THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS: PATTERN FOR COMMUNIST WORLD ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100150001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 77
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 18, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
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THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS":
Pattern for Communist World Organization
CIA/SRS-10
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS":
Pattern for Communist World Organization
CIA/SRS-10
This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
It is based on information available
to SRS as of 11 June 1959.
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I Introduction
Page
II Background 4
The First International 4
The Second International 4
The Third International (Comintern) 5
The Cominform 7
III Prospects for New Communist Organizations 9
IV The Concept of Sodruzhestvo (Commonwealth) 11
V The Post-Stalin Development of the Idea
of Sodruzhestvo 16
VI The Relationship of "System, " "Camp,
and "Commonwealth" 21
VII The Image of the Commonwealth 23
VIII Current Forms of International Socialist
Organization .25
A. The Conference System 25
B. The Creation of an International
Journal 27
C. The Utilization of Existing Bloc
Organizations 28
CEMA
The Warsaw Pact
Multilateral Meetings
outside the Bloc
Regional Coordination
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Page
IX Communist China and the Future of
International Communist Organization 35
X Possible Tactics Implementing Interna-
tional Communist Organizational Strategy 41
A. A Temporary Continuation of the
Conference System 41
B. Exploitation of the Commonwealth
to Promote a United Front 42
C. The Development of Inter-CP
Coordination - A New Comintern? 44
XI Conclusion and Forecast
Annex I. Soviet and Satellite Statements on
the Sodruzhestvo 55
Annex II. Summary of Books and Articles
on Sodruzhestvo Themes 59
Annex III. May Day and October Anniversary Slogans 67
Annex IV. A Comparative Table of British
and "Socialist" Commonwealth 69
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THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS":
1. The crisis which shook International Communism
in 1956 - from the "secret" speech of Khrushchev denouncing
Stalin to the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolt - was
met by the Communist leaders with a concerted drive for sta-
bilization within the movement. 1 Two great Moscow conclaves
have marked the successive advances and triumphs of this cam-
paign: the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties
assembled in celebration of the Fortieth. Anniversary of the
October Revolution (November 1957), and the XXI Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (January-February
1959). Although the Congress was signalized primarily by the
emergence of a new "personality cult" - that of Nikita Khrush-
chev - by the glorification of the new Seven Year Plan, and by
the formulation of the "transition from socialism to commu-
nism, " it was also the occasion for reaffirming the monolithic
unity of International Communism and projecting the future
pattern of governance of the "world socialist system. "
2. The emergence of this "system., " according to
Communist statements, is a direct result of World War II; it
is held to have brought about a. "decisive shift" in the world
balance of power. Prior to the War, there had been only one
Communist state, the USSR, and International Communism
consisted not of a system of states, but of a world-wide array
of subservient parties, some operating legally, others clan-
destinely, under the general control of the Soviet-dominated
1For a discussion of the earlier phases of this process, see
SRS-6, The Prospects of World Communism: The Dialectic
of Crisis and Stabilization (16 September 1957).
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Comintern. The dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was
primarily a gesture to mollify the Soviet Union's wartime
allies; it was also the recognition that post-war Communism
would require a new form of direction, not yet clear in outline.
3. Indeed,, the prospects confronting Stalin in the
first post-war years may well have surpassed his earlier
dreams. Whereas during the previous fifteen ;years he had
been engrossed in "building socialism in one country, " he
was note about to extend his writ over the expanded empire
of the European satellites in which, under the guise of "peoples'
democracies, " Communist governments were coming to power
in rapid succession. China, sweeping toward conquest of the
mainland, and already casting its shadow over the future Asiatic
satellites - North Korea and North Vietnam - would soon be
pressing for a share in the control of the Bloc.
4. To cope with the expansion of the "socialist
system, " a successor to the Comintern was devised, the
Cominform (1947) which disseminated the directives of the
Kremlin through the more restricted medium of an authori-
tative Journal, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Demqc-
racy. " But, in a shorter space of time than its predecessor,
the Cominform outlived its usefulness and was dissolved (1956)
both as a concession to its critics and as a measure of prepa-
ration for a new dis:pensation.
5. The past two years may be regarded as a sort
of interregnum. The classic links and phannels of the move-
ment - embassies, Communist parties, front organizations
and cultural or economic missions - have been reinfbrced
by the extensive use of bilateral and multilateral party meet-
ings, highlighted by dramatic Communist "summit" conferences.
But a formal governing entity has not emerged.
6. In the :Light of the most recent development it has
become increasingly apparent that the leaders of the movement
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are seeking a new and more effective mechanism for main-
taining unity and control. After the 1956 upheavals, the
Kremlin appeared for a time to favor the establishment of a
Comintern-type of organization, or at least a modified Corn-
inform, but this met with considerable opposition, especially
among Communist leaders outside the Bloc. It would seem
that Moscow, acknowledging the validity of these objections,
has cast about for some new form of association which would
emphasize the "sovereign" and "independent" nature of the
participant states.
7. In pursuit of this objective, the Kremlin has
given currency to a relatively new term, the Commonwealth
of Socialist Nations - sodruzhestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran -
or states - gosudarstv. The term sodruzhestvo is derived
from a-Stalinist usage limited in application to the USSR; its
extension to the international sphere dates from the end of
1955, and its official propagation from the height of the 1956
crisis. The concept has been elaborated with a degree of
subtlety and circumspection which has resulted in its being
generally ignored or overlooked in the Free World. And yet,
it appears to contain the germ of an institutional form within
which the Marxist-Leninist imperiurn may move toward the
goal of the "world socialist system, " a nascent Communist
"United Nations" as the organizational framework for the
"transition from socialism to Communism. "
8. This essay is a contribution to the historical,
semantic, organizational and ideological study of the Social-
ist Commonwealth. In our judgment, this analysis justifies
the speculative conclusion that the Soviet Union, and possibly
Communist China, may in the not too distant future utilize
this concept to establish some form of federative union with
their satellites which would pose questions of vital signifi-
cance to the security of the United States and the Free World.
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9. The idea of an international revolutionary asso-
ciation is not an exclusive property of the Communists. Even
before the unrest of 1848, French, Italian and German groups,
led by Blanqui, Mazzini and Marx-Engels respectively, at-
tempted to create a revolutionary International. It was not,
however, until 1864: that the International Working Men's
Association was founded under the organizational direction
and theoretical guidance of Marx and Engels and with the sup-
port of British trade unions. This, the First International,
was destined to last only eight years and to achieve nothing
beyond creating a historic precedent. A split between Marx-
ists and the Bakuninists (Anarchists) proved disastrous, al-
though the Bakuninist faction showed remarkable stamina,
collapsing only at the end of the Spanish Civil War (1939).
10. Established in Paris in 1889, the Second "Social-
ist" International adopted what amounted to the "national roads
to socialism" principle. It was both a representative organi-
zation of the ever stronger trade unions and a debating asso-,
ciationfor orthodox Marxists (Bebel), revisionists (Bernstein),
and extreme leftists (Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg). As the
events of the Paris Commune (1871) had led to the undoing of
the First International, so World War I contributed to the de-
cline of the Second :[nternational. For most Socialists the
call of national patriotism triumphed over international solidar-
ity, though many condemned and opposed the war. In the 1920
Vienna Congress a split occurred between the patriots and the
pacifists. The former reconstituted the International, the lat-
ter established a competing organization. In spite of the Com-
intern's divisive tactics, the two factions merged in 1923, but
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the Second International was already in a decline. Breaking
down entirely during World War II it was gradually restored
after 1946. In 1947 a Committee of the International Social-
ist Conference (Comisco) was set up in England, consisting
of one representative of each member party. In 1951, the
Socialist International itself was reconstituted in Frankfurt,
Germany. Its program was "democratic socialism. " In
1953 the Asian Socialist Conference was established in Ran-
goon, following the model of Comisco.
The Third International, (Comintern)
11. The Third Communist International (Comintern),
which had been advocated by Lenin as early as 1914, was
founded in Moscow in 1919. Since, at the time of its estab-
lishment, the Socialist parties eligible to participate were
all but bankrupt throughout Europe, the Russian section of
the Comintern became dominant at the outset. The "twenty-
one conditions" of membership, outlining radical Leninist
tactics, were laid down and a frontal assault against the Vienna
International was begun. Since the Comintern 'a original impact
had greatly diminished by 1922, United Front tactics, aimed at
absorbing the Socialists, were initiated by the Communists.
From Lenin's incapacitation to Stalin's consolidation of power -
roughly 1922 to 1928 - internecine struggles within the Russian
factions and among Russian and non-Russian Communists all
but crippled the Comintern. The struggle between Stalin and
the Trotsky-Zinoviev "left wing, " which had dominated the
Moscow World Congress in 1924, led to the victory of the former
and the ouster of the "left wings" in all Communist parties as
"Trotskyite. " From then on, the Comintern's development
followed Stalinist lines until its dissolution in 1943.
12. As noted above, the dissolution of the Comintern
cost the Kremlin little and paid handsomely in terms of world
propaganda at a critical stage of World War II. The explana-
tion of the Comintern Presidium that "the organizational form"
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of the Comintern had "more and more become outgrown by
the movement's development and by the increasing complex-
ity of its problem in various countries" was euphemistic but
basically true. Interparty communications were dislocated.
Resistance to Comintern policies outside the USSR and Soviet
occupied territory could not be dealt with effectively. More-
over, the Bolsheviks probably had not expected the non-Soviet
Communist parties to emerge from the war with unimpaired
strength, and may have felt that in the immediate post-war
period World Communism could be ruled from Moscow with-
out formal organization. From the Western point of view,
the dissolution of the Comintern promised an end to the two
pronged Soviet offensive - governmental and party - and ap-
peared to the unwary to indicate that the Kremlin was no
longer planning world revolution. This of course was far
from being the case.
13. Indeed, the prospects for the expansion of the
Communist imperium which the Kremlin faced in 1945 pre-
sented both a challenge and a. new set of organizational prob-
lems. Whereas in the past the Soviet Communist Party had
been the only party governing a national state, Communist
parties in Eastern Europe were put in charge by the USSR
and were given, at least to some degree, the responsibili-
ties of government. In Western Europe, the French and
Italian Communist parties had emerged from the war with
a mass following and an acceptance by the voters so wide
that their taking over authority was not inconceivable; they
remained formidable even after their chance of staging a
successful revolution had passed. On the China mainland,
the Communists were rapidly coming to power through mili-
tary victory. In short, the prospect of a Communist empire
stretching from the Atlantic across Eurasia to the Pacific
was bright, yet no adequate organizational provisions for
central control of a monolithic Communist bloc had been
made.
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14. The problem of directing Communist activity
from Moscow was not serious in the countries under Soviet
military occupation. Behind the lowered Iron Curtain, the
Kremlin proceeded to apply the rules of the book, and before
long the local Communists became effective instruments of
Soviet rule.
15. As this process advanced, Stalin decided to
establish a new international organization to further the con-
solidation of World Communism. As charter members along
,Ninth the East European satellites, he included the French and
Italian parties, unquestionably in deference to their potential-
ities for advancing the Communist cause in Europe. Estab-
lished in 1947 under Zhdanov's leadership, the Communist
Information Bureau (Cominform) initiated a new phase of
aggressive revolutionary actions, notably the Czech coup
(February 1948) and the wave of political strikes in France.
The initial activities of the Cominform quickly disabused
those who might have regarded the Comintern's dissolution
as signalling the end of the world revolutionary drive of
International Communism.
