THE PAKISTAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 6, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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6 May 19 71
e Pakistan Situation
akistanis have long believed that
rested then as colonials. West
--especially those frog the Pun j ab-
mated the country's military and civil
._.
cc, and most financial, industrial, and
aamercial power has been in the West. in the
past decade, West Pakistan has seen a good deal
of economic development, East Pakistan little.
The Bengalis--who constitute over 90 percent of
the people of East Pakistan--argue that their
larger population---75 million to the West's 55
million--and the fact that their agricultural
s? particularly jute, earn over half of
_---_
the country's foreign exchange, give them the
right at least to run their own affairs.
2. In March 1970, President Yahya t
rievances into account when he set up
k Order--the Martial Law Ad-
ground rules for returning Pale
lian rule. Yahya gave Vast Pakistan
-169--of the 313 seats in the National
the body that was to write a new con-
Yaiya, however, reserved. for himself
o change the rules and to accept or
constitution.
sti.ons were orginally? scheduled for
70, but because of flooding in East
were postponed to neceber. In the
East Pakistan was struck by a cyclone
td the inadequate government rehie
-er alienated the Bengalis. When
na to the constituent assembly were
held, the Awa i League of Mujibur tahman
70 percent of the popular vote in East
and 167 of the 169 seats. The handful
of league candidates in the four provinces of
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t Pakistan received only a token vote, as the
pie's Party (PPP), lead by leftist
the seats there; regional, religious-oriented,
or conservative parties took the rest.
4. In the negotiations that followed
dent Tahya tried to encourage agreent between
Bhutto, who wanted a fairly strong central govern-
and Mu j ib (as Iu j ibur Rahrtan is called), who
d to budge fran his long-hold position.
extreme form of provincial autonomy in
the central covernnt would have control
f defense and foreign affairs, while all
r would be in the hands of the provinces.
5. Yahya called for a rooting of all party
leaders in Dacca---East Pakistan's capital--but
Bhutto refused to attend. Subsequently, on I
President postponed the ational.Z--
last Pakistan. On 6 march, tahya gave in tca
ch effectively has trung government operations
bee
6. xuj ib reacted to the postponemnt of the
anal g sbly by calling for a general strike,
some extent, rescheduling the assembly
for 25 March.
'1 01: nis
V-92 acted r, bror a at Pakistani
...~
but instead he sified the general
ndence
,
trike into what he called a "noncooperation move,-
s
smut." Within a few days, the movement had nul--
lifted central government authority and had put
jib in de facto control of East Pakist
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7. On 16
of meetings.
ujib and Yahya began a s
which Muj ib refused to c
8. On 25 March, the army took over Dacca and
arrested Mu jib, who is now in prison in 'lest Pakistan.
Army units at other places in the province, however,
remained in their cantonents, and in the next few
days made only occasional raids into the surrounding
was. Bengali units of the regular army and Est
of the par ilitary forces in East Pakistan mutinied,
killing many of their West Pakistani officers. There
was extensive fighting in the southern port of Chit-
tagong, with Bengali troops holding about a third of
the city for over a week.
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10. Most of the wanton killing occurre
in the first week as the army tried to eli2,dnate
potential troublemakers, especially Awani ague
officials and dissident students. It attempted
to cow potential rioters in Dacca by indiscrim-
inate killing and burning in the poorer sections
of the city. Hindu Bengalis--about 20 percent
of the population--were subjected to a dispro-
portionate amount of brutality, but it is not
clear whether this was government policy or the
responsibility of Hindu-hating Muslin army com-
manders on the scene.
U. In many Bengali-held areas of the coup,,.-
try, similar killings and counterkillings were
under way. At. yniensingh, where Bengalis ruled
for about a month, nearly all Bihari males were
killed. In Chittagong, Bengali mobs killed any--
one thought to be non--Bengali. Revenge contrib-
uted to subsequent arrmy actions but, on the whole
there sews to have been less wanton killing in
the later stages of the campaign than in the
first week.
12. Currently, the government holds most
xs and the major transportation routes.
have the men to move into all of the
2,000 villages, even though reinforcezzents over
the past six weeks have raised governniont rdl3--
tary strength in Fast Pakistan from about 20,000
to over 50,000 men. Bengali forces have been
fragmented, and resistance for the time being
is disorganized and scattered.
13. In West Pakistan, the government has
enjoyed widespread support. Although 2-1. A.
Bhutto disagrees strongly with the military
leaders on social and economic policy, he does
agree with them on national un,ty and therefore
has backed the government. Most other politicians
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have done the same, although a few have remained
discreetly silent.
14. Meanwhile, Pakistan's economic problems
and foreign exchange situation of the governent
-
has deteriorated, and it has had to postpone pay
aa
east ,
nen t-
to resume. Large parts of the transportation
4Wk 9-
W"Rr i s, auw w-.-- ._._._____-
kiStan economic activity has only begun
P
are still not functioning, less than a
tae factories are operating, and ports are
f
i
ne
am
ng at far below capacity. There is no
but most observers predict a severe food
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shortage in about four months.
15, The Indian Red Cross claimed this week
that nearly one million East Pakistanis have fled
to India. The figure may be inflated, but it is
indicative of the size of the influx, which has
been so great that India has called for foreign
help.
16. The Indian xvernment???Twhile stopping
short of formal recognition-has given diplomatic
support to the Bengalis, and top officials, in-
cluding Pr to Minister Gandhi have made strap
statements favoring them.
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CHRONOLOGY
30 March President Yahya promulgates Legal
Framework Order.
7 December Awami League of Mujibur Rahman sweeps
elections in East Pakistan for Na-
tional Assembly tasked with writing
new constitution.
17 December Awami League sweeps provincial assembly
elections in East Pakistan.
January-
February Mujibur Rahman and Z. A. Bhutto meet
in Dacca to try to resolve their dif-
ferences over the provisions of new
constitution.
1 March President Yahya, unable to obtain
agreement among the politicians, post-
pones the National Assembly meeting
scheduled for 3 March.
2 March Mujibur Rahman launches a general strike
in East Pakistan, and martial law au-
thorities place Dacca under night-time
curfew in response to assorted acts of
violence.
3 March Mujibur Rahman declines Yahya's call
to attend a conference of East and West
Pakistani political leaders in Dacca on
10 March.
6 March Yahya announces that the National As-
sembly will meet on 25 March to begin
writing a constitution. He also names
Tikka Khan, a tough West Pakistani
general, as governor of East Pakistan.
7 March Mujibur Rahman announces his party will
not attend the assembly unless Yahya first
ends martial law and turns power over to
elected representatives. Awami League
launches a noncooperation movement that
hamstrings central government activities
in East Pakistan and gives Awami League
de facto control over much of the pro-
vince.
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15 March Mujibur Rahman announces his party has
taken over administration of all East
Pakistan except for Dacca, Comilla, and
Jessore, and issues extensive directives
to local officials. President Yahya
arrives in Dacca.
16 March Discussions begin between Yahya and Mujibur
Rahman in Dacca.
25-26 March After ten days of talks and some reports
of progress, Pakistan Army abruptly seizes
control of Dacca and begins offensive in
East Pakistan.
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EAST PAKISTAN
Area ............ 56,000 sq. miles
Population ........ 70 million
Population density ...1,250 per sq. mile
Sajdpur
?
inajpur
Salt
Lake
BogM? Mymensingh
EA St I~`A K I'TA N
C`Fangail
Chittagong 6
BURMA
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