WARSAW PACT TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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Top Secret
l'l7arsaw Pact Tactical Nuclear Forces in Central Europe
NSA, DIA reviews completed
Top Secret
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SR IM 75-1
March 1975
Copy
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Warsaw Pact Tactical Nuclear
Forces in Central Europe
Summary
Since the late sixties the Soviets have upgraded their tactical nuclear forces in Central
Europe in at-. ongoing effort to broaden 'their range of nuclear options.
- The number of forward-based tactical air units estimated to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons has more than doubled.
- The number of launchers in most ground force tactical missile units has
increased by some 25 percent.
The Soviets continue to rely on USSR-based MRBMs, IRBMs, and bombers for strikes
against important European targets that are beyond the ranges of most of their tactical
systems. The improvements in the tactical nuclF-ir forces in Cent.rdl Europe, however,
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suggest that the Soviets may be interested in a sanctuary option for the territory of the
USSR.
Numerically, the most important Warsaw Pact delivery systems in Eurora are tactical
aircraft. In East Germany, Poland,. and Czechoslovakia-the Pact countries in the MBFR
"reduction area"-about 720 aircraft are in units assessed as probably having a nuclear
mission. Only about 300 of the pilots in these units are qualified for such missions, however.
Some 1,600 other aircraft in these three countries are considered technically capable of
delivering nucleai weapons, but there is little or no evidence that they are intended for this
role.
Pact ground forces in the reduction area have two nuclear delivery systems-the FROG
rocket, with a range of 40 nautical miles, and the Scud missile, which has a range of about
160 nm. There are some 200 FROG launchers and about 190 Scud launchers in ti area.
Pact field artillery is not believed to have been equipped with nuclear rounds.
Ongoing and expected programs to upgrade Soviet forward-based nuclear delivery
capabilities will result in significant qualitative improvements but are not expected to
increase significantly the total ground and air forces in the reduction area.
One or more new missiles now under development probably are intended to
replace some FROG and Scud launchers on a one-for-one basis over the next few
years.
The nuclear delivery capability of tactical air forces will improve during the
seventies as new, longer range aircraft replace older models and more pilots
become qualified for nuclear missions.
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
March 1975
There is an increased likelihood that during future
negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions
specific options will be raised which will treat in
one way or another the tactical nuclear forces in the
Central European reduction area.* This memorandum was
prepared jointly by CIA and DIA to provide for those
involved in the deliberations a brief overview of the
composition and capabilities of Warsaw Pact tactical
nuclear forces. It is not intended to break new an-
alytical ground but rather to summarize the latest
estimates of Pact tactical nuclear capabilities and
to describe the nature of the evidence and uncertain-
ties which underlie these estimates.
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* Reduction c.rea is a term used in MBFR talks to denote the
geographical area in which reductions of both stationed and
indigenous forces are being negotiated. This area encompasses
the FRG and the Benelux countries on the NATO side and the GDR,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the Warsaw Pact side.
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This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research,
CIA, and in the Directorate for Intelligence, DIA. Comments
and queries may be directed to
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Page
Composition and Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ground Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Air Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Possible Effects of Negotiated Force Reductions
or Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Tables
Warsaw Pact Tactical Missile Launchers in
Reduction Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Estimated Storage Capacity for Soviet Nuclear
Weapons in Reduction Area . . . . . . . . . . 17
Illustrations
Subordination of Nuclear Delivery Systems in
Warsaw Pact Ground Forces (Chart and
Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Soviet Tactical Aircraft With Nuclear. Strike
Missions (Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites in
Eastern Europe (Map) 14
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Composition and Capabilities
Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear forces in the MBFR
seduction area basically reflect Soviet military plan-
ning of the late fifties and the sixties, the princi-
pal elements of which were:
Use of nuclear weapons in a war in Europe was
viewed as linked or leading inevitably to
strategic nuclear war.
The primary forces for nuclear operations in
Europe, particularly for strikes in the depth
of the theater, were USSR-based medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
bombers. There is evidence, for example,
that as late as 1970 Soviet military planning
called for up to 90 percent of the nuclear
strikes in the initial nuclear actack of a
European conflict to be delivered by strate-
gic systems based in the USSR.
