REPORT ON LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300210050-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: March 24, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN

LAOS
RADIO TV REPO TS.e 0 / IOC
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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Chronolog STATION WRC TV
NBC Network
DATE March 24, 1972 8:30 PM CITY Washington, DC
REPORT ON LAOS
GARRICK UTLEY: Most Americans may not realize it, but
as the United States tries to extricate itself from Vietnam,
there is a continuing and deepening problem in Laos. That tiny
kingdom's sovereignty, neutrality, and integrity, guaranteed
by 1962 Geneva Accord, are in shreds.
Today almost two-thirds' of Laos is under communist control.
Chinese engineers, protected by Chinese antiaircraft guns, are
building this important road which runs from China, through Laos,
to the Mekong River on the border. And North Vietnamese troops
hold large areas near the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And they are fighting
in division strength throughout the middle portion of Laos.
The United States is also deeply involved in Laos.
But until recently that involvement was shrouded in secrecy.
Apparently the United States did not want to be accused of violating
the Geneva Accord, which the communists ignored from the start.
To conceal this involvement the United States has funneled
money to the CIA through the AID -- the Agency for International
Development in Laos. Money designated for humanitarian purposes
really helps support a secret guerilla army. That was revealed
by Senator Edward Kennedy's committee on refugee problems earlier
this week.
The secret war is getting too big to hide. It has escalated
into a major conflict. And fighting on the American side is
one of the oddest collections of soldiers, secret agents, pilots,
and children that the war in Indochina has produced.
BOB ROGERS: (Film narration) This is one of America's
allies in Southeast Asia. This young man is eleven years old.
He carries an M-16 rifle. He tells me he's used it four times
already in combat against the North Vietnamese.
This year's biggest battle in Indochina is raging, not
in Vietnam, but here in the mountains of Laos. It pits North
Vietnamese Regulars against a secret irregular army, organized,
advised, supported, and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency.
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This is the famous Skyline Ridge, the keystone of the
defensive position at Long Tieng. We're getting mortar fire
in here right now from the North Vietnamese divisions which surround
this place, which is why everybody is staying so low. In the
past few minutes we've had mortar rounds land within fifteen
yards from here.
(Sounds of battle)
ROGERS: Though many of its recruits are under sixteen,
the secret army has been the toughest force opposing the communists
in Laos. Now the North Vietnamese are making an all out effort
to destroy it. This week there is still heavy fighting around
Long Tieng.
The secret army now has men from various ethnic groups.
But it began among the Meo hill tribes. The Meo, or Mung, as
they call themselves, are fiercely independent people who thrive
in the rugged highlands. Today most are refugees, clinging to
those patches of the mountain still under government control.
Despite ten years of defeat and suffering, most have remained
staunch allies of America. Today with other hill tribes they
are still the backbone of the secret army, and make it the closest
thing to a people's army on the government side.
They have paid dearly for their commitment. Their camps
are built of the debris of war. They move constantly, shifting
locations as the war sweeps back and forth across their mountains.
At each new spot they dig in to await the next attack. Where
there is time between moves they still plant their opium poppy.
For centuries opium was their only cash crop. But the
war has reduced the crop to the point where the Mung smoke most
of it themselves.
This is Bum Long (?), forty-five miles from the North
Vietnamese border, and the only major secret army base left in
the far north. To get here means a long flight over enemy territory,
with the pilots dodging anti aircraft positions. The only link
with the Outside world is the airstrip. And it is frequently
closed by enemy shell fire.
There are six thousand people here. Only a few hundred
are soldiers advised by the CIA. The rest are women and children.
Bum Long is called The Fortress in the Sky. And it's
a fortress under siege. The people spend most of their time
repairing the damage from the last enemy attack, and digging
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deeper for the next one. The local Mung commander requires each
family to dig and maintain its own bunker.
Casualties have been high, including hundreds of civilians.
Manpower is so scarce that some positions are guarded only by
straw dummies. Because of its strategic location, the Mung and
their CIA advisors are determined to hold Bum Long as long as
possible. That may not be much longer.
