



Senior leaders in the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence saw IRTPA as a chance to address longstanding challenges, including in the field of analysis.

## From Mandate to Results: Restoring Confidence and Transforming Analysis

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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was triggered by the events of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Doing something dramatic was unavoidable, but there was no appetite for addressing all the ills of the national security enterprise.<sup>1</sup> The legislation was shaped, in part, by a narrative asserting or implying that policy errors had been caused by bad intelligence.<sup>2</sup> The silver-bullet solution was to improve the formulation and execution of national security policy by fixing defects in the Intelligence Community.

Identified and imputed deficiencies in analytic support became the focus of most specifically mandated reforms. I was tapped to lead implementation of IRTPA and White House-directed reforms intended to improve IC analytic products.<sup>3</sup>

To describe IRTPA as unwanted and unloved by the IC would be an understatement. There were many reasons for this, including the accurate perception that it unfairly disparaged the work of all analysts and

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## From Mandate to Results

agencies for the sins of a few and unnecessarily prescribed reforms that already were (or should have been) integral to analytic trade-craft. It also caused uncertainty about how implementation would affect the work and careers of individual analysts. Most analysts believed that they were doing good and important work and that their own agencies (if not necessarily other IC components) did not need outside supervision or unnecessary and potentially disruptive changes.

The stigmatization of IC analysts and analysis jeopardized retention of experienced analysts and the more than half the total who had joined the IC after 9/11. Moreover, the intelligence failure narrative threatened to erode policymaker confidence in the information, insights, and judgments they received from the Intelligence Community. Intelligence is a support activity and IC analysis is supposed to be the best informed, most objective, and best targeted input available to decisionmakers.<sup>4</sup> If or to the extent that decisionmakers lost confidence in the IC and the analysts who supported them, the intelligence enterprise would become an expensive irrelevance, policymaking would suffer, and national security would become more problematic. Addressing these consequences had to be among my highest priorities.

The hyperbole accompanying passage of IRTPA was often unhelpful, but senior managers of analytic components and I nevertheless saw the legislation as an opportunity to address problems that we recognized, found frustrating, and previously felt unable to do much about. In other words, we saw IRTPA as empowering us to do things we knew needed to be done. Indeed, as criticism of the IC intensified in the wake of the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, several of us had begun to meet informally to talk about what we might do. IRTPA gave us the chance to act. This strong consensus that we needed to make and be seen to have made significant changes from business as usual created a receptivity to reform very different than the hostility and passive resistance encountered by the other ODNI deputy directors.<sup>5</sup>

IRTPA provided a mandate to improve analytic products and other forms of support to policymakers, but it did not include a blueprint or road-map for doing so. The goal was clear and, fortunately from my perspective, both the law and the guidance I received from John Negroponte, the first DNI, gave me wide latitude to set priorities and implement measures to make analysis better. But having authority and leeway to make changes was not a plan or even an approach.<sup>6</sup> Calls—demands, really—for me to submit a plan to Congressional overseers and the

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board began within days of my appointment. These calls were well meaning and reflected the urgency many felt about the need to "fix" the IC. But at least some of them were also intended to give Congressional staff and opponents of reform an opportunity to press for actions not included in the legislation.<sup>7</sup> I didn't want more cooks telling me what to do, and I did not want to spend time defending plans that I knew would be imperfect at the expense of getting started, learning from our mistakes, and demonstrating real progress. We adopted an approach that one of my deputies, Mike Wertheimer, summarized as "Think big, start small, fail cheap, and fix fast."

A few days after I had accepted Negroponte's invitation to become his deputy for analysis, he informed me that my portfolio would include chairing the National Intelligence Council and overseeing production of the President's Daily Brief. After referring to the dozens of specific tasks assigned by IRTPA and a recently issued presidential directive, he asked the simple but daunting question, "What are you going to do?" I replied that I'd get back to him. My immediate tasks were to build and staff a new organization (the Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis), restore confidence in the IC and its analytic products, implement the IRTPA-mandated changes and others endorsed by

## Restoring Confidence and Transforming Analysis

the president, and begin a process that would transform IC analysis.<sup>8</sup> Negroponte and I both knew that speed was of the essence and that changes had to be made without degrading daily support to national security policymakers. CIA colleague Peter Clement likened the tasks to replacing the wings of a fully loaded 747 flying at 30,000 feet.

