ISRAEL: WATER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE

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a'"~"rF , Directorate of aecret
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Israel: Water and...
Its Irnplcatnns for
Middle east Peace
MaSTFR f 4tE COPY
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sec>~et
GI 82-10037
February P982
ropy 4 7 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Israel: Water and
Its Implications for
Middle East Peace
IrE1ormation available as of 8 January 1982
has been used in the preparation o.T this report.
This assessment was prepared by
Resources Division, Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Resources Division, OGI, on
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Near East-South Asia and the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East.
Secret
C182-! 0037
February 1981
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Secret
Israel: Water and
Its Implications for
Middle East Peace
Key Judgments Unlike most other nations in the world, Israel has inventoried its natural
resources as a first step in protecting its resource base. Water is a prime ex-
ample, and Israel has implemented stringent policies to conserve and wisely
use it. But, having achieved nearly full utilization of currently available
conventional sources, Israel now must make some difficult decisions-
either redefine current water allocation priorities, make enormous and
continuing investments in nonconventional sources, or seek water
elsewhere.
Some sources of water in neighboring Arab countries are not fully
developed. Israel could gain access to these supplies by working out water-
sharing agreements or by appropriation via annexation or military force.
The decisions that Israel makes concerning water resources will greatly
influence its position in any international negotiations affecting neighbor-
ing areas and its posture relative to annexation as a continuing policy:
? Israel can be expected to claim as much water as possible from any
Jordanian water control projects constructed on the Yarmuk River-the
last surface flow in the Jordan basin that is not fully utilized.
? In any Palestinian autonomy negotiations, Israel will not surrender or
compromise any of its currently held water rights in the West Bank.
Formal annexation of the West Bank would assure the Israelis of
continued control over those water resources.
? The nearest available foreign water source in the region is the Litani
River in southern Lebanon, which potentially could provide a 30-percent
increase in Israel's present water supply. This, of course, provides an
added incentive to Israeli control of southern Lebanon.
All of the options open to Israel in dealing with the water problem will af-
fect the United States. The political-military issues raised in gaining or
keeping access to water resources will have a direct impact on regional
peace and the negotiating process in general. If the Israelis opt to solve the
water problem by developing nonconventional supplies, they may ask the
United States for increased aid.
Secret
GI 82-10037
February /982
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Secret
Contents
Key Judgments
The Current Water Balance
Agricultural Needs
Projections
Water and Middle East Peace
US Interests
Israeli Estimated Annual Water Supply and Demand
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Israel: Selected Water Resources
Aquifer
'` 'Coastal
Yargon-Tanninim
Water Conduit
-Major
- -- Other
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Gaza Strip /
(lsraeli occupied) ,p: ?~
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Israel: Water and
Its Implications for
Middle East Peace
The Israeli Government has long recognized that the
nation's water resources are limiting factors in the
country's agricultural development and industrial and
urban growth. The Israelis have considered protection
and development of this resource an important nation-
al security concern. The task before Israeli planners,
therefore, has been not merely one of creating a
system of national distribution of this extremely
scarce resource but also one of developing a system
that maximizes recovery of water.
The advanced systems that the Israelis have employed
to conserve and efficiently utilize water have been
stunningly successful in minimizing the effects of
water shortages. Israel's accomplishments stand in
sharp contrast to the lumbering progress exhibited by
its neighbors in water resource management. But
Israel is now at a decision point. Its successful water
management policies have resulted in nearly full
utilization of immediately available water resources,
and its further economic growth demands either new
approaches to water management to stretch its cur-
rent supply or access to other sources, or both.
The Current Water Balance
Israel's water is drawn from several conventional and
nonconventional sources. Precipitation and surface
runoff annually replenish river, lake, and groundwater
sources, but the seasonality and distribution of the
annual increment presents problems. Nearly all of the
rain falls from October to April rather than in the
summer crop season, and most of it falls in the
northern hills and mountains where good cropland is
scarce and population is not as dense. Moreover, the
amount varies greatly from year to year, from a low of
400 million cubic meters in one recent drought year to
a high of 2.4 billion cubic meters in the rainiest year.
This variability leads Israeli officials to calculate a
mean annual replenishment rate of about 1.5 billion
cubic meters, the maximum quantity of water from
conventional sources that can be utilized in any one
year without endangering future supplies.
