INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFOR
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE/
CIA/RR IM-370
24 November 1952
WARNING
THIS MAITERIAL CONTAINS 'ORMA.TIOTNN AFFECTING WIT1nN NG THE THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 791+, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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SECURITY I
SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE
Sm maxy
The land reform program initiated in Communist China in 1947 aims
at the complete socialization of Chinese agriculture. In its initial
stages, land reform in Communist China has followed, with some mod-
ifications, the pattern established by the USSR, in particular as it
has been applied in the European Satellites. First, the great land-
lords and even the more well-to-do peasants are dispossessed, and
their holdings are distributed among the landless and land-poor
peasants. Then follows the fostering of various types of cooperatives,
all within the aura of intensive propaganda aimed toward the complete
socialization of agriculture. The process is proceeding in Communist
China more rapidly than was anticipated. By the spring of 1952, land
had been redistributed to about 300 million peasants (including mem-
bers of their households). So far, it appears that agricultural
production in Communist China has not been measurably affected as a
result of the land distribution, although it is still too early to
evaluate with any degree of certainty the effects on agricultural
production.
1. Redistribution of Land.
The Chinese Communist program of land reform was initiated under
the Agrarian Law of September 1947.,1/* This law abolished owner-
ship rights in land and provided for the confiscation of land and
means of production belonging to "landlords and kulaks" and the trans-
fer of this property to landless and land-poor peasants as private
property. Land confiscation followed the "liberation" of new ter-
ritories by the Chinese Communist armies, generally in a geographic
pattern beginning in the Northeast (Manchuria) and North China --
so-called old liberated areas -- through the East, Central-South,
and Southwest regions of China.
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in the
Appendix.
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During the period between "liberation" and land redistribution a
rent reduction program. was carried out. Instructions were given to
create within 1 to 2 years the necessary conditions for land. reform;
that is, a stabilized situation including the evacuation of all
Nationalist troops, a demand from the majority of peasants for con-
fiscation and redistribution, and enough agrarian reform workers
guiding the movement to assure success. At the same time, steps
were to be taken to prevent a falling off in agricultural production.
Thus the actual work of land distribution was usually carried out
after the fall harvests and relaxed at spring planting time.
According to the official plan, land was to be distributed progres-
sively over a series of years, so that by the spring of 1952 the first
stages of land reform would have been completed and specified numbers
of the rural population would have been benefited, on the following
schedule _!? by the spring of 1949, 100 million people; by the spring
of 1950, 157 million; by the spring of 1951, 285 million; and by the
spring of 1952, 385 million.
Certain districts have been excluded from this schedule: Sinkiang,
Inner Mongolia, the Northwest, and Tibet. Because of the indigenous
customs pertaining to land tenure among the minority ethnic groups
living in these districts, a different technique to be described later
is being applied.
Members of peasant households in Honan received from 2 to 3 mou
(0.13 to 0.2 hectare) of land per capita, and in Hunan and Hupeh the
allotments of land ranged from 1 to 2.5 mou (0.06 to 0.17 hectare). !
By the spring of 1952, about 300 million peasants, including mem-
bers of their households, had received land benefits, and it is the
expectation that land distribution will have been completed by the
end of 1952. J As a rule, certificates of proprietorship have been
issued to peasants receiving land. 5/
As a means of checking the progress of their program, the Communist
hierarchy sent out inspection teams in the early part of 1952 to deter-
mine irregularities and report cases in which the land reform had not
been successful. Persons accused of being deviationists were very
often subjected to violence. It is, in fact, estimated that at least
1.5 million people have been executed and that perhaps 35 million to 45
million have been stigmatized as "exploiters" and have been. pauperized
and maltreated in varying degrees. 61 It is possible that this pro-
cedure has been used as a tool to create a "labor force" for use on
government projects such as the Huai Ho water conservancy project.
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2. Role of the Comunist Party in the Redistribution of Land.
Con:i.st Party has rigidly controlled the redistribution of
land inChina through directives to Party cadres, who are trained and
then sent to the villages to organize work teams to effect the con-
fiscation of land, to classify the inhabitants (that is, as landloi&s,
middle peasants, and poor peasants), and actually to distribute the
land. Furthermore, following the distribution of the land, the cadres
engage in completely reorganizing rural life. By indoctrination and
training they are attempting to gain control of the people at the
grass-roots level, especially in old "liberated" areas like North
China and the Northeast.
3. Further Steps in Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy.
The Chinese Communists do not intend that the land redistribution
is to be an end in itself. It is only-the first stage in their agrar-
ian policy. Land redistribution was almost immediately followed by a
second stage inaugurated by the organization of so-called Mutual Aid
Teams. The programs set up for these Mutual Aid Teams have been of
four general types: (a) The first type is the interchange of labor
at seeding time in spring. (b) The second type is the interchange of
labor during each of the three busy seasons of planting, cultivating,
and harvesting. In this program, the winter season, when supplemental
income is earned, is not included. (c) The third type is the estab-
lishment of a year-round labor pool in which implements and animals
sometimes are awned Jointly, and sometimes working capital is also
pooled. (d) The fourth type is the cooperative farming of the land,
with all operations of`planting, cultivating, and harvesting performed
on. a partnership basis, production being divided according to inputs.