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### New Team, New Organization

All my major tasks were interconnected, and all had to be pursued simultaneously. Doing everything required building a team with the experience, skill, and commitment to build a new organization and procedures (ODDNI/A) inside another entirely new organization (ODNI) while executing the continuing analytical mission of the Intelligence Community and introducing changes to enhance collaboration and the quality/utility of analytic support to the national security enterprise. The NIC and PDB had defined roles, structures, and staff, but the remainder of my organization chart was blank. To recruit people, I had to determine, at least in broad terms, what I wanted them to do. Getting started required a first approximation grouping of mandated tasks and desirable goals into coherent portfolios represented by boxes on the organization chart. But I was reluctant to lock in structure and

divisions of responsibility until I understood the interests, abilities, and ideas of those I hoped to add to the team. I also wanted to delay locking in structures and responsibilities until I had obtained input from managers and analysts across the IC and better understood what my ODNI counterparts for collection, management, and customer outcomes were trying to do.<sup>9</sup>

The approach I adopted was influenced by the Chinese admonition to “cross the stream by feeling for the stones.” The first two “stones” were the PDB and NIC. Both had real and totemic importance as producers of the IC’s flagship products for its most important customers. They also had special importance because of the way they had been characterized in the intelligence-reform narrative. Fortunately for me and for the early successes of the ODNI, neither organization required immediate or dramatic changes and the serving directors, Steve Kaplan for the PDB and David Gordon for the NIC, agreed to stay on and were enthusiastic supporters of seizing the opportunity to improve IC products and procedures. President Bush had been in office for more than four years when I inherited responsibility for the PDB. It was his PDB and it reflected his preferences and priorities. My focus was on transforming the PDB from an exclusively CIA product into an IC product. I had a mandate to make the PDB better; whether that goal

was achieved would be determined by the president.

The NIC was already the most inclusive and best integrated component of the IC. Its structure was appropriate to its responsibilities and it was staffed by excellent people from many analytic components. Given the high profile of NIC products in the intelligence reform debate, especially the flawed estimate on WMD in Iraq, I knew that Congress and the PFIAB would use the quality of NIC products as a key metric of ODNI performance. David Gordon and I decided to achieve and demonstrate improvement by incorporating and highlighting mandated tradecraft standards in NIC products.

My intent to defer and limit changes to the NIC was soon overtaken by Negroponte’s decision to transfer responsibility for the preparation of materials for NSC and other high-level meetings from CIA to the NIC. I understood and agreed with that decision, but it put a severe strain on the NIC staff and impeded my ability to use the NIC to achieve other transformational goals.<sup>10</sup>

Improving and assuring the quality and integrity of analytic products was a central focus of the IRTPA mandate. As was true of many mandates, it specified goals without providing clear guidance on how to achieve them. I knew that there were many in the

## From Mandate to Results

IC with the interest and ability to operationalize standards and develop training procedures and evaluative processes. But I also judged that it was important to signal that “we got it” with respect to the prevailing narrative that nothing would change without fresh ideas and outside involvement. I decided to look outside the IC and was thrilled when Georgetown University professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a highly respected diplomatic historian, agreed to build and head what became known as the Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) directorate.<sup>11</sup>

Each of the above positions had relatively clear responsibilities but together they did not cover the full range of mandated and necessary reforms. Managing the relationship between analysis and collection was both a critical and a high-profile task that had figured prominently in proposals for reform. I assigned responsibility for defining the role and leading the Analytic Mission Management directorate to John Keefe, whom I had recruited from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) staff and knew to be a creative and effective manager. I knew that I wanted him on my team even though I initially did not know exactly how I would use him. His role was especially important on issues that crossed boundaries between ODDNI/A and other components of the ODNI.<sup>12</sup>

