GSA SUPPORT TO THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00988R000100090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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GSA SUPPORT
TO THE
CIA
October 28, 1980
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Agency's enabling legislation and General Services Administration's
(GSA's) statutory mission overlap in the areas of supply, procurement, real
estate, and facilities. Precedence has been established over the years wherein
the Agency now relies on GSA to satisfy most domestic requirements; but there
is increasing criticism of, and dissatisfaction with, the performance of GSA.
However, given GSA's statutory authorities and presence, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's (CIA's) General Counsel has been reluctant to use the Director
of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) authorities domestically except in limited cir-
cumstances. A more liberal utilization of the DCI's authorities provided by Sec-
tions 8A and 8B of the CIA Act of 1949 would allow the equilibrium between CIA
and GSA to shift to CIA being more self-sufficient. Self-sufficiency would re-
duce GSA's workload, in turn relieving, somewhat, their chronic problems of
being both understaffed and underfunded. Decentralization would increase the
responsiveness of service to the ultimate customer and, as developed later in
this paper, should increase overall governmental efficiency.
This paper will identify each service furnished by GSA and will provide a
background and problem statement that discusses the issues and provides a
recommendation for improvement. The recurrent theme and recommenda-
tion is that overall governmental efficiency and responsiveness can be
greatly improved through the judicious and controlled delegation of spe-
cific authorities by GSA to the Agency. Requested delegations are sum-
marized in the following matrix:
Category Existing Arrangement
Acquisition of leased GSA has delegated authority to acquire No square foot restriction, only
space up to 5,000 square feet. communications with GSA and adher-
ence to the FPMR.
Reimbursable work. (Im- GSA responsibility, with delegations to Agency responsibility; work accom-
provement, alteration, the Agency on a case-by-case basis. plished through GSA if responsive,
and new construction) otherwise through direct Agency
contract.
SLUC (operations, main- GSA responsibility, with Agency often GSA publish standards for SLUC-
tenance, and housekeep- providing supplemental funds. funded services; where services are not
ing) commensurate with standards, Agency
will contract directly, adjusting the
SLUC payment accordingly.
Cafeteria and vending Services provided through the GSA, by No change.
machines GSI for cafeteria, and Va. Comm. for
blind for vending machines.
Supply and Procurement Interfaces, responsibilities, and authori- No major changes. System tuning
ties clear. ADPE procurement is dele- recommended.
gated to the Agency.
INPIC Under GSA control. Under Agency control.
Protective Services The limited FPS services provided by Conduct a systems analysis to deter-
SLUC are augmented on a reimburs- mine the best mix of options to meet
able basis. requirements.
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The delegation of Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE) procure-
ment authority demonstrates that mission support does improve and that laws
and regulations are honored. GSA has audited this delegation on three occa-
sions since granted in 1973 and complimented the Agency's exercise of the
authority each time. This ADPE delegation represents the direction proposed
for the first three categories of the above matrix and is the direction the Agency
believes the National Academy of Public Administration study should rec-
ommend. If the shift of responsibilities proposed in the matrix is not possible
and it came to a choice of either the Agency or GSA to perform the services, we
would recommend the delegations of the entire set of operating authorities and
the transfer of appropriate resources to the CIA. We cannot continue the cur-
rent pattern of unresponsiveness.
In the early days, the Agency's enabling legislation was focused on the
overseas mission, with domestic needs modest and adequately served by GSA.
As the Agency grew, consolidation through construction at Langley was ap-
proved thus allowing the
otentia or subsequent services to be provided internally, via contract
r through GSA. GSA was selected, and through an exchange of cor-
respon ence in 1959 between the DCI and the Administrator of GSA, it was
agreed that GSA would perform services incident to the operation, mainte-
nance, protection, and repair of the CIA Headquarters Building.
This arrangement went unaltered until 1972 when passage of Public Law
92-313, an amendment to the Property Act of 1949, provided GSA authority to
bill Federal agencies for furnished space and services. This billing was identi-
fied as a Standard Level User Charge (SLUC), designed to provide GSA with
reimbursement for the provision of a standard level of service plus an amount
for a Federal Building Fund to provide for acquisition of new Federal buildings.
In anticipation of the adverse effects that PL 92-313 might have on the CIA, the
DCI, in November 1973, forwarded an appeal to GSA for exemption of the
Headquarters complex and the National Photo ra hic Interpretation Center
(NPIC) facility[-
this appeal was denied
by GSA. Consequently, all Agency Properties subject to the provisions of PL
92-313, including Headquarters and identified to GSA, thus
establishing the basis for our current relationship.
