THE MEANING OF MILITARISM IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 21, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Approved ForJ&e
Cx C
2,~pp1.~o, oo~naas~
OCI No. 2372/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 October 1963
SUBJECT: The Meaning of Militarism in Latin America
Summary Conclusions
A series of sensational military coups d'etat
in Latin America during the past two years has o-
cused considerable official and public attention
on the broader problem of military influence on gov-
ernment and politics in the area. The fundamental
issues and the interpretation of these events have
been sadly confused by the stereotyped, and often
sanctimonious emotional treatment by journalists and
academicians who consistently evaluate the coup
through the lens of Anglo-Saxon political concepts:
militarism is made synon'4mous with all authoritarian-
ism in the area; "civilian governments and military
dictatorships" are separated into neat packages.
The resulting picture is one of blacks and whites,
of villains and heroes, with the military being
stigmatized across the board in the process. The
role of the military in Latin America is unquestion-
ably a more responsible one, and more favorable to
stability and to democracy, than it was at the turn
of the century. Ever since World War II, the mili-
tary has shown an increasing respect for democratic
political practices and effective civilian adminis-
tration. Moreover, although subjective generaliza-
tions cannot be proved or disproved, the military
class has displayed a greater awareness of national
goals and the crying need for socio-economic reform
than other elements of the ruling oligarchies, which
have tended to be reactionary in their grasp of priv-
ilege and power.
Approved For Rele
25X1
 Approved Fop-Rele
The exercise of US pressures on the military
in Latin America could have a perceptible impact on
militarism and could be a strong deterrent to the
use of the military coup against elected constitu-
tional governments. Such a deterrent would not
necessarily insure greater political stability or
more effective civilian administration in the area.
Nor would it necessarily receive the approval of
the majority of the civilian regimes in Latin
America, which clings tenaciously to its fundamental
precept in international relations--nonintervention
in the strictest juridical interpretation of the
term.
Militarism is as much the by-product or re-
flection of political, social, and economic condi-
tions and Latin American values and traditions as
a cause of the authoritarianism and instability
chronic to the area. Militarism--often erroneously
equated to all authoritarianism--would not have
flourished and persisted had not these fundamental
conditions provided continuing nourishment. No
foreign influence can easily or readily alter the
imbedded political habits and institutions which
are characteristic of Latin America--habits and in-
stitutions which are alien to the Anglo-Saxon and
difficult to judge by Anglo-Saxon standards.
The definitive subordination of the military
to civilian leadership in government and the removal
of the military from politics will depend to a
large degree on the demonstration by civilians of
their ability to govern effectively and honestly
within the Latin American framework. This in turn
hinges upon the establishment of a tradition of
loyal and constructive political opposition which
takes its chances on victory at the ballot box to
attain power and accepts the outcome with patriotism
and good sportsmanship, rather than turning to the
path of plotting and obstruction. Both effective
civilian government and a loyal political opposition
are notably lacking in Latin America. When these
lacunae are filled, militarism in the area is likely
to decline.
Approved For Relea - 0 429AO01300050016-4
 Approved For-Rele
Discussion
1. A series of sensational military coups
Vetat in Latin America during the past two years
has focused considerable official and public at-
tention on the broader problem of military influ-
ence on government and politics in the area. The
fundamental issues and the interpretation of these
events have been sadly confused by the stereotyped
and often sanctimonious emotional treatment by
journalists and academicians who consistently
evaluate the coup through the lens of Anglo-Saxon
political concepts: militarism is made synonomous
with all authoritarianism in the area; "civilian`
governments and military dictatorships" are sep-
arated into neat packages. The resulting picture
is one of blacks and whites, of villains and heroes,
with the military being stigmatized across the
board in the process.
2. An understanding in depth of militarism in
Latin America--a facet of authoritarianism--requires
an extensive knowledge of the traditions, history,
values, and institutions of 20 sovereign nations,
each with its distinctive personality, background,
and internal political structure. Like all sweep-
ing generalizations about the area, those applying
to the military institution are subject to innumer-
able exceptions and qualifications. The military
forces in Latin America have undergone a perceptible
metamorphosis in recent decades; they do not act
or react in predictable patterns at all times, even
in the same country; their political and professional
orientation varies considerably from one country to
another. There has been a striking modification in
recent decades of the military view of its legiti-
mate role in politics, in professional and other
training, and even in the motivation--or pretexts--
for military intervention in government.