Implementing all the reforms mandated by IRTPA would be a challenging undertaking, but my new team and I wanted to do more. We wanted to launch a process that would transform fundamentally the way IC analysts do their jobs. I had only the dimmest notion of how to do that, but a fortuitous conversation with Mike Wertheimer, a National Security Agency veteran, persuaded me that he had visionary ideas, pragmatic approaches to achieving them, and a facility for articulating their salience. I recruited Mike without knowing exactly how he would fit into the ODDNI/A or what he would do. He quickly built a team that developed and built A-Space, the Library of National Intelligence, and other transformative capabilities.<sup>13</sup>

The final senior recruitment was that of Navy Captain Ron Rice who served as our first liaison to the military and the law enforcement community. Communication with all IC customers was and remains an essential requirement, but with shooting conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the intense focus on terrorist threats to the United States and our international partners, ensuring that we were providing the tailored, timely, and targeted analytic support needed by those in the field was essential. As with most of the other deputies, Ron had to make it up as he went along and he had to get it right or fix flaws quickly. If the ODNI failed to maintain the

high-level support demanded by those in uniform, those who had opposed its creation and wanted it to fail would have intensified efforts to roll back the IRTPA reforms.<sup>14</sup>

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## Rebuilding Confidence and Morale

Most fixations, crises, and targets of ridicule in Washington have a half-life measured in weeks or months. Intelligence Community analysis and analysts were preferred whipping boys in the run-up to passage of IRTPA in December 2004. Targeting IC analysts was, in part, a convenient way to redirect dissatisfaction with administration policy. It also validated the aphorism that in DC there are only two possibilities: policy success and intelligence failure. Criticism of IC performance was certainly warranted, but the magnitude and severity gave decisionmakers across the national security enterprise reasons to doubt the accuracy and utility of intelligence-based analyses, and undermined morale across the IC. Restoring confidence and self-confidence was an urgent imperative.<sup>15</sup>

Blows to analyst morale were compounded by uncertainties resulting from provisions of the law that gave the DNI authority to reassign people and portfolios, and proposals from non-governmental

## Restoring Confidence and Transforming Analysis

groups and influential individuals calling for extensive restructuring of the IC.<sup>16</sup> Analysts were angered by what they considered unfair criticism and concerned about the potential impact on careers and personal lives. Providing reassurance that ODNI was not planning to make major structural changes to the IC or to move functions and people from one agency to another was an important early undertaking. It proved relatively easy to reassure the workforce because what we were saying had the virtue of being true.

The essence of our message was not, “Chill out, we are not going to change anything. Reform is nothing more than *kabuki* theater.” Rather, it was a combination of encouragement that we had an unprecedented opportunity to fix problems that analysts wanted addressed and to make it easier for them to do their jobs and produce high-quality work. Soliciting their input and demonstrating that we heard what they were saying helped us to build our own “to do” list and to obtain buy-in for the changes we wanted to make.<sup>17</sup>

Verbal reassurances and recurring parish calls to agencies during which we provided updates on what we were trying to do and obtained feedback on our plans and performance probably helped to reduce anxiety and obtain provisional if still skeptical acceptance

of the changes we introduced. Possibly more important was the fact that we had substantial buy-in and support from senior analytic managers across the IC. As noted above, analytic managers began to meet informally before IRTPA was passed to discuss what we could do on our own to enhance the performance and perceptions of our organizations and people. We met as friends, many of whom had known one another for years or decades, rather than as representatives of our agencies. As CIA Director of Intelligence John Kringen, put it, we are probably in our last IC jobs. We see better than anyone the problems that need attention and none of us wants to exit the stage without doing everything possible to restore confidence by improving performance.

The third leg of our strategy to rebuild morale and obtain buy-in was to provide an ambitious vision, a tentative road-map for attaining that vision, and immediate evidence that we could deliver on the promises we made. The vision and road-map we laid out promised steps like joint training, uniform tradecraft standards, easier ability to share intelligence and work collaboratively, and enhanced ability to take advantage of the specialized expertise of IC colleagues and non-USG experts. Some of the steps we took are described in the following section.