16. Yet the Cominform as an instrument for strength-
ening and guiding the Soviet empire had a short life. After the
expulsion of Yugoslavia following the break between Stalin and
Tito in 1948, the Cominform subsided into a device for trans-
mitting Communist propaganda directives. The strategy and
tactics of International Communism remained under the direct
control of the Kremlin, which utilized the customary channels
of instruction and supervision. In April 1956, the Cominform
was officially dissolved. Its demise may be attributed in part
to the desire of the post-Stalin Soviet leaders both to heal the
rift in the Communist camp caused by Tito's deviation and to
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please certain neutralists such as Nehru and U Nu. Moscow
probably also recognized that the Cominform had become a
rump organization, lacking the potentiality of exploiting the
opportunities for Communist proselyting among the uncom-
mitted countries. An ostensible reason for the dissolution
was provided by the policy, set forth at the XX CPSU Con-
gress (February 1956), of permitting "national roads to
socialism. 11
17. The Comintern and the Cominform - each in its
time and within the context of existing conditions - had been
fully exploited by the Kremlin. When their usefulness had
dwindled, they were liquidated. However, this did not imply
a belief that International Communism could dispense with a
mechanism for international control. The question was only
what type of organization would be most suitable.
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III. PROSPECTS FOR NEW COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS
18. We may assume that the Soviet leaders have
seriously considered the establishment of a new organization
along Comintern lines. It would conform to their classic
pattern of control and might perpetuate the dominance of the
CPSU in the movement. Yet, there is evidence that realistic
considerations have led to the adoption of a more cautious and
tentative course. Since the primary effort of 1957 and 1958
was toward stabilization of the international movement, any
attempt to reimpose an institution which had been associated
with Stalinist dictation would be certain to create new diffi-
culties and perhaps even upheavals.
19. A number of major parties were clearly opposed
to a revived Comintern or Cominform. China, which had been
accorded a sort of co-equality with the USSR as early as Feb-
ruary 1955 would probably not have joined any new organiza-
tion which implied Soviet hegemony, and this would have elim-
inated the Far Eastern satellites as well. Yugoslavia obvious-
ly could not be persuaded to participate. Poland was intent on
pursuing its own "road to socialism. " Outside the Bloc, Togli-
atti, who had been shaken by Khrushchev's revelation of Stalin's
crimes and who had played with the idea of "polycentrism, "
was clearly unenthusiastic over the prospect that ('foreign"
- specifically, Moscow - direction would complicate his task
of maintaining the PCI as the leading :mass party in the Free
World. 1 On the other hand, there were Communist leaders
1
In an interesting description of the session of the Comintern
Presidium at which Stalin dictated the dissolution of the body,
Veljko Vlakhovitch, a Yugoslav Communist, states that Togli-
atti had already raised the idea of "polycentrism, " i. e. region-
al cooperation of parties in similar situations, such as the
French, Spanish and Italian, the Scandinavian, or the Central
European Communist Parties. Kommunist (Belgrade, 20 April
1959) quoted in BEIPI (1630 May 1959), p.8.
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who reportedly advocated the creation of a new world organ-
ization, notably Ulbricht (East Germany), Novotny (Czecho-
slovakia) and Hoxha (Albania). The French Communists,
under their Stalinist leader Thorez, and the Spanish Commu-
nists in exile, were also in favor of tighter central direction.
Some of the minor parties, such as the Dutch and the Danish,
suffered factional splits over the issue of Moscow control.
20. Possible international repercussions outside the
Communist Parties may also have weighed in the decision not
to create a new organization at this time. Any reinstitution
of a Comintern, or even of a Cominform, dominated by the
USSR, would imply a reaffirmation of the immutable objective
of world revolution, arousing thereby the suspicions and fears
of the highly nationalistic "uncommitted" nations and defeat-
ing the theme of "relaxation of tensions" and progress toward
the "summit. " Soviet foreign policy objectives would be bet-
ter served by prospective successes in the political, economic
and technological fields. These could be counted on to provide
a telling admonition to wavering Communists to hew to the line
if they wished to participate in the fruits of victory. The appeal
of "different roads to socialism" to fellow travelers and to
leftist-oriented governments outside the Bloc was not to be
sacrificed out of hand.
21. It must have appeared to the Soviet leaders,
moreover, that a potential lay before them, broader and
more alluring than, any accession of power which a reversion
to Stalinist methods could attain. With the Sino-Soviet Bloc
now comprising nearly a third of the earth's population, and
dominating most of the Eurasian land mass, the geopolitical
factors were auspicious. A new confidence infused both the
Soviet and the Chinese leadership. The problem was to estab-
lish a conceptual framework sufficiently vast and flexible to
contain the organizational structure within which World Com-
munism could be achieved. It is apparently with this vision
in mind that the Soviet leaders and theorists have gradually
unfolded the idea of a Commonwealth of Socialist Nations.
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IV. THE CONCEPT OF SODRUZHESTVO
22. The concept of sodruzhestvo requires careful
historical and semantic analysis. Soviet theorists do not use
words casually, especially when they indicate trends or inten-
tions. An attempt will be made to demonstrate in detail that
this...term is pregnant with ideological and political content,
even though its organizational form is as yet imperfectly
delineated.
23. The word itself is of relatively recent origin
and has been derived as a perfective form druzhestvo from
druzhba - friendship. The prefix so denotes association.
The compound, therefore, indicates association in friend-
ship. As such, the word sodruzhestvo is quite different
from the English term commonwealth, which implies a com-
monalty of welfare. Nevertheless, the latter is the official
communist translation of the former, and, for the purpose
of our analysis, will be treated as its equivalent. 1
24. It is of some interest to note that Soviet political
glossaries, dictionaries and encyclopedias.:; until quite recent-
ly have not introduced the term in its broad connotation. Thus
in Ushakov's dictionary of 1940 sodruzhestvo is defined as
"friendship" of the "socialist nations. " There is no refer-
ence to the British Commonwealth of Nations. On the other
hand, Smirnitsky's dictionary, while following Ushakov's
interpretation of "collaboration, cooperation, friendship of
socialist nations" also defines the British.Commonwealth3
as a sodruzhestvo. The second edition of the Great Soviet
IIn non-Communist translations, sodruzhestvo is sometimes
incorrectly rendered as community, family, etc.
2
D. N. Ushakov, ed. Tolkovyi Slovar Russkogo lazyka, Vol.
IV (Moscow, 1940).
3A.I. Smirnitskii, Russko-Angliiskii Slovar (Moscow, 1952).
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Encyclopedia uses the word druzhba to describe the "fraternal
collaboration, political, economic, cultural and military
mutual assistance of peoples of the USSR, enjoying equal
rights and voluntarily;'associated into a single socialist state.
In general, Soviet writers avoid referring to the British Com-
monwealth as a sodruzhestvo and prefer to call it the "British
Empire. "
25. The word sodruzhestvo as an extension of druzhba
appears to have been given some currency by Stalin during
World War II. Subsequently its use was further generalized
and extended, initially, however, only with reference to the
USSR as a "sodruzhestvo (friendship) of Socialist peoples. "
26. The broader application of the term to include
all socialist countries appears to date from the post-Stalin
period. In this connection it is important to note that its
primary application, at least initially, was to the associa-
tion of nations (natsii), countries (strany), or people (narody),
rather than of governments or states (gosudarstva). In no
case is it applicable to "capitalist" nations or states, whose
collaboration is usually described in negative terms as mil-
itary blocs or as agreement for the exploitation of backward
countries.
27. One may recall that Communists - including
Trotskyites and Titoists, as well as orthodox Leninists
have generally accepted Stalin's definition of a nation as
a historically constituted, stable community of
a people, formed on the basis of the common posses-
sion of four principal characteristics, namely: a
common language, a common territory, a common
1Vol. XV, p. 238.
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economic life and a common psychological make-up
manifested in common specific features of national
culture. I
28. Pursuing the terminological analysis somewhat
deeper, we may recall that Stalin, developing and supplement-
ing Lenin's doctrine, introduced the subdivisions of F1capitalist"
and "socialist" nations. The latter are "nations of a new type,
of which the Soviet Union is the "fatherland. " They arose "on
the basis of the old capitalist nations by a process of basic
transformation. " This process has created the "peoples' democ-
racies" of Europe and Asia, each of which follows a course of
development peculiar to its concrete historical, social and politi-
cal conditions. It has been elaborated by Communist literature
with a wealth of reference material.
29. The ideological root of the sodruzhestvo concept
is Marxist-Leninist "proletarian internationalism, 11 which com-
bats "bourgeois nationalism" and aims at its overthrow through-
out the world. The unfolding of the concept may be traced through
three major historical stages:
a. The revolutionary stage (1917-22), character-
ized by the destruction of the former capitalist-imperial-
ist state of Czarist Russia and launching the slogan of the
"right of nations to self-determination. " This was the
period of constructing a transitory internal federation
based on the unity of the proletariat under the leader-
ship of its vanguard, the Communist party, and the prep-
aration for the emergence of a united socialist state. The
First Congrers:s of the Soviets of the Union, on 30 Decem-
ber 1922, declared:
1 "The National Question and Leninism, " Works, II, 348. Of
course, Stalin's definition is not in conflict withtthat which
has been generally accepted by Western political scientists.
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"The peoples of the Soviet Republics met recently in
the congresses of their respective Soviets and unan-
imously adopted resolutions to form a Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Their decision, as peoples exer-
cising equal rights, is conclusive proof of the volun-
tary nature of their unification. The resolutions give
every republic the right to secede from the Union, and
allow all other Soviet Socialist Republics, both present
and future, to join it if they choose. The new Union
state will be a worthy expression of the basic principles
of peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation laid
down in October 1917. It will be a true bulwark against
world capitalism, and a new and decisive step toward
the unification of the toilers of all countries into a
World Soviet Socialist Republic. 1 ti
The Comintern began the propagation of "proletarian
Internationalism" outside Russia as the ideological
means for actualizing world revolution in the Soviet
image.
b. The formation of the "sodruzhestvo" of the
peoples of the USSR (1923-1945). Out of the multi-
national federation of the revolutionary period, a uni-
fied state was created, possessing common political,
military, social and economic objectives. On the world
front, the Comintern continued to work in the interests
of the CPSU, preparing the way for extension of the
revolution within the capitalist system.
c. Beginning at the end of World War II and con-
tinuing to the present, the third stage may be described
Klyuchnikov and Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaya Politika Nov-
eishego Vremeni V Dogovorakh, Notakh i Deklaratsiiakh,
(Moscow, 1925-29) III, 226.
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as the construction of the "world socialist system"
within which the 'tsodruzhestvo of socialist nations"
emerges on an international scale. The projection of
the latter will be developed in the remainder of this
paper. It is first necessary, however, to illustrate
the step by step elaboration of the term itself in Com-
munist writings and statements.
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V. THE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA
OF SODRUZHESTVO.
30. Stalin's contribution to the idea of a Socialist
Commonwealth - a-s' we have noted above - appears to have
been confined largely to the development of the Soviet 'Union
as an association of co-friendship among its numerous nation-
alities. 1 Nevertheless, he laid the groundwork for the inter-
national extension of the concept, especially in his statements
at the XIX CPSU Congress (1952) on the consequences of the
existence of the two rival "world systems" - socialism and
capitalism.
31. At the end of 1955 this broader concept was
explicitly stated by the CPSU in connection with the castiga-
tion of Molotov's ideological "error":
The foreign. policy of the CPSU is based on Leninist
principles - the struggle for peace and t# e peaceful
coexistence of socialist and capitalist systems. The
policy is formulated with full consideration for the
profound changes which have occurred as the result
of the second World War and post-war developments
and which are reflected in the deepening general
crisis of capitalism, in the formation of the great
commonwealth of socialist states, in the disintegra-
tion of the colonial system and the powerful move-
ment of the peoples for strengthening peace . . .
The formation of a mighty commonwealth of socialist
states represented a great, universally historical
achievement of the peoples of these countries . . .
ICf. especially "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
Union, " 1946 and following editions.