Several wastewater reclamation and desalinization
plants supplement these sources and contribute as
much as 100 million cubic meters annually to Israel's
water supply. However, these projects are too expen-
sive to be relied on to greatly alleviate growing Israeli
Most of Israel's water sources have been integrated
into a national water system. lts three main compo-
nents are the upper Jordan River and its tributaries,
including Lake Tiberias, and two large underground
aquifers. The smaller of the two aquifers is composed
of sandstone and lies wholly within Israel's borders
along the Mediterranean coast. The other is limestone
and underlies the eastern part of Israel proper and the
Israeli-controlled West Bank of the Jordan River (see
map). The water carrier links the three main compo-
nents with local and regional water systems and
delivers water to the central and southern desert
regions of the country where rainfall is scanty
25X1
25X1
The upper Jordan watershed constitutes the major
surface and flood water collector, contributing rough-
ly 30 percent of the country's total annual exploitable
water supply. The importance of this watershed, 25X1
however, goes beyond these numbers. During periods
of heavy rainfall, excess surface flows are stored in
Lake Tiberias, Israel's only natural surface water
reservoir. The lake holds about 4 billion cubic meters,
but most of the water is too saline for use in the
national water carrier. Only the amount between 209
and 212 meters below sea level is withdrawn. Hence,
the operational storage volume is only about 500
million cubic meters.
The two aquifers provide about 55 percent of Israel's
annual water consumption, but withdrawals often
exceed natural recharge and they must be replen-
ished. It is particularly important to maintain the
water table of the coastal aquifer to prevent contami-
nation from seawater intrusion. Besides monitoring
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and controlling water withdrawals, the national water
system supplements the unreliable natural rainfall
replenishment of the aquifers through artificial re-
charge. Excess surface water flows not stored in Lake
Tiberias are pumped into aquifers via well casings
normally used to lift groundwater during the dry
season. At the present time, the three pumps that
operate in the vicinity of the lake can add 1 million
cubic meters per day to the aquifers. If not needed for
replenishment, this water can be stored there for
future use.
Two smaller aquifers, located in the northeastern part
of the country, have also been integrated into the
national water system. Another has been discovered in
the south beneath the Negev Desert, but pumping
from it has been limited until more information can
be obtained about its source of recharge and its
relationship to the coastal aquifer.
Agricultural Needs
Agriculture currently consumes nearly four-fifths of
Israel's water supply. In recent years, however, house-
hold and industrial water use has grown rapidly,
reducing in relative terms the portion of the national
supply available for agriculture, a trend that is likely
to continue. With foresight, the Israelis have worked
to conserve and maximize use of the water available
to the agricultural sector. Since 1965 the amount of
water used per area of land has been reduced by 20
percent, thanks to technical advances that have made
their irrigation system one of the most efficient in the
world; presently, 70 to 80 percent of the water
entering the system reaches a crop. By the mid-1970s,
approximately 217,600 hectares were irrigated with
an average annual water requirement of 5,500 to
6,000 cubic meters per hectare.
Three types of irrigation schemes are employed. As of
1978, approximately 85 percent of the hectarage was
irrigated by sprinklers, 10 percent by drip or trickle,
and the remaining 5 percent by gravity. Many of the
irrigation systems are automated and conserve water
through the use of automatic flow-metering valves
that control the timing and quantity of water deliv-
ered or applied. These computer-based systems utilize
a variety of data, including information on water
availability, climatic conditions, soil types, and field
status reports to determine water distribution.
Water available to the agricultural sector is ultimate-
ly dependent on rainfall. If rainfall is plentiful, extra
water allotments may be granted for supplemental
irrigation of such crops as wheat, vegetables, and
cotton; otherwise, these allotments are not made.
When rainfall is scarce, water withdrawals from the
aquifers and Lake Tiberias are rationed. Cuts in
normal allocations to vegetables and field crops are
implemented first. As a last resort, water supplies to
the orchards would be diminished because damage to
the fruit trees would mean more than the loss of a
single year's crop.
Water remains a major constraint on agricultural
expansion, because total water use is so close to total
water potential. So far, the Israelis have been able to
forestall major cutbacks in agricultural production by
enhancing their already efficient use of water in
agriculture in a number of ways: development of crop
genetic strains that are salt tolerant and require less
water, continued improvement of irrigation tech-
niques, changing cropping patterns, and experimenta-
tion with hydroponics. However, the prospects for
cultivation of any of their remaining potentially ara-
ble 200,000 hectares could depend on how much more
can be achieved with water-saving technology in the
years ahead. Output from this reserve land resource
could reduce Israel's dependence on foreign food
supplies and provide additional foreign exchange
earnings.
