MILITARY GEOGRAPHY AS ESSENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 7, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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Lt.! I
7 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
THROUGH: Assistant Director for National Estimates c/Le
SUBJECT: Military Geography as Essential Intelligence
for Counterinsurgency
REFERENCE: USIB-D-63.6/1, dated 30 April 1962, subject:
Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency
1. The JCS memorandum that forms the main substantive content
of USIB-D-63.6/1 purports to indicate "the essential elements of
information relating to any country or area in which an insurgency
or incipient insurgency exists." It makes no mention, however, of
physical environmental factors as essential elements of information
required for counterinsurgency programming and operations.
2. We assume that this gap can only be the result of an
unintentional oversight on the part of the drafters of the JCS
memorandum. The experiences of counterinsurgency operations in
Malaya, the Philippines, and currently in Laos and South Vietnam,
provide ample evidence of the essentiality of information concerning
terrain, natural vegetation, climatic conditions, settlement patterns,
and other elements of the environment for counterinsurgency actions.
3. It is recommended that when the reference paper is considered
by USIB, a proposal be submitted to add to the JCS-proposed list of
Essential Elements of Information for Counterinsurgency Actions the
following item:
What are the characteristics of the significant physical
environmental factors of the country that must be known for the
conduct of counterinsurgency operations?
FOR THE ASSISTAET DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND REPORTS:
DIA review(s) completed.
Enclosure: Referenced Document
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JAMES A. BRAMMELL
ef, Geographic Research
GROUP I
ExcluLd trm
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TAIAICINt 15,1111 1PON 17:11MCToRV 41i
DIAAP-1 5-8
SUBJNCT: (U) Intelligence Required for Counterineurgency Actions
1. denamec/teg 26. 5 u0134.63.6/1 Meguired for Ceesteri,
inetaimme
2. pamIzTosneis
Special Assistent for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint
Star (50405i) developed e list of "Rceential Ilenents of Informatiom for
Counterinsurgency". Re requested DIA, Tab A, to consider .t..11 list in the
development of a tomprebeneive ccunterineurgeney intelligence requirement
amd that the OMOIOTI be applied to a list at 39 oauntries. Onagers'
Umiak slop sebnItted the list to the Speatel Or (CI) 'Oberst it use
noted. Gemmel Molar, am Chairmen at the Speoisl Grasp (CI) forwarded
the requirements (less 12 countries) to MIS for appeopeiete action (20
14). DMA hse liheelse forwarded (lib C) Oeners1 Ululate "otter to MIX
noting that the list of questions is the emme, but the countries are Wk..
ferent. An interim reply (Tisb 0 hes been fmrnisbed Generel Xrulsk en&
also a caw wee prmlolvd to the mmmbere of the MID (Tab IL
3. BMWS.*
the f011eetsg possibilities are dieeaseedi
A. Matablish a now production program or epeeial task force to meet
this reqpirement, =CID 3 states ern the sweet that a requirement is es-
tablished for 'dada there is not existing peoductise espebility, the /*-
rector et dottrel Intelligence, in eassaltstlesittli the 01113, *hall t.1 ii vhish ot the divestments sad egemciee the intelligence aammemlbr
dem beet imdeatehe the primarr reopeueibilit4r es a merriest of amesee mew
eeme". limed as
U. show., the Director, Cil scold ...lie this as a peso.
'eat tor a task terse otter* to prodeme mei amitataia oommtry studios meal*
Leg only Ihe essential elessomts et tetlamiekLea reqpixeda
36 Prodame the regmired imiNanualmilthts the trumoverk of mistime
productive progrums. there are mow in saistemse letelligsmee production
programs empable at providing mach at the imitommeties respired. Mndlfless
ties to tearless timeliness, scope amd orimmloaLos of mush progrome pos?
eatrienslikandlise to sleet the empreseed restiremmuts.
(1) the terms at reteremae for the "rho Atamdard imstrue.
tier. sonsetlis for U. coverage at the isfeeMetiae in the arise et Inter.
est iadiamesi ky G. rask. Chmpter t is a Wrist at all the Chestere
in the 3111 brace it 'beadsman am espresetato vehisle is "bids to immure
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that hie qui=sticro arc answercA, Cia:7tc,r I's have not yet bean completed
on all countries tn wtich qem. Krialsk ,,,,xpressed interest; further some at
those that are completed are severs-1 yes= old, Considerotion has bees
given by the NIB Committee to sr, Increase Lc Chapter I productionb in
this 'way informatien from a hiker irtelligemoe standpolnt would be maltiu
teased acme up.to-date snd the few countries whit& have tot as yet ha
initial coverage would be scheduled. It voLLIA be appropriate to ask the
IX* Committee to make recompendations an measures to meet 0006 trulat's
requirement through the Ble program by increasing timeliness or readOlp
ration. The intelligemco community is etevotimi epyreceinate4lOOtio?
years (the military over 500) to the production of basic intelligence
thromgh the 11B. It is Supposed to meet fully the requirements of the
Dept. of Defense in etratee.c snd h40 level operational planning.
(2) Most oi the countries Oen. Krulak listed have been addressed
by the Board of National Estimate* (BB); however, same of the spec/fin
locations of interest have not been addressed. The terms of refirense
deternine the scope of III's, BIM's. Consequently, the list of quee?
tions could be furnished the DMZ for use, as appropriate, in developing
future tcyma of reference for cetinates.
(3) Since these production resLiressenta will ultimately result
in collection requiresealts if end when the producer determines thet gips
exist, it would be appropriate to alert the collectors to possible Munk
requirements in this area of interest. My forwarding a copy of Oen.
Krulek's quotations to the Chief oriel/61Am in each of the 3) oeuntrite,
this would be done. The Director, DI& *cold lilinvise furnish a copy of
the questions and countries to the V and II Commanders with the contain..
plated WM artless to order to keep then imrammul as to the emphasis
thet is being placed in this area.
44 blatuallIns
34 the netionsl intelligence productima *Mort be tallomaite
meet selelr this requirement or doubt this reqpiresent beset aces with
ether reqpirememte is the finished lotelligne** preldwett
It this reqpirmeent is net within the !Memo* of swistift
pro.-, will It be done through nodifications to the Ilk the Willgt:!
or both?
Mat empheels will be placed an the collection at this infOrmation
where gmps appear/
Viet empheals will be placed an the preemption of fiatsh inteillowee
te loft this requirement?
5. kusestatiar
The following recommindationa are made i
2
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A. The 1182B request the Chairmen, XIX Cammittee to Sake recommends.
time an Noisome* to meet this requirement thromPh the 1111 prelmemw
B. The UDIB 'nevi& the Board of litionsl littimmtie with s oollr or
Oen. Krelaies questions and list of countries tor use, as eBertiortata,
in developing estimates.
C. the USIB request Director at Zetellissome sod Seeeordh, Dept, at
Stets to termlOh Chiefs of Missies is the 39 mostiles with the list of
essential reqpireseate sod the contemplated motions tomtit these re,
gaLremmots.
D. the Director, DIA provide the V & 8 eammendire eith the emu* in.
formation.
R. Director, Oemtral intelligence AdmolOy dreg% stesuPriste reply to
G. Terist.
P. Direiter, DI& provide Illaprapriate tollswep rely to 110. G.
&ask.
6. kw, Day sad Air Force here all. easignecl this *Alas to Oollmetica.
Utica: (Meer* all believe that the reqpiremest shoed be net eithin
mistime Dintromo.
?revered by =silk B. etibas
758X5
3
2601511113
IDA?
