INDIA: PRESENT SCENE, FUTURE PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A001300080005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 24, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Executive Becfistry
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20503 .-
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
24 May 1976
SUBJECT : India: Present Scene, Future Prospects
The attached interagency intelligence memorandum basically con-
cludes that India will continue much along the same course as it has been
following for the past year. Gandhi is in full control and no challenge
to her appears likely. In the foreign relations field, relations with
the. United States are not likely to improve markedly, and there will be
periods of strain alternating with moves toward accommodation.
25X1
Acting National Intelligence Officer
for South and Southeast Asia and Africa
Iracal`~-o
E8O?aty 7.F~1Z
NP*,
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Secret
I
lnteffigence
Memorandum
India: Present Scene, Future Prospects
Secret
NIO IIM 76-021
May 1976
Copy N2 128
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24 May 1976
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: India: Present Scene, Future Prospects
KEY POINTS
-- Prime Minister Gandhi is fully in control of po-
litical life in India and appears likely to face
no serious opposition over the next one to three
years.
- Most Indians seem to have accepted the national
emergency proclaimed in June 1975.
Continued support for Gandhi will be heavily de-
pendent on her ability to maintain sufficient
food stocks, to control inflation, and to stimu-
late economic activity.
Gandhi, aware that opposition is likely to mount if
the emergency continues indefinitely, might ease some
of the restrictions, though the basic authoritarian
structure constructed since the emergency will prob-
ably remain.
- She might well choose to hold national elections
later this year or in 1977 and the Congress Party
* This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of.the
Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury
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would almost certainly win overwhelmingly.
- Gandhi has indicated some form of control over
the press will continue indefinitely.
-- India is likely to become more active in interna-
tional affairs.
- Gandhi may try to reassert India's leading role
in the non-aligned movement.
- India will continue to have little tolerance
for opposition to New Delhi's policies on the
part of the smaller states in the region.
- Relations with Bangladesh present the most likely
source of trouble and Indian military interven-
tion cannot be ruled out.
- The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between
India and Pakistan will improve communications be-
tween them, but relations will probably be cool and
correct and interspersed with periods of heightened
tensions.
- Any major improvement in Sino-Indian relations ap-
pears to be a long-term proposition.
- India will become somewhat less reliant on Mos-
cow for military supplies but political ties will
remain close.
- Relations with the United States will probably
remain restrained.
-- New Delhi will almost certainly conduct additional
nuclear tests, but the timing of such tests is un-
certain, and we believe that no test is likely be-
fore this fall.
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NOTE
This memorandum is an attempt to describe
the present political situation in India and
to estimate what is ZikeZy to happen, both in
domestic politics and foreign relations, over
the period of the next one to three years. It
discusses some of the factors underlying the
widespread acceptance in India of the national
emergency, proclaimed in June 1975, and the
present impotence of the opposition to Prime
Minister Gandhi. At the end of the memorandum,
we examine, briefly, what might happen in the
event Gandhi were suddenly removed from the
scene.
The Present Internal Scene
The Government and Congress Party
1. Prime Minister Gandhi has fully established
her dominance over the nation.
-- Within the cabinet, the two men once consid-
ered potential rivals of Gandhi, Foreign Min-
ister Y. B. Chavan and Minister of Agricul-
ture Jagjivan Ram, have been neutralized by
Gandhi's astute maneuvering.
-- Within the Congress Party, the group of rela-
tively young parliamentary members who, on
occasion, criticized the prime minister and
threatened to become an opposing bloc within
the Party are now either in jail or silent.
2. Gandhi's domination of the Party is exercised
far beyond the capital. She has replaced those state
chief ministers who had achieved independent bases of
support with politicians of known loyalty. The last
remaining chief minister within the Congress Party
who could claim an independent power base was removed
in 1975.
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-- In early 1976 Gandhi eliminated the only two
major state governments, Tamil Nadu and
Gujarat, not under rule of the Congress Party
or its allies. Both states are now under
direct rule from New Delhi.
