TIBET AND CHINA (BACKGROUND PAPER)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060022-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 27, 1959
• Content Type: STUDY

CONFIDENTIAL
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27 APRIL 1959
NO. 2243 / 59
COPY NO. 2
TIBET AND CHINA
(BACKGROUND PAPER)
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
PREPARED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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TIBET AND CHINA
Table of Contents
Introduction
Page
1.
Tibetan Institutions. . . . . . .
. .
1
II.
Land and People . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
7.
III.
Economy and Transportation. . . . . . .
. .
13
IV.
Sino-Tibetan Relations to 1950. . . . . .
19
V.
Chinese Communist Control in Tibet. . .?. .
...
24
VI.
International Aspects . . . . . . . . . .
. .
35
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TIBET REGION
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J
MONGOLIAN
REGION
~
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION O~
A ONOMOUS
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on Chinese Communist maps
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region boundary by Tibetans and related groups
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Ho NINGSIA
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73 those recognized by the U. S. Ga,emment. Se'-, PAIL. 90 56 r ,. N 102
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TIBET AND CHINA
Introduction
The present situation in Tibet is similar in many respects
to incidents that have occurred repeatedly throughout centuries
of contact and conflict between Tibetans and Chinese. For this
reason an understanding of past developments in Sino-Tibetan
relations is essential to an assessment of the present. The
basic factors which have continued to affect this relationship
include the nature and persistence of native Tibetan institutions,
the policies of various Chinese central governments toward Tibet,
and the activities of other nations in the area. These factors
have operated within the framework of the difficult terrain and
climate of Tibet and its rigid social structure.
The area designated by the name "Tibet" has varied greatly.
For the purposes of this discussion, "Tibet" will include the
existing political entity consisting of Tibet proper and the
Chamdo area immediately to the east. The eastern boundary of
the region follows roughly the upper reaches of the Yangtze
River. The area principally inhabited by ethnic Tibetans is
much greater, but it includes territories traditionally gov-
erned by China, India, Nepal, and other border countries.
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I. Tibetan Institutions
The outstanding characteristic of the government of Tibet
is that until recently it has been a functioning theocracy.
While religious and political aspects of the government could
be distinguished, the former were dominant. Events in Tibet
cannot be understood, therefore, without some knowledge of the
Tibetan religion and its coordinate leaders, the Dalai and
Panchen Lamas.
The Tibetan religion is a form of Buddhism usually re-
ferred to as Lamaism. Subjected to a heavy admixture of prim-
itive animism, it is regarded as unorthodox by adherents of the
major schools of Buddhism. Because the early history of the
region was characterized by constant contention among petty ru-
lers, the monasteries, as symbols of continuity and security,
acquired a considerable amount of political power.
The temporal power of the religious authorities was en-
hanced in the 13th century when invading Mongols were converted
to Lamaism and established a Tibetan government under Mongol.
suzerainty. The subsequent conquest of China by the Mongols
led to close relations between Tibet and the central govern-
ment of China.
With the fall of Mongol authority in China in 1368, Tibet
became largely independent and internal conditions became un-
settled. About a century later there arose a Buddhist leader
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who instituted reforms in the Tibetan church and consolidated
the position of a new sect. He was highly revered during his
lifetime, and upon his death an infant was discovered who was
declared to be his reincarnation. This marked the establish-
ment of the institution of the Dalai Lama, of whom the present
incumbent is the 14th reincarnation.
The temporal authority of the Dalai Lama was made absolute
under the able fifth reincarnation, who ruled during the 17th
century with the support of a Mongol Khan. As a mark of rever-
ence for his aged tutor, the fifth Dalai Lama declared him to
be a reincarnation of a Buddha. In addition, the tutor was
granted a large and rich monastery as his headquarters and a
court was established for him which resembled that of the Dalai
Lama but on a smaller scale. Thus was founded the institution
of the Panchen Lama, who has continued to share spiritual auth-
ority among Tibetans with the Dalai Lama. The present incumbent
is the tenth in the 'Line.
Both the Dalai and Panchen Lamas are selected from infants
born within a reasonably short interval after the death of an
incumbent. Delegations of religious authorities search out such
infants, subject them to certain tests, and look for physical
attributes which are supposed to indicate that the child is the
reincarnation of the deceased Lama. The Lamas need not be born
within the political boundaries of Tibet nor be of Tibetan par-
entage; a Mongol prince was once selected as Dalai Lama. As a
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practical matter, however, the search is conducted in areas in-
habited largely by ethnic Tibetans.
From the point of view of Buddhist theology, the Panchen
Lama is superior to the Dalai Lama since he reincarnates a be-
ing of higher rank. Practically, however, the Dalai Lama has
continued to exercise paramount authority, both spiritually and
temporally. The relationship between the two Lamas has fre-
quently been one of rivalry which at times has broken out into
open quarreling.
A significant instance of rivalry occurred during the reigns
of the predecessors of the present incumbents. A long and bitter
disagreement was climaxed by the flight of the Panchen Lama to
China in 1923. After the death of the Dalai Lama in 1933 and
the selection of a successor in 1935 the Panchen Lama began the
journey back to Lhasa, but he died in 1937 while still in Chi-
nese territory.
The present Dalai and Panchen Lamas, although they are eth-
nic Tibetans, were born and discovered outside the political
borders of Tibet, in China's Tsinghai Province. The Dalai Lama,
who was born in 1935, was brought to Lhasa four years later
while the Panchen Lama, born in 1937, remained in a monastery
in Tsinghai until 1952. Their relations have been outwardly
amicable since that time, but recent events have brought their
basic differences to the fore. These developments will be
discussed below in connection with Chinese activities in Tibet.
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The system by which a Dalai Lama is selected has resulted
in the growth of a strong regency as the center of political
power in Tibet. In 1947 a dispute between the current regent
and an ex-regent led to the outbreak of hostilities and the siege
of the Dalai Lama's residence by the faction of the latter. The
regent defeated his enemy, however, and severe reprisals were
taken against the rebelling monks.