The remainder of the paper concerns shifts of responsibilities present in
the GSA/CIA arrangements. There is one area, support to
where the disparity between GSA's capabilities (and track recor) and our sup-
port requirements is so great that we recommend that total responsibility for
the facility be transferred to the CIA. The justifications and rationale for this
recommendation are the subjects of a separate study. However, as the rec-
ommendation represents the most sweeping solution to the problems of GSA
support that permeate this report, a synopsis of the situation is included in the
next paragraph.
GSA's organization has been, and is, primarily structured to support the
routine requirements of a standard office building. This has impacted on the
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Agency most in the area of building management, has always been
unique and has a special purpose, primarily housing technical equipment which
requires special support-support above and beyond GSA's standard services.
The Headquarters complex has each year evolved from a standard office build-
ing to more of a light industrial park, housin ever-increasing amounts of tech-
nical equipment; and, similar to equires special, responsive, and
efficient support services. Although GSA has historically not been able to pro-
vide the necessary support to our operational requirements in either building in
the area of facilities management, we have been able to cope in the less critical
area of support to the Headquarters complex. Coping in Headquarters is also
facilitated by the physical location of GSA shops in the Headquarters building, a
condition that NPIC does not enjoy. The need for reliable, time-critical, respon-
sive, and controlled facilities support at I is non-negotiable in order
to meet the mission-a dynamic mission dependent on the availability of pre-
cise complex and sensitive electro/mechanical/optical equipment. GSA does
not have the capability or apparent inclination to meet Agency requirements at
I land it is, thereby, recommended tha In its entirety,
DISCUSSION
The GSA organization is of gargantuan proportions, is bureaucratic, and
provides most services on a monopolistic basis. Size, bureaucracy, and monop-
oly combine to aggravate managerial and administrative considerations that
are common to all organizations, i.e.:
? There are few standards or feedback mechanisms to evaluate respon-
siveness, effectiveness, and efficiency; therefore, there is no signal
when GSA is performing poorly.
? There are few incentives for good management and few disincentives
for poor management.
? There is a general lack of a sense of urgency or importance, to the
extent that even telephone communication is often time-consuming or
impossible.
? By their perceptions, in which we are in agreement, they are often
understaffed, are often underfunded, and the personnel are often
underpaid and/or undermotivated.
? There is a lack of authority and willingness to make decisions, particu-
larly in the wake of the recent disclosures of dishonesty and fraudulent
behavior.
? There can be lengthy delays due to the plethora of confusing and
restrictive central regulations and congressional directives, oversight
committees, etc.
The efficiency of centralized service, with the potential attendant savings to
the taxpayer, is often realized at a cost in responsiveness to the customer. In
our case, the centralized GSA service has become both relatively costly and
unresponsive.
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This Agency's involvement with GSA is multidimensional, involving the op-
erations, maintenance and alteration of facilities, engineering, housekeeping,
procurement, supply, and transportation. Relations have been good, with inter-
personal relationships at the individual level excellent. Most GSA representa-
tives are eager to be responsive. Nonetheless, although there are many exam-
ples of organizational success, it is also common for the GSA system to
preclude responsiveness. This Agency does observe a strong correlation be-
tween unresponsiveness and monopoly; those areas where this Agency
must go to GSA for services are usually the areas in which GSA is least
responsive. Poor response has forced this Agency to use Its staff to help GSA
help us-professional personnel that could be more effectively utilized in di-
rectly accomplishing tasks through existing Agency authorities.
The world situation is fluid and mission requirements often cannot be
anticipated; specific support requirements, therefore, cannot be incorporated
into long-range plans. Mission duration is often less than the time GSA requires
to respond to our requests for services. To meet our mission, either GSA must
become more responsive or delegations from GSA are necessary, delegations
with the appropriate constraints and procedures for audit.
The recurrent theme that permeates the following examples is that both
overall governmental efficiency and responsiveness of service can be greatly
improved through the judicious and controlled delegation of specific authorities
by GSA to this Agency. The delegations are in the best interest of the govern-
ment not only for the improvement of efficiency and responsiveness but also
because stronger checks and balances to the process of providing services are
possible, thereby reducing the potential for abuses. The relative smallness of
the Agency allows complete internal auditing procedures. Aggressive auditing
and a manageable scope of operations inherently provide reasonable checks
and balances. Repeated Congressional investigations could not find abuses in
the Agency's support or financial operations. Investigations of GSA disclosed
sweeping abuses and dishonesty. The above facts and observations lead us to
suggest that the Agency can inherently offer better safeguards against abuse in
the provision of goods and services.