Tactical nuclear weapons were regarded mainly
as an -'djunct to the strategic peripheral
strike forces--to provide battlefield strikes
in direct support of the individual armies
and fronts.*
Pact tactical nuclear delivery systems in the re-
duction area, therefcre, generally have considerably
shorter effective strike ranges than NATO systems.
Pact fighter-bombers, for example, originally were de-
signed as interceptors and later adapted to the nu-
clear strike role. As a result, most of these air-
craft do not have the capability to strike targets
deep in the NATO rear.
Until recently, the bulk of the Pact's tactical
nuclear firepower ..,onsisted of short-range ground
* In Warsaw Pact terminology, a front is a wartime formation
usually consisting of several field armies and a tactical
air army plus combat and service support units.
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force missiles. Nuclear-capable tactical aircraft in
Eaiterr. Europe were intended primarily to complement
the ground force missile systems by engaging targets
requiring quick reaction--such as enemy mobile mis-
sile launchers--and striking targets beyond the ranges
of the tactical missiles. Most of the aircraft were
also short ranged, however, and there is evidence that
the Soviets did not consider any of their forward-
based tactical systems capable of delivering strikes
against targets deep in enemy territory. There is
clear evidence, for example, that at 1--,st until the
recent introduction of new models, Pact planners con-
sidered most NATO airfields in West Germany to be
beyond the range of their tactical aircraft.
In the late sixties the Soviet; began to imple-
ment some significant changes to improve the overall
capabilities of their forward-based nuclear forces.
These programs, which are still under way, will re-
duce the necessary dependence on USSR-based nuclear
systems and thereby provide some flexibility for con-
fining a nuclear conflict to the European theater.
-- The number of forward-based tactical air units
equipped and trained for nuclear delivery mis-
siens has doubled since abcut 1969 as addi-
tional pilots--particularly in units equipped
with late-model MIG-21 and MIG-23 aircraft--
have been qualified for such missions.
This has been accompanied by a much greater
emphasis on the role of tactical aircraft in
Pact theater nuclear planning. Thu latest
model aircraft now being deployed with
Soviet units in the USSR and Central Europe
have considerably improved range and pene-
t~.ation capabiiities over older Soviet tacti-
cal aircraft and would be able to strike
targets throughout NATO Europe even from
bases in the USSR.
The numbers of launchers in both FROG and
Scud units have been increased by some 25
percent in most Soviet and some non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) units.
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interested in a sanctuary option for the territory
of the USSR. Despite improvements, however, most
Pact tactical delivery systems are still limited by
range. Strategic missile and bomber systems will
therefore continue to play a key.role in Soviet
theater nuclear strike planning at least until the
late seventies, when longer range tactical systems--
such as a new swing-wing fighter-bomber now enterin
service (Fencer A) and a new missile 25X1
I jecome available in sufficient num e .
Ground Systems
FROG and Scud missiles are the-only nuclear de-
livery systems known to be held by Warsaw Pact ground
forces in the reduction area. The FROG, with a range
of 40 nm (70 km), is a divisional weapon--a battalion
of three or four launchers being organic to each divi-
sion. The Scud missile, with a range of about 160 nm
(300 km), is found at the army and front echelons.
Normally, one Scud brigade is subordinate to the head-
quarters of an army, and at least one brigade is avail-
able for each wartime front headquarters. (See chart,
page 6.) The headquarters of the Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany, which would command the largest of
the wartime fronts, has three Scud brigades. The
number of launchers per Scud brigade varies; Soviet
brigades in the reduction area have 9 to 12 launchers,
and East European brigades, 6 to 9.
In all, the Warsaw Pact is estimated to have 57
FROG battalions with some 200 launchers and 18 or 19*
Scud brigades with as many as 190 launchers in the
* One recently formed East German Scud brigade may not yet have
reached full operational status.
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Subordination of Nuclear Delivery Systems
in Warsaw Pact Ground Forces
FRONT
HEADQUARTERS
L
ARMY
HEADQUARTERS II
II
II
DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS
SUBORDINATE
MISSILE UNITS
SCUD
BRIGADE (S)
II
SCUD
BRIGADE
FROG
BATTALION
In wartime, each front headquarters would have one
or more Scud brigades. There are five Scud brigades
in the MBFR reduction area that would be sub-
ordinate to the three fronts-Soviet, Polish, and
Czechoslovak-that probably would be formed there.