The Roots of Militarism
3. The inseparability of the armed forces, the
government, and political action is probably the
25X1
25X1
Approved For Relea - 9A001300050016-4
 Approved ForReleasirSrtdLhQ?;hd_~004298001300050016-4
principal and most enduring characteristic of Latin
American political history. Authoritarianism,
whether civilian or military, was deeply imbedded
in Spanish institutions at the time of the Conquest.
The Conquistadores, who brought with them the re-
ligious and military zeal derived from the protracted
reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors,
carved out the Spanish Empire in the New World. They
were literally the first men on horseback. Military
men and military practices dominated, not only in
the conquest and expansion of the Spanish American
Empire, but in its governing institutions and prac-
tices through more than three centuries of colonial
rule. A decade of wars of independence in the early
Nth century spawned a generation of military caudil-
los. They and their successors were to hold sway in
most countries throughout the century, carrying on
in the normal military-authoritarian tradition in-
herited from the colonial era.
4. Social, economic, racial, and geographic
conditions, along with the Spanish colonial legacy,
promoted and sustained militarism in Latin America.
Military domination of government, as symbolized
in frequent coups, thus did not flourish in a vacuum.
Among all elements of the politically articulate
oligarchy, violence was the generally accepted
method for alternation of executive power--and the
executive was the only effective branch of govern-
ment. Centralism, arbitrary rule, and the over-
whelming dominance of the executive branch over the
legislative and judiciary were institutionalized by
civilians as well as military men in the presidential
chair.
5. Some form of strong government or authori-
tarianism seemed the only feasible means of retain-
ing power and imposing a semblance of authority over
far-flung geographic areas with serious impediments
to transportation and communication--areas which
were by legal fiat nation-states but could not meet
most of the modern criteria for this status. Neither
political freedoms nor Anglo-American democratic
25X1
I
Approved For Relea - 9AO01300050016-4
 Approved For-Rblea~~` ~did#00429AO01300050016-4
practices were adaptable to inchoate nations whose
populations were illiterate, impoverished, outside
the stream of national life, and accustomed to a
rigid caste system.
6. Constitutions incorporating the advanced
liberal ideas of the American and French Revolutions
were composed by the dozens. From the standpoint
of implementation, however, they were sterile liter-
ary exercises and a great waste of paper, and hence
were scrapped about as frequently as a new military
or civilian caudillo grabbed power in any given
country. An almost complete lack of political party
development as we know it--except for those parties
which centered around a strong-arm or demagogic type
of leader--was and continues to be a characteristic
of Latin America and nourishes the authoritarian
tradition. In these circumstances, the army was the
one durable institution through which a government
career could be pursued with any degree of security
and continuity.
7. In Latin America;, militarism has never car-
ried the derogatory connotation it has in the Anglo-
Saxon mind. The successful military man has ranked
at the top of Latin American heroes, illustrating
the value which is placed on glory, bravery, and
masculinity as symbolized by horse, saber, and uni-
form. To be sure, there are second-class heroes in-
cluding poets, educators, and other civilians, but
these hardly compare with Bolivar, San Martin, Artigas,
Miranda, and others of the uniformed category. It
is not pure coincidence that Fidel Castro retains
the trappings of his guerrilla warfare campaign--
fatigues, cap, the rank of major--as a constant re-
minder to the public of his military prowess, au-
dacity, and success against tremendous odds.
8. An explanation of the persistence of mili-
tary influence, domination, and intervention in gov-
ernment in Latin America is highly complex. Politi-
cal, social, and economic conditions which apply in
Approved For Releaifg?fp]"i "?4Lr00429AO01300050016-4
 Approved For-FtbleasbWk1V1&b0429A001300050016-4
varying degrees to most of the area seriously ob-
struct the growth of meaningful democracy and favor
political and economic instability as well as au-
thoritarian rule. These include high rates of il-
literacy and, in several countries, the high per-
centage of Indian population which is outside the
stream of national life; an extreme maldistribution
of wealth and national income; a caste system in
which the lines are sharply drawn against social
mobility; widespread poverty and low levels of liv-
ing; one- and two-crop economies; and imposing geo-
graphic barriers which make difficult the establish-
ment of effective central government. The postwar
phenomena of inflation, deteriorating terms of
trade for commercial exports, and declining foreign
exchange reserves essential to diversify the econ-
omies have compounded the already serious problems
of governing.