The remainder of this paper will identify in more detail the categories of
services received from GSA. The organization of the paper will be to identify the
category of service, provide and introductory narrative (background), and then
identify the issues, followed by a recommendation for improvement. Typical of
most customers who receive services from others, the bulk of the narrative is
concerned with GSA services that lack some combination of effectiveness, effi-
ciency, responsiveness, or adequacy. Service that is responsive is often taken
for granted and not documented and studied. There are many examples where
GSA has performed above and beyond the call of normal duty to be responsive
to our needs, particularly at the individual and working levels.
Category: Acquisition of Lease Space
Background: Although the Agency has, under the provisions of its en-
abling legislation, authority to lease real property, utilization has been restricted
to acquisition of "operational" real estate. Thus the Agency must rely on GSA
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STATINTL
STATINTL
to satisfy its needs for "administrative" property. Unfortunately, most of the
Agency's requirements are for relatively small offices which, although falling
within the "administrative" definition, have operational and security char-
acteristics which dictate location, type of space, and time frame. GSA has
proven to be uniformly unable to respond in a timely manner to these
requirements.
Problem: GSA appears to be both overworked and understaffed. This
problem is exacerbated by an internal bureaucracy which requires many levels
of both vertical and lateral approval before a lease may be signed. In addition,
GSA has become the executive agency responsible for a myrial of social and
economic programs designed to revitalize urban areas, employ minorities, aid
the handicapped, conserve energy, improve the environment, balance the bud-
get, reduce the size of the Federal work force, etc. While worthwhile, the total
impact of these programs is to grind the leasing process to a virtual halt .'Aeal
impact may be achieved through these programs when applied to large-scale STATINTL
Federal space programs. Unfortunately, these conditions are alied a
board and affect this A tempts to obtain an
as well as construction o a major Federal
center.
les:
The temporary space, although nearly thrice
as large as required, was inadequate from a safety and security view-
point. Over the ensuing two and one-half years, GSA was unable to lo-
cate replacement space. Direct appeals were made by the DCI, Deputy
Director for Administration, and Director of Logistics, to no avail. As a
last resort, in November 1979, an Agency officer spent one week, full
time, I I surveyed available space, and located an office
acceptable to and the Agency. It then took GSA until February 1980
to negotiate and sign a lease, and it would not have been done then had
not the Agency intervened at critical times.
2. In 1975, the Agency formally requested that GSA obtain
square feet of office and special-purpose space to meet expan e
Agency requirements. Problems involving GSA funding restraints, leas-
ing priorities, and moratoriums delayed formal solicitation for offers until
May 1979. Negotiations continued until November 1979, at which time
GSA's General Counsel, overruling its local National Capital Region,
determined that GSA could not enter into a lease. Leasing authority was
subsequently delegated to the Agency.
3. Requests for small offices (500 to 800
square feet) were held by GSA for two
years. In both instances GSA ultimately advised that owing to the tight
leasing market, space of this small size was not available. In both in-
stances the Agency subsequently located suitable space.
Pros: GSA provides a certain flexibility and ensures
that leasing reflects current rules and regulations governing space acquisition.
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They also assume the administrative burden of lease payments and ongoing
relations with the landlord. Because of the large volume, they are presumably
very familiar with their local leasing market.
Cons: The nonresponsiveness results in an inordinate amount of time con-
sumed simply attempting to get GSA to react. This largely nonproductive effort
far exceeds the time involved in direct leasing. GSA is, at best, only vaguely
aware of security and cover conditions which affect many of our offices and
totally unaware of the operational priorities which affect our space planning
efforts.
Recommendation: The 5,000 square foot restriction on the recent delega-
tion for leasing should be removed and future leasing should only require co-
ordination with GSA and adherence to the Federal Property Management
Regulations. The 5,000 square foot delegation has proven to be quite workable.
By virtue of its overseas and other operational responsibilities, this Agency has
a professional cadre of engineers and realty officers. These,personnel are com-
petent to design and lease office space. Use of the delegation has cut leasing
delays from literally years to weeks.