Obtaining buy-in from analysts was both an immediate and continuing requirement. So too was the need to regain the confidence of the decisionmakers we supported. If policymakers did not have confidence in the intelligence professionals, usually analysts, with whom they interacted and did not understand or respect the information and insights analysts provided, the intelligence enterprise would be an expensive fifth wheel. Although my interactions with policymakers suggested that loss of confidence was less serious than suggested by commentary, the problem was not a trivial one, and we had to address it. What I learned suggested that many policymakers expressed decreased or limited confidence in the IC but continued confidence in the analysts with whom they interacted and the intelligence they provided. This pattern resembled Fenno’s paradox, in which voters express a low opinion of Congress but a higher opinion of their own representatives.<sup>a</sup> As Ron Burgess notes in his contribution to this edition, his directorate made a sustained effort to assess and respond to customer concerns and my directorate conducted annual surveys to obtain customer assessments of our performance.

a. In 1978, political scientist Richard Fenno observed that people generally disapprove of Congress as a whole but often support their own representatives. See *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Pearson College Division, 1978).

## From Mandate to Results

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### Implementing Reforms

A few weeks after standup of the ODNI, I realized that many of my colleagues, notably those transferred to the new organization from the old Community Management Staff, viewed implementation of the IRTPA and White House mandated reforms as a series of discrete tasks that could be tracked on a spread sheet. Implementation was to be the metric of success (i.e., we were assigned tasks and we achieved them). I understood why they adopted this perspective and saw no reason to oppose what they were trying to do. Nevertheless, my newly forged team saw reforms as means to an end rather than ends in themselves. The end or goal we envisioned was a better integrated community of analysts eager and able to collaborate across agency boundaries in ways that took advantage of multiple perspectives and areas of expertise.<sup>18</sup>

Thinking and talking about reform in this way enabled us to seek buy-in for a vision of how IC analysis could and should function. The prevailing narrative decrying IC analytic incompetence was exaggerated and offensive, casting reform as necessary to raise deplorably low levels of individual and institutional competence. We saw approaching the challenge in this way as a recipe for failure that would foster resistance to reform.

Instead, we adopted an approach that envisioned and described specific changes as steps to reduce impediments to collaboration that had been identified by analysts in the parish call meetings we held across the community and/or articulated by senior managers. Instead of looking back and emphasizing a need to correct existing defects, we sought—and obtained—buy-in for a vision promising to improve IC analytic support by making it easier for analysts to do things they had declared necessary to make their jobs easier and more rewarding. I realize in writing the above sentences that they might be read as describing a shameless ploy to persuade analysts and agencies to swallow bad tasting medicine, but that was not our intent. The vision and our belief that the specific steps we proposed would achieve that vision were genuine.

As noted above, we sought to assuage analyst concerns that ODNI-initiated changes would have negative consequences for their missions, agencies, careers, and personal lives by forswearing intent to restructure analytic components or reassign functions and people. Our stated goal was to make IC analytic support to policymakers better—more useful—by improving the performance of all agencies. To accomplish this, we proposed and took steps that would make it easier for analysts to access information, employ good tradecraft, and collaborate with counterparts and people with

complementary expertise. Here are some of the things that we did to achieve that objective.

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### Tradecraft and Analytic Standards

Although sometimes depicted as dramatic departures from past practice, most of the mandated tradecraft requirements were essentially a repackaging of longstanding approaches and methods that were applied, consciously or not, by analysts across the IC.<sup>19</sup> Our task was not to persuade analysts to do things in a fundamentally different way but rather to clarify, reinforce, and improve good analytic practices. Despite presenting reforms in this way, we were not pushing on an open door and did encounter resistance that was stronger in some agencies than in others. As importantly, we sought to persuade analysts that their counterparts in other agencies were as well-trained and rigorous as they were. This was essential if we were to increase collaboration and use of products prepared in one agency to meet the needs of customers served by analysts elsewhere in the IC.

