THE FUTURE OF BANGLA DESH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100140-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 140
• Publication Date: December 17, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Meinor
andum
The Future of Bangla Desh
C. . 9/OGq X x'1/7 /0'1/'7/
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 December 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Future of Bangla Desh
The generally moderate and pro-Western Bangla
Desh government, which will be installed in Dacca
soon,is ill prepare;' to meet the staggering prob-
lems of the former Pakistani province. Since it
was formed last April, the government's preoccupa-
tion with independence has precluded the develop-
ment of a program for governing the new nation.
The effort to develop such a program may well
split the young government. In any case, the dif-
ficulty of the problems and the inexperience of
the government do not bode well for Bangla Desh.
Ultimately, the failure of the current leadership
could pave the way for a growth of ultra-radical
leftism.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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Government and Political Groups
1. The Bangla Desh government is drawn exclu-
sively from the Awami League, which led the struggle
for provincial autonomy and swept the East Pakistani
elections in December 1970. Its president, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, languishes in jail in West Pakistan,
and in his absence Bangla Desh will be ruled by a
group of men with little experience in the higher
echelons of government. The group includes three
former members of the provincial assembly, one of
whom served briefly in the late 1950s as provincial
justice minister, a former member of the national
assembly, and a former deputy director of operations
in the Pakistan Army.
2. Since its formation last April, both the
demands of the liberation struggle and Indian pres-
sure have tended to submerge differences within the
government. It may be some time before clear-cut
alignments emerge, but so far there appear to be
three broad groups that will determine the govern-
ment's policies.
3. Foreign Minister Kandakhar Mustaq Ahmad
seems to be the leading figure among the relatively
moderate, middle-class Awami League politicians who
hold most of the offices in the Bangla Desh govern-
ment. The senior Mukti Bahini commanders, including
Defense Minister Mohammad Osmani who shared their
exile in Calcutta, have usually sided with this
group.
4. Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad is the key
figure in a more leftist faction of the former
exiles. Although he has less Bengali support than
the moderates, Tajuddin has much closer ties with
New Delhi. The strong backing he may well receive
from India--and possibly the USSR--could enable him
to play an influential rc.e in the new government.
Also important on the left is Muzaffar Ahmad, leader
of a small pro-Soviet faction.
5. The guerrillas in the field could have an
important voice in the shaping of the new state,
but both their views and the degree to which they
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wish to become involved in politics remain unclear.
Some of the officers and troops are professional
military men without strong political or ideological
views other than a dedication to Bangla Desh. Al-
though many of them have criticized the political
leaders who lived in comfortable exile while the
guerrillas risked their lives, they may remain
loyal to the moderate Bangla Desh leadership and
be content to form the niaileus of an apolitical
Bangla Desh Army.
6. Other guerrillas have probably been suc-'
cessfully proselytized by pro-Moscow Communists,
and still others are ultra-radical leftists who
would have looked to Peking for guidance had China
not backed West
7. The political parties to the left of the
Awami League--such as Maulana Bashani's National
Awami Party/Left--received few votes in the last
elections and probably lack any strong popular
or guerrilla backing. Nevertheless, they have
been included in the Consultative Committee, which
acts loosely as a policy planning group to the
Bangla Desh regime. This co m1.ttee was apparently
created at Indian insistence. In talking with a
US newsman, the head of the Bangla Desh mission
in Calcutta implied that some leftist members of
the committee would be brought into the cabinet.
Within the cabinet, they would be likely to lend
their support to Tajuddin Ahmad and the left wing
of the Awami League. Rightist parties generally
supported the West Pakistanis and are therefore
totally discredited.
8. Eight months ago, Mujibur Rahman was the
acknowledged leader not only of. the Awami League
but of all East Pakistan. Should the Pakistanis
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release him from prison and allow him to return to
Dacca, he would again be the pre-eminent political
figure in Bangla Desh. Still, he would face dif-
ficulties.
9. Actions have been taken in Mujib's name
with which he may not agree. Tajuddin Ahmad re-
portedly was not Mujib's first choice for prime
minister, and Tajuddin's rivals claim he was forced
on the government by Mrs. Gandhi. An attempt by
Mujib to move against Tajuddin would lead to fric-
tion within the government and new strains in re-
lations with the Indians. On the other hand, if
Mujib acquiesces in everything that has been done
in his name, his former subordinates--now used to
making decisions without him--may try to continue
to exert scp nnwPr anra ?ao t,; .., 4-.- r
10. In any case, with independence--the only
issue on which the Bengalis are generally agreed--
both ideological and personal rifts are likely to
develop in the government.
