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- JPRS L/10089
3 November 1981
i~lear East North Afric~ Re ort
p
cFOUO 40/81)
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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� JPRS L/10089
3 November 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 40/81)
CONTENTS
INTER-~AB AFFAIRS
PLO's Kha1i1 al-Wazir Interviewed
(Khalil al-Wazir Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'AFtABI, 9 Oct 81) 1
IRAQ
- Ha.mmadi A~ttacks U.S. Role in Mideast
(Richard Owen; THE TIMES, 6 Oct 81) 5
LIBYA
A1-Turayki Discusses 6th Fleet Movements, Mub arak
- (REUTER, 11 oct 81) 6
A1-Qadhdhafi Welcomes Afghan Official
(Martin Walker; THE GUARDIAN, 1 Sep 81) 7
MOROCCO
Arrest of Previously Immune Bouabid Discussed
(Ha.mid Barrada; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Sep 81) 8
S ~UDI ARAB IA
Forei.gn Minister Urges U.S.-PLO Contacts
(Paul Eedle; REUTER, 18 Sep 81) l~+
Yamani Launches New U.K. Magazzne
(Michael Horsnell; THE TiNIES, 1 Oct 81) 16
SUDAN
A1ier Comments on Western Role in Africa
(Abel Alier Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 5 Sep 81) 17
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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r'~zvoy to Cairo Co~ents on U.S . Arms Decision
(Chris~opher Walker; THE TIl~S, 13 Oct 81) . o 19
Numayri Urges U.S., EEC To Boycott Libya.n Oil
(iVum.ayri Interview; THE TIMES, 14 Oct 81) 21
YENL~i A.c'~B P,~'UBLIC
War Seen Bringing Regime to Verge of Collapse
(James Adams; TF~ SUNDAY TIMES, 6 Sep 8Z) 23
Inter-riew With Premier Dr 'Abd a1-Karim e1-Iryan
(Abd al-i{arim al-Iryani Iuterview; AL-WATAN AIr'ARABI, 9 Oct 81) . 25
Briefs
Jets Attack Guerrilla Strongholds 29
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PLO'S KHALIL AL-WAZIR INTERVIEWED
JN120940 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'9RABI in Arabic 9 Oct 81 pp 35-39
[Interview with Khalil al-Wazir, alias Abu Jihad, deputy commander in chief of the
Palestinian revolution forces, by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI corrPSpondent Florence Ra'd,
in Tunis and by telephone from Paris--date not given]
[Excerpts] [Question] Do you think that the PLO leadership is the target at
this stage? Can it be said that someone wants Yasir 'Arafat's head?
~Answer] After the 15-day war in July, which scored a military and moral victory
for the Palestinian revolution and the ~oint forces whose political repercussions
were seen in the Zionist enemy's arena, it became clear that Begin's government
and the U.S. administration are preparing for a political onslaught to besiege
the Palestinian revolution after their destructive onslaughts to wreck the
structure, positions, capability and command centers o~ t't?e joint forces had failed.
This Zionist-U.S. plot is coupled with another sabotage scheme to arouse c~nfusion
in the Lebanese arena. This is being embodied today in the car bomb phenomenon
and the human, material and psychological consequences which aim to arouse disgust
and pain. They will not hesitate to resort to direct and indirect attempts ~
against the leaders or through their agents in order to achieve the psychological
victory they are seeking.
[Question] There are tendentious rumors linking the recent wave of explosions
with the Palestinian stand on the Saudi project. To what degree can these rumors
be believed?
[Answer] Psychological warfare is part of the U.S.-Zlonist onslaught and campaign
against the Palestinian revolution and the ,joint forces. This war is being
expanded to sabotage the Palestinian-nationalist Lebanese relationship, the
Palestinian-Syrian relationship or the national'~;t Lebanese-Syrian relationship.
We should never forget that the primary beneficiary of these explosions and the
moving hand of the agents is the Zionist enemy which has the green light from the
Reagan administration.
[Question] Are the new onslaughts, the Saudi project and the Palestinian stand
- related to each other?
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[Answer] I do not see a specific relationship between the Saudi project~ and the
I'alestinian stand. We as Palestiniaxis have not given our opinion on this project.
'The rumors being circulated regarding our position are part of the ps,ychological
war which the hostile forces are trying to wage to fragment Arab ranks more than
they are divided now.
_ [Question] How would you describe Palestinian-Syrian relations in light of the
recent developments after the ste~dfastness conference and prior to the Arab
summit to convene in Rabat?
- [Answer] We are going through a battle of life and death. Our Zionist e~nemy
is waging a war against the existence of the Palestinian people and the Arab
nation. In light of our understanding of the nature of this battle and our
observation of developments in thz Arab reality we are experiencing, the importance
of the unity of Palestinian-nationalist Lebanese-Syrian struggle has deepened
to confront U.S.-Zionist machinations which realize that these combined forces
f~rm a solid confrontation base.
[Question] Do you exFect an Israeli invasi~n of southern Lebanon? What are the
chances of such an invasion happening?
