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JPRS L/98~3
2 July 1981
S~b-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 729
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JPRS L/9823
_ 2 July ].981
.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 729
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- Western, Eaet Sloc Trade in Africa Compared
(William Gutteridge; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81).~ 1
New African 011 'Giantaf
(Philippe Simonnot; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 May 81)0 5
- BENIN
Benin Four Years Later
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 May 81) 8
Kerekou Releases Some Detainees
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 13 May 81) 11
CAME ROO~N
Briefs
Victoria Refinery Inauguration 13
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPU9LIC
Briefs
French Military Withdrawal Postponed 14
QiAD
B rie fe
Cyclotchad Operation 15
- EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Briefs
Delay in Pro~e ct Implementation 16
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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GAMBIA
Grim View of World Baaik Report Given
(Nana Hum.asi; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) ..............................0 17
KENYA
~ountry Drags Feet on Energy Cr~ch
(Shabanji Opukah; NEW AFRIGAN, Jun 81),0 19
MAIAWI
Budget Showe Deficit for First Time Since Independence
(MARCEiES TROPICA.UX ET MEDITERRANffidS, 22 May 81) . 21
NIGER
Food Production (buld Exceed Population Growth Rate
(Narta Humaei; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81)...~.o 23
Briefs
_ Loan Guarantee 25
Niamey Water Supply Probleme 25
NIGERIA
Abu~a Offers Interesting Investment Prospects
(MAR~ES T1iQPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEIIdS, IS May 81) 26
Companies ~xert Pressure To Reduce Crude Oil Prices
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 May 81) 28
Briefa
Repayment of Foreign Debt 29
Promulgation of 1981 Budget 29 ~
Oil Di.ecuseions With Iran 29
3oviet Cooperation 30
011 ~roduction Cutback 30
Fish Constanption 30
Trade A.grezment With GDR 31
Co tton Importe 31
Export of Bottles 31
SENE GAL
Briefs
Aid to Indus try 32
Presa Agreement With 2raq 32
Saudi Gift 32
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TAN ZANIA
Nation Said. To Be Facing Serious Food Shortage
(NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) 33
ZAIRE
Legislation Regulating Hydrocarbons Industry Enacted
(MARQiE~: TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 May 81) 34
Inga Industrial Free Zotie Establiahed
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 May 81) 35
Inettuctions To Transfer Remuneration of Expatriatea Detailed
(MAR~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 May 81) 38
Briefs
Diam~nd Marketing 40
Railraad Renovation 40
ZAMBIA
Briefs
Saudi Princa's Visit 4I
Purchase of French Vehicles 41
ZIMBABWE
Mugabe Handling of wnites Assessed
~ (Albert Mawarire; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) 42
- c -
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INTER-AFRICAN A~'FAIRS
- WESTERN, EAST BLOC TRADE IN AFRICA COMPARED
London NEW AFRICAN in Engliah No 165, Jun 81 pp 4a-41
[Article by William Gutteridge~
~Text~
THE PRONOUNCED tendency not only In the latter case there aeemed to be
in South Africa and in former white little dietinction in econqmic relation- ~
Rhodeeia, but in some parta of the shipe with the USA, the USSR or the
inuatrisliaed Waet, to equate ideological United Kingdom - the largest purchas-
rhetoric with communiet activity and ers. They were all similarly ausceptible
connectiona, has clearly been counter over a long period to fluctuationa in
producLive. aupply rather than demand.
It has not only made what once was With the posaible exception of Tan-
termed "the godlese faith" attractive to zaaia, W+hich did manage ta diversify its
diseident nationalista and others, but it range of expoits to the USSR for a time,
has distorted commerical and investment the effect of Soviet bloc trade on Afr'.can
judgments. countries has usually been to increase
The emergence of avowedly Marxi~t- their dependence on a single product. As
Leniniat atatea like Guinea-Biaeau, a result ofSoviet seaiatance, for example,
Angola�ansl Mozambique hae made little Guinea he~e expanded bauxite mining at
difference to Eaet-West proporatione of Kindia and at the s.ame time become
trade with Africa. The 9oviet bloc etill much tnore heavily relianS on the sales of
accounte for only flve per cent of the what i~ by no means a ~carce mineral.
contiruntal total. The 8oviet Union ie not free either
from the woree habite of Weetern multi-
~ 8eav~1 Y~i=tt . national companiea who are often
9 charged with putting too great an
The m~ority of exporte from Af~ica to emphaeie on primary producta. In some
Eastern Europe are food~tuffe, and the caeee there has been undercutting of
recent expaneion of erade between Afri- locally proceeaed gooda by other countries
can etatea eeems to have been at the ueing raw materiuls from the same
expenee of Soviet bloc trade. source. Poland was not popular with
Nor i~ it true to eay that what auch Tanzania for buying up wattle bark and
trade etill ~scks in quantity it hae in any proceesing it for its own and other needs.
way made up for by ite qualitative Induatrially also there have been
characterietia, problems. EasteY~n EuroFe has found
Centratly planned economiee might iteelf reatricing imp~rt~ uf, for example,
have been expected, particularly if they African canned gooda on grounds of poor
conduct their bueinesa without ueing qvality - expensi~ely produced from
convertible currency, to provide etable uneconomicaasemblylinea inSovietbuilt
markete avoiding wiid fluctuatione in canneriee. This seema to have been one
commodiLy pricee. Thia hae not been the source of friction with 3omalia. The tying
caN, whathar with Tanzanian coffee or of 3oviet credit to particular projects and
siwl or with Ghanaian cocoa, purchaees hae in a?iumber of cases - in
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NUR OFF'I('IAI, II~N; ()NI.Y
the metallurgical induatry in Algeria
and in Guinea, fo- instance- left African
countries diseatiefied with defects in the
~ineY'Y supplied.
rndeed, the Czech ~~hamber of Com-
merce, first in 1977, has not been ~lone in
warning of the need to be more competi-
tive. In general from Ghana in the 1960's
onwards, and with the exception ofthe oil
- producing countries on the Mediterra-
nean, the conerols imposed by centrally
planned economies and the limitatione of
rigid bilateral trade arrangements with
long term credits have not worked in
favour of Slack Africa.
Free Enterpriae
Nor, it muet be said, does the Soviet Union seem particularly to have benefited,
because it has not necessarily acquired the most appropriate gooda from Africa
competitively priced.
