LETTER TO HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM ABRAHAM S. BECKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release
January 4, 1982
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
As students of Soviet affairs and as members of consultant panels
advising you on these matters, we have been concerned about the
unintended consequences of the recent decision to sharply curtail.
the preparation and publication of unclassified CIA materials for
general public consumption. We are aware of some of the considerations
that led to that decision, including the desire to lower the public
profile of the Agency. However, we believe that these considerations
need to be carefully weighed against the heavy costs that a stringent
implementation of the decision is likely to entail. These include:
(a) a weakened public understanding and professional knowledge of
vital national security issues; (b) adverse effects on the morale
of Agency analysts, particularly the best performers, and on recruit-
ment of new professionals; and (c) ultimately, impairment of the quality
of CIA research and-analysis.
The Soviet affairs profession is heavily indebted to the Agency for
its unclassified publications on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Most of these have been in the field of economics and they have made
an enormous contribution to professional and wider public understanding
of Soviet economic structure, processes and problems. The CIA is
the single most important center of research in Soviet economics
(including military economics) in the western world, and every scholar
dealing with contemporary issues relies extensively on Agency publications.
Moreover, they have also had significant public impact:
o CIA publications on Soviet planning, organization and economic
development have been invaluable in furthering comprehension
of Soviet economic affairs. CIA has produced, and promises
.to revise and update periodically, the first major set of
national accounts for the USSR since the Rand-sponsored
studies of the 1950s and 1960s. Studies of price movements,
ruble-dol.lar ratios, simulations of growth patterns under
various external stimuli, industrial and agricultural pro-
duction and many others, have been mainstays of scholarship
on the contemporary Soviet economy.
7HC RAND CORPORAI ION. 1700 MAIN STgCCT. SANTA MONICA. CALIFORNIA 90406. PHONE: [phone]
 Approved For Release 2007/04/16: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003-0
Hon. William J. Casey -2- January 4, 1982
o It would not be an exaggeration to say that CIA estimates
of Soviet military expenditures in rubles and the dollar
cost of these activities were one of the most important
factors in changing the climate of opinion in the U.S.
Congress and the country generally in recent years with
respect to the gravity of the Soviet military buildup.
o The Agency's estimates of Soviet oil production called
attention to a critical variable in Soviet economic growth
forecasts. All subsequent analyses, whether agreeing or
disagreeing with CIA forecasts, have had to take account of
the Agency's thought-provoking analysis.
The last two points concern groups of CIA publications that have
generated considerable controversy and public debate. It is under-
standable that the Agency should wish to avoid being the target of
public criticism, some of which is uninformed and ill-willed. Staff
members are too busy to respond. to all or even most of the critiques;
often security considerations prevent a point-by-point rebuttal.
However, some of the criticism has also been helpful. It has stimulated
reconsideration of the analysis and the underlying evidence and has
sensitized managers and staff to key issues and new developments.
Despite controversy surrounding successive Agency oil estimates, we
believe that the CIA's reputation gained rather than lost in the outside
professional community as a result of these publications. Because CIA
is the only intelligence community (or even government) organization
with significant competence in Soviet economic affairs, and is thus
by far the dominant source on this subject within the government, it is
particularly important that the Agency's intelligence product should be
submitted, insofar as security considerations permit, to the test of
external scrutiny in the general community of Sovietologists.
Indeed, the argument can be made that CIA should be doing more by way
of external, unclassified interaction--including greater participation
by staff members in professional meetings, and even Agency sponsorship
of professional meetings. These activities have a direct bearing on
your expressed goal of raising the quality of CIA's output. Conference
attendance and open publication are also critical measures of professional
self-identification, and are therefore of major importance in recruiting
and retaining quality staff. We believe that greater intellectual
outreach, interaction and even competition with the outside professional
community are essential to the improvement of the Agency's analytical
product.