9. In addition to the entrenched tradition
of authoritarianism and centralism, exemplified by
the executive domination of all branches of govern-
ment, local and central, the Latin American peoples
are generally accustomed to and often tend to ac-
cept a rampant spoils system, widespread bribery
and corruption in administration, arbitrary elec-
toral practices, and suppression of civil and po-
litical liberties. Constitutional law and even
ordinary legislation are viewed by the Latin
American as a kind of idealistic philosophy, ra-
ther than respected as measures to be applied in
the real world. Military involvement in politics--
in the light of Latin American history, of the values
and traditions of the ruling classes, and of the
severely limited supply of administrative and lead-
ership skills--would seem more an outgrowth of the
political system than violation or deviation from
it.
10. In a negative sense, the failure of civilian
political leaders to develop enduring political par-
ties with reasonable programs has either forced or
provided a continuing opportunity for the military
to exercise its influential role in government. Ephem-
eral political parties, which have generally been
25X1
Approved For Rele 429A001300050016-4
 Approved For?Releas llTOEWEJNZ A042 001300050016-4
formed around a single popular leader (frequently
of military background) have demonstrated a notable
lack of discipline and cohesiveness. Once victor-
ious at the polls, Latin American parties have tended
to fall apart, partly because of internal dissension
and jealousies. The losers, moreover, have almost
invariably refused to play the role of "Loyal Opposi-
tion."
11. The civilian "outs," rejecting openly or
subconsciously their loss in even relatively fair
elections, generally begin to employ all the legal,
quasi-legal, and extralegal tactics in the varied
bag of political tricks to obstruct and undermine
an incumbent regime, civilian or military. Realiz-
ing that armed forces support is usually a sine qua
non of government survival, the opposition mosE
always seeks to foment disaffection in the armed
forces and/or to win the backing of key military
leaders for a coup attempt. Civilians thus tend to
enmesh the military in politics by plotting with
key military leaders.
12. In another sense, the military has little
leeway for choice. Involvement is inherent in the
primary function of the military in Latin America;
that is, to support the constitutional regime and
maintain internal peace and order. It is axiomatic
that self-preservation is the priority concern of
government. And even today in Latin America, most
regimes must divert a substantial portion of their
financial resources and energies from more construc-
tive services in the pursuit of this elusive ob-
jective. As the fulcrum of survival, the military
cannot avoid close association in the public mind
with the policies of any incumbent regime.
13. The officers, particularly the top lead-
ers, must ipso facto risk their futures in support-
ing, withholding support, or taking direct action
against a government in power. To protect their
own skins, military officers often feel that they
must keep in touch with public opinion and determine
25X1
Approved For Relhasp iJQFLJ9iFM29A001 3
 Approved Fo leas cEkPFW-W[ 6k-004Z9*001300050016-4
I
at what point an administration has alienated the
powerful political elements which are essential to
stability. Otherwise they may find themselves
forced to command their units to shoot students,
strikers, and political agitators promoting anti-
government violence--actions which are serious blows
to military prestige, however justified such counter-
action may be in a legal sense. Personal survival
is thus a major concern to top officers who determine
the political moves of their commands; they realize
that the spoils system is not restricted to the
civilians in government and may sweep them in its
path in the event they wind up on the losing side
in the political game. To a large degree, once an
officer reaches the top ranks in the command struc-
ture he must be--voluntarily or involuntarily--a
politican as well as a military man. He knows that
he is accepted as a participant in the political
game, and that the rules of the game bar no holds.
14. In addition to control of arms and physical
force, the armed forces have other tactical and stra-
tegic advantages over civilian political groups in
the perennial political struggle in Latin America.
The army and other service branches are enduring in-
stitutions. Governments of varying orientations,
parties and leaders have come and gone in kaleidoscopic
fashion, but the military institutions remain. Of-
ficers may lose in the shuffle of political cards by
overbetting their hands; they may have been farmed
out on foreign diplomatic assignments for excessive
political ambitions or suspected plotting; exiled
or jailed for failing in a coup attempt; yet they
know that one day they may have a chance to return
to duty with the right change of names in the presi-
dential palace. Meanwhile their brother officers
will be sympathetic in court martial proceedings
or in passing decision on the retention of pensions
and other emoluments, and the indispensable institu-
tion for public peace and order will survive. More-
over, the members of the armed forces are probably
held in higher esteem (or fear) by the public at
large than civilian political parties and their lead-
ers, thus providing the officers with a professional
and economic status and job security which is not
available to the leaders of the prototype personal
political party in Latin America.