Projections
Demands for water are intensifying. By the turn of
the century, Israel's water requirements, based on a
projected population ranging between 4.7 million and
5.4 million, could total 2.3 billion cubic meters per
year, which is significantly higher than the present
supply from conventional and nonconventional sources
(see table). To handle this growth, the water authority
over the next 10 to 15 years plans to augment its
annual supply by 500 million cubic meters. Most of
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Iraeli Estimated Annual Million cubic meters
Water Supply and Demand
Total
1,612
2,112
Jordan River
_--
490
-
490
Groundwater
990
1,076
Floodwater
27
91
Wastewater
100
450
---
Desalinization
5
5
___
Demand (nonagricultural)
Total
_ - -_
369
722 to 849
Household
306
594 to 661
Industrial
63
128 to 188
(excluding brackish water)
Available for agriculture
1,243
1,390 to 1,263
the increase (350 million cubic meters) will accrue
from wastewater reclamation and, to a lesser extent,
from tapping additional sources of groundwater and
floodwater. Such augmentation will be expensive.
Current estimates call for $1 billion (in 1979 prices) to
be spent on wastewater reclamation projects during
the next 10 to 15 years. Another $12.5 million will be
used to install another pump at Lake Tiberias, which
would increase the aquifer recharging capability by
120-130 million cubic meters. Even if these efforts are
successful, water allocations to the agricultural sector
will not increase appreciably, and to the extent that a
deficit occurs in any one year, it will likely be
compensated by a reduction in the water allocated to
the agricultural sector.
Desalinization, because of its excessive cost, does not
figure as a major additional source of water until well
after the year 2000. Nevertheless, the Israelis are
working to discover cheaper desalting technologies
and are currently cooperating with US experts in such
a project at Ashdod. Alarge-scale pilot plant based on
an Israeli-developed distillation process is under con-
struction, with the United States providing about half
of the project's estimated cost of $25 million. In
return, the technology will be made available to US
firms on a nonexclusive, nondiscriminatory basis.
When completed, the plant will contribute from 6.2 to
6.9 million cubic meters per year to Ashdod's water
supply. Because the technology is under development,
it is too early to predict the operational costs of
is too expensive to be used in irrigated agriculture, it
is generally allocated to household consumption.
Completion of the projected Mediterranean-Dead
Sea canal project will not have a direct impact on
Israel's water balance. Although the seawater could
be utilized as cooling water in industry, the canal's
primary purpose is to exploit the 400-meter difference
in elevation between the two seas to produce hydro-
electric power. If completed, such a plant could
produce about 15 percent of Israel's projected elec-
tricity requirements by the early 1990s
Water and Middle East Peace 25X1
Protection of shared water resources plays a salient
role in shaping Israeli foreign policy toward its neigh-
boring nations. A key Israeli goal is to retain access to
all water resources that it presently utilizes, a posture
that complicates the Middle East peacemaking pro-
cess. The recent move to annex the Golan may have
been motivated in part by a desire to secure the
headwaters of the Jordan River. Water rights have
become such a sensitive topic that Israel and Egypt
agreed in October 1981 to postpone consideration of
that topic during their negotiations for Palestinian
self-government until agreement is reached on the
nature of an elected council to govern the Palestinians
living in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip and West
Bank. Israeli water demands also have contributed to
strained relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of 25X1
Jordan and delayed the construction of water control
projects on the Yarmuk River. Israel's need to aug-
ment its current water supply. could also be a factor in
determining Israeli moves in southern Lebanon.
Golan. Water resource issues probably played a role
in Israel's recent decision to push ahead with annex-
ation of the Golan Heights. Only one of the three
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principal tributaries of the upper Jordan, the Dan, is
presently within Israeli borders. Inclusion of the
Golan region will bring the Baniyas under Israeli
jurisdiction, thus safeguarding this critical portion of
Israel's water system.