In the same period the Republic of South Africa, though subject to boycott,
covertly, seems to have increased its trade with Black Africa, precisely because
of the free enterprise nature of its economy and the needs of its own diverse
population, by supplying appropriate cheap consumer goods.
To some exteat, ae the earlier experi- Soviet pricing policies baeed on the
ence of Guinea-Biesau,lV~ali and Ghana, concept of "equivalent exchange" are
and more recently Angola and Mozambi- regarded es no more satiafactory for
que have shown, the tendency of Eeatern p~~ ~an thoae of multinationals
Europe to impoae ite development models insisting on off-loading the full effecte of
on African statea has been critical. inflation. There ia little difference,
Weetern governmente and multi- either, in the effects of indebtedneas.
nationals have aleo been guilty but they Zambia has been spending 30 per cent of
eeem to have reeponded a little more the proceede of its exports to repay the
flezibly to local circumetgncee. 8oviet West, Guinea 26 per cent of overseas
ideology and rhetoric hae eeemed to bear earninge and Egypt coneiderably more to
little relation to local yeed~, The recent ~ repay the 8oviet Union.
demonetration in a BBC-TV pro~rrsmme
of connectiona between the U$$R and
South At~ica, at leset over diamo~d~ and ~~C~S~
plrtinum, ha~ eimply served fn Al~ican
t~erme to change a chara'e of irrelevancy
into one of hypocriry. Indaed, there hae been eome concern
A wedge hae been driven between about the $oviet Union trying to make
iderology atid economic ~elf�intere~t. It ir, exieting trade pay by the application of
moreover, likely that one concorn of the free enterpripe principlea and increasing
8oviet Union in relation to a nutaber of the foraign exchange content of credit.
key metalo, like chrome and vanadium, is The tougheet deals have been in Soviet
that her coets of production, not neceeoar- arme eales to Africa which grew so
ily tho~e primarily attributed to lnbour, rapidly in the periad 197b-80 that the
are much higher than tho~e of South purely commercial element in the sale
Afl~ica or Zimbgbwe while the quality of primarily of date weapons and equip-
the end product ie lowor. Thia reca.lle the ment ie now seen as predominant. Thia ia
traneactionr in Bhodesian chrome which in keeping with Ruasia's demox?etrable
the U38Rapparently indulged in in spite ability to help in time of conflict but her
of eanctione, even allegedly eupplying inndequacy in attempting to consolidate
the United 9tates. peace.
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Terms oftrade and credit whieh may or The implicstions of Soviet economic
may not actually turn out to be relationships with Africa are many and
unfavourable are one thing. Exploitation related to unfulfilled political aspira-
is another. tions. There is no doubt that few states in
Mozambicans readily recall the sale by have established a political order
Aeroflat of diacount air tickets on the entirely satisfactory to the Soviet Union.
black market thus depriving their coun- The USSR has found itself, therefore,
try of much needed foreign exchange. collaborating with countries of diverae
Ironically, perhaps because of political ideologies.
dependence, auch cases have been most At first the Pan-Africanist aspirations
frequent in Marxist-Leninist etates. The of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, which did
Soviet-Guinea-Bissau joint fishing much for African aelf-confidence, and
enterprise provided for 85 per cent of the nzore rec~ntly the well defined national-
catch and the profits to be retained by the iam of Robert Mugabe anii othera have
Soviet Union. failed to conform to the deaired mould.
Where, as in Guinea under $ekou
~ Toure, the breach with the former
colonial power virtually forced upon the
`T.he lesson for Black country close liriks with the Soviet
Africa fs thef the interests Union, therelationship quickly began to
deteriorate and Soviet technical aid wae
of the people should be not alwaye what it seemed, even if the
placed before ~f~~f t%C8/ well-worn joke about the delivery of snow
- C01'1S~d9t8f101'1S' ploughr i~ wholly discounted.
The inadequacies of the Soviet Union
~ ~ in rel~tioa to African develc+~pment are
partly due to the etrength of the capitaliet
eco~omic otder, which dominates world
$imilarly in Moumbique there hae relationahipe. Ironically thie may par-
been little eoncern for fieh atock coneer- ticularly apply to countriea which`have
vation and re-investment and it was the achieved their independence aethe regult
Dutrh and not the Ruasiane who built of a guerrilla war.
ccld storage plante. It could almoat be It could well be argued that the
argued that there hae been an inherent devadation of Zimbabwe in such a war
difficulty in reconciling ideology with has temporalily deprived ite post-
profit and food aupply. independnence govemment of freedom of
Western multinationalsand the 3oviet action in terms of choice of eyetem. The
Union have atimulated the export of revival of agricultural, and moderniea-
mineral raw materials at the expenee of tion ofthe railways, to achieve a meaeure
local refining and processing reflected in of freedom from dependence on South
a tiny proportion (0.8 per cent) of the AfYi~a~ requirehuge sume which can only
world'e manufacturing output lxated in be mst by foreign investment. And
Bleck Afl~ica. foreiQn investmc:nt would be deterred by
It hae frepuent,ly been a matter of the expropriation of compe~nies, which
- comment why Ala~rie, with ite rocisliet miQht also cauee a flight of technicians.
development proQremme baoed on Soviet economic relntione with Africa
"indu~trinlieing induetries" (thst ie to th~n have had e chequered hietory,
bec~ure of the commitment of African
nay indurtrie~which generate acillarie~), ~eaderrhipe to their countries' economic
hae hnd clo~er economic relationB with d~,a~apment and in eome caeet actually
the West than mocwrchiet Morocco. The to eurvival.
reason ie eegestially because ehe hae
been able to eecure favourable netural ~+hQ le~~
ge~a and other deale with America baeed
on aecondary production of synthetic ~u~ qfrican maize in +he case of
reeins, methyl alcohol and hydrocarbone. ~bie'or South African technical assis-
In the view of the late Preeident tance in running Mozambique's railways
Boumedienne, Algerie oo far from selling. and harbours are symbols not only of
out to American capitaliam wae uaing it Afric,~n pragmatiem, but of the inability
to achieve th~ objectivee of the sceialist of the Soviet bloc in many cases to fill the
revolution. The Soviet model focusaing economic gaps.
on capital-inteneive heavy induetry The ability to adapt African e~ omies
would not have worked. to fit into the "Socialist trading commun-
3
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ity" has not been demonstrated. It is
ironic for the USSR that Zimbabwe,
which of .all A&ican states, inherited,
partly becawe of eanctione, the moet
saphisticated natwork of economic con-
trols and a eyetem of etate control and
nationel plarming, hae ao far rejected any
exclueive internntional relationehip.
