branch of OSS had established itself in Shanghai in Wedemeyer's headquarters since late October 1944. Soon after Wedemeyer took charge, he advised Marshall that "One outstanding weakness in [the] Allied war effort in China is the fact that there are so many different [intelligence] agencies operating independently and uncoordinated, running at cross purposes, competing for limited Hump tonnage and altogether confusing the situation." Those organizations included OSS (which had developed a relationship with the Communists), various separate Army and Navy elements, the service attaches, the Joint (Army-Navy) Intelligence Collection Agency, and US diplomats. That chaotic arrangement had improved somewhat by the time Marshall arrived, but with China an important target for US intelligence after the war, confusion persisted in some areas of operation, causing difficulties

7. John J. McLaughlin, *General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America's Unsung Strategist in World War II* (Casemate, 2012), 149.

8. John King Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir* (HarperCollins, 1983), 316, 321.

with intelligence support to Marshall during his early negotiations and in his relations with the Chinese Communists later on.[9]

The intelligence situation in China, Marshall told his successor as Army Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, in January 1946 was "unsatisfactory." He was receiving a surfeit of hard-to-reconcile reporting from the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, State Department, and SSU; "there have been too many separate agencies reporting on China which is bound to create confusion, may easily lead to unfortunate leaks and requires too much of my time to examine to see if erroneous impressions may be given." To partially address the situation, he asked Eisenhower to put G-2's China activities under the supervision of the military attache, which the new Chief of Staff did. More serious was the disarray and lack of coordination among US intelligence elements in Mukden, the largest city in Manchuria, the most fought-over region in the Communist-Nationalist conflict.

> *The military Attache was antagonistic to the SSU senior, his side was accused of being pro-Soviet while the SSU was accused of being pro-Kuomintang. Both were criticizing each other and declining to pool or cooperate. . . . The American Consul General, a very fine fellow, was sitting in the middle of this unfortunate American muddle in the center of the most delicate region in the world, possibly, at this moment.*

Marshall employed his familiar management approach of consolidating control in one place.

> *I therefore directed that all United States intelligence agencies in Manchuria be coordinated by the Consul General. I anticipate that there may be objection from [Army General and Director of Central Intelligence Hoyt] Vandenberg's new agency [the Central Intelligence Group], but while I recognize its independency [sic] from one point of view, I cannot accept its independence unless it goes completely under cover, which will take time and the introduction of new personnel. I also anticipate some disagreement from your G-2, but again I cannot accept the responsibility for*

9. Maochun Yu, OSS *in China: Prelude to Cold War* (Naval Institute Press, 1996), 199.

> *action out here with such fumbling and almost public muddling as inevitably goes on under divided control.*[10]

Marshall further complained that the intelligence he was receiving was poor in quality and arrived too late to aid him in the negotiations. He told Eisenhower that "I need immediate radio Top Secret code reports if I am to be benefitted in my work in this manner." To G-2 Chief Bissell he wrote: "What I would appreciate are frequent evaluations of world matters as they effect [sic] China, Manchuria in particular."[11]

A major point of contention arose around that time when Chou En-lai, Mao's lead representative in the talks, complained to Marshall about SSU's spying on the Chinese Communists in northern China and Manchuria.[12] Initially uncertain whether he should accede to CCP demands that the SSU withdraw, Marshall sought advice from the principal US officials involved with intelligence in China. John King Fairbank, a former OSS analyst who was then chief of the US Information Service in China, was critical of the SSU. Conversely, Col. Ivan Yeaton, head of the US Army Observer Group (the Dixie Mission) in Mao's stronghold of Yenan and an expert on Chinese Communism, supported continued SSU operations in northern and eastern China.[13] Presumably hoping to move the talks along,

10. Marshall message to Eisenhower, 2 August 1946, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-general-of-the-army-dwight-d-eisenhower-51/. See also Marshall message to War Department, 1 August 1946, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-the-war-department-office-of-the-chief-of-staff/, and Marshall message to Lt. Gen. Alvan Gillem, 1 August 1946, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-the-commanding-general-china-service-command-gillem/. Gillem commanded US Army forces in China.

11. Marshall messages to Eisenhower and Bissell, both dated 22 January 1946, ibid., 5:420 n. 1.

12. Shortly before arriving in China, Marshall had to deal with a similar flap involving Soviet complaints about OSS operations in Manchuria. In August 1945, an OSS team codenamed Cardinal was dropped into Mukden to learn about Soviet activities in the region and to track down POWs. The Soviets ordered the OSS unit out of its occupation zone. Marshall initially wanted to file a formal protest, but after receiving further information about the situation, he relented and instructed US commanders in China and the Soviet Union to "take no actions . . . concerning this matter," thus ending OSS's collection efforts in Soviet-occupied Manchuria. Yu, 242-47.

13. As Chief of Staff, Marshall had encouraged President Roosevelt to dispatch the Dixie Mission, hoping that it would acquire useful intelligence and help American pilots who had crashed behind Japanese lines evade capture. Roosevelt's message to Chiang read: "Thank you for the steps you have initiated as stated in your message of February 22 to facilitate our plan for sending American observers into North China to gain more accurate information regarding large Japanese concentrations there and in Manchuria. The area of North and Northeast China should be a particularly fruitful source of important military intelligence of the Japanese. We shall therefore plan the dispatch of the observer mission in the near future." Marshall stayed at the unit's spartan outpost in Yenan when he met with Mao in March 1946. One of the mission's original members, S. Herbert Hitch, was on Marshall's staff

Marshall deferred to Chou and encouraged Wedemeyer to stop SSU activities in those areas. Wedemeyer, who wanted the SSU to remain operational, did not respond immediately but then grudgingly recommended deactivating it. During his trip to Washington, DC, in March-April 1946 for consultations, Marshall got into a back-and-forth with the JCS, which at first opposed Wedemeyer's recommendation but reversed itself after Marshall met with them. The War Department's Operations Division then weighed on the SSU's side after SSU leadership told it that the organization "was furnishing practically all the intelligence emanating from the China Theater and also the intra-China radio net of SSU was a valuable asset." At this point, Marshall backed off, saying that "he was not familiar enough with the situation and desired to leave the decision on the continuance of SSU to General Wedemeyer," who changed his mind and allowed the SSU to remain.[14]

Marshall now evidently saw value in having the SSU as an intelligence provider supporting his negotiations and rethought his earlier position about closing it down. After the War Department deactivated the China theater effective on 1 May 1946, the SSU's headquarters office in China continued operating until 1 July. After then, the SSU's China personnel reported to its headquarters in Washington and got logistical and liaison support from the Army, but they preferred that the Navy's Seventh Fleet take over command of their organization. Marshall agreed and sent this message to Wedemeyer in early July:

> *Some form of China SSU organization after 30 September is desirable for essential intelligence coverage, and its continuation under limited control and full logistic support of Seventh Fleet may be necessary. However, realistic steps should be taken to reconstitute it as an undercover agency if possible, particularly if we are to avoid Chinese Government's right to press for a similar*

during the negotiations. Yeaton advised Chou about Marshall's personality and encouraged him to set up a "war room" so Marshall would take him and the Communists seriously (the Americans helped build it). Yeaton also instructed Marshall about the Communists' ideology and goals and accompanied him to the meeting with Mao. Carolle J. Carter, *Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944-1947* (University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 19, 180-83, 186; Kurtz-Phelan, 2-3, 132, 137. On the Dixie Mission's initial activities, see Bob Bergin, "The Dixie Mission 1944: The First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists," *Studies in Intelligence*, 63:3 (September 2019), 19-38.

14. Yu, 256-57.

> *unit in United States or avoid Soviet right to establish similar unit in China. At present, SSU in China lacks cover as counter espionage agency and is of definite value only as an intelligence unit.*[15]

However, Marshall did not want to have any direct tie to the SSU to avoid displeasing the KMT, the CCP, or the Soviets. Chiang and the KMT were concerned that the continued operation of a US intelligence service in China violated its sovereignty; the CCP had already protested to Marshall about SSU activities in north China and Manchuria; and the Soviets had demonstrated their hostility to US intelligence operations in the north since the end of the war. The SSU chief in China reported that "Marshall and [Henry] Byroade [head of Marshall's executive headquarters in Peking] have stated that they want nothing to do with SSU directly, although all admit [the] value of our work." In late July, Marshall indicated his preference that the Navy's Seventh Fleet "assume control and support of SSU China as soon as practicable in order to disassociate officers in the military advisory and executive groups from connection with an intelligence agency." That occurred on 30 September, and SSU/China was renamed External Survey Group 44 and then External Survey Detatchment 44, or ESD 44. The Washington-based Central Intelligence Group, created on 1 January 1946 as OSS's successor, took charge of ESD 44's finances. All elements of the SSU were eventually integrated into CIA, which was established in September 1947.[16]

Three-Sided Intelligence Intrigues

As the negotiations with the KMT and the CCP dragged on, Marshall grew increasingly frustrated as he learned from various sources, including the SSU and the Dixie Mission, that Soviet collusion with the CCP was growing. In May 1946, the Dixie Mission delivered this analysis: "Direct positive proof based upon personal observations together with much circumstantial evidence definitely establishes the fact that the Soviet Union is guiding the destinies of one of its strongest allies, the Chinese Communist Party, as it has in the past

15. Marshall message to Wedemeyer, 7 July 1946, *PGCM*, 5:624; Yu, 252-57.
16. Ibid., 261-62.

and will in the future." Other intelligence reporting concluded that Moscow was supplying Mao's troops with rifles, mortars, machine-guns, and tanks.[17] Marshall was not able to get definitive evidence of a CCP-Soviet nexus through COMINT—"intercommunication back and forth I never was able to pick up exactly," he later said—because Chou appeared to rely on one-time pads to encrypt his messages. In contrast, Marshall often knew what Chiang's supporters were up to ahead of time because American cryptanalysts had much less trouble reading their communications.[18] He also was aware that the CCP had planted agents inside the KMT, including its espionage and counter-intelligence apparatus—they even got hold of Chiang's codebook—but he did not know that the Soviets had penetrated his own side. An economic adviser in the Nanjing embassy, Solomon Adler—whom Marshall called "indispensable"—had passed information to KGB handlers during the war when he worked at the Treasury Department, and now he was informing the Soviets about Chiang and the KMT from his current post.[19] Adler was designated in KGB traffic with the codename "Sax." Presumably the Soviets passed on some of his information to the Chinese Communists, but how or whether that espionage complicated Marshall's mission is not apparent from the record.

Notwithstanding his awareness of the expanding Soviet-CCP relationship, Marshall continued trying to avoid alienating Mao and his confederates. Beyond Marshall's conduct of the negotiations, he demonstrated that attitude in two intelligence episodes. In mid-May 1946, he learned that ONI planned to present a posthumous citation to Dai Li, the KMT's brutal spymaster who ran what at the time was the world's largest espionage organization, with around 500,000 case officers, assets, and informers as of 1945. Dai Li had died in a weather-related airplane crash two months earlier

17. Kurtz-Phelan, 197; Marshall message to Col. Henry A. Byroade and Walter S. Robertson, 14 January 1946, *PGCM*, 5:421.

18. Ibid., 5:420, n. 2. Marshall's own communications were secure because they were encrypted by a Sigaba machine, a highly sophisticated device that the United States and Great Britain used during the war to pass messages about ULTRA.

19. Frederick Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (University of California Press, 2003), 273, 341; Marshall testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 February 1947, *PGCM*, 6:38; Haynes, 144-45; Weinstein and Vassiliev, 158; Marshall message to Byrnes, 10 February 1946, *PGCM*, 5:451.

that many local observers regarded as suspicious. The US Navy had decided to help Chiang build a modern surface fleet, and senior US officials, including Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Admiral King, had promoted Dai Li to be commander of the new KMT navy—a prospect the Maoists abhorred. In a 19 May message to Forrestal, Marshall warned that presenting the citation "will seriously prejudice my efforts by virtually egging on the Communist propaganda against American support of National Government in present conflict. Importance of naval recognition of Dai Li's assistance . . . I think is of negligible importance compared with settlement of present crisis. Cannot this matter be delayed?" Emphasizing the urgency with which Marshall viewed this development, the message's routing instructions to his aide Col. Marshall Carter stated: "Please see Secretary Navy personally immediately and give him the following orally. Repeat orally." According to Cmdr. Milton Miles, a professional friend of Dai Li's who headed the US Naval Group China, Marshall prevented both him and Adm. Charles Cooke, the Commander of the US Seventh Fleet who had a Legion of Merit for Dai Li, from attending his funeral. (Miles did so unofficially wearing civilian clothes.)[20]

Presumably for the same reason that he opposed the Dai Li citation, and perhaps out of personal respect for CCP lead negotiator Chou En-lai, Marshall did not take advantage of an amazingly serendipitous intelligence windfall that came his way—a notebook that Chou had dropped when he dozed off on a plane flight in June 1946. It contained many valuable secrets, including the name and address of one of the top CCP spies in the KMT. On 9 June, Marshall sent an

20. Wakeman, 355-58, 364; Marshall message to Forrestal, 19 May 1946, *PGCM*, 5:560-61; Yu, 255-56. In late 1942, Dai Li had tried to control US intelligence operations in China—particularly OSS's—by proposing an agreement to create a Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO) that he would lead. The JCS took up the proposal in February 1943. King supported it, but Marshall strongly disapproved of the portions of the draft charter that had the US officer in charge of American equities report to Dai Li and not to the commander of US forces in China, Gen. Joseph Stillwell. Stillwell, however, agreed to relinquish control of intelligence to SACO, thereby disarming Marshall's opposition. The agreement establishing SACO was signed in China on 4 July 1943, but neither OSS nor Army intelligence were ever completely subordinated to it. To circumvent SACO, William Donovan collaborated with the commander of the 14th Air Force, Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, to set up the 5329th Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (with the infelicitous acronym AGFRTS) and enable OSS to run operations inside Japanese territory under Air Force cover. No documentation indicates that Marshall got involved in that maneuver in any fashion. After OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945, SACO's dissolution followed 10 days later. Ibid., 94-100, 153-57, 252; Wakeman, 285-93, 315-18, 377-83; Waller, 205-14.

aide to Chou's estate to deliver a thickly wrapped packet. Chou was astonished to find his notebook inside. He was sure that Marshall had had its contents copied and prepared to have the spy in the KMT activate his escape plan. Nothing indicates Marshall had the notebook copied, but if he did, he did not disclose any of the information to the KMT, and the spy continued to operate in place under CCP control.[21] Critics of Marshall's handling of the China mission would later use this incident to demonstrate that he was too willing to defer to Mao to secure an accord with him.

Figure 20: Marshall with Chou En-lai. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Frustration and Disheartenment

Marshall's mediation efforts never regained any momentum after he returned to China from Washington in mid-April 1946. Chiang's nationalists and Mao's Communists had staked out irreconcilable positions, violated earlier agreements, and tried to take advantage of Marshall's attempts to find grounds for compromise. As historian Ernest May succinctly observed, "The Nationalists would make no real concessions, and the Communists only pretended to do so."[22] More expansively, then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated in 1949:

21. Yu, 254. Marshall later wrote that "In my conversations with Chou, I found him to be one of the ablest negotiators with whom I had come in contact. He was very agreeable, clever and inscrutable in the sense that one could never quite tell what were his objectives or intentions of the moment." Letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, 18 May 1951, *PGCM*, 7:525.

22. Ernest R. May, "1947-48: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China," *Journal of Military History*, 66:4 (October 2002), 1005.

> *[O]ur policy at that time [of the Marshall mission] was inspired by the two objectives of bringing peace to China under conditions which would permit stable government and progress along democratic lines, and of assisting the National[ist] Government to establish its authority over as wide areas of China as possible. As the event proved, the first objective was unrealizable because neither side desired it to succeed: the Communists because they refused to accept conditions which would weaken their freedom to proceed with what remained consistently their aim, the communization of all China; the Nationalists because they cherished the illusion, in spite of repeated advice to the contrary from our military representatives, that they could destroy the Communists by force of arms.*[23]

By the fall of 1946, Marshall concluded that his mission was futile. He later lamented that "I tried to please everyone. The result was that by the time I left, nobody trusted me."[24] As early as October, he proposed to President Truman that it be terminated, and in November he ended mediation efforts. In late December, he told the President that "It is quite clear to me that my usefulness will soon be at an end for a variety of reasons," as he had become "persona non grata." "It is now going to be necessary for the Chinese, themselves, to do the things I endeavored to lead them into."[25] Truman announced Marshall's recall to Washington on 6 January 1947 and his appointment as Secretary of State the next day. In a personal statement issued on 7 January, Marshall complained that

> *The greatest obstacle to peace in China was the almost overwhelming suspicion between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. . . . They each seemed only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. . . .*

23. "Letter of Transmittal," 30 July 1949, in *China White Paper*, 1:xi.