3. In both government and party, Gandhi has made
it clear that she wants individuals whose loyalty to
her is beyond question.* Development of a personality
cult around the prime minister has been one of the more
prominent features of the emergency. While not exactly
alien to Indian tradition, it is at odds with the na-
tion's political history since independence. Gandhi's
father, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the leader of his nation
for 17 years, but he rejected setting himself beyond
criticism, fearing it would lead to dictatorship.
During his years in power, he generally sought com-
promise rather than confrontation, urging on his coun-
trymen "the politics of consensus."
4. The prime minister relies for advice on a
small group of confidants including her 30-year-old
son, Sanjay. This inner circle is composed of bureaucrats
and family retainers, reflecting the prime minister's
general distrust of politicians who might one day
challenge her control. Sanjay holds no position in
the government and only recently was elected to the
executive committee of the youth wing of the Congress
Party. In this post he has traveled widely through-
out the country and has already established a cadre
of youthful supporters who apparently are intent on
hitching their wagons to Sanjay's rising star. The
prime minister has apparently encouraged the recent
campaign to publicize Sanjay and present him to the
nation as a potential successor.
5. The Military. Gandhi's government has main-
tained the loyalty of the military and the security
forces during the emergency. The officer corps of
the armed forces is highly nationalistic and tradi-
tionally apolitical. Some senior military officers
2X1
D.K. Barooa , President o e on-
gress Party, is credited with originating the widely
publicized slogan "Indira is India and India is Indira."
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have privately applauded the greater sense of na-
tional discipline which exists under the emergency.
The army would prefer not to participate in inter-
nal security operations, and Gandhi, cognizant of
this, has thus far relied primarily on paramilitary
forces. The government has ample well-trained and
equipped paramilitary forces at its disposal for the
maintenance of internal security. These include
the Border Security Force (80,000), the Central
Reserve Police (60,000), and the Provincial Armed
Constabulary (242,000).
Supporters of the Emergency
6. There is widespread acceptance of the emergency.
-- The upturn in the Indian economy since the
emergency was declared in June 1975, even
though the emergency played only a minor
role in it, has worked in Gandhi's favor.
-- The largest fall harvest in history, due to
a good monsoon last year, combined with tight
monetary policies started in 1974, have kept
food available and prices down for urban
workers.
-- Many Indians applaud the government's ener-
getic drive against economic crimes, such
as hoarding and black marketeering, and its
efforts to reduce corruption and improve the
functioning of the civil service.
-- Businessmen are generally pleased by the curb
on strikes and by the government's relatively
favorable action toward the private sector.
-- The rural landlords are pleased by the gov-
ernment's emphasis on discipline and with the
high priority accorded agriculture.
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-- The Indian peasantry, which makes up 80 per-
cent of the population, has remained apathetic
and fatalistic.
Opponents of the Emergency
7. Under the emergency, the opposition
operates under many constraints,
none perhaps as limiting as the tight censorship
of the media. By closely controlling the domestic
press and radio, the government can insure that
speeches by opposition members of parliament,
proclamations by jailed leaders, mass demonstra-
tions, or acts of sabotage will receive no pub-
licity. As a result of this and other government
policies, the opponents of Gandhi are isolated,
weak, and ineffective.
8. Opposition to the emergency comes largely
from the following:
-- The numerically small intelligentsia,
including most of the now muzzled Indian
press; this is basically a non-activist op-
position which criticizes, usually privately,
Gandhi's actions.
-- The universities, where there has been some
open opposition -- usually broken up quickly
by the police; many student leaders and some
faculty members have been intimidated and
some jailed.
-- The judicial system, particularly at the
state level (the Supreme Court, in part
reflecting Gandhi's use of her appointive
power, has been relatively cooperative);
Gandhi has called for "basic reforms" in
the legal system.