CIA interaction with the community of scholars is also of great importance
for the rebuilding of the shrunken academic base of CIA analysis of
Soviet affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, the intelligence community
 Approved For Release 2007/04/16: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003-0
Hon. William J. Casey -3- January 4, 1982
depended heavily on academic and other,nongovernment research as the
foundation of the intelligence analysis. In the 1970s, with the
virtual disappearance of foundation money and for other reasons, in-
cluding a change in the public's interest, the level of effort in non-
government Soviet studies was cut back sharply. The result has been
an equivalent curtailment of the analytical aid the Agency received
from the outside, as well as of its major source of recruitment in this
field. Increased outside interaction now would be a major step toward
repairing the damage inflicted in the 1970s, and would thereby make a
significant contribution to the Agency, too.
The CIA's reputation was badly damaged in the 1970s, largely because of
certain aspects of its covert operations. Nevertheless, in the profes-
sional community-and not just among Sovietologists--there has been
increasing respect in recent years for the quality of the Agency's
openness. As a consequence, a very fruitful interaction was developing
between work in the scholarly community and the CIA, and the joint
products--for example, assessment of Soviet economic prospects--are
probably stronger for that interaction. Severe curtailment of unclass-
ified publication would stimulate invidious comparisons with the previous
policy and reawaken old suspicions of ideological and political bias in
the CIA's intelligence reporting. It would certainly adversely affect
the quality of research on the Soviet economy outside the CIA and,
very possibly, within the Agency as well.
We therefore urge you to review the implementation of your decision to
curtail-open publication, with a view toward minimizing the adverse
effects on the Agency, Soviet affairs'analysis outside the government,
and general public understanding of some of the critical issues of our
day.
$incerely,
Abraham S. Becker
Senior Economist
Member,_Military-Economic Advisory Panel
Arnold L. Horelick
Senior Social Scientist
Member, Political-Military Advisory Panel
 pproved For Release 2007/04
TO: ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL
1 DCi
2 DDC
3 D/ICS
4 DD/ NFA
5 DD/A
6 DD/0
7 DD/S&T
8 Chm/NIG
9 GC,
-10 IG
11 Compt
12 D/EEO
13 D/Pers
14 D/OPP
15 C/EAS/OPP
16 C/IAS/0PP
17 A0/DCI
18 DDI
19 D/OEA
,with. a .reply for, his signature "forwarded:
._ througk-.EXDIK f `;
Approved For Release 2007/04/16: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003
 Approved For Release 2007/04/16: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003-
January 4, 1982
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
As students of Soviet affairs and as members of consultant panels
advising you on these matters, we have been concerned about the
unintended consequences of the recent decision to sharply curtail
the preparation and publication of unclassified CIA materials for
general public consumption. We are aware of some of the considerations
that led to that decision, including the desire to lower the public
profile of the Agency. However, we believe that these considerations
need to be carefully weighed against the heavy costs that a stringent
implementation of the decision is likely to entail. These include:
(a) a weakened public understanding and professional knowledge of
vital national security issues; (b) adverse effects on the morale
of Agency analysts, particularly the best performers, and on recruit-
ment of new professionals; and (c) ultimately, impairment of the quality
of CIA research and analysis.
The Soviet affairs profession is heavily indebted to the Agency for
its unclassified publications on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Most of these have been in the field of economics and they have made
an enormous contribution to professional and wider public understanding
of Soviet economic structure, processes and problems. The CIA is
the single most important center of research in Soviet economics
(including military economics) in the western world, and every scholar
dealing with contemporary issues relies extensively on Agency publications.
Moreover, they have also had significant public impact:
o CIA publications on Soviet planning, organization and economic
development have been invaluable in furthering comprehension
of Soviet economic affairs. CIA has produced, and promises
to revise and update periodically, the first major set of
national accounts for the USSR since the Rand-sponsored
studies of the 1950s and 1960s. Studies of price movements,
ruble-dollar ratios, simulations of growth patterns under
various external stimuli, industrial and agricultural pro-
duction and many others, have been mainstays of scholarship
on the contemporary Soviet economy.
THE RAND CORPORATION, 1700 MAIN STREET, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90406, PHONE: [phone]
Approved For. Release 2007/04/16-: CIA-RDP83MOO914R001800040003-0- !"'!