Approved For Rele
25X1
 Approved For-ReleasCJ1.[fR0042A001300050016-4
I
15. From another standpoint, the military in-
stitution offers a citizen one of the few attractive
and reliable paths for a government career, far more
so than most parties. Indeed in some countries the
military services appear to be a species of political
party, and, like the New York Yankees in baseball,
the one most likely to enjoy consistent success. The
military also offers comparatively good opportunities
for professional training and other education through
military academies, as well as good salaries and
fringe benefits in relation to the civil list.
16. In contrast, a person seeking a civilian
political or governmental career confronts a thorny
and hazardous future, particuarly since the develop-
ment of non-political civil service merit systems
is only in the rudimentary stage of formation in
most Latin American-countries.
Metamorphosis of Militarism in Latin America
17. Until the early decades of the 20th century,
political action by the armed forces in Latin America
was conducted arbitrarily, with little concern for
the reaction of organized pressure groups. The mili-
tary caudillo who captured the presidency by coup
usually carried out the operation in a swift and of-
ten bloodless manner, with the support of the garrison
in the capital. He may or may not have had formal
military training to justify the title he had adopted
or forced the government to confer upon him. Frequently,
the caudillo was merely a shrewd demagogic politician
masquerading in a uniform, who inspired fear, respect,
or admiration among his followers. Whatever knowledge
he had of military strategy and tactics was often de-
rived from the seat of his pants in the saddle rather
than in the military classroom, on the drill field,
or in battle experience. Having seized power, the
military leader seldom had any intention of challenging
the socio-economic power of the oligarchy which con-
trolled the nation's resources.
18. The military institution and its political
practices have altered markedly since 1940. The
Approved For R
 Approved For lea O .IDR -WEIR.ih004 001300050016-4
transformation is not unrelated to the striking trend
toward urbanization and industrialization and the con-
comitant social and political changes throughout much
of the area, particularly the multiplication of po-
litical parties, student, labor,and business organiza-
tions, and other pressure groups. All of these must
be taken into account to some extent in present-day
political action. The simple, protozoan anatomy of
the old-style coup has become a more complex organism.
19. The military also have become more sophisticated
politically, more strictly professional in orientation,
more qualified in the military arts. Military respon-
sibilities have gradually come to comprehend "civic ac-
tion programs," designed to promote economic and so-
cial development but also serving to link the military
with a broader segment of the public and to improve
military relations with the people at large.
20. The officer corps usually is-one of the better
educated sectors of a society where trained leadership
is at a premium. The curricula of military schools
have expanded and broadened, and the level of instruc-
tion has generally improved. Opportunities for ad-
vanced foreign training, especially in the United States,
have increased since World War II. Several top of-
.ficers in most Latin American countries have been ex-
posed to this type of broadening educational experience
and at the same time to American concepts of civilian-
military relationships in government.
21'. Domestic and foreign pressures and,develop-
ments have also forged modifications in the political
outlook of the armed forces. Service organizations
have expanded in size and complexity. While still the
dominant component, the army is no..onger the single
spokesman for the military establishment in matters
political, particularly when strong action such as a
coup is under consideration. Thus, the traditional
service unity, in which the army played the decisive
role, has been somewhat diluted by the development of
sizable naval and air forces in several countries.
22. These little-brother branches of the service
have at times demonstrated their political independence
Approved For Rele 429A001300050016-4
 Approved For.ReleaWOMET: E t 0042 001300050016-4
of the army. For example, the Ecuadorean air force
shattered military unity after the ouster of Pres-
ident Velasco Ybarra in November 1961, and prevented
the army from imposing its political choice on the
nation. The Argentina navy revolted unsuccessfully
on its own in 1963 against the political policy of
the majority elements of the army.
23. Similarly, unity within the army for
political action is more difficult to attain, as
was pointed up by internal political dissension with-
in the Brazilian ground forces over the accession
to the presidency of then Vice President Joao Goulart
in August 1961. There has also been serious division
within the Argentine army for several years over an
acceptable government policy toward Peronists. The
increasing difficulty of attaining political unity
within and among the military services has probably
been a deterrent on many occasions in recent years
to arbitrary coup Action.
24. Military leaders plotting political moves in
the'pasttwo decades have generally felt compelled to
estimate public reaction, including the prospects of
violence by civilian groups, and to win at least a
minimum of civilian collaboration. The potentially
violent or passive opposition of sizable civilian
organizations is apparently a strong new deterrent
to hastily conceived military coup attempts, as il-
lustrated by the innumerable military and military-
civilian efforts to overthrow President Betancourt
and the predecessor interim regime in Venezuela
after the fall of General Perez Jimnez in 1958.