INWOMMINONIMIND
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(T/Z. WAAL US _CIL; C 01P ;724IINTS.IIR.07.,NCY,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
I. THE PROBLOI . 0 .. . . o a o 000000 ci o o o 1
II. INTRODUCTION . . 0 . 4 ...??... 1
A. Purposes of Paper' . 200390c0000
B. Terminology 0,,,4'. obe 000a 0 .0 004 2
C. Scope of Paper: Types of Insurgency . ? ? 3 -
ILL. THE SMATION ANDTHREAT. ? ? . 0 ? . ? . ? 5
A. The Situation. . 000000.000000 5
B. The Causes of Insurgency . . . ? . 00 . 6
C. The Threat: Cummuni4t Doctrine and
Tactic*. 000000000002000 10
IV. THE CENTRAL FRAMEWORK CI? US POLICY AND 'RATEGY ,13
A. US Policy and Objective* Toward
Modernizing Societies. . . . . . . . . 13
B. The US Interest in Internal Defenze. 00 15
C. US Counte?Jusurgency Objectives. . . . . 16
V. GENERALIZED CONCEPT FOR THE ENPLOYNENT OF US
RESOURCES . . . . 0 . . ............. 17
A. The Local Problem ..... 4 0 0 0 op oo 18
B. The US Problem. . . 0 0 . 0 . . . . . .0 19
C. A Generalized Concept of US Joint
Operations ... . . 0 .? . 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 20
VI AEGICDCRE, T TIN . . ? . 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . . . 23
Au The Broad US Purpozo........... 23
B. The US Posture Toward Nba-Communist
Inpurgvncy. ... . ., . . . ?.... . . 28
C. US Involvemant in Cemmunint-Directed
Insurgency. . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . 31
D. The Critical Fectors. ? . . 0 . 2000.0 34
E. Intervention vs. Cooperativo Involve-
ment. . 0000000000 o 0000 o 40
F. The Ultimm.te Target?People 0 . 0 . . . 4 41
G. Counter-Ideas and Counter-Organizations . 42
H. Strategic At7,giignments (Roles and
Mission. 00.000? 000000 0 0 0 43
I. Offensive.Countermeasures Against DVI,;
Type Aggreonion ? . . 0 0 . . . . 0 0 . 50:
J. The Role of Allies and Intern42tiona1
Organizations . . . , . . . . . ?.00 0 50
K. Unresolved Doctrinal Issues . . 0000 0 50
VII. OPERATIONAL DaCTRIa7.: LINES OF ACTION 0 . . . 51
,
VIII. ROLES Ara MISSION-3. . . . . . . 0000000 51
IX. CONCLUSIOES u . . 4 .2 0 .2 .2 ..1. 9_ 0 0. i' ?
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S/P:5/8/62
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GENERAL US DOCTRINE ON CIOUNTERINSURGENCY
AIMEEITAL DEFETaLOPERATIONS
? Inr
I. THE PROBLEM
To (a) provide a generalized ezoncept, and the accompanyTng
non-technical doctrinal guidance, for the employment of .US
sources tO prevent and defeat Communist-directed insurgency in.
the less developed world and (b`p delineate the roles and inte:r- ?
relationship of the executive agencies of the US GovernMent (1)-
partments of State and Defense (JCS), AID, CIA, USIA) which sr!
engaged in meeting this element of the Communist threat to HS
interests.
IL .117ROT?UaTI2!i
A. pup,p9gEs OF PAPER
The Basic National Security Paper (BNSP) deal 1.1; US policy
and objectives toward the underdeveloped world but does not ex-
plicitly fill the gap between policy and applied action in the
field of counterinsurgency, i.e., the doctrinal gap of a body of
working principles intended as guides for translating policy into
purposeful action.
A purpose
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A purpose of this paper is to fill this gap insofar as pos-
sible (we are not yet in a position to be dogmatic in a field of
as many variables as counterinsurgency). A second purpose is to
give general doctrinal guidance to US activities and to define,
insofar as possible, operational roles and missions for the arms
of US policy which cope with Communist-directed insurgency.
These of necessity must be empirical undertakings. It is
easier to settle on policy than to devise doctrinal guidance on
how to execute it. But a beginning must be made and certain
doc -.7.posts are evident. Others will doubtless appear as
we get on with the tasks which lie ahead.
B. TERMINOLOGY
Counterinsurgency and internal defense are used inter-
changeably in this paper, each to mean the entire range of
strategic and tactical responses to any form of subversive political
activity, agitation, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection de-
signed to weaken and/or overthrow an existing government or oc-
cupying power which the United States supports.
Conversely, insurgency is also used as a word-of-art to
cover the entire spectrum of subversive activity, including armed
insurrection, aimed at overthrowing a friendly government supported
by us. Insurgency thus does not include political opposition con-
ducted within constitutional norms but does include incipient or
latent
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latent dissidence susceptible of unconstitutional expression or
inimical manipulation.
Internal defense is used throughout as roughly synonymous
with internal security and is believed to be a preferable usage to
either counterinsurgency or to internal security for two reasons:
It is more psychologically palatable abroad, and it contains more
positive connotations of the totality of the national effort r_-
quired to safeguard the modernization process against the inroads
of Communism or other forms of inimical extremism.
Internal war is used throughout in its broad connotation and
also as a synonym for the Communist usage of "wars of national
liberation."
DVN' type aggression is intended to mean the sending of unin-
vited arms and men across international boundaries and the direction
of internal (guerrilla) war from outside a sovereign state (e.g.,
the current activities of North Vietnam against South Vietnam and
Laos).
Throughout, all uses of the terms underdeveloped or less de-
veloped world or nations, or modernizing or transitional societies,
refers to free world areas as opposed to countries modernizing
under the Communist model.
C. SCOPE OF PAPER: TYPES OF INSURGENCY
This paper by definition concentrates on Communist-directed
insurgency and insurgency which might furnish Communist footholds.
It is
cpequemp
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It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that Communist
-
directed insurgency is only one of four types of insurgency which
- affect US interests toward modernizing societies. The other three
types are these:
1. Insurgency which is wholly national in origin and support.
Here the US interest lies in remaining aloof; or in covertly em-
ploying our resources to deny Communist or inimical foreign support
of the insurgency; or, if we do not support the government, in
covertly assisting the insurgents.
2. Inimical nonCctmnunictforei-sunortedinsurenc (e.g.,
Arab pressures on Israel, Indian support of Nepalese insurgents,
or Rhodesian support of Katangan mercenaries).
3. Foreign and/or US-supported insurgency in pursuit of US
interests.
Insurgency in all its forms thus affects US objectives for
good or bad, depending on its origins, intensity, purposes and
leadership. This paper proceeds on the assumptions that Communist-
directed insurgency is the basic threat to US objectives throughout
the underdeveloped world in the 1960's; and that when insurgency
is inspired, directed, or captured by Communism or its proxies, it
will invariably challenge US interests and generally require the
application of US resources in conjunction with those of the society
under attack.
III. The Situation
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III. 'THE SITUATION AND THE THREAT
Doctrine on, counterinsurgency must begin by considering the
reasons why the underdevelaped world is vulnerable to insurgency,
the role of insurgency in Communist strategy, and the threat which
Communist-directed insurgency poses to US and free world interests.
A. THE SITUATION
The central forces at work and juxtraposed in varying degrees
of intensity throughout the underdeveloped world are (a) the
stresses and st7ains of the modernization process?the revolutionary
breaks with the traditional past and the uncertain and uneven prog-
ress toward no and more modern forms of political, social, and
.economic orgAnization, and (b) the contest between Communism and
the Free World generally for primary influence over the direction
and outcoma of the modernization process.
It i6 central to our problem that modernization generates
targets of exploitable Communist opportunity and that all develop-
ing countries are therefore susceptible to Communist subversion
and insurgency in varying degree. Dissidence, dissatisfaction,
and disequilibrium are the minimum concomitants of a modernizing
society, especially a loosely-structured society with weak govern-
mental institutions.