-- Opposition political parties, many of whose
top leaders are in jail; this source of op-
position has been ineffective and many party
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members have sought admission to Gandhi's
Congress Party.
-- Some elements of the labor movement, many
of whose leaders are in jail.
-- Political prisoners (out of the estimated
70,000-100,000 persons believed jailed since
the emergency, perhaps 20,000 purely politi-
cal prisoners remain incarcerated).
-- Underground opposition; despite minor acts
of sabotage, the underground movement is
presently insignificant.
Foreign Relations
9. In the foreign policy field, the emergency
has permitted Gandhi to act more freely in the knowl-
edge that there would be no criticism or demonstra-
tions by opponents of her policies. This freer hand,
for instance, has allowed her to move toward im-
proved relations with China and Pakistan without
the open denunciation by the leaders and newspapers
of the Jana Sangh or other Hindu nationalist organi-
zations that might well have occurred prior to last
June.
10. China and Pakistan. Gandhi's diplomatic
initiatives toward these two neighbors, first taken
in April 1976, are probably aimed primarily at demon-
strating India's independence and refurbishing the
nation's credentials as a truly non-aligned state
in preparation for the Non-Aligned Summit in Colombo
in August. (A few third world countries have criti-
cized India's close ties to the Soviet Union -- in
particular, the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971.)
Beyond this immediate goal, Gandhi probably views im-
proved relations with Peking, exemplified by the an-
ticipated exchange of ambassadors after a lapse of 15
years, as useful in trying to limit Chinese diplomatic
and material support for Pakistan and possibly as a
means of neutralizing potentially unfriendly Chinese
influence in Bangladesh.
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11. Agreement was reached with Pakistan in May
1976 to re-establish diplomatic relations, severed
in 1971, to renew overflights and direct airlinks,
and to restore rail communications between the two
countries. New Delhi probably expects that normal-
ization with Pakistan will help improve India's
international standing, particularly among the Mus-
lim nations, which have generally been sympathetic
with Pakistan.
12. Bangladesh. Relations with Bangladesh have
been less than cordial since the overthrow of the gov-
ernment of Mujibur Rahman in August 1975. Subsequently,
Bangladesh's improved relations with Pakistan and
China caused suspicion in India. Widespread popular
and governmental distrust of New Delhi exists in Bangla-
desh, fueled by reports of Indian support for armed
dissidents operating near the border and by India's
action in diverting some water from the Ganges River
upstream from the smaller country. Occasional fire-
fights along the border have added to the tension
despite agreement between the two nations to estab-
lish a joint border commission to investigate such
incidents.
13. India appeared during the confusion that
followed the second and third coups in Bangladesh
last November to be seriously considering military
intervention. Spokesmen in New Delhi then and
since have repeatedly warned that if unrest in
Bangladesh resulted in communal violence and a
new horde of Hindu refugees fled across the border
into India, as happened in 1971, Indian armed forces
would intervene. Bangladesh leaders view the Indian
threat seriously and have taken action to prevent
communal clashes. Relations between the two coun-
tries remain cool and occasionally tense, but it
appears that the government in New Delhi has con-
cluded that the present regime in Dacca is the best
that can reasonably be expected at this time.
14. USSR. Relations with the Soviet Union re-
main close, based in part on New Delhi's present re-
liance on Soviet military and economic assistance but
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also on general agreement regarding most important in-
ternational issues. For their part, the Soviets
openly praised Gandhi's decision to impose the emer-
gency last summer. They have instructed the Communist
Party of India (CPI), an informal ally of Gandhi's,
to continue to support the prime minister on most
issues.
15. Differences between Moscow and New Delhi,
however, have arisen on occasion. Repeated Soviet
requests for Indian diplomatic support for an Asian
collective security pact have been rejected in New
Delhi, as have Soviet requests for permanent repair
and supply facilities for naval vessels in Indian
ports. The recent Soviet refusal to allow India to
repair Egyptian aircraft was a blow to India's image
as an independent leader of the non-aligned. Moscow
has not made an issue over India's recent initiative
toward China.