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The commonwealth of socialist states is the mighty
bulwark of all laboring humanity.
32. The XX CPSU Congress, though it did not stress
the term sodruzhestvo, contributed basic themes to the expan-
sion of the "world socialist system. " Strengthening "fraternal
relations with the peoples democracies" would lead to the
'Hevelopment and fortification of fraternal ties with the toilers
of all countries. " Acknowledgment of "different roads to
socialism, " which contributed so powerfully to the Polish and
Hungarian crises, laid the basis for the theme of "unity in
diversity, " which, with variations of emphasis - chiefly on
unity - , has informed communist utterances ever since.
33. As the crisis over Stalin sharpened, and Com-
munists throughout the world demanded a "Marxist explanation"
of his crimes, the CPSU was forced to respond with an ideo-
logical stopgap, the 30 June 1956 Resolution of the Central
Committee. This Resolution reaffirmed the principal theses
of the XX CPSU Congress, and specifically mentioned in the
first sentence the sodruzhestvo.
34. The 30 October 1956 "Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the USSR on the Basic Factors in the Development and
Further Consolidation of Friendship and Cooperation among
the Soviet Union and other Socialist States" - written in appar-
ent haste to quiet the upheavals in Hungary and Poland
presented the first official definition of sodruzhestvo:
1
Kommunist, No. 14 (October 1955), pp.4-7 (emphasis on
commonwealth supplied here and in subsequent quotations).
This is the same issue which contains Molotov's own recanta-
tion of his "error" in not recognizing that the "building of
socialism" had been completed in the USSR, the first step
in his decline.
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United by the common ideal of building a socialist
society and by the principles of proletarianism, the
countries of the great commonwealth of socialist
nations can build their relations only on the basis of
complete equality, respect for territorial integrity,
national independence and sovereignty and non-inter-
ference in each other's internal affairs. This does
not preclude, but on the contrary, presupposes close
fraternal cooperation and mutual understanding among
the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the
economic, political and cultural fields.
35. The next stage in the unfolding of the Common-
wealth called for a statement, not merely of the CPSU, but
of all Communist parties of the Bloc. The occasion was pro-
vided by the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution (Moscow, November 1957). The "Decla-
ration of the Conference of the Reprefiantatives of Commu-,
nist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries" pro-
claimed:
The Socialist states are united into one sodruzhestvo,
by having entered upon the common path to socialism,
by a common class substance of their social and
economic system and state authority, and by the need
for mutual support and aid, by a community of inter-
ests and objectives in the struggle against imperial-
ism and for the victory of socialism and communism,
and by a Marxist-Leninist ideology common to them
all.
36. It is apparent that this Commonwealth now in-
cludes the Peoples' Democracies and is no longer restricted
to the one state which had completed the "building of social-
ism, " the USSR. All of these twelve states are governed by
certain "common laws, r' which the Declaration spelled out
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in classic Communist terms. With this formal definition in
solemn conclave, the Commonwealth may be said to have been
officially launched, not as an institution with precise organiza-
tional contours, but as a broad, vague concept susceptible of
varying interpretation and emphasis.
37. During the first few months of 1958, there
appears to have been relative silence on the sodruzhestvo in
the press and official statements, but, since June of that
year there has been a steady flow of utterances by authori-
tative Soviet leaders and theorists. A number of citations
are presented in Annex I to establish the currency of the
term and to illustrate its Protean aspects.
38. Inevitably, in the wake of such an authoritative
statement as that of the November 1957 Declaration, the line
of theory, agitation and propaganda has systematically eulo-
gized the Commonwealth theme. Numerous books and articles
have appeared, amplifying and bringing the changes on the
basic theme laid down by the 1957 Moscow Declaration. A
number of these are summarized or listed in Annex II.
39. It may be significant that several recent articles
in Pravda have featured the word sodruzhestvo in the title,
while using it scarcely or not at all in the text. This is par-
ticularly striking in the case of an article by A. Kosygin,
Chief of Gosplan. Although the title reads "The Great Com-
monwealth of the Socialist Countries, " all references are to
the "world socialist system" or the "camp" except for the
last sentence which speaks of the "great sodruzhestvo of the
socialist states (gosudarstv). 1 On the other hand, Y. Andro-
pov in a discussion of the "Theoretical Problems f the Con-
struction of Communism" under the title "Development and
IPravda, 28 April 1959, p. 3.
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Strengthening of the World Socialist System" describes the
system as a commonwealth, using almost verbatim the lan-
guage of the 1957 Moscow Declaration. 1
40. One of the most reliable indications of the weight
attached to a term or concept is to be found in the slogans
which appear in connection with the anniversary of the October
Revolution and the May Day celebration. Subtle, tactically
significant variations of emphasis characterize these semi-
annual exercises, and the use of sodruzhestvo is no excep-
tion to the rule. In Annex III there are listed the slogans
since 1957 in which it is hailed. The wording of the latest
May Day slogan (No. 12) is as follows:
Hail to the world socialist system, the indestructible
bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples!
May the great commonwealth of the countries 6f the
socialist camp grow stronger and flourish!
1Pravda, 24 April 1959, p. 2;
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VI. THE RELATIONSHIP OF "SYSTEM, " "CAMP, " AND
'COMMONWEALTH"
41. It is apparent that the "world socialist system, "
the "camp, "' and the sodruzhestvo are to a certain extent over-
lapping or interchangeable terms. T aey constitute a triad, a
sort of unity in trinity, in which the specific differentiae are
not always immediately clear. Indeed, one is tempted to
assume that in many cases the usage of an individual writer
or speaker may be dictated by habit rather than by precise
intention.
42. The close interrelation of the three terms can
be illustrated from numerous recent theoretical writings.
A single example will suffice:
The transformation of socialism into a world system,
the formation and consolidation of the great socialist
camp, is the defining factor of the present-day stage
of social relations . . . In this lies the source of
strength and the inviolability of the socialist Com-
monwealth.
Nevertheless, the three terms have distinct connotations,
which are carefully pondered in theoretical statements and
in propaganda.
43. The "world socialist system" is variously des-
cribed as "a fact, "" as an historic event of crucial importance,
as the product of a transformation in which the first two or
three post-war years were decisive. In the broadest sense,
1
"The World System of Socialism, an Indestructible Bastion
of Peace and the Security of Peoples, " Pravda, 21 April
1959.
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it is perhaps best to view it as an ideological framework, the
incorporation and consolidation of nations under the aegis of
a "secular religion" which aspires to world totality. As such,
the term is charged with a sort of "mystique, " but it is not
vested with a specific organizational form.
44. Similarly, the "socialist camp" is not conceived
as a concrete organization. Rather, as its origin in the Ger-
man word Lager implies, it is an expression of militancy.
One body of fighters faces another in hostile array. The
"socialist camp!' is portrayed both defensively and aggres-
sively. It is a monolithic unity of "peace-loving" peoples
confronted by an implacable and aggressive adversary..
Against the provocations and aggressions of the "imperialists, "
the "socialist camp" will deliver a "decisive rebuff. " It is
within this concept that the communists have developed their
now classic tactic of alternating military threats with blan-
dishments and professions of "peaceful coexistence.
45. Unlike the other two, the sodruzhestvo contains
an implicit principle of organizational unity, a nascent struc-
tural concept. Its usefulness is still being explored, its
specific forms are being derived empirically, and its propa-
gation is still tentative.
46. One may be tempted to evaluate the significance
of these three concepts in terms of the relative frequency
with which they are used. On the basis of a statistical sam-
ple of Soviet editorials, articles and speeches it is apparent
that both the "system" and the "camp" predominate heavily ::
over "commonwealth. " Nevertheless, the relative infrequency
of the term sodruzhestvo does not indicate that it is less sig-
nificant. The fact, which we have noted above, that it is in.,
creasingly featured in headlines or book titles, even though
its use in the text may be sparing, suggests that it is being
"groomed, " as it were, for more intensive development.
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47. From the analysis and quotations already pre-
sented, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines of the
Socialist Commonwealth, as Soviet propagandists would have
it apprehended.
48. The guiding ideological principle is,of course,
''proletarian internationalism, " first worked out by Marx and
Engels, and "creatively" developed by Lenin. Under this
principle, there is no room for "bourgeois nationalism, 1' the
false patriotism instilled by capitalist exploiters into the
working class of their countries. Soviet propaganda extols
the special form of "nationalism" which has been cultivated
within the USSR, and which is held to be the prototype of the
broader relationship that will one day flourish among all
countries. Thus Khrushchev, in his keynote speech at the
XXI CPSU Congress, declared:
The Soviet Union is a multinational socialist state
based on the friendship of equal peoples united by a
single will . . . The commonwealth of socialist
nations is the source of the growth of strength and
might of the multinational socialist state.
The Uzbek Mukhiditnov - the Presidium's expert on national
minorities - in his 30 January speech at the Congress echoed
the theme-,
In a multinational country like ours, one of the most
important conditions for successful struggle for the
victory of communism is the consistent pursuit of an
internationalist national policy . . . In our country
national relations have been harmoniously developing
on the basis of the principles of the great common-
wealth of all nations, the inviolable foundation of the
Soviet state.
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49. Soviet doctrinal writings on the Commonwealth
rely heavily on the so-called Pancha--Shila or Five Points of
the Bandung Conference (1955). The relations of the states
in the sodruzhestvo are based on "equality, respect for ter-
ritorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty and
non-intervention in each other's affairs. "1 In the atmosphere
of "peaceful coexistence, " all countries, big and small, are
equal, regardless of their advance or backwardness on the
road to socialism. No country enjoys any special privileges.
The concern of all. is with fraternal cooperation and mutual
assistance.
50. Soviet propagandists of course cannot refrain
from stressing the leading role of the USSR, its wealth of
revolutionary experience, and its "great ideological strength"
as the "guard and citidel of the liberation movement through-
out the world. " This theme is interwoven with praise of
Soviet economic power, second only to that of the United
States, which enables the USSR to set aside "substantial re-
sources for the allocation of the aid which the Socialist coun-
tries need, without pursuing commercial self-interest. "
51. But the theme of Soviet pre-eminence, which is
strong in discussions of the "camp" is relatively muted in the
Commonwealth. Rather, the emphasis is on the bonds of
Marxist-Leninist ideology which tie together the aspiring
peoples of socialism in their striving to create a "glorious
future for mankind. " In this sense, sodruzhestvo is pre-
sented as the embodiment of humanity's fondest dreams.
1
S. Sanakoyev, "The Basis of the Relations between the
Socialist Countries, " International Affairs, No. 7 (July 1958)
p. 25.
2Ibid., p.29.
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VIII. CURRENT FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST
ORGANIZATION
52. Having presented evidence that the concept of
sodruzhestvo is being consciously developed by the Commu-
nist leaders as a matrix for the international organization
of the "world socialist system, " we shall now discuss the
principal concrete forms which have been utilized so far,
and then endeavor to project them into the future. It is
understood that both party and government institutional
forms are under discussion; these may merge, overlap and
diverge according to the situation. The important role which
China plays in manipulating these organizational develop-
ments must also be considered.
53. Three principal topics will be analyzed: (a)
The use of the system of bilateral and multilateral confer-
ences; (b) The creation of an international journal; (c) Adap-
tation of existing Bloc institutions - the Council of Economic
Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and the Warsaw Pact.
A. The Conference System
54. The 30 October 1956 Declaration, as observed
above, marked the first official proclamation by the CPSU
of the sodruzhestvo concept, and at the same time it may be
said to have constituted the first step in the campaign to
stabilize the International Communist Movement after the
disturbance created by de-Stalinization and the upheavals in
Poland and Hungary. The Declaration was also a concession
to the pressure for more nearly equal treatment of the in-
dividual states and Communist parties of the Bloc.