' Thew' are the vulnerabilities of modernizing societies on
which Comunism and other enemies of controlled revolutionary
progress prey in an effort to subvert and redirect modernization
to their
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to their purposes. Furthermore, Communism exerts appeals to
certain innovators and intellectuals within the new countries: it
represents a proven route to modernization if human liberties and
consumer wants are disregarded.
14/V-4
In some areas the threat of insurgency is active (e.g., Laos,
Vietnam, Colombia); in others it is lasiamt (e.g., Northeast
Thailand, northeast Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela); and
elsewhere it is and will remain at least latent until each modern
!zing nation develops a firm national unity, a popular consensus
in support of the general purposes and direction of the national
government, and a capability to defend itself internally.
Each modernizing society is to some extent unique in its
culture, origins, structure, aspirations end progress toward modernity.
It is therefore difficult to generalize on the modernization process:
It must be studied in the geographic, 7:iztoric, ethnic and political
context of the individual society. Yet certain generalizations
bearing on the causes of insurgency cansafely be ventured.
B. THE CAUSES OF INSURGENCY
All insurgency, ?to succeed, must have an active indigenous base
and some form of political direction and structure; and advanced
stages of insurgency will have both an active domestic base of
popular support and a politico-military structure, i.e., a proto-
government in opposition to the central government which either
competes with it for support or resists its writ (e.g., Laos, South
Vietnam, Colombia).
Insurgency is
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Insurgency is grounded in the allegiances and attitudes of
people within a modernizing society. Its origins are domestic
and its support must remain largely domestic if it is to succeed
without resort to large-scale foreign support of a typo which could
change its character and scale. The causes of insurgency are there-
fore really the inadequacies of the local government to requite,
contain or remove popular or class dissatisfactions released .a
breaking from the traditional mold and social structure. In the
interim between shattering the old mold and consolidating a viable
modern state of popularly accepted and supported institutional
etrength, the modernizing state expoaes its vulnerability to
insurgency most acutely.
Politically and soclIlly, a typical transitional society will
exhibit many of these divisive forces and attitudes at work:
Deep rifts between the urban centers and the rural messes,
complicated by an essential lack of communication between the
central government and the countryside; lack of social cohesion
stemming from inequities of the old class structure and often
exacerbated by racial problems, social discrimination, and
religious differences; mass illiteracy but, nonetheless, the
dim stirrings of hope aaong the underprivileged for a better life
and greater participation in the society; an inadequate educational
system; weak governmental institutions and administrative capacities,
an inadequate civil bureaucracy, and semi-corrupt political leaders;
a government which is not or cannot be, adequately responsive to the
aspirations of
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aspirations of the people; a political process in which the
military are the ultimate arbiters of power, often in league
with the traditional oligarchs; fragmented political parties,
- which complicate the formation of stable governments and the
functioning of representative institutions; no firm cense of
purpose, direction or achieTement; a frustrated and articulate
segment of the youth and liberal intelligentsia. (often foreign-
.
educated) which aspires to merz! radici solutions to speed
modernization; a developing middle cics which cannot yet control
? .:the political process and extremes of Right and Left which contest
its rise to political and economic power.
Es9nomi_sajay, the society may exhibit these divisive forces
and attitudes:
?Widespread poverty and an ir!luitable distribution of wealth
and income; an inadequate system of lend tenure and agricultural
production, with little progress toward land reform or the development
of a sturdy peasantry; an inadequate and unbalanced industrial
structure with no coherent plan for economic growth which will confer
equitable social benefits; inadequate economic and social infrastructure;'
inadequate ability to mobilize domest resources or to marehal and re-
invest savings; balance of peyments difficulties; overdependence on
exports of primary products; dissatisfaction with foreign private
investment yet great dependence on foreign capital assistance for
economic growth; inadequate urban housing, especially low-cost housin;
an inadequate tax and tax collection system; an unhealthy concentration
of wealth
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of wealth and economic power in an upper class or in a few
individuals or families; large-scale unemployment and under-
employment, including the dangerous youth segment of the educated
unemployed.
Nilitarilx, most modernizing states are vulnerable in these
respects:
They have underestimated the internal threat and over-
estimated and overprepared for an external threat; they do not
have an adequately balanced military-police structure to maintain
internal security in both the cities and the countryside (in many
Latin American countries, military units cannot leave the cities
lest a security vacuum be created); the military--becaume of
excessive demands on the budget, repressive measures, participation
in unpopular or oppressive governments, or lack of good works--are
eetrz?ngad from the people; and, the military have not made the
contribution of which they are capable in promoting nation-build-i
and social cohesion (civic action, good works in the countryside,
statecraft in government, training of conscripts in literacy and
vocations).
Ilycholozically, few of the modernizing states have won the
battle against the blandishments and false hopes aroused by
Communism among the students, educated youth, intelligentsia,
the rural dispossessed and the urban underprivileged. Except in
a few of the modernizing states with charismatic, articulate and
social-minded leaders (e.g., Nehru) ; there is an abysmal
psychological gap
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psychological gap between the central government and the masses,
the students, the laborers and those who for various reasons foal
estranged from the government and the society as a whole. Where
the central government is Lagging behind the tides of popular dis-
content, this gap is a very dangerous vulnerability.
This partial enumeration of vulnerabilities illustrates the
magnitudes of the Communist threat in canalizing and directing
popular disaffection for subversive ends.
Nor is this the whole story. Too rapid a tempo of modernization
can be as dangerous as too little movement unless the new institutional
mold is strong enough, and its leaders wise enough, to contain the
powerful new social thrusts released in the process (e.g., the non-
Communist social revolution of Bolivia in 1952). Just as failure to
move rapidly enough encourages popular opposition and the aspirations
of alternative leadership, which often takes power through a violent
"social revolution" (cf. Mexico in 1910, Bolivia in 1952, Egypt under
Nasser, Cuba in 1956, Iraq in 1958), so does movement forward sow the
seeds of future crisis as the underprivileged reach out for more.
Thus the modernization process is un7-ertain and treacherous
and few societies have attained modernity without bloodshed and
reliance on authoritarian techniques at some point enroute.
C. THE THREAT: COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND TACT/CS
. The Communists make no secret of their intention of expanding
control to those societies of the Free World which they can subvert
(Czechoslovakia),
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(Czechoslovakia), take over through internal war (China), or
capture from within after an essentially nationalistic social
revolution (Cuba). We must start from a premise that Communism
threatens all modernizing societies.
A second premise is that the Communists by doctrine and.
practice are equipped to press their objectives along the whole
gf the insurgency spectrum: they study and exploit the vulners-lailities
of societies, they are expert in political maneuver from indigenous
footholds, and they understand and practice the various forms of
internal war.
They regard all modernizing societies as candidates for internal
war at some stage of their developmtmt, which will be the final stage
in the class struggle within the society. They plan to set the stage
for these "wars of national liberation" and to support them; and
these wars, we have been told publicly, are the "just" and "sacred"
wars which they must support in order that the society may eliminate
all foreign influences and leave Communism in control of the
modernization process.
Communism has from its origins posed this threat. But the
threat is more credible and poignant as of today for two reasons:
First, the number and diversity of the modernizing societies
have proliferated enormously eras imposes additional burdens on
those, like ourselves, who would permit the .new societies to perfect
existing institutions and to fashion their own system and pace of
modernisation,
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modernization, instead of ruthlessly imposing the predetermined
institutional blue-prints of Communism).
Second, in view of the general strategic stalemate and the
dangers of direct Bloc-Western military confrontations, the
Communists' "wave of the future" strategy is now based primarily
on insurgency rather than overt aggression across international
borders. (This accords with the general lesson of history since
the Korean War and a probable Communist assessment that "wars of
national liberation" can be supported without running the unacceptable
risks of Western nuclear retaliation).
