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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
CIA/RR. CB 64-71
November 1964
Copy No. 228
INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA CONTEMPLATE THE USE
OF 1, 000-KILOWATT RADIO TRANSMITTERS
FOR BROADCASTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and Reports
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declossifcation
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA CONTEMPLATE THE USE
OF 1,000-KILOWATT RADIO TRANSMITTERS
FOR BROADCASTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
In July 1964, Communist China approached Japan for the purchase
of a 1, 000-kilowatt (kw) medium-wave radiobroadcasting transmitter.
This request probably was in reaction to earlier Indian negotiations in
1963 and 1964 with Free World and Communist countries for the pur-
chase of a similar 1, 000-kw transmitter to be located near Calcutta
to counter Chinese Communist broadcasts to Southeast Asia. Although
neither the proposed location nor the use of the Chinese Communist
transmitter is known, it is expected that it will be installed in Southwest
China so as to improve broadcasting coverage to Southeast Asia. To
date, neither country has concluded negotiations for delivery of the
transmitters. Even if contracts are signed in the near future, it is
unlikely that either project could be completed before late in 1966 in
view of the lag inherent in the design, production, and installation of
such transmitters.
1. Indian and Chinese Communist Plans
In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war, India and Communist
China have sought to increase the coverage and effectiveness of their
international radiobroadcasts to Southeast Asia. Within this context
of a possible burgeoning propaganda war, both countries are now giving
strong consideration to the use of 1, 000-kw medium-wave radio trans-
mitters. For its part, India early in 1963 reached an agreement with
the Voice of America (VOA) for a jointly controlled 1, 000-kw medium-
wave transmitter to be installed near Calcutta. In August 1963, India
terminated the VOA agreement because of internal political considera-
tions and opened negotiations with other Free World and Communist
countries for the import of a similar transmitter that would be com-
pletely under its operational control. By early 1964, additional bids
had been received from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Japan, the UK,
and the US. All of these bids were unacceptable, however, either
because of delivery dates or because financial terms did not meet
the Indian requirement for payment in rupees. In May 1964 the USSR
entered the picture with an offer to provide on favorable terms a
1, 000-kw transmitter to be operational within 2 years. Although a
flurry of interest followed the Soviet offer, India apparently has post-
poned any decision at present.
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With the advent of the Soviet offer to India, Communist China quickly
revealed a strong interest in acquiring a 1, 000-kw medium-wave radio
transmitter. In hopes of meeting this need, Communist China turned
to a Japanese trading company in July 1964, when it submitted a formal
request for assistance in the construction of a 1,000-kw radio station
with Japanese technology and equipment.
25X1 C
This interest by India and Communist China in 1, 000-kw medium-
wave transmitters mirrors a growing worldwide interest in supple-
menting international short-wave broadcasts with powerful medium-
wave broadcasts to reach the greater number of conventional medium-
wave broadcast receivers. Propagation conditions at medium frequencies,
however, are such that coverage beyond a few hundred miles can be
attained only during hours of darkness. As shown on the map, the
Indian transmitter, which is planned for installation near Calcutta,
probably would permit nighttime coverage with a high signal strength
to at least 1, 000 miles. This coverage would encompass all of Burma
and parts of Laos, Thailand, and South China. Communist China could
achieve similar geographic coverage by locating its prospective trans-
mitter in the Kunming area. Nighttime coverage from transmitters
of this size might in fact extend to 2, 000 miles, although the signal
strength would be much weaker and subject to intermittent fading.
At present the US has the only operational 1, 000-kw medium-wave
transmitters -- located in Okinawa and the Philippines -- but the UK
and Egypt probably will have operational transmitters of similar power
in the near future. This limited use of 1, 000-kw transmitters can be
attributed to a considerable degree to the requirement for manufacturing
specialized component parts for such powerful transmitters and to the
high investment and operating costs. Initial investment costs for
1, 000-kw transmitters range from US $1 million to US $2 million, and
recurring operating and maintenance costs range from US $250, 000 to
US $500, 000 per year.
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3. Prospects
Although the Soviet offer to India appears at present to be the most
attractive, and indeed the most likely to be accepted, India still has
the alternative of a Czechoslovak offer to accept payment in rupees
for a somewhat smaller transmitter. Among the bids offered. by non-
rupee payment countries the two bids rendered by Japan are the most
favorable. India has attempted to rationalize its earlier refusal of
the Japanese offer on the basis. that its electronics industry lacks
experience in the design and production of such transmitters, although
in fact the electronics industry of the USSR is similarly untested. The
advanced stage of development of the electronics industries of both coun-
tries, however, would indicate that each has the ability to master the
necessary technology and could provide an operational transmitter
within 2 years. With respect to Communist China, Japan probably
will accede to the request for technology and equipment for the. con-
struction of a 1, 000-kw radio station. Japan's initial response to
the. Chinese Communist inquiry probably reflected an awareness that
the US would be sensitive to any Japanese assistance in the buildup
of Communist China's international broadcasting effort to Southeast
Asia. Nevertheless, Japan probably will be reluctant to jeopardize
its prospective position as a major supplier of telecommunications
equipment to Communist China.
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Potential Nighttime Coverage of 1,000 Kilowatt Medium-Wave Radio
Transmitters from Possible Sites in India and Communist China*
~~` emorccfip7
z.-7Jne ..
C) ty-
Ulpi __1'
Calcutta K'un-ming**
PAKISTAN
*Actual areao/ coverage would be dependent on target countries
and antenna systems.
**Although the planned transmitter site in Communist China is un-
known, K'un-ming was chosen to reflect potential area coverage
from a site in Southwest China.
JAPAN
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