' The lesaon for Black Africa ie that
individual atatee ehould seek their
economic independence by all meane -
and that in negotiating trade or invest-
ment, whether with East or West, the
direct intereets of their populations
' shou.ld be the firat consideration. This ie
more iunportant than political considera-
tions.�
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
, NEW AFRICAN OIL ''GIANTS'
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 36-37
~rticle by Philippe Simonno~
~ex~ A few l.arge exporters, generally members of OPEC, such
as Nigeria, Libya, or Algeria, and a majority of coun-
tries buying oil at the full price--up till now this
has been the eituation in Africa. It is changing. New
producers (particularly the Ivory Coast and Cameroon)
will see their economies disrupted in the short term.
Tomorrow~ others will follow: Ghana, and perhaps Cha.d.
Though still quiet, the African black gold rush is on.
A rush for African black gold? If rush there is, it is surprisingly dis-
creet. Perceptible only by indirect indications such as the influx of
businessmen and oilmen to the large hotels of Abidjan or pouala, the b~:ild-
ing of schools for the children of expatriate engineers or training facil-
ities for local labor, the expansion of refining capacities, and the cal-
culated indiscretions whispered in the ear of this or that journalist. As
for the oil companies, they are almost as silent as carps. Manifestly,
they have received from African ~overnments orders to say as little as
poesible.
Today, novertheless, the new African oil hit parade is incontestably headed
by the Ivory Coast and Cameroon (see below). Tomorrow's star will be Ghana.
Rumors
And the moat extraordinary rumors are beginning to circulate, as happens
whenever a government or firm wants to keep a secret. Thus Ivorian oil
production, which this year hardly reaches 10,000 barrels daily, or 500,000
tons yearly, could rise to 20 million tens before the end of the decade,
or even--by the most dArin$ forecasts--to 50 million tons (we recall that
thie latter figure corresponds to the present production of the Algerian
Sahara) .
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- Likewise Camer~on, which in 1981 will have extracted some 4 million tons--already .
a splendid figure, since its 1978 oil production was on:~y 600,000 tons--is
promised 10 mi.tlion by 1985 and--by the most venturesome seers--100 million
by 1g90. A new Nigeria! When oilmen's secrets are multiplied by those of
governments~ imaginations have free rein.
Prehistory ' _
Those recent discoveries are no surprise to geologists (JEUNE AFRIQUE no.
1010). All coastal countries on the Gulf of Guinea in fact have an oil vo-
cation. To explain it, we must go back to prehistory. Some '100 million
years ago, indeed, before the Atlantic finally severed Latin America from
- the African stock, a basin was formed there whose precious organic deposits
have been protected from stirring by ocean currents.
In the center of this immense deposit is Nigeria--and that prodigious gift
of nature, unequalled in Afriaa, constituted by the Niger delta--whose oil
producing capacity is '120 million tons. To the north stretch Liberia, the
Ivor�y Coast, Ghana, ~ogo, and Benin. To the south, Cameroon and An~ola.
Wedged between Nigeria and Gabon, Cameroon could not but have great hopes
for oil. Bn~ the ~ame could be said of Equatorial Guinea, ana '_ikewise of
the three enclaves separating the Ivory Coast from Nigeria--particularly
Ghana and Benin~ :yhich already produce nearly a million tons each per year.
If this oiI was in fact present~ it will be asked, why was it not discovered
- sooner? Here the economist can contribute his answers: the price of oil was
not high enough for oil companies to run the risks of costly prospecting in
seas of ever growing depth where deposits are assumed to be smal'!. And then,
it takes time. If we consider that it was the second oil shock, of 197$-79,
which gave the decisive impulse to the discovery of new African oil, we can
even be surprised at the speed of that discovery.
Luck
In fact, the first wells were drilled eome 10 years ago, perhaps not al.ways
with the needed perseverence. Many, it is true~ proved dry or insufficiently
attractive.~ Thus~ for example~ Elf-Aquitaine abandoned its prospecting in
the Ivory Coast after three uneuccessful wells had been dril.led. No luck:
the Po~th was to prove the good one~ and today Exxon and Phillips Petroleum
share ~he Ivorian gold minel But El.f and Tota~1. are both catching up in
Cameroon.
A11 thie~ we note, is taking place within one African oil "province." Three
othors exi~t on the continent: the north African province (Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt), already well explored, but which could still hold some sur-
priaes, even in Al~eria; the Cha.d basin, closed to exploration for the past
thrse years for political. reasons, but which oilmen today seek to approach
from the eouth--that is, at the Central Africari border; and finally the Zaixe
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basin; where a first well has been drilled. Considerin; that those two ba-
sins are still unknown quantities from the oil standpoint, the Gulf of Guinea
appears today as an easy stage in the history of African oil resources ex-
ploration, though only 3 years ago it was considered very risky.
Prudence
Does all this justify the secrecy surrounding African oil? Quite understand-
able is the concern shown by the governments of those countries td avoid the
negative effects which announcements of discoveries could have on development
efforts. We can only take satisfaction in their determination to reserve for
investment purposes the revenues froar black gold~ as is appaxently the case
in the Ivory Coast. ~xamples of other countries where the oil manna was fool-
ishl.y squandered serve to counsel wisdom.
That secrecy, however, does make for certain disadvantages. First, because
it cannot be perfect, and consequently $ives rise to all sorts of uncontrol-
~ lAble rumors which whet the appetites of intereeted parties. SPcondly, be-
cause wealth attracts wealth. For countries cruelly short of capital, no-
thing would be more convincing to financiers and other backers than depend-
able and accurate information. In the era when oil was entirely a capitalist
affair the companies, once certain of their discoveries, hastened to proclaim
- them from the housetops; their stocks rose on the exchange, and capital came
in a flood!
Calculations
Is there a fear that to appear less poor would result in a reduction of aid?