16. US. Relations between India and the United
States have remained cool since imposition of the emer-
gency. Gandhi has been bitterly resentful of American
and other Western criticism of her repressive actions.
Her occasional public attacks on the United States
over such issues as "interference" in South Asia and
creation of a "naval base" on Diego Garcia are in
contrast with her government's quiet support of ini-
tiatives to improve bilateral economic and cultural
relations. A consistent irritant in relations for
the last two decades -- Indian concern over the supply
of American arms to Pakistan -- was exacerbated by
removal of the US arms embargo on South Asia in
February 1975.
Government and Congress Party
17. For the short term, Gandhi appears firmly
in control of India. There are no viable alternatives
to her. Gandhi will continue her practice of re-
moving from power anyone who appears to be developing
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an independent power base. Over the longer range,
through mid-1979, we expect her to retain power.
Challenges against her, however, could arise if the
agricultural situation deteriorated.
18. Gandhi will continue to rely on her son,
Sanjay, and a handful of relative unknowns for po-
litical advice. The rise to prominence of Sanjay
has been one of the more remarkable developments
during the emergency. We believe that he, en-
couraged by his mother, will exert increasing in-
fluence over domestic political developments.
He is obviously being groomed for high office --
possibly as eventual successor to his mother.
Gandhi must be aware, however, that her son's
rapid rise to power has irritated many -- both
within and outside the Congress Party -- and she
will.probably try to bring Sanjay along slowly.
A seat in the next parliament is possible, although
higher office within the Congress Party appears
more likely. Conceivably, Sanjay may choose to
retain only his present post in the youth wing of
the Congress while gathering around him younger
members of the party whose loyalty could be useful
to him in a contest for power some years from now.
19. Gandhi can probably count on the con-
tinued loyalty of the military and the security
forces. The military will remain with her as long
as :
-- it gets sufficient attention;
-- economic disorders do not erupt on a wide
scale; and
-- the facade of legality exists.
We believe these conditions will be fulfilled in the
time span of this memorandum.
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Support Dependent on Economy
20. Urban popular support for Gandhi will remain
heavily dependent on her ability to maintain sufficient
food stocks, control inflation, and stimulate economic
activity. Thanks to the recent record-breaking food
grain harvest and continued procurement of foodgrains
from abroad, stocks of rice and wheat appear sufficient
for the nation to survive at least one bad monsoon with-
out serious food shortages or unduly high prices.
21. The Indian government's annual economic sur-
vey, supported to some extent by a recent World Bank
report, is relatively optimistic about the present
state and future trends of the economy. Much of the
optimism is based on the estimated 114 million ton
record harvest of foodgrains this crop year -- as
compared to 101 million tons last year.* Over the
next few years, however, the government will have to
press energetically for more irrigation, better seeds,
and increased use of fertilizers and pesticides if it
is to reach the World Bank projection of 125 million
tons by 1978-79. India will also have to grapple
with massive unemployment and underemployment in the
cities, and in this area the prospects are not prom-
ising. Over the still longer term, government at-
tempts to improve living standards of the people will
be as dependent on efforts to increase agricultural
production as on a decline in population growth rates.
22. Industrial production has increased during
the past year,but much of the industrial sector re-
mains sluggish and troubled, with many firms.facing
slack demand and increasing inventories. The budget
for 1976-77 contains a variety of tax incentives and
offers of direct governmental financial assistance
which will probably facilitate some increased in-
dustrial production.
* AZZ tonnages used in this section are metric.