Each year the enemy assaults become heavier. The defenses
are littered with the bones of North Vietnamese soldiers who
have died here. This week the secret army has been using these
positions to attack enemy supply routes. The object, to relieve
pressure on Long Tieng. If Long Tieng falls, Bum Long will almost
certainly be next.
For years this compound in the village of Long Tieng
was one of the most secret spots on earth. This was headquarters
for the CIA and the secret army in Laos. It was a little bit
of America, crammed with sophisticated electronic gear. Journalists
called it "Spook Heaven." This year Spook Heaven has become
part of the front line. The CIA has moved to a new location.
We talked to a CIA man assigned to the secret army.
The agency calls him a Case Officer. He's a civilian, but in
any other war he'd be called a military advisor.
Just what do you CIA men do up here?
AGENT: Well first of all, let me set the record straight.
We do not command any of the combat troops. Our primary role
is one of supporting the indigenous Lao forces in MR 2. That
support involves a number of things. Some of it is technical
advice, a great deal of it is training, it involves advice.
Our advice is one of keeping them informed on what is possible
with the resources that are available.
ROGERS: What are we trying to accomplish up here?
AGENT: Well the primary aim of the United States government
in Laos is to assist the people of Laos to have the kind of government
that they want to have. Our job is not one of telling them how
to run the war, of having the war become our war. Our task is
one of working with them, training them, advising them, letting
them make the decisions that they believe are in their national
interests. So far we have been able to conduct this with very,
very few Americans.
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ROGERS: The man who commands most of the secret army
is General Vang Pao. He is a Mung tribesman who worked closely
with the CIA in organizing the hill people. Today, along with
his secret army role, he also commands all Lao forces in the
most crucial military region.
We found him helping his soldiers repair shell holes
in the airstrip near his headquarters. He is definitely not
an armchair general. He's part warlord, part tribal father figure,
and the most effective military leader in Laos today.
When the war permits Vang Pao spends most of his time
with other tribal leaders. The Mung look to him for leadership
in politics as well as fighting. But in the tribal hierarchy
Vang Pao is not a dictator, but a sort of first among equals.
Decisions are reached only after the traditional long discussion
with other clan chiefs.
But Vang Pao's favorite spot is the front line. Some
of his American advisors complain that VP, as they call him,
spends too much time in the fox holes and not enough time plotting
grand strategy. But the fact is, the soldiers, especially the
Mung soldiers, fight best when VP is around. And despite his
advisors, Vang Pao is not about to change his style, even when
his arrival attracts enemy mortar fire.
Vang Pao likes nothing better than playing the role
of an Oriental George Patton, and personally directing counter
battery fire.
General, what have we got over in that position?
GENERAL VANG PAO: One-twenty mortar.
ROGERS: A one-twenty mortar?
GENERAL VANG PAO: That makes it interesting.
ROGERS: We're up on Skyline Ridge, which in terms of
the war in Laos, is likely to become a legend like Heartbreak
Ridge in Korea or Hamburger Hill in Vietnam. These holes we're
sitting in right now up until about forty-eight hours ago were
occupied by one of the best North Vietnamese regiments there
is. All these positions off to our front here are occupied by
the North Vietnamese.
The secret army was not designed to slug it out with
North Vietnamese divisions. Their performance at Long Tieng
has surprised most experts. But the fighting there is heavier
than ever. And no one knows how long they can keep it up.
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Casualties in this year's battles have been the heaviest
ever. They are evacuated in American furnished planes and helicopters.
Most of those who survive are treated in hospitals paid for and
run by the American Agency for International Development. The
dead are also flown out, wrapped in American body bags. The
lightly wounded can expect to be back in the front lines quickly.
They can also expect a visit from General Vang Pao, who tries
to make sure they get the best care available.
Frequently he is accompanied by an aide de camp with
a briefcase full of money. Vang Pao and his men receive their
money direct from the CIA, bypassing the corruption that plagues
the Lao regular army. By Lao standards they are very well paid.