24. Roll, *Marshall*, 418.

25. Marshall message to Truman, 28 December 1946, quoted in Kurtz-Phelan, 321.

Figure 21: Marshall with Zhang Qun, KMT representative, and Chou En-lai, CCP representative, 1946. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

One of the few positive passages in Marshall's message was his praise for the intelligence support he received from US elements in China, with due recognition given to the difficult circumstances under which they operated. "It was only through the reports of American officers in the field teams from Executive Headquarters that I could get even a partial idea of what was actually happening and the incidents were too numerous and the distances too great for the American personnel to cover much of the ground."[26]

The following day, Marshall boarded the aircraft that took him and his wife, Lily, to Hawaii for a week of rest before he returned to Washington to start his next assignment. Marshall tried to arrange with the White House for the announcement of his recall and appointment to have a maximum impact in China. He wrote to his aide, Marshall Carter, on 5 January:

> *. . . my decision is to leave here Wednesday a.m. the 8th local calendar stopping over for rest in Honolulu. Request following White House announcement be made 24 hours earlier:*
>
> *"The President has directed General Marshall to return to Washington to report in person on situation in China. He will probably leave Nanking tomorrow morning."*
>
> *In case there is a leak from out here, which is quite possible, make the announcement immediately correcting time element accordingly. I decided that the general effect out here would be better,*

26. *PGCM*, 5:772-76.

> *first to have the shock of my immediate departure with its various implications, to be followed a few days later by the added shock of the January 10 announcement.*

However, outgoing Secretary Byrnes apparently disclosed news of Marshall's appointment, dissipating that intended effect.[27] Soon after he arrived and took up his new post, Marshall would have to deal with the political and security ramifications of his failed mission in the fevered, espionage-inspired atmosphere of the "Second Red Scare" of the latter 1940s (see chapter 10).

27. Marshall message to Carter, 5 January 1947, and Carter message to Marshall, 8 January 1947, *FRUS, 1946, Volume X, The Far East: China*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v10, Documents 366 and 374.

Chapter 8: At State: Protecting Departmental Equities, Dealing With Covert Action

Upon his return from China, Marshall replaced Secretary of State James Byrnes, who had resigned after his relationship with President Harry Truman soured over some domestic political disputes. Marshall had known of his possible appointment since May 1946, when new Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower broached that idea at Truman's behest while in China on a Far East inspection tour. Eisenhower recalled Marshall's reaction: "Great goodness, Eisenhower, I would take any job in the world to get out of this place. I'd even enlist in the Army."[1] Without holding a hearing or floor debate, the Senate unanimously confirmed Marshall in January 1947 on the same day Truman submitted his nomination. He was sworn in two weeks later and became the first professional soldier to hold the office. He also was the fourth Secretary of State in just over two years.

Marshall had extensive experience running a military bureaucracy and liaising with service counterparts from other countries, but aside from his mission to China, he was unfamiliar with the conduct of public diplomacy. Accordingly, he delegated responsibility for managing the State Department to his deputies, Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett, and reserved the policymaking role for himself. He made the transition from military to civilian life smoothly, although he was still referred to, and referred to himself, as "General Marshall." Acheson reported to Stimson that "General Marshall has taken hold of this baffling institution with the calmness, orderliness, and vigor with

1. Jim Newton, *Eisenhower: The White House Years* (Doubleday, 2011), 81.

which you are familiar. We are very happy and very lucky to have him."[2]

During his two years as America's chief diplomat, Marshall dealt with intelligence in several contexts. He restored his department's intelligence capability by annulling a counterproductive bureaucratic change his predecessor made. As the chairman of the executive branch body that oversaw US foreign intelligence activity, he engaged with various programmatic and administrative issues involving CIA's predecessor. While the National Security Act was being drafted and debated in 1947, he sought assurances that the State Department's intelligence prerogatives would not be undermined. Afterward, he worked to reconcile the respective roles of his department and the new CIA in the emerging covert action mission, including the use of an aspect of the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, as a cover for funding secret Agency operations. Finally, CIA's first significant intelligence lapse put Marshall's safety in jeopardy while he was on an official trip overseas and prompted a rancorous interagency dispute that he had to squelch.

Reconstituting State Intelligence

In his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in October 1945, when he addressed the problem of intelligence redundancy and inefficiency, Marshall pointed out that "the necessity [for improvement] applies equally outside the armed forces. It includes the State Department and other functions of Government, and it should therefore be correlated on that level."[3] Soon after he took office, he quickly set about improving the department's intelligence process.

One of his first actions—at Under Secretary Acheson's urging—was restoring the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS), which President Truman had established under the same executive order that had disbanded OSS. Believing that the intelligence component

2. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (Simon & Schuster, 1986), 391.

3. Barkley, 3.



Figure 22: Marshall as Secretary of State. Source: National Archives.

would overwhelm the department's diplomatic functions and that its work duplicated that of the regional desks, Byrnes had broken up the IRIS and distributed its responsibilities among geographic offices—a move the often acerbic Acheson variously called "deplorable," "unhappy," and "gross stupidity." Marshall—perhaps learning from his experience in not addressing Army intelligence's shortcomings during World War II—"understood what G-2 was in the Army Staff and needed no long explanation of what should be done" and immediately ordered the change.[4] On 6 February 1947, the dispersed components were reconstituted as the Office of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence. The restored office later was renamed the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and became known as INR.[5]

4. Acheson, *Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (Norton, 1969), 127, 214. See also chapter 18, "The Department Muffs Its Intelligence Role," for background on Marshall's action.

5. Rudgers, 94-95; *FRUS-EIE*, 185-86 and Document 94; Mark Stout and Dorothy Avery, "The Bureau of Intelligence and Research at Fifty," *Studies in Intelligence*, 42:2 (1998), 18-19. The office's head

Intelligence Management and the National Security Act

As Secretary of State, Marshall served as chairman of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), established in January 1946 to oversee the new Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and the US Government's other intelligence elements. In addition to the secretary of state, the NIA's other members were the secretary of war, the secretary of the Navy, and a representative of the president. The head of CIG, the director of central intelligence (DCI), was responsible to the NIA. The main issues the NIA addressed in its early months centered around which member would exercise the most control over CIG—the Army and the Navy moved out most aggressively at first—and whether the DCI would emerge as a force of his own. Marshall did not oppose DCI Hoyt Vandenberg's effort to become the NIA's "executive agent" with day-to-day authority over the intelligence components of the Department of State and the services. When Vandenberg's successor, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, relinquished that role at the final NIA meeting in June 1947, Marshall likewise did not resist that diminution of the DCI's and CIG's stature. Still, Marshall believed that CIG—and later CIA—should have the preeminent role in foreign clandestine operations; he believed that a "neutral," nonmilitary agency was needed to avoid disputes between the Army and the Navy. Moreover, in keeping with his recurrent themes of centralization, rationalization, and efficiency, he advocated that intelligence funds "should be appropriated in a lump sum and controlled by one person"—presumably the DCI—instead of being disbursed among the various departments. He believed that NIA members should espouse the idea when appearing before Congressional committees.[6]

At first, Marshall fervently opposed President Truman's plans to reorganize the United States' foreign policymaking and warfighting bureaucracy through what became the National Security Act. In a confidential memo to Truman in early February 1947, he couched his

at the time of its restoration was William Eddy, a former OSS officer who had distinguished himself during World War II in North Africa during Operation TORCH and afterward.

6. "Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority," 12 February 1947, and "Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority," 26 June 1947, *FRUS-EIE*, Documents 185 and 319; Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 201.

reservations about the proposed legislation in a way that supported both the President's and his own authorities in diplomacy.

> *The powers and functions which the bill would vest in this [proposed National Security] Council appear to be extraneous to the purpose of the bill—unification of the military departments—and would evidently by statute dissipate the constitutional responsibility of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs . . .*
>
> *Under the foregoing provisions, apart from those which have to do with unification of the armed forces, there would be inaugurated a critical departure from the traditional method of formulating and conducting foreign policy. The procedure under Sec. 301 would give predominance in the field of foreign relations to a body composed of not less than six, of which at least four would be the civilian heads of military establishments. I think it would be unwise to vest such a Council by statute with broad and detailed powers and responsibilities in this field. Under the proposed statute it would be the duty of the Council in carrying out the specific obligations imposed upon it and in exercising the authority granted to limit, in effect, this vital responsibility of the President in the first instance and at the same time markedly to diminish the responsibility of the Secretary of State. Coordination is highly desirable, and the lack of it has been a weakness in the past, but Sec. 301 introduces fundamental changes in the entire question of foreign relations.*
>
> *The constitutional and traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs, principally throughout our history with the aid of the Secretary of State, is deeply rooted, I believe, in the sentiments of the people. There is also the strong feeling that the direction of policy, foreign or domestic, should be dominated by the non-military branches of the Government. The President should not be made subject to the statutory persuasions for which the bill provides.*
>
> *The foregoing comment might be enlarged upon, for example, by emphasizing the implications of the provision that action taken in any department to implement decisions of the Council shall nevertheless be taken in the name of the head of the department.*

> *Under this provision the Secretary of State would become the automaton of the Council.*
>
> *On the basis of the general analysis and considerations stated, it seems to me that the provisions for the Council should be eliminated from the bill, confining its purpose to the unification of the armed services and such reorganization as that might require, without introducing critical matters concerned with the conduct of foreign relations.*[7]

The State Department had no representative on the White House–chaired group that drafted the National Security Act, which might seem odd considering that the prospective NSC would primarily be concerned with foreign policy and potentially encroach upon its domain. As one historian has observed, "it does not appear that the State Department . . . gave any real thought as to how [it] would function in relation to it [the NSC] or the scope of the problems it would consider."[8] Besides Marshall's private assertions to Truman, that observation appears correct. In his memorandum, Marshall explained his department's lack of involvement: "This original purpose [unifying the armed services] was evidently the reason that the Department of State was not asked to participate in previous studies or in drafting. I am aware that in the discussion of these developments reference has been made publicly to a Council having to do with the integration of foreign and military policies; but this has been in very general terms." Also, the fact that the NSC only had a small staff that focused on administrative matters and that the State Department dominated the production of policy papers that the NSC considered might have later allayed Marshall's concerns about the NSC's infringing on his department's equities. After leaving government service, Marshall was critical of the NSC, telling an official study group in 1953 that Truman's council was "evanescent," composed "of busy men who had no time to pay to the business before them, and not being prepared, therefore took refuge in non-participation or in protecting their own departments." Its policy papers "never presented alternatives to

7. Marshall memorandum to the President, 7 February 1947, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/6-018-memorandum-president-february-7-1947/.

8. Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," *Journal of American History*, 59:2 (September 1972), 380.

Marshall and CIA's *Daily Summary*

Marshall did not like CIA's first current intelligence publication that it prepared for the President, mainly because he found it superfluous. In February 1946, President Truman received the inaugural issue of the CIG's *Daily Summary*, a digest of important intelligence-related stories that was the earliest predecessor to the *President's Daily Brief*. The *Daily Summary* also went to the secretaries of state, war, and the Navy; the President's chief of staff; the heads of the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces; and several senior military commanders in plans, operations, and intelligence. CIA assumed the responsibility for producing it. Truman was pleased with having a single publication that gisted what the CIG and CIA determined to be the key foreign policy developments of the day, but other policymakers were less impressed—Marshall among them. After receiving the document for two weeks, he stopped reading it and told his aide to flag only the most significant items for him to look at. The aide did that only two or three times a week; he said that "most of the information in the Dailies is taken from State Department sources and is furnished the Secretary through State Department channels." Marshall also stopped reading a similar publication, the *Weekly Summary*, after the first issue, presumably because he thought it also was a time-waster. (No information indicates that he thought better of the Agency's current intelligence products when he was Secretary of Defense.)[a]

a. Assistant Director, CIA Office of Collection and Dissemination memo to Assistant Director, CIA Office of Reports and Estimates, "Adequacy Survey of the CIG Daily and Weekly Summaries," 7 May 1947, CIA Freedom of Information Act Reading Room.

decide upon," and Truman was not "a force at the table to bring out discussion."[9]

In like fashion, Marshall and his senior advisers initially saw the creation of CIA as threatening their prerogatives. The Agency would be responsible to the NSC, on which the military services would be heavily represented and coequal to the secretary of state, who formerly chaired the NIA. Marshall also was concerned about losing his

9. Anna Kasten Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," *Journal of American History*, 72:2 (September 1985), 370; Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 115:3 (Fall 2000), 339, quoting Marshall testimony, NSC Study,"NSC—Organization and Functions [1949-1953] (5)," 19 February 1953, NSC series, Eisenhower Library.

department's foreign collection and analysis responsibilities to the new central intelligence organization.

> *The Foreign Service of the Department of State is the only collection agency of the government which covers the whole world, and we should be very slow to subject the collection and evaluation of this foreign intelligence to other establishments, especially during times of peace. The powers of the proposed agency seem almost unlimited and need clarification.*[10]

After Truman determined to go ahead with his reorganization plans, Marshall evidently agreed with William Eddy, his senior intelligence adviser, that under the new arrangements, the departmental intelligence elements would retain their prerogatives and that the new central intelligence organization would perform the important task of clandestine collection, which the State Department should avoid but from which it would benefit. Marshall took no further part in the high-level discussions over the National Security Act. His subsequent comments and testimony about it largely mirrored what he said during the service unification debates in 1945.[11]

The Policy Planning Staff and Covert Action

Another early step Marshall took that would have important implications for intelligence was his directive to Acheson to create a planning staff to, in Acheson's words, "look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them."[12] Marshall recalled that when he arrived at State, "I found out that there was nothing, no planning agency, at all. You can't plan and operate at the same [time]. They are two states of mind. . . . One or the other is going to suffer from it."[13] To run what became the

10. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President," 7 February 1947; Hogan, 56-57.

11. Eddy memo to Marshall, 15 February 1947, cited in Rudgers, 137; Sean N. Kelic, "Military Posture for Peace: Marshall and the National Security Act," in *Marshall and the Early Cold War*, 96-97.

12. Acheson, 214.

13. Pogue interview with Marshall, 20 November 1956, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Tape_19.pdf, 562. Foreign Service Officer John Paton Da-

Policy Planning Staff (PPS), Marshall elevated Foreign Service Officer George Kennan, a later champion of covert action, to a position from which he could influence the State Department's developing role in what was then variously called "psychological warfare" or "political warfare."

After CIA was established in September 1947, Marshall had to reconcile the respective roles that it and his department played in conducting covert action. In May 1948, Kennan set forth a strategy for the "inauguration of political warfare," which he defined as the "employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives," including propaganda, support to insurgents, and political action. The CIA Special Procedures Group's success in the Italian elections in April 1948, when the US-aided Christian Democrats turned back an aggressive challenge from the Soviet-supported Communist Party, provided "proof of concept" for that approach, and Kennan wanted State to take the lead in establishing a covert action capability outside of CIA's exclusive hands and before the US military moved in to set up its own. "[T]here are two types of political warfare—one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State."[14]

Marshall was receptive to the idea of the United States having a covert action capability but, unlike Kennan, did not want it lodged in the State Department to avoid potential diplomatic embarrassment. For example, he eschewed having his department associated with the term "warfare" and requested that the word be deleted from the title of a planning paper from an interagency coordinating committee that the NSC was considering. He also asked whether the proposed program would conflict with his policy of telling only the truth over the

vies, who later ran afoul of Congressional critics of US China policy, served on the planning staff and later wrote: "The State Department had never more than occasional ad hoc committees for peering into the future. . . . The Department—including the Foreign Service—had always functioned largely by precedent, esoteric knowledge, intuition, extemporization, and salvage, and rather liked it that way." John Paton Davies Jr., *China Hand: An Autobiography* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 295-96.

14. John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (Penguin Press, 2011), 252-53, 316-17; "Policy Planning Staff Memorandum," 4 May 1948, *FRUS-EIE*, Document 269.

Voice of America.[15] For the same purpose of preventing covert action from compromising his department, he did not favor the creation of an interagency panel that would guide the DCI in psychological operations overseas.[16] In subsequent NSC-level discussions, overt foreign information activities came to be separated from "psychological warfare" and covert action, as reflected in the two lines of authority the NSC granted in its directives. NSC 4 and NSC 43 established the State Department's responsibility for overt foreign information programs, and NSC 4-A and NSC 10/2 gave CIA charge of covert action.[17]

Because CIA's Office of Special Operations had responsibility only for espionage and counterintelligence, a new covert action organization had to be set up. Marshall does not appear to have been directly involved in those discussions, but Under Secretary Robert Lovett was and conveyed his views.[18] By late May 1948, those participating in the deliberations—principally Lovett, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and Allen Dulles, chairman of an NSC special survey group looking at CIA—had determined that the Agency was the proper place for clandestine and covert operations and that a new unit should be created to carry out the latter. NSC 10/2, issued on 18 June 1948, created the Office of Special Projects (OSP)—later renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—with an anomalous status. Its budget was appropriated to the military and the State Department but sequestered within CIA to conceal it from public disclosure. The Agency paid for and administered OSP/OPC, but it fell under the policy direction of the secretaries of state and defense in peacetime and wartime, respectively, with the former nominating its chief with the DCI's concurrence. The DCI was directed to ensure through State and military representatives that covert action operations were planned and conducted consonant with US foreign and defense policy. At Kennan's suggestion, Marshall nominated Frank Wisner, a former OSS officer and now a Deputy Assistant Secretary

15. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 2nd Meeting of the National Security Council," 14 November 1947, ibid., 616 and Document 250.