In the reduction area there are 13 or 14 Scud brigades
subordinate to the Soviet and East European army
headquarters and the two Soviet groups of forces in
Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Each of the 56 Soviet and East European tank and
motori ,,d rifle divisions in the reduction area, as well
as the Polish assault landing division, has a FROG
battalion.
_~ II
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Warsaw Pact Tactical Missile
Launchers in Reduction Area
Scud
FROG
East Germany
Soviet
96
80
East German
9-18a
24
Soviet
9
b
8
Polish
30-32
39-42c
Soviet
9
20
Czech
27
30
Soviet
114
108
East European
66-77
93-96
180-191 201-204
a. East Germany recently began forming a second Scud
brigade, which in all likelihood will also have
nine launchers.
b. There is evidence that until recently the Poles had
24 Scud launchers in operational units--four bri-
gades with six launchers each. They have, however,
bought a number of later model Scud launchers from
the Soviets over the past year or so, raising the
number of launchers in at least three of the bri-
gades to eight.
c. Polish organizational. concepts call for each Polish
division, with the exception of the airborne divi-
sion, to huve a battalion of three FROG launchers.
Some of the divisions apparently do not yet have
their full complement. It is clear, however, that
the Poles intend to bring all the divisions up to
this standard, and they may be testing a four-
launcher battalion concept in one or two divisions.
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reduction area. (A detailed breakdown of nuclear de-
livery systems by type and country is provided on
page 7.)
Information on the numbers of FROG and Scud units
is better and generally viewed with higher confidence
than are estimates of the numbers of launchers.
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-- There is considerable evidence that the nuclear
missile units are organic to the ground forces
in the structure shown in the chart on page 6. 25X1
1all
active Warsaw Pact divisions in the reduction
area--with the exception of the Polish air-
borne division---have a FROG battalion.
-- The subordination of Scud units does not
appear to follow as consistent an organiza-
tional pattern as the divisional FROG bat-
talions. Therefore, estimates oi: Scud bri-
gades in the reduction area are made on an
individual, unit-by-unit basis
The main uncertainty in estimates of Pact missile
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or Scud unit.
Current estimates are based on the following
judgments:
-- The progr;.m to increase each Soviet and East
German FROG battalion from three to four
launchers has been completed.
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Polish FROG battalions still generally have
three launchers, and Czechoslovak, two to three
launchers, although some battalions in both
countries may recently have received a fourth
launcher.
-- The eight Soviet Scud brigades in East Germany
have each been increased from 9 to 12 launchers
over the past several years; the other two
Soviet brigades in the reduction area still
have nine launchers but probably will also be
enlarged; and indigenous brigades generally
have from eight to nine launchers each.
Another nuclear missile system, the 500-nm Scale-
board, is held at military district level by Soviet
ground forces in the USSR. This system probably is
intended for front-level support in wartime. Thus
far, however, there has been no evidence of Scaleboard
deployment in Eastern Europe.-F-
uro e.
The Soviets are not believed to have deployed
nuclear rounds for their currently operational tube
artillery. They began a development program for
nuclear tube artillery in the fifties and formulated
tactical employment doctrine for these systems.
After developing two super-caliber artillery pieces,
in about 1960, they decided to deploy nuclear-capable
FROG rockets instead. This decision probably was
prompted by technical difficulties, better technical
characteristics of the rocket systems, and competing
requirements for fissionable material. At the same
time, Soviet military doctrine was modified to re-
flect the deployment of FROGs rather than nuclear-
capable artillery.
Since then, research, development, and testing of
low-yield warheads for artillery probably have con-
tinued. The Soviets probably had developed prototype
nuclear projectiles for medium-caliber artillery
weapons by the amid-sixties and by the end of the
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decade could have begun production had they chosen to
do so. There is some evidence that the Soviets have
nuclear rounds for the 152mm naval rifle on board some
cruisers.
Air Systems
Estimating numbers of nuclear delivery aircraft
is more complex than estimating numbers of ground force
delivery systems because of the dual conventional-
nuclear capability and role of tactical aircraft.
While aircraft can be generally classified as "nuclear-
capable" on the basis of performance characteristics,
this group would include nearly all modern combat
aircraft--not all of which are intended for use in a
nuclear role.