Critics have suggested that the rice and money from America are
the secret army's main motivation.
MAN: No amount of money or rice or medical treatment
is going to get any young man to stand up and fight the North
Vietnamese and run the very high risk of being killed or maimed
for life. Because remember, these are irregulars. They're very
much like we had in the Revolutionary War in our own country.
They volunteered in, and they can volunteer out. The Mung attitude
is that this is his home. They're here and fighting because
this is their homeland. They lose this and there is no place
else for them to go.
ROGERS: But each year the Mung homeland shrinks. The
battles are bigger, the casualty lists longer. And there are
signs of weariness among the hill tribes.
Vang Pao spends a lot of time visiting the isolated
Mung settlements, trying to boost his people's morale. Except
for the small local garrison, there are usually few men present.
They are all away at the front. One of his unpleasant duties
is to inform wives and mothers that their loved ones are dead
or missing.
This week some units of the secret army refused to continue
the fight at Long Tieng. But they were not hill people. The
Mung are a tough and stoic race. And as long as Vang Pao is
willing to lead, they seem willing to follow.
To continue the fight the secret army has to look beyond
Laos for recruits. These soldiers are Thai volunteers, recruited
and trained in Thailand by the CIA, which also pays them. The
Lao, and particularly the hill tribes, have been bled white by
the war. They have simply run out of manpower. The result is
about eight thousand Thai volunteers presently fighting in Laos.
Some Senators claim this violates a Congressional ban on mercenaries
being hired to fight in Southeast Asia. Both the Lao and Thai
governments are very touchy on the subject. The volunteers have
taken heavy casualties in the recent fighting.
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Where are you from?
SOLDIER: I'm from Bangkok.
ROGERS: This is' a long way from Bangkok. How long
have you been here?
SOLDIER: One year.
ROGERS: You've been here one year.
SOLDIER: Yes.
ROGERS: Do you fight the North Vietnamese very much?
SOLDIER: Yes. I. work here one year, but I think it's
very long, same same ten years.
ROGERS: One year here seems like ten years. Do you
like it here.
SOLDIER: No, I don't like.
TRANSLATOR: The entire northeastern region of Thailand
has a population of about eighteen million Lao. Therefore, these
Lao -- that is, these Thai of Lao descent -- have a reson to
defend Laos as well. This is readily understandable. It is
not Thai regulars that we have now, but volunteers.
QUESTION: His Highness is satisfied that this does
not infringe on Laos' position in the world as a neutralist country?
'TRANSLATOR: This is no problem. They are volunteers
who come to fight, as was the case, as you know, in France'with
the Foreign Legion, which includes individuals from all nationalities.
So why not in our case.
ROGERS: Whatever the diplomatic nicities, the Thai
volunteers are absolutely necessary. Without them, the secret
army and Laos too would pr bably collapse. Even if that happened,
Vang Pao says the Mung will fight on.
TRANSLATOR: Even:if the North Vietnamese could take
over all our territory, we. will take to the jungle to carry on
the fight against them no matter how long it takes -- fifty or
even one hundred years. W0 will keep on fighting until the North
Vietnamese get out of our land.
ROGERS: These days Vang Pao seldom sees his home or
his children. He has been through crises before, but this year
the military situation is worse than ever. He's troubled for
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UTLEY: Given the mood of America, the CIA is hardly
a popular organization. But in assessing the role of the Agency
in Laos we should remember certain things. It was given the
job of organizing a secret army by the United States government.
We wanted to preserve the fiction of our adherence to the Geneva
Accords while preventing the North Vietnamese from overrunning
Laos. The CIA did the job with a minimum of American personnel,
money, and casualties. For eight years its ragtag irregulars
have fought off some of the best trained and equipped troops
in the world. The CIA performed its mission well. So well in
fact, that future American governments might be tempted to launch
the Agency on similar ventures elsewhere, perhaps as in Laos,
without the knowledge and consent of any of us.
There are other American civilians involved in the secret
war. In a moment we'll look at them.