55. During the year which followed the Declara-
tion, more than one hundred and fifty bilateral and multi-
lateral conferences were held, for the most part in capitals
of the Bloc. Many of these were attended by representatives
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of Free World Communist parties, who in turn. passed on
the line to other parties outside the Bloc.
56. The effectiveness of this series of conferences
soon became apparent. In monotonous succession they pro-
duced declarations of "identity of views on the Hungarian
"counter-revolution, " on the need for loyal cooperation with
the CPSU and other parties, and on the insidious dangers of
Titoism and "revisionism" in general. The ideological and
organizational campaign was intensified, spurred on by
promises of economic assistance to the sometimes hard-
pressed satellite regimes.
57. With the growing manifestation of cohesion and
solidarity in the parties and front organizations, the ques-
tion of a central Comintern type of organization was thor-
oughly canvassed., and, as noted above, at least temporarily
set aside. The Moscow Conference of Communist and Work-
ers' Parties of November 1957, reportedly decided that the
system of bilateral, multilateral and "plenary" conferences
was sufficient to insure coordination. 1 This decision was
duly reflected in subsequent theoretical utterances:
It is natural that the Communist and Workers' Parties
in the socialist camp deem it their duty to formulate
a single point of view on the most important problems
of socialist construction and on the struggle for peace.
They are unanimous in believing that, in line with bi-
lateral meetings of leaders and the exchange of in-
Cf. V. M. Churayev, On Party Unity (Moscow, 1958): The
participants in the Moscow Conference "exchanging opinions,
decided that there! is no current need for creating any kind
of international body of communism like the past Comintern
or Cominform" (emphasis supplied).
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formation, it is expedient as far as possible, to
conduct even more extensive conferences of Com-
munist and Workers' Parties to deliberate on actual
problems, to exchange experiences and to coordin-
ate action in the joint struggle for peace, democ-
racy and socialism. 1
B. The Creation of an International Journal
58. Although the establishment of a new Comintern.
or Cominform was deemed inadvisable, a decision was made,
probably at the Moscow Conference, to establish an author-
itative international journal in order to provide guidance for
the movement. It is not known whether there was any serious
opposition to this step. According to Pravda (7-8 March 1958)
the organization meeting at Prague was attended by represen-
tatives of "some" Communist countries. Those parties which
did not partake in the founding meeting are to be given "an
opportunity to join on an equal footing or take part in the pub-
lication and work of the journal in any form that suits them. "
59. The new journal is now being published in fif-
teen langua'es and bears the title Problems of Peace and
Socialism. Its editor is Alexei Rumyantsev, .,.a Khrush-
chev protege, who is a member of the Central Committee
of the CPSU and a former editor of the authoritative Soviet
theoretical journal, Kommunist.
1
Ye. Yuskov, "The Socialist Camp - A Mighty Union of
Fraternal Nations, " Kommunist, No. 11 (1958). Although
this article stresses the "camp, " it also identifies it with
the "fraternal sodruzhestvo of nations in a new socialist
order, in a new economic structure. "
2Several of the foreign languages are not printed in Prague
and some have different titles, the English as wellras ~.
the American edition being World Marxist Review.
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60. It is still too early to evaluate this successor
to For a Lasting Peace! For a People l s Democracy!
So far its impact appears to have been slight, and its
approach is more cautious than that of the defunct Comin-
form journal. Nevertheless, it provides a medium to dis-
play the leading personalities and theorists of International
Communism on an implied footing of equality. It does set
forth a-cexitral line, though hardly one which differs from
that appearing in Pravda, Kommunist, International Affairs,
New Times, and other readily available Soviet periodicals.
In time, it may become more than a merely "theoretical
and informative" organ of the movement and provide an
authoritative interpretation of Soviet policies, a guidance
for the "socialist camp" and a cement of ideological unity.
So far, its articles have not emphasized the Commonwealth.
C. The Utilization of Existing Bloc Organizations
61. Although the establishment of a formal inter-
national control mechanism remains in abeyance, the
economic, political and military aspects of cooperation
and mutual assistance are being vigorously developed under
the guidance of two existing Bloc organizations, the Council
for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and the Warsaw
Pact. Created in 1949 and 1955, respectively, their cur-
rent burst of activity beginning in May 1958 and continuing
to the present was unquestionably stimulated by the Moscow
"summit" conference of November 1957, which, as we have
seen, launched the concept of the Commonwealth on an inter-
national basis. These two primary and permanent organ-
izations are supplemented by continuing development of bilat-
eral and multilateral meetings, and by some degree of tacti-
cal coordination at regional levels.
62. CEMMIA - or as it is sometimes called,
COMECON - has only within the last year begun to place
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heavy emphasis on the coordination of the separate economies
of the member countries. Whereas under Stalin, each of the
European satellites had patterned its economy after the Soviet
model, seeking to create a heavy industry base even in such
predominantly agricultural countries as Bulgaria and Albania,
Stalin's successors have increasingly recognized the need for
diversification and specialization. The turning point seems
to have been reached in the meeting of CEMA which was held
in Moscow in May 1958. There is evidence that the Kremlin,
at that time, undertook the gradual transformation of the Coun-
cil into a major organization for long range economic coordin-
ation, leading perhaps eventually to the full economic integra-
tion of the Bloc.
63. A climax in this development was marked by the
celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of CEMA (May 13-16,
1959). It is not without significance that the meeting took
place in Tirana, Albania, and was immediately followed by
the twelve-day visit of Khrushchev and by the appearance of
the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal Peng Teh-huai. The
intertwining of military, political and economic motifs, the
presence of the supreme leader of the Bloc in its tiniest cap-
ital, the representation of China - to be sure, by a military
rather than an economic or political leader - all seem to
present the emergent Commonwealth in epitome.
64. There have been many adumbrations of the fu-
ture role which CEMA may be expected to play. A single
example will serve to illustrate it:
The socialist camp presents itself, not only as a
political Commonwealth of socialist countries, but
as a definite economic unity. It would be premature
to consider the world system of socialist economies
at the present stage as a single economy directed by
a common plan. Such a stage in the development of
world socialism has not yet been reached. The ten-
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dency to the formation of a single world socialist
economy has still not reached its culmination. The
world socialist economic system now appears as an
association of mutually connected (sokupnost' vzaimos-
vyazannikh) national economic systems of the social-
ist states, the political, economic and cultural devel-
opment of which proceeds on the base of self-subsistence
and independence. 1
65. This citation - others could be adduced - reveals
clearly the caution with which the subject is being handled. It
is only natural that the European satellites should be appre-
hensive over the restrictions which, in the name of "special-
ization" may be placed over their economic expansion. They
have grown used to having their economic activity controlled
by Moscow on a direct bilateral basis, and their relations with
other satellites have been conducted through an often untidy
complex of multilateral arrangements. There is some evi-
dence that the satellite leaders have not adjusted their think-
ing and practice to the idea that a new order lies before them.
Even up to the tenth. anniversary session, Polish, Czech, and
East German officials are reported to have dismissed the idea
that CEMA could become a significant factor in their economic
dealings with the other satellites and especially with Moscow.
There is still a tendency to view the current outburst of prop-
aganda as unrelated to the reality of short range, largely ex-
ploitative control of Bloc economies by the Kremlin overlords.
66. It is the general contention of this paper that
the long range prospects of the Commonwealth must be taken
seriously, particularly with regard to economic planning.
1I. Vinogradov, "The Economic Cooperation of the Socialist
Countries, " Kommunist, No. 6 (April 1959) p. 84.
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For that reason we impute high significance to both the
ceremonial and the theoretical activity surrounding the
Tirana celebration. 1
The Warsaw Pact
67. The role of the Warsaw Pact in the future organ-
ization of International Communism must also be considered
in the framework of sodruzhestvo. Although this sham alli-
ance was a mere creation of the Soviet Union, obviously de-
signed as a formal military counter to NATO, it has been
increasingly presented as a political unity of sovereign and
equal states. The Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization has been enlisted in major Com-
munist propaganda campaigns, especially in support of "peace"
and the banning of nuclear tests. Its communique of 26 May
1958 - three days after that of CEMA - strictly followed the
overall Soviet line.
68. Although the Warsaw Pact, being a military
alliance, tends to invite presentation as a "monolithic camp, "
its Political Consultative Committee is suffused, in:.,recent
writings, with the aura of the Commonwealth. Its
program for consolidating peace . . , expresses the
interest of all humanity, and consequently obtained
the approval of the widest circles in the international
community.
IThe significance of the CEMA developments is beginning to
be noted in the Western press; cf. Paul Wohl "Soviet Talks
in Tirana Conclude, " Christian Science Monitor (27 May 1959)
who observes that "the new plan highlighted Moscow's decision
in favor of joint economic development of the European end of
the 'socialist commonwealth'. ''
2Yuskov, op. cit., p. 35.
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The use of the Warsaw Pact framework for political purposes
was demonstrated by a meeting of Bloc Foreign Ministers in
April 1959, ostensibly for the coordination of policy prior to
the Geneva Conference. For the first time in the history of
the Pact, Communist China participated.
Multilateral Meetings Outside the Bloc
69. Concentration on strengthening the unity and co-
hesion of the Bloc has not led the Kremlin to neglect the
parties of the Free World. Here, too, the device of the mul-
tilateral meeting has been employed, and again the theoretical
conception is that of sodruzhestvo. At the end of June 1958, a
conference "For Peace in Europe" was convoked in East Ber-
lin, ostensibly by the West German Communist Party (KPD).
Of the fifteen participating parties, only three were from the
Bloc - East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and all-of
the remainder were from Western Europe. The Communique
of the conference, following the line of the Warsaw Pact meet-
ing, called for the cooperation of the working class against
the "adventurous course of American and German imperial-
ism" on behalf of the "world-wide peace movement. " Soviet
praise of this meeting, as demonstrating the "fraternal sup-
port of the working class throughout the world" for the coun-,
tries of the Socialist Commonwealth shows clearly the direct-
ing hand of the Kremlin center. 1
70. Other multilateral meetings of Free World Com-
munist parties have been held. On the occasion of the XXICPSU
Congress in Moscow, both Western European and Latin Amer-
ican party leaders are reported to have met in secret sessions
under the chairmanship of Suslov, and to have received bind-
ing tactical directives. Subsequently a group of the Latin Amer-
ican delegates visited Peiping' where they are believed to have
listened to advice from Mao Tse-tung on the conduct of revolu-
tion in the Western hemisphere.
1Ibid.
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Regional Coordination
71. A number of indications point to an increasing
use of regional control points for International Communism.
These are not intended to function autonomously, in the spirit
of Togliatti's "polycentrism." They are primarily centers
to facilitate communications, travel, and coordination of
matters common to the area. The strongest and most signi-
ficant Communist Party is assigned certain limited functions
which it must carry out in strict subordination to Moscow. If
a substantial change of strategy is called for, this is still
likely to be laid down in Moscow, behind the scenes at an
International Communist conclave, such as the XXI CPSU
Congress. So far, the emphasis of this regional activity
appears to be more of a Cominform than a sodruzhestvo type.
72. The clearest evidence that this practice is well
established comes from Latin America. Several factors ap-
pear to have dictated the use of regional control centers:
distance from Moscow, difficulty and expense of secure
travel and communications, relative weakness and in many
cases illegality of Communist Parties, and sparsity of Soviet
and satellite diplomatic establishments.
73. In the Middle East, the situation is in flux. The
creation of an Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (December
1957) with its seat in Cairo appears to have had the dual pur-
pose of exploiting the "spirit of Bandung" for regional'prop-
aganda and marshalling Communist and fellow travelling
elements for the penetration of the area. Subsequent develop-
ments, especially the revolution in Iraq and the repression of
Egyptian Communists by Nasser appear to have reduced the
value of this instrumentality to International Communism.