That would be a poor reckoning, insofar as aid-dispensing countries and agen-
cies have means o~ knowin~ exactly what the facts are, and since in any case
their contribut~on is stil]. but a pittance in proportion to anticipated oil
revenues.
In a word, the effects of this secrecy may well be more negative than posi-
- tive, insofar a~ it might appear, in the end, as a sign of governmental weak-
nesa.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
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BENIN
BENIN FOUR YEARS LATER
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May 81 pp 31-32
[Article by Ginette Cot: "Four Years Later"]
[Text] Repercussions from the mercenary aggressian organized
by Paris are still being felt. But 10 May seemed like a new
and bitter defeat for French imperialism.
Certainly, after the bitter failure of the mercentary aggression of 16 January
1977, and the indignation that it provoked everywhere, the Giscard Administration
was compelled by the force of circumstances to observe a more reasonable attitude
toward the People's Republic of Benin, which was "guilty," according to the
administration, of breaking with a neo-colonial status quo that had led the
country to a condj.tion of chronic instability and economic and financial
bankruptcy, to being committed, since September 1972, to a course of courage
and dignity.
In the face of irreversible evidence of this new course, de~onstrated by a
strong popular consensus, Paris seemed to have abandoned its plan of resorting
to further armed aggression, whether open or camouflaged. And since the meeting
of the Franco-Benineae ~oint high commisaion in May 1979, cooperation between
the two countriea had experienced a new i~?petus, as we know. But it was in
vain, and for good reason, that Cotonou had demanded that the mercenaries
involved in the attack, moat of whom were French, be punished, and that the
record of the aggression and of its serious human and material consequences for
the country be officially opened in Paris.
~ A Vulnerable Economy
Therefore, although the RPB jPeople~s Republic of Benin] had continued the
restructuring of political, social, cultural and economic life, step by step
and obstinately, the country was dealt a severe blow, and its consequences are
still felt seriously today. In fact, the damages caused by this "restab3lization"
operation were estimated in 1977 at more than 5 billion CFA francs. And the
assistance, both in cash and in kind, later contributed after several international
survey commissions by various African and European countries (Niger, Liberia,
Tanzania, Seychelles, Iraq, Cyprus, Switzerland, and the German Democratic
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Republic), as well as by the UNDP and the OAU--aesistance which amounts to a total
of almost 1 billion 500 Tnillion CFA francs--is still short of the neec~.s.
As President Kerekou stressed on 4 May, when receiving Mr Farah, the assistant
secretary-general of the UN, who came at the request of Cotonou after a resolution
adopted in that regard last December by the international organization, in order
to reeveluate the economic problems facing the RPB and to establish an adequate
international assi.stance program, that is to say that "the direct and indirect,
multiple and many-sided consequences of the armed aggression of 16 January 1977
are still having a dangerous effect on our economy." An economy that, in addition,
as can be imagine3, is being made more and more vulnerable by the fallout from
the international economic crisis.
Personal Interests
At the same time, this also means that the concrete difficulties created in this
way, which frnm time to time, will slow down, if not undermine, the efforts being
made to control key sectors of the economy, to increase production and to improve
the level and the quality of life of the masses in all areas, are always
eagerly exploited by the reactionary forces from within.
Undoubtedly, and this is a unanimously acknowledged fact, the nationalist and
revolutionary process, which answers the deep-seated yearnings of the populace,
is now largely ~mplemented, and the regime resulting from the change of 22 Septem-
ber 1972 has a strong foundation which makes impossible any attempt to turn
back. In this respect, the release which occurred at Easter time--without
- causing the least controversy or the least anxiety among the population--, of
three members of the farmer presidential council, Justin Ahomadegbe, Sourou Migan
Apithy and Huber.t Maga, is significant~
However, one cannot overlook the fact that the Beninese revolutionary process
is unfolding in a rather unfavorable environment, since neighboring countries,
such as Togo and Nigeria, seem to be veritable paradises f~r unscrupulous
businessmen. Especially since the aggreasive and threatening policy of Giscardian
- France in Africa continuea to act as an encouragement to the dealings of conserva-
tive forces az~d to have a negative influence on the more moderate elements, who
are more conc~arned with personal or short-term interssts than with the nation's
- future.
In any case, it is this difficult combination of circumstances which explains in
great part the intensive struggle that the more radical elements must carry on
at all times in order to deepen the revolutionary process and to promote true
popular democracy, both within the party and in the grassroots organizations as
well as in basic government structures. Which also explains how they could
arrive at this paradoxical situation where a certain number of cell members,
- holders of key responsibilities in ~he economic sectors, continue to hold
themselves in positions of reserve, if not more or less veiled hostility, vis-a-vis
� the political course determ~ned by the party in power.
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It goes withuut saying that the pressures exerted by a dangerously aggressive
"environment" cannot help but aggravate the inherited contradictions of the former
system. These are contradictions which were brought to light during the conference
of cell members organized on the eve of the election of the revolutionary national
assembly, in November 1979, who seem to have taken a sharp turn in favor of the
vast labor of reflection and control that, for a year, has been undertaken in
all sectors of the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country.
Special Session
TherPfore, it is in a much more favorable context, in any case, forever rid of the
threat--which was always present until 10 May 1981--of a possible "destabilizing
action or of restrictive pressures on the part of the former colonial power,
that the tasks that are now planned in the People~s Republic of Iienin will go
forward. These tasks include; in particular: the renewal and the expansion of
the party's authority, the holding of congresses by grassroots organizations,
the establishment of an exhaustive economic equilibrium (which must be the subject
of a special seasion of the central committee, and which will be the occasion for
drawing up a statement of the status of the health of national enterprises, and
deciding what mergers or reorganizations may be necessary).
And there is no doubt: for Cotonou, for the Beninese people, who were completely
mobilized, on 16 January 1977, to defend their independence, which they have
barely recovered, the victory of the left in~France can only appear to be a
second and bitter defeat for the arrogant and criminal colonialists aggression
~ which hit the country so hard 4 years ago.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
- 9174
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BENIN
KEREKOU RELEASES SOME DETAINEES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 May 81 p 41
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Toward Reconciliation?"]
[Text] Ahomadegbe, Apithy and Maga were released 19 April.
But other people are still in prison.