A further aspect of the Communist threat is doctrinally
important: Consolidating and exploiting active domestic insurgency
bases, both in the cities and the countryside, are valuable moans
of accomplishing two Communist purposes: Building power bases for
future political takeovers, and arresting a state's forward movemmt.
Hence, urban strongholds within disaffected student and labor
groups, and guerrilla bases in the countryside may be developed,
held and utilized not for purposes of an immediate drive to power
but for purposes of sowing confusion, adding to the drain on domestic
resources, and widening the base of political pewer for an ultimate
assault on the state when the time is deemed right.
The guerrilla is especially suited for this purpose: A guerrilla
expresses action emotions and tberfore has a strong psychological
appeal to a part of the populace even when he opposes a moderately
unpopular regime; he strikes at the economy and social cohesion of
a country
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a country and thereby weakens the government; in suitable terrain,
be occupies the attention of many times his number in conventional
soldiers who may further contribute to the government's unpopularity
by reprisals, inept tactics, or failure to think back to first causes;
and he is a costly thing to eliminate.
The Communists have thus refined subversive insurgency as an
instrument of political warfare which can be destructively applied
to underdeveloped countries at almost all points of vulnerability.
Andin organizing massively for subversion in all forms, they also
systematically seek to align themselves with the three great forces
atwork in modernizing societies?nationalism, anticolonialism and
the revolution of rising expectations. Their threat is formidable
and all-pervasivn, but it cannot succeed without the support of people.
It can be bluntad and defeated only if we and other free nations make it
crystal clear in action and deed that Communism can never align with
.the finer instincts of human nature because it is not a political
system which fulfills the aspirations of men who prefer to find
their own independent ways in a world community of free nations.
IV. TEE CENTRAL FRAMMORR OF US POLICY AND STRATEGY
US policy and strategy toward the Communist threat are designed
to aafeguard the modernization process in order that the deeper
aspirations of men and nations to remain free and to fashion their
own ways of modern life may be fulfilled.
? A. US POLICY AND OBJECTIVES TOWAPJ) MODERNIZING SOCIETIES
The BNSP is our guide for US policy and objectives toward the
underdeveloped world.
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Our broad interests in the underdeveloped world are three:
--144 have a gsgaisa. and Itelo.Lical., interest that the
free modernizing nations evolve in directions which will afford a
congenial world environment for fruitful international cooperation
and our own way of life.
--Wo have a military interest that their manpower and
resources not fall under Communist control and that they maintcin
the minimum essential military capabilities to preserve their internal
security and independence from Dn.-type aggression, or to combine with
foreign assistance in meeting overt external aggression.
--144 have an economic interest that their resources and
markets remain available to us and to the other industrialized nations
of the Free World.
Doctrinally, our strategy points toward extricating ourwelves
from being wholly reactive to Communist initiatives by getting on
more positively with the constructive tasks of encouraging and
safeguarding the modernization process. This requires our recognizing
that assisting modernization (the positive thrust of US policy) and
assisting in its defense are two sides of the same coin.
The task of safeguarding the modernization process involves
assisting transitional nations upward through the modernization
. barrier with all available resources and counsel at our disposal,
and acceptable to them, while simultaneously improving their
dapabilities of internal defense across the entire spectrum of
? politico-military activity.
Our objective
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Our objective is that modernizing countries remain independent
of Communism, and free from Communist footholds (especially in the
critical rural, student and labor union sectors), in order that
they may progressively assume roles of dignity and responsibility
in an expanding world community of free nations and. pluralistic
values; and our purpose is to assist them to become free and
unified nations capable of internal defense, gouvernance by
consent, and self-generating economic growth within indigenous
modernization systems representative of their own cultures and
aspirations.
The central focus of this policy is to assure an environment
of sustained progress toward higher standards of economic welfare,
social justice, individual liberties, and popularly based govern-
ments--an enterprise in which the risks and responsibilities will
normally be shared with other nations and international groupings,
including the United Nations, though in terms of financial aesistance
and military support, ours will doubtless remain the dominant role
in large parts of the world in the decade ahead.
B. THE US INTEREST IN INTERNAL DEFENSE
As long as the Communists and their partisans and proxies
continue to exert external and internal pressure on free societies,
%we must devote attention and resources to the defense of these
'societies because (a) a sense of security, and (b) a demonstrated
capacity to
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capacity to defend its vital interests are minimum conditions for
the creative modernization of any free society.
Since Communist policy is systematically geared to create
and exploit vulnerabilities offered by political unrest, economic
sluggishness, diplomatic disarray, and military weakness within
the free community, we must, in addition to maintaining a full
spectrum of military capabilities which will make the CommunistL
hesitate to employ force at any level (including guerrilla warfare
and urban insurrection ), seek to minimize the emergence of circum-
stances and situations which permit Communist pressures and manipula-
tion, with special attention to those sectors cn which the Communists
traditionally devote major efforts--the countryside, the students and
educational system, and the labor unions.
In this endeavor, the preventative aspect of US and indigenous
capabilities cannot be overemphasized. It is in the long run far
less costly materially and in terms of damage to the society to
prevent insurgency than to defeat it after its appearance. The
dreadful arithmetic of counter-guerrilla operations, where history
indicates 10 to 15 soldiers are required to cope successfully with
each guerrilla, issomething which every modernizing society should
maks efforts to avoid at all costs.
C. US COUNTERINSURGENCY OBJECTIVES
The over.-all US purpose in the field of counterinsurgenly is
to assist the transitional states to develop balanced capabilities
for the totil
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for the total defense of their societies against internal and
external threats, this to be done with minimum diamonds on domestic re-
sources required for internal development.
To this end, US internal defense objectives are:
1. To contribute to the systematic immunization of
vulnerable societies not yet seriously threatened by Communist
subversion.
2. To assist countries where insurgency is incipient
(e.g., Thailand, Brazil) to defe't the threat by removing its political,
social and economic causes before the invurgency becomes active-.
3. In countries where insurgency is active (South Vietnam,
Colombia), to assist the government under attack with military as
well as non-military means, consistent with the US interest as
determined in each case.
4. To minimize the possibility of direct US military
involvement in internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities
of countering and defeating insurgency.
5. To minimize the risk of encalation (without deferring
to this risk) of insurgency toward conventional or nuclear war.
V. GENERALIZED CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF US RESOURCES
In countering insurgency, the major effort in terms of US
interests, must always be indigenous. We have noted that insurgency
is a uniquely local problem affecting the aspirations an allegiance
of'local people. In putting down insurgency, it is only ine local
government which
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government which can remove its causes, win back the support of
the insurgents, and strengthen the society's cohesiveness. In
internal war it is always better for one national to kill another
than for a foreigners-especially one with a different skin )colorii.
ation--to do so.
The active participation of non-indigenous (especially US)
forces in internal defense operations can be counterproductive LI
that it (a) dilutes the nationalist appeal, and hence the accept-
ability, of the local government, (b) makes the United States a
more obvious target for anticolonialism than it already is, and (c)
permits the Communists more easily to associate themselves with the
forces of nationalism and anti-Westernism.
The US effort abroad must therefore relate primarily to advice,
assistance and the training of indigenous capabilities. We must
always begin this effort by knowing, what the local problem is and
learning to see its distinctive local context.
A. THE LOCAL PROBLEM
The local problem is that modernization generates insurgency
in some form and poses cruel choices of tempo and of how best to
reconcile opposing forces at work within the society-of bringing
tolerable order and unity out of relative dishevelment as smoothly
and securely as Possible. This is nothing less than the problem of
building and defending a nation against its internal tensions and
upheavals and those incited from abroad.
A large ....part
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A large part of the local problem is that the new leaders
have an imperfect view of the consequences of their acts and an
imperfect vision of where to lead and how to get there. Their
inexperience contributes to their difficulty in seeing the totality
of theirnational problem, since the society is in flux and also
under attack: the forces of flux open the avenues of attack and
forward movement will depend on the skillful employment and orc7-1m-
tration of all constructive national capabilities, energies and
resources, both creative and defensive..