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23. The Indian balance-of-payments outlook is
relatively good, assuming that net foreign aid con-
tinues at present levels of about $1.25 billion per
year. Indian officials predict, somewhat optimisti-
cally, that because of recent petroleum discoveries
in the Arabian Sea near Bombay total Indian produc-
tion will increase from a million tons in 1975
to over 20 million tons by 1980. Moreover, coal
production, which has increased from 78 million
tons in 1973-74 to 98 million tons in 1975-76, is
expected to reach 135 million tons by 1978-79. Both
factors will decrease India's dependence on foreign
oil. Although their ambitious energy goals may not
be fully met, the increased production combined with
anticipated increases in domestic supplies of non-
ferrous metals, steel and fertilizer could lead to a
decrease in the large annual trade deficit that India
has registered for the last three years.
24. Gandhi appears likely to continue her pro-
gram of publicly advocating socialist changes while
attempting to stimulate the private sector of the
economy with various incentives and a prohibition
on strikes. Her long history of advocacy of social-
ism, however, could bring this program to an abrupt
halt if the economy fails to respond. Sanjay, who
boasts of advocating highly pragmatic policies to
increase productivity, could be influential on his
mother's thinking in this field. Businessmen have
applauded the proposed budget for 1976-77.
25. Although some progress is likely, it is
doubtful that India will make a major breakthrough
in stepping up economic growth during the next several
years. Much will depend on increased investment and
a substantial boost in development expenditures. On
balance, however, India's economy will continue to rely
on its agricultural output, and despite some improve-
ments in irrigation and increased use of fertilizer,
the uncontrollable and unpredictable whims of the
monsoons will be the critical factor.
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Possible Opposition
26. Organized labor, weak in India even before
the emergency, can be expected within the next year to
chafe under the ban on strikes and other labor agita-
tion. Active resistance to the emergency appears un-
likely, however, at least in the absence of a new round
of inflation. Failure of the government to satisfy
wage demands and prevent industrial layoffs at the
high rate established in 1975 could cause isolated
outbreaks of unrest.
27. Opposition to the emergency in rural areas
is unlikely to develop into significant proportions,
at least over the period of this estimate. Large
landowners are nervous as a result of Gandhi's re-
peated calls for land reform but are encouraged by
the history of government inaction that has accom-
panied such calls in the past. Small landowners and
landless workers are unlikely to take an interest in
politics but will become increasingly cynical if
Gandhi's repeated exhortations to her government to
enforce her Twenty Point Economic Program comes to
nothing. Rural violence, however, is likely to be
isolated and thus pose no great threat to the govern-
ment.
28. The small urban middle class and the in-
telligentsia will continue to furnish the majority
of Gandhi's active opponents. Student opposition
is likely to grow if the emergency is continued
much beyond the end of this year. To be effective,
however, student agitation would need allies with-
in the ranks of labor or the bureaucracy -- or even
the police -- and prospects for such help appear
remote over the short term.
29. The opposition political parties, with the
possible exception of the ideologically motivated
Jana Sangh and Communist Party of India/Marxist, are
unlikely to recover from the blows to their organiza-
tions administered under the emergency. Despite the
obvious need for unity among the opposition parties,
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the distrust stemming from ideological and personality
differences will continue to make more than surface
unity difficult to achieve. The movement of opposition
legislators into the Congress Party can be expected
to continue as individuals opportunistically seek to
better their political fortunes.
30. There is only a slight possibility that
the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India will abandon
its de facto alliance with the Congress Party despite
economic moves to the right by the government. Only
economic chaos or a sharp turn away from socialism,
improbable in the near term, would be likely to drive
this faction of Communists into active opposition.
Furthermore, pressure from Moscow will probably con-
tinue to be exerted on the Party to keep it allied
with Gandhi.
31. The underground opposition may grow slowly
in size and effectiveness over the next three years
if the emergency is prolonged. Again, the economy
will be instrumental in determining the future suc-
cess or failure of an underground campaign. At
present, the security and intelligence forces appear
loyal to the government and adequate in size and
training to contain any dissident movement.
32. Frustration and repression, nevertheless,
could lead to an increase in the number of incidents
of anti-government violence over the next few years.