Is a new political era beginning for Benin? They have been asking this question
in Cotonou since 19 April. In fact, that Easter Sunday coincided with the
release of three former members of the presidential council: Justin Ahamadegbe,
Sourou Migan Apithy and Hubert Maga.
Indulgence
Arrested following the military coup of 30 November 1972 which would bring Colonel
- Mathieu Kerekou to power, the three old campaigners of the Beninese (then
Dahomean) p~litical scene were imprisoned together, first at Avrankou and then
at Abomey, before being separated. Mr Maga rema.ined at Abome~, Mr Apithy was
assigned to Prakou and Mr Ahomadegbe to Natitingou. However, since they were
suffering from high blood pressure, the first two were cared for in the Cotonou
hospital ~or several months. On Easter morning, all three returned to their
respective homes where a auccession of relatives and friends congratulated them.
"They are certainly thinner and have aged a little," one of these visitors
confided in us. "But in general, they seem to have withstood these 8 years and
5 monthe of detention very well.'~ It is true that the three illustrious
~ prisoners were at no time mistreated, and that their familiea visited them
regularly. They were allowed to choose their meals, as well as their favorite
books and newspapers,
After all, until now, Colonel Mathieu Kerekou~a regime has been careful not to
commit excesses. Aaide from this amall mistake.... Aikpe (this min~ster of the
interior was killed 20 June 1975 under doubtful circwnstances, J.A. No 756), the
Beninese revolution, unlike many other African revolutions, has always been able
to combine firm principles with a certain amount of humanity. It prefers to
wield cutting slogans, rather than the executioner's knife. This earns it a
certain amount of indul$ence, even on the part of its avowed adversaries.
Therefore, fo rnner pxes3dent Emtle Derlin Zinsou did not hesitate to proclaim:
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"Bravo Kerekoul" at the announcement of the release of his three predecessors at
the head of goverument, before adding: "Provided he goes all the way, that is,
that he releases all of the political prisoners an3 firmly commits himself to the
path of national reconciliation."
Judgment
The three former members of the presidential council were not, in fact, the only
prisoners in Beninese prisons. Some people close to the former regime are still
awaiting their freedom, purely and simply �or lack of an equitable ~udgment.
This is the case of former ministers Chabi Kao and Theophile Paoletti, in the
Cotonou Guezo cam~, or of Adrien Glele, jn the Porto Novo prison. The same is
true of Abbe Alphonse Quenum and of Robert Tagnon, former Secretary General ir~
charge of planning. Many officers have also been in prison for several years,
such as Captain Janvier Assogba, former minister to President Kerekou; Commander
Hacheme and Colonel Alphonse Alley, who for aome time carried out the duties of
the chief of state. On the other hand, it appears that Commander Chabi Ibrahima
~ may have died in prison.
Severity
How long does Colonel Mathieu Kerekou intend to prolong the martyrdom of these
men whose only fault lies in not sharing in t:le orientation and methods of the
regime born of the 30 November 1972 coup? Certainly, within the presidential
entourage, there are those who urge inCrasigence and severity. In Cotonou, it
- is whispered that President Kerekou had to override their opposition to release
- Messrs Maga, Apithy and Ahomadegbe~ Why doesn't he do the same tu restore
freedom to other political prisoners, some of whom are suffering from various
illnesses? In any case, this is the only way he can live down the past, turn
fihe page and permanently establish his regime. And thus create the conditions
for a real national reconciliation, which is the basis for the renewal desired
- by all Beninese.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
9174
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CAMEROON
BRIEFS
; VICTORIA REFINERY INAUGURATION--President Ahmadou Ahidjo opened on 16 May the
Victoria oil refinery with an annual volume of 2 million tons and built at a total
cost of 72 million CFA francs. The National Refining Company (SONARA)--where the
Cameroonian state holds a ma~ority interest (66 percent) in partnership with the
companies Total (10 percent), ELF (8 percent), Pecten-Cameroun (8 percent) and
Mobil (8 percent)--was in charge of this project~with technical assistance provided
by CFP-Total. After inviting tenders for bids, a construction contract was signed
with the Proco-France company on 25 May 1979. Funds to finance this project were
provided by the state, by international banking institutions and by the Central
Fund for Economic Cooperation. The Victoria refinery will process crude oil pumped
from offshore oil fields which are operated by the ELF~SEREPCA/PECTEN group 20 kms
off the coast of Cameroon. In 1981, these oil fields will yi.eld around 4 million .
tons of crude oil (compared to 2.7 million in 1980). Their production could go up
to 8 million tons a year by 1984 and Cameroon's current requirements for refined
oil stand between 700,000 and 600,000 tons. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1425] 8796
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
FRENCH MILITARY WITHDRAWAL POSTPONED--The withdrawal of a company of French
soldiers from the CAR, planned for the beginning of May, has been suspended
until President Mitterrand takes office. Note that at the end of Mr Giscard
d'Estaing's presidency there were 1,300 French troops in the CAR, 800 at
Bouar and the reat at Bangui. [Text] [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 22 May 81 p 1426] [COPYRICHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
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CHAD
BRIEFS
CYCLOTCHAD OPERATION--In our article on the situation in the south of Chad (No
1850, 24 April 1981, p 1171) we indicated that the Cyclotchad company had ceased
operations. In fact, the company~s shops at Mnundou are not closed, but
production has been slowed down. A subsidiary of CFAO [French Compxny of West
Africa], the Cyclotchad company assembles cyclea and mopeds. [Text] [Paris
MARC~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1427] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
DELAY IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION--Significant delays, technological and especially
financial, are preeently occurring in the execution of development pro~ects in
; Equatorial Guinea financed by foreign aid. It is a matter particularly of
i delays in signing lettere of credit and warranta for payment as well as in
executing payments. A serious ahortage of national financial experts appears
to be at the root of the eituation. [Text] [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1426] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1981.] 9693
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GAMBIA
GRIM VIEW OF WORLD BANK REPORT GIVEN
London NEW AFRICAN in English Jun 81 p 28
CArticle by Nana Humasi: "Few Options for Gambia as World Bank Gives Details of a
Failing Economy"~
~Text~ A REC~NT World Bank report diecloses The GPMB, by far the most important
that half of The Gambia's 12 public financial institution in thecountry, has a
servicee are financial loeeee. The docu- yearly turnover of �60-million, twice as
ment attributes their failure to inadequ- much as the government's 1980 budget.