Gaza. Water issues in the Gaza Strip are not as
divisive as those concerning the West Bank. The
Israelis do not withdraw water from the Gaza aquifer
for use in Israel proper. In addition, the rainfall that
replenishes the Gaza aquifer falls in Israel, so Israel
already controls the amount of water that makes its
way into Gaza. Nevertheless, the Israeli Military
Government in Gaza has implemented a number of
water control procedures to prevent overpumping that
would lead to aquifer salinity. For example, it has
imposed licensing on well drilling and citrus grove
planting and placed meters on existing wells. Its goal
is to maintain a water usage level of 70-80 million
cubic meters, the normal aquifer recharge level, thus
bringing Gaza water use and supply into balance
while maximizing water consumption in the Israeli
portion of the watershed. One stumblingblock to
further progress on the issue of independence for the
Gaza is that Israeli negotiators will not agree to any
water concessions that could be considered a prece-
dent for resolution of West Bank water questions.
West Bank. Water obtained from the aquifer that
underlies Israel and, to a greater extent, the West
Bank is so important to the Israeli economy and the
population's quality of life that a final resolution of
the West Bank's political status is probably not
possible unless Israel's water needs are satisfied. One
of the rationales given initially for Israeli occupation
of and settlement in the West Bank was the necessity
to protect and manage this shared source, which
provides over one-third of the best sweet water in the
Israeli national water system. Because of the danger
of seawater intrusion, pumping from the coastal
aquifer cannot be increased to compensate for a
decrease in water withdrawals from the shared
aquifer. Thus, Israel will insist that any settlement of
West Bank sovereignty include a guarantee for Israeli
use and control of the aquifer. Failure to obtain a
favorable settlement could stalemate the autonomy
talks or lead to Israeli annexation of this region.
West Bank water consumption is regulated by policies
designed to maximize the quality and quantity of
water available for Israeli use. Any water' resources
developed by Israel in excess of pre-1967 Arab water
usage levels are reserved for the exclusive use of
Israelis in the West Bank. Data on the amount of
water consumed by Israeli settlements are not avail-
able, but in 1979 it was estimated at about 21 million
cubic meters.
Furthermore, the Israeli Military Government in the
West Bank has imposed strict water restrictions on
the native Palestinians. For example, an Israeli license
must be obtained to drill any new wells or place
pumps on existing wells, and Israeli authorities usual-
ly closely supervise all Palestinian drilling operations.
The Israelis also monitor Palestinian well withdrawals
and have imposed maximum limits on the amount of
water that can be pumped from existing wells. As a
result, Palestinian water consumption has ~'ncreased
little since the Israelis arrived.
The water resources available to the Palestinians in
the West Bank range between 150 million and 250
million cubic meters, but because water rights are
considered private property, a regional water system
for Palestinian use has not been developed. As of 1979
about 120 million cubic meters were exploited, but
even this amount was not efficiently utilized. Irriga-
tion methods are outdated, and water from wells and
springs is conveyed to crops by open channels rather
than by pipes. As a consequence, more than 50
percent of the water never reaches the crops. More-
over, many Palestinians have not invested in sprin-
klers or drip irrigation systems, but continue to
employ flood irrigation techniques that result in fur-
ther loss of this scarce resource. If the Palestinians
upgraded their water control systems, it is conceivable
that they could save 40-50 million cubic meters
annually.
Israeli officials contend that any increase in water use
by the West Bank Palestinians must originate from
currently underutilized sources. Besides implying that
the Palestinians must develop more efficient methods
to use the water that they now have (albeit within the
confines of Israeli water policy for the West Bank),
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Israeli officials insist that a portion of any water that
becomes available from new water control projects in
the Jordan River Basin must be allocated to the West
Bank Palestinians from the Jordanian share.
Jordan. This demand has delayed Jordanian construc-
tion of a storage dam on the Yarmuk River (Nahr al
Yarmuk, a tributary of the Jordan River that forms
the northern boundary of Jordan with the Golan
Heights and Syria) at Maqarin and a diversion weir at
Adasiya. If completed, these projects would bring
under control the last surface flow in the Jordan River
Basin that is not fully utilized. The nations are very
far apart on determining how much water should be
made available to the West Bank from these projects,
and US intermediaries have thus far failed to make
any headway on a compromise. Israeli annexation of
the West Bank could indefinitely delay a peaceful
settlement by further inflaming emotions in Jordan.