The traditional government consisted of two major divisions,
one to administer ecclesiastical affairs and the other to handle
secular affairs. Many principal posts were dual, held jointly
by a monk and a layman. Even the command of the armed forces was
shared in this manner. Most lay members of the government were
chosen from the nobility, whose families often owed their posi-
tions to association with the church. The families of the suc-
cessive Dalai Lamas, for example, have traditionally been ele-
vated to the nobility and granted estates. The form of govern-
ment was preserved under Communist domination until the recent
outbreak of rebellion in Lhasa, at which time it was dissolved.
A prime minister--often the regent or ex-regent--served as
intermediary between the Dalai Lama and the Kashag (cabinet).
The Kashag, which consisted of one monk and three lay ministers,
was responsible to a "Small Assembly" of mixed lay and ecclesias-
tical membership whose decisions it was obliged to carry out.
All government acts, however, required the approval of the Dalai
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Lama before being put into effect. A "Great Assembly" of about
400 members representing major monasteries and noble families met
only to consider important matters such as the selection of a re-
gent or a declaration of war.
Tibetan society is characterized by rigid stratification
based on the dominance of the clergy and nobility. Since the
church has been the only road to advancement open to the common
people, great numbers of young men enter monasteries. It has
been estimated that about one sixth of the male population are
monks, a factor which has tended to limit the growth of the
Tibetan population and, in some parts of the country, led to
the practice of polyandry.
The importance of the monasteries is not limited to polit-
ical and religious matters. Because of the large proportion of
the population living under their control, the monasteries are
deeply involved in economic activities such as trade and the
management of farms and herds. The monks also carry on a sub-
stantial part of the handicraft work which provides Tibetans
with daily necessities.
After dissolving the traditional Tibetan government on
28 March 1959, the Chinese Communist authorities turned over
administration of the area to the Preparatory Committee for the
Tibetan Autonomous Region, which had been established in 1956
under the nominal chairmanship of the Dalai Lama. The nature
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and functions of this committee will be discussed in more detail
below, in connection with relations between Tibet and the Chi-
nese central government.
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II. Land and People
Various aspects of the physical environment in Tibet--par-
ticularly terrain, climate, and location--pose serious obstacles
to domination by an outside power. Most of Tibet consists of
very rugged, inhospitable terrain, with vast, desolate plateaus
to the north and high mountains and deep river valleys in the
east. These act as formidable barriers isolating and protecting
the major centers of authority in southern Tibet, which are lo-
cated principally in the middle reaches of the Tsangpo (Brahmapu-
tra) River and its tributaries. Here are located the chief ur-
ban centers and much of the cultivated land, as well as Lhasa,
the capital and seat of political and religious power. Chinese
activity consequently has focused on southern Tibet, and major
efforts have been directed toward construction of communication
links with Chinese bases across the outlying barrier regions.
Eastern Tibet, or Chamdo, Tibet's second most important re-
gion, contains the upper reaches of the Salween, Mekong, and
Yangtze--rivers that flow in extremely deep, rocky, north-south-
aligned gorges. On the interfluvial divides of 13,000 to 15,000
feet are grassy plateaus that permit considerable grazing. The
northwestern portion of Chamdo is a transitional region--the
characteristic features of the plateau of northern Tibet merge
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into the mountain and gorge terrain of southeastern Chamdo. The
topographic complexity isolates the productive areas and severely
restricts communications, thus contributing to the political frag-
mentation of Chamdo, the continuance of petty feudatories, and a
favorable milieu for, guerrilla warfare. Communist activity in
eastern Tibet has been concentrated on the construction and main-
tenance of the Szechwan-Lhasa road and connecting routes and on
the control of strategic centers such as Chang-tu.
Northern Tibet is a vast plateau (the.Chang Thang) 14,000
to 16,000 feet in elevation, enclosed on the north and south by
mountains more than 20,000 feet high. It is a region of Internal
drainage with numerous large, usually brackish lakes--particu-
larly in the southeast. Although extensive grazing grounds--
mainly in the southern half--support nomads and their flocks,
much of the Chang Thang is desolate and uninhabited. Except for
mineralogical exploration and the exploitation of borax, Chinese
activity in this region has been nil.
Western Tibet (A-li) is a largely isolated area consisting
of mountains, plateaus, and the gorges and ravines of the SutleJ
and Upper Indus Rivers. Gartok is the regional capital. The
principal activity of the few Chinese troops quartered here is
directed toward political security--a matter of some concern to
the Chinese because of the considerable trade and pilgrim traffic
with India and Nepal. A recently constructed road connects
A-li with Chinese supply bases in Sinkiang.
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The climate of Tibet varies considerably from region to
region. In general, cold, arid conditions prevail in northern
and western Tibet while there are more moderate temperatures
and heavier precipitation in the southeast. The northern
plateau of Tibet is characterized by extreme cold during much
of the year (temperatures may drop to -40?F), great daily vari-
ations in temperatures, scanty precipitation mainly in the form
of snow and hail, and frequent very strong winds. In the more
sheltered valleys of southern and eastern Tibet, however, tem-
peratures are more moderate, permitting a four-to-five month
growing season. Precipitation is considerably greater and, in
some favored areas, reaches 40 inches a year (about the same as
for Washington, D. C.). Although only low grasses and shrubs
can grow on the high plateau, the more moist conditions of south-
eastern Tibet result in some forested areas and extensive high
altitude grasslands.
Climatic factors have posed serious problems for the Chi-
nese Communists in Tibet. The Szechwan-Lhasa, road--particularly
the section west from Chang-tu to where it nears the Brahmapu-
tra River--is subject to landslides and washout of roadbed and
bridges during the summer rainy season and snow and ice are
often problems along the higher sections during winter. The
other main road from China, the Tsinghai-Tibet road, is like-
wise subject to some damage and blockage during the rainy season
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and occasional snow and ice problems; damage is generally less
serious, however, because of lighter precipitation. The high
elevations and bitter cold characteristic of much of Tibet have
contributed to morale problems for Chinese personnel, most of
them lowlanders with little liking or tolerance for the Tibetan
environment.