 Approved For Release 2007/04/16: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003-0
Hon. William J. Casey -2-
January 4, 1982
o It would not be an exaggeration to say that CIA estimates
of Soviet military expenditures in rubles and the dollar
cost of these activities were one of the most important
factors in changing the climate of opinion in the U.S.
Congress and the country generally in recent years with
respect to the gravity of the Soviet military buildup.
o The Agency's estimates of Soviet oil production called
attention to a critical variable in Soviet economic growth
forecasts. All subsequent analyses, whether agreeing or
disagreeing with CIA forecasts, have had to take account of
the Agency's thought-provoking analysis.
The last two points concern groups of CIA publications that have
generated considerable controversy and public debate. It is under-
standable that the Agency should wish to avoid being the target of
public criticism, some of which is uninformed and ill-willed. Staff
members are too busy to respond to all or even most of the critiques;
often security considerations prevent a point-by-point rebuttal.
However, some of the criticism has also been helpful. It has stimulated
reconsideration of the analysis and the underlying evidence and has
sensitized managers and staff to key issues and new developments.
Despite controversy surrounding successive Agency oil estimates, we
believe that the CIA's reputation gained rather than lost in the outside
professional community as a result of these publications. Because CIA
is the only intelligence community (or even government) organization
with significant competence in Soviet economic affairs, and is thus
by far the dominant source on this subject within the government, it is
particularly important that the Agency's intelligence product should be
submitted, insofar as security considerations permit, to the test of
external scrutiny in the general community of Sovietologists.
Indeed, the argument can be made that CIA should be doing more by way
of external, unclassified interaction--including greater participation
by staff members in professional meetings, and even Agency sponsorship
of professional meetings. These activities have a direct bearing on
your expressed goal of raising the quality of CIA's output. Conference
attendance and open publication are also critical measures of professional
self-identification, and are therefore of major importance in recruiting
and retaining quality staff. We believe that greater intellectual
outreach, interaction and even competition with the outside professional
community are essential to the improvement of the Agency's analytical
product.
CIA interaction with the community of scholars.is also of great importance
for the rebuilding of the shrunken academic base of CIA analysis of
Soviet affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, the intelligence community
 Approved For Release 2007/04/16: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800040003-0
Hon. William J. Casey -3-
January 4, 1982
depended heavily on academic and other nongovernment research as the
foundation of the intelligence analysis. In the 1970s, with the
virtual disappearance of foundation money and for other reasons, in-
cluding a change in the public's interest, the level of effort in non-
government Soviet studies was cut back sharply. The result has been
an equivalent curtailment of the analytical aid the Agency received
from the outside, as well as of its major source of recruitment in this
field. Increased outside interaction now would be a major step toward
repairing the damage inflicted in the 1970s, and would thereby make a
significant contribution to the Agency, too.
The CIA's reputation was badly damaged in the 1970s, largely because of
certain aspects of its covert operations. Nevertheless, in the profes-
sional community-and not just among Sovietologists--there has been
increasing respect in recent years for the quality of the Agency's
openness. As a consequence, a very fruitful interaction was developing
between work in the scholarly community and the CIA, and the joint
products-for example, assessment of Soviet economic prospects--are
probably stronger for that interaction. Severe curtailment of unclass-
ified publication would stimulate invidious comparisons with the previous
policy and reawaken old suspicions of ideological and political bias in
the CIA's intelligence reporting. It would certainly adversely affect
the quality of research on the Soviet economy outside the CIA and,
very possibly, within the Agency as-well.
We therefore urge you to review the implementation of your decision to
curtail open publication, with a view toward minimizing the adverse
effects on the Agency, Soviet affairs analysis outside the government,
and general public understanding of some of. the critical issues of our
day.
Sincerely,
Abraham S. Becker
Senior Economist
Member, Military-Economic Advisory Panel
Arnold L. Horelick
Senior Social Scientist
Member, Political-Military Advisory Panel