Moscow may be developing a limited form of regional party
coordination, utilizing the Syrian Communist Khalid Bakdash
and his apparatus to facilitate communications and tactical
operations among the Arab countries. Addis Ababa., plays a
coordinating role for East Africa.
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74. In Europe, the Italian Communist Party appears
to have taken on new responsibilities vis-a-vis the hard-
pressed French party, and possibly in the Mediterranean area
generally. At the beginning of April 1959 a meeting of six
Western European Communist Party leaders was held in Brus-
sels for the purpose of discussing the problems presented by
the Common Market and European integration. There is no
clear indication, however, that a West European Cominform
is in being.
75. Relatively little is known about the coordination
of Communist Party activities in South and Southeast Asia.
There must be some division of function between the Soviet
and the Chinese parties. The fact that the USSR and the
European satellites are more widely represented diplomat-
ically than Communist China undoubtedly favors a preemin-
ence of Soviet influence, although the Chinese economic
"model" is generally held to be more pertinent for the coun-
tries of that region than that of the USSR.
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IX. COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL. COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
76. The growing power of Communist China assures
it a major voice in the future organization of the International
Movement. Since the crisis of 1956 the long shadow of Mao
has hovered over every aspect of World Communism, and,
at the Moscow meeting of November 1957, he stepped direct-
ly into the limelight. No attempt will be made to review the
entire course of interplay between the two leaderships - the
more so since it is inevitably obscure at many key turns -
but there will be offered a speculative appraisal of the atti-
tude which China appears to hold toward the developments
described above. This attitude may be examined in its two
components of party and state organization.
77. We may be certain that Mao yields to no one in
his advocacy of unity and harmony among the Communist
parties of the world. But he is equally determined to pre-
serve the principle of specific national differences within
this prevailing unity, and to resist any tendencies toward
absolute hegemony on the part of the Soviet Union, The
classic statement of these principles is contained in a funda-
mental document of the stabilization campaign, "More on the
Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"
(28 December 1956):
Marxism-Leninism holds that there are common basic
laws in the development of human society, but each
state and nation has features different from those of
others. Thus nations pass through the class struggle,
and will eventually arrive at Communism by roads
that are the same in essence but different in their
specific forms . . . All the experience of the Soviet
Union, including its fundamental experience, is bound
up with definite national characteristics and no other
country should copy it mechanically. I
1
FBIS, 31 December 1956, pp. 14-15.
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These are carefully measured words, and Mao has elaborated
them elsewhere in reproof both of deviationist tendencies among
the satellites, especially Poland and Hungary, and of "great
nation chauvinism" of the Russians. The Chinese have, of
course, been particularly bitter in denouncing the "revision-
ist" position of the Yugoslavs.
78. The corollaries of this theory of International
Communist solidarity are two:
(a) should the Communist parties maintain relations
of equality among themselves and reach common
understanding . . . through genuine, and not nominal
exchange of views, their unity will be strengthened;
(b) conversely, if in their mutual relations, one party
imposes its views on others, or if the parties use the
method of interference in each other's internal affairs
. . . their unity will be impaired. 1
79. Applied to party organization, the Chinese posi-
tion is incompatible with the reinstitution of a new Comintern.
Although Peking recognizes the ideological pre-eminence of
Moscow, it is unwilling to permit outside determination of its
own party policies. Moscow's leadership, which Mao person-
ally reaffirmed in 'November 1957, results in part from its
historic role in the world revolution, in part from the recog-
nition of its guiding role in strategy, and in part from its
economic aid and military support. It is not absolute.
80. In general, it would appear that during the past
two years harmony has prevailed in the relations of the Soviet
and the Chinese parties. It cannot be denied, however, that
there have been manifestations of sensitivity, which, at least
to non-Communist eyes, seem to reveal considerable areas
of actual or potential friction. Besides rebuking "great nation
chauvinism, " Mao has set forth a doctrine of "non-antagonistic
contradictions" between the ruling party and the masses which
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Khrushchev has criticized with visible pique. The over-
zealous ideological claims which attended the launching of
the communes on mainland China were received with initial
frostiness and then were quickly rebutted by Soviet leaders.
Yet both sides have decided not to "wash their dirty linen in
public" and have made adjustments in their positions which
restored equanimity. It is impossible to say how much
underlying resentment persists, but harmony seems to have
been restored.
81. Against this background of party amity, it is
probable that Communist China will adapt itself to the con-
cept of relations among socialist states which the Soviet Lead-
ers have been elaborating. Whether this will lead to an accept-
ance of the sodruzhestvo in any concrete organizational terms
remains to be seen. There has been a rather noticeable reti-
cence on the subject in Chinese statements. So far, the Chi-
nese Communists have made no effort to provide a theoretical
discussion of the Commonwealth comparable to that which
Soviet publicists have put forth. Indeed, there appears to be
no precise equivalent to the term sodruzhestvo. The usual
translation is to chia t'ing (great-house-court) which may be
rendered as the "great family" of socialist nations. Political
commonwealths, such as the British?are designated by the
term lien pang which means a "federated form of government. "
82. In the field of intra-Bloc economic organization,
Peking has maintained an ambivalent position. Together with
its satellites, it has participated in meetings of CEMA in an
observer capacity, but there is no evidence that it has become
more deeply involved. The communique of the tenth anniver-
sary session in Tirana has been duly reported in the Chinese
press, but without the enthusiasm which characterized the
attendant propaganda in the Soviet Bloc countries. It has in-
deed been apparent for some time that China, like the Euro-
pean satellites, is mistrustful of CEMA's program of "co-
ordination" and "specialization, " but unlike the latter it is
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powerful enough to assert its reservations. It is inevitable
that China, with its aspiration to achieve a fully developed,
balanced modern socialist economy, "outstripping Britain"
and other advanced capitalist economies, cannot accept
restrictions on any of its fields of expansion. In 1956 Chou
En-lai spoke out against the application of "specialization"
to China. Continuing difficulties in the progress of trade
negotiations with the USSR indicate that Peking has no inten-
tion of remaining indefinitely a mere supplier of agricultural
products and raw materials to the Bloc. Although it will
remain dependent on the USSR and the European satellites
for the sinews of heavy industry for years to come, it will
not cease to strive for a more equitable balance in the com-
position of its trade, and for a growing role in the economic
penetration of the underdeveloped countries. Recent Soviet
statements have been careful not to indicate any desire to
restrict this striving.
83. On the political side, the tradition of Chinese
Communist theory has much in common with the line which
the Soviet Union has been developing. Liu Shao-chi, now
second in command to Mao, wrote as early as 1948:
The proletariat firmly opposes all national oppression.
It firmly opposes both the oppression of its own nation
by any other nation and the oppression of any other
nation by its own nation; it advocates complete free-
dom of federation or of separation from all nations.
This concept of "free federation" lies close to the flexible
approach to Bloc relations which the Socialist Commonwealth
is designed to provide. We have noted above the close paral-
lel between the guiding principles of the latter and the Pancha
I"On Internationalism and Nationalism, " China Digest,
(14 December 1958), emphasis supplied.
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Shila or Five Points of Bandung, developed by Nehru and U Nu,
which Chou En-lai enthusiastically espoused.
84. In practical terms, Communist China on more
than one occasion has intervened in Bloc affairs in the spirit
of sodruzhestvo. At the height of the 1956 crisis, Chou En-
lai toured Eastern Europe, seeking to calm the rebellious
mood of Poland and to moderate the resentment against Soviet
dictation in the satellites. At the same time, he - and Mao
in "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of
the Proletariat" ! - made it plain that the Chinese Communists
were firmly opposed to "national communism" in the sense
which Tito had given it. Any hope that China would e spouse
"polycentrism" or would condone excessive emphasis on
''national roads to socialism" has been effectively dashed.
85. Within China itself, the possibility of creating
a sodruzhestvo patterned after the USSR scarcely arises.
China, with its thousands of years of culture, has always re-
garded itself more as a civilization than as a nation. The
national minorities are small, constituting only about six
percent of the entire population, and their assimilation pre-
sents much simpler problems than is the case with the minor-
ities of the USSR. During the past ten years Chinese policy
toward the minority groups has generally been cautious, al-
though1within the past year there has been a noticeable hard-
ening. The brutal treatment of Tibet has evoked protests
from China's Asiatic neighbors. Peking, however, probably
feels that it has no choice but to proceed with the extirpation
of "reaction, " counting on time to blur the sense of outrage.
lAn excellent summary of the changes in this policy is
presented by Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's
First Decade: The Minorities, " New Leader, (8 June 1959),
p. 21.
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86. In sum, the Chinese Communist attitude toward
the organization of International Communism follows orthodox
Marxist-Leninist tradition. Unity comes first, but it must
not be imposed arbitrarily. On the party side, the pre-emin-
ence of Moscow must be respected, but it cannot be allowed
to dictate through a Comintern. On the governmental side,
the co-equality of states must be recognized, and their rela-
tions must be developed on the basis of mutuality of interest.
Thus, it appears that Peking might be willing to participate
in a Socialist Commonwealth in which it would share with
Moscow a benevolent condominium of superior power over
the satellites but would not permit the exercise of hegemony.
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X. POSSIBLE TACTICS IMPLEMENTING INTERNATION-
AL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY
87. We have seen that in the aftermath of the 1956
crisis, the leaders of International Communism, in their
drive for stabilization and ideological conformity, have at-
tached the highest priority to restoring the unity of the Bloc
on both the party and the government levels. In this process,
no major sacrifice of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to political
expedience has been permitted. "Reactionary" and "revision-
ist" elements - Tito, Nagy, the Dalai Lama - have been
crushed by force, where this was possible, or have been
expelled from the fold. The maintenance of ideological purity
is integral with the preservation of order and cohesion in the
Communist movement. The key to its dynamism is organi-
zation, dedicated to a social vision of enormous and ominous
aspect.
88. If, as this paper contends, the Commonwealth
of Socialist States is being readied for a future role of great
importance, the question naturally arises what shape it may
be expected to take. In all strategic steps the "creative"
elaboration of Marxism-Leninism proceeds on a basis of
multiple objectives. Tactical requirements may obscure
for a time the primary direction, and resistance may lead
to temporary retreats. Hence, in assessing the sodruzhest-
vo, we must project our scrutiny beyond current vicissitudes
and seek to penetrate the deeper confines of its potential.
A. A Temporary Continuation of the Conference System
89. As noted above, Communist leaders and the-
orists have proclaimed the virtues of bilateral and multi-
lateral meetings of both parties and governments. They
have been resourceful in finding occasions for staging inter-
national "get-togethers " - an anniversary or a plenary ses-
sion of a leading Party. These may be switched from one
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end of the Bloc to the other, dramatizing the vastness of the
land mass over which Communism holds direct sway, or even
the strategic significance of its tiny exclave, Albania. The
profusion of ceremonial speeches and propaganda outpourings
builds up an image of power and activity, while providing a
convenient screen for closed discussions of tactics and policy.
