JPRS ID: 10229 USSR REPORT CONSUMER GOODS AND DOMESTIC TRADE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500010027-6
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10229
31 December 1981
Kor~ean Affai r~ Re ort
p
CFOUO 6/81)
_ Fg~$ FOI~EIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION S~Ri/ICE
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NOTE
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~PRS L/10229
31 December 1981
~ KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT ~
(FOUO 6/81)
CONTENTS
SOUTH KOftEA
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
'SEKAI' Exarrri.nes Japan-South Korea Relations
(Otsuki Shinji; SEKAI., Nov 81) 1
,
- a- IIII - ASIA - 109 FOUO]
F(1R (1FFif T ~ T t iCF (1N1 V
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S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
'SEKAI' EXAMINES JAPAN~SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS
Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Nov 81 pp 122-128
~Article by ASAHI News Reporter Otsuki Shinji: "The Focus of New Collusion Between
- Japan and Korea: Rush to Seoul"]
[Text] Japan-Soutn Korea Relationship Enters a New Phase
The llth regular session. of the Japan-South Korea cabinet conference in Seoul
(10-11 September) broke the precedent of a joii~t declaration and concluded on an
unexpectedly discordant note. Following the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers,
Sonoda and No Sin-yong, in August, the "second round" of the Japan~-South Korea govern-
mental level negotiations ended in disharmony. The general interpretation is that
formal fence-mending will be delayed for a while. The Japanese Government declared
that it will assume a watchful waiting stance for the time being. "We will rest a
bit.... I think it is sufficien*_ that we think about the future in small doses...."
(12 September, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa)
Despite the ostensible confrontation, "Japan and South Korea are in basic agreement
with regard to the perception of the international and regional situa.tions. It has
- been a meaningful conference in that we were able to devote our zeal and effort to
it and that we were able to obtain bright hope and anticipation for the future."
(Foreign Minister No's speech at the closing ceremony of the cabinet conference)
Thus it is true that Japan has steadily advanced toward advocacy of the Chun Doo Hwan
adm3.nistrations. The joint press release of the cabinet conference, compi.led after
much parley to avoid the impression of a split, stated that "under the current harsh
conditions, the Japanese cabinet members appreciate the fact that South Korea's defense
efforts are contributing to the maintenance of a balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.
In order to contribute to Korea's nation-building efforts as a friend and neighbor,
- Japan will offer economic cooperation insofar as it can." With regard to the passage
" recognizing that there is a tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, Japan's original
draft contained a phrase regarding "the presence of American forces in Korea." At
the last stage, Japan agreed to strike this passage. According to Foreign rlinistry
- sources, South Korea's argument was that "it would not be appropriate to in~Iude the
. United States in a discussion involving Japan and Korea. But it is clear that the
true intent was to give a close-up focus to Korea's defense efforts.
Behind the recognition of tension on the Korean Peninsula and the evaluation that
South Korea's defense efforts are contributing to the balance of power and promotion
of the Fifth Repubtic's nation-building effort under the Chun Doo Hwan administration
' through economic cooperation can be seen a blueprint for the Japan-U.S.-South Korea
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division of labor in Northeast Asia strongly advocated by the Reagan administration.
The basic tenor is very different from the joint declarations of the 10 previous cabinet
conferences, which gave high marks for promotion of North-South talks and other tension-
- mitigating effc~ts and expressed hope for peaceful unification in the future. Although
the press release does not go as far as "economic cooperation for security," in Japan-
South Korea relation~ the dimension of fence-mending has been superseded, and we are
about to ente~ a definite new phase.
Rush to Visit South Korea
The shift toward "security mindedness" in ~he Japan-South Korea tzlationship can be ~
seen 3s a logical development resulting from the Japan-U.S. declaration that in order
"to promote peace on the Korea Peninsula as an important factor. for the peace and
security of East Asia, including Japan," Japan will accept appropriate responsibilities,
~ and from the Ottawa summit declaration which concluded that "we need a strong defensive
strengt~ ourselves"--a conc~.usion based on a cautionary spirit against Russj.a. But we
must not forget that an important �actor which is supporting South K.~xea's strong
negotiating posture is South Korea's offensive assault on Japanese political circles.
