BIRTH OF AN OPPOSITION IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100170050-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: May 30, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100170050-1
A . _ C? APP: ':R!D
ON Y'', ____ /_
FOREIGN REPORT -_
(Published the The Economist Newspaper
30 May 1979
The fragmentation of the loose coalition of forces that united to bring down the Shah
has raised the prospect of a belated resistance campaign by elements who are opposed
both to Ayatollah 1-Momei is :Moslem fundamentalists and to the Marxist left.
The power-struggle in Teheran is bewilderingly complex. The key Iranian groups
Birth of an opposition in Iran
1. Khomeini's Islamic Revolutionary Council, representing the most
5. The remnants of the Iranian armed forces.
Khomeini's Islamic supporters::=
2. The more moderate Islamic clergy, who have become increasingly identified
with Ayatollah Shariat-NfadntA.
3. The pro-So-iet Tudeh party; whose influence is particularly strong among I
workers in the southern oilfields around Abadan, and the recently-formed
Iranian Communist party, which was created as a rival to the Tudeh party,
but is suspected by some observers of being another Soviet front (see below); : t
4. The two revolutionary guerrilla movements, the Fedayeen - of declared-.
Marxist-Leninist leanings - and the Mujaheddin,-which maintains links with-..'
6. A clandestine: network.: of -pro-Shah. junior army officers and former- .
Savak officials who may.- have--been involved in ` the recent assassination.
campaign against Khomeini's -leading supporters that- claimed -the life- of
Ayatollah MotaharL (A : shadowy group called. Forhan has claimed
responsibility for many of these attacks and has set out to sow- terror among
Khomeini's key supporters.)
7. Regional and separatist forces, including not only the Kurds, who pose the
most serious military challenge, but- the proponents of an `Arabistan' in the -
south-west of the country, and the Azerbaijani secessionists who- were
encouraged by the Russians in. the immediate aftermath of the second world -
war. -
Most western observers were surprised by the trancelike way in which the Shah's
army chiefs reacted to Khomeini's return to Teheran -and in which many of them
subsequently submitted to the death sentences handed down by the revolutionary
Islan}'_c tribunals. Their passivity was the product of (a) explicit orders from the Shah
not to intervene and (b) American dissuasion (see Fo-tEIGN REPORT -No. 1559). How-
ever, not all surviving officers of more junior rank are disposed to let the revolution run
its course. Although their position remains fairly hopeless - with huge quantities of
weapons in the hands of left-wing militias and Khomeini's Islamic Guardians, and a
Palestinian unit acting as the nucleus of a revolutionary secret police in Teheran - they
can now count on a greater degree of outside backing than in the past. The Israelis, for a
start, have nothing to lose by aiding the opposition to a regime that has declared its
total support for the Palestinian cause, claims to be willing to provide a base for inter-
national terrorist operations and has `executed' a prominent local Jewish businessman.
Significantly, the Israelis were restrained by pressure from the Ca ztfter administration
from lending greater support to efforts to head off Khomeini's revolution last year.
Approved For Release 2007/06/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100170050-1
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