UTLEY: The American effort to fight a secret war has
produced some strange situations. The Director for the Agency
for International Development has admitted that CIA men use AID
humanitarian health programs as a cover in Laos. There are also
reports that AID public health funds are being used to provide
medical care for CIA irregular soldiers and their dependents.
In some cases, CIA men even pose as AID workers.
In Laos itself most Americans refer to the CIA and its
people by the nickname "Brand X." And working for both AID and
Brand X is a most peculiar airline called Air America. Air America
is a private charter company which has been flying mysterious
missions in Asia for twenty years. Its planes parachuted supplies
to the besieged garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Today Laos is one
of its biggest operations.
Another major charter company in Laos is called Continental
Air Services. It's smaller than Air America, but does the same
job. Between them the companies share about thirty million dollars
in government contracts. Their pilots are civilians, their planes
are unarmed. But without them the secret war would be impossible.
ROGERS: For the civilian charter pilots the war begins
at dawn when the engines start turning at Dien Tsien (?) Airport.
Air America alone carries twelve million pounds of cargo and
nearly ten thousand people out of Dien Tsien each month. Their
destinations are diverse and often dangerous.
PILOT: Well now, on the unfriendly activity, which
is right off to the south, I don't see the same marks that were
on the previous chart. But there again it looks like perhaps
we've lost that unfriendly activity.
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ROGERS: There are very few milk runs left in Laos.
At pilot briefings the latest reports on enemy anti aircraft
positions are as important as the weather.
Pilots say the only thing worse than flying in Laos
is trying to land there. By local standards this dirt strip
set between mountains is a major airport. It is now the secret
army's headquarters in northern Laos. Big planes bring the cargo
in, and from here smaller Planes and helicopters haul it to a
hundred different sites in the surrounding mountains. These
days much of the cargo is ammunition, most of it parachuted to
what the pilots call friendlies.
The control tower is primitive, and there are no navigation
aids. Yet between daylight and dusk this strip handles nine
hundred takeoffs and landings each day.
Some of the planes end up like this. As one pilot said,
Air America is not exactly like flying for Pan American out of
JFK.
This was one of Air America's major operation centers
until the enemy overran it. The combination of danger, superb
flying, and exotic locale, plus a tradition of secrecy, has led
to some highly sensational reporting about Air America. Its
pilots have been called America's flying Foreign Legion, and
the Lord Jim's of Laos.
What is Air America?
MAN: Well, it's the same thing today that it always
has been. That is, a char-ter air carrier whose major customer
is the United States government. And it's nothing more or less
than that. The average age, by the way, is forty-three out here.
So that they're not a bunch of apple cheeked youngsters looking
for big thrills. Most of them have already had their thrills.
PILOT: Each week, it gets worse. As an example, we're
within fifteen minutes now of an area that last year was like
a rest center. This year, as you know, we've already had one
airplane shot down.
ROGERS: What's the worst thing about flying out here?
The mountains, the weather, or the bad guys?
PILOT: It's a combination of all three. We have three
distinct flying seasons -- it's either smokey, windy, or raining.
And any one of the three, combined with the enemy, creates a
situation that none of us like.
ROGERS: So you don't really have a happy season?
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ROGERS: How long do you plan to keep this up?
PILOT: Each year I say it's my last one. This is my
seventh year now.
ROGERS: (Words inaudible)
PILOT: No, not really. It's a big influence, of course.
I have two daughters to put through school yet, out of my six.
So even though I'm retired, I still have to work.
ROGERS: Do you like the guys you work with?
PILOT: They're a real bunch of pros. Every one of
MAN: We have an extreme sense of comradeship and a
sense of competition that I think is not excelled in any profession.
MAN: Let's say the US government put, let's say, five
hundred thousand troops into North Vietnam to accomplish the
same job that we're accomplishing here with a handful of, so
to speak, American professionals.
MAN: We have a commodity to sell, and we can't sell
it any place in the world except right here.
MAN: If you want to be mundane about it, take this
war away, or if we quit -- you talk about why we do it. If most
of us went back to the United States we would be a dirty old
man.