Foreign ministers conferences, regul3r cabinet meetings, coordination by administrators--
_ are all legitimate avenues for pressing its (South Korea's) views. At the same time,
- it is generating a mood of "acceptance of South Korea's position as resonable" among
Liberal Democrats, Democratic Socialists and even Komeito Party members. That is,
Sou~h Korea is pressuring governmental, Foreign Ministry policy decisions by inundating
the uuter perimeters.
For approximately half a year after Chun Doo Hwan's takeover--September 1980--tY~ere
were practically no visits by South Korea officials to Japan, and Japanese politicians'
visits to South Korea were limited to a few pro-Korea Kishi/Fukuda ~faction~members,
and those were infrequent. The inauguration of President Chun on 1 September was
attended by Japan-South Korea Cooperative Council Chairman Shinsuke Kishi; Secretariat
Director-General Shun Hasegawa; Director Kazuo Yatsugi; representative of the Japan-
- South Korea Diet Members League chairman, Kazuyuki Kasuga; and Japan-South Korea
rriendship Association Vice Chairman Masahide Kanegama. On 24-26 September 1980,
f.ormer Prime Minister Fukuda visited Korea accompanied by Liberal Democartic Diet
members Shintaro Ishihara, Noboru Sato, Mutsuki Kato, Yoshiaki Mori and others, and
met with President Chun, Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwack, Prime Minister Nam Tok-u
and Coreign Minister No. At President Chun's inauguration under the n~w constitution
on 3 March this year, Foreign Minister Masaki Ito attended as the (Japanese) Govern-
_ ment's representative. Aside from him, however, the delegation was the same--Kasuga,
Japan-South Korea Diet Members League Executive Secretary Matsuhei Mori and so on.
The situation changed dramatically around early June, when the regular session of the
Diet ended. Fir~t of all, the traffic of Japense and South Korean politicians expanded
significantly. In particular, the Japanese politicians' pilgrimage to Seoul took on
pr.oportions worthy of the term "rush." Secondly, there was a significant broadening
of the class of politicians going to South Korea--in terms of age, the appearance of
younger men in the middle echelon; in terms of Liberal Democartic Party factions,
Dai~o of the Tanaka faction; and it culminated in the first ever visit by Komeito
Party Chairman Takei.re. These phenomena may be interpreted as a significant weakening
of the traditional Japan-South Korea pipeline.
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In the context of Japanese circumstances, the tentative conclusion of the Kim Jae Kyu
~ trial became the springboard. "In January 1981, the current South Korean Government
recommended that the Supreme Court's death sentence be reduced and Japan declared that
it applauded South Korea's act~::n as promoting Japan-South Korea friendship and
cooperative ties.," (Diplomatic ~31ue Book) the interpretation was that "there is no
longer the �.:�~~ght of the Kim Jae Kyu incident." Nevertheless, the Chun Doo Hwan
administration was responsible for initiating the new contacts with covert intentions.
After the presidential election under the new constitution on 3 March, Chun Doo Hwan
was inaugurated. By transferring che second r�an in power--National Armed Forces
5ecurity Chief No Tae-u--to the post of second minister of state and so on, he consol.i-
dated the new order and he established as the most important prerequisite for the time
- being the goal of. obtaining from Japan a 6-billion-dollar economic cooperation agree-
ment tied to the security pact. While trying to negotiate through official diplomatic
channels, South Korea also started to lay the foundation for directly influencing the
Japanese political pracess.
The first group to visit South Korea after the close of the ordinary session of the
Diet was the Liberal Democractic Party's policy study group (Kisaragi Club) of Hideshi
Aizawa (9-12 June) at the invitation of the South Korea-Japan Diet Members League.
