TANZANIA TAKING THE LEFT TURN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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TANZANIA TAKING THE
LEFT TURN
OCI No. 0290/65A
Copy No. 5 6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT I N T E L L, I G I N T E L L I G E N C E
GROUP I Excluded from outdmatic
downgrading cind declossificotior
21 May 1965
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21 May 1965
The United Republic of Tanzania under Presi-
dent Julius Nyerere has been drifting slowly but
steadily leftward. Today, it has moved into the
vanguard of Africa's radical states and offers the
Chinese Communists an unusually promising oppor-
tunity to penetrate the continent. This process
has been under way at varying speeds since.Tangan-
yika became independent in December 1961, but has
been accelerated by Nyerere's determination to lead
the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa
and by Tanganyika's union with Zanzibar last year.
Far from coming under moderate Tanganyikan control,
Zanzibar has continued to be a center from which
radical, pro-Communist influences radiate.
Nyerere is Western educated
and, at least initially, was
biased in favor of Western po-
litical principles and proce-
dures, but he has tailored these
drastically to fit what he views
as the exigencies of Tanzania.
He is a weak executive, and
since he has surrounded himself
with radical lieutenants, it
has become difficult to tell
whether or when vital decisions
of policy are his own.
Some observers contend
that Nyerere's hand is being
forced at every turn. The cur-
rent situation in Tanzania, how-
ever, seems to be largely of his
own making; in any event there
is little evidence to suggest
that he has tried seriously to
reverse the trend. In his un-
compromising pursuit of African
freedom and nonalignment he ap-
pears determined to keep his
country on its present course,
even though this parallels rad-
ical African and Communist ob-
jectives and is likely to lead
to a further erosion of the West-
ern position.
On the question of African
liberation Nyerere is a fanatic.
Beneath a charming personality
which disarms many Westerners,
he is a man of strong conviction,
prepared to pay almost any price
to achieve a united Africa ruled
by black Africans. Independence
came easily and peacefully to
Tanganyika, but had Britain not
been prepared to accelerate the
hand-over of power, Nyerere would
have done nothing to prevent the
use of violence by his more ex-
treme colleagues. Hypersensi-
tive to any suggestion of out-
side interference, Nyerere has
not hesitated to expel US dip-
lomats and reject West German
aid regardless of the consequences.
In southern Africa, as with
his own country, Nyerere would
prefer to employ peaceful proce-
dures. The political solutions
he occasionally proposes to West-
ern leaders for the dismissal of
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%Ppanda
D
Tabora
MAL A.W,
MOZAMBIQUE
(PORT.)
Congolese Premier Tshombd or
for the termination of Portu-
guese rule in Africa may seem
naive and idealistic, but they
are none the less sincere.
Until a year ago Tanganyi-
kan support for the various lib-
eration movements was largely
political. A few training camps
for Mozambique rebels had been
established on Tanganyikan soil
and a shipload of miscellaneous
small arms had been accepted
from Algeria, but this was a
minimum gesture of African na-
tionalist pressure. Political
action to marshal "world opin-
ion" has not moved the Portu-
guese or the South Africans,
however, and Nyerere's irrita-
tion clearly has mounted.
Action Abroad
Personally frustrated, and
pressured by militant radicals
at home and abroad, Nyerere has
turned to more activist methods.
Today his regime is involved in
training and arming dissident
exiles from the Congo, Mozambique,
Malawi, South Africa, and Rhodesia.
Strategically, Nyerere's
chief enemy is South Africa,
whose apartheid is anathema to
him, with Mozambique as a target
en route. Ever since Tshombd's
rise to power in Leopoldville
last July, however, Nyerere's
main tactical effort appears to
have been directed against the
Congo. Tshombd's use of South
African mercenaries to kill black
Africans is considered by Nyerere
to be treason to the pan-African
cause. By the same token, Prime
Minister Banda of Malawi has be-
come a target of Tanzania's rad-
ical nationalists because of his
friendship with the Portuguese
and his refusal to allow Malawi
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to be used as a sanctuary for
raids against Mozambique.
As Tanzania has increased
military support for the various
rebel groups, Tanzanian fears
of Portuguese or Congolese re-
taliation have risen. The Con-
golese incursions into Uganda
and the Sudan, recent implied
threats by Tshombd, and even
the US strikes into North Viet-
nam have brought this fear to
almost pathological proportions.