16. Darling, 260-61.

17. *FRUS-EIE*, 616 and Document 292.

18. Lovett, who succeeded Acheson in July 1947, later said, "I was his alter ego. We worked together almost as brothers." Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959* (Viking, 1987), 150.

at the State Department, to run OSP.[19] With OSP/OPC, Marshall and the State Department had the best of both worlds: a foreign policy action arm they exercised policy guidance over in peacetime (through Kennan's PPS) but with plausible deniability because CIA carried out the operations and reported to the NSC. As Kennan stated after he approved OSP's first operation, " . . . I am ostensibly acting in a personal capacity and can, if necessary, be denied by the Secretary."[20] In the same vein, he wrote to Lovett that "A cardinal consideration in the establishment of Wisner's office under NSC 10/2 was that, while this Department should take no responsibility for his operations, we should nevertheless maintain a firm guidance."[21]

OPC started not quite from scratch, inheriting a small staff, communications gear, and around $2 million in unspent funds. It also received several projects that CIA had begun in previous months—efforts to use balloons and clandestine radios for propaganda—and the operations of the Marshall Plan's administering agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), with anticommunist labor unions in Western Europe. As the Truman administration started using covert action more expansively, including paramilitary operations, OPC grew rapidly. After just one year, its budget expanded to $4.7 million, and it had over 300 personnel and seven overseas stations. During the Korean war, OPC burgeoned; by 1952, its budget was $82 million, and it had over 2,800 personnel and 47 overseas stations.[22]

19. "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," 18 June 1948, and Kennan memo to Lovett, 30 June 1948, *FRUS-EIE*, Documents 292 and 294; Darling, 262-81; Gerald P. Miller, "Office of Policy Coordination, 1948-1952," Clandestine Service Historical Series CSHP 228 (CIA Historical Staff, 1973), 27-37; Gaddis, 31; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (Simon & Schuster, 1995), 29-30; Rudgers, 170-72; Michael Warner, "The CIA's Office of Policy Coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 11:2 (Summer 1998), 211-20; Stephen J.K. Long, "Strategic Disorder, the Office of Policy Coordination, and the Inauguration of US Political Warfare against the Soviet Bloc, 1948-50," *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:4 (August 2012), 459-74; idem, *The CIA and the Soviet Bloc: Political Warfare, the Origins of the CIA, and Countering Communism in Europe* (I.B. Tauris, 2014), chapter 4.

20. Quoted in Gaddis, 318.

21. Kennan untitled memo to Lovett, 29 October 1948, *FRUS-EIE*, Document 305.

22. Anna Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book IV, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate* (Government Printing Office, 1976), 31-32.

After OPC got up and running, Marshall did not directly oversee its operations, leaving that responsibility to Kennan and the PPS. As Secretary of State, he did not express any recorded opinions about political action or paramilitary undertakings, including CIA's first two significant ones, the election operation in Italy and the start of the destabilization effort in Albania, both in 1948. Several times, however, he showed that he regarded propaganda as somewhat "un-American." He did not object to the fact that his department had overall control of "psychological warfare," but he did not want it to have operational responsibility. He insisted that official US messaging be overt and contain no distortion or disinformation, yet he also recognized the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of such "white" (overtly attributable) propaganda. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1947, he stated: "I would be unalterably opposed to our following an ordinary propaganda procedure. I do not think it would be acceptable to the Congress and I am quite certain it would not be acceptable to the people and in line with our traditional thought on what is the right thing to do."[23] In response to a senator's question around the same time—"How directly should we counteract Soviet psychological warfare against the U.S.?"—he replied:

> *[T]he use of propaganda as such is contrary to our generally accepted precepts of democracy and to the public statements I have made. Another consideration is that we would be playing directly into the hands of the Soviets who are masters in the use of such techniques. Our sole aim in our overseas information program must be to present nothing but the truth in a completely factual and unbiased manner. Only by this means can we justify the procedure and establish a reputation before the world for integrity of action. It is a long and tedious procedure, and the result wiII become apparent so slowly that we may not recognize success when it is achieved.*[24]

In 1948, he similarly told an executive branch committee looking at the impact of the National Security Act that

23. "Testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee," 16 May 1947, *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GC-MPvol06.pdf, 135.

24. Marshall letter to Senator William B. Benton, 15 April 1947, ibid., 96.

> *He [Marshall] feels that a democracy will never get very far with propaganda in time of peace. We just don't have it in us to run a successful peacetime propaganda campaign if by propaganda is meant the twisting of facts to support a desired course of action. He feels that the American people are too fair minded to accept propaganda procedure in time of peace. The best procedure for us is probably to "'drench the world with facts, with the truth," although it is sometimes hard even to decide what the facts are and the dividends will accumulate very slowly.*[25]

Marshall realized that the United States was the target of "a continuous propaganda of misrepresentation. It is regrettable, but perhaps natural in view of our position in the world today, that much of this propaganda is directed against the United States. Our purposes are distorted, our motives impugned, our traditions and institutions decried and smeared." Soviet Bloc propaganda was "skillful, diabolical," but nevertheless not something the US Government should or could similarly engage in.

> *We can't afford to do that in our country. I was thinking the other day when I was listening to the other speeches [at the United Nations]: what would happen to me if I made a speech like that? I would be literally torn to ribbons by the American people and the press because they would never have stood for a representative of their government distorting the truth in any such [a] manner like that. For the moment, they might have applauded, but in the end they would have torn you down and properly so.*
>
> *I am always concerned with propaganda—the Voice of America which met with so much approval in Congress. I must insist that they stick to the truth. And, it [adversary propaganda] is seemingly not so effective as the other procedures—one our standards will not permit. Our outlook on life will not permit it, and we don't know well enough how to do it. We are not such free-handed liars.*[26]

25. "Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on National Security Organization" (Eberstadt Task Force), 28 July 1948, ibid., 513.

26. "Speech to the Women's National Press Club," 1 July 1947, ibid., 167; "Speech to the American Club of Paris," 7 October 1948, ibid., 574.

Notwithstanding these general admonitions and ethical reservations, Marshall did not try to curtail OPC's more tactical uses of "gray" (attributable but covert in origin) and "black" (unattributable) propaganda in some of its operations. Perhaps they did not rise to his level of attention, or, as he did as Army Chief of Staff, he let his subordinate "commanders"—in this case, Kennan and Wisner—decide what methods would be most effective in the field. He maintained his cautious view toward propaganda while he was Secretary of Defense during the Korean war. In Congressional testimony in July 1950, he stated that the United States had to meet the Soviet Union's effective and persistent propaganda attacks with its own countermessaging but noted that "as a continuing Government function [those activities] will not be a good thing. But I think it is now urgently necessary. . . . [T]he fundamental principle involved in this effort is that we confine ourselves to the truth. Just what particular truths, at what particular time, in what particular quantity, and how put out, is a technical question for experts."[27]

The Marshall Plan and Covert Action Funding

The record does not definitively indicate whether Marshall was involved in a key engagement OPC had with his namesake program for Europe's economic recovery—the organization's use of "counterpart funds" to bankroll some of its covert activities in Western Europe. It seems unlikely, however, even though the ECA worked separately from the State Department, that the Marshall Plan's principal administrators, Paul Hoffman and Richard Bissell, or the US representative on the European organization that partnered with the United States in carrying out the recovery program, Averell Harriman, would not have informed him at least indirectly of such a potentially controversial employment of monies ostensibly set aside for overt purposes in an unprecedented and highly publicized US effort in which he was so personally invested. Hoffman directed the ECA, Bissell was his deputy, and Harriman ran the ECA's headquarters in Paris. Hoffman

27. "Testimony on Expanding the International Information and Education Program," 5 July 1950, ibid., 7:126.

Figure 23: Marshall with President Truman, ECA administrator Paul Hoffman, and Ambassador Averell Harriman discussing the Marshall Plan, 1948. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

later said, "I kept him [Marshall] informed because he was Secretary of State, but I think his feeling was that as long as it was going all right, that was it."[28] The ECA was not equipped to combat the subversive tactics Communists were using in Europe at the time—such as manipulating elections and propagandizing labor and student groups—so OPC took on that task. Wisner met with two unidentified ECA officials—probably Hoffman and Harriman—in November 1948 to scope the work. "The OPC acted as a complement to the Marshall Plan, providing functions that could not be performed by the CIA or through diplomatic channels. . . . The Marshall Plan was falling short because it had no political functions," according to a history of OPC, CIA, and the Marshall Plan.[29]

28. Pogue, *Statesman*, 255-56. On Hoffman and the Marshall Plan, see Alan R. Raucher, *Paul G. Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid* (University Press of Kentucky, 1985), chapter 5.

29. Wisner memo, "Relationship and proposed course of dealing as between OPC and ECA; memorandum of conversation between H1, H2 and FGW," 16 February 1948, *FRUS-EIE*, Document 307; Sallie Pisani, *The CIA and the Marshall Plan* (University Press of Kansas, 1991), 68. See also Greg

To carry out those "political functions," OPC used its own unvouchered funds and also drew on the counterpart funds authorized for Marshall Plan administration. The legislation creating the ECA included duplicate funding and administrative cost procedures that could be drawn upon for special projects, some of which OPC inherited. In effect, Marshall Plan funding became a concealed appropriation for OPC covert action operating in parallel with the ECA's overt efforts. Bissell explained how the arrangement worked in a 1983 interview:

> *Recipient governments had to deposit 100 percent of the value of their received aid in their own banks. Five or 10 percent went to the US government for administrative—State Department—expenses. Five percent in each country was tapped privately. Hoffman probably knew but didn't like it. Didn't want to know. But he had been told by higher authority [Marshall?] that it was approved use.*[30]

In his memoir, Bissell further recalled that

> *Wisner explained that he needed money and asked me to finance the OPC's covert operations by releasing a modest amount from the five percent counterpart funds. . . . Wisner took the time to assuage at least some of my concerns by assuring me that Harriman had approved the action. . . . I assumed Harriman had sufficient authority and that he probably knew, and approved of, the purpose. . . . I ultimately released the funds to Wisner, and it would not surprise me to learn that the five percent counterpart funds were used for many OPC operations.*[31]

Behrman, *The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe* (The Free Press, 2007), 240-42; Benn Steil, *The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War* (Simon & Schuster, 2018), 315-16; Long, "Strategic Disorder," 475-76. Along with Bissell's memoir cited below, these are the only sources among the many about the Marshall Plan—including biographies of its conceptualizers and administrators—that discuss the covert use of the counterpart funds.

30. Quoted in Pisani, 73.

31. Richard M. Bissell Jr. with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (Yale University Press, 1996), 68-69. For the relevant language in the Marshall Plan legislation, see "Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Economic Cooperation Act of 1948," 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Chapter 169, April 3, 1948," Section 115 (b) (6), https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/06/Foreign_Assistance_Act_of_1948.pdf.

In a 1986 interview, Bissell said that Harriman had conceived the plan to assist OPC with the counterpart funds, but according to the most extensive treatment of the Marshall Plan's connection with covert action, "it is clear from the statements of George Marshall and the actions of George Kennan and James Forrestal that many contemplated emergency funding procedures such as this one."[32] The exact amount of counterpart funds that OPC spent on covert activities is unknown.

Some of the operations OPC conducted in Europe under State Department authorization while Marshall was Secretary included subsidizing anticommunist unions, religious, and political groups, purchasing a newspaper for a labor organization, underwriting a peace conference, and preparing and disseminating pro-Western and anti-Communist propaganda.[33] That Marshall was not directly tied to any OPC undertaking during his tenure demonstrates the effectiveness of the divided lines of authority under which it operated in affording him plausible deniability.

A Close Call in Bogotá

A CIA lapse in handling a warning message from Colombia nearly put Marshall and other Americans in physical danger while he attended the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá in late March-early April 1948. Marshall was mainly interested in establishing an inter-American defense council and building support for resisting Communist advances in Latin America. Since the beginning of the year, violence had broken out in several of Colombia's provinces as supporters of the opposition Liberal Party protested the governing Conservative Party's policies. Tension markedly increased in March when the Liberal leader, Jorge Gaitan, withdrew all his party's members from the government, enabling the Conservative President, Ospina Perez, to appoint an all-Conservative cabinet. Marshall knew that a week before the conference a dispatch from the Embassy warned of "numerous indications that Communists and

32. Pisani, 73.

33. Miller, 14; OPC Finance Division memo to Wisner, "CIA Responsibility and Accountability for ECA Counterpart Funds Expanded by OPC," 17 October 1949, *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman*, ed. Michael Warner (CIA History Staff, 1994), Document 57.

left wing Liberals will endeavor to sabotage inter-American Conference in order to embarrass [the] Colombian Government and create difficulties among American republics." Before he left Washington on 29 March, however, he expressed in "salty" language that no threats should interfere with the proceedings and went on the trip, first to Brazil for another conference and then to Colombia. After 10 peaceful days, rioting erupted in Bogotá after Gaitan was assassinated, and the conference was disrupted.[34]

Marshall was having lunch at a private home beyond the city center, where the American delegation was staying, when the riots started. Gunfire could be heard outside, and the leftists had taken over the radio stations and were broadcasting anti-American messages. Marshall's translator, Army Maj. Vernon Walters (a future Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), wrote in his memoir that he called the Colombian ministry of war and suggested that some troops be sent to protect Marshall. A young Army lieutenant soon arrived with 13 soldiers; he posted them in front of the house and then came inside and sat down.

> *The Secretary of State was sitting in the living room reading a Western novel. He looked out the window at the soldiers and said, "I would like to speak to the officer in charge of these men." . . . He [the lieutenant] came into the living room where General Marshall was, with his helmet under his arm and a loud clicking of heels. . . . General Marshall asked, "Lieutenant, how many men do you have?" I translated the question into Spanish, and the lieutenant replied that he had 13 men. General Marshall cast a glance through the window and said, "But they are all at the front door." The lieutenant nodded and said "Yes, sir." Marshall then said to him, "Well, what are you going to do if they come in the back door?" The lieutenant said, "I don't know, sir." . . . He*

34. Ambassador Beaulac telegram to Marshall, 22 March 1948, *FRUS, 1948, Volume 9, Western Hemisphere*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v09/d9, Document 137; Darling, 242; Ferrell, 272-78; Jack Davis, "The Bogotazo," *Studies in Intelligence*, 13:4 (Fall 1969), 75-87; editorial note, *PGCM*, 6:435-36; CIA *Daily Summary*, 10, 11, 14 April 1948, CIA Freedom of Information Act Reading Room; J.F. Devlin (CIA) memo, "The Bogota Riots—April 1948," 7 January 1952, declassified 20 December 1990, copy in author's possession. CIA analysts assessed that Colombian Communists did not instigate the violence, which was a spontaneous response to the assassination, but did encourage mob activity after riots broke out. Gaitan's assassin was later identified as a personal enemy of his and had no connections with the Communists.

Figure 24: Marshall speaking at Bogotá Conference, 1948. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

> *told the young Colombian lieutenant, "If I remember my small-unit tactics correctly, when you are defending a perimeter, what you do is to garrison that perimeter lightly and place a large, centrally located, mobile reserve at a point where it can move rapidly to any threatened point on the perimeter." The lieutenant nodded but looked somewhat confused and said, "Yes, sir; but what shall I do?" General Marshall smiled and said, "Put one man at the front door, one man at the back door, and all the others in the garage, where they can keep warm tonight." The lieutenant digested this, nodded, clicked his heels, about-faced, and . . . went out the front door and carried these measures into effect. . . . By this time, firing was going on all over the neighborhood, and there were two bodies lying in the street about a block up from our house . . . There was also a heavy attack under way against the large Jesuit college up the hill.*[35]

35. Vernon Walters, *Silent Missions* (Doubleday, 1978), 153-55. Forrest Pogue wrote that Marshall's military aide, Col. Marshall Carter (a future Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the National Security Agency), phoned the War Ministry, not Walters. Pogue, *Statesman*, 389.

The Colombian army secured control of the city during the next two days, and the conference resumed on 14 April, but several thousand Colombians had been killed and many structures in the capital damaged. In a speech to the delegates, Marshall asserted that the violence in Bogotá had followed "the same definite pattern . . . which provoked strikes in France and Italy. . . . This is a world affair—not merely Colombian or Latin American." He later amplified his remarks for the press.[36] In large measure due to the riots, Marshall achieved some of the solidarity he had sought; the conference issued an anti-Communist declaration and concurred in establishing the inter-American defense council. In addition, the Organization of American States was founded at month's end.