This fourth type still excludes the winter supplemental work. 7
It has been officially announced that 80 percent of farm households
in Manchuria and 55 percent in North China have been organized into
Mutual Aid Teams of one or another of these four general types,
Statistics are incomplete for the rest of China, but percentages of
organization are undoubtedly lower than in the North and Northeast,
where Communist control is not so firm. The 19-52 plan for North. China
is to organize 70 to 80 percent of all peasants into cooperatives and
other types of Mutual Aid Teams.
The next stage of the agrarian reform is the organization of the
Agricultural Producer Cooperative, in which all boundaries of house-
.hold lands are eradicated and in which there is a complete division
of activities among labor groups. The government encourages the
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evolution of the four types of Mutual Aid Teams into the Agricultural
Producer Cooperative type. The shares of each member in the profits
are governed by the individual's inputs of land, labor, and capital.
In an April speech, Kao Kang, chairman of the Northeast China People's
Government, stated that there are now more than 1,200 Agricultural
Producer Cooperatives in the Northeast.*
At the same time that Agricultural Producer Cooperatives are being
encouraged by the government, state farms are being organized in
increasing numbers. There are 52 relatively large state farms in
various localities, 10 including 20 large mechanized farms in Man-
churia. 11 The latter have been in existence since the Japanese
occupation and were taken over by the Communist government'in 1948.
The purpose of the large farms in Manchuria is to train cadres of
young Communists. in modern mechanized farming methods and at the same
time to indoctrinate them with the "political ideology" which is thought
to be correlated with the idea of collective farming. Wheat and soy-
beans are mostly grown on these farms. The goal is to establish a
state farm at regional, provincial, county, and subcounty levels, to
serve as a model for Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives.
Nationalization of the land has not entered into the Chinese pic-
ture as yet. The Chinese Communists are convinced, however, that
agriculture must be collectivized if China is to acquire the capital
and labor it needs for industrialization.
4. Evaluation of Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy.
There are many indications that the Chinese Communists are in a
general way following in the path of Communists in the USSR and the
European Satellites, benefiting perhaps in some instances by their
experiences and mistakes. As in the USSR, the first principle of
action has been the abolition of private ownership of land "in order
to free the rural productive forces, develop agricultural production,
and thus pave the way for New China's industrialization." 12/ By
this means the regime will gain control of agricultural production.
Like the USSR, China needs agricultural commodities to barter for
industrial goods.
* Kao Kang further stated that the Northeast would be fully mechanized
within 5 or 6 years. 9/
Before the Japanese war, 80 percent of the total value of China's
exports cam from agricultural commodities.
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The genuine grievances of the Chinese peasants have been skillfully
utilized by the Chinese Communists in their struggle for political
power, agrarian reform being made an effective political instrument.
Consequently, one characteristic of the land policy of the Chinese
Communists is its synchronization with political expediency. Certainly
it can be expected that the regime became popular to a degree, having
given the "land to the tillers," 12 which was the promise of Sun Yat Sen.
What has actually followed as an immediate after-effect is a matter of
conjecture. There have been reports 13 that the taxes exacted by the
Communists are higher than total taxes under the old government -- the
announced rate is no higher than 37 percent of all crops produced --
but some reports indicate that it is often as high as 50 to 70 percent.
When the 1952 wheat harvest turned out to be better than average, the
government immediately announced a higher collection rate. In addition
to taxes, farmers are induced to make "voluntary" contributions to
"victory bonds" and to "arms for Korea."
Since dune 1950, Chinese Communist tactics have been to encourage
a "rich" peasant economy. By efforts to induce peasants to work with-
out fear that their produce would be requisitioned, the government
hopes to stimulate production. "Rich" peasants are encouraged because
their land and means of production are generally superior and because
their productivity is therefore higher than the average. At the same
time, the government has taken steps to minimize resistance to its
policies. As in all primitive countries, Chinese peasant farmers are
wedded to the principle of private property and do not understand the
"advantage" to be gained from nationalization.
Another aspect of the Chinese Communist agricultural policy is
that great stress has been placed on endouraging the peasants to
organize voluntarily, a process which may permit China to avoid the
disruption that followed the forced collectivization of land in the
USSR in the early 19301s. According to one report,
25X1 X7
Kao Kang said 15/: "Cooperatives in such manner that
is, forcibly organize d3 will produce very poor results and
will leave a bad impression upon the people, adding dif-
ficulties to the future development of Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives."