There is no information available which specifies
the aircraft or combat units "dedicated" to nuclear
operations in Pact war plans. Nor is there evidence
that all aircraft of any one model in Eastern Europe--
even those that are known to have a nuclear delivery
role--are uniformly equipped with special mechanisms
for the delivery of nuclear weapons, or that such
equipment is required as i'= is on Western nuclear de-
livery aircraft.
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In addition to assessments of technical capability,
therefore, our estimates of Pact nuclear delivery air-
craft also take into account the role of the unit to
which the aircraft are assigned-j-
ssi ned
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an Tanyevienceromoerre
po tin on Pact nuclear planning.* On this basis,
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Soviet Tactical Aircraft With Nuclear Strike Missions
~,~ its ~-~-? .._.. _`~?-.`
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Pact aircraft that are technically capable of deliver-
ing nuclear weapons are categorized according to the
probability of their having a nuclear mission, as
follows:
Probable -- All aircraft (except 720 (all Soviet)
trainers) having the technical ca-
pability for nuclear delivery and
assigned to Soviet units assessed
as having a nuclear delivery role
however, only about 300 of the
pilots--uF-..dlly those in the most
proficient squadrons--are qualified
Possible -- Aircraft of the same 390 (130 Soviet,
type as those in the "probable" 260 NSWP)
category but assigned to East
European ground attack units,
those trainers deployed with Soviet
units which probably have a nuclear
role, plus Foxbat reconnaissance
aircraft and Beagle bombers.
Possible, but unlikely -- Older 1,245 (240 Soviet,
model aircraft never associated 1,005 NSWP)
with nuclear operations, most
reconnaissance aircraft, and
late-model East European aircraft
as_-i;ned to air defense units.
There are some 110 East European aircraft--mainly
SU-7s in ground attack regiments--which generally
meet the criteria of the "probable" category but,
because of uncertainties regarding control and avail-
ability of nuclear warheads, have been counted only
as "possible."
Since the late sixties the number of tactical air
units in Eastern Europe assessed as probably having
nuclear missions has doubled as more pilots have been
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qualified for such missions and new model MIG-21s--
the Fishbed J, K, and L; the SU-17/20 Fitter C; and
the MIG-23 Flogger have been delivered. The percent-
age increase was even greater than initially believed
because earlier estimates of the nuclear delivery
force, based solely on technical assessments of air-
frame capability, included older model MIG-21s which
it now appears were never intended for a nuclear de-
livery role.
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 Possible Effects of Negotiated Force
Reductions or Limitations
Future programs for continuing improvement of
Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities probably will
increase the number of nuclear delivery aircraft and
nuclear-qualified pilots and will qualitatively im-
prove the tactical missile forces. These programs
are not expected to result in a significant increase
of the total manpower, missiles, or aircraft in the
reduction area, however.
-- The program to increase the number of launchers
in Soviet tactical missile units is complete
for the FROG units in the forward area and
nearly complete for the Scud units. The number
of launchers in most East European tactical
missile units has not been increased, and it
is not clear whether it will be.
-- Future changes in ground force delivery sys-
tems are likely to result from deployment of
one or more new missiles
These are expected to replace existing FROG
and Scud missiles, and are not likely to re-
sult in any significant increase in numbers
of launchers.
-- Deployment of nuclear artillery rounds could
provide a significant increase in the Pact
tactical nuclear arsenal and would not be af-
fected by restrictions on the numbers of mis-
sile launchers.
-- Increases in the proportion of nuclear delivery
aircraft have taken place as part of an air-
craft modernization program, and have not af-
fected the overall number of Warsaw Pact air-
craft in the reduction area. Future aircraft--
whether intended for nuclear or conventional
missions--will probably all be technically
capable of nuclear delivery.
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-- Insofar as the capabilities of Pact forward-
based nuclear systems are concerned, the
extended range and improved penetration ca-
pabilities provided by the Fitter C, MIG-23
Flogger, and the new Fencer A aircraft are
considerably more important than any impact
their deployment is likely to have on the
overall number of nuclear delivery aircraft.
Without restrictions on qualitative improvement,
therefore, even some reduction in overall numbers of
delivery systems would have minimal effect on Soviet
efforts to increase their forward-based nuclear de-
livery capabilities.
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