[Answer] ~ince the cease-fire, the Zionist leadership has been paving the way
for the next aggression through a series of steps begun by Menahem Begin in his
memorandum to Haig and through the United Nations, ~.n this memorandum, Begin
claimed that the PLO is reorganizing its forces in the south and that this
constitutes a violation of the cease-f ire. He also claimed that the Palestinian
forces are massing men, arms and materiel and that more than 20 tons of equipment
and arms have arrived in the south.
- Whate~*er the circumstances, the Palestinian and Lebanese leaderships are closely
watching the constant possibility that the Begin government, backed by the
United States, is seeking to score a military victory that will be part of the
victories and gains which liegin wants to crush revolutionary presence and carry
out the autonomy projects.
[Question] The PLO has requested an emergency Arab suuuait be held. Lebanon as
well has moved in this direction. Are you in agreement with Lebanon on this
- step?
[Answer) We support an Arab summit that would discuss the main issue: The Zionist
danger threatening Lebanon and the Arab homeland. As far as we know, however, the
Lebanese Government's request is restricted to a discussion of the southern
Lebanese issue. We believe that this issue is part of the major issue that should
be discussed at future Arab summits. We do not think we are in conflict with the
Lebanese stand on this point.
- [Question] What is the Palestinian view on Prince Fahd's initiative? Some have
said that it embarrassed the Syrians and encircled the Palestinians.
_ ~
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~Answer] (Jokingly) Why was the question p~sed in this fashion? I can only
d~scuss thc Palestinian viewpoint.
[Questionj All right, as yau wish.
[Answer] A great deal has oeen said about the initiative. We have declared on
various occasions and at press conferences that we consider it extremely i.mportant,
~articularly regarding the condem~ation of the Americans who support the Zionist
aggression. We said that this condemnation should be transformed into a loud
Arab cry against the United States which is the Zionist enemy's political umbrella
and which is extending to this enemy all forms of material aid and backing.
Regarding the points raised by Prince Fahd, we announced that the Pa~estinian
~ommand ins~itutions will study these points and give an opinion on them. At
this juncture, I shall make an essential remark which should be obvious: The
_ Zionisr enemy has rejected the Saudi proposals and the United States has refrained
fram ~;iving a frank opinion on them; rather, reports by x~ews agencies ~ake us
sense that there are U.S. reservations regarding tiiese proposals whic'~ are closer
~o rejection than acceptance. Therefore, we believe that the stands announced
by the United States and the Zionist enemy place this initiati~~~ at present in
the relam of stagnation,
At any rate, we as Palestinians have the Palestine Na~ional Council's resolutions
which have specified the landmarks of the solution of our issue and what is
compatible and what is incompatible with these landmarks. The Palestinian revolu-
tion will express its opinion in light of these resolutions.
[Question] I do not understand. Are you with or against the initiative and why?
[Answer] We have not yet announced our official stand, particularly regarding the
~oint dealing with indirect recognition of Israel through recognition of the right
of the states in the region to live in peace.
[Question] There are those who say that the Saudi plan is the springboard for
a post-Camp David stage. What is your opinion?
[Answer] This is not a case of what we or our Arab leaderships raise because the
issue depends upon the srands of the international quarters and the U.S. stand
_ which intransigently opposes all the Pal~stinian people's legitimate rights.
Frankly, what is required froin our Arab leaderships is not only to raise the
minimum but also to raise the principles ~hich the masses of the Arab nation
aspi.re to achieve, principles which safeguard and insist on Palestinian rights
and wt~icl~ are founded on the basis of recognition of the Palestinians' rights to
self-determination and establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
[Question] How do you assess French-Pales~inian relations following the Socialist
Party's assumption of power?
[Answer] The Frencti president made many promises when he was a presidential
candidate. With his assumption of power, several steps emerged whcih were then
considered prejudicial to Israel, such as the French stand on the Arab boycott
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of Israel and the declaration that companies and plants which adhere to thz boycott
= regulations will not be subsidized by the government. There was also Claude
Cheysson's announcement on the PLO's representa~ive status and that it is not the
sole representative of the Palestinian people. Despite this, we look forward to
a development of the French stand through the Socialist government. In the coming
stage, we hope that the French stand will be more advanced than ir~ the previous
stages in order to clearly overcome all causes for hesitation toward the Palestinian
right to self-determination and establishment of an independent state.
[Question] Do you still have hopes in the European initiative about which there
has been a lot of talk?
[Answer] We believe that our move and political struggle make it incumbent upon
us to be in constant contact with European quarters in order to develop their
stands. The stand taken in Venice (the European summit conference) was a step
forward, although it was followed by hesitant stands by some European circles in
ttieir contacts within the framework of the EEC.
[Question] Have you been informed that Khomeyni's Iran is dealing with Israel
aeainst th~ Arab country of Iraq?
[Answer] tde in the Palestinian revolution have defined our stand on the Iraqi-
Iranian war, hoping that it would end as soon as possible. We hoped that the
bloodletting and the sapping of resources in the Iranian-Iraqi arena would end,
for we consider that the Palestinian cause and~the conflict with the Zionist enemy
needs these squandered resources and potentials.