Marshall returned to Washington to find the State Department and CIA locked in a bitter wrangle, abetted by Truman administration critics, over who had committed the warning failure, with the two organizations engaged in dueling impromptu declassifications of assessments to substantiate their irreconcilable positions. Thomas Dewey, again campaigning for the presidency, made this allegation:

> *If the United States had the adequate intelligence service it should, it would have known about Communist plans for the Bogotá uprising in advance. Knowing what goes on in the world is just as important as knowing how to handle it. The Panama Canal is vital to our security. Yet because of the dreadful incompetence of our present government, we apparently had no idea what was going on in a country just two hours bombing time from the Panama Canal.*
>
> *During the war the United States had the finest intelligence service operating all over South America under J. Edgar Hoover. After the war Mr. Truman ordered the entire service discontinued. He cut off our ears and put out our eyes in our information service around the world.*[37]

President Truman and Under Secretary of State Lovett added to the confusion by stating that they had no forewarning of violent upheav-

36. Quoted in Ferrell, 278.

37. Quoted in Davis, 81.

als in Colombia and were as surprised at what happened in Bogotá as anyone else. Truman told reporters that he had information about possible picketing and demonstrations at the conference but no inkling that violence would break out.[38]

Congressman Clarence Brown (R-OH) of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, which had sponsored the National Security Act of 1947 that created CIA, launched an investigation into what he called a "South American Pearl Harbor" to "learn whether the Secretary of State and other high officials were promptly warned that a revolution was impending in Colombia, and that their attendance at the Bogotá Conference might endanger their lives and bring embarrassment to the United States." He called DCI Hillenkoetter to testify at an executive session of a subcommittee on 15 April. Hillenkoetter stated that the Agency knew ahead of time about potential violence and read excerpts from classified CIA intelligence reports, based on information received from agents in Bogotá during January-March 1948, that mentioned Communists were planning to demonstrate against and impede the progress of the conference. He then charged that US Embassy officials in Bogotá had blocked transmission to the State Department in Washington of a key report, dated 23 March, about "confirmed information that communist-inspired agitators will attempt to humiliate [the] Secretary of State and other members of [the] US delegation . . . by manifestation and possibly personal molestation" upon their arrival in Bogotá. Brown emphasized the interference issue at the hearings and elsewhere and said Congress had not intended to give the State Department the power to veto Agency reporting. After the executive session, someone leaked the proceedings to the press, and the committee directed Hillenkoetter to read his testimony—including the excerpts from top secret reports and his charges against the State Department—to reporters.[39]

At a news briefing the same evening, a State Department spokesman responded by citing the 23 March telegram from the Embassy men-

38. Darling, 240; David M. Barrett, *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy* (University Press of Kansas, 2005), 34-35.

39. Davis, 82-83; Barrett, 35-37; "Bogota Riots," 5.

tioned above and other information that was more general than the CIA material but covered much of the same ground. The Department said that Marshall had known of these warnings before his departure but had brushed them aside and insisted that it had received no dire forecasts of assassinations or major rioting from CIA. That turned out to be true but not in a fully exonerating way. Hillenkoetter did not transmit the Agency's 23 March report directly to Lovett, as he arguably should have given its alarming nature, but instead adhered strictly to an NSC directive requiring that CIA intelligence be released only by the "senior US representative" in an area—in this case, the ambassador in Bogotá. However, the DCI agreed with another State official there that it should not be disseminated and that the Embassy's own warning on the same date was adequate. Representative Brown then publicly repeated his charges of intelligence failure, and a journalistic to-and-fro ensued, with CIA and State officials laying their respective claims of responsibility on each other's department.[40]

According to the official CIA account of the troubles in Colombia, known at the time as the *Bogotázo*:

> *When Secretary Marshall heard of the rousing events in Washington, he ordered an end to the public dispute between State and CIA and to the airing of classified documents. His authority was sufficient to have his will prevail, though he probably was aided by growing embarrassment among senior White House advisers and leaders of Congress. The Brown subcommittee never reconvened—despite the Chairman's public statements that he planned to call witnesses from State and the military intelligence organizations, and even Marshall himself when he returned to the country. Marshall's success in continuing the conference despite the devastation of Bogotá and in obtaining a resolution condemning international Communism soon produced news stories of US diplomatic successes and decreased attention to charges of intelligence failures.*[41]

In Marshall's view, however, CIA did not come out the better in the Bogotázo flap. When an executive branch task force that was assess-

40. Davis, 83-84; Darling, 223, 241-43; Barrett, 37.

41. Davis, 84.

ing the impact of the National Security Act asked Marshall about the state of the Agency around this time, he replied that "it is on the right track but has received far too much publicity and investigation. The investigations resulting from the Bogotá situation were a blow to the effectiveness of its operations."[42] CIA's contemporary assessment of the episode concurred with Marshall's view: "the capabilities, usefulness, and general efficiency of CIA received quite a going-over in the newspapers. . . . A large measure of unfortunate publicity was given to CIA operations by Hillenkoetter's public testimony and the discussion which followed it." The main criticisms voiced on some editorial pages and in some syndicated columns concerned whether CIA was too dependent on the State Department for intelligence evaluations and communications channels and whether Marshall had ignored warnings of pending violence. One of his officials, however, stated that no such warnings had been feasible under the circumstances: "Only Superman and Steve Canyon [the protagonist World War II veteran in a contemporary comic strip] combined could have learned that, at 1:15 p.m., on April 9, six blocks away from the meeting place of the conference, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan would be shot to death by a personal enemy named Jose Sierra. Such pinpoint predictions of acts virtually unpremeditated are beyond the power of any human intelligence service."[43]

Only a Brief Respite

After serving two years as Secretary of State, Marshall resigned on 20 January 1949. He looked forward to finally retiring from the rigors of public service after nearly 47 years and spending the time he had left at his home, Dodona Manor, in Leesburg, Virginia, with his wife and his gardens or wintering with her at Liscombe Lodge in Pinehurst, North Carolina, near Fort Bragg. Duty soon called again, however, in the now-familiar guise of President Truman, who in September 1950 asked him to serve as Secretary of Defense. Marshall explained to his goddaughter why he acquiesced to Truman's second

42. "Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on National Security Organization," 513.

43. "Bogota Riots," 7-9.

request for him to un-retire: "I have been trembling on the edge of being called again into public service in this crisis, but I hope I get by unmolested, but when the President motors down and sits under our oaks and tells me of his difficulties, he has me at a disadvantage."[44]

44. Letter to Rose Page Wilson, 24 July 1950, and editorial note, *PGCM*, 7:146, 155.

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Chapter 9: At Defense: Establishing Rules of the Road With CIA

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea after the North Korean leader, Kim Il-Sung, got approval to do so from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Marshall was enjoying his retirement when in September, President Truman told him that Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, with whom Truman had had a total falling out for several official and personal reasons, would be asked to resign. The President asked Marshall if he would be willing to serve in that position through the current crisis. Marshall responded: "Mr. President, you have only to tell me what you want, and I'll do it." He had two conditions: he would serve no more than six months (those stretched to a year), and he wanted Robert Lovett appointed as his Deputy Secretary. Truman agreed to both.[1]

The main obstacles to surmount were rebutting conservative Republicans' attacks on Marshall's record on China and getting Congressional approval to waive the National Security Act's requirement that, to guarantee civilian control of the military, the secretary of defense could not have served on active duty as an officer in the armed services during the previous 10 years. Some acerbic debate in both houses ensued in which a few rightwing members impugned Marshall's character and record as showing he was "soft" on Communism and helped "lose" China to Mao Zedong and the CCP. Marshall had cautioned Truman that "my appointment may reflect negatively on you and your administration. . . . I want to help, not hurt you," but the waiver easily passed with the stipulation that it applied only to him.

1. Roll, *Marshall*, 562-63.

After a one-day confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at which he faced sharp questioning from Republican William E. Jenner (R-IN), Marshall was confirmed by a 57-11 majority on 20 September and was sworn in the next day.[2]

Marshall took office less than a week after MacArthur's successful surprise attack at Inchon, North Korea, on 15 September, and soon after United Nations forces began to drive the North Koreans back toward the 38th Parallel. Most of his year at the Pentagon was preoccupied with overseeing the conduct of the war, dealing with MacArthur's insubordination and dismissal as commander of military operations in Korea, pacifying a dispute between the Air Force and the Navy over capital weapons priorities, rebuilding demobilized US military forces, meeting and negotiating with European defense and foreign ministers about the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and repairing relations with the JCS and the Department of State because of friction between his predecessor Johnson and the service chiefs and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Despite some demonstrated inadequacies in US military intelligence thus far in the war—particularly in COMINT, which presumably would have attracted his attention—he did not address them as part of his other efforts to improve efficiency in the Department.[3] The only organizational change pertaining to intelligence that he made was establishing a Domestic Security Coordinating Council to oversee the activities of staff components that dealt with civil defense and "internal security."[4]

2. *PGCM*, 7:155, 160-63; Condit, 34-35; Wayne C. Thompson, *A General's Last Call: George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense, 1950-51* (Mariner Publishing, 2020), 9-16; Roll, *Marshall*, 562-65; Pogue, *Statesman*, 420-28. Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) told reporters that "Marshall should not be confirmed unless and until he convinces the Senate that he has learned the facts of life about communism that that he will listen to MacArthur's advice rather than Acheson's advice on the Far East." Four days earlier, during debate to amend the National Security Act to permit Marshall's nomination, McCarthy's Senate *confrere*, Jenner, had gone even further and accused Marshall of being "not only willing" but "eager to play the role of a front man for traitors. The truth is this is no new role for him, for General George C. Marshall is a living lie . . . an errand boy, a front man, a stooge, or a conspirator for this administration's crazy assortment of collectivist cutthroat crackpots and Communist fellow-traveling appeasers." *PGCM*, 7:161; "Appointment of General George C. Marshall to the Office of Secretary of Defense," *Congressional Record* 96, pt. 11, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 14914, 14917.

3. The official history of Marshall's office states that he "did not seek drastic organizational change" and "found the current OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] organization generally satisfactory and accepted some 'growing pains' as inevitable." Condit, 483. On the problems with Korean war COMINT, see Thomas R. Johnson, "American Cryptology During the Korean War," *Studies in Intelligence*, 43:3 (2001), 29-37.

4. Editorial note, *PGCM*, 7:372.

Figure 25: Secretary of Defense Marshall in his Pentagon office, 1951. Source: Department of Defense.

On one occasion, he expressed some annoyance at press demands for government transparency and the lack of information about the Soviet Union's military buildup. In a speech on 9 April 1951, he complained that at times he felt like "a G-2 [intelligence officer] for Stalin. I am perfectly willing to be that if they make him a G-2 for me. We don't know anything about that side and have to tell everything on this side."[5] On major intelligence issues, Marshall focused on resolving four concerns that arose between the Pentagon and CIA during 1950-51, mainly as a result of the Korean war: the level of Defense Department support for the Agency's intelligence missions and requirements, including personnel staffing; conflicts between CIA and the military services in the areas of espionage and counter-

5. Ibid., 464.

intelligence; the Agency's role in paramilitary operations in Korea and elsewhere and its and the Pentagon's respective responsibilities for them; and CIA's preparation of intelligence assessments of the Soviet threat that the DCI believed necessitated access to sensitive but hitherto unshared US military information.

A predominating factor in how Marshall handled those issues was the leadership at CIA. On 7 October, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith became DCI after Hillenkoetter left under a cloud because of a series of actual and perceived CIA intelligence failures—the Bogotázo flap, the surprise Soviet atomic test in 1949, and the lack of tactical warning of the North Korean invasion. Marshall had known Smith since 1931, when as a captain Smith came to then-Colonel Marshall's attention at the Army Infantry School. When Smith graduated, Marshall had him appointed as the school's secretary. When Marshall became Army Chief of Staff in 1939, he had then-Major Smith assigned to the War Department General Staff as its assistant secretary. Smith subsequently became the Secretary of the General Staff, the JCS, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. When Eisenhower took over US forces in the European theater, he accepted Marshall's suggestion that Smith be his Chief of Staff. Smith was promoted steadily and received his third star in 1944. He later served under Chief of Staff Eisenhower as head of operations and planning, after the war as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and then as commander of the First Army before his appointment as DCI.[6]

In that position, Smith, who had no prior direct involvement with intelligence, set out to rectify the organizational problems at CIA that had contributed to the above-mentioned intelligence lapses, and he jousted with Marshall at times in his effort to establish the Agency's prerogatives vis-a-vis the armed forces. As a career military man, Marshall was on more familiar territory at the Pentagon than at Foggy Bottom, but overall he was more passive and less engaged as Secretary of Defense than he had been as Secretary of State, probably because of age, health, and fatigue. He maintained a cordial and businesslike relationship with Smith, generally was inclined to seek

6. Ludwell Lee Montague, *Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1992), 5-6; Crosswell, 165-74 and *passim*.

compromises with the Agency, and did not second-guess its sometimes inaccurate assessments of events in Korea or meddle in its covert operations there. However, he did confront the cantankerous DCI when he thought important departmental equities were at stake. (Smith was often described as being the most even-tempered man anyone could meet; he was always angry.)[7]

Pentagon Support to CIA

How much of the Defense Department's resources should be allocated to assisting CIA's activities was one of the prominent themes in Marshall's dealings with Smith. Two months after taking office and one month after the surprise Chinese entry into the war in November 1950, Marshall complained to Smith about the inadequacies of US intelligence and the need to significantly improve strategic and tactical warning of a Soviet attack. As a "first-priority consideration," he wanted seven to 10 days' warning of imminent hostilities and 12 to 48 hours' warning of atomic strikes against US bases. "The foregoing provisions are obviously beyond our capabilities and possibly for a long time to come. However, they do provide a clear-cut target toward which your agency and the Department of Defense should point their intelligence efforts." Because "the current basis of estimates concerning the Soviet armed forces seems dangerously inadequate," owing to CIA's limited capability to penetrate the Iron Curtain, "the Department of Defense is prepared to place support of CIA operations in these fields in Priority One." To best assist the Agency, Marshall asked Smith for a detailed statement of what he needed to improve its collection and analysis.[8]

7. Unlike Marshall, some of his lieutenants pointedly criticized CIA for not warning of the North Korean invasion. James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III, 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part One* (Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), 23-24. Marshall did not officially or privately take issue with them. Through British liaison in late October 1950, Marshall and others received an indirect warning of the Chinese intervention the following month, but, according to the official history of the JCS, "it was not accepted with the finality that, in the light of subsequent events, should have been accorded it. . . . The belief prevailed that Communist China would have little to gain by intervening in Korea at that time." Ibid., 112, 122.

8. Marshall memo to Smith, "Present Status of United States Intelligence," 27 November 1950, *PGCM*, 7:253-54.

Smith responded a month later in a memorandum that listed eight requirements. Four have been redacted from the released version of the document. Those that remain request more military personnel assigned to CIA; clarification of the relationships between CIA representatives and theater commanders to ensure operational security; arrangements by which the JCS would keep CIA fully informed of military plans and decisions that affected information sharing about operations that concerned the Agency; and establishment of a permanent liaison between CIA and the JCS. Perhaps distracted by wartime matters, Marshall did not reply for nearly four months. His letter to Smith had a pronounced bureaucratic aloofness because members of his staff wrote it. The communication cited the need to consult all the service branches, competing personnel requirements, continuing discussions of respective agencies' responsibilities, the existence of satisfactory current mechanisms, and a need to defer such recommendations until the NSC decided on the intelligence departments' respective authorities in revisions to the pertinent NSC Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). An accompanying "Top Secret, Personal and Informal" note from Marshall, addressed to "Dear Smith," sounded much more encouraging:

> *I just want you to know personally and informally that you can count on us to give you every reasonable and possible assistance in carrying forward your heavy responsibilities. I am hopeful that our staffs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can work out agreed arrangements to our mutual satisfaction, and know that if any difficulties arise which cannot be agreed by them, you will have no hesitancy in talking it over directly with me. With warm regards, Faithfully yours . . .* [9]

Two months later, Marshall displayed his exasperation at the Pentagon's slow progress in improving cooperation and coordination with CIA. In a memo to JCS Chairman Omar Bradley, he wrote:

9. Smith memo to Marshall, "Support Required by the Central Intelligence Agency from the Department of Defense," 26 December 1950, *FRUS, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community* (Government Printing Office, 2007; hereafter *FRUS-IC*), Document 36; Marshall letter to Smith, 13 April 1951, ibid., Document 64; Marshall note to Smith, 13 April 1951, *PGCM*, 7:484-85. According to one of Smith's biographers, Ludwell Montague, Department of Defense files contain a number of personal notes between them addressed to "Dear General Marshall" and "Dear Smith" that are "correct and businesslike" but "have a distinctly different tone" than the staff-drafted correspondence. Montague, 238.

I get the impression that there is a very considerable reluctance, if not opposition, on the part of the services generally towards furthering the plans of General Smith of the CIA in the development of personnel to carry out a rather elaborate program of tasks. I realize that there are complications involved in this matter, but the impression I get, correctly or incorrectly, is that there is too little of a desire to cooperate in what to me is a very important function.