The Portuguese foreign minis-
ter's public reference, most re-
cently in mid-May, to the pos-
sibility of bombing Tanzanian
bases has fed the Tanzanians'
neurosis.
Communist Arms Influx
This situation has offered
the Communist nations an extra-
ordinary opportunity to peddle
military hardware, and Dar es
Salaam has received over 2,500
tons of arms from China and the
USSR during the past year.
Tight security precautions have
made it difficult to determine
the precise disposition of these
arms. Many have transited Tan-
zania to the eastern Congo, and
some have gone to the various
liberation training camps, par-
ticularly the Kigoma camp on
Lake Tanganyika, where some
3,000-4,000 Congolese are in
training. The Tanzanians are
known to have offered Chinese
arms to the Malawi dissidents.
A large part of these ship-
ments including armored person-
nel carriers, artillery, anti-
tank and antiaircraft guns, mor-
tars, trucks, and a variety of
small arms, has probably been
used in the extensive build-up
of Tanzanian forces. This build-
up is taking a large and growing
percentage of the country's budg-
et and is contributing to its
deteriorating financial condi-
tion, even though most of the
Chinese arms are believed to
have been a gift. The Tanzanian
People's Defense Force, which is
to be at least five battalions
strong, now has one Chinese-
equipped, one Soviet-equipped,
and the original two British-
equipped battalions. It seems
likely that the Tanzanians will
gradually adopt Communist weap-
ons for all their armed forces.
Until recently there were
about 50 Soviet and 27 Chinese
military advisers in Tanzania,
including those on Zanzibar.
The eight Soviet officers on the
mainland were sent home on 17
May, ostensibly because they had
completed their duties and Tan-
zania considered multiple train-
ing missions undesirable. The
Chinese advisers have finished
training the Chinese-equipped
battalion and are reported to
be giving a short course in
light weapons to a 600-man re-
serve group from the Mozambique
border area. They had earlier
trained two similar groups which
now are part of the new 10,000-
man Volunteer Reserve Force.
The Chinese are also expected
to participate in military train-
ing for the police force, prison
services, and National Youth
Service, all of which would be
mobilized during a national
emergency.
Nyerere probably would like
to have some Western presence to
balance the Communist influx.
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A US proposal last year to send
a substantial number of instruc-
tors to train a paramilitary
police force has been side-
tracked, however, and there is
some question how much longer
the Israeli police advisers will
be welcome, as the police are
becoming increasingly involved
in training foreign freedom
fighters. A Canadian training
mission has established a mili-
tary academy and will probably
take on the air force program
abandoned by the West Germans.
Nyerere is still looking to
Britain and Canada for overseas
training of officer candidates,
but 37 naval cadets have gone
to Indonesia and about 75 train-
ees from various arms are in
Communist countries.
Tanzania and the Wider World
The cornerstone of Nyerere's
foreign policy in its broader
aspects has been nonalignment.
To him this means not only the
maintenance of good relations
with all powers, but also a par-
ity of aid and representation
from each power so that no one
country can achieve a dominant
position in Tanzania. In his
pre-independence writings,
Nyerere discussed Africa's role
in the cold war; he saw a need
for East and West to compete
there economically and to learn
to get along with each other
while working toward the same
goal of economic development.
Nyerere wanted no part of the
world's political quarrels, but
in his quest for economic aid he
has had to contend not only with
the East-West conflict and the
Sino-Soviet split, but with the
East vs. West German issue and
the Arab-Israeli quarrel.
Nyerere has welcomed rep-
resentation and aid from any
interested Communist country to
offset the extensive Western
influence which existed in Tan-
zania at independence and to
balance Tanzania's membership
in the commonwealth, which he
views primarily as an anti-Com-
munist club. Today, the envoys
of the 18 Western and neutral
nations resident in Tanzania
slightly outnumber those of the
11 Communist countries, four
radical African states, and In-
donesia. The latter grouping,
however, is the more active and
enjoys more ready access to Tan-
zanian officials.
Western, and particularly
US, contact with Tanzanian lead-
ers has been limited and the
scope for exerting effective in-
fluence is rapidly shrinking.
It would appear that some time
last year the Tanzanian leader-
ship concluded that the US is
the principal impediment to Tan-
zania's aspirations in Africa.