Category: Reimbursable Work-Improvements, Alterations,
New Construction
Background: The Agency requests reimbursable services outside of those
provided under SLUG by means of GSA Work Authorization Form 2957. Sup-
posedly, GSA provides the Agency "detailed estimates"; but, in fact, only over-
all figures for labor, material, and total are reflected and those figures in ab-
solutely no.detailx(Wide variations in material quantities, oversights, duplication
between shops, and other discrepancies are possible and likely, with no ver-
ification possible. Costs significantly higher than Agency estimates, little control
over GSA work schedules, and quality of work often cause reimbursable ser-
vices to be unresponsive. v z ttt-? "a A-+:y _-.
Problem: Where:construction is involved, GSA is not responsive. Most
construction is preceded by a feasibility study, construction drawings and
specifications (design), and finally, after award, construction. This assumes that
the Architect and Engineer selection process (which takes usually eight
months), Congressional prospectus process (if the project is of significant size),
which may take from two to five years, and the budget process are all satisfied.
Given the GSA staffing and competition for those limited resources from other
agencies, only the highest priority projects get attention, and important
projects continually slide further behind. Limited resources available to the
Agency are consumed in trying to prod GSA into action.
Since the Agency is a captive customer and must deal with GSA without
the benefit of competition, it ultimately faces a "take it or leave it" bargaining
situation. It is necessary that the Agency be able to judge the adequacy of
transactions. Estimates in sufficient detail to show materiel lists and man-hours
per job element must be prepared and used at negotiation sessions. Alter-
natives must be given the Agency if agreement cannot be reached in cost or
response.
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Pros: There are certain projects which can be forecast far enough in ad-
vance to get GSA moving in an acceptable time frame. Useful life of capital
improvements can be predicted and replacements set in motion. In some in-
stances, GSA can, and occasionally does, program the necessary funding. It is
advantageous when this Agency can provide guidance and prodding, with GSA
administrating the projects. Where fiscal year funds are involved, arrangements
can occasionally be made in sufficient detail to obligate Agency funds, with
GSA performing the majority of the actual project administration.
Cons: When an operational exigency exists, GSA more often than not can-
not respond. Only utilization of maximum Agency influence at the highest level
can achieve improved response and then only in extremely rare cases. Installa-
tion of major equipment, even when it is provided by the Agency, takes years to
accomplish and then with only minimum efficiency and coordination evident, as
seen in the installation of emergency generators at the power plant. It is clear
that GSA is deficient in areas vital to this Agency's operational integrity.
Recommendation: It must be clearly established that this Agency has the
responsibility and authority to accomplish necessary repairs, improvements,
alterations, and new construction through its own resources, and that work may
be accomplished through direct Agency contract or through GSA; the decision
to be made solely at this Agency's discretion.
Category: SLUC-Building Operation, Maintenance (SLUC-Custodial-
Covered in Next Category)
Background: GSA supposedly provides a habitable environment for a nor-
mal 40-hour workweek under the provisions of the Public Buildings SLUC proc-
ess.(Funde;- r- and above the actual amount required for normal operation are
collected for the purpose of providing increased maintenance, repair, or man-
ning),(Much of the funding collected by GSA from client agencies flows outside
the system.It is usually necessary for an agency to provide additional funds for
any service falling outside of the narrowly defined standard services'vOur
Agency has responsibilities that require 24 hours per day, 365 days per year
support Utilities must be continuously available to computers and communica-
tion equipment. Backup equipment must be provided, maintained, and op-
erated to preclude either scheduled or unforeseen events from interrupting
critical functions, -,
F*VW9ms:,GSA is either unwilling or unable to provide the 24-hour level of
reliable service required. Even though reimbursed to provide the necessary
resources, GSA allows emergency equipment to become and remain inoper-
ative, preferring to trust that the primary equipment stays on line. Important
equipment may remain inoperative for years, such as the #3 1500-ton chiller in
the power plant, the Dunham Bush 500-ton chiller in the Headquarters Building,
and the central control air compressors in the Headquarters Building. After
years of "recruiting" the diesel technicians and electricians to operate the
multimillion dollar emergency power system, the system is still not staffed to
have the necessary personnel available for 24-hour coverage at the minimum
level.
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Pros: The bad state of affairs just described has few advantages beyond
the fact that there are usually a few GSA mechanics around when an emer-
gency occurs. GSA seems emergency breakdown oriented and responds
reasonably well when the last operable piece of equipment fails. When things
are going well, they do handle their own personnel and administrative head-
aches without burdening Agency resources.