Among the politically conscious, Gandhi is either
idolized or hated; the emergency has polarized In-
dian politics as probably nothing else since inde-
pendence. With no legal outlet for their opposition
to the government, politically active Indians could
turn increasingly to clandestine activities and violence.
33. The present repression could also eventually
stimulate latent regional opposition to the center.
While probably beyond the time frame of this paper,
there is a potential for the growth of significant
opposition. to the central government in the extreme
south of India, in West Bengal, and in Kashmir.
Gandhi's concentration of power in New Delhi has
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tended to eliminate some of the strengths of the
federal system so important for a country as ethnically
and culturally diverse as India.
Possible Course of Action
34. Gandhi could defuse somewhat the threat of
violence and dissident regionalism by moving to con-
ciliate her enemies. The most obvious moves would be
suspending the emergency, releasing political prisoners,
and holding national elections.
35. With the continued absence of significant
opposition, Gandhi could well choose to lift the
emergency -- it could be reimposed at any time --
and hold national elections. Elections would appear
likely late this year or in the first half of 1977.
Having little to fear in elections from the disparate
opposition, we would expect her to release most, if
not all, of the political leaders now in jail. Some
might be released, however, only on condition they
quit politics. Any election held, even if carried
out with scrupulous honesty, would almost certainly
lead to a very large Congress Party victory -- giv-
ing Gandhi, once again, the majority in Parliament
necessary to amend the constitution at will.
36. Some form of censorship, meanwhile, is likely
to remain in force indefinitely. During her ten years
in office, Gandhi has frequently demonstrated resent-
ment at the press for its criticism of her and its
support of her enemies. She probably had newspapers
in mind when she warned shortly after the emergency
was proclaimed that there could be no return to the
"permissiveness of the past." It is possible that
censorship will continue to be loosened, as it has
been slightly since the early days of the emergency,
but not removed entirely. Editors and reporters can
be expected to continue to test the barriers to de-
termine how far they can safely go. Meanwhile, Gandhi
has moved in another direction to assure friendly
coverage in the large newspaper chains in India by
exerting increasing influence over their publishers.
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37. Gandhi's campaign against the restraints
which the courts have sought to place on her can also
be expected to continue. In April 1976, the Working
Committee of the Congress Party proposed constitutional
changes which would restrict the power of judicial re-
view at both federal and state levels of legislation.
Another proposal is to the effect that amendments to
the constitution cannot be called into question "in
any court on any ground." If eventually passed by
parliament, as seems inevitable, this latter change
would surmount a major hurdle to government plans
for basic changes in the constitution via the amend-
ment process.
38. In short, now that Gandhi has clearly es-
tablished herself as the unchallenged leader of India,
she may be willing to lift some repressive measures.
It is unlikely, however, that she will retreat from
a basically authoritarian approach to governing.
International Relations
39. The prime minister and most of her country-
men harbor a deep-seated desire to make India strong
enough to stand on its own, free from dependency on
any other power. They also want to limit foreign
involvement in bilateral disputes within South Asia.
India's recent initiatives toward China and Pakistan,
as well as the sending of an ambassador to Moscow
after a year's hiatus, probably indicate a decision
by New Delhi to play a more active role in international
affairs. Recent years have seen India concentrate on
internal problems while abdicating to more radical
states a once leading position in the Third World.
At the Non-Aligned Summit Conference, scheduled for
Colombo in August 1976, India's apparent goal of
reasserting a leading role in the movement may be-
come clearer. Meanwhile, New Delhi can be expected
to continue its active effort to restrict membership
in the movement to those states not allied to either
East or West. The primary object of this activity
will be to keep the traditional enemy, Pakistan, out
of the non-aligned group.
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40. The possibility exists of growing rivalry
between India and Iran, the only other regional nation
with major power ambitions. India's hopes for further
Iranian economic assistance, concessional oil prices,
and its desire to minimize Tehran's political and mil-
itary support of Pakistan, should keep New Delhi from
permitting a serious confrontation to develop. Tehran,
likewise, is interested in reducing the likelihood of
friction, and Iran has worked for better relations in
recent years on a number of fronts.