Enhancing confidence in the competence of analysts in other agencies was necessary because existing behaviors to build agency esprit often disparaged the people and products of other IC components. Moreover, the absence of standardized training and evaluative

## Restoring Confidence and Transforming Analysis

standards made it imprudent to assume that the quality of work produced elsewhere was suitable for submission to all policy customers. Under the leadership of first Nancy Tucker and then Richard Immerman, another academic, the AIS directorate established a joint training program, established standards for evaluation, evaluated the work of all agencies on selected topics, and assisted agencies requesting help to establish or expand their own training and evaluation programs. What became known as Analysis 101 mandated joint training of new analysts from all agencies. Smaller agencies generally welcome Analysis 101, but resistance in one of the largest proved almost insurmountable. Training jointly provided assurance that all analysts were working toward the same standards, but it also facilitated networking across agency boundaries.<sup>20</sup>

The IRTPA required an annual report to Congress on the evaluation of IC analytic performance using the mandated standards. We decided to preclude unhelpful and invidious comparisons of individual agencies by aggregating information on all agencies and submitting a single report for the entire community. The strengths and weaknesses of individual agencies and/or analysts were treated as a diagnostic tool reported only to the agency involved. The evaluative reports were accompanied by a tailored offer from ODDNI/A to help improve performance. This offer was eagerly

accepted by many agencies, especially DIA and the FBI.

Enhancing tradecraft and building confidence in the abilities of colleagues were necessary but insufficient steps toward building a community of analysts and enabling the IC analytic components to function in a more integrated and synergistic way. To achieve that goal, we adopted measures not specified in the reform legislation. One of the first was to revitalize and repurpose the Analytic Resources Catalog (ARC), a database of analysts and expertise that had been proposed more than a decade earlier by then NIC Chair John Gannon and resuscitated by Mark Lowenthal when he was assistant DCIA for analysis. Their efforts were frustrated by a combination of counterintelligence (CI) concerns and reluctance of analysts to be included in a directory that looked like a free-agent list of experts who could be recruited or reassigned without consent. We saw the ARC as a repository of expertise that could be used to facilitate collaboration by making it easier to find potential partners.

Illustrating once again the dictum that few things are more difficult than achieving what is obviously a good idea, our efforts to populate the ARC immediately encountered challenges centered on the question of who should be considered an analyst. Hoary IC traditions dating back decades distinguished—and discriminated—between “all source” and “single INT”

analysts and assigned status, equivalent to white-collar and blue-collar workers, based on the agency in which one worked. We regarded that as outdated and counterproductive. Twenty-first century analysis requires input and insights from all “INTs” and analytical specialties.<sup>21</sup> We determined to break down barriers by adopting a broad and elastic definition of analyst. As importantly, we left it to analysts to specify their areas of expertise and were indifferent about how they had acquired it (e.g., in graduate school, previous IC assignments, the Peace Corps or military service). One of our operating premises was that many people knew more about the places or problems they covered in a previous assignment than about those in their recently assigned portfolios.

Making it easier to find potential collaborators was helpful but of limited value unless we could also lower barriers to information sharing, of which there were several. One of the most maddening and unhelpful restricted dissemination of intelligence to specific agencies even though “all” analysts in all IC analytic components had (or could have) the same security clearances. We attacked this problem on two fronts. One attempted to reduce ORCON (Originator Controlled) restrictions by invoking IRTPA language on analysis driving collection and arguing that analysts, not collectors, should be the ones who determined what intelligence they needed to do their jobs. This was a long and frustrating

## From Mandate to Results

battle that eventually produced Intelligence Community Directive 501, “Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information Within the Intelligence Community.”<sup>22</sup>

Another component of our multifaceted attempt to facilitate collaboration was the creation of A-Space, which was quickly dubbed “Facebook for Spies” by the media. A-Space was a pilot program to develop a common collaborative workspace. Access was limited to analysts with up-to-date clearances who were listed in the ARC. Several attributes of A-Space warrant mention. One is that it was developed with the active participation of more than 100 analysts to ensure that it did what they wanted it to do and did not have unwanted bells and whistles of the kind that had given “tools” a bad name in the analytic community. A second is that it allowed all analysts to access and share intelligence reports with anyone or everyone who had access. Although using A-Space was voluntary, within weeks the utilization rate was greater than 90 percent. People used it because it helped them to do their jobs. A third notable feature was that sharing drafts widely led to the discovery of previously unknown colleagues working on similar or complementary subjects and greatly enhanced opportunities for collaboration and synergy.<sup>23</sup>

