NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 12, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Friday August 12, 1977
CG NIDC 77-187C
0 0
25 0
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 0
CIA-RDP79TO0975AO30300'YbV%*ecret
(Security Classification)
dhommon
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
(Security MMWA'Mnl
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday. August 12, 1977
in orming
senior o icials.
CONTENTS
PHILIPPINES: Cease-Fire Holding
ETHIOPIA-SOMALI: Situation Report
SUDAN: National Reconciliation
GUINEA: Toure on TU-95s
WEST GERMANY: New Combat Aircraft
PHILIPPINES: Base Negotiations
CHINA: Party Congress
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PHILIPPINES: Cease-Fire Holding
.The eight-month cease-fire between Philippine
MusZ-Lm rebels and government forces in the southern part of
the country continues to hold with few exceptions. Resentment
among the Muslim population could once again erupt into vio-
lence, however, especially if the government's economic develop-
ment programs for the area are not improved.
I I In recent conversations with visiting US embassy of-
ficials, Philippine army commanders in the area took a generally
pessimistic line. Almost unanimously, they referred to the
cease-fire as a period of preparation during which the Muslim
forces were "resting, recruiting, and consolidating their base
area."
I Even allowing for some exaggeration by the army offi-
cers, i is clear from available evidence that the rebels are
capable of resuming guerrilla warfare and defending their
secure bases against, government incursions.
I IMore important, no meaningful dialogue has been es-
a is a between the two sides, and mutual suspicion and dis-
like persists between local Muslims and Christian troops from
outside the area. Except for those provinces where the Christian
population has a majority, there is little understanding or re-
spect between Philippine troops and the local population, de-
spite the government's tentative rehabilitation programs.
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The senior Philippine military commander in an area
that saw intense fighting during the height of the insurgency
described the Muslim political organization in his area as
"determined and disciplined," engaged in the recruitment and
training of new personnel, and, in effect, functioning as the
local government.
I In an effort to convince the Muslim population of the
governor nt's concern, President Marcos has embarked on a fairly
ambitious economic development program. However, the effort--
aimed at providing housing and public works for the four south-
ern provinces--is spotty and in many instances ill-considered
and impractical. Of more significance, the government's effort,
addresses only a portion of the long-standing Muslim grievances.
Land rights, employment opportunities, and the preservation of
Muslim culture appear to receive little emphasis in the govern-
ment's program.
Representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front--
the Muslim political organization--have also made it clear that
they have no intention of participating in the "provisional"
government proposed by Marcos some months ago. They are con-
tinuing their demands for greater autonomy.
Further negotiating efforts between the government
and the Muslum front do not seem likely at present. The govern-
ment does not seem to be under any immediate pressure from the
four-nation Arab team which has attempted to mediate the dispute.
ETHIOPIA-SOMALI: Situation Report
//The Somalis have succeeded beyond our, and very
likely their own, expectations in forcing the Ethiopian military
forces and civil authorities to withdraw from virtually all the
military and administrative centers in the lowland Ogaden area,
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expect for Jijiga. They are starting now to invest and if pos-
sible seize Jijiga and the other major Ethiopian centers in
the north, Dire Dawa and Harar. The Somalis say they hope to
accomplish this within the month.//
//We believe that the Somalis intend to continue
fighting until they are satisfied that they can withstand a
serious counteroffensive in this region and that they have
gained the main political symbols of a Somali Ogaden. The cap-
ture of Jijiga and the neutralization or capture of the large
population centers of Dire Dawa and Harar would satisfy So-
malia's need for territorial successes. The Ethiopians would
find it extremely difficult to launch a ground counteroffensive
against the Somalis without these bases.//
//The loss or neutralization of the airfield at
Dire awa would also make unlikely a successful airstrike
against Somalia by Ethiopia unless the Ethiopians acquire more
modern longer range aircraft than they now have, although So-
mali forces in the Ogaden could still be reached by Ethiopian
air strikes.//
//Operations against Jijiga, and particularly
against ire Dawa and Harar, will not be as easy, however, as
those against more outlying garrisons have been. Dire Dawa is
less exposed than Jijiga, but is vulnerable to attack by So-
mali armored forces. Harar, on the other hand, lies in the hills
in broken terrain, which provides good cover for guerrilla sab-
otage and interdiction operations but is poor tank country.//
//We do not have precise evidence, but we believe
the Soma 7i, think their logistic situation is still superior