The visiting delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party Policy Affairs Research Council
(15-19 June) led by Council Chairman Shintaro Abe was invited by South Korea's new
party in power, the Democratic Justice Party. A group uf nine national Diet members
of the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League headed by Chairman Ken Yasui (14-16 July)
was invited by President Chun. House of Representatives Steering Committee Chairman
~ Motoaki Yanashita and five other Diet members (21-24 July) were invited by South Korean
I' . A~sembly Steering Coaunittee Chairman Yi Chong-chan. Vice Secretary General of the
cabinet Chikara Kawara and other parliamentary vice ministers (besides the Secretariat,
' the delegation, which visited 11-13 August, consisted of the Foreign Ministry, MITI,
Transportation, and Self Defense Forces vice ministers) was inviCed by the South Korean
~ Govern*_nent. Komeito Party Chairman Takeire's visit to South Korea took the form of an
' invitation from South Korean National Assembly Speaker, Chong Nae-hyok. Indeed, they
I
; were literally surrounded by the Chun ~Doo Hwan administration. An organized, colla-
borative, well-thought-out diplomacy-by-~invitation could be c~early detected in their
i moves.
~
i
j Shadow of Younger Leaders
I
I
~ The prime minister, Vice Premier Sin Sung-hyon (Economic Planning Agency chief),
I National Defense Minister Chu Yong-~'ok, National Security Planning Agency head
~ Yu Hak-song--all the major ministerial members of the Chun regime--South Korea-Japan
' Diet Members I.eague Cliairman Yi C'nae-Hyong, Chief Secretary Kim Yun-hwan all those
in charge of dealing with the visiting Japanese delegation spent time in cc~ference
with them, bombarding them with South Korea's claim: "The threat from Russia is
making the ~ast-West military balance uncertain. The defense efforts of South Korea
holding off the "North" are contributing to the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.
As a result, South Korea pours 6 percent of its GNP and 35 percent of its national
budget into national defense. It can no longer rely on the United States economically.
since Japan benefits directly from South Korean security, Japan should consider South
Korea's situation as its own problem." "The trade deficit that accumulated in the
past 15 years since normalization of diplomatic relations totals 19 billion yen. There
is pent-up grievance within South Korea that what Japan has been doing is not economic
cooperation but a profit-motivated commercial transaction." When appropriate, the
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Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan and the Second Military Build-Up Plan
- are explained in detail. The 6-billion-dollar economic coop~ration request has been
made unofficially through Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Abe and Japan-
~ South Korea Diet Members League Chairman Yasui. "Seeing is believing" is South
Korea's motto. A secret tunnel 40 kilometers north of Seoul that the "North" dug for
in~vasion of the South and outposts along the Demilitarized Zone are included in the
.lapanese delegations' itinerary, and the Nort'h's "rapacious penetration" is repeatedly
detailed.
A group of the Blue House [The official residence of the ROK President] secretaries,
which forms the nu~leus of the Chun Doo Hwan administration, the military and the
- National Assembly members who are nearly all freshmen representatives--many of these
men belonged to the hangul [Korean language] generation and received thorough anti-
_ communist, anti.-Japanese education under the Syngman Rhee rule. It is the generation
that opposed normalization of Japan-South Korea relations. Therefore, rather than the
individual pipelines acting as healing catalysts, reliance on "ratianal, mutual
understanding" (South Korea-Japan Diet Members League Chief Secretary Kim Yun-hwan)
is strong on the South Korean side. The fact that South Korea di.~ not bend its claim
and handled the negotiations with Japan regarding the economic cooperation question
in a"straight beeline fashion" (without compromise) is based on thi~ kind of hard-
nosed stand. Members of the South Korean delegation to the cabinet conference disclosed
that "since they are diplomats, they know that there is a settlement point in neogita-
tions.but the men behind them (middle echelon, younger members of the administration)
- must be persuaded; and they are like a wall."
Exchanges Between Japan--South Korea Diet Members League and South Korea-Japan Diet
Members League
The centra]. figure in the Diet member's intercourse is stil:l the Japan-South Korea
Diet Members League and its Korean counterpart, the South Korea-Japan Diet Members
League. The South Korea-Japan Diet Members League was officialy founded by 197 Diet
members on 10 June, and the lineup of actors has changed completely. Many influential
politicians were arrested by the authorities and banished from political activity.
President Chun Doo Hwan, who assumed his seat through ttie National Conference for
Unification election ser. forth under the new constitution, ordered his political
council, which he controls directly, to prohibit 835 old politicians fr~m activity.