(Laughter)
MAN: It is a different operation, I think, than you'll
find any place in the world. But on the other hand, as far as
professional standards go, we do meet the requirements of any
major airline, regardless of where it is throughout the world.
MAN: It is becoming tougher. It hasn't reached the
point where we're giving up by any stretch of the imagination.
All of us are very talented. Very, very talented. And we can
avoid what they have given us so far. But it is becoming a little
more difficult for us to do.
MAN: We are really all -- most are highly experienced,
qualified people, and we've gone through this thing before and
it's a thrill.
MAN: It's a business. It is not a romantic, devil-
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we weren't there to carry them, they'd die. And about the time
you participated in some of these uplifts of seriously wounded
men you get the feeling that there's a reason for being here.
We move refugees by the thousands. And this again is a very
heart warming experience for a pilot and those of us on the ground
because if we didn't move them they'd be overrun and made prisoners
and made bearers by the opposition. And we carry rice, we carry
food to the people, medicail supplies.
ROGERS: Rice is dropped in eighty pound sacks. Nearly
one-quarter of this country's population are displaced persons.
Most have fled the communists. Some have fled our bombing of
the communists. A quarter of a million people are outright refugees,
existing on American handouts. Over a hundred thousand depend
on aerial deliveries for survival.
Supervising the relief program is a handful of American
AID men. They spend most of their time in remote locations like
this. It's a measure of the loyalty of the hill tribes that
in ten years of wandering unarmed through the communist infested
mountains not a single AID' man has been betrayed to the enemy.
(Men speaking in Lao)
ROGERS: They are not CIA agents. Their job is to help
refugees. But even this function is indirectly linked to the
war. If enough refugees flee the enemy, the communists may be
left trying to conduct a people's war without people.
The AID program also runs hospitals. This one treats
over forty thousand people. a year. Many of them are flown in
by Air America and Continental. This little girl was hit by
grenade fragments in a remote village. Few Americans object
to this sort of American involvement in Laos. But the General
Accounting Office reports that much of the AID money Congress
thought it was appropriating for civilian health care was being
used for medical support of the secret army. Until recently,
at least, even deceiving the United States Congress was considered
a legitimate tactic of the secret war.
The latest North 'Vietnamese offensive has already created
fifty thousand new refugees. Most of them are Mung tribesmen.
And for most of them this is the third time they've been uprooted.
At their last location AID. had provided them with homes, schools,
and a dispensary. Now they are back to square one, huddled on
a bleak hilltop, shelteredby parachutes and scrap lumber. They
are both tired of the war and nervous about a peace settlement
that would abandon them.
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In the meantime they depend on the charter planes for
everything. And for the pilots of those planes, landing strips
like this are becoming riskier every day.
Has this increase in enemy activity and the loss of
real estate, has this effected the morale of the pilots?
MAN: No, I think it's probably made them more cautious.
It can ruin your whole day if you land at somebody else's airstrip,
or one that you think is friendly and you find out it isn't the
hard way.
ROGERS: That very thing recently happened to one Air
America pilot. His wrecked aircraft still sits like a squashed
bug on the enemy held airstrip.
PILOT: People on the airplane talked to people on the
ground, and they said everything was secure so I landed. The
fellow I had with me is known to me as Swamp Rat, and suggested
that I shut the engines down. So I turned the engine off. And
this was one of the first mistakes I made that day. The minute
that the prop stopped turning they started shooting at us. The
first ones put holes in the machine, and the Swamp Rat was already
outside the airplane, and he hollered at me, let's go. And this
didn't take a lot of encouragement since the airplane was done --
unwound. I leaped out of it too, and I still was laboring under
the illusion that when it's all over I'm going to get back into
my machine and fly out of there. This is what aviators do.
They don't walk off. They fly.
ROGERS: Two days after losing his plane, and nearly
losing his life, Jim Russell was flying again.
The first battle of Long Tieng was reaching its climax,
and only the performance of the charter planes enabled the secret
army to turn almost certain defeat into at least a temporary
standoff.