The population of Tibet is estimated to be about 1,300,000
inhabitants, but there are at least as many Tibetans outside the
political boundaries--primarily inhabiting the adjoining prov-
inces of Szechwan, Tsinghai, and Yunnan--making the total Tibetan
population in all of China almost 3,000,000. Additionally, there
is a considerable admixture of Tibetans with various hill groups
in northern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North-East Frontier
Agency of India, part of Kashmir, and in other Himalayan border
tracts of northern India. According to the Chinese Communists,
the area of Tibet is 1,225,000 square kilometers--roughly com-
parable in area to the combined territory of Texas, New Mexico,
and Oklahoma--but this figure includes an estimated 70,000 square
kilometers of the North-East Frontier Agency shown on Chinese maps
as part of Tibet. The population density of about 1 person per
square kilometer (or slightly more than 2.5 per square mile) is
the lowest of any province or comparable administrative unit in
China, and makes Tibet one of the most sparsely populated areas
in the world.
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Concentrations of population correspond closely to areas of
relatively low elevation (generally under 14,000 feet), suitable
temperatures and adequate water supplies to permit the growing
of hardy grains and vegetables, and available natural vegetation
suitable for grazing. Consequently, the major concentrations
of population are in southern Tibet in the Brahmaputra Valley
and along its major tributaries, and in lowlands and valleys of
eastern Tibet. Outside of these comparatively few lower valleys
and plainp,the population is very scant and confined almost en-
tirely to the more favored grazing lands. There are large un-
inhabited areas, in particular the cold, barren wastes of the
northern portion of the Tibetan plateau.
The major urban centers of Tibet include the capital of
Lhasa, located in the fertile Kyi Chhu Valley at about 12,000
feet--population about 80,000, including several thousand monks;
Zhigatse, situated at the confluence of the Nyang-chu and the
Brahmaputra rivers and the traditional seat of power of the
Panchen Lama--population 20,000; and Gyangtse, located on the
Nyang-chu River some 50 miles southeast of Zhigatse--estimated
population 10,000. Other population centers are much smaller,
and villages of a dozen houses or less are typical.
Tibet has countless monasteries that may or may not be
associated with a village or town. Although several monas-
teries, notably those near Lhasa, have 5,000 or more inmates,
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most are small with fewer than 100 inhabitants. In western Tibet
near the Indian and Nepalese frontiers, several temporary trading
encampments are established for several weeks each year--generally
during late summer and early fall--at which time the nomads and
Tibetan traders barter with traders from India and Nepal.
The pattern of distribution of the Tibetan population has
both aided and hindered the institution and maintenance of Chi-
nese control. The traditional concentration of Tibetan political
and religious power in a very few urban centers has facilitated
the imposition of Chinese authority. Most of Tibet, however,
consists of rugged and remote uplands--the domain of the nomads.
Because of the difficult and isolated areas in which they dwell
and because of their mobility, nomadic groups have long enjoyed
virtual independence from any central authority. The physical
factors have proved significant obstacles to consolidation of
Peking's control over the sparsely populated areas of Tibet,
through which Chinese Communist overland supply routes must pass.
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~'fERRAIN AND TRANSPORTATION -=~
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Motorable road, under
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III. Economy and Transportation
The traditional economy of Tibet prior to 1951 was largely
self-contained. Although industry was practically nonexistent and
the known resources largely undeveloped, the people were accus-
tomed to a simple mode of life and there was little demand for
industrial products. In general, the agricultural areas of south-
ern Tibet supplied adequate quantities of the main food staples--
barley, lesser amounts of other grains, and root crops--and meat
and dairy products were available from the vast herds of sheep,
yaks, and yak-cattle crossbreeds. The only significant dietary
item not supplied in Tibet was tea, and this was obtained from
China. Tibet's animal population also provided skins and wool
for clothing and shelter, and the ubiquitous yak supplied dung
for fuel throughout the sizable areas devoid of fuelwood.
Tibet did engage in trade with India, China, and the neigh-
boring Himalayan states. Trade with India was of most importance,
with the greatest volume carried over the Lhasa-Kalimpong (Gang-
tok) trade route that. crossed the passes on the border of Sikkim.
Several million pounds of Tibetan wool was exchanged annually for
a wide variety of goods, of which cotton textiles, foodstuffs,
and sundry consumer goods were of greatest importance. Trade be-
tween western Tibet and India likewise was important, and petty
barter trade--normally salt from Tibet exchanged for grains--
was common to the entire southern frontier of Tibet.
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After eight years of Chinese rule, Tibet's basic
economic structure remains essentially unchanged. Aside from
the construction of transportation routes, Chinese efforts have
been directed towards a survey and appraisal of Tibet's resources,
with emphasis on strategic minerals and food crops. Perhaps the
most notable Chinese project has been the mining of borax from
one of the numerous brackish lakes of the Tibetan plateau. The
output from this deposit (at Panggog Tso, located some 160 miles
west of Hei-ho) is one of the two major sources of China's pro-
duction. Since total output is far in excess of known Chinese
needs, much of this borax is believed to be exported to the Soviet
Union and the European satellites. In addition to traditional
uses, borax derivatives are potentially useful as missile fuels
and as control materials in atomic energy production.
Economic progress in other fields has been slow. A truck-
repair shop has been built in Lhasa, and an iron works to pro-
duce machine parts and agricultural equipment is under construc-
tion. Three small hydroelectric and steam power plants have been
constructed at Lhasa, Zhigatse, and Chang-tu, the total generat-
ing capacity of which is only 800 kilowatts. A larger hydro-
electric plant with a proposed generating capacity of 7500 kil-
owatts is under construction near Lhasa.
In agriculture, the Chinese have improved existing irriga-
tion facilities, reclaimed unknown amounts of "wasteland," and
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experimented with the growing of grains and vegetables suitable
to the Tibetan environment. The Chinese may be able to supply
much of their vegetable requirements locally, and the Lhasa area
reportedly supplies outlying garrisons. Despite Chinese efforts
along these lines, however, the increase in food-grain produc-
tion has apparently not kept pace with the growing number of Chi-
nese personnel stationed in Tibet. An announcement from Lhasa
in 1958 told of the "determination" of the Tibet Military Dis-
trict to be self-sufficient in food grains within the next three
to five years.
Chinese statements that Tibet could provide land for "sev-
eral million" peasants from overpopulated areas in China have
been cited as one reason for Tibetan discontent, From an analy-
sis of Tibet's physical environment and fragmentary statistics
released by the Chinese, there appears to be little additional
arable land actually available for prospective colonization. A
Chinese report indicates that only 2,000 to 3,000 acres of addi-
tional farm land has been found in the fertile Brahmaputra Valley;
roughly 20,000 acres of potential farmland is purported to be
available in southwestern Chamdoo Even it these acreage figures
were doubled, probably only 75,000 to 100,000 Chinese could be
absorbed.
It is probable that improved grain varieties, greater em-
phasis on and improvement of irrigation facilities, and use of
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fert1lizex's could increase total food-grain output appreciably,
but limitations of high elevations, low temperatures, a short
growing season, and inadequate precipitation suggest that Tibet
is not likely to become another Manchuria to the Chinese.
No major alterations in India-Tibet trade have occurred un-
der Chinese occupation, even with the opening of the roads from
Lhasa to China. In recent years a balance favorable to India has
been recorded as a result of the increased Chinese demands for
consumer goods, construction materials, and foodstuffs. Some at-
tempts have been made through trade agreements with India and
Nepal to limit the number of trade routes and markets.
Prior to the Chinese Communist occupation there were no mo-
torable roads in Tibet. Caravan trails joined the major towns
and areas, and a journey from Lhasa to Chinese centers in Szech-
wan and Kansu over the long difficult trails required from two
to three months.
Initial work on a motorable road from the east, begun in
1950 in conjunction with the advance of Chinese Communist troops
to Tibet, was completed to Lhasa in December 1954. Construc-
tion problems were numerous since the road, about 1,400 miles
long, crossed some of the world's most difficult terrain, with
mountain passes up to 15,000 feet and river gorges several
thousand feet deep. Moreover, maintenance was difficult and
costly since many sections of the route were susceptible to
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washouts, landslides, and, at higher elevations, ice and prob-
lems of freezing ancl: thawing. The section in southwestern Chamdo
where the road approaches the Indian border was particularly
troublesome, due to the heavy summer rains. In 1956, Tibetan
rebel forces apparently assisted the forces of nature, and since
that time large sections--particularly in the west--have been
inoperable most of the time. Construction of alternate roads
north and south of the main road has been undertaken to bypass
the troublesome portions of the Szechwan-Lhasa road.
In 1954 the Chinese also constructed a second road-about
1,300 miles in length,-conncecting Lhasa with Hsining, capital
of Tsjnghai Province. Because much of this road passes over high
and barren but essentially passable plateau, "construction-" in
many areas simply meant the moving of a few rocks from a suit-
able area of level ground. Serious drawbacks to the use of this
road have been extremely high elevations and intense cold and
strong winds during much of the year. The Chinese have con-
tinued to improve this road, nevertheless, and it is now the ma-
jor supply route to their forces in southern Tibet.
Additional roads within southern Tibet have been built,
notably a road from Lhasa to Yatung, near the Sikkim border, via
Zhigatse and Gyangtse. A road from Sinkiang has been constructed
to supply their forces in distant western Tibet, but it is open
only six months of the year. The alignment of this road appar-
ently crosses some uninhabited high plateau and mountain country
that normally is shown on Indian maps as part of Indian Kashmir.
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Although the construction of these roads represents signif-
icant engineering achievements, they were built at an unknown but
probably considerable human cost, particularly the difficult
Szechwan-Lhasa road. Forced labor has been used, including that
of Tibetans, and this latter fact has been one of the many fac-
tors exacerbating Sino-Tibetan relations.
The key to continued Chinese occupation of Tibet is the main-
tenance of their transportation links with bases in Kansu and
Szechwan. The eastern part of the Szechwan-Lhasa road and a new
road to the south may enable the Chinese to supply their forces
in eastern Chamdo, but to supply Lhasa via this route would mean
the reconstruction of many sections. There is the strong possibil-
ity that the combined actions of man and nature would make this
difficult and costly. The maintenance of the Tsinghai-Tibet road
is less difficult, principally because the general plateau sur-
face over which the road passes is far less susceptible to inter-
diction. This road is capable of supporting the present number
of Chinese Communist troops in Tibet; additional measures of re-
serving the road for military traffic and increasing the number
of trucks would enable the Chinese Communists to support a 50-
percent increase in their current strength.
An air link between Tibet and China has been established,
with the construction in 1956 of an airfield at Tang-hsiung in
a 13,900-foot plain located about 100 miles north of Lhasa. Air-
lift support is possible but difficult.
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IV. Sino-Tibetan Relations to 1950
Relations between Tibet and the central governments of
China have been marked by conflict since the first appearance
of Tibet in historical records more than a thousand years ago.
In general, vigorous and expansive Chinese dynasties have at-
tempted to assert authority over Tibet, often by force of arms,
while less dynamic ones have been content to maintain a merely
ceremonial suzerainty over the area.
During periods of Chinese withdrawal, the rulers of Tibet
tended to acknowledge the suzerainty of Mongol leaders. As noted
above, Lamaism was made the state religion of the Mongol empire
by Kublai Khan in the 13th century, and the fifth Dalai Lama be-
came absolute ruler of Tibet in the 17th century through the in-
tercession of another Mongol Khan. As a result of these close
connections with the Mongols, Tibet had established contact with
the Manchus even before the latter conquered China in 1644. The
newly enthroned Manchu emperor did not immediately question the
temporal power of the Dalai Lama, backed as it was by the armed
force of a great Mongol Khan and the religious devotion of all
the Mongols. Mongol authority was represented at Lhasa during
this period by a Mongol king who administered secular matters un-
der the control of the Dalai Lama.
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It was not until 1709 that the second Manchu emperor, Kang
Hsi, sent a Chinese official to Lhasa to "assist" in the govern-
ment. Certain Mongol tribes, believing that the Dalai Lama and
the Mongol king of Tibet had become Chinese puppets, thereupon
invaded Tibet, deposed the Dalai Lama, and killed the king. The
Manchus responded with a counterinvasion and by 1720 had taken
Lhasa and driven out the Mongols. The suzerainty thus gained by
the Manchus included Bhutan and other Himalayan dependencies as
well as Tibet itself. The Manchus enthroned a seventh Dalai Lama
and permitted him and the Panchen Lama to retain both temporal
and spiritual powers over the country.
A strong Manchu garrison remained in Tibet after the con-
quest, but a rebellion in 1727 compelled the Chinese government
to take stronger measures. After that date, a Chinese resident
was stationed in Lhasa and eastern Tibet was placed under the
jurisdiction of two Chinese provinces. The Tibetan government
was reorganized into the form which it retained until the pres-
ent day, garrisons were increased, and communications between
China and Tibet were assured.
After a further revolt in 1750, the Manchus tended to dis-
courage foreigners from visiting Tibet and the Nepalese began
to warn the Tibetans against the English, who were then push-
ing up from India. As a result of these influences Tibet
started withdrawing into the isolation for which it later be-
came noted.
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Some of the basic elements of later Chinese policy toward
Tibet were instituted during the first decades of Manchu influ-
ence in the area. In the early years of Kang Hsi's reign the
famous fifth Dalai Lama visited Peking at the invitation of the
Manchu court: the Panchen Lama had declined because of his ad-
vanced age. The succeeding Panchen Lama, however, was granted
honors by the Chinese government and his became the first of
several Panchen Lamas to be bolstered by various Chinese regimes
as a counterweight to the authority of the Dalai Lama.
Peking's interest in Tibet was further asserted in 1792,
when a Chinese force defeated a sizable invasion by Gurkhas from
Nepal in mid-winter. The Manchus thereafter forbade any deal-
ings between the Tibetan government and representatives of a
foreign power.
By the beginning of the 20th century Tibet had become a
pawn in the game being played in the area by China, Britain, and
Russia. The Manchus held nominal control; in reality, however,
no one had full authority, and Britain and Russia were maneuver-
ing to secure the exclusive right to trade and develop the re-
sources of Tibet. When a British request to send a mission to
Lhasa to deal directly with the Dalai Lama was refused, Britain
invaded Tibet and entered Lhasa in 1904, forcing the 13th Dalai
Lama to flee to the Mongolian city of Urga, now Ulan Bator. The
invasion resulted in a convention which strengthened trade
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relations between Tibet and India, and in a subsequent agree-
ment in 1906 Britain pledged "not to annex Tibetan territory or
to interfere in the administration of Tibet."
When it appeared that British influence was beginning to
weigh heavily in Tibet, the Manchus tried to regain their posi-
tion by force and in 1910 sent an army to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama,
who had just returned from his Mongolian exile, then fled to
India for British protection. The Chinese revolution of 1911
intervened, however, the Manchus were overthrown, and by 1913
the Tibetans expelled the Chinese from their territory and ar-
rangements were made for the Simla conferences between China,
Britain, and Tibet.
A tripartite agreement was initialed at Simla in April 1914,
but China refused formal signature. The negotiations broke down
over the question of the frontier to be established between China
proper and Tibet. The British and Tibetan representatives were
willing to recognize China's suzerainty over the whole of Tibet,
provided China would agree not to convert it into a Chinese
province and would recognize the autonomy of Outer Tibet--i.e.,
the western portion of the area, excluding Chamdo. The Chinese
were to maintain a resident at Lhasa with not more than 300
troops; the British agreed to maintain only a visiting agent
there.
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During the two decades after the failure of the Simla con-
ference, British influence in Tibet increased at the expense of
the Chinese. British missions were sent to Lhasa at various
times, and trade between Tibet and India flourished. Meanwhile,
fighting broke out on the Sino-Tibetan border in 1917 and again
in 1931, And by 1933 Tibetan control had been extended almost to
the Chinese province of Szechwan. Tibetan resistance was aroused
in part by the action of the Nationalist Government of China in
including parts of eastern and northeastern Tibet in the prov-
inces of Sikang and Tsinghai, which had been created in 1928.
It was in 1924, during this period of unrest, that the ninth
Panchen Lama fled Tibet as a result of a dispute with the Dalai
Lama and took up residence in Chinese territory. Since he re-
mained in China until his death in 1937 and his successor did not
return to Tibet until 1952, nearly three decades passed during
which there was no Panchen Lama in Tibet and the two successive
holders of the title were under Chinese influence,
The Panchen Lamas stayed in Tsinghai--a province initially
under the control of a local warlord, who owed only a tenuous
allegiance to the Nationalist government at Nanking. When the
ninth Panchen Lama dried and a tentative successor was found in
1939, this warlord apparently saw an opportunity to extend his
influence to Tibet by supporting the candidate. This action was
in keeping with the long-standing tradition of the Panchen Lamas'
pro-Chinese leanings.
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V. Chinese Communist Control in Tibet
When Communist forces moved into northwest China in 1950
the young Panchen Lama and his attendants had already been sub-
jected to more than ten years of grooming as potential carriers
of Chinese influence into Tibet. The new Communist authorities
were quick to take advantage of this situation and held the Pan-
chen Lama in Tsinghai only until their position had been consoli-
dated in Tibet. After gaining the acquiescence of the Lhasa
authorities, the Chinese Communists returned the Panchen Lama
to his former headquarters near Zhigatse in June 1952, in the
midst of a vigorous propaganda campaign asserting that the Dalai
and Panchen Lamas were once again on friendly terms. It was not
until 1954, however, when both were in Peiping, that a final
agreement was reached between them.
The Tibetan government, apparently alarmed at the rapid
gains being made by the Chinese Communist forces, expelled the
representative of the Nationalist government from Lhasa in July
1949. The Tibetan authorities were prepared in February 1950
to deal with a Communist delegation in Hong Kong but would not
consent to a meeting in Peiping which the Chinese demanded. The
Chinese Communists opened hostilities in October 1950 and moved
their forces into Chang-tu in the extreme eastern part of Tibet;
they then issued a proclamation calling on the Tibetans to
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co-operate. Tibetan military forces, in the face of the military
superiority of the Communists, capitulated after only token re-
sistance. As the Chinese forces approached Tibet, the Dalai Lama
left Lhasa and moved to a point near the Indian border where he
remained for several months.
The captured leader of the defeated Tibetan forces, Ngabo
Ngawang Jigme, was named negotiator for the Lhasa government at
Chinese Communist insistence. After an abortive attempt to seek
aid from the United Nations, Lhasa sent a small group of repre-
sentatives to Peiping to negotiate under Ngabo's leadership. On
23 May 1951, the Tibetan representatives signed an agreement be-
tween the "Government of the Tibet Region" and the Chinese Com-
munist government which provided for the "peaceful liberation"
of Tibet. The Chinese Communist forces were thus able to enter
without further fighting.
The Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951, which consisted of a
preamble and 17 articles, served as the basic document govern-
ing the Chinese position in Tibet until 28 March 1959. The
agreement began with the propagandistic assertion that the
Tibetan people had "returned to the big family of the mother-
land--the Chinese People's Republic." The Chinese central gov-
ernment was given the right to station and maintain troops in
Tibet and to conduct Tibet's foreign affairs. In return the
Chinese professed to accord to Tibet the right of local self-
government in internal matters. It was stipulated that the
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Chinese central government would not alter either the existing
political system in 'Tibet or the established status and authority
of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. Peiping further agreed
to respect the religious beliefs of the Tibetans, to protect the
monasteries, and to make no change in their revenues.
An article relating to "reforms" stated that the Chinese
Communist authorities would not force them on the Tibetans, but
that the local government of Tibet would undertake such reforms
of its own accord following popular demands expressed through
consultation with the "leading persons of Tibet." The Chinese
conceded that former officials who had been"pro-imperialist" or
"pro-Kuomintang" might remain in office, provided they severed
their old relationsh:lps and did not engage in resistance.
Although the validity of the 1951 agreement has sometimes
been questioned, the Tibetans did not openly repudiate it until
the rebellion of March 1959. A case for invalidity might be
made on the grounds of duress, since the chief Tibetan signatory
had been captured by the Chinese Communists in the course of mil-
itary operations; however, three of the other four Tibetan del-
egates who signed the agreement had been sent to Peiping for
the express purpose of negotiating. In October 1951 the Dalai
Lama, who by then had returned to Lhasa, addressed a telegram
to Mao Tse-tung expressing approval of the agreement.
After the arrival of Chinese Chinese Communist military
forces in Lhasa in September 1951, Tibet was incorporated into the
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Chinese military system as the "Tibet Army District.,, The num-
ber of Chinese troops in Tibet has varied according to the degree
of resistance occurring in certain areas but has probably aver-
aged about 50,000, the major portion of them stationed in the
Lhasa area.
Chinese Communist propaganda has made much of the claim that
Chinese forces in Tibet have not confined themselves to military
tasks but have also reclaimed and cultivated patches of land and
assisted the local inhabitants in the construction of small-scale
irrigation works. As a means of spreading improved methods, the
Chinese Army is said to run an agricultural training course in
Lhasa for Tibetans and to have opened an experimental center there
for agriculture and animal husbandry.
The 1951 agreement provided that the Tibetan local troops
would be reorganized as part of the Chinese Communist regular
forces. Although some senior Tibetan officials have been given
high rank in the Chinese military command and Chinese officers
have been assigned to the headquarters of Tibetan regiments, it
appears that integration never proceeded very far. Press re-
ports have referred to Tibetan local military units at major
urban centers, and the Dalai Lama retained his bodyguard. It
also appears that the! Panchen Lama acquired a bodyguard, al-
though he did not have one previously.
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The Chinese Communists apparently were quite careful to ad-
here to the letter of the 1951 agreement regarding religious and
local political affairs. There was some indication that Peiping
would attempt to build up the political authority of the Panchen
Lama during the early years of Chinese Communist occupation of
Tibet, perhaps with the intention of substituting him for the
Dalai Lama as the highest temporal and religious leader of Tibet.
This attempt was soon abandoned, however, and the Communists
were scrupulous thereafter in acknowledging the Dalai Lama's
supremacy.
The Chinese Communists have made a show of not meddling in
the purely religious affairs of Tibet, just as they have usually
been careful to avoid offending the religious sensitivity of
the Moslems in other parts of China. Furthermore, Tibetan
authorities on numerous occasions have warned the Chinese in-
directly that interference with their religion would have seri-
ous consequences.
While attempting to maintain an appearance of observing
the letter of the 1951 agreement, the Chinese Communists set
about to undermine the religious and political systems of Tibet
by other means. These have included propaganda, education,
economic penetration, and the creation of the Preparatory Com-
mittee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. The Chinese announced
their intention to establish this committee in 1955, and it
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was formally inaugurated in April 1956 under the nominal chair-
manship of the Dalai Lama. Technically the committee did not
violate the 1951 agreement, since it was merely "preparatory"
and did not actually take over the administration of the local
government at that time.
The Panchen Lama and the commander of the Tibet Army Dis-
trict were first and, second vice chairmen respectively of the
Preparatory Committee, which included an additional 48 Tibetans
and four Chinese. The Tibetan membership was made up of both
ecclesiastical and noble personages. The committee was made sub-
ordinate to the State Council (cabinet) at Peiping and was given
the task of preparation for regional autonomy "in accordance
with the provisions of the Chinese Constitution, the 1951 agree-
ment, and the concrete circumstances of Tibet." The committee
was provided with a number of subordinate commissions and depart-
ments to deal with financial, religious, civil, economic, educa-
tional, and other affairs. Appointments to the key posts in-
cluded a number of Chinese. Eight offices of the Preparatory
Committee were set up in important towns throughout Tibetan
territory.
The Chinese Communist party has operated in Tibet through
its "Tibet Work Committee," which has its headquarters at Lhasa
with branch committees at other important places. Before mid-
1956, no Tibetans from Tibet proper appear to have joined the
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Communist party, although a number from border areas had done so,
including one who helped pave the way for the entry of the Chi-
nese Communists into eastern Tibet in 1950. Since 1956, however,
there have been occasional reports of "Tibetans in Tibet" having
joined the party. It is likely that Peiping has counted heavily
on party recruitment as a means of facilitating control in Tibet.
Another arrangements made by the Chinese Communists which
was not provided for in the 1951 agreement was the establishment
of the office of the "Representative of the Central People's Gov-
ernment in Tibet." This official, Chang Ching-wu, first arrived
in Tibet in 1951 and has held his position since then in spite of
appointment to a high post in Peiping in 1955. Chang is also
secretary of the Chinese Communist party's Tibet Work Committee.
Although the Chinese Communists did not attempt to impose
sudden and drastic social and economic reforms within Tibet,
they did introduce land reform and collectivization measures
among some groups of ethnic Tibetans living in Chinese border
provinces--measures which were greatly accelerated as a result
of the intensive collectivization drive of 1955-56. These in-
creased pressures led to revolts in Tibetan-inhabited "autono-
mous areas" within the Chinese provinces of Tsinghai and Szechwan,
The Chinese Communists promptly revised their policies and a
"comfort mission" was sent from Peiping to placate the inhab-
itants of these regions, but apparently with little success.
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In February 1956 a serious uprising occurred in a Tibetan
autonomous area in Szechwan Province, during which the Chinese
Communists resorted to aerial bombardment of at least two
Lamaist monasteries which had become centers of resistance.
Traffic on the road from Szechwan to Tibet proper was interrupted
for a considerable time, and sporadic outbreaks continued for
many months, Peiping admitted publicly the following June that
the trouble had been caused by an attempt to impose land reform
and to establish agricultural co-operatives, thus depriving the
monks of income from their lands and from peasant donations. The
monasteries had also been adversely affected by new policies con-
cerning taxation and grazing lands and by the confiscation of
their weapons, including those placed in temples as offerings
to the gods.
The Chinese Communists attempted for a time to conciliate
the Tibetans. The inauguration of the Preparatory Committee for
the Tibet Autonomous Region has held in April 1956, and the prin-
cipal Chinese speaker declared that "reforms in Tibet in the fu-
ture must proceed from the upper to the lower level by peaceful
consultation, and they must accord with the wish of the great
majority of the people." In an attempt to allay the apprehen-
sions of monks and nobles, the speaker assured them that "during
and after reforms the government must take steps to guarantee
the upper strata of Tibetans (including the upper strata of
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religious circles) that their political status and level of ma-
terial life is not lowered."
A year later, in April 1957, the Chinese Communists went
still further in postponing "reforms" in Tibet and announced
that action would not be taken until after 1962. They promised
that organizations established to prepare for reform would be
reduced in size, and that many Chinese personnel who had entered
Tibet to assist with reform would be withdrawn.
In spite of Chinese attempts to reassure the Tibetans, out-
breaks of rebellion continued to occur in the eastern part of the
region. In sympathy with their fellow Tibetans living in Chinese
territory, the Khambas, a tribe inhabiting Chamdo, attacked Chi-
nese garrisons and seriously interfered with road traffic between
China proper and Tibet. Refugees from the disturbed areas be-
gan to appear in Lhasa in early 1956, and it became known that
a Tibetan independence party--the Mimang--was functioning as the
moving force behind anti-Chinese demonstrations. The Mimang also
prepared petitions against Chinese policies and presented them
to the Dalai Lama. The instances of revolt by Tibetans were on
a relatively small scale, however, and constituted an annoyance
rather than a threat to Chinese Communist domination.
During 1957 and 1958 the Chinese may have intensified their
military countermeasures in an effort to stamp out the continuing
uprisings. In addition, the highly publicized communalization
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movement in Communist China in the autumn of 1958 undoubtedly
increased Tibetan apprehensions. Tension was further raised
by the gradual drift westward of Khamba tribesmen into the
vicinity of Lhasa, an area where violence had not yet occurred,
The Chinese Communists announced in March 1959 that the
Dalai Lama had been named a delegate to the National People's
Congress, scheduled to open in Peiping the following month. The
Dalai Lama had attended the initial session of the congress in
1954, and his visit to Peiping had extended to eight months.
The Tibetans had protested the departure of the Dalai Lama from
Lhasa at that time, however, and the prospect of another journey
to Peiping was probably even more alarming in 19590
On 10 March 1959, the Dalai Lama was invited by the Chinese
to attend a function in Lhasa. The manner in which the invita-
tion was delivered may have helped to inspire rumors that the
Chinese were about to abduct him, and violent anti-Chinese
demonstrations occurred throughout the city. Disorders con-
tinued during the following days, and the Dalai Lama was spirited
from Lhasa on 17 March. Open fighting between Tibetans and
Chinese broke out in Lhasa two days later.
Peiping first acknowledged on 28 March 1959 that a violent
rebellion was taking; place in the Tibetan capital. In an attempt
to minimize its implications, the Chinese Communist authorities
claimed that the Dalai Lama had been taken from Lhasa under
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duress by the rebels. On the grounds that the Tibetans had, by
their own actions, abrogated the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951,
Peiping declared the Tibetan government dissolved, turned over
its authority to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Auton-
omous Region, and "temporarily" named the Panchen Lama chairman--
a position nominally held by the Dalai Lama. Chinese Communist
armed forces in Tibet were enjoined to "thoroughly stamp out" the
rebellion. It was claimed that the revolt involved "only about
20,000"" insurgents in southern Tibet and other "very remote
places" in Tibet and western China.
The Panchen Lama was sent to Peiping in April 1959 as a del-
egate to the National People's Congress. He was elected to its
presidium and spoke out strongly in support of Peiping's action
in suppressing the Lhasa revolt. Before leaving Tibet, he had
called for the regimentation of ecclesiastical and secular mem-
bers of Tibetan society and requested that they assist Chinese
Army units. The Panchen Lama also suggested that reluctant
acquiescence in Chinese Communist policies would no longer be
tolerated, as "willingness to follow the path of socialism" is
now mandatory for all Tibetans.
On 31 March the Dalai Lama entered India, where he was granted
asylum as a religious leader. While the Chinese Communists have
at their disposal ample military strength to quell the rebellion
within Tibet, the presence of the Dalai Lama in India will pro-
vide a continuing reminder of the rebellion and its implications.
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VI. International Aspects
Outbreaks of rebellion against Chinese Communist authori-
ty.will probably continue for some time in Tibet and Tibetan-
inhabited areas of China but will not present a serious in-
ternal threat to the stability of the Peiping regime. Out-
side Communist China, however, the revolts and the repressive
measures by which Peiping has quelled them have damaged its
prestige among the Afro-Asian countries.
Peiping had entered into two international agreements
which contain provisions regarding the status of "the Tibet
region of China." A treaty concluded with India in 1954
governs the conditions under which trade and travel would be
carried on between territories under the jurisdiction of India
and Tibet, and a similar treaty was negotiated with sepal in
1956. Both treaties permitted continuation of the locally
important traditional trade across the southern borders of
Tibet and the travel of Buddhist and Hindu pilgrims to holy
places. New Delhi agreed to turn over Indian-owned postal and
telegraph facilities to the Chinese, and both India and Nepal
agreed to withdraw military escort forces which they had main-
tained in Tibet. The signatories were also authorized to set
up trade agencies in specified places.
In these treaties India and Nepal acknowledged Chinese
sovereignty over Tibet, with the provision that the traditional
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Tibetan government would continue to administer local affairs.
Indian and Nepalese representatives at Lhasa became consuls
general accredited to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
rather than to the Tibetan government. The treaties subscribed
to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" (Panch Shila),
which include mutual "noninterference in interal affairs."
Even before the Dalai Lama had been granted asylum in
India, Prime Minister Nehru had publicly expressed concern
over the situation in Tibet and sympathy with the rebels, but
without violating India's pledge of "noninterference." Nehru
reiterated his government's hands-off policy toward the "Tibet
region of China" before an aroused parliament on 23 March 1959,
but his statement by implication put Peiping on notice that he
regarded Chinese failure to respect Tibet's "autonomous" status
as a violation of previous assurances. The Indian Parliament
and press urged a much stronger stand than that publicly assumed
by the government.
Peiping on 28 March accused India of permitting a "central
headquarters" of the Tibetan revolt to operate'at Kalimpong in
the Indian state of West Bengal. The Chinese Communist communi-
que implied that further discussion of Tibet in the Indian
Parliament would be "impolite and improper." These charges
were sharply rejected by Nehru with the comment that his gov-
ernment would not "submit to any kind of dictation from any.
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country." His statement was balanced, however, with a plea
for restraint and a reaffirmation of friendship for China.
After these initial exchanges of charges and rejections,
it appeared for a time that Peiping would treat Indian sensi-
tivities with greater regard, perhaps in the hope of inducing
the Indian government to restrain the Dalai Lama from making
public statements refuting Peiping's claims as to the nature
of his flight. After the Dalai Lama's statement of 18 April,
when he denied that' he had left Tibet under duress, Chinese
Communist attacks on the.Indian government became more intem-
perate and carried hints that India must not permit the Dalai
Lama to engage in political activity. Peiping did not, however,
make a formal diplomatic protest to India.
One of the strongest Asian reactions to events in Tibet
came from Malaya, where the foreign minister officially con-
demned the Chinese use of force and likened it to Soviet re-
pression in Hungary. Cambodia's Premier, Prince Sihanouk, was
quoted in France as expressing surprise that India was not
firmer in exercising its "moral duty" to uphold the Tibetan
cause.
Buddhist circles in Ceylon strongly protested Chinese
Communist actions in Tibet. A delegation of Buddhist per-
sonages of high rank attempted to gain a hearing at the Chi-
nese embassy in Colurbo but was refused admittance, bringing
further unfavorable publicity to the Chinese.
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Sections of the press in Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Japan, and the United Arab Republic have
voiced protests, some of them in publications which had pre-
viously tended to be uncritical of the Chinese Communist re-
gime. The Japanese press has given the Tibetan developments
especially heavy play, almost unanimously criticizing the sup-
pression of the revolt and Peiping's callous disregard for its
understandings with the Indian and Tibetan governments. Cairo
radio joined the UAR press in denouncing Chinese repression in
Tibet as "the new imperialism."
While India will not permit the Dalai Lama to carry on
political activities during his residence there, his status
as a refugee from Chinese Communist oppression cannot fail
to have political as well as religious implications. His
flight from Tibet and Peiping's dissolution of the Tibetan
government have done more than any other development to dam-
age the image of Communist China as champion of freedom for
the Afro-Asian nations--an image the regime has been trying
to set up in the four years since the-Bandung Conference.
Approved For Release 20Q QIAMMAL 00025R000100060022-5