The pressing water needs of the region should give
Israel and Jordan reason enough to negotiate the
West Bank issue in the interest of getting on with the
Maqarin Project. The danger is that the long lead-
times needed to construct a dam and fill the reservoir
(an estimated three to five years) and to build pipe-
lines and canals could make serious water shortages
unavoidable in Jordan by the late 1980s. The Israeli
move to annex the Golan may stiffen Jordanian
resistance to Israeli proposals. But even if a solution to
the West Bank problem were to be worked out, Israeli
officials would probably still not agree to construction
of the Maqarin Dam unless the Jordanians guarantee
that the 25 million cubic meters of water that the
Israelis now draw from the Yarmuk below the pro-
posed dam site would still be available.
Syria also has a voice in the Maqarin issue, as a major
portion of the Yarmuk catchment basin lies in Syrian
territory. But from a water resource perspective, its
interest is marginal because terrain limits the bene-
fits, other than electric power, that Syria would derive
from completion of the dam. Syria is already at odds
with Jordan, and because of the recent Israeli moves
in the Golan, Syrian cooperation in a project that
would benefit those two countries is not likely to be
forthcoming.
Southern Lebanon. The limits that water availability
place on development continue to prompt Israeli
efforts to increase supply. The nearest unexploited
water resource in the region is the Nahr al Litani, a
river in southern Lebanon which flows largely unused
into the Mediterranean Sea. In the past, several
international studies have dealt with developing the
Litani's waters as a regional resource and determining
how they should be shared among the nations in-
volved. As early as 1954 Israel commissioned its own
study, the "Cotton Plan," which proposed integration
of the Litani and Jordan basins, water sharing (Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), as well as compensation
to Lebanon "either in money or electric power for net
power benefits foregone due to exporting excess Litani
water to the Jordan basin." Cooperation among the
nations that would benefit from this project is not
likely to be forthcoming, given the current nature of 25X1
Arab-Israeli relations and the chaos in southern Leba-
non. 25X1
An Israeli official in 1975 estimated that if the Litani
waters were harnessed and provisions were made for
ample growth in Lebanese water consumption, about
500 million cubic meters, an increase of roughly 30
percent to Israel's existing water supply, could be
diverted to Israel. He estimated that it would take
about a year to build a 30-kilometer connecting canal
from Dan in Israel to a point about 1 1 kilometers
inside the Lebanese border, where the Litani turns
westward toward the Mediterranean. Some Israelis
have advocated invading Lebanon to gain control of
the Litani as well as the Hasbani River, which is the
only principal tributary of the upper Jordan not under
Israeli jurisdiction.
Israel has long considered the Litani a natural securi-
ty border, and in 1978 invaded the region to end
Palestinian raids into northern Israel. Since then a
buffer zone connecting Christian partisan settlements
has been established along the Israeli border and
includes much of the region where the connecting
canal could be constructed. If anti-Israeli activities in
southern Lebanon were to intensify once again, Israeli
leaders, despite foreign opposition, could decide to
install a military government there, thus giving Israel
physical control of the Litani.
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1~X"I
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US Interests
Israel's desired agricultural, household, and industrial
water demands will continue to exceed availability for
some time, and all of the options open to Israel in
dealing with its water problem would have an impact
on US-Israeli relations. If Israeli officials tried to
deemphasize the role of agriculture in the economy,
societal, economic, and political dislocations inside the
country could result and affect domestic stability.
Since Israel is not likely to give up any of its currently
held water rights in the West Bank and will continue
to press its claim for water that would become
available from the proposed Yarmuk River projects,
this barrier to peace with its Jordanian neighbor will
persist. Israel's water needs could figure in a decision
to move militarily into southern Lebanon, but security
considerations would be the main reason for such a
move.
Development of nonconventional supplies is an expen-
sive option. If the Israelis opt to solve their water
problems by increasing investments in nonconven-
tional technology, they are likely to request additional
financial support from the United States or suggest
jointly funded projects like the desalinization pilot
plant in Ashdod. At present, Israel receives about
$785 million annually in economic assistance from the
United States. Israel has discretionary use of these
funds; none are specifically earmarked for water
supply projects.
If the United States were to give Israel additional
funds for use in developing its nonconventional water
supplies, the Israelis would probably not spend them
on desalinization ventures unless cheaper processes
were discovered. Wastewater reclamation costs can
more easily be justified, because they concurrently
relieve sewage disposal and concomitant environmen-
tal problems. The Israelis will continue groundwater
exploration and purification of brackish water, al-
though the cost of the latter option is high in compari-
son to the quantity of water that could be obtained.
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