Only helicopters could land to pluck out the seriously
wounded. North Vietnamese artillery was shelling the airstrip.
Enemy snipers were firing up at the planes. Enemy machineguns
on the hills were firing down at the planes. But the friendlies
were out of water and ammunition. So the planes went in anyway.
They shared the narrow airspace with fighter bombers, trying
to bomb the enemy off the ridge line. To the charter pilots
it was just another mission.
MAN: It goes in spurts. Last February, for example,
when we didn't have so much anti aircraft, we had twenty-seven
airplanes hit in one month.
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ROGDRS: Twenty-seven airplanes hit in one month?
MAN: Yes. This December, when the flak was more intense,
we had twenty-four airplanes hit. However, the hits can be more
serious because you're dealing with a larger caliber of weapon.
PILOT: But that is part of the challenge that is part
of why we are here. And it's not a death wish by any stretch
of the imagination. It is a little competition with the other
side. And try to survive. And use my talents against their
talents, and usually it wins.
ROGERS: The favorite watering spot for the odd ball
warriors of this odd ball war is the Purple Porpoise Bar. The
clientele includes spooks, military attaches, pilots, and diplomats.
The pub keeper is a misplaced Englishman who calls himself
Monty Banks. He gives away nearly as much booze as he sells.
And to make sure his clients can discuss their clandestine business
in private, he frequently places. his saloon off limits to journalists.
(Sound of singing)
MONTY BANKS: The Americans that are in this town are
the best Americans I've yet met. The people that walk into my
bar -- the Americans -- collectively are human beings who love
humanity.
UTLEY: Dare devil pilots dropping American rice and
ammunition are one aspect of the war in Laos. Warplanes dropping
American bombs are another and even more controversial issue.
We'll look at that side of the war in a moment.
UTLEY: One of the tragic ironies of the war in Laos
is that in this age of ideologies this war is probably less a
question of ideology than of simple geography. The strength
of the local communist Pathet Lao has actually decreased in recent
years. But North Vietnamese regiments and cadres have more than
made up the difference.
We too have escalated our efforts. Laos was once described
as a warm green paradise Where all a man needed to live was a
small knife to peel bananas and a large knife to kill pigs.
But today the knives have been replaced by tanks and heavy artillery
on the enemy's side, and bombs and napalm on our side.
ROGERS: Legend has it that whenever the city of Vientiane
was threatened by invaders the monks of this temple would pray
and beat the sacred drum to summon forth a dragon which protected
the city. Today the very existence of Laos is threatened. But
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Even in the best of times Laos was a fragile country.
The only unifying force is allegiance to the king. Even the
communists pay lip service to the throne. But that doesn't keep
them from shelling the Royal Capitol. After nearly one billion
dollars in American military assistance, the Lao regular army
still leaves a lot to be desired. It does not fight well, but
it has been fighting a long time.
Over one-third of these military academy cadets are
children of men killed in action.
For the most part the children of the rich and powerful
don't have to worry about the army. They don't seem to worry
much about the war either. Millions of dollars in American aid
have helped make Vientiane a swinging town. Usually only those
without money or political connections end up in the army. They
are poorly paid and usually poorly led. They have little motivation.
Many units have become experts at avoiding confrontation with
the enemy.
The main military factor in staving off the collapse
of what is left of Laos is a massive bombing campaign. It involves
Navy and Air Force jets, including B-52's, as well as the US
supported Royal Lao Air Force. Most of the strikes in Laos are
directed by American Air Force officers called Fac's, or forward
air controllers. Accompanied by a Laotian observer they cruise
over enemy territory in a light plane, armed only with smoke
rockets. Their task is to locate and mark the target for the
bombers. It's probably the most dangerous job in Laos.
No one in Washington or Vientiane will say just how
many bombs are being dropped, or exactly where. But the Fac's
say civilian targets are avoided.
MAN: We're reasonably sure that a hundred percent of
them are military targets. We have a system of assurances.
We carry a Laotian to talk to Laotians that don't speak English.