Although 270 were exempt from the regulatory sanctio~i, former Prime Minister Kim
- Chong-pil, a long-time chairman of the South Korea-Japan Diet Members League, and
another former prime minister and the National Assembly Speaker, Chong I1-kwon, who
attended Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's funeral--politicians who have had close ties
with Japan--left the public sphere. Administrator-at-large Yi Sung-hi, who formerly
handled all dealings with Japan and was regarded as the shadow foreign minister, is
now conc~ntrating on his post as the Asia Basket Association President, and he has
not had any contacts with Japanese politicians since participating in the Japan-South
Korea Diet Members League's special plenary session in December 1979.
- 7'he new principals are Chairman Yi Chae-hyong, First Vice Chairman Kwon Chong-tal
and Chief Secretary Ki.m Yun-hwan. Chairman Yi is a politician who held the position
of vice presiclent of the New Democratic Party, but thereafter he switched to the
economic world and returned to the political arena as the ruling party's (Democratic
Justice Party) delegate under Chun Doo Hwan. He is 68 and is the elder stateman. He
has not been involved in past liaisons with Japan, but he attended Chuo University
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and is quite fluent in Japane~�. These, then, are his curriculum vitae whict. qualified
him for his new post. Vice Chief Secretary Kwon is a 15th class graduate of the Army
Officers' School and is chief of National Military Security Information and a power
behind the Chun Doo Hwan (llth class) administration. He now holds the position of
operational chief (chief secretary) of the Deniocratic Justice Party, which he helped
to form. Prior to his state visit to the United States this August, he stopped in
Japan and discussed the cooperation issue centering around the Japan-South Korea
Diet Members League. Chief Secretary K~m transferred to the post of the Democratic
Justice Party Assembly member from the CHOSEN NIPPO editorial staff, at which post he
acquired experience as the corresponden~ in the United States and in Japan. His
strc~n~;ths are. his many acquaintances in Japan, his inherent energetic personality
and his flawless Japanese. When he came to Japan in May and again in June to present
his credentials and to sttend the fifth Japan-South Korea Friendship Society conference,
he not only called on former Primc: Minister ~ukuda, Foreign Ministers Soneda and
governmental and Liberal Democratic Party leaders, but he also got in touch with
Komeito, Democratic Socialist and New Liberal Club [Shin Jiyu Kurabu] Party members
as well.
In response, on 3 June the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League chose former House
of Councillors Speaker Ken Yasui (Liberal Democrat) as chairn~an to fill the seat left
empty for 2 years by the death of Chu Funada. But Alternate Chairman Kasuga and
Secretary General Mori and the other leadership-level participants have not changed
much. Aside from the new chairman, the addition of Policy Affairs Research Council
Vice Chairman Abe and Defense Agency Director ~eneral Nobumoto Kanemaru have been the
~ only significant changes. According to sourc.es connected with the Japan-South'Korea
Diet Members League, South Korea strongly ad�vocated the appointment of former Prime
Minister Fukuda to the chairmanship and has said privately that if possible, the other
~ lineup should be changed completely. But Mr Fukda declined firmly and irstead recommened
~ Mr Yasui. Those around Mr Yasui camment that "although he hss always been interested
; in the Japan-South Korea issue, he is not a traditional Korea hand. Perhaps his
I prestige as speaker of the House ~f Councillors was the deciding factor in his appoint-
~ ment...." In any case, Japan did not agree to change the leadership lineup altogether.
I Dur:ng President Pak's time, narrow, individual pipelines were thought much of and
~ they became hotbeds of corruption. For the new Japan-South Korea relations, South
Korea wanted broader ties at newer levels. However, Japan did not undergo a revolu-
tionary reorganization; therefore, there was no basis for criticizing Japan's traditional
roster.
South Kor.ea's impetuosity c:i~i~ed much bewilderment and displeasure to the Japanese.
i When the Japanese delegates to the cabinet conference visited President Chun, one
I of the influential cabinet ministers said to him: "This may be uncalled for, but I
' would like you to hear me out. Perhaps it will serve as a point of reference.... I
have been connected with the exchange o� Diet members and have come to South Korea a
number of times. But on this trip, I discover that my acquaintances have either
vanished or been demoted. South Korea appears to have removed the people who have
done wrong in the past and I do not defend the assembly members who were clearly
proven to have done wrong, but those who participated in the Japan-South Korea trans-
- actions before ar.d who did not err or who might have erred but now are sorry, should
be put to effective use, perhaps in civilian roles...." His comments reflect the
Japan~se attitude.