Figure 26: Walter Bedell Smith as DCI. Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

Marshall encouraged Bradley to get JCS approval of Smith's request in March that the armed services be allowed to assign 150 "candidates" annually to CIA after their military service. Smith wanted to develop a CIA career service and thought that military training, discipline, and experience would benefit new Agency recruits. Bradley had cited budgetary concerns for demurring, but in May the JCS determined that up to 200 individuals could be trained each year for work with the Agency on a reimbursable basis and as long as they were not Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) graduates, who were then in short supply. In June, Bradley said the JCS had reconsidered and decided that the CIA should find personnel elsewhere. A perturbed Marshall replied that this response was "a prime example of the instances mentioned in my memorandum to you of June 14." Pointing out that providing CIA with 200 ROTC graduates would constitute

approximately 1.7% of our total intake and to my way of thinking is a nickel and dime proposition. After re-reading the two pleas from Smith, I am constrained to make the following comment on the JCS response[:] "The mountain labored and came forth with a mouse." I think the time has come for some broad-gauge consid-

> *eration of this problem, but more particularly of our relationships with CIA. It should not be necessary to point out that I give every appearance of being completely dissatisfied with our actions in this regard to date.*

After meeting with the JCS on 22 June, Marshall signed and forwarded their memo but attached a handwritten note to Smith stating that he had had a "long talk" with the service chiefs and that they were "disposed to do all in their power to help you." On 5 July, the DCI thanked Marshall for the "proffered cooperation of the Services in training Agency career personnel," writing that he was "grateful for your support in this matter." Despite the conciliatory words, Smith had gotten no more than the JCS was willing to offer at the start, as Marshall chose for unexpressed reasons not to fight with his service chiefs over this matter. As the training program was put into effect, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force accepted non-ROTC college graduates whom the CIA recruited, put them through basic training and Officer Candidate School, and gave them a year of active duty overseas or at sea. After that, they were assigned on active duty to the Agency until their military obligation expired.[10]

In 1950-51, American newspapers reported rumors that as part of the US Government's civil defense planning, an "alternate Pentagon" was going to be built at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, where the Army and OSS had trained intelligence officers during World War II. The government had been acquiring the camp from the Maryland National Guard to develop a "supplemental communications installation," but the massive construction project at nearby Raven Rock fed speculation that it would become a substitute Pentagon if the Soviets attacked the United States. Instead of that repurposing, Smith in May 1951 proposed to Marshall that CIA be allowed to use the camp as a covert operations training base. Marshall told Secretary of the Army Frank Pace to assign an officer to look into Smith's request. The Agency did not end up using the facility for that activity, having found a suitable location elsewhere.[11]

10. Marshall memo to Bradley, "Cooperation and Coordination with the CIA," 14 June 1951, and editorial notes, *PGCM*, 7:554-55; Montague, 243-44.

11. *PGCM*, 7:517-18, n.1.

Pentagon and CIA Authorities for Clandestine and Covert Operations

As the Korean war expanded and then fell into stalemate, conflicting Pentagon and CIA authorities and responsibilities for clandestine and covert operations—especially paramilitary ones—became crucial for Marshall, Smith, and US national security decisionmakers to resolve. High-level discussions had already taken place among the Defense and State Departments, CIA, and the NSC over the terms of NSCID-5 and NSC 10/2, which laid out the Agency's roles in foreign espionage and counterintelligence and in covert action.[12] As of May 1950, the JCS's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was considering a revision to NSCID-5 that would give the JCS control of all US espionage and counterintelligence activities overseas during wartime, as had happened with OSS during World War II (except for the FBI in Latin America). In February 1951, Smith proposed consolidating NSCID-5 and NSC 10/2 in a new directive that gave the DCI responsibility for "the planning, preparation, and execution of covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities in peace or in war and for insuring that such operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with and in support of U.S. foreign and military policies and with overt activities."[13] Possibly because his idea appeared to be a power grab, it did not go any further.

Instead, the JCS in June 1951 submitted to Marshall, for transmission to the NSC, a proposed revision of NSCID-5 that incorporated the JIC's draft but went beyond it in authorizing the armed services to engage in espionage operations without the DCI's knowledge and consent. Marshall invited the DCI to comment and got the expected response: CIA regarded the JCS proposal as unacceptable. In a personal letter to Marshall four weeks later, Smith wrote that the JCS was disregarding the intent of Congress in the National Security Act, which he said clearly was to centralize control of foreign clandestine

12. NSCID-5, "Espionage and Counterespionage Operations," 12 December 1947, is in *FRUS-EIE*, Document 423.

13. Smith memo to NSC Executive Secretary, "Draft of NSC Directive on Covert Operations and Clandestine Activities," 8 January 1951, *FRUS-IC*, Document 38.

activities, and that its proposed revision did not merit NSC's consideration. In addition,

> *From the practical point of view, it is unwise to have a number of different authorities conducting clandestine operations. When I assumed my present duties, I found that a number of Government Departments were operating their own "spy nets" abroad. One or two of these were voluntarily transferred to CIA control in accordance with the intent of the law. Others remain in existence, and we cross trails from time to time; sometimes with ludicrous and occasionally with rather tragic results. On the whole, however, this multiplicity of control of a very sensitive type of operation is a thoroughly bad business. I believe it can be corrected in time by establishing a broader base of confidence and cooperation in CIA operations and by improving those operations to the point where they meet the needs of the agencies CIA is designed to serve.*

That said, Smith closed on a conciliatory note by averring that "I am prepared at any time to discuss any such [clandestine] activities proposed by other Departments and Agencies and to endeavor to reach an agreement with respect to them." Also, "I wish to make it clear that this Agency is entirely willing to place its personnel under the American theater commander in any theater of active military operations where American troops are engaged and is equally willing, and indeed anxious, to coordinate its activities with the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[14]

Marshall's subsequent involvement is not documented, but he evidently agreed with Smith and did not forward the JCS's proposal to the NSC. Possibly Marshall found Smith's centralization effort appealing, and he might not have wanted to expend energy in a bureaucratic tug-of-war over HUMINT operations, in which he never took much interest. Instead, Smith prepared his own revision of NSCID-5 that kept the 1947 text but added four short paragraphs defining CIA's relationship with the senior US diplomatic and military representatives overseas and the JCS regarding clandestine collection. Most significantly for Marshall and the Defense Department, the revision

14. Smith letter to Marshall, 2 July 1951, ibid., Document 77.

required that Agency officers in active theaters of war take orders from the theater commander.[15]

Marshall was less engaged with Smith's move, at OPC Chief Frank Wisner's instigation, to revise NSC 10/2, paragraph 4, which declared that "In time of war or national emergency, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the execution of covert operations in military theaters shall be under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Soon after the Korean war started, Smith said that he construed the "somewhat ambiguous" directive "as giving clear responsibility and authority" to the DCI over OPC's activities. Smith eventually agreed with Wisner that with a major war on and fears growing that it might spread to Europe, that ambiguity needed clarification and for the moment persuaded the NSC to suspend the provisions of paragraph 4. The JCS, presumably with Marshall's approval, submitted a paper on the subject that President Truman found so unacceptable that he returned his copy to the NSC with "margins full of scathing comments." Even Gen. John Magruder, Marshall's liaison officer to OPC, commented that the JCS's stance was "an example of the extreme positions which can emerge from an insulated atmosphere in which strictly unilateral consideration is given to national issues"; the tone and content of the JCS paper would evoke "extreme prejudice against the JCS, which is now of unwholesome proportions." To avoid either rejecting his service chiefs' view or creating an interagency deadlock that only the President could break, Marshall had Deputy Secretary Lovett meet informally with Smith, Under Secretary of State James Webb, and JCS Chairman Bradley to settle the matter. The outcome went mostly Smith's way; paragraph 4 now stated that orders for covert operations would be transmitted through the JCS for their information but would originate with the DCI, and it implicitly underscored that in wartime the DCI reported to the NSC and the President, not to the JCS. In contrast, Smith told Marshall, the JCS perspective disregarded Congress' intent in the National Security Act

15. Montague, 242; "National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 Revised," 28 August 1951, *FRUS-IC,* Document 255.

to centralize control of clandestine activities abroad. Marshall had no further comment on the issue and presumably considered it settled.[16]

The conflict between the Pentagon and CIA over covert operations authorized under NSC 10/2 was not just another case of bureaucratic infighting. It took on much more significance militarily and was more difficult to settle because both organizations were conducting paramilitary activities in Korea and because of OPC's anomalous status as a CIA-based entity under the direction of the State and Defense Departments during peace and war, respectively. Alongside its conventional activities, the US military launched many special ground and maritime operations nominally overseen by the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK) but controlled by American tactical commanders. At the same time, CIA's Joint Activities Commission, Korea (JACK)—notionally under CCRAK but for the most part autonomous—staged numerous ground, maritime, and air missions in Korea. In addition, the Agency conducted two large covert campaigns against the PRC intended to divert some of its forces from fighting UN troops in Korea: BGMARQUE, working with Chinese Nationalists to infiltrate operatives onto the mainland to spy, set up resistance networks, and sabotage military targets; and HTMERLIN, using so-called "Third Force" elements that were anti-Communist but not aligned with Chiang did much the same.[17] Marshall made no recorded comments about any of the military's or CIA's guerrilla operations, an indication of his deference to Smith in that area of activity. In late 1950 and early 1951, he received messages from Third Force members trying to encourage greater US support for the Third Force effort by claiming that disaffection with the CCP was "rampant" in the southern region, which was "particularly vul-

16. "Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee," 20 October 1950, Smith memo to NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, "Draft of NSC Directive on Covert Operations and Clandestine Activities," 8 January 1951, and Smith letter to Marshall, 2 July 1951, ibid., documents 29, 38, and 77; Montague, 78-79, 206-08.

17. *Veritas* [Journal of Army Special Operations History], special issue, *ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces] in the Korean War*, 9:1 (2013); Charles H. Briscoe, "CIA Paramilitary Operations, Korea, 1950-1951," "JACK Operations and Activities, Korea, 1951-1953," and "JACK Air Operations, Korea, 1951-1953," on US Army Special Operations Command website ARSOF in the Korean war, https://arsof-history.org/arsof_in_korea/index.html; Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: U.N. Special Operations during the Korean war* (Naval Institute Press, 2000); Frank Holober, *Raiders of the China Coast: CIA Covert Operations during the Korean war* (Naval Institute Press, 1999); Roger B. Jeans, *The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War* (Lexington Books, 2018).

nerable to attack at this time," and that guerrilla forces were "waiting for outside help." He did not respond to their entreaties.[18]

This crowded covert action arena was potentially rife with interagency conflict that Marshall would have to deal with, especially while MacArthur commanded UN forces in Korea and had Charles Willoughby as his chief intelligence officer. Dating back to World War II and OSS, both generals disdained competing intelligence organizations and tried to marginalize or eliminate their activities in areas over which the two had authority. One of CIA's senior officers in Japan bitterly observed that "MacArthur has three enemies [in Korea]: the Russians, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. I have four, those three plus MacArthur!" MacArthur and Willoughby's departure in 1951 eased much of the high-level tension, but communication and coordination problems persisted in the field as CIA was drawn gradually and reluctantly into a larger unconventional warfare role.[19]

Contrary to the commonly held view that the Agency was eager to deploy all of its covert capabilities far and wide, DCIs Hillenkoetter and Smith resisted taking on deniable paramilitary operations because they did not consider them to be one of CIA's core missions. They did not want responsibility for them, assuming them only reluctantly after NSC 10/2 came into effect in 1948 because the Agency lacked sufficient resources to carry them out and would need substantial help from the Pentagon. As Smith described the situation in early 1951, "the responsibilities which are being placed upon us under our Charter and under NSC directives, particularly in the field of planning and execution of guerrilla warfare activities, go beyond our current capabilities and indeed embrace operations of such magnitude that they threaten to absorb the resources of this Agency to a point which might be detrimental to its other responsibilities."[20] Marshall and his uniformed leadership were not anxious to exercise authority over OPC during the war, as the two-year-old directive called for, and after Smith asserted control over OPC and effectively took it out

18. Jeans, 39, 41.

19. Haas, 177 *et seq*.

20. "Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Smith to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)," 2 March 1951, *FRUS-IC*, Document 54.

of the military's hands, Marshall and the JCS did not object. Smith quickly proceeded to cancel as many as one-third of OPC's projects, further reducing the possible areas of contention with Marshall and the Pentagon. He persistently advocated for turning over all responsibility for unconventional warfare to the US military, questioning "whether it was desirable for CIA to operate as a sort of 'covert War Department' for the conduct of large-scale guerrilla operations" and contending that "the operations tail are [sic] now starting to wag the intelligence dog." However, he had not achieved that goal by the time Marshall left office in September 1951.[21]

CIA's Access to US Military Information for Preparing Strategic Estimates

The last large issue Marshall and CIA got involved with was the Agency's request to receive sensitive information about US military capabilities so it could prepare more accurate and useful analyses of the Soviet strategic threat. In effect, the Agency wanted to start making "net assessments" that analyzed what military steps the Soviet Union was taking based on its perception of the power of the US arsenal. To better gauge that perception, CIA analysts sought access to types of information that Marshall's predecessors had not authorized the Pentagon to share with the Agency. A month before Marshall was confirmed, CIA leadership had identified this lack of information sharing as a hindrance in preparing assessments.

> *Difficulties are encountered by CIA in producing adequate intelligence estimates, due to the refusal of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agencies to honor CIA requests for necessary intelligence information, departmental intelligence, or collection*

21. The following month, the NSC reaffirmed the DCI's "responsibility and authority . . . for the conduct of covert operations" and requested the Secretary of Defense "to provide adequate means" whereby the DCI "may be assured of the continuing advice and collaboration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of plans for paramilitary operations during the period of the cold war." Nicholas Dujmovic, "Drastic Actions Short of War: The Origins and Application of CIA's Covert Paramilitary Function in the Early Cold War," *Journal of Military History*, 76:3 (July 2012), 775-808; Montague, 204, 208-11; Robert P. Joyce (State Department Policy Planning Staff) memo to Director of Policy Planning Staff, "The Director of Central Intelligence on the Scope and Pace of CIA Activities with Particular Reference to Para-Military Operations and Preparations for Operations," 21 July 1951, and "Note from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council," 23 October 1951, *FRUS-IC*, Documents 75 and 90.

> *action. . . . Information has been withheld from CIA by IAC agencies on the basis that it is "operational" rather than "intelligence information" and therefore not available to CIA; that it is "eyes only" information or on a highly limited dissemination basis; or that it is handled under special security provisions which by-pass CIA. . . .*[22]

Agency analysts encountered stiff resistance from the service chiefs, however, and Marshall did not intervene to countermand them at any point. He displayed more bureaucratic parochialism on this matter than any other he dealt with in either of his cabinet positions, principally out of a concern for security and a belief that CIA could prepare adequately responsive assessments without needing access to what today would be called sensitive compartmented information.

The prompts for the conflict between Marshall's and Smith's organizations on this matter were requests for three different intelligence assessments from President Truman; Senator Brien McMahon (D-CT), chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and an influential voice in nuclear policy; and Maj. Gen. Alexander Bolling, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Army G-2. In January 1951, the President asked Smith to have an Estimate prepared on "the prospects for the creation of an adequate Western European defense." Such an assessment would require assistance from the JCS's Joint Strategic Plans Group, which the service chiefs did not authorize. Smith then said that CIA would prepare a paper solely about intelligence matters and request the JCS's input on its operational aspects. The service chiefs strenuously objected to the draft Estimate, contending that it conveyed an implicit criticism of the sufficiency of plans they had approved. As a result, Smith canceled the project. In these instances, Marshall deferred entirely to the JCS in their determination not to share any information about US strategic plans with CIA, notwithstanding Truman's request.[23]

22. CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston, "Memorandum for the Record," 29 August 1950, ibid., Document 23. The IAC comprised the intelligence representatives of the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission and advised the DCI at his request on matters related to his execution of his and CIA's functions as set forth in the National Security Act. Hillenkoetter memo to the NSC, "Appointment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee," 19 September 1947, *FRUS-EIE*, Document 222.