41. India's vast size and relative power within
South Asia will continue to worry smaller states in the
region. New Delhi considers South Asia as an area of
its primacy, if not hegemony, and will have little tol-
erance for opposition from its smaller neighbors. Bhutan,
and to a lesser degree Nepal, will continue to be dom-
inated by India. Relations with Sri Lanka are good and
are likely to remain so for the period of this memoran-
dum.
42. Relations with Bangladesh present the most
likely source of trouble during the next three years.
Political instability, compounded by almost insurmount-
able economic problems, will remain a feature of life in
Dacca. While the present government is apparently ac-
ceptable to New Delhi, there is no assurance it will
remain in power for even one, let alone three years.
Any successor would probably be less acceptable to
the Indians.
43. Violent political changes in Bangladesh
could be accompanied by communal clashes and a large-
scale movement of Hindu refugees into India. The
communal disturbances could erupt as a result of
long-standing Hindu-Muslim hatreds or, conceivably,
could be stimulated by New Delhi as a pretext for
eventual military intervention. The latter would
increase in probability if there were a change of
government in Dacca followed by a shift of foreign
policy toward greatly improved relations with Is-
lamabad and Peking. Regardless of the cause of the
refugee flow, India could be expected to first threaten
and then actually intervene militarily in Bangladesh.
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44. The restoration of diplomatic relations
with Pakistan, as agreed to in the May 1976 bilateral
negotiations, will make communication between New
Delhi and Islamabad easier, but the historic drive
of India for regional leadership will continue to be
rejected by Pakistan. At best, relations will prob-
ably be cool and correct, interspersed with periods
of heightened tension. Basic differences, e.g., the
status of Kashmir, will remain, although neither gov-
ernment will be likely to press any issue to open
confrontation. Probably the most dangerous scenario
for the next three years in South Asia would evolve
if India were to move militarily into Bangladesh and
the latter called for international assistance. In
the case of Pakistan, we would expect Prime Minister
Bhutto to try to calibrate his nation's response so
as to avoid another war with a militarily superior
India.
45. Despite the upcoming exchange of ambassa-
dors, India's relations with China will probably
improve only marginally because of the reservoir of
mutual suspicion and a competitive interest in South
Asia. While the present leadership in Peking pre-
sumably will continue its efforts to detach India
from its close ties to Moscow, it is unlikely to be
willing to jeopardize its own intimate relationship
with Pakistan in the absence of firm indications
from New Delhi that a major realignment of Indian
foreign relations is likely. We do not expect India
to make such a realignment.
46. Gandhi has made it clear that a basic
plank of her foreign policy is continued close re-
lations with the Soviet Union. New Delhi's efforts,
however, to diversify its sources of military equip-
ment, combined with growing indigenous defense pro-
duction, will make India less reliant on Moscow.
In the political arena, the two nations' interests
are likely to coincide more often than not. Even
so, New Delhi will probably seek to improve rela-
tions to a limited degree with China and the United
States in an effort to establish a more balanced re-
lationship with the three great powers.
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47. Relations with the United States can be ex-
pected to continue much as they have existed over the
past three years with periods of strain alternating
with moves toward accommodation. Gandhi would like
to see her regime gain more acceptance from other coun-
tries, especially the United States. While Indian
leaders would like to retain an aid tie to Washington,
especially for food aid, they remain suspicious of
United States' aims and activities in South Asia and
in the Indian Ocean. Any major commitment of US arms
to Pakistan would strain US-Indian relations, at least
temporarily. Finally, Gandhi and many of her as-
sociates will continue to find the United States a
convenient scapegoat whenever a diversion is needed
from domestic problems.