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FuK c~FNic~:~t. ~~~r~ c~t~~.~~
In any case, the activities of the Japan-South Korea and South Korea-Japan Diet
Members Leagues have made a good starty and immediately after the conclusion of the
regular session of the Japan-South Korea cabinet conference, the l~ineth South Korea-
Japan D3et Members League Joint Assembly was held in Secul on 16 and 17 September.
The joint declaration published after 2 days of debate "expressed deep conceh~ i~garding
the shared recognition that the abnormal increase in the Soviet military mig
creating many uncertainties in various regions of the world. The assembly recognized
that in East Asia, there i.s constant crisis arising out oF noticeable military buildup
and constant aggressive acts by North Korea and there is severe tension on the Korean
Peninsula as a result." In addition, the Japanese Diet delegation "expressed appreci-
ation for the defensive effort of the Republic of Korea and thorough understanding of
the difficult~economic situation it f~ces as a result of the heavy burden of national
defense cost, and promised "that (Japan) will give economic support in all sincerity.
The logical construction that South Korea repeatedly reiterated at the foreign ministers
conference and the cabinet conference was enumerated pretty much in its original :~orm.
It can be said that the realistic role of the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League,
"backed-up" by the Chun Doo Hwan administration, has clearly been detailed.
Tanaka Faction's Movemenrs
But as pointed out before, one of the characteristics of South Korea's atteanpt `to
create new con:acts is its sudden intimacy with the Tanaka faction, which had been
relatively distant--in comparison to the Kishi, Fukuda, Shiina, Nakasone factions.
House ~f Representatives Steering Commiittee Chairman Yamashita, who visited South
Korea at the invitation of the South Korean National Assembly Steering Committee
chairman, was accompanied by Tanaka faction politicans Yo~hiro Yayashi, Tasaburo Doi,
and Noboru Tawara. From 23 to 26 August, Noboru Takeshita, Keizo Kobor~., Masaharu
Gotoda, and S~iroku Kajiyama--all belonging to the same faction--visited South Korea.
Foreign Minister who came to Japan for the foreign ministers conference, was scheduled
to call on former Prime Minister Tanaka as well as l~iki and Fukuda, but was unable
to find time in his schedule as Tanaka was at Karuizawa. There is no question that
South Korea is well acquainted with political cliques and the powerful influence of
the Tanaka faction over th~ policx decisions of the Suzuki administratiQn.
On 3 September the same former Prime Minister Tanaka scolded the younger members of
his faction for "getting excited over 6-billion-dollar ai.d." South Korea was greatly
- heartened by his comment. As a matter of fact, a Japan2se participant at the Japan-
South Korea cabinet conference disclosed that the South Korean Assembly members and
journaliszs often told him that "6 billion dollars worth of economic cooperation tied
to the security pact is quite natural in view of the Japan~U.S. joint declaration
and the Ottawa summit. ~eXcessivel f~?imhrappraisalnoftformeraPiimeyMinisteraTanakaht."
tie was embarassed by this Y g
~ Currently there appears to be vigorous pressure applied through the South Korean
Embassy in Japan to get Liberal Democratic Party Executive Board Chairman Nikaido to
visit South Korea. Mr Nikaido has been in China and has just completed the task of
a special emissary of the Japanese Government in bringing the Sino-Japanese plant
exportation question to a de facto conclusion. Although the general scenario was
already written by undersecretary level personnel, the 300-b~llion-yen capital fund
cooperation that Mr Nikaido took with him was hastily decided in a last-ditch nego-
tiating session among the governmental agencies to synchronize with his visit to China.
It was said that his close tie with Prime Minister Suzuki was the decisive factor. In
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view of his position as the highest executive of the Tanaka faction, it is no wonder
that South Korea has high hopes regarding his influence. In any event, Sc;uth Korea
- considers Fukuda and Tanaka as the two pillars supporting the Suzuki administration.