And they verify our targets. There are certain places that are
just obviously unfriendly. And any of the targets, trucks, boats,
supplies that we find are military targets. And such targets
where civilians may live, like villages or hootches somewhere,
we stay strictly away from these.
ROGERS: Well the North Vietnamese dre pretty smart
people. Knowing you're trying to avoid civilian targets, they
concentrate their supply efforts in a civilian type area. What
happens then?
MAN: Of course, they've got that one system, and they've
used it all the time. They put supplies in villages and we can't
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hit. And of course, the Laotians fly the Laotian airplanes,
and there are occasions where if they deem the target is important
enough then Laotians -- strictly Laotians with no American involvement
whatsoever -- hit targets that they consider to be of vital importance.
ROGERS: The Royal Lao Air Force is an American created
byproduct of the secret war. It's trained, equipped, and advised
by Americans. And in a country where fighting spirit is hard
to find, the Air Force has become an elite force. The pride
of the Air Force are these fighter bomber pilots.
Actually, their fighter bombers are T-28's, originally
built as trainers during the Korean War. But they are rugged,
easy to maintain, and carry a surprisingly large load of bombs,
rockets, and napalm.
With forty T-28's, the Lao Air Force flies up to four
thousand missions a month. The pilots quickly become veterans.
They are paid about fifty-five dollars a month, plus a bonus
of one dollar and sixty cents per combat mission. But any standards
their losses have been heavy. The sons of two Laotian Cabinet
ministers are among the pilots who have been killed.
This year's enemy offensives have put new strains on
the Air Force. There are more missions and more enemy anti aircraft
guns. For the pilots we flew with recently, it was the fifth
mission of the day. Except for a short lunch break, they had
already-spent seven hours in their cockpits.
There were five strike planes on the mission, all of
them loaded with a complete assortment of lethal ordnance. I
flew in the back seat of a strike plane. NBC News cameraman
Charles Feckity (?) flew in the American piloted Fac plane which
was pinpointing the target's for the strike.
We've just got the targets marked here, and now we're
going to try to go in and clobber it.
The target was a Laotian Army outpost that had been
overrun the night before.
We've just completed our first pass. We're going around
again now.
After a day's flying there is happy hour -- often a
mixture of American whiskey and Lao dancing. One pilot told
me the whiskey helps him fbrget the twelve point seven -- he
was referring to the twelve point seven heavy machine guns which
are one of the communists' favorite and most deadly anti aircraft
weapons.
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PILOT: That thought always exists in the back of your
mind. Now you never know, of course, when somebody is going
to pull in a twelve seven. Whenever I go into a new area I'm
always careful to at least stay above the effective range of
a twelve seven. And then today it was particularly true because
I had no idea what to expect. Because the friendlies had reported
trucks moving into the area, and they could have been bringing
in anything. So I started out in the area fairly high. But
they don't have a tendency to shoot at Fac's so much unless they're
reasonably sure that they can get them. Once they give away
their position then we call in too many air strikes on them.
So they generally stay away until they are sure they can either
get a Fac or else they can get the strike aircraft.
ROGERS: The forward air controllers have become a special
breed. Their uniform usually consists of blue jeans, camouflage
survival vests, and a colt revolver. They are mostly Captains
and Lieutenants in their early twenties. They are proud of their
work. This one, George Towsley (?), graduated from the Air Force
Academy in 1969. Before that he was an Eagle Scout.
How long do you normally stay out on one of these missions.
GEORGE TOWSLEY: We can go for about three hours with
the fuel we have. And we can stretch it to three point five
missions. Four hours is about the very most this airplane can
go. And that leaves us no reserve. So it's about three point
five.
ROGERS: Will you be relieved by somebody else then?
TOWSLEY: No, I'm taking off now and I'll go to about
five o'clock and then I start going back home.
ROGERS: Good luck.
TOWSLEY: Thank you very much.
ROGERS: Six weeks ago George Towsley's luck ran out.
He was killed over Laos. No one knows how many Americans have
died there. That part of the secret war is still secret.
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