Cons: Communications, data processing, and other activities directly
contribute to national security and must have reliable and responsive support.
GSA support to critical activities is the weak link of an otherwise strong chain.
Continuity of service is jeopardized for the entire building under the SLUC
system. Poor support reliability, especially in utility systems, is not compatible
with Agency requirements.
Recommendation: In those instances where the Agency determines the
level of services received are not commensurate with the amount for which
reimbursement has been provided, the Agency must be able to contract di-
rectly for an acceptable level of service using whatever source of funding is
appropriate, including adjustment to the ongoing SLUCfund.i6 g!Although it is
acknowledged that no alternative appears demonstratively superior to a com-
petent GSA, it is clear that GSA is deficient in areas vital to this Agency's
operational integrity. This Agency must be able to obtain those vital services for
which Agency funds are budgeted and/or which appear in the SLUC account.
Category: SLUC Housekeeping/Custodial
Background: Through an exchange of correspondence in 1959 between
the DCI and the Administrator of the GSA, it was agreed that GSA would per-
form services incident to the operation, maintenance, protection, and house-
keeping of the CIA Headquarters Building. Although GSA was invited to provide
housekeeping and related services, time has institutionalized the arrangement
and GSA now considers the Headquarters Building as a public building, and
therefore under GSA control.
Problem: Support provided by GSA to this Agency under the SLUC
arrangement has never measured up to Agency expectations, particularly in the
custodial area, although this has, no doubt, been due in part to the thankless
nature of the services provided. However, over the past several years, the qual-
ity of these services has deteriorated primarily due to the lowering of custodial
standards by GSA.
Pros: Although responsiveness suffers and difficulties arise due to the
inherent crossing of GSA/CIA organizational lines and perceived prerogatives,
GSA is convenient and is saddled with the complexities of hiring, motivating,
and controlling a blue collar work force.
Cons: GSA is not responsive. However, the task is onerous and we do not
think anyone could provide better service under the same constraints.
Recommendation: In those instances where the Agency determines the
level of services received are not commensurate with the amount for which
reimbursement has been provided, it must be able to contract directly for an
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acceptable level of service using whatever source of funding is appropriate,
including adjustment to the ongoing SLUG funding. Responsibility and control
remain with GSA. However, similar to the recommendation for the other areas
covered by SLUG (operation and maintenance), this Agency must be able to
obtain those services for which Agency funds are budgeted and/or which ap-
pear in the SLUG account.
Category: Supply and Procurement
Background: The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Part 101,
subchapter E, prescribes regulations, policies, procedures, and delegations of
authority pertaining to property management and the supply and procurement
F of goods and sThe Agency interfaces with GSA for the provisioning of
ervices. Services include: (a) b) acquisition and
roper y, c) transportation, and (d) motor vPhode.
It should be noted that the overlapping of Agency and GSA authorities
have never impacted on the Agency's abilities to meet mission requirements.
GSA has historically accepted the legitimacy of the Agency's procurement
authorities, and has recognized that GSA is but one of
several alternatives to obtain goods and services. Further, unlike construction,
operations, and maintenance activities which involve a physical GSA presence,
supply and procurement are of low profile and generally conducted without
GSA presence or awareness. However, should GSA become aggressive and
insist on participating in our procurement and supply endeavors, the Agency's
ability to provide responsive service would deteriorate and a problem would
exist.
In the area of ADPE acquisition, GSA has delegated its exclusive procure-
ment authority for ADPE and related services to the Agency to accommodate
its requirements and those of any activity under Agency operational and tech-
nical control. The delegation was formally granted to the DCI on 7 December
1973 by the Commissioner, Automated Data and Telecommunication Service,
GSA. It was amended in September 1978 to update the regulatory citations
which limit this authority of the Agency, and to include ADP management and
procurement on a Government-wide basis (i.e., all Federal agencies). They can
be found generally in FPR 1-4.11 and FPMR 101-35 and 36. In addition, the
delegation provides for an annual GSA review of ADPE procurement actions as
a means of assessing compliance with regulatory procedures.
The delegation from GSA for ADPE has proven to be advantageous to the
Agency for obvious reasons, not the least of which has been the effect of reduc-
ing the time required to conduct procurements by eliminating the GSA review
and approval process that would be required in advance of mailing an award.
GSA apparently has found this arrangement satisfactory, since they not only
extended the delegation in 1978, but also expanded it to include ADP services.