23. Montague, 245-46.

Soon after that episode, Senator McMahon sent queries to Marshall and Smith on two related subjects that required the Defense Department to disclose sensitive information about US strategic forces and plans. McMahon asked Smith for "a comprehensive estimate on Soviet capabilities 'to impair, prevent, or frustrate the delivery of atomic weapons to targets inside the USSR.'" Although the subject was an enemy capability, a "comprehensive estimate" would require recognition of US strengths and vulnerabilities. On 1 February 1951, Smith told the JCS that "we [CIA] need to be kept informed by receiving the papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military cable traffic. These papers are essential to keep our operational planning current and up-to-date, and to keep our Office of National Estimates informed. These papers will naturally be handled with maximum security and minimum circulation." The JCS declined Smith's request. Four days later, the DCI wrote to Marshall requesting authorization for the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, a Defense Department body jointly run by the JCS and the Research and Development Board that advised the Secretary on scientific research related to national security and had recently concluded some relevant operational analyses, to collaborate with the Agency in responding to McMahon. Smith noted that a thorough Estimate would help ensure Congressional support for related US military programs. He might have hoped to bypass the JCS in this approach to Marshall, but the tactic did not work. Marshall, avoiding a direct rebuff to Smith, referred his second request to the JCS, which predictably did not approve it. Moreover, the JIC, composed of the military members of the IAC, would not allow Smith to see its assessments, and Marshall did not direct it to do otherwise.[24]

On 12 February, McMahon, dissatisfied with progress on the US nuclear program, submitted to Marshall a list of questions "concerning our atomic weapons, our ability to deliver them, the selection of targets, our atomic missile development, and other details." After consulting with President Truman and the JCS, Marshall responded on 2 April that "there is no practicable way in which this type of information can be made available without serious risk to our national security." "[A]nswers to the questions propounded," he went on, "can-

24. Ibid., 246-47.

not be complete in themselves; that is they can serve only to develop further fields for examination. Thus the ultimate result could only be a complete briefing of our most secret war plans including all the information upon which they are based." Reinforcing his agreement with the JCS's refusal to assist CIA with the Estimate discussed above, Marshall forwarded this response to Smith and asserted that security concerns had forced him to deny relevant Defense Department information to McMahon.[25]

The last scenario in which Marshall declined to allow US military information to be used in an intelligence product arose when General Bolling in May 1951 asked CIA to prepare a National Estimate on "the probability of a Communist attack on Japan during 1951." Work on the tasking began in June but was canceled a month later because the Agency was unable to obtain information about the strength and disposition of US forces in and near Japan. As DCI Smith's biographer noted, that was "information that the Soviets would certainly have and would take into account in deciding whether or not to attack Japan"—the assessment of which was the whole purpose of the Estimate. "Enemy intentions could not be estimated without regard to the capabilities of US forces that the enemy knew to be present." Once again, Marshall did not overturn his service chief's refusal to assist CIA despite the sound logic of Smith's viewpoint.[26]

25. Marshall letter to McMahon, 2 April 1951, and n.2, *PGCM*, 7:468-69.

26. Montague, 247.

Chapter 10: Handling the "Second Red Scare"

Marshall headed the State and Defense Departments at a time of heightened Cold War tensions when large portions of the US populace and prominent members of its political leadership were becoming increasingly concerned about penetration of the US Government and other institutions at all levels by Soviet spies and American Communists and "fellow travelers" who were advancing the agendas of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The increasingly widespread suspicions received confirmation, real or inferred, because of sensational revelations, some corroborated, some not, of Soviet espionage against and infiltration and subornation of American political and societal institutions. Because this "Second Red Scare," which came to be loosely and inaccurately referred to as "McCarthyism," overlapped Marshall's tenures as Secretary of State and Defense and followed him into retirement, it will be dealt with separately here. The rapid and stark change in the American *zeitgeist* from World War II to the early Cold War is clearly shown in Marshall's differing response to concerns about Communist subversion of the US Government. During the war, he, Stimson, McCloy, and the JCS opposed barring Communists from receiving officers' commissions.[1] After the war, when serving at the State Department, he oversaw and defended the implementation of a sometimes heavy-handed loyalty and security program that affected his officers' recruitment, morale, and retention. Ironically, he later he found himself victimized by the same campaign

1. Bird, 228-29, 420-21.

against foreign adversaries' purported undermining of the American political system.

Security Problems at Foggy Bottom

Marshall already was a bete noire of the China Lobby—an informal but powerful collection of anti-Communist businessmen, publishers, military officers, missionaries, and teachers who strongly supported Chiang and the KMT—and the Republican Party's right wing because of his China mission, and the State Department's recent checkered security history left him in a precarious position when he became Secretary in 1947. Its Security Office was established in June 1945 after two Department employees were accused of leaking classified documents to the Far Eastern affairs journal *Amerasia*, which criticized US support for the KMT.[2] Along with the contemporaneous defections of a Soviet code clerk in Canada (Igor Gouzenko) and an American Communist who worked for the KGB (Elizabeth Bentley), who together gave the first glimpses into the Soviets' extensive espionage operations in the United States and elsewhere, the *Amerasia* case contributed to a growing anxiety about Communist clandestine and subversive activity in the postwar United States that Marshall had to deal with, not always adeptly, while at Foggy Bottom in 1947-49.

Marshall's basic authority over loyalty and security cases was granted in 1946 when Congress allowed the secretary of state, at his absolute discretion, to terminate the employment of anyone in the department or any member of the Foreign Service "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States."[3] The language first appeared in the so-called McCarran Rider to the State Department's appropriations bill in 1946 and was reiterated in subsequent acts. The rider was named for Patrick McCarran,

2. Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The* Amerasia *Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism* (University of North Carolina Press, 1996); US Senate, *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations Pursuant to S. Res. 231, A Resolution to Investigate Whether There Are Employees in the State Department Disloyal to the United States*, 20 July 1950 (Government Printing Office, 1950), 96-144.

3. "The Security Program of the Department of State: Text of Security Principles and Hearing Procedure of the Personnel Security Board," *Department of State Bulletin*, 19 October 1947; Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (Oxford University Press, 1990), 62-63.

a conservative Nevada Democrat who headed the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee that launched investigations into Communist infiltration of and influence in the Federal Government.[4] A number of Congressional members pressed for its immediate use. (One State Department official warned: "The sentiment clearly seems to be—'What is Jimmy Byrnes waiting for?'")[5] During 1946, the Department's Security Office flagged 284 employees as "security risks," and 79 of them were dismissed.

One of those cases, involving Carl Marzani, became a minor cause celebre at the time and made a Congressional committee put Marshall on notice that the State Department's overseers regarded its security procedures as seriously deficient. Marzani had come to the Department from the OSS. A loyalty board convened during the war had exonerated him of charges that he was a Communist, but during a State Department investigation, information from the New York Police Department identified him as a member of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). He was fired in December 1946 and convicted of perjury for concealing his membership to keep his job. The Senate Appropriations Committee claimed to Marshall in June 1947 that "the evidence brought out at his [Marzani's] trial was well known to State Department officers, who ignored it and refused to act for a full year." "It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places, but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity." This allegation might have prompted Marshall to take a relatively hard line on security matters, as described below.[6]

The Security Office soon expanded into a division and had responsibility for implementing President Truman's loyalty program, instituted under Executive Order (EO) 9835 of 21 March 1947 in an effort to rationalize a disorganized effort begun during World War II and to fend off Republican-inspired Congressional investigations. Around

4. On McCarran, see Michael J. Ybarra, *Washington Gone Crazy: Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American Communist Hunt* (Steerforth Press, 2004).

5. Fried, 63.

6. Ibid., 63; David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (Simon & Schuster, 1978), 304; William F. Buckley Jr. and L. Brent Bozell, *McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning* (Henry Regnery Company, 1954), 21.

2.3 million Federal workers fell under the program's scope, including some 10,000 employees at the State Department. Under the order, the standard for denying or terminating employment in the executive branch was "reasonable grounds" for believing that the subject was "disloyal to the Government of the United States."[7] The EO also directed the US attorney general to compile a list of all subversive organizations.

Marshall first invoked the McCarran Rider to implement EO 9835 on 27 June 1947 when he summarily dismissed 10 State employees about whom "derogatory information" had been developed. The firings, executed without hearings and designated as being "with prejudice," created such a backlash that he had the Department reexamine the cases. At the time the Department announced the dismissals, a spokesman said they were based not necessarily on the employees' loyalty but rather on "their discretion and the company they keep," including "indirect association with representatives of a foreign power." Three of the employees worked in the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, a frequent target of conservative administration critics for allegedly harboring communists. A few days later, Marshall tried to reassure those serving under him: "I wish to emphasize that the great bulk of the employees of the Department are wholly loyal and conscientious. We are not engaged in a witch-hunt, and I will not permit unfounded charges based on prejudice to force our hand. I mean to see that the rights of the personnel as well as the interests of the Government are secured." Answering reporters' questions, Marshall said that all the employees knew why they had been dismissed and that none had tried to appeal to him personally.[8]

7. Four years later, the standard was loosened to the more subjective "reasonable doubt" in EO 10241, and the Department reopened all of its cases. Eleanor Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program* (Cornell University Press, 1953), 150, 275-82.

8. "Termination of Ten Employees Under McCarran Rider to 1947 Appropriation Act: Statement by the Secretary of State," *Department of State Bulletin*, 13 September 1947; "Marshall Says Fired Employees Had Ties with Foreign Agents," *The Washington Post*, 3 July 1947, 1; "Five of Dismissed Employees Are From Upper Pay Bracket; No Appeal Possible," ibid., 28 June 1947, 1. In *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948* (Knopf, 1972), Richard M. Freeland says that Marshall ordered the 10 firings to appease Congressional appropriators who were trying to gut the overseas information program, criticized on Capitol Hill at the time as a "newfangled New Deal extravagance." Freeland's argument is thinly substantiated and seems to be more of a case of coincidence than of causation. If a *quid pro quo* existed, Marshall did not get a very good deal, as nothing near the full funding he sought was restored. A more likely driver behind the timing of the dismissals was an internal deadline requiring that they be made

Negative media coverage of the State Department's security procedures and legal and political pressure during the next few months forced it to examine the 10 cases again. In October, three of the employees were allowed to resign without prejudice, enabling them to more easily find jobs elsewhere. The seven others were not given details of the charges against them or allowed to similarly resign. In a statement issued in November, Marshall reaffirmed the handling of the cases under procedures in effect at the time and declined to second-guess the determinations. In a somewhat circular argument, he said that "the Department's action was, in large part, based on highly classified material not under its control. For this reason, the Department determined that it could not give the employees a full statement of charges. Without charges, a true hearing was impossible." Under new policies, however, "employees will, wherever possible, be given written notice of charges, the right to representation by counsel, and [a] formal hearing." Soon after, the Civil Service Commission promised that the seven employees would receive hearings, and the State Department relented and permitted them to resign without prejudice, citing convoluted bureaucratic arrangements that in effect denied them any avenue of appeal. *The Washington Post* opined that "The great State Department security crisis has at last ended as it should have begun. And the pity is that the department had to be shamed into doing what elementary considerations of fair play made imperative from the beginning. . . . One wonders what could have led men like Secretary Marshall and Undersecretary Lovett to attempt the defense of so indefensible a procedure. . . ." In a final awkward twist, the first tersely worded letters the Department sent to the seven employees acknowledging their resignations failed to include the words "without prejudice" and had to be resent with the phrase added. Pre-

by the end of June. See Freeland, 202-04, and his main source, Bert Andrews, *Washington Witch Hunt* (Random House, 1948), chapter 1; "First for Voice Project Lost, Senators Say," *The Washington Post*, 17 June 1947, 3; Mary Spargo, "Senate Group Allows 12 Million for Limited Overseas 'Voice,'" ibid., 21 June 1947, 1; "Marshall Fails to Block Cut in 'Voice' Funds," ibid., 26 June 1947; "'Voice' Funds Cut to Force Dismissals," ibid., 4 July 1947, 2; "'In the Interest of the U.S.,'" *Time*, 7 July 1947, 13; Michael McCoyer (Department of State Office of the Historian) e-mail to author, 22 March 2021. Freeland makes the same contention about Marshall when he was advocating for European Recovery Program funding in 1948; see 313. The definitive account of the overseas information program during this period, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* by Nicholas J. Cull (Cambridge University Press, 2008), discusses State Department budget issues in connection with Congressional loyalty suspicions but does not link them to Marshall Plan funding.

sumably because of all the public backlash, Marshall did not invoke the McCarran Rider again.[9]

In July 1947, the State Department set up a joint Loyalty-Security Board to handle cases arising under EO 9835 in a more methodical fashion. Three months later, a House of Representatives inquiry turned up 108 potential disloyalty cases in the Department, and as of March 1948, 57 of the employees still worked there, with 22 of them under investigation.[10] Between January 1947 and February 1948, the Department dismissed 202 employees on security grounds.[11]

9. "Three Terminated Employees Permitted to Resign Without Prejudice," *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 October 1947; Marshall Andrews, "7 Employees Kept in Dark on Dismissal," *The Washington Post*, 3 November 1947, 1; "Letter from Acting Secretary Lovett to Employees' Counsel," *Department of State Bulletin*, 16 November 1947; "Responsibility for Review of Dismissal Cases Rests with Civil Service Commission: Statement by the Secretary of State," ibid., 16 November 1947; "7 Discharged State Employees Promised Civil Service Hearing," *The Washington Post*, 10 November 1947, 1; "The Department Permits Seven Dismissed Employees to Resign Without Prejudice," *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 December 1947; "Security Resignations," *The Washington Post*, 19 November 1947, 18; Bert Andrews, "State Dept. Bluntly Accepts Resignations of Seven Once Fired as 'Security Risks,'" ibid., 21 December 1947, M16. Andrews, affiliated with *The New York Herald Tribune*, closely followed the State Department's at-times clumsy handling of the dismissals and later wrote a highly critical account of it in *Washington Witch Hunt*.

10. The House probe was one of three that the chamber conducted into the Department's loyalty program and one of 22 the 80th Congress (1947-49) launched concerning Communism. Fried, 73. The secret list of 108 State Department subversives Senator McCarthy later claimed to carry around with him was based on the Loyalty-Security Board's proceedings given to an investigator for that House inquiry. David M. Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy* (The Free Press, 1983), 110; Klehr and Radosh, 165.

11. *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State* (Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2011), 73-90, 123, 124; Klehr and Radosh, 161. Between January 1947 and February 1950, another 91 were dismissed for "moral weakness"—i.e., homosexuality. In June 1950, the head of the Department's Loyalty Review Board told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that of 304 cases received from the Civil Service Commission, 230 were cleared without hearings, 37 were cleared after charges were preferred, seven employees resigned with charges pending, three employees were found to be security risks after hearings, and 23 cases remained undecided. *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation*, 194. A few years later, international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote a trenchant critique of the State program: "The Impact of the Loyalty-Security Measures on the State Department," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 11:4 (1955), 134-40.

The Federal loyalty program gained momentum and affected more of the US civil service over the next decade. By mid-1952, over four million serving or prospective Federal employees had been investigated, and 378—.002 percent of the total—were dismissed or denied employment. Bontecou, 145. As of 1956, over five million Federal employees had undergone loyalty screening, at least 25,000 of them were subjected to FBI full field investigations, around 3,900 had been dismissed, and around 12,000 resigned. Ralph S. Brown Jr., *Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the United States* (Yale University Press, 1958), 487; Caute, 274-75. Despite its reputation as a haven for subversives, the State Department's record proved remarkably clean, presumably because few problematic employees got hired. Between 1947 and 1955, the Security Division conducted 42,795 investigations of applicants and rejected 554 for security reasons. By February 1952, it had separated only 11 more employees on security grounds and none for disloyalty. Brown, 60; Bontecou, 147. The effect the loyalty and security program had on deterring people from applying for Federal employment, however, cannot be determined.

Other than being aware that investigations of Department employees were being conducted and making general statements about their conduct, Marshall does not appear to have been involved in them to any substantial degree, as indicated by the detached posture he took toward the 10 firings discussed above. He did not say anything about the harm the investigations might inflict on the effectiveness of the Foreign Service if diplomats feared that their candid evaluations of developments overseas would be scrutinized for alleged pro-Communist sympathies. He was mainly interested in ensuring that the loyalty inquiries were handled fairly. In March 1948, one week after President Truman directed Federal agencies to ignore future Congressional requests or subpoenas for confidential information without his express approval, Marshall sent a message to his employees to allay their concerns about the scope and tenor of the investigations. He avowed that he was "confident" of his employees' loyalty and insisted that any accusations "must be based on reliable evidence" and not "spiteful, unsupported, or irresponsible allegations."[12] In Senate testimony that same month, Marshall said that out of some 7,500 Department employees who had been investigated so far, 274 had resigned or been "eased out" and that the FBI was still looking into 38 other cases. He stated that the loyalty review "has been proceeding about as rapidly as we could manage with fairness. . . . One of the most serious troubles in this whole business is to try to be at least American to the extent that we do not ruin a man." When asked whether "proper action has been taken where it should have been taken and, on the whole, it is pretty well cleaned up," Marshall replied, "Pretty well cleaned up, and it is in process toward completion."[13] Because he had not been read in to the VENONA program, Marshall would not have known that its decrypts would later reveal 22 identified Soviet penetrations and several unidentified sources within various US foreign relations agencies operating under State Department auspices, mostly during the war,

12. Marshall statement, "Loyalty of State Department Employees," 10 March 1948, *Department of State Bulletin*, 21 March 1948; Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security, and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945-1950," in *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Quadrangle Books, 1970), 224-25.