Another major innovation, which like A-Space was conceived by ADDNI for Analytic Transformation and Technology

Mike Wertheimer, was the Library of National Intelligence. Among other capabilities, LNI enables analysts to discover the totality of intelligence reports on any given subject. Discovery does not mean that analyst would automatically have access to every report, but they would know that the reports exist and be able to discover who does have access. This was another of the capabilities requested in our initial parish calls to solicit ideas and outline what we hoped to do.<sup>24</sup>

These and other transformational reforms incorporated mandated and other measures prescribed by IRTPA, responded to requests solicited or demanded by IC analysts, and contributed to progress toward restoring confidence, improving the quality and utility of analytic products, and building a community of analysts. As importantly, they made it easier for analysts and analytic units to work smarter without working harder. None of these steps was a magic bullet that solved all IC problems. Each of them, however, made the situation better. As importantly, individually and collectively, they were recognized by analysts, agencies, and oversight bodies as constructive moves in the right direction.

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## Achievements and Unrealized Goals

The passage of time inevitably changes the lenses through which

we view and assess the past. A decade ago, I probably would have cataloged in detail the steps we took and frustrations they encountered. In this essay, my goal has been to summarize in broad brush fashion what we were attempting to do and how we sought to use the mandate and opportunity provided by IRTPA to achieve meaningful and enduring improvements to the analytic enterprise. We certainly achieved the minimal but essential goals of standing up and staffing a new organization and checking the “done” box with respect to all mandated reform tasks. That we would do so was not a foregone conclusion. What probably looks easy and unimpressive in retrospect was anything but at the time we did it. Doing many obvious and necessary things was complicated by ambiguity, animosity, and the imperative to provide continuous support to the national security enterprise while attempting to transform critical relationships and procedures. We accomplished a lot more than simply checking all boxes. I think we improved the quality and utility of IC analyses, enhanced collaboration across agency boundaries, introduced technologies and practices that made it easier for analysts to do their jobs, restored morale, and regained the confidence of those we supported. These were not trivial accomplishments.

Not everything that we attempted was successful and many of our most innovative ideas did not long outlast my departure at the



## Restoring Confidence and Transforming Analysis

end of 2008. Examples that did not survive include our Summer Hard Problems Program (SHARP) and multidisciplinary teams composed of IC analysts trained and equipped with the leadership skills, analytic tools, tradecraft, and mission processes to meet complex analytic challenges—Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response (RASER) teams. Another change that proved short lived was the inauguration of regular meetings between National Intelligence Officers and members of the press for the purposes of demonstrating the expertise of our senior analysts and helping journalists to avoid mistakes that we would have to clean up later. Our efforts to expand and deepen engagement with experts outside the IC achieved

less success than I had hoped. Most distressingly, my efforts to forestall dilution of NIC and NIO status and authority by retaining their responsibility for tasks later transferred to National Intelligence Managers yielded only evanescent success.

No one with experience in Washington should expect successors simply to continue what has been initiated by others, and I certainly did not have any delusions in that regard. Some of our victories (e.g., preservation of separate directorates for analysis and collection to ensure that analysis was not swamped by the much larger collection enterprise) proved ephemeral, but many—even most—of the changes we launched and the battles

we won have had staying power. Twenty years later, I remain proud of the things we accomplished, deeply grateful for the ideas and dedication of the team I built, and heartened by President Bush’s statement to me at the end of our terms that I had succeeded in restoring his confidence in IC analyses.