This factor was also influential in forcing the Ec-
uadorean army leaders to accept, however reluctantly,
Vice President Arosemena as the new chief of state
in November 1961,
25. Along with its awareness of the strength
and importance of pressure groups, the Latin Amer-
ican military is also displaying an increasing con-
cern over its public position and prestige, both
at home and abroad. The dismissal of most of the
Approved For Rel
25X1
 Approved FoeleaW.2E)IU00429A001300050016-4
old officer corps in Bolivia after the b+INR Revo-
lution of 1952 and the subsequent establishment
of civilian paramilitary forces to balance the reg-
ular army was a sobering example to the military
in the rest of Latin America. But the initial liq-
uidation of the Cuban armed forces by the Castro
regime has undoubtedly had the most resounding psy-
chological impact on the military in the area. Con-
comitantly the military policy of Revolutionary
Cuba has sharpened and at times accounted for real
or exaggerated military fears of Castroism and Com-
munism elsewhere in Latin America and is at least
partly responsible for a seeming resurgence of
hasty military interventions against constituted
governments.
26. The military's collaboration with civilian
groups in recent coups and civilian cooperation in
de facto regimes are important appendages of the
new-sty a coup anatomy. They reflect a growing de-
gree of public relations "sense," awareness of the
strength of civilian pressure groups, and a tacit
recognition that civilians should nominally control
the administration under "normal" circumstances. In
contrast to the past, a coup is seldom carried out
today in which only military considerations are im-
portant.
27. The reasons, motives, and pretexts for mili-
tarism are also more complex today than they were
30 years ago. The armed forces in many countries
have acted with bona fide concern to meet an ostensi-
ble or imagined threat to the security of their in-
stitution, to their careers, and to their respon-
sibilities as guardians of the constitution and pub-
lic order. Armed forces intervention in Argentina
in recent years, for example, sprang from a real or
exaggerated fear of the resurgence of Peronism and
its potential impact on the military establishment.
Often the underlying motive for political action is
to maintain the military role as ultimate arbiter
of the political destiny of the nation, including
umpire status among bickering civilian political fac-
tions.
Approved For Rel-A an -, X,_ 09AAM
29A001300050016-4
 Approved For%Releas 29 - SPIiF0042 001300050016-4
28. Another reason for armed forces interven-
tion is the default, ineptitude, or excesses of an
incumbent civilian or military regime which tends
to result in political stalemate, stagnation of gov-
ernment administration, and a breakdown of public
order. Often there is widespread approval for
such action, as occurred with the ouster of former
Conservative President Laureano Gomez in Colombia
in 1953 and again with the removal of his military
successor, General Rojas Pinilla, four years later.
A more recent case was the military takeover of
government from President Carlos Arosemena of Ec-
uador.
29. The alleged expansion of Communist influ-
ence in government has served the military for both
cause and occasion of intervention, and partly re-
flects military awareness of US official attitudes
and the desire to mollify anticipated opposition
from this country. However, civilian politicians
are responsible to some degree for the existence
of the pretext because they are in fact excessively
complacent toward Communist political and subversive
tactics. Although Communist infiltration of student,
labor, and political groups and even bureaucracies
is widespread in Latin America, Communist parties
have no independent capability for seizing control
of any country. On the other hand, the officer
class in Latin America is strongly anti-Communist
and genuinely concerned with the long-range threat
which Communism and Castroism pose, and has taken
steps to keep the armed forces relatively free of
Communist infiltration. Military awareness of the
threat of Communism and Castroism to their insti-
tutions, however, does not impede its use for im-
mediate political expediency, as recently exemplified
in the Dominican Republic and Honduras.
30. Still another cause of military interven-
tion springs from the encouragement and collabora-
tion of opposition political groups who seek to sub-
vert elements of the armed forces and provoke their
action against the incumbent regime in order to at-
tain power or a greater share in its exercise. Such
Approved For Re
 Approved For..Releasl' :DR-W&tcIT004001300050016-4
collaboration is evident in the composition of the
de facto military regimes in Ecuador, Honduras, and
Do-minican Republic--the latest coup examples in
the area. While it is true that the military often
takes political action on its own initiative to
satisfy the ambitions of individual leaders or at-
tain the selfish objectives of the military estab-
lishment, many of the coups of recent years in
Latin America might have been prevented if there
had been a show of unity among opposition political
groups in support of the regime in power, or if the
seed of coup action had not been planted within the
military by the disgruntled political "outs."