[QuestionJ Facts, however, have dashed these hopes?
[Answer] This is our viewpoint. We need the Iranian revolution on the side of
the Arab nation. The reality in Iraq and Iran is painful to the entire Arab
- nation. We are still hoping and talking to our brothers in Iraq and Iran. We
are exerting all effort to stop this bloodletting. We are convinced that the
battle with the Israeai enemy needs all efforts and from all directions.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WA"I'AN AL-ARABI
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IRAQ
HAMMADI ATTACKS U.S. ROLE IN MIDEAST
PM061203 London THE TIMES in English 5 Oct 81 p 8
[Report by Richard Owen: "Iraqi Minister Attacks Arab States' Policies"]
[Text] Mr Sadun Hammadi, the Iraqi foreign minister, yesterday criticized moderate
Arab states for pursuing pro-Western policies which he said were likelX to cause
internal unrest and thus create-further instability in the region.
Speaking at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Mr Hammadi singled
out Egypt as a country whose leadership had created widespread discontent through
~ts mistaken commitment to Camp David, but added that President al-Sadat was not
alone among Arab leaders in tying himself to the West against the wishes of his
people.
Mr Hammadi was especially critical of those Arab states which had strong links
with the United States. Since the Reagan administration--"in so far as I can
understand their policy"--had emphasized the need for a Western military presence
in the Middle East while relegating the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian
question to a secondary role. Iraq did not approve of Soviet attempts to dominate
the region, but was equally opposed to American efforts.
The ~'lmerican idea of a"strategic consensus," he said, was built on a fallacy.
Western leaders were wrong if they believed they could form alliances with both
Israel and the Arab nations at *he same time. He later clarif ied this to mean
that if Western coun.tries wanted to develop good relations with the Arabs, they
would have tc show readiness to make Israel "feel the pinch."
Mr Hamma~di, who earlier paid a courtesy call on Mr pouglas Hurd, the minister of
state at the Foreign Office, said West Europe should put pressure on both Israel
and the United States to acknowledge the ~rab viewpoint.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, [198.1]
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L IBYA
AL-TURAYKI DISCUSSES 6TH FLEET MOVEMENTS, MUBARAK
_ JN111423 London REUTER in English 1022 GMT 11 Oct 81
[Text] Damascus, 11 Oct (REUTER)--Libyan Foreign Secretary (Minister)
'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki Y~as said U.S. Sixth Fleet movements in the
Mediterranean will only make the Arabs more determined to foil the U.S.-
sponsored Camp David peacA accords between Israel and Egypt.
llr. ~11-Turayki told reporters after meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister
'Abd al-lialim Kha3dam and Palestinian leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) here
yesterday that the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat should
- be a"lesson to American imperialism."
(The official Libyan news Agency JANA, monitored in Beirut, said today had
b een declared a holiday in Libya to enable citizens to express th eir joy
at the death of President al-Sadat.)
Dr al-Turayki, who arrived in Syria yesterday, went to the Mediterranean city
of Latakia t~day to deliver a message from Libyan leader. Muammar al-Qadhdh afi
to President Hafiz al-Asad on developments in the Arab world.
He said his talks with Mr Khaddam and Abu Iyad concentrated on the "importance
of tne Arab role in strengthening the struggle to remove the traces of Camp
David."
Syria, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Algeria and South Yer.ien
are members of the steadfastness and confrontation front, which is strongly
opposed to the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel.
Dr al-'rurayki said Husni Mubarak, who has been nominated to succeed President
al-Sadat, was "apparently trying from the beginning of the road to be an
extension to al-Sadat's tren~."
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LIBXA
AL-QADHDHAFI WELCOMES AFGHAN OFFICIAL
PM011345 London THE GUARDIAN in English 1 Sep 81 p 4
[Dispatch by Martin Walker: "Afghan Minister Is Welcomed by L3bya"`]
[Text] Tripoli--Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has cleared the final hurdle which
separated liim from the Soviet block--his opposition to the Russian inv~sion
of Afghanistan--by welcoming an official representative of the Kabul government
to Libya's 12th anniversary festivities in Tripoli this week.
Mr Sullmar La}�gig, a member of the Afghan Revolutionary Co~an Cou~cil and
minister of tribal affairs, was welcomed to Tripoli and made a formal statement
of praise.
Colonel. al-Qadhdhafi's welcome to the Afghan minister reverses the stand that
Libya had maintained against the Soviet presence in that country. On his state
visit to Russia earlier this year, Colonel al-Qadhdhaf i~ad embarrassed hts
hosts by criticising yet again tneir military intervention in a Muslim country.
That visit, which had been expected to lead to an invitation to Russia to
arrange a regular naval presence in Libyan ports, was seen as something of a
failure because of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's stand on Afghanistan. The Soviet
Union has since made an effort to mollify the Libyans by deploying diplomats and
officials from their own Muslim re~ublics. Mr Arstanbek Duysheyev, the president
of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, and vice-chairman of the Soviet
Presidium, has been one of the Soviet officials who has helped to persuade
Colonel al-Qadhdhafi that Moscow should not be seen as an enemy of Islam.