90. And yet, the conference system can hardly be
regarded by the Communist leaders as an adequate mechanism
for directing the movement. It does not provide those proper
organizational weapons which Lenin consistently argued are
essential to the triumph of the world revolution. The confer-
ence system lacks the continuity which a powerful core of
permanent executives gave to the Comintern. Instead, the
central leadership must rely on an assortment of channels
and "transmission belts, " diplomatic establishments, polit-
ical, economic and. cultural missions, international journals
and front organizations. We may question whether this com-
plex system would appear adequate, in the eyes of the Krem-
lin, to cope with a repetition of the crisis of 1956, or even to
provide the necessary dynamics of advance in a prolonged
relaxing period of "'peaceful co-existence. IT
B. Exploitation of the Commonwealth to Promote a
United Front
91. Although the sodruzhestvo concept is applied at
present primarily to the twelve existing nations of the Bloc,
it also is being projected, tentatively at least, on a global
scale. An appeal is constantly being made, over the govern-
ments of the Free World, to the rank and file of workers and
"peace-loving peoples" and to some of the left-wing political
parties. In time, the Commonwealth concept may be exploit-
ed as a lure to entrap sympathetic governments and people
in a vast United Front. The appeal is couched in vague,
idealistic terms:
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As yet the international relations of a new type are
completely dominant in only one part of the world -
the Socialist World. However, the existence of these
most humane and lofty relations between peoples and
countries in mankind's many-centuries long history
exercises a great positive influence upon the whole
system of relations between countries and upon all
the processes taking place in the world today. I
This "wave of the future" is presented to all the workers of
the world in a spirit "combining internationalism and patriot-
ism. "
92. This is, of course, only a part of the untiring
campaign of blandishment which International Communism
directs to the Socialist parties. Although these appeals
usually fall on deaf ears or meet sharp rebuff:, Moscow may
feel that, couched in the terminology of the sndruzhestvo,
they will gradually gain. greater acceptance. By subtle analogy
with the British. Commonwealth, the Communists convey an
image of unfettered association, free from apprehension of
imperial dominion. 2 The peoples which may be tempted to
participate are given the promise of "true" national indepen-
dence.
93. The Social Democratic parties of Western coun-
tries are, of course, much too experienced in Communist
deviousness to be taken in by professions of "non-interference"'
and "fraternal mutual assistance. " But in other areas of the
1Sanakoyev, op. cit., p. 33.
2The Communists, of course, repudiate any basic similarity
of the two institutions: "The imperialists . . . term as
'commonwealths' the aggressive blocs created for war prep-
aration, NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, which are
entirely subject to US policy. But they are not a common-
wealth of nations. They are rather unions of predatory im-
perialists. " Kuskov, p..26. ~, See Annex IV an differences
between the two commonwealths.
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world, especially the Afro-Asian, more susceptible mater-
ial is at hand. By nurturing the virulent nationalism of the
newly independent countries, by offering them arms and
economic aid, and above all by professing to be satisfied
with their "neutralism" and not demanding positive support,
the Communists are preparing the ground to embrace them
in an eventual Socialist Commonwealth.
C. The Development of Inter-CP Coordination - A New
Comintern?
94. The past few years have been marked by a
cautious attitude toward the coordination of the activities of
international Communist parties. There is every reason to
assume that this will continue to be the case for some time
to come. The objections of many Communists to the reviv-
al of a visible Comintern, together with the adverse impact
which such a step would have on the neutralist and uncom-
mitted nations, probably remain decisive.
95. On the other hand some measure of demonstra-
tive action, some display of solidarity and universality will
always seem desirable to a movement with the essential
characteristics of a "secular religion. " The outward evi-
dence of comradely cooperation and harmony - however
fraught with tensions it may be beneath the surface - is an
organic requirement for the vitality and dynamism of the
movement.
96. The opinion is sometimes expressed that a
Comintern is - and indeed always has been - in being, des-
pite the absence of tangible institutional form. The Confer-
ence of Communist and Workers' Parties is regarded as the
"present form" of the "International Communist organiza-
tion, formerly represented by the Comintern and the Com-
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inform."' Its November 1957 Declaration - quoted above
is viewed as the manifesto of a permanent body, continuity
with the past being represented in the person of O.V. Kuu-
sinen who was Secretary of the Executive Committee of the
Comintern from 1921 to 1939 and who is now a member of
the Soviet Presidium.
97. There is much to be said in support of this view.
Nevertheless, we incline to believe that this Conference of
Communist and Workers' Parties is as yet an "organization
without an organization. " Although such an arrangement
cannot be entirely satisfactory to the top leaders of the move-
ment, it probably commends itself at this time as a comprom-
ise between the hard, rigid, undeviating dictation which was
possible under Stalin and the more flexible assertion of power,
working through consensus which is the professed"style" of
Khrushchev.
98. The Conference of Communist and Workers'
Parties and the Commonwealth of Socialist Nations may be
viewed as a loose but vast apparatus serving the function of
welding the "monolith" of parties and states. They are the
twin engines of world revolution, guided and dominated by
one principle, "proletarian internationalism. " Neither has
achieved clear institutional delineation, yet both appear to
meet the actual needs of the movement. Their roles to some
extent overlap. Either or both can be expanded as opportun-
ity arises, or reduced if tactical expedience so dictates.
But as strategic instruments - whatever form they eventually
1This is the contention of the US Senate Subcommittee to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act:
cf. "The Revival of the Communist International and Its
Significance for the United States" (May 1959) passim. Sig-
nificant evidence is adduced in support of this view, with
special emphasis on the subordination of the CPUSA to
Moscow.
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assume - they appear to be firmly established. They are
wielded by a determined leadership, and so long as a direct-
ing will can maintain unity within the movement, they are
not likely to be abandoned.
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XI, CONCLUSION AND FORECAST
99. Having analyzed - so far as possible, within the
Communist frame of reference - the emergence and develop-
ment of the concept of a Socialist Commonwealth and its rela-
tion to other conceptual and organizational aspects of the
"world socialist system, " we address ourselves to the vital
questions of concern to the Free World and the United States:
what are the long range prospects for the Commonwealth?
Do the Communist leaders really believe in the concept and
intend to give it tangible shape and form?
100. Although it is obviously impossible to project
with confidence over the time span which these questions em-
brace, it is at least possible to venture a prediction of what
may happen to the "world socialist system" over the next ten
to fifteen years, unless there is a more vigorous reaction by
the Free World to the challenge of the "Commonwealth " than
is now being displayed. Put in simple terms, unless it is
vigorously countered by bold, positive and imaginative meas-
ures, in our opinion the sodruzhestvo has good prospects of
making major advances outside the present Communist Bloc.
101. What we are witnessing may prove to be another
brazen, brilliant and successful attempt of International Com-
munism to appropriate a noble concept of freedom, precisely
as it has grasped and debased other treasures of our heritage
- Peace, Democracy, Humanity, and even Freedom itself.
The British Commonwealth has set the pattern for the peace-
ful transformation of an Empire into a harmonious associa-
tion of widely disparate but equal and sovereign nations. Com-
munism, declaring this institution corrupt and moribund,
issues the challenge of its own "co-friendship. "
102. One may derive some reassurance from point-
ing out the obstacles which the Communists are bound to
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encounter, but, if we are to avoid dangerous complacency, we
must try to project ourselves into their consciousness and
measure the dynamics of will power which they can focus and
the historic processes which they expect to work in their be-
half. Such a projection is very sobering.
103. We have seen that Communist spokesmen present
the Socialist Commonwealth as a step toward realizing the unity
of mankind, a kind of "kingdom of heaven on earth. " In polit-
ical terms, this implies that the nation state is already regard-
ed as obsolete. As the embodiment of "bourgeois nationalism"
it has become the major source of socio-economic evil. Against
it, under the banner of "proletarian internationalism" a world
community consisting of nationalities is to be created.
In the long run, national interests in one country not
only coincide with internationalism, but international
interests supersede national ones, and the state which
acts to the detriment of the harmonious correlations
and common interests of the Commonwealth (sodruz-
hestvo) is neither internationalist nor patriotic. 1
104. The Communists are not unaware of the danger
of Utopianism, and inveigh against it, as, for example, in the
case of the exaggerated claims which accompanied the launch-
ing of the Chinese communes. They have prescribed a long,
painful. struggle to achieve the "transition from socialism to
communism. " They recognize that it will not be won unless
they can enjoy "peaceful coexistence" over an extended period,
not between the two ideologies which are mortally at war, but
between the two "systems" of states which have and will retain
1M. A. Sverdlin and P. M. Aogachev, Voprosy Filosofii, No. 1
(1959), p.44. "Patriotism and Internationalism. It
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the physical power to destroy each other. Their ideology
gives them the assurance that the outcome is inevitable
triumph: this, of course, is a matter of faith, but, in their
conviction, of faith that moves mountains.
105. One might be willing to believe that the roseate
vision of the Commonwealth could, over a long period of time,
come to be accepted by a group of states possessing some
ethnic or historical factors in common, such as the Soviet
Union and the East European satellites. But could it be ex-
tended to comprehend the masses of China and to project
outward among other remote and dissimilar peoples? Will
not the population explosion of China engulf the Soviet Union?
Are not rivalry and conflict between the forces led by Mao
and Khrushchev and their successors inevitable?
106. These questions cannot be dismissed with cate-
gorical answers. That there are frictions between the two
chief countries of the Bloc is certain. But the ties drawing
and holding them together, their economic, military and
foreign policy interests, are strongly cemented by common
ideology and common interests.
107. Duumvirates are notoriously unstable. Never-
theless, whatever disruptive issues may arise, Mao and
Khrushchev appear determined to resolve them before they
become dangerous. Both men are imbued with the sense of
historic mission, and are conscious of the limited time'.ly-
ing before them. They have been compared to twin Moses,
glimpsing from afar the Promised Land of Communism which
their successors will enter. As time-bound humans, they
may prefer that the vanguard of the "chosen people" be Chinese
or Russian, but their vision, however clouded, is turned toward
future generations of all mankind.
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108. The sodruzhestvo concept, of course, is far from
being inspired uniquely by such "lofty and humane considera-
tions" as the Communist theorists and propagandists invoke.
As a logical development of Marxism-Leninism applied to
organization, it must be regarded by the Kremlin as an em-
inently practical instrumentality. It can be made to serve
the broad purposes of foreign. policy, such as the promotion
of "peaceful coexistence. " It can be used to invest a demon-
strative gesture, such as the recent Tirana gathering, with
symbolism "unto the least of these" - and portent - missile
bases in Greece and Italy. 1 It can be propagated as a global
United Front tactic.
109. The tempo of the Commonwealth is adjustable.
There is no deadline for its inauguration, and there are ad-
vantages to delay and deliberation. But the development of
inter-state Communist association is self-propelling. What-
ever the tactical divagations, the strategic goal is steady.
110. The specific interim form which the Common-
wealth would be most likely to take would be a federation of
Socialist states. At a solemn conclave, for example, at the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (1967) - or
much earlier - the Conference of Communist and Workers'
Party might "unanimously" approve a constitution which
could, for form's sake, be presented by one of the satellite
party leaders. The Constitution might establish a Congress,
1
It is interesting to note that the Tirana meeting extended at
least an olive twig in the direction of Tito. Premier Hoxha
of Albania used a sodruzhestvo type of language in offering
to develop relations with Yugoslavia on the basis of "mutual
respect, equal rights, and non-interference in internal af-
fairs. " (FBIS, 1 June 1959, AA 3).
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meeting at specified intervals, rotating through the capitals
of the Commonwealth. At each Congress a hierarchy might
be elected, a Chairman, a Presidium or Directorate. and a
Central Committee. All member nations would be equally
represented, and would be eligible to share the highest of-
fices. Existing central organizations, such as the Warsaw
Pact and CEMA, would be assimilated into the central insti-
tution on the same principle of equality. Existing local or-
ganizations would be maintained in each member country.
111. We do not believe it unrealistic to think that the
Soviet Union could accept such a governance with its formal
principle of equality of the greatest and the least. For a long
time to come, it could afford to rely on its total power -
ideological, political, economic, military - to insure its ef-
fective predominance and control. Eventually it might hope
that this Commonwealth would realize what the Soviet Union
has gone far toward achieving in prototype, the fusion of dis-
parate nationalities into a single political entity.