A major contributing source of this difficulty is their
imperfect understanding of the political structure of insurgency,
even armed insurgency, and their failure to appreciate that a
creative combination of politics and force (active or potential)
is required to eliminate the root causes of insurgency as opposed
to the mere, and often temporary, repression of its symptoms.
B. THE US PROBLEM
The US problem is to involve ourselves constructively and
acceptably in the local problem in order that we may cooperate
with and assist the local government in resolving as wide a range
of subsidiary problems as possible. This requires our developing
and refining several capabilities on the part of our Country Teams:
..An ability to acquaint ourselves thoroughly with the
totality of the local problem in all its distinctive qualities (its
stage of modernization, the points of strength and weakness, the
sources of
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sources of dissidence, the external vs. the internal threat, the
probable consequences or action or inaction).
..An ability Co assist the local government, together
with the society's innovators and constructive alternative leaders,
to see more clearly the interaction of modernization and insurgency
and the blend of politics and force required for an adequate internal
defense capability. .
..An ability to convince the local leaders that within
transitional societies insurgency' is part of the political process
and must be dealt with in this context rather than as a compartment-
alized problem for the police or the military.
..An ability to coordinate and orchestrate US resources:,
and to develop techniques adapted to the unqiue local context, toward
the end of strengthening .the local capability of defense against
insurgency with minimal damage to the society and the momentum of
modernization.
C. A GENERALIZED CONCEPT CP US JOINT OPERATIONS
Though the US contribution should be ancillary and as inconspicuous
as possible, each operational arm. of US policy represented at the
Country Team level has unique and indispensable capabilities and
resources to employ in supporting the counter-insurgency operations
of a friendly government. What is needed is more precise advanced
planning and preparation for the contingencies of their use, greater
coordination in
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coordination in their use when emergencies arise, and greater
sophistication in applying our resources in a variety of distinctive
situations and contingencies.. In short, though we may generalize on
strategy, we should not generalize on tactics, which must always be
tailored to the local situation.
Abroad, the US concept of joint US counterinsurgency operations
in a society whose government accepts our involvement in its problems,
and our assistance in their solution, should be to pool US resources
in reaching a joint determination on the critical vulnerabilitiea of
the oociety; to refine our judgment on this determination by discussing
thp3c vulnerabilities and what can be done about them, with the loccl
government and, as appropriate, others within the society; and to
apply US resources as necessary, in coordination with those of the
local government, on the basis of a conzaon plan, if possible,
4
in any event, on the basis of a coordinated US plan of action in
which each US resource will maximally contribute to the cohesiveness
and internal defense capabilities of the society.
US Country Teams should prepare and have before them at all
times two "terrain" or "situation" mops?one which represents the
long-term development plan of the country, i.e., where the country
plans to go along the modernization spectrum in the next three to
five years; and one which plots the "'counterinsurgency geography"
of the country, 'Ise., a country plan which plots the vulnerabilities
that the country's modernizing activities will foreseeably ameliorate
or exacerbate.
Ideally, these
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Ideally, these maps, especially the strategic development
plan, should be prepared in concert with the local government.
But regardless of local cooperation, it is essential that our
Country Teams jointly prepare such documents since, in their
absence, we have no clear picture of our strategy in a particular
country and no frame in which to coordinate US resources,.
Only if we proceed in this fashion, with each component of
the Country Team knowing the other's business and capabilities
will we be able to match the objective studies which the Communists
make of local vulnerabilities and the versatility of Communist
personnel in politics, psychological operations, and insurgency.
These projections will serve other indispensable purposes:
1. Their preparation and periodic upeating will make all
members of the Country Team more acutelyeware of the state of health
of the local political organism: individually an as a team, we will
learn to look through a socinty instead of at it.
2. Our increasing ability to spot the malEunctions of the
local political organism should sharpen our ability tc forecast
dangerous trends and suggest remedies. Our diagnosis oE the local
fever chart will suggest the main outlines of how US rescmrces should
be employed to anticipate insurgency, prevent deterioratioa, or
prepare for serious trouble ahead. It will give us the ind:spenable
knowledge required to assess programs suggested by the local government
or to persuade the local government to different courses of action.
3. Agreoment
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3. Agreement at the Country Team level on these matters
will greatly facilitate the coordination and approval of country
strategies at the national level in Washington.
Coordination of this effort at the Country Team level will
be the responsibility of the Ambassador. At the national level,
the employment of US resources in specified critical countries will
be coordinated by the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). In
countries which are not specified as critical, the Department of
State will coordinate plans and resources at the national level
under procedures which should *urgently be refined (see Section VI).
. VI, STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
Against the foregoing analysis of US policy and the complexities
of the modernization process, this section seeks to fix the strategic
framework in-which all components Of the Country Team 4;witld act
.integrally in making their unique and interrelated contributions:
it is the body of common doctrine which should generally guide the
formulation of programs and their execution, as contrasted with
operational guidance to components of the Country Team (Section VII).
A. THE BROAD US PURPOSE
1. Area of competition with-Communism. A fundamental objective
of US strategy in the 1960's must be to perfect capabilities of
offsetting or counterini--the Communiat threat at all levels of
violence--tbrough the eisrmonuclear deterrent as well as in tactical
nuclear, conventional
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nuclear, conventional limited, guerrilla and other forms of .
ambiguouS politico-military werfare--and to confine the struggle
to political and socio-economic competition. This will require
adequate personnel, properly trained and broadly knowledgeable
of the range of US capabilities, to cope with sub-conventional
violence in cooperation with modernizing societies. If Khrushchev's
and Mao's strategy in the underdeveloped world is to be aborted,
major changes will be required in ours at the sub-Korean level of
conflict.
2. The US interest in assisting free modernizing societies
to maintain adequate counterinsurgency capabilities stems from (a)
our national objective of keeping them independent of Communism and
free to develop in their own ways, and (b) our recognition that all
modernizing societies face internal threats in varying degrees
because of the interaction of modernization and insurgency.
3. The central US purpose is to assist governments responsive
to our influence with program guidance and US resources which will.
counter, or preferably prevent, insurgency while, at the same tips,
looking to first causes and effecting the necessary internal reforms
to remove them.
4. .91abglit of modernizing societies. The principal arct,a
of political and social conflict with Communism will be the under,-
developed areas. Here our central problem is to assist countries
in remaining
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in remaining free to fashion their own modernization systems under
conditions of reasonable stability. Their stability, in turn, will
depend on their achieving relative security against internal and
external threats and their developing governments which respond to
the aspirations and needs of their peoples. To the extent we assist
in this process, we simultaneously improve their capabilities of
internal defense.
The central focus of US resources in the long run is not.
to fight Communism as such but to develop ways in which our programs
can make free governments secure against domestic enemies and politically
attractive to a working majority of their people. This done, we will
accept the strategic gamble that the new states will opt to remain
independent of the Communist system and will progressively lean
toward the Western way of life and its values.
6. The central focus of US counterinsurmEsimma.ms should,
at every level of violence, be to combine civil and military (police)
capabilities for purposes of defeating the insurgamcy and te contribute
to the cohesiveness of the society by encouraging the local government
? to redress the legitimate grievances of the insurgmts. Insurgency_
can seldom be uprooted unless this is done. All forme of violence
should be dealt with in this manner, and collila they &re in an elementary
.form, before they degrade into armed insurgency or guerilla warfare.