13. "Senate Testimony on State Department Budget Restorations," 23 March 1948, *PGCM*, 6:422; *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation*, 182-83.

some since the mid-1930s; at least two were still in the Department while he was Secretary.[14]

Another high-profile espionage and security controversy Marshall confronted while at State stemmed from the sensational Congressional testimony of three officials in the Department's Visa Division in July 1948. They alleged that the Soviets had infiltrated several hundred intelligence operatives into the United States under the auspices and protection of the United Nations as a cover for clandestine activity.[15] The officials testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization in mid-July. After newspaper reports of their testimony appeared soon after, Marshall in a press conference denied knowing of any cases of a foreign UN official threatening US national security. In late July, he appointed a committee of three private citizens—the editor of *The Washington Evening Star*, a former US Assistant Attorney General, and a retired clerk of the House Appropriations Committee—to look into the allegations. During its four-week inquiry, the committee reviewed over 300 cases the Visa Division had flagged as concerning and, in a report released on 31 August, categorically rejected the State officials' contentions. "Your committee is shocked by the manner in which these serious charges were made. . . . The testimony produced serious repercussions on the foreign policy of the United States, and that testimony was irresponsible in its lack of factual support. So far as we can determine, the subordinate officials who testified, even if they were disturbed over the seriousness, as they saw it, of a developing situation, had never made any persistent effort to bring it to the attention of the responsible policy-making officials of the Department of State." In response to the report, the Chairman of the Senate subcommittee asked Marshall for the names of persons who had entered the United

14. Haynes and Klehr, 201-05, 421-22 n.28.

15. Sources on this episode are: Pierre J. Huss and George Carpozi Jr., *Red Spies in the U.N.* (Coward-McCann, 1965), 41-44; Joseph A. Loftus, "Subversive Agents Believed in U.S. under Wing of U.N.," *The New York Times*, 21 July 1948, 1; Mary Spargo, "Soviet-Linked Spies Roam U.S., State Officials Say," *The Washington Post*, 21 July 1948, 1; C.P. Trussell, "Marshall Knows No Agents in U.N.," *The New York Times*, 22 June 1948, 3; John Fisher, "Report of Spies in U.S. Disputed by Marshall," *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 22 July 1948, 4; Bertram D. Hulen, "Marshall Starts U.N. 'Spy' Inquiry," *The New York Times*, 29 July 1948, 1; "Report on Alien Admittance Under U.N. and National Security," *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 September 1948; Lewis Wood, "U.N. Spy Charges Called Baseless," *The New York Times*, 2 September 1948, 4; Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., "Probers Find No Basis for U.N. Spy Tale," *The Washington Post*, 2 September 1948, 1.

States under UN credentials so he could make his own investigation of the charges, but Marshall refused and had no further comment on the matter.[16]

"Who Lost China?"

The most intense period of internal security fervor over the State Department occurred after Marshall left and spanned the late 1940s and early 1950s before, during, and after he was Secretary of Defense. By 1949-50, Mao and the CCP had taken over China and were fighting on the side of the North Koreans against US and UN coalition forces, and the Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb. The public mood in America was increasingly influenced by growing concerns of Communist activity in the United States. Espionage investigations and trials involving the likes of Alger Hiss, formerly with the State Department and at the time head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Judith Coplon at the Justice Department; the atomic spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs; members of the CPUSA indicted for subversion under the Smith Act; and the activities and rhetoric of the China Lobby and Congressional anti-Communists like McCarthy, McCarran, and the House Un-American Activities Committee intensified hostility toward officials who had criticized the Truman administration's support for Chiang and the Nationalists.[17]

The principal victims at State were the so-called China Hands—notably Foreign Service Officers John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies Jr., and O. Edmund Clubb—who

16. The record does not indicate whether Marshall ever heard about DCI Hillenkoetter's letter to the subcommittee in July 1949 reporting, in full contradiction of the State Department committee's conclusion, that 82 Soviet Bloc diplomatic officials "have been engaged in subversive activity prior to their assumption of official duty in the United States as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments." Hillenkoetter letter to Senator Pat McCarran, 13 July 1949, copy in author's possession.

17. A former Soviet military intelligence operative, Whittaker Chambers, had publicly accused Hiss in 1949 of being a Soviet spy starting in the 1930s. Hiss denied the charge before a Congressional committee but was convicted of perjury. The Smith Act, formally known as the Alien Registration Act, was a Federal law passed in 1940 that criminalized advocacy of the forceful or violent overthrow of the US Government and required all adult aliens living in the United States to register with the Federal Government. In 1949, 11 leaders of the CPUSA were convicted of violating the act, and the Supreme Court upheld the convictions in 1951. After that decision, the Department of Justice prosecuted over 100 cases involving American Communists.

were very skeptical toward the Nationalist government and, like their former boss Marshall, got blamed for contributing to the "loss" of China. All were subjected to multiple official reviews and investigations and suffered public disgrace from exaggerated and distorted allegations about their sometimes credulous perspectives toward Mao and the CCP. Service, Vincent, and Davies were dismissed from their jobs, but the Supreme Court ordered Service's reinstatement. Clubb was recommended for dismissal, cleared by Acheson, and relegated to a lesser job but chose to resign rather than accept demotion. Less-well-known China experts also suffered. In all, of 22 Foreign Service Officers who had worked at the China desk before the war, only two remained at the State Department in 1954. Moreover, the highly publicized scrutiny of the China Hands discouraged recruitment into the Foreign Service.[18]

Marshall did not make any recorded public or private statements at any time defending them even though he shared their disillusionment with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government, and the Congressional and departmental investigations into their alleged disloyalty were based on dubious political grounds. His reticence about the China Hands while serving as Secretary of Defense is partly understandable; the US military was fighting in the Korean war, and he would have been reluctant to get himself and the Department embroiled in a distracting controversy with administration critics, particularly after he agreed with Truman's highly divisive dismissal of MacArthur, commander of UN forces in Korea, for insubordination in 1951. Marshall indicated more than once that any statements he made on any public issue immediately became fodder for political speculation and decided that he would refrain from any comments that could be so interpreted. That might in part explain his reluctance to engage in public disputation with the so-called McCarthyites that could result in criticism of the Truman administration. For example, in November 1950, he declined an invitation to be a sponsor for the third annual Roosevelt Day Dinner, a celebration of the 32nd President's policies and principles, citing "the very important necessity

18. On the China Hands contretemps, see Caute, 309-15; Brown, 198; *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation,* 74-94, 162-63.

for me, at this particular time, to keep as clear of any matters of plain political significance as possible. In everything I do these days, I appear to be accused of participating in a political maneuver."[19] Marshall maintained this aversion to being drawn into political disputes well after, declining a request in 1955 that he prepare a memoir with the observation that "Practically anything I wrote now would be brought immediately into the coming political campaign, perverted or otherwise."[20] Perhaps also, like Eisenhower later did as President, he thought McCarthy's allegations were too unfounded to survive scrutiny or warrant refutation and that the Senator would eventually destroy himself through his excesses.[21]

Marshall's only documented private comments supporting any State Department official accused of disloyalty were letters he wrote in March and April 1950, respectively, to Philip Jessup, a distinguished international law scholar who had been US delegate to the United Nations and subsequently US Ambassador-at-Large, and Alfred Kohlberg, one of the most prominent members of the China Lobby. McCarthy and other Republican rightwingers had accused Jessup of having, in the former's words, "an unusual affinity for Communist causes" by serving as a character witness for Hiss, editing the State Department's "White Paper" defending US China policy (it contained an account of Marshall's mission), having a role in MacArthur's dismissal, and being affiliated with organizations later identified as Communist fronts. Marshall wrote to Jessup: "I am shocked and distressed by the attack on your integrity as a public servant. Throughout your intimate service with me when I was Secretary of State, you were clearly outstanding as a representative of the government as to your masterful presentations and the firmness of your opposition to all Soviet or Communist attacks or pressures. . . . Both the Under Secretary, Mr. Lovett, and I counted you as a great source of strength to the State Department during those critical days." In "a classic example of *inno-*

19. Marshall letter to Elmer G. Davis, 13 November 1950, *PGCM*, 7:239.

20. Marshall letter to Virginius Dabney, 12 May 1955, ibid., 878.

21. In contrast to Marshall, Dean Acheson, who fired Foreign Service officers in 1951, publicly recanted four years later: "The trial of Foreign Service officers for disloyalty or security risk, or both, because their views 10 years ago are now regarded as heretical by a politically powerful and obstreperous group, is a purge no different from the Moscow type. . . ." Acheson, *A Democrat Looks at His Party* (Harper & Brothers, 1955), 132.

cence by association," historian David Oshinsky observed, Jessup used Marshall's letter, along with one of similar tenor from Eisenhower (then serving as President of Columbia University), to defend himself before the Tydings Committee—a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Millard Tydings (D-MD) and convened to investigate McCarthy's sweeping charges that the State Department housed Communists. Kohlberg wrote to Marshall that he believed those letters "were meant to be an endorsement by both of you of Ambassador Jessup's record, including his affiliation with Communist fronts, his long and close association with Communists and Fellow-Travelers, and even his public appearance as a character witness for Alger Hiss in both Hiss trials." Marshall replied: "I believe it is necessary for you to re-read the text of my letter to Ambassador Jessup as I think it can be interpreted but one way."[22]

In an ultimately ineffective attempt to lift suspicion from the State Department that it was withholding evidence about Communists and subversives, Tydings in May 1950 persuaded President Truman to open 71 of its loyalty review files to members of the Foreign Relations Committee. McCarthy had referred to 71 officers with identifiable pro-Communist views in a speech in the Senate in February. The members' examination of the files proved that McCarthy had been more than duplicitous in his charges, but he retorted that the files had been tampered with. Marshall, at the time the President of the American Red Cross and Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission, made no recorded public or private comments on the President's and the committee's actions involving confidential

22. Thomas C. Reeves, T*he Life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A Biography* (Stein and Day, 1982), 387-92; Oshinsky, 122-25; Arthur Herman, *Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator* (The Free Press, 2000), 128-31; *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation*, 37-43; Marshall letters to Jessup, 17 March 1950, and to Kohlberg, 6 April 1950, *PGCM*, 7:69-70, 80-81. Eisenhower wrote to Jessup: "I am writing to tell you how much your university deplores the association of your name with the current loyalty investigation in the United States Senate. . . . No one who had known you can for a moment question the depth or sincerity of your devotion to the principles of Americanism. Your university associates and I are confident that any impression to the contrary will be quickly dispelled as the facts become known." Eisenhower letter to Jessup, undated but c. March 1950, copy provided by Marshall Research Library in author's possession. Because of the storm McCarthy and the Republican right caused, Jessup's nomination to a UN position became stalled, but President Truman gave him a recess appointment.

departmental files that affected the reputations of some of his former employees.[23]

Before going to the Pentagon, Marshall did respond to a statement from the Tydings Committee that Owen Lattimore, an Asian scholar at The Johns Hopkins University who had advised Chiang but had never worked at the State Department, was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" while Marshall served as Secretary of State. Lattimore had a strong intellectual influence at the Department and, like the China Hands, had gotten swept up in the "who-lost-China" controversy. He became a prime target of McCarthy, who charged him with being the "top Soviet spy, the boss of the whole ring of which Hiss was a part," and the McCarran internal security subcommittee as part of its later investigation of a left-leaning think tank called the Institute of Pacific Relations he was affiliated with—some of whose members were connected to the *Amerasia* case.[24] McCarthy's first direct attack against Marshall involved Lattimore. In April 1950, the Senator said Marshall was "completely unfit" to be Secretary of State and had "boned up" on China by reading Lattimore's writings critical of Chiang and the KMT. In response to a letter from the Tydings Committee, Marshall denied ever meeting Lattimore and commented on "the harmful effect of such statements, charges or insinuations broadcast with so little regard for the truth. They undoubtedly confuse our friends abroad, undermine and weaken our position before the world and actually lend assistance to the powers that would destroy us."[25] That was Marshall's only public statement critical of the phenomenon that came to be known as "McCarthyism" (a term Lattimore coined).

23. Oshinsky, 156-57; Reeves, 284-85.

24. Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (University of California Press, 1992), x; Herman, 120-28; *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation*, 48-74, 160-61.

25. Marshall letter to Tydings, 24 April 1950, and editorial notes, *PGCM*, 7:83-85. Marshall and Lattimore both attended a State Department roundtable on China during 6-8 October 1949, but nothing indicates that they spoke to each other then. Marshall's remarks at the event are in ibid., 5-12. Lattimore mentioned Marshall a few times in his memoir, *Ordeal by Slander (*MacGibbon and Kee, 1952). Along with some passing references, he corrected a columnist's identification of him as a Marshall adviser, stated that in 1947 he "followed General Marshall in accepting the fact that the Kuomintang was beyond salvage" and observed that in replying to Tydings's letter, Marshall and three other secretaries of state "had wheeled into line and discharged a volley to the effect that they had never known me and I had never slipped anything over on them." Lattimore, 46, 169, 179.

Why Marshall did not express his private support for Service, Vincent, Davies, or Clubb to them or anyone else, as he had with Jessup, after he left government service in 1951 is harder to explain, particularly as McCarthy's rhetorical attacks on the State Department intensified and increasingly damaged the reputation of the institution he once led. He did not, for example, express concern that diplomats might temper their written assessments of overseas events to avoid controversy with their Washington-based superiors and Congressional overseers over their on-the-record views, or might be reluctant to accept assignments in politically sensitive areas, as was anecdotally reported at the time.[26]

Facing McCarthy's Wrath

In 1950 and 1951, while nominated for and serving as Secretary of Defense, Marshall himself was the recipient of a series of scurrilous denunciations from McCarthy as a Communist appeaser.[27] The Wisconsin Senator cited the *Amerasia* case, the conviction of Hiss, and the controversies over the China Hands as proof of State Department perfidy and Marshall's assent to Truman's firing of MacArthur as evidence of his unwillingness to stand up to America's Communist enemies. McCarthy told reporters that "Marshall should not be confirmed unless and until he convinced the Senate that he has learned the facts of life about Communism and that he will listen to MacArthur's advice rather than Acheson's advice on the Far East." On separate occasions from the Senate floor in 1951, McCarthy assailed Marshall's efforts in China as "the most weird and traitorous double deal that I believe any of us has ever heard of" and, after his Congressional testimony against MacArthur, characterized him as a "mysterious, powerful" figure who was part of

26. Bontecou, 151; James Reston, "State Secrets in the Limelight Put Intelligence in the Dark," *The New York Times*, 19 June 1951, 4. In 1948, Marshall awarded Davies the Medal of Freedom—the US Government's highest honor for civilians—but not for his diplomatic work; he was recognized for his heroism in helping lead to safety a group of Americans who parachuted into the jungle in Burma in 1943 after their airplane experienced engine trouble over hostile territory. Davies, chapter 10.

27. On Marshall and McCarthy, see Pogue, *Statesman*, 488-90, 496-97; Roll, *Marshall*, 416; Cray, 728; Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* (Random House, 2012), 527, 543-44; Reeves, 371-74; Oshinsky, 128-29, 137-57, 201, 205-06, 236-38; Newton, 73-75; Buckley and Bozell, 388-92; Marshall letter to Frank McCarthy, 9 September 1954, *PGCM*, 7:852.

a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally, exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men. . . . What can be made of this unbroken series of decisions and acts contributing to the strategy of defeat? They cannot be attributed to incompetence. If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve his country's interest.

Figure 28: Senator Joseph McCarthy. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Marshall declined to respond publicly to all this invective, some of it also coming from McCarthy's allies, telling a journalist that "if I have to explain at this point that I am not a traitor to the United States, I hardly think it's worth it." Privately, he thanked several members of Congress and Marshall Plan administrator Paul Hoffman for defending him after McCarthy's 1951 speeches.[28] Marshall's only recorded comment on Hiss came during his confirmation hearing as nominee for Secretary of Defense. When asked why he had recommended Hiss's appointment as Executive Secretary of the American Secretariat at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference that laid the groundwork for what became the United Nations, Marshall replied that he did not recall having appointed Hiss.[29]

28. *PGCM*, 7:557 n. 2, 653, 721. Albert Wedemeyer, embittered because he believed Marshall had scuttled his appointment as Ambassador to China, later added his own denunciation in his 1958 memoir, asserting that the exhausted Marshall "became an easy prey to crypto-Communists, or Communist-sympathizing sycophants, who played on his vanity for their own ends." Wedemeyer, 369-70

29. *PGCM*, 7:161-62. Hiss left the State Department shortly before Marshall became Secretary, and Whittaker Chambers did not make his allegations about Hiss's espionage until over two years later.