Economic Problems
11. Even had Bangla Desh gained independence
peacefully, its economic problems would still. be
staggering. One of the poorest nations on earth,
it cannot feed its population even in good years.
it has suffered severe natural disasters--e.g.,
several hundred thousand perished in a cyclone in
the fall of 1970. Health standards are low, and
epidemics are a constant threat. Road, rail, power
transmis$ion, and telecommunications facilities are
inadequate.
12. Bangla Desh gained its independence after
eight months of guerrilla war and a full-scale In-
dian invasion. Both the guerrillas and retreating
Pakistani troops severely damaged the transporta-
tion system; even the inland water system has been
disrupted by the loss of boats and the death or
flight of boat operators. In some parts of the
country, guerrilla and army activity prevented the
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harvesting of the fall crop or the planting of the
next one, and the disruption of transportation has
prevented the distribution of seeds, fertilizer,
and pesticides. The country has managed to avoid
famine, but this was partly due to the exodus of
ten million refugees. Food distribution will re-
main a problem, and the return of even a million
refugees will exacerbate the situation. But the
combination of private stocks, renewed imports,
and new harvests si:ould again avert a food crisis.
Plans are already being made to ensure that the
refugee return is gradual, according to the Bangla
Desh prime minister, In the fighting hundreds of
villages have been destroyed, adding more dis-
placed persons to those who fled to India.
13. The end of fighting will quickly ease
some economic problems. For example, production
in jute mills has been below normal, in part be-
cause workers were afraid to go to their jobs.
This obstacle has been removed. Other problems,
such as rebuilding the road and rail system, will
require a good deal of foreign assistance. Some,
such as the food and population problem, require
long-range planning.
14. The government has announced that it
will nationalize industries, but otherwise has
developed no economic program. Even nationaliza-
tion may be designed as a cover for seizing West
Pakistani - owned property rather than as an eco-
nomic policy.
Law and Order
15. During the past eight months, local ad-
ministration and police functions broke down com-
pletely in East Pakistan. Some of the civil serv-
ants fled or were killed, others sided with the
military government, and many remained in govern-
ment service as much to hamstring the provincial
administration as anything. The police became
even more disorganized, joining either the gov-
ernment forces or the Mukti Bahini.
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16. In such a situation, village government
became the responsibility of local guerrilla or
Pakistan Army commanders, or it was handed over
to councils representing only the small minority
of East Pakistanis loyal to Islamabad. In most
places, however, it simply ceased to function.
The police were largely replaced by Razakars--
"licensed bandits,"
who may have committed as many crimes as they
prevented. Criminals masquerading either as
Razakars or Mukti Bahini had a free hand in many
places.
17. With isolated bands of professional
criminals, Razakars, and Biharis still operating
in the country, the government faces a serious
situation. But the Bengalis could be an even
greater problem. The Biharis--non-Bengali East
Pakistanis, most of whom suppc.ted Islamabad--
have earned the hatred of the Tkcngalis. Mobs of
Bengalis have already killed ~;v;ne Biharis, and
unless the government can save most of the mil-
lion or more others, international sympathy for
Bangla Desh could dissipate quickly. President
Na:.rul Islam told an Indian newsman that Bengalis
would surrender the vast quantity of weapons now
in their hands, but he expressed apprehension about
the safety of non-Bengalis.
Relations with India
18. Dacca's relations with New Delhi could
bring the first major strains in the government.
Indian troops have been greed as liberators by
the Bengalis, but this attitude could change quickly.
Even during the liberation struggle, friction devel-
oped between the Bengalis and the Indians. The
Mukti Bahini chafed at taking orders from the In-
dians, fretted over the long delay in open Indian
military intervention, and resented Indian refusal
to give the Mukti Bahini heavy weapons. The moder-
atas in the Bangla Desh government disliked India's
heavy-handed direction and clashed with Tajuddin
Ahmad on issues such as supporting the Indo-Soviet
treaty, the formation of the Consultative Committee,
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and the subordinate relationship of the Mukti Bahini
to the Indian Army. Behind these-, specific issues
lies a suspicion, probably justified, that India
plans to control Bangla Desh in much the same way
that it has tried to dominate Nepal and does domi-
nate Bhutan.