In, this process of putting down violence and also elimilating its
causes, there
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causes, there will rarely be a pure civil or military action: each
will interact with the other in support of the common purpose;
7. Correct counterinsurgency programs will advance US ,foreign
policy ,oblectives in a vulnerable society and should be designed to
do so. Counterinsurgency strategy should always interact on
modernization strategy and be utilized to advance and stabilize the
modernization process. The preventive (defensive) aspects of our
diplomatic, military, economic, informational and covert prograus ,
which point directly at preventing or defeating Communist-elrected-
fmsurgency involve broader objectives; since each is intended to
safeguard and permit social, economic, and political progress in
the country involved, each is closely related to the totality of
US foreign policy toward the country.
8. The basic US posture must be that of guardian of the
modernization process rather than, as all too often in the past,
that of custodian of the status quo. We must never commit ourselves
wholeheartedly to a regime simply because it is anti-Communist. Our
purpose is to defeat Communism through the progressive modernization
of societies which are vulnerable to Communism as long as they remain
politically dishevelled, economically stagnant, and socially divided.
9. Short-run relations vs. _1211:nsislo2,12a2i221. If we are to
induce the tough structural changes in the existing order required
in many states (e.g., Iran and many Latin American republics), we
must not sacrifice.long-rangs purposes to short-run relations with
the transitional
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the transitional oligarchies. We must bear in mind that the
oligarchies have no rational alternative to going along with our
policy of the progressive liberalization and modernization of
transitional societies. We must give hardnosed realism priority
over diplomatic niceties and be prepared to risk the displeasure
of governments and classes currently holding power. And we must
use our varied array of overt and covert resources more imaginatively
and effectively than in the past to influence change in directions
which serve long-range US interests.
10. Alliance with modernization. Our aligning US foreign
policy with the major forces of modernizatim st work within under'
developed countries means that we must come to terms with the major.
forces at work within these countries: nationalism (often of an
irrational and irresponsible type), anticolonialiam (Which includes
the problem of powerlessness adjusting to the Great Powera of the
Free World in new relationships), and the revolution of rising
expectations. It must be a major US purpose to coordinate colnterm
insurgency programs on a pragmatic basis to deny Communist expllitation
of these forces.
? 11. Fuller capitalization on US itstettsm.? Certain Communist
asymmetries Which now, work against us can be counterbalanced if we
more systematically employ US resources to capitalize on four
advantages we hold over the Communists:. (a) our ability to involve
ourselves more deeply and cooperatively in the internal affairs of
the new
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the new states on matters affecting modernization and internal
defense; (b) the fact that we do not threaten their independence
or freedom to fashion their *own modernization systems and that,
therefore, our long-range interests basically coincide with theirs;
(c) our willingness to assist them in an empiric quest for moderniza-
tion within the framework of their own unique problems, culture and
aspirations (our fully exploiting this advantage will nevertheless
entail adjustments in US attitudes toward mixed economies, state.
owned enterprise, the role of private capital, Lnd reliance on
authoritarianism during modernization crisas); and (d) the
demonstrable failures of Communism in enlisting the deep-seated
incentives which appeal to human nature?notably the failure of
Communism to solve the problem of agriculture.
B. THE US POSTURE TOWARD HON.-COMMUNIST INSURCRICY
1. The initial US response. The United State*: cannot afford
to be against violence or revolution, 2..w. se, 48 historic agents of_
change. The right to change governments, economic systems and social
structures by revolution is recognized in international law and the laze
of force to overthrow non-Communist government? is not always contrary
to US interests. Situations will doubtless' arise where we shall want
to Support (or inspire) internal movements against established govern-
ments or colonial powers.
Where there is no provision for a peaaeful transfer of.
power, a change brought about through force by mu-Communist elements
may be a
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may be a preferable alternative to prolonged deterioration of
governmental effectiveness or to a continuation of a situation in
which increasing discontent and repression interact to breed each
other, thus building toward a more dangerous climax (e.g., Batista's
Cuba, Trujillo's Dominican Republic, Angola).
Each case of latent, incipient, or active nom-Communist
insurgency must therefore be examined On its merits in the light oi
US interests before we become involved on either side. We must avoid
jumping to easy conclusions that the insurgency is Communiat-inspired,
remembering that the Communists will seek to exploit purely nationalistic
breakdowns of order and that many legitimate nationalistic protests for
social improvement need not get out of band or become exploitable
Communist targets if the local government takes timely political
corrective action.
Our initial role should be that of counseling the local
government to examine objectively the grievances of insurgents, even
those under Communist influence, before resorting to force, unless
there is no practicable alternative.
2. Repression vs. reform. If force is required, we must make
it clear that the mere repression of insurgency at most usually does
no more than buy time which, unless put to political advantage, may
work in favor of the dissidents or of their Communist mentors on the
sidelines. It is always better to uproot insurgency than merely to
repress it,
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repress it, especially when the insurgency is aligned with a
popular cause. In the transitional societies, insurgency is a
time-hallowed form of political expression and often the only
available political pressure which can be brought to bear to
effect needed reforms. It should be so regarded by the local
government.
3. Persuasion of .82..vertmuentalleaders. :it is vital that
US Country Teams develop insurgency maps into country plans in
order that they may assess what position we shomld take when
insurgency occurs. For situations will doubtlese arise when
we may wish overtly or covertly to throw our suppcort behind the
insurgents in an effort to bring pressure on or to replace the
local government. When insurgency can be anticipated, US diplomacy'
and other resources should seek to keep the governmental leaders
from delaying until a real crisis is upon them, in whi,..1 case
their alternatives are more limited and the use of form will be
more imperative.
' The persuasion of local 1 aders to act in the interests of
their society before the Communists obtain footholds is a ciraplex
and subtle business and cannot succeed unless we know the facto
and are willing to contest certain facts that the local goverment
' may wish to sweep under the rug. It is therefore essential that
our County)
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our Country Teams determine where the points of strength and
vulnerability lie. This done, we can determine bow to strengthen
thowelements labia' most effectively support our objectives and
haw best to ease the tensions which have created the vulnerabilities.
C. US INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNIST-DIRECTED INSURGENCY
1. The scale of US involvement at the level of force should
'be as limited as possible and ancillary to the indigenous effort.
It is important for the United States to remain in the background,
and where possible to limit its support to training, advice and
material, lest we prejudice the acceptability of the local government
and complicate its task of gaining the allegiance of the insurgents,
and lest we expose ourselves unnecessarily to the "colonial coloration"
of Communist propaganda.
2. US strategv toward insurgency. Where insurgency is latent
or incipient (a Stage I situation), the US strategy ahould be directed
toward its elimination lest it provide Communist footholds and escalate
into active insurgency (a Stage /I situation), in a Stage 1 situation,
every effort must be made to immunize the critical sectors frac'
Communism and to eradicate Communist footholds therein (see following
section).
Where Communist influence or control is established in a
Stage I situation, steps rhould be taken to eliminate it through
practicable reform measures and informational programs designed to
evidence the
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evidence the concern and interest of the central government (e.g.,
''tie programs now underway in Northeast Brazil).
In Stage II situations the US involvement will be
intensified, indigenous force will be required, and the offensive
support capabilities of the US military and of CIA may be necessary
adjuncts to the local effort. In these situations, US programs should
be designed to make the indigenous military response as rapid and
incisive as possible on the hardcore insurgents and to parallel this
with reforms directed at ameliorating the insurgency.
3. The Philippine model. The Philippine campaign against the
Huks, as led by Hagsaysay, is a model of countering insurgency,
winning the allegiance of the demer/zic popular base from the Communists,
and destroying the foundations of Co=munist-directed guerrilla action.
Hagsaysay's strategy of the do gist fist of force and the extended palm
of conciliation and reform reveals what can be accompliehed by an
enlightened, energetic and imaginative central government which
'combines force with reform in defeating insurgency. It is a pattern
of action which should be implanted, with whatever local modifications
are necessary, wherever possible to other vulnerable underdeveloped
countries facing the reality or threat of Communist-directed
insurgency.