- ate ~nancial atructure and ineuff'icient It contributea heavily to current and
qualit"ied staff. development budgets, and laet year lost
Woret hit are th~ Livestock Marketing �4-million in the process.
Board (LMB), the Gambia Utilities Cor- Since independence in 1965, the Gam-
poration f GUC) and the Gambia Produce bia has launched three modest develop-
Marketing Board ( GPMBI. Tlie LMB, ment programmes, with 80 per cent of the
created in 1976, organises cattle market- capital being provided by foreign aid.
ing and is already �200,000 in the red. This has been problematic since the
The GLTC, since its inception in 1972, has country has a low capacity to absorb
been bedevilled by power failures and an capital.In the mid�1970sthe government
accumulated loss by June 1979 of �2.8- deviated from previous cautious policies
million. to launch the first five-year development
The GUC's difficulties, the report says, plan. Although the annual investment
in part are due to inefficient, uneducated, rate increased from 10 per cent of the
inexperienced ataff - a staff that is too GDP in 1975 to 27 per cent in 1979, the
large, anyway. Other factors are low actual growth was only 1 per cent a year -
tariffs compared to coeta, uneconomical a rate much lower than the population
ventures like stretching servicea to the growth figure. This aeverely reduced the
- Provinces, high coat of repairing poor standard of living for all Gambians, the
equipment, and unsatisfactory debt col- report diacloses.
lection, By ~July last year the corporation The increaae in investment by the
had �500,000 in unpaid billa with pri- government necessitated heavy borrow-
vate, civic and government conaumers. ing from the Central Bank, rocketing
government debts to �8-million by June
The burdea 1980 - up from �1-million three years
before. The report says that government
Tn tackle the electticity criais, gov- efforts to correct this might be too late.
ernmant contracted a loan from the pne reason for this was that world
African Development Bank (ADB) on market prices for groundnuts were
terme which, the report says, will burden expected to deciine considerably.
the GUC with heavy repayments. The The Gambia lies in the Sahel region
loen would purchase two three-megawatt and suffers acutely from insufficient and
generators which were to have been [rregular rainfall. With 95 people on
inetalled by January this year. every square kilometre of arable land.
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the soil potential has declined progres- advantages to countries such as Seychel-
sively. Irrigation could be the answer, the les, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and the Canary
report concludea. But a planned bridge- Islands which compete for beach-type
barrage to effect this has already become holiday demand." ~
an inhibiting �55-million proposal. This disclosure dces not complement
The barr~ge, about 130 miles up the enthusiasm of President Dawda -
country, ia expected to hold back salt Jawara when he recently said in a speech
water which has ruined healthy farm- that, on looking back, the Gambia's
land over the yaars, thua achieving investment in hotel construction and
self-suf~'iciency in rice productioa. "This other basic tourist infrastructures, rep-,
strategy is not without considerable resents a major step in the government's
riek;' the report warns, "consideri:~g the efforts to diversify the economy.
country's limited irrigation experience,
the labour conatraints and the substan- p0~ ~Q~~
.tial capital investmen+.."
In The Gambia, 80 per cen! of the The document reports a poor perfor-
labour force worka in agriculture which mance in groundnut production - the
generates 4b per cent productivity. main agricultural produce harasaed by
Induetry contributes a meagre 8 per cent drought with loesesto the country close to
in productiv:ty and employa only 5 per �15-million in 1980. Faced with poor
cent of the labour force and clearly cannot health and malnutrition, the 570,000
stand as an alternative despite govern- population is growing at a rapid 2.8 per
ment attempts to introduce technology, , cent annually - with one doctor to every
and to eetablieh an industrial estate in 12,390 citizens, 793 patients per hospital
Kanifing on the periphery of Bar~jul, the bed, and 217 babies dying each year out of
capital. every 1,000 live 6irths.
- The gcrvernment~has inveated heavily The repoi~t advises that the highest
in tourism, the report diacloses. The priority should be investments in the
purchase and development of the �30- groundnut sector, though the expected
millio~ four-star Atlantic Hotel, chaina price movements in the world market
of other hotels, k~each development, and could discourage this. It says that over
game park reservation worka, indicate the next five to 10 yeara, groundnut
the government's intereat in expanding production and exporta will probably
~ this sector. "et, the report pointe out, remain the prime determinant of
tourist figures have been falling draeti� economic growth in The Gambia, given
cally. The government hopee to increase the long geetation period of the bridge-
hotel facilities to 6,000 bede in 1985, barrage project. However, it says, with
raieing The Gambia'e touriet accommo- the EEC-ACP promise of compeneation
dation potential to 80,000 a year. Thie is, for loeaes in agriculture, reliance on
however, an optimietic target ae the groundnute may not be as rieky as it
northern European market ia almost appeare.
eaturated, and Roota hae already loet ite The palicy makere in The Gambia have
promotional ef'fect in America. a choice. They can reat their stakee on
The report continuee: "Beeidee, the loana and compensetion achemea. Or
rscent price increaeee in The (3ambia are they can return to more cautioue and
likely t~ be detrimental to the sector and educated management of the country's
cause The Cambia to lose its comparative meagre resources�
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazinea Limited
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KENYA
COUNTRY DRAGS FEET ON ENERGY CRUNCH
Londox~ NEW AFRICAN in English No 165 Jun 81 pp 36-37
rArticle by Shabanji Opukah~
rText~
WHEN PRESIDENT Moi formed his Kibaki is in charge of the Minietry of
poat-Kenyatta Cabinet after the Finance. The man in charge of energy is
December 1979 elections, obaervers John Okwanyo. And Okwanyo has yet to
noticed a definite focus on certain key offer the country effective direction in
areae of the Kenyan economy. Fuel was this area.
one of them. So far, all that his ministry has done is
Thecreation of2he Ministry of Energy, to quote Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1980.
hitherto non-existent in Kenya, was one That refers only to the need to conserve
of several innovations. energy, It does not provide any concrete
Energy today is a prime concern of the energy programme for the country now or
Moi Government. It ia agreed that Kenya in the future.