to that of the Ethiopians, and that they therefore can carry
forward the operations they are contemplating. From what we
have seen of the Ethiopian performance, we believe that the
Ethiopians' morale, logistic, and command problems are so se-
vere that they will not be able to use the three remaining ma-
jor centers in the Ogaden as bases for a serious counterattack,
and that they could well lose all three. We also believe that
a major Ethiopian counteroffensive to retake the Ogaden is not
likely before the end of the year.//
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//The general Somali objective is to establish in
the Ogaden a Somali-dominated administration that will, prob-
ably by the end of the year, "request" that it become part of
a larger Somali nation. We would expect the Somalis to estab-
lish outposts only a fairly short distance up into the high-
lands in the northern Ogaden region because their ethnic sup-
port thins out as the altitude rises.//
//Guerrilla forces that include a large number of
non- oma.i people, especially the southern Galla, are attempt-
ing to gain control of parts of Bale and Sidamo provinces that
are not part of the Ogaden. Somalia may be planning to use this
territory as a bargaining chip should Ethiopia attempt to mount
a counterattack in the Ogaden.//
//We believe that the Somalis can defend such an
area, stretching from Aysha to Moyale, for at least several
months. Ultimately, however, if communist aid is effective in
rebuilding Ethiopia's military capacities, the Somalis' situa-
tion will become more vulnerable. Somalia's success thus far
has been made possible by the revolution in Ethiopia and the
disarray that has accompanied it.//
//The Ethiopian strategy is to buy time, looking
to a future when the country's superior resources and manpower
reserves can be brought to bear. Diplomatic, technical, and
material assistance are required to support this strategy, and
the recent Ethiopian approaches to the US are indicative of a
sense that all possibilities must be canvassed.//
//We doubt that Ethiopia will show any interest
in a negotiated solution. Under present circumstances, this
would mean admitting defeat or at least the legitimacy of So-
mali claims. For Somalia, there is no point to negotiation
that involves compromise: the Somalis are in possession of the
territory and are enforcing long-held claims.//
/Soviet policy toward Ethiopia and Somalia de-
pends primarily on the need of both for Soviet military supply
and resupply. The Soviets apparently calculate that no Western
power will be prepared to underwrite Somali efforts to seize
the Ogaden and that as long as they remain willing to arm both
sides in the conflict, they will be unlikely to lose signifi-
cantly in either country regardless of the outcome.//
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//Over the long term, the Soviets may favor the
kind of vision that Cuban President Castro conjured up before
the Somali and Ethiopian leaders last spring: a socialist con-
federation that would be the central power in northeast Africa
and would project its influence into southwestern Arabia and
into the Indian Ocean. Neither the Soviets nor the Africans
concerned, however, consider this to be a near-term possibil-
ity.//
//The Soviets are now worried that Ethiopia's set-
acks in t e Ogaden, coupled with difficulties in Eritrea, may
be sufficient to topple Chairman Mengistu and thus endanger
the "socialist cour::s>e" of the Ethiopian revolution. The USSR
is exerting consider:-able diplomatic pressure on Somalia to stop
fighting and start talking. The Soviets, however, are unwilling
to exert the kind of pressure on Somalia that might force it
to the negotiating table against its wishes.//
I //We believe that the Soviets will continue to de-
liver military supplies they have agreed to send to Somalia,
but they may stand back from new commitments. We think they
will also fulfill the commitments they have made to Ethiopia.
The Soviets realize that Ethiopia doubtless will seek to retake
the Ogaden as soon as it is militarily capable, but they may
hope that in the interim they will be able to effect an accept-
able compromise between the two sides.//
//Our best estimate is that over the next year
both Ethiopia and Somalia will modify their relations with the
Soviets because of their disappointment and suspicion of Mos-
cow. In this situation, the US and other Western countries--and
in the case of the Somalis, some of the Arab states--will. find
opportunities to play larger roles than they now do. We do not
believe, however, that either Ethiopia or Somalia will break
with the Soviets.//
/We also doubt any early move by the Somalis to
oust the Soviets from their facilities at Berbera, although we
would expect some gradual constriction on the freedom with which
the Soviets make use of the facilities. President Siad is, we
think, too good a poker player and his skepticism of US atti-
tudes too strong to throw away this card.//
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I //On the Ethiopian side, we would expect greater
interest in US and other Western economic and technical assis-
tance as a balance to the Soviet - East European - Cuban pres-
ence, but barring a real change of regime the Ethiopians will
continue to look primarily to the East for help. At this stage,
disillusion with the Soviets is more likely to make the Ethio-
pians-look elsewhere among the communist countries than to the
West.
SUDAN: National Reconciliation
Sudanese President Numayi~i's reconciliation effort
with conservative opposition groups is gaining wider support
at home and abroad. In a Letter published in Khartoum on Tues-
day Husayn at-Hindi, a prominent opposition leader in exile who
previously was reported to have rejected Numayri's overtures,
expressed his support of the terms of reconciliation worked out
between the Sudanese President and Sadiq al-Mahdi, exiled leader
of Ansar dissidents.
Husayn may be more cautious than Sadiq in accepting
Numayri's offer of amnesty provided for in a government decree
publicized earlier this week. Under the terms of the decree, he
would have to return to Sudan to be eligible for amnesty.
According to a source of the US embassy in Khartoum,
Husayn indicated in an unpublished portion of his letter that
he would be unable to return soon because of "health reasons."
He also appealed to Numayri to improve relations with Libyan
President Qadhafi, a highly unlikely development given Libya's
continuing interest in undermining the Khartoum government.
I INumayri's primary objective in his continuing recon-
ci is ion program is to neutralize Libyan and Ethiopian efforts
to use exiled Sudanese dissidents to overthrow him. If Husayn
does not agree to come home, Numayri will probably seek to iso-
late him by winning over Sadiq's considerably larger Ansar fol-
lowing.
I The Numayri government has begun a concerted effort
to elicit- broad support for the reconciliation effort. Prime
Minister Bakr is delivering speeches strongly supporting recon-
ciliation in traditional Ansar areas of the country. Party leader
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Abul Gassem, who as a military officer directed the effort that
crushed Ansar resistance in 1970 and probably argued against a
general amnesty, is now likely publicly to affirm his support.
I I In another public relations move designed to stress
national unity, Numayri has appointed a special law commission,
presumably to give greater emphasis to traditional Islamic law,
made up of members of the conservative Khatmiyya and Ansar
sects--traditional rivals--and the Muslim RrnfhPrhnn(9_
//Guinean President Toure reiterated to the
charge We nes ay that the two Soviet TU-95 naval reconnais-
sance aircraft that Landed at Conakry Last weekend did so
through an administrative error. Toure also confirmed directly
to the charge that his decision of Last June to stop all TU-95
Landings still stands.//
//Toure said that the functionary who approved
the landings, without his permission has been suspended and that
the old directives governing TU-95 operations have been can-
celed. Toure asserted that he has given the Soviets four days
to repair and remove the remaining TU-95 that malfunctioned
Toure went on to suggest that the incident may
have been a Soviet effort to test his decision to bar TU?-95s--
in his words, a "plot to spoil US-Guinean relations, and Guinea
had to remain ever vigilant in this respect."//
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WEST GERMANY: New Combat Aircraft
//West Germany will soon begin research and devel-
i
opment on a new combat aircraft for the 1990s, possibly in coZ-
laboration with other West European countries. If carried for-
ward, the project would eventually give the struggling West
German aerospace industry a much-needed boost. The West Germans
hope to have a prototype of the aircraft ready for testing by
the early 1980s.//
I //The new aircraft are intended to replace West
Germany's current force of some 250 F-4 fighter-bombers and
reconnaissance aircraft. No decision on design has yet been
reached, but the air force would like a highly maneuverable,
lightweight aircraft that would excel as an air superiority
fighter and complement the Tornado, a deep strike aircraft.//
I//The project will be attractive to the West Ger-
man aerospace industry, which has been forced to reduce its
work force and shorten plant working hours in recent years. A
major new aircraft. production contract would spur modernization
efforts and keep design teams together.//
//The West German firm of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-
o m mos kely will take the lead in the project. The com-
pany reportedly may begin designing the aircraft and selecting
equipment before the end of the year.//
/West Germany prefers production of major weapons
systems by multinational consortia and probably hopes to develop
the new aircraft with a European or even a US partner. The ap-
parent success of a consortium of West German, Italian, and
British firms in producing the Tornado may encourage one or more
European countries to participate in a new joint venture.//
//The UK, which will need to begin replacing its
Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft in the 1980s, has been mentioned
as a likely partner. British firms lead
Western Europe in engine technology and would complement the
West German firm's strength in airframe design and production.
Moreover, the British aerospace industry needs new contracts
and is a strong proponent of coproduction projects.//
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//The UK would prefer a ground-attack aircraft,
and a UK - West German partnership might be obstructed by dis-
agreements over the aircraft's design. The economic need: of
both countries, however. could help to promote a compromise.
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PHILIPPINES: Base Negotiations
I I The Philippine government has strongly hinted that
2 in en s o raise the issue of US military bases during the
talks in Manila early next month between the US and the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations.
A lead editorial this week in one of the government's
chief press outlets charged that the past few decades of US-
Philippine relations have exposed the "inequalities and lop-
sidedness" of agreements between the two countries.
Asserting that it is the "clear intent" of the US
government to retain the bases, the editorial concluded that
"more equitable" agreements need to be forged in order to cor-
rect the imbalance of the relationship.
I President Marcos has been generally silent on the US
bases con roversy, broaching the subject in low-key fashion
most recently during a foreign correspondents' reception in
early June. At that time, he said Manila still insists that the
US bases be put on a rental basis.
I //Negotiations on the bases issue broke down last
year during talks between then Secretary Kissinger and Foreign
Secretary Romulo. Although there are a number of unresolved
points at issue--involving the recognition of Philippine sover-
eignty and operational authority in the base areas--the talks
foundered essentially over the amount and nature of payment for
continued tenure.//
The US bases question is an extremely sensitive one
for the Philippines, and President Marcos has enjoyed broad
public support throughout the negotiations with US representa-
tives.
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I I Marcos has not recently tried to press the issue,
largely because he J_s aware that well-documented accounts of
Philippine violations of human rights have adversely affected
the Philippine reputation in the US.
I lAlthough he has attempted to improve the record on
the Hunan rights issue, Marcos realizes that he will. run into
formidable opposition in the US if he presses his original de-
mands--particularly those dealing with the amount and form of
compensation.
During the ASEAN talks, Marcos probably will go no
further than to sound out US representatives on the resumption
of negotiations. Marcos has privately argued for a pragmatic
resolution of irritants peripheral to the base issue--such as
body searches of Filipino employees and the use of guard doas
against scavengers.
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China: Party Congress
I I China's 11th party congress has opened, according to
a Ch2nese official in Peking who spoke yesterday to a member of
UN Secretary General WaZdheim's delegation. The Chinese usually
do not announce major party meetings until they are concluded.
25X1 I I The congress will elect a new central committee, which
in urn will elect a new politburo. The current central committee
and politburo, which were elected in August 1973, have been de-
pleted by the deaths of senior members and the purge last October
of its leading leftist members.
The congress is likely to be a short and pro forma af-
fair. Major issues relating to the selection of the new politburo
and central committee, principally the return to power of Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-piing, were worked out at party meetings in
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March and July. The new central committee may also consider the
question of whether Teng will replace chairman Hua Kuo-feng as 25X1
premier. A decision, however, almost certainly will not be an-
nounced un ' the National People's Congress, scheduled for later
this year.
I //The Swedish government, under pressure from fish-
ermen an ?- e opposition Social Democrats, has unilaterally ex-
tended its fishing zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles. The new
limit, effective January 1, 1978, will give Sweden claim to 45
percent of the Baltic fishing area, compared with its current
10 percent.//
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/A strong response can be expected from the USSR,
which as negotiated for a median line between the Swedish and
Soviet mainlands. The new limit gives Sweden a claim to a 10,000-
square-mile area it would not have had under a Soviet boundary
proposal. The Finnish foreign minister, in a move clearly aimed
at placating the Soviets, called the move "politically deplor-
able" and asserted that cooperation among the Baltic
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