Suspicions of US intentions in
that part of Africa and in Tan-
zania, in particular, were
heightened by US support of
Tshombd and fanned by the radi-
cal African and Chinese represent-
s in Dar es Salaam. F__~
forged documents isclosed
a US-Portuguese-Tshomb "plot"
to overthrow the Tanzanian Gov-
ernment. Last January, the Chi-
nese on Zanzibar taped an innoc-
uous conversation which led to
the expulsion of two US diplo-
mats for "plotting the overthrow"
of the Zanzibar regime. As a
result, Nyerere has become more
and more isolated from Western
counsel.
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The Chinese Communists were
the first nation to establish
an embassy in Dar es Salaam
after independence and have
since attained the most influ-
ential and trusted position.
Foreign Minister Kambona has
long allowed the Chinese to dis-
regard the 12-man limit placed
on all other foreign embassies.
China's presence and prestige
in Tanzania has increased stead-
ily. Vice President Kawawa's
visit to Peiping in June 1964
was a major contribution to this
process. He negotiated both eco-
nomic and military agreements
and, perhaps more important, re-
turned greatly impressed by Chi-
nese capabilities and overwhelmed
by Peiping's generosity. His
guide was Zanzibar's former for-
eign minister Babu, Peiping's
principal Zanzibari agent, who
also accompanied Nyerere to
China last February. Babu re-
ceived a $4,000 bonus from the
Chinese for convincing Nyerere
to make the trip.
Nyerere's delegation signed
a trade agreement and discussed
additional economic and military
aid, but the final communiqud
papered over some fundamental
disagreements on such issues as
the UN. At first Nyerere was
cautious in his dealings with
the Chinese, but he told a vis-
itor recently that Tanzania
realized the power and importance
of China and must accommodate to
the future. He needs Chinese
assistance and probably believes
that he can limit their influence
within Tanzania. He has been im-
pressed by their performance, by
the quality of their arms--as
opposed to the older Soviet ma-
teriel--and by what he believes
to be the unselfishness of their
aid. Since his return from Pei-
ping he has taken to wearing a
simple tunic--without the Chi-
nese collar, however--and has
embarked on an austerity program,
publicly citing China as an ex-
ample of careful management of
resources and of spending on
only absolute essentials. The
Chinese may eventually press
too hard in Tanzania, but so
far they have been more success-
ful than the West or the Soviets
in relating themselves to the
African.
China has given Tanzania
$4.8 million in hard currency
and $39 million in interest--
free credits for agricultural
and industrial projects. While
there is a steady stream of
Chinese flying in and out of the
country, those stationed there
total well over 100. Nyerere
often points out, somewhat de-
fensively, that there are over
300 US Peace Corps teachers, and
he becomes incensed at those who
lecture him on the Chinese peril.
A US demarche last August con-
cerning the arrival of seven Chi-
nese military instructors incited
him to a public denunciation of
such interference. He told a
visiting West African delegation
this month that the Chinese would
be welcome as long as they con-
tinued to behave correctly and
helpfully. He added that he
had recently seen the Chinese
in Mali addressing aid to the
real needs of the people, while
the only Soviet project was an
expensive stadium for propaganda.
Soviet-Tanzanian relations
are polite. Dar es Salaam ac-
cepts Soviet economic and military
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aid because it is needed, but
with a certain amount of re-
serve. The Tanzanians were an-
noyed last year when the Soviets
refused to help them persuade
the East German Embassy to leave
Zanzibar and later when Moscow
sent about 25 Soviet military
advisers to the island without
notifying Dar es Salaam. Mos-
cow has offered a $20-million
credit for mineral and agricul-
tural surveys, a hospital, a
radio station, and schools, but
Dar es Salaam is still haggling
over the terms. The main dif-
ficulty for the Soviets has been
Tanzanian dissatisfaction with
the Soviet interest rate and
with the financing of the local
costs of the proposed projects.
The Chinese, on the other hand,
have provided hard currency and
consumer goods which the Tan-
zanians can sell to generate
local currency for this purpose.
Polish and Czech credits
and East German aid to Zanzibar
amount to another $18.5 million.
who wanted to resist union with
the thought, as one of his lieu-
tenants expressed it, that it
was "worth losing Zanzibar's
300,000 people for the sake of
Tanganyika 's ten million."