needa an energy policy - a clear direction At a recent Press Club lunch, Okwanyo
in this vital sector of any developing told journalists that his ministry will
country's economy. shortly produce an energy policy. He also
Kenys does not produce oil. It apende dwelt at length on the country's prepara-
36 per cent of ite foreign exchange tione For the forthcoming United Nations
earnings on the importation of fuel. This Conference on New and Renewable
figure, ae Vice-Presiiient Kibaki recently Energy, due to be held in Nairobi in
told Parliament, represents "the whole of August.
the earninga from coffee, and even thia is He aaid the country would spend an
not enough to finance the importa of oil". eatimated Ksha 14-million on hosting the
Coffee ia Kenya's main foreign conference. But Kenya would recoup
exchange earner. To highlight the prob- several times the cost ofthe conference by
lem the country facea over oil, Kibaki told way of revenue from hotel bookings by
Parliamant: "Our economy is very heav- the more than 1,000 delegates who will
ily dependent on petroleum. As much as atter..d � the talks. Meanwhile, the gov-
85 per cent of all the enee~tv utiliaed ernment has aet asids Kahs 4,000-billion
came~ f~om fuel�oil or petroleum, and to cover oil imports this year alone.
only IB per cent from hydro�power."
But, Kibaki claimed, deepite thoae The backboae
difflcultiee "the price ofpetrol in Kenya ie
stfll thc loweet in sny part of the Many people are asking whether the
continent other than Nigeria and Libya, Kenyan Government will actually come
which produce their own eupplies". out with a definite energy programme.
Prem~urti petr~l coate Kyhs 6.1B a litre, The Preae, the general public and Parli-
reqular coatd K~hd 6.70 a litre while ament have all voiced their concern in
dieeel aelle at Keh~ 3.93 a litre. view of the deteriorating economic situa-
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tion. Oil, it ia agreed, ia the backbona of pAwer de:aaad
the economy and many shortcominga in
the economy can be btamed on the cost of It ia known, however, that the Kenya
~t� Government is continuing its efforts to ~
There is talk of Kenya rerlucing its find viable alternative sources of energy.
dependence on oil and rationing the There are plans to increase the coun-
consumption of it in an effort to reduce try's output of geothermal power. The
imports. . Olkaria geothermal plant south of
Others eee the direct importation of Naivasha in the Rift Valley is expected to
Fuel from oil-producing countries as generate 15 megawatts by this month.
another method of reducing the cost. At i~iinimum power potential at the plant
present, Kenqa imports her oil through is estimated to be 170 megawatts over 25
' multi-national companies. yeara, while the m~imum is estimated
The government aeems apprehensive at 1,400 megawatts. Total power demand
of taking a deciaion. Unlike socialiet in Kenya is about 300 megawatts.
- Tanzania, Kenya prides itself on what ie There are also plans to reduce depen-
regarded as freedom from government dence on oil and utilise gasohol. To this
control. This means that those who drive end, the country has embarked on the
the latett Mercedes Benz and other construction of a gaeohol plant at
luxury care ahould be lePt free to "er~joy Kisumu in the heartland of th~ augar
tha fruite of their swest". belt. The plant is estimated to cost about
As to the choice of alternative energy Kehe 1,000-million.
eources, eome oil' company off'icials But critice claim the multi-national
recently told journalists that in their companies concerned are fleecing Kenya
opinion alternatives euch as eolar energy of badly needed foreign exchange. The
would be more expensive. cost, it is said, even exceeds the World
The �same o~cials, Kenya Shell's Bank estimate for a plant producing
General Manager H:J: Muriuki and 100-million litres a year~ which ahould
Chairman J.W. Gordon, aleo said the cost between 50-miliion and 100-million
prospecta o� striking oil in Kenya were Kenyan ahillings. It is claimed that
~ "slim". (lil in Kenya, they reported, was Kenyan costs are approximately double
"burnt o.~t during the formation of the the original figure quoted.
Rift, Valle~~". Shell had prospected for oil Other critics eay the plant will demand
in Kenya se�reral yeare ago but etopped that more acreage of agricultural land is
when prospects seemed non-exietent. aet aside for the production of augar cane,
This, it is feared, would woraen the
country's food situation�
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/91
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MALAWI
BUDGET 5HOWS DEFICIT FOR FIRST TIME SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Paris MARCHES TROFICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 pp 1432-1433
[Text] Since the end of the budgetary year on 31 March last, and for the first
time since independence, the Malawi budget shows a deficit.
According to the 1981-1982 operating budget provisions, that deficit will amount to
20.1 million Malawi kwachas [MK] which is double the figure for the previous fiscal
year (MK 10.6 million). The main reason for the deficit is an increase in the
public debt as a result of a poor agricultural performance combined with the higher
cost of imports in recent years.
The operating expenses have gone up by 11 percent compared to the previous fiscal
year. These expenses will be as high as MK 236.1 million. The service of the
public debt which ~s in::luded in the operating budget will cost MK 71.5 milliox~
(MK 52.5 million for the external debt) compared to MK 58.8 million in the 1980-
1981 period, representing an increase of 22 percent. The main operatjng expenses
for the administrative departments involve educatton (MK 25.9 million or 11 percent
of the overall budget), defense (MK 22 million or 9.3 percent), health (MK 14.1
million or 6 percent) and the police (MK 13.4 million or 5.8 percent).
Cash generation wi11 be provided by direct taxes (MK 57.2 million) and indirect
taxes (MK 112.8 miltion or 60.5 percent). These reaource.s will be 5 percent higher
than those of the 1980-1981 period and wil.l total MK 186.6 mi7.lion. It must be
pointed out that, for the fiscal year star::tng on 1 April this year, import taxes
will be up by 15 percent and taxes on hotels and restaurant by 10 percent.
Witti regard to the development budget, it should be noticed that during the
current fiscal year, ex~enses have dropped (down by 5.8 percent) and will total
MK 156 million. The deficit of MK 28.1 million will be 34.7 percent smaller than
the 1980-1981 deficit. The local share of the pro~ects wilT be financed with
Eoreign loans to get the budget balanced again.
The main expenditures for development will be affected to: transportation, MK 48
million (or 30.8 percent of the total budget); agriculture, 25.4 million (16.3
percent); education, 21.6 million (13.8 percent); water supply, 12.5 million (8
percent); construction of administrative buildings, 9:7 million (6.2 percent).