- South Korea is attempting to cement the bond of friendship with the Fukuda faction
� through the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League and relat~d pipelines; at the same
time, separate invitational diplomacy is being used to approach the Tanaka factio~.
It appears to be a carefully planned strategy basad on an astute analysis of the
clique configuration within the Liberal Democratic Party.
It has been stated previously that the striking advance of middle-echelon, younger
Liberal Democratic Party members into center stage is also a new trend. FoJ.lowing
Mr Aizawa's "Kisaragi Club's" visit to South Korea, freshmen and sophomore Uiet members'
(Shizuka Kamei, Akio Karino and so on) "Tadpole Club," too, went to South Korea.
Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawara and a group of other parliamentary vice
ministers' group, President Chun expressed his hope that "Japan and South Korea have
maintained friendly relations thus far, but hereafter we hope that we won't merely
follow the old ways but will create friendly relations through new methods." In
addition, he asserted that the consciousness of ordinary citizens needs to be revolu-
tionized. That is to say, Korean nationals have entir.ely too strong an anti-Japanese
sentiment because of unfortunate incidents of the past, and likewise, Japanese under-
standing of the actual state of affairs in Korea is insufficient. Thus, "in order to
resolve this lack of understanding, I(President Chun) hope that you will persuade
your people."
Chairman Takeire Visits South Korea
Komeito Party Chairman Takeire's visit to South Korea symbolized the widespread and
varied nature of the new ties between Japan and South Korea being formulated now.
Traditionally, the intercourse with Korea by the opposition was the exclusive domain
of the Democartic Socialist Party, and that at the discretion of aide-de-camp Kasuga.
But although South Korea has taken quite a hawkish diplomatic stance, it realized that
the Japanese public opinion building offensive should not be restricted to the Liberal
~ Democratic Party and the Democratic Socialist Party. South Korea decided that "in
- terms of numbers, the LDP and DSP together may be sufficient; but the index of public
opinion in Japan may be more faithfully represented by the utterances of the Komeito
Party." (South Korea-Japan Diet Members League l~adership) Consequently, South Korea
spurred on Takeire's visit to Korea.
i
The Chun Doo Hwan administration's efforts in lobbying the visiting Komeito Party group
reaped unexpectedly good results. The Komeito Central Committee meeting on 7 September
focu~ed on a speech which elucidated t~ie constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces,
_ and Mr Takeire charactPrized the militarily tense situation on the Korean Peninsula
as an objective reality and affirmed that although there is a tendency to downgrac~e the
improvement of Japan-South Korea relations, the Chun Doo Hwan administration's advocacy
of a new people-based friendship, quite detached from present and past experience, is
appropriate for the new era and should be cultivated. Policy Board Chairman Masaki
touched on Japan-South Korea economic cooperation and spoke in favor of special consider-
ation: "Juding from the location of the two states across a narrow strait, it would
be difficult to give aid as we would for all other countries of the world. It is
necessary to take some steps."
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The shift o~ Kon~eito to a pro-South Korea stance created complex reactions amang
~he various opposition parties. It appears that there may be polarization within ths
opposition c~~lition over the Korean Peninsula policy. In full agreement are tue
Democartic S~cialists. They are Yiappy because they have gained suppor~ers who would
give prominence to South Korea. The Communist Party has a contrasting reaction.
Although the Socialists would not overtly criticize on account of their alliance with
Komeito in realit , their views are similar to those of the Communists. That is to
, y
say, they agree that Komeito's line is a clear elucidation of the "member of the West
concept and that it leads to promotion of the Japan-tI.S..-South Korea military system.
Within the Socialist Party, es~ecially, there is a concern that since the breach over
the South Korea policy has bec~me so marked, alliance (between Socialists and Komeito)
would necessarily fall apart.
An important condition for the success of the middle-of-the road coalition 3s an
agreement regarding the national security and defense policies. The salient issues,
needless to say, are: the role of the Self Defense Forces, continuation of the.
Japan-U.S. security pact system and the Korean Peninsula policy. As one aims for
a middle-af-the-road co4lition with a view to participation in the administration in
the near future, one must deal with affirmation of the national security/defense poiicy.