Babu's rationalization
may yet prove to have been
sound. President Nyerere gave
the Zanzibaris heavy overrepre-
sentation in the Tanzanian cab-
inet in the belief that the
"wild men," as he calls them,
could best be neutralized by
"smothering" them in Tanganyi-
kan nonalignment. The less
competent of the Zanzibaris
who were transferred to Dar es
Salaam have since drifted back
to Zanzibar, but those that re-
mained have strong voices in
Nyerere's administration. To-
gether with radically inclined
Tanganyikans they control all
the important ministries. Babu,
now minister for commerce and
cooperatives, has proved to be
able and effective and his in-
fluence with Nyerere has grown
steadily.
The Union of Tanganyika
and Zanzibar, hastily enacted
a year ago, has not only failed
to eliminate the Zanzibar can-
cer, but has in some ways fa-
cilitated its spread throughout
the mainland government. The
union proclamation of 23 April
1964 caught Zanzibar's pro-Com-
munists by surprise and blocked
them.from the complete take-
over that then appeared imminent.
Zanzibar's foreign minister and
leading Communist, Abdulrahman
Mohammed ("Babu"), realized
that he had been outmaneuvered
and restrained those militants
The deputy finance minis-
ter, a Zanzibari Communist,
stated in March that the island
radicals were pleased with the
way things have developed.
They believe they have estab-
lished themselves as the brains
and main source of inspiration
and information in the Tanzan-
ian Government. In order to
strengthen their influence over
Nyerere, they have successfully
worked for the removal of all
moderate advisers. One of the
last moderates of any stature
in the Tanzanian regime, the
finance minister, has been ill
--on the verge of a nervous
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breakdown--and apparently ex-
pects to be dropped from the
cabinet in the near future.
At the same time the Zan-
zibaris have been able to re-
sist real integration of the
island's administration. Nye-
rere's uphill struggle in this
direction has been another
source of personal frustration
and has had a disproportionate
effect on his conduct of both
domestic and foreign policy.
In his desire to avoid a direct
confrontation with the islanders
he has frequently compromised
and agreed hastily to positions
which he might not otherwise
have taken. Each surrender to
radical pressure has resulted
in a further diminution of his
authority and future maneuver-
ability.
In Zanzibar itself, the
union has never been popular,
and it was only Tanganyika's
steamroller tactics which forced
it in the first place. Main-
land leaders convinced Zanzi-
bar's President Karume, now also
first vice president of Tanzania,
that union with Tanganyika was
the only way to prevent Babu and
his pro-Chinese Arabs from gain-
ing complete control. Karume
gave little thought to the con-
sequences of such a union, and
obtained Zanzibar's ratification
of the agreement even though
only one third of the island's
Revolutionary Council voted in
favor and despite strong opposi-
tion from radical labor and
youth elements.
leagues. They still control
their own entry and exit proce-
dures. Several councilmen
traveled recently to East Ger-
many without even notifying
Dar es Salaam. West German dip-
lomats on the mainland have been
unable to visit the island de-
spite Tanganyikan permission,
and visiting US aid officials
are frequently blocked or ha-
rassed. The Communist-trained
Zanzibar Army has not been in-
tegrated with mainland forces;
the one attempt to do so last
fall resulted in the recall of
the island soldiers after they
looted a Tanganyikan town.
Karume now allows the main-
landers just enough authority
on Zanzibar--particularly through
the mainland police unit--to en-
sure that the "wild men" of the
Revolutionary Council do not
get the upper hand completely.
Most of the 32-man council are
either rabid radicals--many Com-
munist trained--or uneducated
gunslingers who roam the island
arresting "plotters" and confis-
cating property at random.
Until this month Karume
had never really come to grips
with the long-term problem of
what to do with these men. In
his relations with the council
he seems to have been following
a policy--much like Nyerere's
--of proceeding slowly and avoid-
ing trouble at almost any cost.
Karume may also see in the coun-
cil a useful defense against
the "imperialist" ambitions of
the mainland Africans.