It should also be studied in detail by all US civil and
military officers concerned with counter. insurgency operations as
a model of
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a model of how US resources--civil, military and covert'.-can ,
inconspicuously, yet vitally, support an energetic domestic
effort.
, 4. Coordination of civil and military, resources. Anticipating,
preventing and suppressing Communist-direeted insurgency requires a
blend of military and non-military capabilities and actions to which
each US agency at the Country Team leve can and must contributc
In the battle of safeguarding the modernization process, carefully
evaluated intelligence, the ability to penetrate the enemy's stronv?
holds, the training of adequate and balanced military and police
capabilities, developmental assistance and advice, information
programs designed to ameliorate and bring understanding to local
problems--these are all indispensable components of an effective
"development diplomacy" adequate to the problems of the 196013.
Preventing and defeating Communist-directed insurgency is
therefore a total program for the local government?with its
positive and defensive sides--and for US resources in support
thereof. Success will depend on a careful *valuation of known
facts and on a unifying concept of operations based on a country
plan tailored to the local context in which applied civil and
military resources interact and overlap.
D. THE CRITICAL
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p. TBE CRITICAL SECTORS
1. The vital' sectors within modernizing societies on which
programs must be orchestrated are the rural sector; the labor
'front; the student and youth organizations, including the educated
unemployed; the communications and informmtional media; the military,.
police; the civil bureaucracy; the variant; middle-class elites
*(entrepreneurs, artists, academicians); and the political particJ,
including often a legal Communist Party but invariably an illegal
Communist apparat operating underground or through various fronts.
The Communists seek to subvert all these sectors but are generally
less successful than we in exerting major influence over governmental
leaders, the civil bureaucracy, the military and police, and the
middle class in general, including the centrist political parties:
2. The critical sectors from the atandpoint of US interests
are generally the countryside, the students and youth (including
the educational system), the labor unions and educated unemployed,
and the communications and information meCia. This is not to say
that the other sectors are entirely secure or that greater US
across-the-board efforts are not required. But in the typical
underdeveloped country, disaffected middle class or Communist
organizers are most likely to organize insurmnicy within the ranks
of the peasants, laborers, students, and the inemployed and under,-
privileged in general.
3. Urban vs.
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3. Urban vs. rural sectors. Insurgency must be guarded
against in both the cities and the countryside. In loosely.?
structured countries where the cities are beachheads for the
outside world, the economy is predominantly agricultural, the
central government has not gripped and led the peasantry, a passive,
detached rural population, capable of being terrorized or enflamed,
is the more important and rewarding target for Communist political
activity (e.g., South Vietnam, Northeast Brazil). In these
situations, the battle must be joined at the village level,
which normally represents the lowest social and political organiza-
tional level.
Discontented urban ...opulations may be the more fertile
. ground for Communist activities if the country is in the uneasy
. throes of early industrialization and urbanization (e.g., Egypt,
Iran) or is undergoing a political and social renovation from the
evils of dictatorship and mismcnagement (e.g., Venezuela).
Or the Communist thrust may come through the exploitation
of rural canorities which may have footholds in provincial capitals
(e.g., the Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Iran and Turkey).?
4. Special Problems of the Countryside. The underdeveloped
world is predominantly agricultural, with 75 per cent of its people
living co the land, often under feudal or semi-feudal conditions
(e.g., Ecuador, Peru), yet not immune .from the modernizing
influences of
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influences of the cities and the Communists-,who place a high
priority on organising peasant land-reform leagues even in the
more enlightened of the modernizing societies (e.g., India).
The fact that the Communists have for so long held a virtual
monopoly of urging land for the peasants suggests the necessity
of our placing land reform, community development, and increased
agricultural productivity at the top of our agenda for counter*
insurgency programs. But there are other cogeat reasons.
Land reform can or Cannot contribute to increased
agricultural productivity, depending =bow effectively it is
administered from the standpoint of credit and technical assistance.
But it can be made to contribute to increased agricultural productivity
and the latter is a strategic objective for modernizing societies
in order to (a) create market relations between't3e cities and the
countryside, thus strengthening the cohesiveness of the society,
(b) proviee a base of rural puntbasing power for urban manufactured
products, and (c) eat,e the country's balance of payments problem
by contributing to its agricultural.self-sufficieacy.
-Regardless of whether the country is adapted to guerrilla
warfare,- re-should therefore place special eppbasis.on land reform
and increased agricultural production in ortht to seal off the country-
side from Communism and bring the normally coLnervative peasant, which.
Communism has
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Communism has traditionally used but distrusted, into the main-
stream of his society and its market economy.
Community development is a vital adjunct to the political
.,and social development of a loosely- structured country for the
reason that it takes government to the countryside and establishes
channels of communication and response between the rural sector
and central government. It is thus a reinsurance policy against
insurgency in the countryside and a mechanism for making government
responsive to the people's needs.
For these reasons, US strategy should emphasize defense
of the countryside through sound land reform, increased agricultural
productivity, and community devel,;?mc.7.t programs. This process can
be helpfully accelerated, as it hos ia many countries (e.g., Mexico,
Turkey) by civic action programs On the part of the local military,
thus carrying the central writ to the country in expressions of
interest and concern of a type which strengthen a society.
,
5. Special urban problems. Within modernizing societies, labor
and youth will continue to present problems of dissatisfaction and
disaffection, as they have in most countries, including the Soviet
,Union. Yet a greal deal more can be done to focus US programs and
resources on explaining to both the trials and troubles of the
modernization process and the pitfalls of turning to Communism as
an alternative to fighting for progress as loyal nationalists.
We must
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We must especially devote more attention to the
educational systems of the new states, to assist them in improving
the quality of their curricula and teachers, and in supplying text-
books which will prepare students for the modern democratic world.
The dissidence of the urban discontented can also be ameliorated
considerably through emphasis on the types of programs envisaged
under the Alliance for Progress (e.g., low cost housing, potable
water supplies, sanitation measures, construction of schools, etc.).
The importance of youth end labor to US interests is
illustrated by a recent despatt Embassy Quito which states
that the students' and labor fe.,orztions of Ecuador--a country on
the brink of insurgency?are more politically powerful than any one
of the existing political parties.
6. Assets on which to build. While getting ourselves in shape
to deal more effectively with the critical sectors, we must not
neglect to build more constructively on those assets which now
'generally lean toward US objectives?the military and police, the
civil bureaucracy, the middle class generally, and the political
leadership.
We shou1d find ways of making greater use of our ability
to train indigenous officers corps in nation-building and state-
craft, bearing in mind that our military train more foreign nationals
in military
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in military sciences than all other US government training programa ?
combined. Our strategy should be to make the local military and
police surrogates of US-Free World interests and officers with
whom we can cooperate fruitfully in the politico-military intracacies
of safeguarding the modernization process. Such would create an
asymmetry in our favor which could go farther than vie have gon in
the past to offset Communist advantages of being able to operate
through indigenous political parties.
It is similarly strategically critical that we devote
'iota attention and resources to training avil bureaucrato. in
administrative practices and problems of modernization.
7. The middle class. Ours is predominantly a middle-class
society and our strategy vis-a-vis the modernizing socinties is in
actuality one of converting them into open, permissive middle-class
societies. We have not in the past always clearly seen this as our
real purpose. We have too often been timid in risking the disfavor
or enmity of oligarchic leaders who, though they claim ta as brothers,
have no appetite for our advice.
In a society which is in flux, we must accept the fact that
we cannot please all ctasses or all persons; what we must therefore
do is to remain true to ourselves and project the image of a liberal
dtmocracy
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democracy in action which stands for the strengthening of the
middle class in all sectors of modernizing societies, and in the
countryside as well as in the cities.