19. East Bengali suspicions about Indian mo-
tives were overshadowed by dislike of the Punjabis
of West Pakistan, but wi-Gh the Punjabis no longer
on the scene, Indian unpopularity may well grow.
Despite its avowed secularism, the Bangla Desh gov-
ernment has tended to discriminate against Hindus.
It was reluctant to recruit them for the Mukti
Bahini, and Hindus hold no position of importance
in the Bangla Desh government or in the Awami League.
In addition, all Bengalis--both Muslim and Hindu--
resent domination by the Hindi-speaking northern In-
dians. This resentment has been one cause of the
civil disorder and Communist strength in the neigh-
boring Indian state of West Bengal.
20. Until the West Pakistanis imposed re-
strictions, East Bengal's commerce was closely tied
to India and New Delhi is almost certain to seek a
return to this pattern. India would replace West
Pakistan as the major source of Bangla Desh imports;
raw jute exports would again be sent to mills in
the Calcutta area; and tea from India's state of
Assam would again be transported on Bangla Desh's
rivers. The Indians could legitimately claim that
such an arrangement is more natural than the polit-
ically inspired trade patterns of the recent past.
Indian economic influence in Bangla Desh could also
be projected through technical assistance. Bangla
Desh may well find its economy largely dependent on
its larger neighbor.
21. Much will depend on events in the irunedi-
ate future. India will be a major supplier of tech-
nical and economic assistance to Bangla Desh in that
period. The Bengalis can hardly refuse this much-
needed help, and the Soviets--as in Nepal--are likely
to support the Indians rather than compete with New
Delhi. Despite some resentment over Chinese and
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American positions during the liberation struggle
Dacca may soon seek economic help from both, not
only to prevent Indian domination but also because
New Delhi is unlikely to be able to meet the needs
of Bangla Desh.
22. India may also try to assume a special
role in preserving stability in Bangla Desh. Al-
though New Delhi probably does not want to be re-
sponsible for the domestic problems of Bangla Desh,
it will have difficulty ignoring widespread disor-
ders there. According to the press, an Indian Gov-
ernment spokesman said that Indian troops would re-
main in Bangla Desh "until normalcy is restored,
until the task set for the army is fully done, un-
til the health and municipal services are restored
and the refugees are repatriated."
Relations With Others
23. Bangla Desh is anxious to secure formal
recognition, but even without recognition may be
willing to allow foreign diplomatic missions to re-
main in Dacca. The Bengalis are annoyed with the
UN, both because of its failure to agree to pro-
Bengali resolutions and because of suspicions that
the UN relief mission in the East aided the Pakistan
Army. They may therefore be slow in seeking UN mem-
bership. According to the Bangla Desh High Commis-
sioner in Calcutta, "If they want us, let them rec-
ognize us."
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24. Most of the Awami League leaders were pro-
American as late as last year and actively sought
US support before fighting began in March 1971. Dis-
appointment with US policy has grown since then, and
in recent :reeks Bangla Desh radio has attacked Wash-
ington for supporting West Pakistan and has even ac-
cused the US of having instigated Islamabad's repres-
sive policies in order to gain a firm hold on East
Bengal. Nevertheless, Tajuddin Ahmad told an Ameri-
can newsman that he hoped US economic assistance
would be forthcoming, although, he added, Bangla
Desh could seek aid "elsewhere."
25. If the USSR follows the pattern of its re-
lations with Nepal, it will try to maintain some de-
gree of influence in Bangla Desh but will refrain
,from any action likely to antagonize the Indians.
Until now, the Soviets have worked through the In-
dians rather than directly with the Bengalis.
26. Peking supported West Pakistan throughout
the independence struggle and will be reluctant to
risk its position in Islamabad by attempting to es-
tablish close relations with Dacca. For their part,
the Bengalis--including the radical Communists--have
little reason to like the Chinese. A shift leftward
in Bangla Desh could, however, change the outlook of
both parties.
27. Perhaps no government could solve the
problems of East Bengal, and the new government is
handicapped by lack of experience and resources.
As conditions in the province worsen, the main al-
ternatives would seem to be a growth of leftism or
increased Indian intervention. Either would again
make Bangla Desh a major trouble spot.
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