A year later the Zanzibaris
remain usually uncooperative and
often ignore their mainland col-
In early May, Zanzibar
adopted a new party constitution
which makes Karume's Afro-Shirazi
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Party the supreme authority,
above the government and all its
organs. The labor union, youth
corps, and other mass organiza-
tions--which have been a source
of Communist power on the island
--will be absorbed into the party
as separate departments. The
new constitution may well allow
Karume, as president of the
party's all-powerful central com-
mittee, to curb the more unruly
members of the Revolutionary
Council, but it remains to be
seen whether it actually reduces
Communist influence or facili-
tates integration with Tangan-
yika.
Karume is a true African
nationalist who desires to build
a socialist society for his peo-
ple, who wants no involvement
in the cold war, and who would
welcome aid from both East and
West. He is also a racist who
detests particularly the Arab
landowners and Asian merchants
who long monopolized power and
wealth on Zanzibar and who rele-
gated the African to an inferior
status. His distrust of capi-
talism and private enterprise
is an outgrowth of this experi-
ence, and last month he ordered
the confiscation of 237 clove
plantations and all 25 of Zan-
zibar's soft drink, sugar, and
other processing plants. The
regime already controls most of
the island's import-export trade.
Until recently Asian busi-
nessmen have merely been harassed,
but now that they realize that
the regime intends to nationalize
all privately owned enterprises,
the rate of emigration will in-
crease. More than 8,000 Asians
left the island in the first 13
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months after the revolution.
The Arab population was halved
during the same period--about
4,000 were killed during the
revolution and some 22,000 emi-
grated.
The popular Karume is po-
litically shrewd, but he is
poorly educated and not as so-
phisticated as many of those
around him, some of whom are
firmly in one Communist camp or
the other. The foreign Commu-
nist advisers have considerable
influence, particularly in eco-
nomic affairs, with the pro-Com-
munist Zanzibari ministers who
in turn have Karume's ear.
Karume does not seem to worry
about the pro-Communists in his
government, unless they happen
to be Arab; he believes they
are loyal to him and that most
of them are merely paying lip
service to the foreign Communists.
Communist influence mean-
while is taking a variety of
forms. The Chinese are training
the security service, among other
things. They brought in ten more
economic advisers in March and
appear to be gaining the upper
hand in a conflict with the East
German financial advisers, who
were on the scene earlier. The
Soviets are the least noticeable,
but their 80-man contingent in-
cludes twelve known or suspected
intelligence officers. The East
Germans, now that their former
embassy has become a consulate,
are putting pressure on the Zan-
zibaris to downgrade all consul-
ates general to their level.
The expulsion of the US
consul last January was a signif-
icant victory for the Communists.
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He had been able to exert a mod-
erating influence on Karume and
could claim some credit for
Karume's change from a violently
anti-US attitude to relative
friendliness. Zanzibar, because
of Karume's efforts, was one of
the few African capitals that
had no anti-US demonstrations
after the Stanleyville paradrop.
Since the consul's departure
Karume's pendulum seems to be
swinging back.
Tanzania is gradually iso-
lating itself from the rest of
East Africa. Its radical poli-
cies and its flirtation with the
Chinese have alarmed the moderate
elements which still make up the
majority in Kenya and Uganda.
Furthermore there are increasing
strains in the economic ties
that bind the three countries
through the East African Common
Services Organization--which was
begun by the British to make pos-
sible more rational economic
development to assist ultimately
in forming political ties.
The Tanzanians have drawn
closer to Uganda's top leaders
because of their common fear of
Tshombd, but Nyerere's doctri-
naire attitude toward the Congo
situation is further estranging
Kenya's President Kenyatta. On
15 May, Kenya seized 11 Ugandan
trucks carrying arms from Tan-
zania. This, together with
Nairobi's recent anti-Communist
crackdown may eventually add
Kenyatta to the Tanzanian radi-
cals' list of neocolonial targets.
At some point, Nyerere may
try to redress the balances in
Tanzania. Foreign aid for his
five-year plan is falling short
of expectations, and he realizes
that foreign investment can only
be attracted to a reasonably
stable environment. Although
he has turned to the East for
material assistance, he has
maintained Western predominance
in education. In domestic poli-
tics, Nyerere appears to be back-
ing Vice President Kawawa in an
effort to curb the power of For-
eign Minister Kambona, but these
rivals are only radicals of vary-
ing shades. It remains to be
seen whether the radicals that
now dominate Tanzania's single
party would allow Nyerere to
change course, even if he wanted
to. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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