48. India's drive for recognition as a major
power in the world was given a substantial boost by
the explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974. In-
dian leaders claimed then, and still do, that they
are developing nuclear explosives solely for peace-
ful purposes. No second blast has occurred, but the
Indians have repeatedly indicated that more nuclear
tests will be conducted after the results of the first
explosion have been thoroughly studied. In February
1976, the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Com-
mission stated that the analysis had already been
completed. A major constraint on carrying out a
second test was removed in May 1976 when the Canadian
government announced that it would not resume assist-
ance, suspended following the first test, for India's
nuclear power program. As long as the negotiations
for resumption of Canadian assistance were underway,
India was unlikely to conduct another blast.
49. With the removal of this factor, the Indians
may move ahead with plans to conduct a second test.
Little information is available on the timing of the
next test, however, and it is likely that the Indian
leadership, itself, has not established a firm test-
ing schedule. India will approach the decision to
resume testing very pragmatically. Considerations
which India will take into account include the present
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delicate stage in the normalization of relations with
Pakistan and China, the forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit
Conference in August, and the license application for
nuclear fuel shipments for the Tarapur reactors pend-
ing before the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Al-
though a recent report has indicated that a test may
be planned within the next 30 days, it is likely that
no such event will occur before this fall.
50. In any event, it is prudent to assume that
over the next few years India will move to develop a
ons
ile of nuclear wea
t stock
m
de
2X1
p
p
o
s
A major con-
straint
on the size
and shape of any Indian nuclear
weapons
force would
be delivery capability. The only
bombers
now in the
Indian inventory are slow Can-
berras,
which have
a combat radius of only about
1,000 nm with a 5,000-lb payload. The Indians
are looking at planes which are faster and more man-
euverable than the Canberras, but which have a con-
siderably shorter combat radius. In order to obtain
a long-range nuclear delivery capability within the
time frame of this memorandum, India would have to
purchase suitable long-range bombers. Efforts to
develop a suitable missile delivery capability have
been in progress since the 1960s; however, it will
be the mid-1980s before that capability is realized.
51. This memorandum up to this point has been
based on an assumption that no totally unexpected
events occur -- such as the sudden disappearance of
Gandhi from the scene. It is impossible to create
with any degree of assurance a scenario of events that
would be likely to follow her demise. Gandhi's sud-
den removal would undoubtedly heighten factionalism
within the Congress Party and fuel opposition activity.
This could create a temporary law and order problem.
52. With Gandhi gone, there might initially
be a period of collegial rule. Fairly soon, how-
ever, there would be a move to select a single
leader, probably a senior cabinet member. There
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NOFORN
is no obvious choice,but either minister of Agricul-
ture Jagjivan Ram or Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan
despite their advanced ages, would be possible choices.
Alternatively, the Congress high command might settle
on some lesser known figure acceptable to most, if
not all, of the party.
53. Conceivably, Sanjay Gandhi would attempt
to succeed his mother. A move by Sanjay to grab power
for himself would fly in the face of recent Indian
history and traditional Indian preference for older
leaders. Perhaps more likely would be an effort by
Sanjay to act as a power broker.
54. Direct involvement by the armed forces in
any succession struggle would be likely only if the
Congress Party failed to unite around a single
candidate and if, in the confusion that followed,
there were threats of disintegration of the nation's
political structure. Even then, they would probably
consult first with the president, to whom they are
responsible according to the constitution. Any ac-
tion taken by the armed forces would probably be
accompanied by a commitment for early return of the
nation to civilian government.
55. Assuming that the transition to another
Congress government was orderly, we would expect no
basic change in Indian foreign policy -- at least
in the near term. These policies have evolved over
a period of nearly three decades. Probably the most
significant immediate change to be noted by the out-
side world would be a lack of decisiveness at the
top, possibly combined with renewed dissension
within party ranks. There is some potential danger
in such a scenario as the new leadership, uncertain
of its support within India, might attempt to rally
the nation by adopting a strongly nationalistic --
even bellicose -- attitude toward some of its neigh-
bors.
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