The Komeito Party's pro-South Korea stance patterned after the Democratic Socialist
Party's s~mbolizes this fact. Then, what were the reactions of the New Liberal
Club and Social Democratic League.
New Liberal Club representative Tagawa disclosed at a press conference on 4 September
that "on defense policy and South Karea policy and the like we cannot go along with
the current Democratic Socialist Party's views," thereby aborting the chance of forming .
a coalition in the Diet among Komeito, the Democratic Socialists, the New Liberal Club
and the Socialist People'~ League.
The truth of the matter is that a speech by Democratic Socialist Party adviser Kasuga
at a television debate i.mplying that s~curity-motivated economic cooperation is proper
and just was interpreted by Tagawa as a show of bad faith, and he in turn decided
against joining the coalition led by the Democratic Socialist Party. The Japan-South
Korea issue had an important impact on the middle-of-the-road coalition movement.
In the meantime, the Socialist People's League has continued to have intercourse with
the North. F~r example, representative Tagawa visited North Korea during April of
this year. At the same time, the league's position regarding the Kim Jae Kyu incident
is that so far there has been no definitive political solution, including the return
of the status quo. It shows no inclination to agree with the Democratic Socialist's
stance nor with Komeito's change ot heart. Although South Korea's shakeup of the
Komeito Party was successful, it rather invited negative results as far as the New
Liberal Cl~b and the Socialist People's League are concerned.
South Korea Has the Initiative
Finally, I would like once again to touch on the issue of economic cooperation tied
to the security agreement. According to Foreign Ministry sources, after the conclu-
sion of the cabinet conference, the South Korean representatives began adopting the
following lines: "Cement donated for social development will enable construction of
highways foi moving troops and encampments. Receiving rice and apportioning it tu
soldiers does not constitute military aid." The fact that Japan praised South Korea's
defense efforts created the basic flow of things, and there is indication of a decision
that the rest--disposition of the total amount--is a matter of political settlement.
, ~
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With regard to Japan's declared avowal of separation of security consideration and
nation-building economic cooperation, it appear�s that the distinction between the
cwo h.~s become quite blurred. But avoidance of "economic cooperation tied to security
consideration" k�as founded on the concept that in view of Japan's adherence to a
peaceful constitution, it would be impossible to provide aid which is really a tran~
fer of defense cost. Another significant element is (Japan's) diplomatic policy of
cumulative contacts (commercial, economic, cultural) with the Democratic Republic of
Korea (North Korea) and through them, opening up avenues for ~ommunication. Still
- another is the recognition that the maintenance of tha status quo on the Korean
- Peninsula is a matter of mutual concern to China and the USSR [as well as to Japan
and the two Kor~as], and that China and the Southeast Asian states mu~st also be
included in the consideration. That is to say, kyohi kaito [the."refusal"] was not
based solely on the principle of economic cooperation--that governmental development
assistance be directed toward the developing nations with a low income level or that
~ cooperation between Japan and South Korea be, in the main, a civilian effort and
that the aid is intended for stablizing civilian life and improving people's welfare;
and that there can be no guarantee of any comprehensive figure and so on.
Of course, there is need for broadening the avenue for Japan-South Korea communication
at various levels, including political intercourse, and deepening of mutual under-
~ standing. Compared to the murkiness of the Japan-South Korea relations under the
Pak regime, the current state of affairs at least is an improvement. But the loud
chorus urging "appreciation of South Korea's position" composed not only of T~iberal
Dem~crats but of Democratic Socialists and Komeito as well, acting as a"cheering
section" for the Chun Doo Hwan administration, ties the hands of Prime Minister Suzuki
and Foreign Minister Sonoda, who are trying to refuse aid that is coupled with the
security issue; and there is danger of that chorus being used to destroy their
political base. Al~eady, the symptoms are apparent and the axis of coordinates has
shifted considerably to a pro-South Kor~a position (in favor of the military govern-
ment). We must not translate "ideological mutual understanding" into recognition
of the Soviet's or the North's threat, or view and approach the Japan-U.S.-South Korea
security pact in Northeast Asia and the dlvision of labor between Japan and South
Korea with "Sout~i Korean eyes."
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten 1981
11460
CSO: 4105/14 END
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