112. Whether the Chinese Communist leaders would
find such a development compatible with their own interest
is perhaps more problematical. The sense of military and
economic dependence on the Soviet Union will continue to en-
gender ambivalent reactions probably for many years. But
the growing consciousness of power, unless it is checked by
some unforeseen crisis, should gradually lead to. a more re-
laxed attitude toward the Soviet Union, and produce greater
willingness to dilute the de facto condominium with the Soviet
Union over the lesser nations of the `isocialist system.
113. If the Soviet Union pressed for an actual federa-
tion with its own satellites - a partial rather than a compre-
hensive sodruzhestvo - China might develop a similar rela-
tionship with North Korea, r.Nbr.th;.Vietiiatn: and Outer Mongolia
- not to mention other countries which might be lured or
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forced to join. Thus, it is possible that the present Bloc
might be organized. into two Commonwealths remaining
juridically separate for some time, While maintaining har-
mony and cooperation under their common Marxist-Leninist
banner. On the practical level such an arrangement might
provide a useful Illegal" basis for direct interventions by
force - as in the case of Hungary - to repress rebellious
members of the federation, whether Asiatic or European.
This would provide a pretext for circumventing the United
Nations.
114. The idea of a federation of Bloc countries,
eliminating existing national boundaries, is close to, if not
at the surface of public awareness. In his speech to the
German workers at Leipzig (7 March 1959) Khrushchev ex-
pressed the hope that border problems "will disappear in the
future with the worldwide victory of Communism . . . fron-
tiers as they are understood today will gradually cease to
exist." As might be expected, this cryptic but authoritative
utterance did not go unnoticed in the satellites. A Budapest
article has significantly echoed the theme:
The quick economic development of certain countries
has resulted in a natural lessening by degrees of the
importance of existing economic and outmoded ties
among us. This, for example, can have repercussions
on the development of certain countries which, because
of the victory of communism, can lead to the end of
the importance of borders. Under these conditions
the old conceptions of borders will gradually disappear.
Comrade Khrushchev stressed recently in a speech at
the Ninth All-German Workers' Conference that these
borders will simply determine the historical settle-
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ment of one or another country. Their significance
will not be economic it political, but rather ethno-
graphic and cultural.
115. We have suggested that the ultimate goal of fed-
eration within the Bloc would be to create the matrix for a
sort of "Communist United Nations. " If such an organization
were to emerge, it would undoubtedly have to be acknowledged
initially by the Communists to be standing in "antithesis" to
the existing United Nations. They would justify this "counter"
organization by alleging the corruption of the UN resulting
from imperialist - specifically American - domination. From
the confrontation of the two, they might claim that a new
"synthesis" would arise, a "true" world federation. Through
the process of "transition from socialism" such an entity
would seek to supplant the horno socialisticus s.ovieticus,
sinicus and even albanicus by the homo communisticus uni-
versalis, a proletarian world citizen in whom national loyal-
ties would be absorbed in a higher loyalty to all mankind.
116. We domot imply that this goal will ever be
achieved. The Communist "'brotherhood of man" still awaits
the millenium. This "wave of the future" is no more inexo-
rable than others have been. But in order to meet it before
1Robert Jozsef and Imre Pener, "Equalizing the Development
of the Socialist Countries, " Nepszabadag (24 May 1959).
Alert American journalists" quickly noted the implications of
this idea. On 27 May 1959, Joseph Alsop and David Lawrence,
in columns datelined Budapest and Geneva respectively, re-
ported that Khrushchev is developing an ambitious plan to re-
organize the Soviet Empire; Lawrence suggests that this calls
for "virtual annexation of the satellites. " Alsop associates
this "federation" with the concept of "commonwealth. "
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it can mount to a crest and overwhelm us, we must know
the forces which are propelling it. It is the Free World
which developed an institutional embodiment for the concept
of Commonwealth. By positive actions, it must widen the
limited base on which that concept now rests.
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SOVIET AND SATELLITE STATEMENTS
ON THE SODRUZHESTVO
Presidium member Al. .Kirichenko, who is held to
be next in rank after Khrushchev and Mikoyan, in an address
to the XI Congress of the Czech Communist Party described
the socialist camp as:
. . . this great Commonwealth of truly independent,
truly equal nations, united by the high and noble aims
of building a new rich life free of the evils of the cap-
italist 'paradise'. In this Commonwealth each nation
strives to help the others, and each regards the suc-
cesses of the others as his own. (Pravda, June 20,
1958).
At a meeting of the Czech-Soviet Friendship Society
(12 July 1958) Khrushchev dealt with the mutual relations of
the Socialist countries primarily in the context of the "social-
ist camp"; he also, however, dwelt on the Commonwealth
theme:
The rallying of the socialist countries into a brother-
ly Commonwealth of states with equal rights is dice
tated by vital necessity . . . It is fully understandable
that such a Commonwealth, established on the basis
of the identity of the social-economic and political
regime of the socialist countries, identity of their
Marxist-Leninist ideology, and unity of aims in the
struggle for the victory of socialism and peace, has
nothing in common with the aggressive imperialist
blocs aimed against the freedom and independence of
the peoples, and against peace and socialism . . .
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On the anniversary of the 1957 Declaration of Repre-
sentatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, Presidium
member O. V. Kuusinen stressed the need for socialist
solidarity:
The Declaration emphasized that in the current situa-
tion, it is especially important to strengthen the unity
and brotherly cooperation of the socialist states.
This recommendation of the Declaration could not
have been more timely. The fact of the matter is
that in recent years world reaction has led concen-
trated attacks on the Commonwealth of socialist
countries. And the unity of the countries and com-
munist parties of the socialist camp has been one of
the main targets at which contemporary revisionists
aim their poisoned arrows . . .I
Again at an international party conclave, the XXI
Congress, Khrushchev repeated the theme of the Moscow
Declaration. In enumerating the tasks confronting socialist
foreign policy, he stated:
It is essential to strive for the cessation of the cold
war and for relaxation of tension, and to do every-
thing possible to strengthen the world socialist system
and the commonwealth of fraternal peoples.
It is perhaps significant that against this Soviet cres-
cendo, the satellite leaders, generally Stalinist by tradition,
appear to have clung to the more familiar image of the "camp. "
Nevertheless, even Antonin Novotny, President of the People's
Republic of Czechoslovakia and First Secretary of the Czech
Party, paid homage to the new concept. In an address to the
Central Committee he declared:
1 -56-
Pravda, 22 November 1958.
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The Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union today
represents a mighty Commonwealth of Socialist
States, united by the strong ties of proletarian inter-
nationalism, based on closest brotherly support,
and solidified in their position by new socialist inter-
national relations. (Mlada Front, 12 December 1958).
As might be expected, Gomulka appears to have wel-
comed the new concept. In a speech to the Polish shipbuild-
ers at Gdansk (28 June 1958) he hailed the "unshakeable
Componwealth of socialist countries" as the outgrowth of
Soviet economic aid and the mutual assistance of the Bloc
members. Criticizing Yugoslavia for its ambiguous posi-
tion toward the two rival camps, he remarked:
One could say, 'There are thirteen socialist countries,
but only twelve belong to the socialist camp. One. of
the countries - Yugoslavia - does not, and does not
wish to, belong to the socialist camp. ' The imperial-
ist peoples say that they are not attacking Yugoslavia;
that they allow her to build socialism although she is
isolated. The reply to this is simple. Yugoslavia as
a socialist state can exist only because there exists
a Commonwealth of twelve socialist countries . . .
More recently in his report to the Third Polish Work-
ers' Party Congress (10 March 1959) Gomulka declared:
When we speak today, as we did in the past, about
the world socialist revolution and the inevitability
of the world victory of socialism, we must - without
detracting one iota from the importance of Marxist-
Leninist theory for the development and success of
this revolution, but on the contrary developing and
enriching this theory - we must realize that at the
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present historical period, in view of the emergence
of the world. socialist system, the decisive import-
ance of the further development of world socialist
revolution lies in the practice of communist and
socialist construction in the united Commonwealth
of socialist countries . . .
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ANNEX II
In 1958, an immense number of books, pamphlets, and
articles were devoted by Soviet and Communist literature to
the question of "world socialist system, " the "camp, " and
the "sodruzhestvo. " From this mass of material the follow-
ing three books may be selected as probably performing the
role of authoritative directives-
1. "SODRUZHESTVO STRAN SOTSIALIZMA" ("The
Co-friendship of the Countries of Socialism") issued by
the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR in the summer of 1958 (338 pages);
2. "MIROVAYA SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA SISTEMA
KHOZYAISTVA" ("World Socialist System of Economy")
published at the end of 1958 by the Institute of Economics
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (559 pages);
3. "VOPROSY VNESHNEI POLITIKI STRAN SOTSIAL-
ISTICHESKOGO LAGERYA" ("Questions of Foreign
Policy of the Countries of the Socialist Camp") pub-
lished at the end of 1958 by the Institute of International
Relations (254 pages).
The most striking theses of the three books are summarized
below.
Published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy
of Sciences of the USSR, the book under the title of "SODRUZ-
HESTVO STRAN SOTSIALIZMA" consists of articles by si,x
important Soviet Marxist philosophers (M. B. Mitin, Ts. A.
Stepanian, F. T. Konstantinov, I. S. Shcherbakov, A. I.
Arnoldov, and A. K. Azizyan) followed by an editorial from
Pravda (May 9, 1958) entitled: "In the unity and solidarity
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of the Marxist-Leninist parties lies the guaranty of the further
victories of the world socialist system. " The book presented
the following theses:
1. The October Revolution came as a natural conse-
quence of the conflicts of imperialism and the growth
and development of the Russian and international labor
movements. It was of world wide historical significance.
2. As a result of the October Revolution social and
economic changes based on socialist principles were
made in the USSR, exemplary socialism was construct-
ed in one country, and the road toward liberation from
capitalism was defined.
3. "The victory of revolution within one country is at
one and the same time the beginning and premise for
world revolution which is continuing to develop as a
result of the revolutionary withdrawal of countries from
the system of imperialist states. " (P. 123).
4. The experience gained by the CPSU and the Soviet
state is of international significance and is utilized in
the first place by the People's democracies; this exper
ience has confirmed the influence of the Marxist-:Lenin-
ist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
role of the Communist party.
5. The October revolution gave an impulse to the revol-
utionary movement in the entire world and to the move-
ment for national liberation of the countries of Asia and
Africa, by initiating the organization of Communist
parties and of the Communist International.
6. The formation of a "world system" of socialism
fundamentally reconstructed the relationship which
existed between capitalism and socialism. This system
had its beginning in the October revolution and in the
successes of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet state has
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played a major role in creating and developing the People's
democracies.
7. Transition to socialism produces multiple forms but
retains one substance which is the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat. Regularly appearing phenomena which unite the coun-
tries of socialism into one camp exist in the historical devel-
opment of all countries. The laws of revolutionary trans-
formation common to all, and the principles of socialist con-
struction arising therefrom do not permit the appearance of
varieties of socialism ("national socialisms"JLand communism
(''national communisms'.').
8. The communist and labor parties directing socialist
countries play a dominant role in the unification of these
countries. Therefore, the conference of Representatives of
Communist and Labor Parties of Socialist Countries held in
Moscow on November 14- 16, 1957, was a development of his-
torical significance.
9. "The Soviet Union has been historically formed into the
center of the Communist movement of the world. The in-
destructible camp of socialist states is led by the Soviet
Union." (p. 29).
10. The manner in which revolution occurs in individual
countries of the socialist camp differs in each case. This
leads to variations in the political forms assumed by the
leadership of society, as well as in the economic methods
used for the transformation of society.
11. Individual countries belonging to the socialist camp are
not isolated in their development but mature in close com-
munion and coordination with other socialist countries. The
development of the Communist regime proceeds under many
forms but is unique in its social and economic contents.
12. The countries of socialism are interlinked by the form
of. authority which they enjoy ("Dictatorship of the proletariat").