Another tactic McCarthy and some Republican rightwingers took against Marshall and the Truman administration was castigating the appointment of Anna Rosenberg as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower in 1950. Marshall's choice of Rosenberg to help with pressing military mobilization problems during the Korean war was daring and provocative given the political atmosphere then, as Forrest Pogue has noted: "A more cautious man would have thought twice about the nomination, given the current climate of opinion. Marshall's recommendation was a New Dealer, a Jew, an Easterner, and a woman; proposed for a top job in a man's world—getting more troops for the armed forces."[30] Although she was highly qualified for the position given her extensive prior work in labor relations—for which she had received the Medal of Freedom, the first woman to be so honored—her nomination encountered bitter opposition from anti-Communist political figures, one of whom mistakenly accused her of being a member of an American Communist organization in the 1930s (the FBI determined that another woman named Anna Rosenberg was). The Senate Armed Services Committee in late November 1950 had recommended her confirmation, but the allegation forced it to reconsider and prompted an investigation that disclosed the erroneous identification. Rosenberg later said that "I was almost his [Marshall's] Dreyfus case" but that "I had his complete backing. . . . He told me when all this started, people are going to go after you." She offered to step aside, and that "was the only time I saw him get mad. He said 'I told you this would happen. They are not after you, they are after me. We will stick this out. It is aimed at me."[31]

Marshall advocated for Rosenberg to the Senate committee members, had the Defense Department counsel provided all the records they sought, and persuaded President Truman to release FBI files about Rosenberg to committee representatives. After its investigation, the committee unanimously recommended her confirmation, and the

30. Pogue, *Statesman*, 430. See also Thompson, 51-53; and *PGCM*, 7:207-07, 232-33, 296-97.

31. Pogue interview with Rosenberg, 30 December 1957, transcript provided by Marshall Research Library. Rosenberg was referring to the hugely controversial conviction and imprisonment of Capt. Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French Army who was wrongly convicted of espionage in a scandalous miscarriage of justice in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Public pressure, encouraged by French notables, eventually led to Dreyfus's exoneration and reinstatement after one of the most trying episodes in French history.

Figure 28: Anna Rosenberg being sworn in as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, 1950. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett is on the right. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

full Senate confirmed her on 21 December. According to Rosenberg, when she heard the news while Marshall was meeting with the JCS, "I rushed in. . . . I was choked up. He said when I told him I was confirmed: 'That's good. Go home and get a facial; you look like hell.' The Joint Chiefs looked shocked that General Marshall would know anything about a facial."[32]

McCarthy's campaign against the State Department further embarrassed Marshall after he left the Pentagon when presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower, previously one of his defenders, deleted praise of him from a campaign speech in Wisconsin in October 1952 given while McCarthy was present.[33] Marshall told his goddaughter, "Eisen-

32. Rosenberg interview; Pogue, *Statesman*, 432-36; Reeves, 357-62; Oshinsky, 202-05.

33. Two months before the Milwaukee incident, when a reporter asked Eisenhower, "What do you think of those people who call General Marshall a living lie," he replied: "How dare anyone say such a thing about General Marshall, who was a perfect example of patriotism and loyal service to the United States. I have no patience with anyone who can find in his record of service for this country anything to criticize." Smith, 527.

hower was forced into a compromise; that's all it was," and added a quip from humorist Will Rogers: "There is no more independence in politics than there is in jail." Conceding that Eisenhower was put in a difficult political spot with Republican control of the Senate at stake, Marshall told his former aide, Frank McCarthy, that "It's all [a] tough and dirty business."[34]

As President, Eisenhower defended Marshall from another insult from McCarthy, who in August 1954 had had inserted in the *Congressional Record* a letter from former Secretary of War Henry Woodring charging that Marshall "would sell out his grandmother for personal advantage." In a press conference, Eisenhower retorted that Marshall had "a brilliant record" that "typified all that we call—or that we look for—in what we call an American patriot." Marshall refused to publicly comment on the Woodring letter or Eisenhower's praise, which got widespread press coverage that evidently pleased him.[35] Elsewhere in his remarks, however, Eisenhower was more tempered in his defense of Marshall. He sidestepped the "who-lost-China" debate by cautiously noting that "I know nothing" about Marshall's conduct of the China mission. "What were his judgments, what were the things that could have been done that were not done, or should not have been done, I don't know."[36] Later, speaking privately to Vice President Richard Nixon, Eisenhower went further, indicating his agreement with the Republican right's complaint about Truman's policy toward China and claiming that "The reason we lost China . . . was because he [Marshall] had insisted upon Chiang Kai-shek taking Communists into his government, against Chiang's judgment."[37] Marshall does not appear to have ever been aware that Eisenhower felt that way about his China mission.

34. Marshall letter to McCarthy, 9 September 1954, *PGCM*, 7:852.

35. Ibid., 854 n.3.

36. Smith, 527.

37. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Volume Two, The President* (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 202.



Conclusion: Marshall as an "Organizer of Intelligence"

Several major themes stand out from this narrative of Marshall's sojourn in the secret world that show the range of his attitudes and approaches to intelligence. They also highlight how he applied some of his leadership principles to an unfamiliar environment beset with problems that continue to confront intelligence managers and practitioners today: interagency rivalries, conflicts of authority, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and security concerns.

Marshall as Army Chief of Staff and Cabinet secretary mostly engaged with intelligence from the standpoint of a high-level military manager and policy adviser with particular attention to chain of command, areas of responsibility, interaction with other agencies, and information security. The overall characteristics of his leadership style—unity and centralization of command, delegation of authority, and conciliation over confrontation—are evident in his general approach to intelligence. He only rarely delved into operational or analytical matters as a military commander and Cabinet secretary, leaving them to his subordinates to deal with directly. Much lauded after the war as the "organizer of victory," he did not make the same administrative improvements in Army intelligence that he did in other areas of the service. His delegatory style of management slipped into detachment in his handling of G-2 while he concentrated on larger administrative and strategic issues during the war. Similarly in his Cabinet positions, with the exception of his reconstitution of INR at State, he mostly took a hands-off approach to the intelligence components under him.

Marshall's exposure to intelligence during World War II gradually helped him appreciate its complexities and its significance in informing wise battlefield and policy decisions. His experiences encouraged him to improve coordination with the Navy and ensure that the War Department's intelligence products were timely and useful to high-level consumers, especially the President. Marshall more readily accepted unconventional operations, notably by the OSS, than most of his military contemporaries, especially as long as those activities were subsumed under the regular chain of command. Also, he was ahead of his time in championing inter-service integration, with COMINT as one of his initial focuses. His persistent drive for unity of command lay behind his push for cooperation between the Army and the Navy on intelligence and elsewhere and his advocacy of a single Cabinet department for the armed services.

One area of intelligence where Marshall got much more directly involved was security, especially regarding COMINT to avoid having compromises contribute to military setbacks. For him, "need to know" about that sensitive source was paramount over "need to share." At times, he probably put that concern into practice to a fault, as the Pearl Harbor inquiries brought out. Moreover, as Secretary of State, he tried to restore the Department's battered reputation for lax security through a rigorous regimen of personnel scrutiny that sometimes overreached.

During World War II and after, with a few exceptions mainly involving COMINT as Army Chief of Staff, Marshall was not an avid consumer of intelligence products. He read the daily MAGIC summary largely because of its tactical importance in the conduct of military operations in the Pacific. He focused less on ULTRA but appreciated its significance in the Allies' prosecution of the ground and naval war against Germany. He seemed to see less strategic or tactical value in HUMINT, which might in part explain why he did not address the shortcomings of the military attache system, even though at the start of the war it provided most of the intelligence the Army collected. Nothing in the record, for example, indicates that Marshall, through G-2, ever availed himself of the information that OSS's Secret Intel-

ligence units collected in German-occupied territory or that he took notice beyond what has been mentioned of the Special Operations units' paramilitary and collection activities in the European and Asian theaters. At the State and Defense Departments, he seemed satisfied with the intelligence he received from his organizations and did not read CIA's daily products or levy any requirements on it through the NIA or the NSC. He was on the dissemination list for CIA intelligence Estimates, but how or whether they influenced his thinking about foreign policy and military issues is unknown.

One of Marshall's leadership dictums was "Don't fight the problem—decide it."[1] As a military diplomat helping to lead an often fractious coalition during World War II, Marshall often put it into practice, and he did so in his dealings with intelligence as well, including in his interactions with aggressive contemporaries. For the most part, he kept his formidable temper under control while working with the strong-willed personalities of King, MacArthur, Vandenberg, and Smith. A few examples of departmental parochialism notwithstanding, Marshall preferred to seek common ground with the Navy and CIA on most issues and to clearly define agencies' respective responsibilities to minimize bureaucratic conflict over operations and resources.

Marshall sometimes displayed a bit of the naïveté toward US adversaries' espionage that many Roosevelt and Truman administration officials showed. His openness to liaison with the NKVD/NKGB during World War II despite the obvious espionage risks and his returning of Chou En-lai's misplaced codebook during his mission to China as a gesture of trust suggest a less-than-realistic appreciation of counterintelligence. He had no illusions about Soviet meddling in China but would not let it distract him from his goal of reaching a KMT-CCP accord. On the other hand, his skirmishes with Soviet leaders at the foreign ministers conference in Moscow in March-April 1947 mostly disabused him of any remaining hopes for postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union and might have left him more willing to take a hard line on security matters at the State Department and to permit some European Recovery Program funds to support CIA anti-Soviet covert

1. Pogue, *Statesman*, 148.

action despite the possibility of damaging blowback if such a connection were revealed.

Finally, Marshall was very keen on applying the lessons of history to expanding, mobilizing, and deploying the Army before and during World War II and in confronting the challenges the United States faced in the postwar world, but he did not carry that attitude into his responsibilities for intelligence. Among several examples of the former, in an address to the American Historical Association in 1939, he observed that

> *Historians have been inclined to record the victories and gloss over the mistakes and wasteful sacrifices. . . . Veterans of the World War often seem to overlook the fact that almost a year and a half elapsed after the declaration of war before we could bring a field army into being, and even then its weapons, ammunition, and other material were provided by our Allies. And many of them seem unaware of the fact that the partially trained state of our troops proved a costly and tragic business despite the eventual success.*[2]

In a speech at Princeton University eight years later, Marshall observed that

> *We do not lack for knowledge of what to do for our future security. The lessons of history provide plain guidance. . . . One usually emerges from an intimate understanding of the past with its lessons and its wisdom, with convictions which put fire in the soul. I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.*[3]

2. "National Organization for War: A Speech to the American Military Institute, at the American Historical Association convention, Washington, December 28, 1939," *PGCM*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-to-the-american-historical-association/.

3. Speech at Princeton University, 22 February 1947, ibid., 7:48, 49. For other Marshall statements on the uses and lessons of history, see "Speech on School History Texts," 10 February 1923, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-on-school-history-texts/; "Speech to the American Legion," 6 November 1938, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-to-the-american-legion-2/; "Speech to the National Rifle Association," 3 February 1939, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-to-the-national-rifle-association/; "Speech to the Maryland Historical Society," 11 May 1945, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-to-the-maryland-historical-society1/; and a brief essay he wrote in the *Infantry Journal* in 1921 titled "Profiting By War Experiences," which he

In contrast, he seems not to have considered, or even been aware of, the baleful history of US military intelligence, with its cycles of build-up and teardown and its failure to broadly inculcate an institutional memory of intelligence practices, accomplishments, and shortcomings. The Army did not have a school for general intelligence instruction until 1942, when one was established at Camp Ritchie, Maryland; no records indicate that Marshall was involved in that development. When commenting on the curriculum of a proposed joint service school, he did not mention including intelligence or the US military's experience with it as subjects.[4] In their book *Thinking In Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May describe Marshall as "seeing and thinking in 'time-streams.' Though busy fighting a war, he paused to ponder possible futures. He looked not only to the coming year but well beyond, and with a clear sense of the long past from which those futures would come." That is generally true for Marshall's approach to military affairs and their international repercussions and might be evidenced in his interest in the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, but he did not regard intelligence with the same expansive mindset either as a warfighter or a policymaker.[5]

* * *

In late August or early September 1951, Marshall submitted his letter of resignation as Secretary of Defense to President Truman, dated 1 September but to take effect on 12 September. "With deep regret," he wrote, "I feel I must terminate my active daily service in the government . . . but," he dutifully continued, "as you well know I will

closed by stating that "We remain without modern experience in the first phases of a war and must draw our conclusions from history"; ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol01.pdf, 205. In a related vein, in 1923, Marshall got involved in Pershing's effort to improve the portrayal of the US military in history textbooks. See Marshall memo to Pershing, 1 January 1923, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-general-pershing/, and Marshall memo to Col. Oliver L. Spaulding Jr., 5 March 1923, ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-for-colonel-oliver-l-spaulding-jr/.

4. Ibid., https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/GCMPvol04.pdf, 7 n.3; Powe and Wilson, 48. The War Department's cryptanalytic unit, the Signal Intelligence Service, established in 1930, had had the Army's only intelligence specialist's school since 1931, and the Army Cryptographic School opened in late 1942. Lewin, *American Magic*, 39, 134.

5. The Free Press, 1986; chapter 14, quote at 248.

always be available for whatever temporary service you may desire of me." Truman graciously responded:

> *In again accepting your resignation from a position of high responsibility I realize how many times previously you have sought to retire to private life. But one time after another you have responded to the call to public service. To all of these offices you have brought great talent and wisdom. In fact, no man ever has given his country more distinguished and patriotic service than have you. . . . You have earned your retirement many fold and I wish you many good years at Leesburg.*[6]

Marshall remained busy during his last eight years, engaging in a variety of activities typical at the time of a man of his place and stature. What he had confided to Gen. Omar Bradley in 1948 applied to his retirement: "It seems to me that as I grow older the birds fly faster."[7] He was a member of and/or participated in meetings or functions of the VMI Board of Visitors, the VMI Foundation, the National Geographic Society Board of Trustees, the Business Advisory Council, the American Battle Monuments Commission, the American Red Cross, and the International House Board of Trustees. He received some organizational awards and spoke at numerous celebratory occasions for educational and other institutions, his last being at VMI's graduation ceremony in June 1956. The traditional recognition at VMI in 1951 was dedicated to him, and, as had been done for George Washington and "Stonewall" Jackson, an arch at the barracks was named in his honor. He traveled to Europe three times, in 1952 to inspect US military cemeteries and in 1953 to represent the United States at Queen Elizabeth II's coronation and receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Marshall continued to refuse to write any memoirs and reportedly declined a million-dollar contract for one. He relented somewhat by agreeing to give an oral history interview for an official JCS history and a series of interviews with official biographer Forrest Pogue.

6. Marshall letter to Truman, n.d., and Truman letter to Marshall, 11 September 1951, *PGCM*, 7:629-30. On 19 October, Marshall attended a Cabinet meeting at which Truman presented him with the desk chair he had used as Secretary of State and Defense. Ibid., xxxii.

7. Marshall letter to Bradley, 9 January 1948, quoted in Stoler, *Marshall*, 194.

Figure 29: Marshall's home, Dodona Manor, in Leesburg, Virginia. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Besides his involvement with the American Battle Monuments Commission, the only other US Government business Marshall undertook in retirement was serving as a consultant to a blue-ribbon committee that recommended improvements in the Defense Department. Known as the Rockefeller Committee after its head, Nelson Rockefeller, the Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Reorganization, its members were General Bradley, Chairman of the JCS; Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution; Milton Eisenhower, President of Pennsylvania State University; Robert Lovett, Marshall's successor as Secretary of Defense; Arthur Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; and David Sarnoff, chairman of the Radio Corporation of America. Joining Marshall as senior military consultants were Admiral Chester Nimitz and the first Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Spaatz. Marshall went to Washington several times during March and April to attend the committee's 10 meetings, held mostly on weekends. The committee issued its report on 11 April with strong recommendations to increase the authority of the secretary of defense, clarify command channels within the Department, and enhance the status of the Joint Chiefs. Intelligence matters were not directly addressed. Committee records

do not indicate the extent of Marshall's role in the discussions, and he made no private or public statements about the committee's work or its report. Given his prior role as Defense Secretary, he assuredly endorsed its recommendations.[8]

Age and declining health took their toll on Marshall as his final years passed. He gradually reduced his activities and spent more time at home and on vacations. He also had intermittent and lengthy confinements at Walter Reed Army Hospital during 1956-58. In January and February 1959, soon after his 78th birthday, he suffered two strokes that together deprived him of his sight, hearing, speech, and memory and from which he never recovered. He succumbed to a third stroke on 16 October of that year. A man of simple tastes, he told his second wife that he did not want a grand official funeral as Pershing had had or to lie in state in the Capitol Rotunda. She slightly altered his request by arranging for his coffin to stay overnight in a small chapel at the National Cathedral. An honor guard from VMI and the military services stood watch while crowds lined up to pay their respects. A brief funeral at Fort Myer Chapel at Arlington National Cemetery followed the next day. Marshall was buried at a spot he had chosen years before, next to the graves of his first wife and her mother. He was not far from the statue and burial site he had arranged for Sir John Dill, his "special source" in the British high command and collaborator in back-channel intelligence sharing during World War II.

8. *PGCM*, 7:755-56; Richard M. Leighton, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume III, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956* (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), 21-29; *Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization*, 11 April 1953 (Government Printing Office, 1953); several committee documents the secretary of defense's historians office provided to the author in his possession. Marshall had a second, briefer involvement with Defense Department organization in early 1958 when Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy asked him to meet with a special assistant to discuss the topic. Marshall's military aide reported that Marshall "made some very keen answers" to the assistant's questions and familiarly "reminisced quite a bit, almost entirely along the lines of the importance of a unified and well-coordinated team." *PGCM*, 7:988.

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