Similarly, vis-a-vis a government which may veer dangerously
toward Communist norms in its socialist experiments, we must be
patient and understaAing, bearing in mind that excesses often
correct themselves (e.g., India, Guinea) and that no nationalist
government can survive indefinitely or without trouble on a
completely conservative politic 21 program. In these situations,
we still must act with confidence according to our own standards,
keep to our middle-class strategy, cald take care that we do not
drive the government farther to the Left, or into dependency on
the Bloc, by cutting off avenues of assistance and advice (e.g.,
our support of Bolivia since the 1.9\52 revolution).
E. INTERVENTION VS. COOPERATIVE INVOLVEMENT
"Development diplomacy" differs materially from traditional
*diplomacy as practiced with the advanced countries of the North,
or with hostile states. The essence of development diplomacy is
that we develop the capability and the capacity to involve ourselves
deeply in the internal affairs of modernizing states in order to
assist them with advice and resources.
While we will
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While we will continue to eschew unwanted intervention, we
must bear in mind that the doctrine of non-intervention applies
only to unwanted or unwelcomed forms of intervention, notably armed
intervention. There is no doctrine against the deep and intricate
involvement of one or more states in the modernization and internal
.defense problems of another, though obviously the practitioners of
? development diplomacy must proceed in recognition of the sensitifities
of the host government. This is an additional reason why US represent-
atives abroad must be grounded in the factual tcrrain of the society
.in which they serve.
F. THE ULTIMATE TAXGET--PEO "
In counterin3 insurgency, 1..t especially ia suppressing internal
' war, we must kcep in mind the ultimate and deciaive target: the people,
who are mo,--e decisive to the outcome thce the territory captured or
the insursc.nts killed. In internal war, society does not retreat
to the aidelines and leave the battle to the zoldiers: aociety itself
is at war and the resources, motives and ta,tgez, of the struggle are
found almost wholly within the local society. The terrain on which the
ultimate battle is won or lost is the support of the people.
Viewed in this light, insurgency and interntl war--if they cannot
be avoided by timely political action?offer opportunities to strengthen
the society and point it toward modernization vita greater social
immunization against
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immunization against Communism (e.g., the Philippine model, Malaya).
It is just as important to attack the inner political and psychological
structure of :insurgency as it is to attack its exterior manifestations
of violence, and the attacks should always be mutually reenforcing
in dangerous situations.
G. COUNTER-IDEAS AND COUNTER-' ORGANIZATIONS
Because insurgency, especially Communist-directed insurgenc),
is always rooted in attitudes and a political structure, there is
need, in the political struggle against Communism, both for counter
ideas and countereorganizations. For ideas to have political force,
they must be supported by some form of organization-- something the
Communists understand well. Soma form of organization whLeb permits
outlets for confused emotions and somewhat inchoate political
' aspirations is especially important to overcome the feeling of
rootlessness of people who have been uprooted from their traditional
way of life and are caught in the flux of modernization, industrial-
ization and urbanization. This explains part of the appeal of
Communism in transitional societies.
. US programs and resources should be more systematically geared,
therefore, to the development of counter-ideas and counter-organizations.
All arms of US policy represented abroad can contribute to this
strategic objective, but especially our military and police training
missions, CIA and USIA.
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H. STRATEGIC ASSIGNWENTS (NEES AED MISSIONS).
1. The Counta Team concept. The Country Teem, beaded by
the Ambassador as the President's principal representative in a
country, is the forum for preparing and coordinating the execution
of counterinsurgency programs abroad for these reasons:
a. The modernization process in underdeveloped countries
involves the entire range of governmental and public activity: it
is the purpose of government and ubiquitously affects the internal
and external policies of the state in its relations with its own
people and with the outside world. Everything we do will affect this
process in some way. It is therefore vital that we coordinate the
US effort in modernizing societies on be basis of a central US
strategy which will be a combination of the country's development
plan and a country plan for coping with the country's vulnerabilities
to insurgency.
b. The country plan aLduld evolve towazd a US strategic
plan for seeing the country through it:: difficulties with minimum
risks of insurgency--a combination of the type Of counterinsurgency
plan developed for South Vietnam and of the type of strategic plan
we are seeking to develop in key Latin American countries to determine
how US resources can be brought to bear on key points of leverage to
induce progress toward Alliance 1(47 7.1rogress goals. This is a matter
to which
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to which all US agencies at the Country Team level must contribute
both in preparation and execution.
c. The Country Team mechanism should therefore be
systematically employed for developing country plans and coordinating
the employment of US resources in their execution. It should
aimilarly be utilized as a forum in which to educate all participants
in the complexities of the others' buoiness, thus achieving a greater
coordination of effort and s7,11,-,-astzb t-77, the local government, to&e.ther
with a greater versatility
2. Coordination at the natimv, level. A similar need for
coordination exists at the national level. The Special Group (C-I)
fulfills this need in respect of couutries certified to iL as critical.
The Task Force mechanism under the chairmanship of the Department of
State is a 7.artial answer to the need. But beneath the level of
critie=lit: Atli which the Speci-1 Cup (C-I) and the Task Forces
are col:cox-AA, there are a wide of countries whose insurgency
probleLJ a.ro. dealt with on a less m cint and effective basis from
the standpoint of coordination. Mc. Department of State should
.therefore take a lead in devising mc.ce effective methods of
those
coordinating at the national level/c7ourit?erinsurgency programs
recommended to it by the Country Team.
3. Strateds roles of the Country Team. Strategically, the
Country Team should strive toward these capabilities in support of
the Amhavsadorse
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the Ambassador's and Department of State's over-all responsibilities
for the conduct of US foreign relations:
a. Adequately trained personnel generally indoctrinated
in the entire range of problems confronted by the various US agencies
in a moderning society, including the problem of subversive insurgency.
.8
b. Carefully evaluated intelligence on a society7Foints
of strength and vulnerability and on its leaders, innovators and
dissidents, including Communists and Communist organizers and fronts.
All US agencies can make uniqu-.... 1.:.:..mts to our intelligence map of a
society.
c. The widest posaible contacts with all sectezs of the
society, including the opposition. All US agencies should systematically
widen contacts in the sectors of their principal interest.
d. A capacity to understand and to discuss the country's
problems in depth with all classes of people. A consistent dialogue
on the country's problems should be a strategic purpose of all US
agencies, both because it will divulge attitudes and intelligence
and because it will assist us in mastering the complexities of the
local scene.
e. A capability of coordinating US resources in support
of centrist political groupings capable of assuming political power
and of transferring it through orderly processes.
f. An ability
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f. An ability to work with the, local government in
ekplaining its programs and probleml to the people at large.
g. An ability to influence the local military toward a
balanced mix of external and internal defense capabilities which
will assure a total defense of the society with minimum drains on
local resources.
b. An ability to influence the critical sectors suLeptible
to Communist influences in Free World values and purposes vis-a-vis
their society.
i. An ability to influence political and social develop-
ment more effectively throu3b 4avc1opmental and military assistance
and training.
4. azelIE_Fnt of in the field, the Amlassador and
Department of State perzonzi c.ttcched to his staff sbould take the
lead in encGtIging end pereUrls the strategic roles of the Country
Tccm, as env,::crated above, nrA in 3iving tactical counzel to other
US agencies. The Ambassedor and one or more counterinsurgency
specialists assigned to his staff- should also take the lead iLN
putting together the country plan, in coordinating its executioA,
and in integrating the plan into the totality of US foreign policy
a maintained and coordinated at the country level by the Aizbaasado):.
5. The De 4_20.E.L._:tccart.
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5. The rnt of Defenoe. The strategic role of Defence,
in cooperation with AID and CIA, is n3 local country in
developing a balanced security gc :a, -.72.th minimal 1=ands on
internal resources, which will country a of military
(police) security against 5,171=n, czternal threat. Defense
(AID, CIA) can make contributions of gz.-,
imp-w:tance by (a)
in the coaplexit cf the =:,:a:.zatitya
te local
of thc inter-
relationship oZ clodernisation 4nd insurgency: