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CIA-RDP79T00975A003300320001-9
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
9 October 1957
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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0 State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
03300320001-9
&- 1. KHRUSHCHEV INTERVIEW TO ADD TO ANTI-
WESTERN PRESSURE IN UN
&*- 5. PEIPING AND MOSCOW SEEK TO ENHANCE
KADAR'S PRESTIGE
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6. HAITIAN INAUGURATION: MAY BE CRITICAL PERIOD
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7. FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM
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')- 8. IRANIAN EXTREMISTS MAY BE AIDED BY ARREST
OF NATIONALIST LEADERS
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1, KHRUSHCHEV INTERVIEW TO ADD TO ANTI-
WESTERN PRESSURE IN UN
25X1 A The tone and content of Soviet
party chief Khrushchev's interview
of 7 October in the wake of the
launching of the Soviet earth satel-
lite and the announcement that a "mighty hydrogen de-
vice" has been detonated by the USSR will increase pres-
sure on the West in the UN General Assembly to accept
Soviet disarmament proposals, Khrushchev offered to
subject the Soviet earth satellite and missile program to
international control, possibly an elaboration of the So-
viet proposal of last March to control all missiles capa-
ble of" carrying nuclear warheads as part of the second
step in an omnibus disarmament scheme. This latest
offer is designed to encourage wavering or neutral na-
tions to support Soviet proposals for a two- td:three- year
nuclear test ban and a five-year prohibition on the employ-
ment of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
Khrushchev said the only obstacle to
an accord on the control of all new weapons is the refusal
of the United States to accept the principle of peaceful co-
existence. He singled out Secretary Dulles for attack in
calling on the United States to renounce the cold war and
end the arms race.
The Soviet disarmament campaign in
the UN will also profit from the positions on nuclear test-
ing taken by Japan and India and by the Polish and Czech
proposal to prohibit manufacture and stationing of nuclear
weapons on their territories and that of the German states.
Ambassador Lodge has warned that public apprehension
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over radioactivity has already made it difficult for the
representatives of governments normally backing the
Western disarmament position to vote against a Soviet
proposal for a nuclear test ban if the Russian resolu-
tion should be brought to a vote first. The attacks on
the West by the. Saudi Arabian and Egyptian delegates
in their 3 October speeches before the General Assembly
have already made it difficult for friendly. Arab states to
take any pro-Western position.
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5. PEIPING AND MOSCOW SEED: TO ENHANCE
KADAR'S PRESTIGE
The honors given to Hungarian Pre-
mier and Party First. Secretary Kadar during his recent
visits to Peiping and Moscow underline the bloc's effort
to enhance his prestige. and to strengthen his position in
his own party. They are also designed.to :impress neutralist
nations with. the normalization of conditions in Hungary.
En route to China, Kadar was ban-
queted in Moscow by Mikoyan. In Peiping, he was received
by Mao Tse-tung, personally praised by Chou En-lai at the
National Day,celebrations, where he was the featured for-
eign notable, and was pointedly introduced by Chinese of.
ficials to dignitaries from nonbloc nations. On his return
to Moscow, he was feted by Khrushchev and Mikoyan.
The recognition that Kadar is the
Kremlin's picked man in Hungary will reduce opposition to
him in his own party and in Hungary generally. Former
.Stalinist elements who have supported only his hard-line
political measures will be more restrained in challenging
his policies, notably the continued relaxation in economic
affairs. The Kremlin's reindorsement of Kadar will make
it clear to potentially hostile elements in the Hungarian
populace that they have no alternative to his regime and
will deepen their apathy with the approach of the anniversary
of the national uprising.
As Kadar's control over the party and
country improves, he may act to be able to afford 'further,
concessions, such as a limited political amnesty. The Krem-
lin might also be willing to make a token withdrawal of So-
viet troops.
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6. HAITIAN INAUGURATION MAY BE CRITICAL PERIOD
The approaching inauguration of
Haitian President-elect Duvalier,
reportedly scheduled for next week,
has sharpened speculation concern-
ing the army's future role in politics.
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The interim military government has
been severely criticized because of the brutal treatment
of opposition elements, the death of a US citizen during
police interrogation, and an apparent anti---American at-
titude on the part of some high officials. Some Haitians
reportedly feel that the curtailment of US economic aid
announced on 4 October may have been a result of the
government's failure to offer an acceptable explanation
of the American's death,
A reported lessening of tension during
the past few days does not preclude a resurgence of civil
disorder. The period . immediately following Duvalier's
inauguration is expected to be the most critical.
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7. FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
The American embassy in Paris reports
that statements in the French National
Assembly and in the press seem to indi-
cate acceptance of a French nuclear
weapons production program "as a foregone conclusion. "
Although the government has announced no decision to pro-
ceed with such a program, the deliberate ambiguity of offi-
cial statements has created a widespread public impression
that at least preliminary weapons work is already under
way.
The embassy estimates that French
public opinion now would be temporarily satisfied with a
token program, but considers it practically certain that
the French military will press for the manufacture of
the widest range of nuclear weapons the French budget
can possibly support.
The most recent confirmation of
French intentions to proceed with nuclear weapons pro-
duction was provided by French insistence that the
charter for OEEC's proposed nuclear energy agency
not bar technicians engaged in this project from using
the resultant information for weapons production.
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8. IRANIAN EXTREMISTS MAY BE AIDED BY
ARREST OF NATIONALIST LEADERS
increase the influence of extremists within the Na-
tional Resistance Movement (NRM), which. was backed
by former premier Mossadeq. These .arrests may have
convinced a larger number of its members that
forceful removal of the Shah is needed before Iran's
problems can be solved. In addition, the action may
facilitate Communist penetration of the NRMO
The recent arrest in Iran of ap-
proximately 70 nationalists on
charges of conducting propaganda
activities against the. Shah may
The Iranian Intelligence and Se-
curity Agency, Savak, in mid-September started round-
ing up nationalists in Tehran, Meshed, Tabriz, and Is-
fahan under direct orders of the Shah. , Savak seems to
have tried to keep the action from the Iranian public,
but it is now well known in Tehran. The government
apparently does not have enough evidence to bring most
of the prisoners to trial despite the confiscation of a
? quantity of propaganda material.
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