This type of delegation enables services to be more responsive, increases Gov-
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ernment efficiency, and provides checks and balances to minimize the potential
for abuse.
Problems: With the delegation for ADPE, the GSA/CIA supply and
procurement entities have generally been responsive to mission requirements.
It is noted that the system for property disposal is awkward from our point of
view, requiring storage of the material for extended periods of time, but as in
other areas where we have similar perceptions, like vehicle acquisitions, we
would only recommend GSA review its system to cut current time standards in
half.
Cons: Efficiencies could be improved by fine tuning the system.
Recommendations: Specific improvements to the existing GSA/CIA inter-
face follow:
1. Minimum Order Limitations (MOL)
We suggest that GSA permit procuring agencies to waive the MOL by
unilateral determinations when critical operational requirements or ex-
igencies prevail. This would eliminate the sometimes rather lengthy ap-
proval process when critical operational requirements exceed the MOL.
2. Mandatory Nature of Federal Supply Schedules (FSS)
We suggest that GSA allow procuring agencies to negotiate better
pricing based on "similar or identical items" rather than solely for
"identical items". This would enable agencies to take full advantage of
the on-the-spot conditions affecting price in the marketplace.
3. GSA-improved Management Controls
GSA recently imposed management controls on specific commodity
groups, e.g., furniture, paper, etc. We suggest that GSA permit agencies
to continue to procure these items to meet their specific minimum
requirements rather than attempt to "force fit" Government-wide stan-
dards on all agencies.
Category: Protective Services
Background: Protective services for Agency buildings in the Washington
area, including the Headquarters compound, are provided by the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) of GSA. Federal Protective Officers (FPO's) are as-
signed to Agency buildings from five separate FPS zones, one of which is totally
dedicated to the protection of the Headquarters compound,
buildings, and thel The working relationship e-
tween FPS and the Agency has been generally cooperative over the years. With
the formation of FPS in 1971, FPO's have not only provided physical protection
but have served as onsite police authority at our installations.
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A small portion of FPS coverage of the Headquarters compound and cer-
tain other Agency buildings is provided by GSA under the SLUC umbrella. This
minimum amount is determined by GSA in the context that Agency buildings
require only basic protection services similar to nonsensitive Government facili-
ties, e.g., the Department of Agriculture.
The sensitive nature of Agency facilities and operations dictates that this
basic SLUC coverage be dramatically augmented to meet our security require-
ments. This augmentation is accomplished with GSA cooperation but within the
limits of available FPS manpower on a reimbursable basis-sometimes at an
overtime rate. Reimbursement charges for FPS services in recent years have
been escalating; at the present time GSA's regular hourly rate of reimburse-
ment is $12.82 and the overtime rate is $19.23.
Problem: As in other areas, GSA/FPS appears to be overworked and
understaffed in providing protective services. In addition, the FPS seems philo-
sophically moving in the direction of becoming a police support organization,
while the vast majority of Agency protective requirements continue to be of the
guard service variety. Further, as noted in other GSA support activities, FPS
has been in a monopolistic position in serving our needs. This monopoly has
encumbered the responsiveness of FPS to serve our requirements. At least on
one occasion FPS has unilaterally decided to reduce protective coverage of
Agency installations without even advance notification. It has also inhibited our
ability to respond in an immediate fashion to emergency coverage require-
ments. In the past several months, FPS requested that the Agency immediately
implement a severe reduction in its protective coverage, simply because FPS
was unable to recruit a full complement against its own established billet
ceiling.
Our General Counsel has acknowledged the responsibility of FPS to pro-
vide protective coverage to GSA buildings. He has also advised that this FPS
responsibility does not inhibit nor encroach upon the Agency's own responsibil-
ity and authority to establish access controls for Agency installations and to use
alternative resources to FPS to implement these controls. Use of such alter-
natives would not include their exercise of police powers.
Recommendations: Our review of this function does not result in a rec-
ommendation for any change of the FPS. Rather, we believe CIA needs to
conduct a thorough, updated analysis of the protective service requirements of
its Washington area installations to seek a more cost-effective and responsive
method for satisfying our needs. Depending upon the results of this analysis, we
may exercise the option of providing protective services using methods and
resources in addition to, or other than, the FPS.
CONCLUSION
The delegations of the authorities identified in the matrix located in the
Executive Summary of this report will improve overall governmental efficiency,
greatly improve the responsiveness of support to the Agency's mission, and
decrease the potential for abuse in the provision of goods and services.
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Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP85-00988R000100090001-2