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Propaganda, political pressure, and economic inducements are combined
to convince peasants of the "advantages" of Mutual Aid Teams and Agri-
cultural Producer Cooperatives. For instance, farm equipment supply
stations, fertilizer cooperatives, and so on, give priority of supply
to Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer Cooperatives.
In the Northwest and some other areas where there are ethnic minor-
ities, the implementation of the land reform differs from that carried
out in areas populated by Chinese. Chinese Communist officials have
even stated 161:
"Before land reform can be carried out well, it must be
demanded by the local minority nationality masses, concurred
in by the leading personages, directed by localities, and
its method of implementation planned in complete conformity
with local conditions.
"There will be no expropriation of land owned by
Mohammedan mosques and Tibetan monasteries for distribu-
tion. These lands are closely related to the religious
faith of the masses and they must be differentiated from
the land of the landlords."
In China proper the graves which, it is said, occupy 2 percent of
the arable land, have so far been left intact, although many churches
have been confiscated and are used for grain storage.
It is perhaps too early to judge the results of the agrarian pol-
icies, but it appears that agricultural production has not been meas-
urably affected as a result of the land distribution. It is reported
that some peasants have already become disenchanted with the regime --
with its interference in their private lives, and constant drives for
donations added to the high taxes -- and have resisted through the
weapon of lowered production. This result is difficult to ascertain,
however, from production statistics, because of the long period of
war with Japan, then civil war and disruption, and a serious drought
in 1949.
Among the problems which will confront the Chinese Communist govern-
ment are a further subdivision of the tillable land and the practical
application of mechanization. The latter cannot be accomplished with-
out the consolidation of small holdings into units large enough for the
economic use of modern farm machinery which is one of the reasons for
the government stressing the Agricultural Producer Cooperative.
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For the Communists, the mechanization of agriculture is pre-
requisite to industrialization, and in China it seems a particularly
formidable problem. Agricultural implements cannot be manufactured
domestically in sufficient amounts, and the more urgent need of other
items precludes the importation of agricultural implements. There
is no evidence of the importation of agricultural machinery in signif-
icant quantities either from the USSR or from other sources. On the
other hand, the estimated industrial labor force of China and Man-
churia today is about 2 million as contrasted with an agricultural
labor force of 200 million to 240 million. Chinese industry is unable
to absorb the present surplus agricultural labor, and there would have
to be a tremendous expansion in industry before the additional labor
supply released by the mechanization of agriculture could possibly be
absorbed.
It is believed that mechanization of agriculture in China will
follow the same general pattern as was followed in the USSR, and as is
being followed in the European Satellites today. This pattern is to
propagandize mechanization, but to defer its being put into effect
until such time as industry has developed to a point where it can pro-
vide the necessary farm machinery and also absorb additional manpower.
In all the present Communist countries, at the time that the Communist
regimes came into power, there existed a situation similar to that now
obtaining in China -- a general inadequacy of industry and a large
agricultural population, generally under employed. In the USSR,
mechanization of agriculture was not attempted until 10 or 15 years
after the Russian Revolution of 1919. The European Satellite govern-
ments are only now beginning to make serious attempts to mechanize
agriculture, 7 or 8 years after gaining power. How long the mechaniza-
tion of agriculture will require in Communist China is difficult to
foretell, but it is believed to be several years in the future.
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APPENDIX
SOURCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
A - Completely reliable
B - Uusually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author does not disagree with the
evaluation on the cited document.
1. People's China, Supplement to No. 2, Vol. II, 16 Jul 1950.
U. Eval. RR A-1.
2. OIR Report No. 5713, 8 Nov 1951. R. Eval. RR B-3.
3. Chao Kuo-chun, "Current Agrarian Reform Policies in Communist
China," reprinted from The Annals of the American Academy of
Politic-1 and Social Science, Sep 1951. U. Eval. RR 1.
4+. Department of State Despatch No. 1126, Hong Kong, 5 Dec 1951.
U. Eval. RR 3.
The figure given in this source is 310 million. Later data,
25X1 A2g however, indicate that "areas with t-t-.1 rural population of
300 million have fulfilled land reform." FBIS, 1 Oct 1952,
p. AAA 26. R. Eval. RR C-3.
25X1X7 6. OIR Report No. 5713, 8 Nov 1951, P. 5. R. Eval. RR B-1.
7.
8. OIR Report No. 5650.8, 15 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR B-i.
9. FBIS, 21 Apr 1952. R. Eval. RR 2.
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25X1 A2gDP79
001-4
2 1X Eval. F-2.
l3. These reports include: IR-52-52, CIA 727878, 26
10. People's China, No. 19, 1 Oct 1952, p. 17. U. Eval. RR 2.
11. Interrogation of August Schill, 7 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR F-3.
12. People's China, Supplement to No. 2, Vol. II, A2ticle 1.
U. Eval _. P%.R A-i. 25X1X7A
15. FBIS, 21 Apr 1952, AAA 23. R. Eval.
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