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13. There is complete "unity of views and actions" between
the Communist party of China and the CPSU.
14. The common enemy of the countries of the socialist camp
is "revisionism. It
15. "Proletarian internationalism" is the basis of interrela-
tions between socialist countries.
16. The fortification of the socialist camp is the fortification
of socialism as a whole. "In the unity and solidarity of Marx-
ist-Leninist parties lies the guaranty for the further victories
of the world socialist system. " (p. 317).
"MIROVAYA SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA SISTEMA
KHOZYAISTVA, " a publication of the Institute of Economy of
the Academy of Sciences of the USSR issued about the end of
1958, is a compilation of instructions covering Communist
propaganda and information. The contents are, apparently,
the outcome of conferences of the institutes of economy of the
USSR and the People's Democracies, held in Warsaw in 1956,
and subsequently reviewed at a conference of economists of
Socialist countries which met in Moscow on November Z6-30,
1957. The book includes five studies by Soviet authors (K.
OSTROVITYANOV, L. GATOVSKI, A. KOZIK, A. ALEKSEEV,
V. KUVARIN, and A. LOSHCHAKOV), and twelve by economists
of other countries in the Socialist camp. These countries are:
YUI GUAN-YUAN (China), B. MINTS (Poland), G. KO1 MEN
(East Germany), two studies by V. KAIGL and K. SVOBODA-
L. SHPIRK (Czechoslovakia), I. FRISH (Hungary), N. N.
CONSTANTINESCU (Rumania), T. CHERNOKOLEV (Bulgaria),
Kh. MARA (Albania), LI MEN SO (Korea), N. ZHAGVARAL
(Mongolia), and BUI KONG CHING (Vietnam). In substance
all these studies reflect the economic program set forth by
the "Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Com-
munist and Labor Parties of the Socialist Countries" (Novem-
ber 14-16, 1957).
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The following theses serve as foundation to the entire
compilation:
1. The October Revolution ended the existence of a single
and all-embracing capitalist system. A new socialist system
of economy arose and was developed in the USSR.
2. The successes' of socialism in the USSR demonstrated
the advantages of the socialist over the capitalist system and
created in the Soviet Union conditions favorable to the con-
struction of a material foundation for communism, as well as
a base of production.
3. The formation of a Soviet Socialist state led to socialist
changes in other European and Asiatic countries and launched
the formation of a "world socialist system" now developing on
the basis of economic socialist laws identical to those operat-
ing in the USSR.
4. The interrelationship existing between the countries of
the socialist system presents a new type of international re-
lationship built on principles of economic cooperation, brother-
ly mutual assistance, and socialist (proletarian) international-
ism. The coordination of plans of people's economy lies at the
base of economic cooperation and has resulted in the establish-
ment of a new international market of socialist countries. A
decisive premise to the successful construction of socialism
in all countries belonging to the socialist system is the inviol-
able unity of these countries.
5. The interests of the peoples adhering to the socialist
system are tied in with the fundamental interests of the toilers
of the whole world. The expansion of economic ties between
the socialist system and countries poorly developed from the
economic point of view is of the utmost importance.
6. The construction of socialism in the countries within the
socialist system is founded on important laws common, oblig-
atory, and inherent to each country which is in process of
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building socialism; they include state centralism and single-
minded planification of people's economy, as well as constant
strengthening of the unity existing between the countries of the
socialist camp. ("It is impossible to march singly to Com-
munism" .- Khruehiche:v). An important role in achieving
this unity is played by the distribution of labor between states,
and by specialization and cooperation of industry among the
interconnected branches of the economy of countries adhering
to the socialist system.
7. The successes of the "world socialist system" exercise
increasing influence over the international environment and
multiply to an ever greater extent the number of followers of
socialism in capitalist countries. "The forces of the socialist
world are not limited to the territories and the population of
countries within the socialist camp." (P. 89).
8. Economic collaboration between the countries adhering
to the socialist camp is developing according to principles
identical with those which inspired the co-friendship -
sodruzhestvo - of the peoples of the USSR.
9. The principal economic task of the Soviet Union which is
"to overtake and surpass in output per head of the population
the more highly developed capitalist countries" is the nsain
condition for the further expansion and fortification of social-
ism in all the countries of the socialist camp.
10. The experience of the Soviet Union in the construction
of a socialist society and the aid which socialist countries find
therein are a decisive factor in promoting the construction and
successes of socialism throughout the socialist camp.
11. Of exceptional. significance for a more rapid develop-
ment of industrial forces in all socialist countries is the con-
tinuous perfecting of the forms of economic collaboration, as
well as a more profound specialization and cooperation of
industry within the interconnected branches of the people's
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economy, as stipulated by the decisions of the conference of
representatives of the Communist and labor parties of coun-
tries who participated in the Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance (CEMA) on May 20-25, 1958.
"VOPROSY VNESHNEI POLITIKI STRAN SOTSIALISTI-
CHESKOGO LAGERYA" published by the Institute for Interna-
tional Relations of the USSR at the end of 1958 presents the
first attempt in Soviet'.literature to show the foreign policy of
the Socialist "camp" as forming an integral whole. The book
contains thirteen separate articles, two of which (N. PAVLOV
and A. GRIGORIEV-A. POPOV) are devoted to the foreign
policy of the USSR and socialist camp as one unit, and the
remaining eleven (M. KHOSHEV, M. GOSTEV, V. LARIN,
M. SATURIN, N. SIDOROV, L. KUTAKOV, V. LEZIN, V.
TITKOV, G. ROZANOV, N. LEBEDEV, and P. YANIN) exam-
ine the principles followed in foreign policy by the individual
countries forming the socialist camp.
"Unity of the socialist stratum" which is dependent upon
the regularity in the construction process of socialism and
upon the application of the principles of "proletarian interna-
tionalism" lies at the foundation of the foreign policy line
maintained by the socialist "camp. IT 'The Declaration of the
Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Labor
Parties of the Socialist Countries" maybe regarded as a con-
crete expression of such unity.
In the foreign policy whicih it follows, the socialist
'"camp" finds support in certain principles including:
(1) Peaceful coexistence and economic competition of
the "two systems. ""
(2) Assistance to countries which are fighting to
fortify their national independence and sovereignty.
(3) Aid to underdeveloped countries.
(4) Work for peace.
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The book further discusses. the significance of CEMA and
the Warsaw Pact as binding the socialist "camp" into an econom-
ic, political and military whole. Another question examined
concerns individual bilateral treaties concluded between coun-
tries of the socialist world.
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ANNEX III
MAY DAY AND OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY SLOGANS
The May Day slogans of 1957 exalt proletarian
internationalism and bloc unity in two separate slogans:
9. Long live the great commonwealth of peoples
of the countries in the socialist camp!
10. Peoples of socialist countries, our strength
lies in fraternal friendship and mutual
assistance!
Pertinent to socialist growth on the occasion of the
40th Anniversary of the October Revolution (November,
1957) is a slogan which urges "a. transformation of social-
ism":
10. The transformation of socialism into a world
system is the main feature of the present
epoch. May the great commonwealth of
peoples of the countries of the Socialist camp
become stronger and flourish I
The October Anniversary slogan for 1958 differs
only in the hortatory language of its opening phrase:
12. Hail to the mighty socialist camp, inviolable
bulwark of peace and the security of the
peoples! May the great commonwealth of
peoples of the countries of the socialist camp
become stronger and flourish.
The May Day 1959 slogan, then, rewords this
slogan of the preceding October, reintroducing the "sys-
tem: "
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U. Long live the world socialist system,
inviolable bulwark of peace and the security
of the peoples! May the great commonwealth
of peoples of the countries of the socialist
camp become stronger and flourish!
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ANNEX r`V
A COMPARATIVE TABLE
British Commonwealth
of Nations
"Socialist Commonwealth"
Scope
Eleven fully independent mem-
bers, plus the remaining colon-
ial empire of the UK, compris-
ing territories in all stages of
political development.
Twelve members of which
the USSR is fully indepen-
dent and Communist China
partially dependent on
Soviet ideological leader-
ship and economic support.
All other satellites are fully
dependent, with some minor
exceptions for Poland.
No constitutional provisions in
any way impair the sovereignty
and independence of any member
state. The Crown is now regard-
ed as divisible or dispensable.
Secession would require nothing
more than a proclamation by the
withdrawing member.
No ostensible organization-
al provisions but firm
ideological conformity is
required and deviation from
more than minor principles
is suppressed - with force
if necessary. The USSR
must be recognized as the
leading nation and the CPSU
as the leading Party. Se-
cession would not be tol-
erated, as Hungary's ex-
ample demonstrates.
Political -Diplomatic
No central organs for policy
formulation. Prime Ministers
meet every year or two for non-
binding discussions. Frequent
consultations for the achieve-
ment of understanding on differ-
ing positions.
No ostensible central organ
but policies to be adopted
throughout the Bloc are
determined by Moscow and
in some cases by Peiping.
Frequent meetings of Party
and government officials
for purposes of coordinat-
ing the Soviet viewpoint.
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Military
No Commonwealth strategic
planning. Alliances of mem-
bers exist for purposes of Com-
monwealth security. Existing
military cooperation grows out
of generally similar organiza-
tion, training and equipment.
All Commonwealth members,
except Canada, belong to the
sterling area. Trade connec-
tions are long-established and
are reinforced by preferential
tariffs. The Commonwealth,
however, is not an economic
bloc.
"Socialist Commonwealth"
The East European Bloc
is militarily organized
under the terms of the
Warsaw Pact. Military
assistance by the USSR is
given to Peiping. Strate-
gic planning and standard-
ization of equipment is
Soviet-dominated through-
out the Bloc.
All Bloc nations are in
what may be called the
ruble. area. Their econ-
omies are more or less
regulated by Soviet re-
quirements and organiza-
tionally supervised by
CEMA. The political
Bloc is also an economic
Bloc; there is no free
trade. Stress is on
planned, "voluntary"
coordination and special-
ization in production by
member countries.
There are a great number of com- There is much cultural
mittees, institutes, and leagues, exchange ideologically
operating among all or several conceived and supervised.
member countries. Their inter- There is no free cultural
ests range from scientific re - give-and-take. There is
search to sports. Some are gov- censorship even within
ernment sponsored, others are the Bloc.
mixed public and private organi-
zations, and again others are private.
-7b-
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British Commonwealth
"Socialist Commonwealth"
Ideological
Since all member nations are
parliamentary democracies,
there exists among them a
natural and voluntary ideolog-
ical affinity. The fundamental
principles of the rule of law,
free elections and individual
liberty are a British inheritance
which all wish to share and to
preserve,.
All members are under the
monolithic rule of the "dic-
tatorship of the proletariat. "
Their political affinities are
forced upon them by the Com-
munist parties which, in turn,
are guided by the doctrines
of Marxism-Leninism. There
are no liberties; there are no
free elections. They must
follow the Soviet Party line
implicitly.
The future of the Commonwealth
is uncertain. No member will
sacrifice what it considers its
national interests; the Union of
South Africa's policy, for exam-
ple, may make it eventually in-
compatible with the multi-racial
commonwealth. So long as there
are no major crises, the Com-
monwealth will continue to bene-
fit.it:s.members, but in a world
crisis a split may occur between
the Western-oriented and the
neutralist-minded members.
Although there is at present
no organizational control
apparatus, the "Socialist
Commonwealth" is held to--
gether by common ideology
and economic dependency on
the USSR to an extent which
makes secession impossible.
It is possible that this modus
operandi will suffice for the
time being, but the establish-
ment of a tight-knit organiza-
tional superstructure in the
future also is a distince pos-
sibility. So long as the two
great Communist states, pre-
dominantly the USSR, are
still powerful executors of
the Communist heritage, the
"Commonwealth" ties probably
will tend to become stronger.
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