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## Endnotes

1. See, for example, Charles Perrow, “A Symposium on the 9/11 Commission Report: Organizational or Executive Failures?” *Contemporary Sociology* 34:2 (March 2005) 99–107; and Michael Allen, *Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence After 9/11* (Potomac Press, 2013).
2. See Mark M. Lowenthal, “Toward a Reasonable Standard for Analysis: How Right, How Often on What Issues?” *Intelligence and National Security* 23:3 (June 2008), 303–315; and Paul R. Pillar, *Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (Columbia University Press, 2011), especially chapter 11.
3. For more on this point and others addressed briefly in this essay, see Thomasingar, *From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from intelligence Reform* (Stanford University Press, 2021).
4. On intelligence as a support activity, see, for example, Thomasingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford University Press, 2011).
5. See John D. Negroponte and Edward M. Wittenstein, “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” *Yale Law and Policy Review* 28:2 (Spring 2010), 379–417.
6. The responsibilities and authorities assigned and delegated to me as DDNI/A were specified in Intelligence Community Directive Number 200: Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis. (January 8, 2007) (since withdrawn but available at <https://irp.fas.org/dni/icd/icd-200.pdf>).
7. President Bush changed the name to the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board in 2008 to reflect the integration of domestic and foreign intelligence mandated by the IRTPA. See “President’s Intelligence Advisory Board,” <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/piab/#:~:text=President%20Reagan%20re%2Dinstituted%20the,end%20at%20our%20Nation’s%20borders>.
8. The president endorsed many reforms proposed by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction which submitted its “Report to the President of the United States” (hereafter WMD Commission Report) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005) after passage of IRTPA. See “Bush Administration Actions to Implement WMD Commission Recommendations,” <https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/06/wh062905-wmd.pdf>.
9. See the essay in this compilation by Ron Burgess.

## From Mandate to Results

10. See Thomas Fingar, "New Missions, New Challenges: 2005–2008," Robert Hutchings and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Truth to Power: A History of the US National Intelligence Council* (Oxford University Press, 2019), 133–56.
11. For background on Tucker see Thomas Fingar, "Nancy Bernkopf Tucker: Scholar and Public Servant," H-Diplo/ISSF Forum 35 (2022), <https://issforum.org/forums/35>. See also, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report," *The Washington Quarterly* 31:2 (Spring 2008), 47–61.
12. Notable examples include reform of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and regularized procedures for bi-weekly updating of collection priorities.
13. See remarks of Dr. Michel Wertheimer at the 2007 Analytic Transformation Symposium in Chicago, September 6, 2007, at [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20070905\\_speech.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20070905_speech.pdf).
14. For more detail on building the ODDNI/A team and organizational structure see Fingar, *From Mandate to Blueprint*.
15. See Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Can the CIA Really be that Bad?" (Brookings, July 13, 2004), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-the-cia-really-be-that-bad/>.
16. See "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 108th Congress, Public Law 458, especially Section 1018.
17. For a more extended discussion see "Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman, National Intelligence Council, at the DNI's Information Sharing Conference and Technology Exposition" (August 21, 2006), [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20060821\\_2\\_speech.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20060821_2_speech.pdf).
18. See Thomas Fingar, "Building a Community of Analysts," Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives* (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 287–301; and Thomas Fingar, "Analysis in the US Intelligence Community: Missions, Masters, and Methods," Baruch Fischhoff and Cherie Chauvin, eds., *Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations* (National Academies Press, 2011), 3–27.
19. See, for example, Jack Davis, "Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analyst," *The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers*: 1:5 (November 2002); and Jim Marchio, "Analytic Tradecraft and the Intelligence Community: Enduring Value, Intermittent Emphasis," *Intelligence and National Security* 29:2 (2013), 159–83.
20. See Richard H. Immerman, "Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community's Best Kept Secret," *Intelligence and National Security* 26:2-3 (2011), 159–81.
21. See Thomas Fingar, "A Guide to All-Source Analysis," Peter G. Oleson, ed., *AFIO's Guide to the Study of Intelligence* (Falls Church, VA: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 2016), 297–303.
22. Intelligence Community Directive 501, "Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information Within the Intelligence Community," January 21, 2009, <https://www.odni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD-501.pdf>.
23. For more on A-Space, see "Interview of Dr. Mike Wertheimer, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Transformation and Technology, CNN & Federal News Radio, September 5, 2008," [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20080905\\_interview.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20080905_interview.pdf).
24. For additional information on LNI and other transformational technologies and approaches, see "Analytic Transformation: Unleashing the Potential of a Community of Analysts" (2008). ■