Mr Duysheyev is also now in Tripoli for this week's celebrations.
Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's acceptance of the Soviet-backed Afghan regime follows
last week's friendship treaty between Libya and the pro-Soviet states of
L'thiopia and South Yemen. The communique of that treaty made no criticism
of: the Russian presence in Afghanistan, hailed the socialist block for "their
st~~~port oF liberation struggles around the world," and cor.demne3 "the forces
of imperialism and reaction" for meddling in Afghan affairs.
Libyan officials yesterday refused to comment on s~agges~ions that the visit of
the Afghan leader liad been arranged only at the last minute. But diplomatic
ob:;ervers in Tripoli saw it as yet another sign of the change in Libyan toreign
policy tliat the confrontat ion with the U.S. 6th Fleet in zhe Gulf of Sirte has
inspired.
CUPYKIGHT: Guardian Newspapersr Limited, 1 September 1981
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INLY
MOROCCO
ARREST OF PREVIOUSLY IMMUNE BOUABID DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Frencl: No 1081, 23 Sep 81 pp 18-21
[Article by Hamid Barrada: "Why King Hassan II Arrested Bouabid"j
[Text] In one of the most stirring episodes of the Algerian war, Jean-Paul Sartre
openly defied government authority. Certain aides to the preajdent of the French
- Republic, arguing that the law was equal for everyone, suggested indicting the
philosopher, but De Gaulle settled the matter in his sovereign manner: "fJne does
not arrest Voltaire!"
- A comparison is not justification. Abderrahim Bouabid is not Jean-Paul Sartre.
King Hassan II is not De Gaulle. And yet, between the first secretary of the USFP
(Socialist Union of Popular Forc.es) and the Moroccan monarch, there have always
existed relations governed by an unwritten law but one that was perfectiy verifi-
~ able, according to which the leader of the opposition enjoyed absolute immunity.
At one time or another, the leaders of his party of any importance have all tasted
prison or been forced to go into exile, when they were not assassinated. He re-
mained untouched.
_ On 16 Jul.y 1963, aCter one of the many conspiracies that made the headlines, the
Oufkir police proceeded to arresk all the leaders of the UNFP [National Union
of Popular ForcesJ (now the USFP) when they were at a meeting. Bouabid was with
them, but he was immediately released as soon as the king learned of the "mistake."
Hassan II had been inspired, for less than 2 years later, in March 1965, the Casa-
blanca riots broke out and the monarch found an interlocutor t.o help him out of a
bad spot: Abderrahim Bouabid. With a few variations, the same scenario has been
repeated throughout the entire tormented history of independent Morocco.
This mutual understanding cannot be explained by somP unswerving friendship between
ttie c~l~ief of statc and the leader of the opposition. The two men have fought one
a~iother relentlessly, to such a point that political life has often taken on the
aspect of a singular duel between them. ~ut it is as if whatever the cost, each
one were scrupulcusly careful not to go b~.yond certain limits. The moderation of
one would be answered by the proper measure of the other. Everything separates
thc socialist from the monarch, but they have the same sense of government.
Historians may one day say what the unsteady Moroccan democracy owes to what must
be cal.l.ed the conflictive alliance between Hassan II and Abderrahim Bouabid.
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Observers may henceforth affirm that with the arrest of the leader of the opposi-
tion, an era has come to an end. What happened to cause the king to break with
a deeply rooted tradition and order the questioning, then th~ charging, of
Abderra-
him Bouabid? What are the consequences of the apparently incomprehensible decision?
The very coz~ditions of the arrest of the leader of the opposition are rather sur-
prising. Obviously, it was decided no longer to spare a man who enjoyed the af- ~
fection of Muhammed V and who receives a certain amaunt of consideration abroad
as well as in the interior of the country.
At 2230 hours on Tuesday, 8 September, they rang the doorbell at his ccrnfortable
(not luxurious) home in the Agdal district of Rabat. The unknown caller refused
to reveal his identity but demanded to speak with "Si Abderrahim." Bouabid finally
went to the door himself. He.found himself facing three strapping men who said
they were from the police and asked him to go with them. Without further details
- or any arrest warrant, Bouabid refused to obey. They knocked him about, tried to
- put handcuffs on him and finally overcame his resistance. However, they did not
take him away by force.
Najat, Bouabid's wife, telephoned friends to warn them in the meantime and bother-
some witnesses rapidly gathered before the house on Rue Michlifane. The family con-
tinued to telephone. At one time, the op~rator came on the line: "Please hang up;
- the minister of interior wants to speak with Si Abderrahim." Driss Basri was soon
on the other end of the line, but the three policemen prevented Bouabid from speak-
ing with the all-potoerful minister. ~ One of them, wear.ing an overcoat, went info
- the living room to take the phone and was heard to say: "I am Merzak, from the
RG [exparsion unknown]. We have ordc~rs not to let him go b ack home." .
Bouabid still refused to get in one of the four Simca 1000's parked near his home.
He would only leave in the official red and white van of the National Police. It
was 2345 hours. The police did not oppose his being accompanied by Mohamed Farouki.
The reyuest was not without misunderstandings: They had,confused the lawyer, who
is not unknown, with Mohamed Farkani, member of the Political Bureau of the USFP.
It was not until 0330 hours that they would admit their error and free Farouki.
Abderrahim Bouabid's questioning began immediately after his arrival at the Central
Police Station. The subje:ct of the crime was a communique f rom his party's
- Political Bureau. The party had been meeting since 1 September to study the pro-
posed referendum in ~he Sahara decided upon by the OAU in Nairobi on 24 and 25
- August and accepted by the king of Morocco (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1079). On Tuesday,
7 September, the USFP was planning to release a text in which it considered that
ttle Nairobi II resolutions, contrary to the official position, risked leading to
the abandonment of the Sahara. It recommended, in order to meet "the grave and
- real perils threatening the territorial integrity of our country," a"democratic,
popular referendum, in keeping with the constitution."
In sum, the USFP wanted a referendum in all of Morocco on the timeliness of a
reterendum in the Sahara. It was this position that provoked the curiosity of the
police. T]Ze leader of the opposition told them this in substance: "We believe
that the decisians made at Nairobi II go against the interests of Morocco. We
hope we are mistaken, but when dangers threaten a nation, it is better to be
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mist:~ken than to remain silent." His "interlocutors" had concerns that were not
so lofty, of the "Who wrote the text, who typed it?" sort. "As first secretary,
I am responsible for everything," the prisoner stated.
At abuut 0530 hours, Bouabid was taken to USFP headquarters to verify that the
text in question was indeed being printed and stored there. An hour later, the
police would return alone to seize typew~iters, mimeograph machines and other
copiers.
In the afternoon, the first secretary of the USFP was notified that he was being
charged with violating the government's foreign security (Article 188 of the Penal
Code). He risked a prison term of 5 to 30 years in wartime, 1 to 5 years in
peacetime. Less than 24 hours after his questioning (at precisely 1700 hours on
Wednesday, 9 September), Abderrahim Bouabid was consigned to E1-Laalou Prison.
At the same time, Mohamed Mansour, also a member of ttie Political Bureau of the
USFP and one of the most prestigious figures of the resistance under the Protec-
torate, was arrested in Casablanca. The other party leaders were actively sought.
Mohamed Forkani the Yeal one was arrested. Mohamed Lyazghi and Mohamed Aziz
Lahbabi could not be found. On Thursday, 10 September, they went to the police of
their own accord. This did not stop the search because expert sleuths would try
to put their hands on them by searching Bouabid's home.
Two days after the questioning of the leader of the opposition, all his colleagues
in the Political Bureau still in Morocco (Ab derrahmane Youssoufi, Moulay Mehdi
Alaoui and Dr Abdellatif Benjelloun were abroad) were therefore under lock and
key. By 100U hours on Friday, 11 September, they were to be tried according to the
- flagrante delicto procedure. '
The trial did not immediately go well for the accusers. The court, made up of
young judges, was in a tight corner before the black wave of the defense. Some
200 lawyers from the four corners of the country had donned their robes! In a
dramatic move, the prosecutor announced that he would not apply Article 188 (vio-
l.ation of foreign ~ecurity). Only the dahir of 29 June 1935 (see below) would
be involced. Conseyuently, the accused risked no more than. 3 months to 2 years
in prison.
The deEense refused to bring up procedural questions. "When Abderrahim Bouabid
is in the dock, the form becomes absurd," remarked Seddiki, aide to the leader
- of ttic opposition and pres3.dent of the barristers of Rabat. At the outset, they
had not even taken the troub].e to ask for the 1lfting of parliamentary immunity for
deputies Lyazghi and Mansour. Another dramatic move: The court decided to
"delay the trial for two weeks to study the file." The defense retained its ad-
vantage: "We could demand provisional fr~edom for our clients, but wi~h their
approval, we abstain!"
In this test of force, it was without a~.oubt the opposition that won the first .
heat. Bouabid had constantly been depressed in r.ecent months and had evex? "gotten
_ old" (he was only 61). According to all witnesses, he was in top form after his
arrest: "That is the best thing that could have happened to him!" his close
f.riends affectionately snid. Referring to the ad~oining cells where he was held
with his four comrades, he quipped: "They reserved a suite for us!"
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This man, who has remained faithful to his humble origins, only seems to be at ~
ease in adversity. The definite idea he has of his worth, combined with a certain
idea he has of Morocco, clashes with the role of eternal opponent in which the
Palace has managed to confine him. For over 20 years, heading a left whose
generous fights vie with adventurous wanderings, he has repeatedly repaired the
mistakes of his friends, limited the damage done to his party. He has never been
paid back.
In fact, the entire USFP has paradoxically regained 1.ts freedom of movement since
it has again experienced prison, for both good and bad reasons. This party,
- rcoted in the armed struggle against the Protectorate, is more suited to heroism
and martyrdom than to the patient work of education and organization required by
its sociodemocratic choices. It is not any accident that the slogan that most
f.requently emerges f.rom its depths is an appeal for "perseverance" (Samidoun-
Samidoun). It should be noted that the practices of the government as attested
to by the blind repression of the June riots in Casablanca as well as the circum-
stances surrounding Bouabid's arrest do not facilitate the reconversion of minds
to democratic legality.
The recent evolution of the Sahara question has not brought the government closer
to the opposition. If one carefully reads the USFP communique on Nairobi II, one
notes that the leaders of the party wonder, with sincerity if not with anguish,
whether King Hassan II has not made concessions that carry him too far, if, very
specifically, the country is not going to lose its Sahara after the heavy sacri-
fices it has made to get it back. ~
Actual.ly, if it abides scrupulously by the OAU decisions and the known or fore-
seeable intentions of the antagonists, it is to be feared that the referendum
may lead to the secession of part of the territory heretofore considered as
- the nation's. At any rate, it is the first time, to our knowledge, that the re-
sults of a vote linked to the history of decolonization has been ignortd. Nairobi
succeeded in the eyes of the OAU because 3.ts decisions are black and white. Either
the glass is ttalf empty or half full. '
As Hassan II does, one may also emphasize the real advantages for his country
(maintenance of the Moroccan administration and army over the disputed territory,
Cor examnle) or join with the USI'P in emphasizing the equally real disadvantages
(such as the interim administration or the principle of allowing refugees from
neigliboring countries to participate in the voting). .One may bet that Hassan II,
whose savoir-faire no longer has to be demonstrated, will finally win out and keep
the Sahara, bur. it is also permissible to speculate on the opposite ~ossibility.
It is a matter of faith or opinions.
But why do differences of opinion on the question of the Sahara, which divides
_ the political class and which is not a recent one for example, ~he opposition
had recommended breaking with Algeria since 1975, while the king systematically,
and coura~cously, took it upori himself to avoid the~irreparable suddenly give
rise to a bitter conf.rontation? Why has the famous sacred union collapsed like a
castle oE sand? ~ ~
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The answer is quite simply because more than the Sahara and Morocco is involved.
In other words, if it dealt with the regions of the south colonized by Spain, the
sacred union has not, strictly speaking, gone beyond that very limi~ed domain.
And in the long run, it resulted artificial, especially since with the extension
of the Saharan conflict (it has lasted 6 years), problems such as the high cost
o~ living became more important, in the eyes of the poor.
� Under such conditions, the socialisL- opposition, whose popular following remains
real, could not, unless it contradicted itself, remain insensitive to the concerns
of the majority of the people. Convinced in all good faith that tioroccan diplomacy
committeri an error in putting its finger into the spokes of the OAU, having nothing
more to expect from a partner that gives it a figurehead role in the institutions,
and fearing it was witnessing the last days of the policy of liberalization, the
USIP was quite naturally willing to seize the first opportunity to embarras~ the
government. Nairobi II provided it with that opportunity. It was a good tactic.
That was all the government needed to initiate hostilities, ior Abderrahim Boua-
bid's arrest has no other meaning.
How far will they be pushed? In our opinion, not too far. "This regime neither,
cuts otf heads nor settles problpms," it has judj.ciously been said of the Moroccan
monarchy. It should be added that despite the new determination it now shows,
the socialist opposition also shares this peaceful r- and reassuring nonchalance.
Are democracies not built on imperturbability and tolerance?
One does not arrest Voltaire! But if one does arrest him, one can fairly well
release him! .
"Whosoever Law"
The Dahir of 29 June 1935 by virtue of which Abderrahim Bouabid and his comrades
are being tried is very "popular" in Morocco. It is commonly known as the "whoso-
ever law" because of the indefinite pronoun that punctuates the text. It was im-
posed on Mul~amed V by the colonial authorities and its abrogation has been futilely
demanded since independence.
The official translation reads: "In all countries, the concern for maintaining
public order, more essential than ever to restoring the economic situation, justi-
fies new measures aimed at affirming trust. For some time, the French Government
has taken timely measures in the possessions or colonies directly under its
authority.
"()ur Majesty, concerned for maintaining order, tranquillity and security in his
empire, in trusting cooperation with the protective nation, has deemed that these
new requirements had to be accompanied by appropriate legislation. This dahir
is for that purpose.
"Article: Whosoever, in any place and b~~ any means, provokes active or passive
resistance to application of the laws, decrees, regulations or orders from the
public authority;
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"Whosoever incites to disorders or manifestations or provokes them;
~
"Whosoever engages in an action aimed at disturbing order, tranquillity and secur-
ity will be subject to imprisonment for 3 months to 2 year~ and a fine of S00 to
2,000 francs, or only one of these two penalties. The penalty of local banishment
- may also be pronounced."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
11,464
CSO: 4519/3
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SAUDI ARABIA
FOREIGDI MINISTER liRGES U.S.-PLO CONTACTS
JN181322 London REUTER in English 1247 GMT 18 Sep 81
- (Report by Paul Eedle]
[Text] Bahrain, 18 Sep (REUTER)--Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud
al-Faysal urged the United States today to establish contacts with the leadership
of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as an essential move towards
Middle East peace.
In a telexed reply to questions from REUTERS, he also said contacts between the
U.S. and the PLO already had achieved results in South Lebanon last Jul.y, endir:~
2 weeks of increasingly bitter f ighting between Israelis and Palestinian
guerrillas. ~
Prince Sa'ud made the statement as Crown Prince Fahd was due in London in the
latest stage of a major Saudi initiative to end the decades-old Arab-Israeli
conflict.
He added: "The ceasefire in southern Lebanon was successful because it was worked
out between the parties directly involved, i.e. the PLO and Israel, through the
valuable mediation of the United States.
"We believe tnat this method should be repeated in the discussions aim3ng at a
just and durable peace in the region. Anyway, this is the oniy realistic approach
to solve this problem."
A senior U.S. official said last July the U.S. was tryin~ to develop the shaky
ceasefire into a broader peace settlement.
The Saudi foreign minister stated today: Peace in the Middle East can only be
achieved through the full and equal participation of the PLQ in all the discussions
' aiming at the solution of the Middle East and Palestine problems.
"L'nited States recognition of this fact is absolutely essential, and we hope the
U.S. Government will realise this and be~;in establlshinb contacts with the PLO
leadership."
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Saudi Arabia launched its peace initiative last month when Prince Fahd called on
the U.S. to recognise the PLO. He also listed eight principles for a Middle East
settlement, including the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as
its capital and the right of all countries in the region to live in peace.
In addition to Prince Fahd's talks in Europe--he already has seen Frenc:~ President
Francois Mitterrand--Saudi Arabia is looking to the United l~ations and the next
- Arab summit, probably in Morocco next November, for support for its initiative.
~ Prince Sa'ud said today his country wanted Prince Fahd's eight principles to be
~ the "basis and f ramework of a single resolution to be adopted and implemented
by the iJnited Nations and especially the permanent members of the Security
Council."
Saudi Arabia's f ive partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council--Kuwait, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman and Bahrain--agreed earlier thi~ month to try
to rally other Arabs behind the plan at the forthcoming sumanit.
The public has been given few details of Prince Fahd's talks, which included
conversations with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig.
CSO: 4400/26
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SAL'DI ARABIA
YAI~IANI LAUNCHES NEW U.K. MAGAZINE
PM021129 London THE TIMES in English 1 Oct 81 p 14
[Report by Michael Horsnell under the general headline "The Times Diary": "With
a Little Help From Shaykh Yamani"]
[TeYt] A white rolls-royce and a fleet of Saudi Arabian Embassy cadillacs
outside the Cafe Royal did not exactly keep secret the arrival of the Saudi
Oil Minister Shaykh Yamani yesterday.
.In the empire room, with a bust of Napoleon in the background, Yamani held court;
not to warn of dreadful news at the petrol pumps but to confirm himself the
unf amiliar role of magazine columnist. The affable Yamani was bestowing a fa~~our
on his old friends Muhammad Salah ad-Din and Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Wazir by gracing
the launch of their new monthly glossy publication ARABIA, THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW.
He has written weighty pieces for the f irst two editions, which have already been
printed. 'The launch was delayed bec3use of the logistical problems of getting
globetrotting Saudi princes and eminent Islamic academics together as spea.kers.
In the event, the floor was awash with eminent Moslem scholars whose general
theme seemed to be to berate the West for the failures of its systems and values.
Yamani, of course, has no intention of taking up journalism as a fulltime career
but he did tell me the magazine had been established to inform the West about
developments in Islam. Later the oil minister, the soul of courCesy, put me right
on my well-meaning suggestion that he had helped finance the venture--he has not.
For those too impatient to obtain copies of ARABIA, I can reveal that Yamani's
articles are on the supply and demand of crude oil, and the affinities and
differences between Islam and Christianity. Though I fear the market for English-
language, Middle East orientated magazines in London may well be saturated, I
am sure the publication will not lack for finance or, indeed, continuity.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper.s Limited, [19~1]
cso: 44oo/z6
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SUDAN
ALIER COMMENTS ON WESTERN ROLE IN AFRICA
PM140820 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 5 Sep 81 p 11
[Undated interview with Sudanese Second Vice President Abel. Aiier by Dino
Frescobaldi: "What To Do To Counter 'al-Qadhdhafi.Storm
[Excerpt] Rome--"By sending his troops to Chad," Abel Alier said, "al-Qadhdhaf i
not only violated the principle of noninterference in other countries' internal
affairs, which lies at the root of the OAU charter. Are there conflicts in Chad?
Then they should be resolved by the people concerned, that is, by the country's
own inhabitants. The mere fact that Libyan forces are on our borders constitutes
improper interference and pressure. The Libyans are not in a position to invade
Sudan and we are capable of defending ourselves, but we see a grave threat in
Tripoli's behavior. Furtherntore, we know that other African governments are of
the same opinion."
As far as the Sudanese second vice president is concerned, however, the
al-Qadhdhaf i issue is only one aspect of Africa's troubled existence. Above all,
� al-Qadhdhafi must not constirute an excuse for the guilty conscience of the West,
particularly Europe. "Let us take the ~Tamibian problem," Abel Alier said:
"South Africa not only refuses to grant the country independence, ignoring the
peoples'righ~ and appeals from throughout the world, but even invades Angola.
Nevertheless, the United States refuses to condemn it, thus helping to discredit
the security council and facilitating Soviet policy in Africa. It is difficult
fox Atricans to understand such behavior. We say to the Europeans: You are
worried abaut Soviet penetration into Africa; well, start by using all the means
available to you and all your prestige to ensure recognition of the Namibian
people's right to self-determination. If Namibia is independent a~ if Angola
no longer feels threatened, the Soviet Union and Cuba will have no further
reason to run to their aicl."
[Question] But there are other conflicts in Africa, after all. In particular,
how do you view the recent agreement am~ng Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, which
tY~reatens to split Africa even more into rival camps and which seems to grip
Sudan in a vise?
[AnswerJ Sudan has and intends to maintain good-neighborly relations with
Ethiopia. We make no pronouncements about Ethiopia's internal system. We do
kr~uw, however, that the Ethiopian people are very proud of their independence.
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41e, therefore, believe that, once the problems of Eritrea and of relations with
Samalia have been r.esolved, they will be very pleased to free themselves of
any forms of interference.
You would like to know whether there is a solution to the Eritrean problem and
~ to the problem of Somalia, Ethiopi.a and Kenya. I do not want to go into
detail, partly to avoid interfering, but I must not omit to point out that Sudan
- resolved its domestic problems years ago through debate and the peaceful approach.
= We are convinced that if this method is encouraged by those in authority--I am
- referring to Europe and particularly to your country--the p~-oblems of the Harn
of Africa can be resolved, Thus the reasons for the Soviet presence in the area
~ will disappear. Roughly the same can be said about the other Africa.n conflict,
in the Western Sahara.
[Question] Can al-Qadhdhafi's destabilizing activity be stopped? How can Moscow
bc prevented from continuing to "fish in troubled waters" and to tak~ advantage
of AI-rican rivalries?
[Answer] There is only one piece of advice that I can give to Europe: Help
the African sacieties to free themselves from their most serious ills--poverty
anci famine.
COPYKIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 4528/2
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SUDAN
ENVOY TO CAIRO COMMENTS ON U.S. ARMS DECISION
PM131453 London THE TIMES in English 13 Oct 81 p 6
[Disgatch by Christopher Walker: "Khartoum Hails Arms Deal and Alignment With
U.S."]
[Text] Cairo, 12 Oct--The Sudanese Government today expressed satisfaction at
- America's decision to pump extra arms and money into the impoverished country
of 18 million people which seems destined to become the latest focal point for
superpower rivalry in Africa.
= In an interview with THE TIMES, Mr Ghasim Idris, first secretary of Sudan's
Embassy in Cairo said: "The arms are intended to defend our country against
the Libyans. Our relations with America are now getting very steady and we
have no reservations about the development. My government believes that the
Soviet Union is trying to get a foothold in the area."
- Mr ldris confirmed that a top-level team of American advisers had been dispatched
to Khartoum to negotiate the urgent delivery of American arms designed to help
the government of President Numayri to combat incrsasing Libyan bombing raids
from Chad into western Sudan.
It is understood that the arms package will include tanks, aircraft and possibly
a ground-to-air missile system. The Sudanese have been lobbying strongly for
such weapons ii Libyan aggression is to be countered.
The latest raid took place last Thursday, the first day of the Muslim f east of
the sarrifice and resulted .in a number of casualties when two villages were
bomb ed .
~ome foreign observers believe that President Numayri is taking a considerable
risk in allying tiimself so closely with the American concept of security in
the Middle East.
An immediate result is certain to be ft!rther isolation in the Arab world and
opposition in Sudan where the traditional hostility between the north and south
~f the country has been exacerbated by the discovery of oil.
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- Like tt~e late PreSident al-Sadat President Numayri has come under increasing
internal pressure from Islamic opposition groups, and concern in Washington
about ttie stability of the government is one reason why the United States
has been so quick to respond.
While al-Sadat arrested about 16,000 of his countrymen last month in a purge
of religious and political opponents, a little earlier President Numayri
ordered ttie arrest oE about 10,000 Sudanese.
President Niiria.yri's internal difficulties have Ueen increased by the country's
acute financial situation, with estimates of its short-term f inancial needs
of anything up to 1,OOOm pounds. The Reagan administration has pledged
$200m (lllm pounds) for the next financia'1 year, half of which is earmarked
Lor military sales.
Guropean observer5 interpret the American decision to provide such i.mmediate
zind visible support to Sudan as the latest manifestation of the domino theory
so fami] i