31. During the past decade the optimists root-
ing for civilian democracy in Latin America had pointed
to the overthrow, death, or retirement from power
of Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Marcos Pdrez Jimonez
in Venezuela, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael
Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Ful-
gencio Batista in Cuba, Manuel Odria in Peru, Juan
Peron in Argentina, and others, as signalling a
new "democratic era" in the region. These optimists
for the most part have subsequently joined the Pes-
simists' Club as the result of military interven-
tion against elected civilian regimes In Argentina,
Peru, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras,
and the rumblings of possible military coups in
Brazil and Venezuela.
32. Democratic traditions in particular nations
cannot be firmly rooted even over a period of decades;
nor can it be demonstrated that the military has been
the major obstacle to such growth. Three successive
civilian governments were elected in Ecuador after
1948, and all three presidents completed their con-
stitutional terms in office, the single term being
a unique development in this country; many observers
evaluated this as the establishment of democratic,
civilian tradition. Subsequent events have demon-
strated the fallacy of such a hasty conclusion. The
collapse of democratic rule in Argentina, one of
the most advanced countries in Latin America,, demon-
strates that even a seemingly well established
25X1
Approved For Rel
 Approved For.ReIe 4 001300050016-4
tradition of civilian rule can be shattered under
given circumstances. Brazil's traditions of civil-
ian democracy are certainly being subjected to
the severe strains of irresponsible leadership,
political radicalism, and economic deterioration.
33. A more reliable--or better, a less haz-
ardous--appraisal of militarism may be derived
from an examination of the trends noted above in
the more subtle metamorphosis of the militaristic
influence on politics. These include: the grow-
ing non-political and professional outlook in the
officer corps, along with a concomitant rise in the
educational standard of its membership; a reluctance
of the military to seize power arbitrarily without
strong public acceptance or tacit consent; closer
association with civilian groups in interim mili-
tary administration; an endorsement of the need
for basic reforms; and a willingness to relinquish
power, seized extralegally, within a reasonable
period of time to civilian authority after the
motives for a coup have been satisfied. This is
not to imply that the military has not acted and will
not continue to act arbitrarily and irresponsibly
in certain countries in opposition to democratic
practices.
34. The role of the military in Latin America
is unquestionably a more responsible one, and more
favorable to stability and to democracy, than it
was at the turn of the century. Ever since World
War 11, the military has shown an increasing re-
spect for democratic political practices and ef-
fective civilian administration. Moreover, although
subjective generalizations cannot be proved or dis-
proved, the military class has displayed a greater
awareness of national goals and the crying need
for socio-economic reform than other elements of
the ruling oligarchies, which have tended to be
reactionary in their grasp of privilege and power.
35. The exercise of US pressures on the mili-
tary in Latin America could have a perceptible impact
on militarism and could be a strong deterrent to the
25X1
Approved For Re 001300050016-4
 Approved For.&eleas 1IDE ALP04ZW001300050016-4
use of the military coup against elected consti-
tutional governments. Such a deterrentwould
not necessarily insure greater political stability
or more effective civilian administration in the
area. Nor would it necessarily receive the ap-
proval of the majority of the civilian regimes
in Latin America, which clings tenaciously to
its fundamental precept in international re-
lations--non-intervention in the strictest ju-
ridical interpretation of the term.
36. Militarism is as much the by-product or
reflection of political, social, and economic con-
ditions and Latin American values and traditions,
as a cause of the authoritarianism and instability
chronic to the area. Militarism--often erron-
eously equated to all authoritarianism--would
not have flourished and persisted had not these
fundamental conditions provided continuing nourish-
ment, No foreign influence can easily or readily
alter the imbedded political habits and institu-
tions which are characteristic of Latin America--
habits and institutions which are alien to the
Anglo-Saxon and difficult to judge by Anglo-Saxon
standards.
37. The definitive subordination of the mili-
tary to civilian leadership in government and the
removal of the military from politics will depend
to a large degree on the demonstration by civilians
of their ability to govern effectively and honestly
within the Latin American framework. This in turn
hinges upon the establishment of a tradition of
loyal and constructive political opposition which
takes its chances on victory at the ballot box
to attain power and accepts the outcome with patri-
otism and good sportsmanship, rather than turning
to the path of plotting and obstruction. Both ef-
fective civilian government and a loyal political
opposition are notably lacking in Latin America.
When these lacunae are filled, militarism in the
area is likely to declines
Approved For