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The necessary resources will come from loans which will cover 59.4 percent of the
expenses (MK 76 milliQn or a 24 percent increase over the 1980-Yg81 period) and
the balance will be provided by international donations (MK 51.9 percent or 15
percent less than in the previous f iscal year).
The main suppliers of multialteral aid will be the UNDP [UN Development ProgramJ,
_ the EDF [European Development Fund], the IDA [International Development Association]
and ehe ADB [African Development Bank] gro~.p. Bilateral aid will be mainly provided
by Great Britain, the FRG, the United States, Can~da, Denmark, Japan and France.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981
8796
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NIGER
- FOOD PRODUCTION COULD EXCEED POPULATION GROWTH RATE
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 165, Jun 81 p 26
~Article by Nana Hun~asi~
CTextl
BEFORE THE takeover by a benevolent ~rghum and rice are two other impor-
dictatorahip of the military, Niger suf- ~nt crope auetaining the 6.5-million
fered grave economic and social prob- ~pulation.
lems, many of which related to hardahips A divereified economy has helped
caused by long spells of drought and Niger tackle years of deficit and it was
subsequent declining living standards. not until 1976 that an increase in
That was a decade ago. Then in 1974 uranium and groundnut exports, plus a
Lt.-Colonel Seyni Kountche led the forcea tight control on oil imports, brought
_ responsible for the overthrow of former relief putting the country 1,616-million
Prssident Hamani Diori. Since then CFA francs in the black. In 1974, when
conditiona have improved steadily with drought hit the Sahel hardest, Niger had
Ko~~tle aa Head of State. incurred a 10,532-millioa CFA deficit.
Now, the US Agency for Development Colonel Kountche has practically
in Niamey, the capital, has discloaed that abandoned traditional buresucratic
Niger could achieve a level of production ~eans of checking on ine~ciency or
that will exceed its' 2.7 per cent popula- corruption. Instead he has adopted
tion growth-rate. With a grosa national 8uthoritarian and arbitrary ways of
product (GNl') of �386-million in 1980, checking on hia subordinates. For
the $upreme Military Council, compoeed inetance, he ordered a full two months of
of aoldiere and civiliane, has channelled auditing of all government revenue
induttrial revenue into food prnBram- of'~ces aRer the arrest of Diori's former
mes. Uranium, tin and iron depoeita have c,~etary�General, Baboukar Adamu.
been exploited at a yearly growth rate of ~e aurpriee checke have not eliminated
five per cent. corruption but they have made life
harder for diehonest officials.
~~y~Q np With 90 per cent of the population still
The uranium minea in the north of the PeB~ant, the government has devised a
- country produced 1,308 tonnee in 1976 programme for a broailly based organisa-
und by 1978 had increseed output to tion which will allow for the participation
1,710 tonnes, From this comea?b per cent of rural dwellers in determining govern-
of Nige~s annual reveaue and the ment policy. Called the Theory of
government funnels it into increasing DevelopmentSociety,ittakescognisance
groundnut axporta to 200,000 tonnes - of food production being a top priority.
the m~jor agrlculturel ~export. Millet, the Most of the revenue and agency aid
main foad crop, reached 978,000 tonnes money will continue to be directed
in 197?, up t~om 827,000 tonnea in 1974. toward pmviding farming equipraent,
conducting experimenta with grain
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NUR ()H'N'1('IAI, i~til~: ()NI,Y
improvement, working on methode of
conaerving water, and ensuring vieible
benef'its to the farmers and their com-
munitiea.
F? mtche, an ascetic who sees his
country's poverty in realistic terms, has
been known to say that one cannot make
a hungry man a democrat. He detests
dependence on aid which, he says, might
encourage control of one's affaira by
donor countries and agencies.
Et~aiC element
"Our primary neede are food, houaing,
education, health, and being clothed;'
the colonel told the Presa in Niamey. The
second moet important factor, he saye, ie
the po~eible duruptive ethnic element.
Neither the Supreme Military Council
nor the colonel him~elf have Qiven any
indication ae to when the country will
return to civilian rule. If hie performance
record ie anything to go lay, $eyni
Kountche is likely to stay at the helm for
a while yet~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
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I~OIt UFFI('IAi. I1~E ONI,Y
NIGER
BRIEFS
LOAN GUARANTEE--On 5 May, the Nigerien Council of Ministers adopted a draft
etatute authorizing ratification of the agreement in which the Republic of
t~Tiger guarantees the loan in the amount of 7 million units of account signed
; on 27 March 1981 at Abid~an between the African Development Bank and the BDRN
[Development Bank of the Republic of Niger]. This loan, which anaunts to
2,016 million CFA francs, is intended for the financing of various pro~ects of
emall and medium-sized industrial concerns and for the training of BDRN personnel
in techniques for evaluating and supervising pro~ects. [T~xt] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1418] [COPYitIGHT: ~ene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
NIAMEY WATER SUPPLY PROBLEMS--Since the beginning of May, the people of the
_ Nigerien capital have been experiencing a certain decrease in the flow, and
even intermittent shutoffs, of water from the taps. The two waterworks presently
supplying Niamey produce 40,000 m3 of water for a population of approximately
~ 250,000 inhabitants and are insufficient to respond to demand and to the needs of
the population. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
22 May 81 p 1418] [COPYRIGHT: Rene M~oreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
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_ NIGERIA
ABUJA OFFERS INTERESTING INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May ~31 p 1367
[Text] Reporting on the conference organized by the Nigerian-British Chffinber of
Cammerce at the begfnning of May in London, the 11 May F~NANCIAL TIMES emphasizes
- the interesting investment possibilities offered by the future Nigerian federal
capital in Abu~a. Moreover, these possibilitiea have repeatedly been emphasized by
federation officials and again quite recently in Paris by Minister of Industry
Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, who noted that the pro3ect was in a good position among those
included in the 1981-1985 National Development Plan (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 8 May,
p 1303) .
However, Great Britain has to date shown only relative interest, as in the case of
the railroad and other pro~ects, for which it was criticized, particularly by Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs Alha~i Umaru Dikko during his visit to London at the be-
ginning of April (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 10 April~ p 1012).
The FINANCIAL TIMES notes that investments planned in Abuja during the period of
the plan amount to 1.9 billion pounde, which places the pro~ect ffinong the very first
ones to be canpleted. Already~ he notes, pledged investments according to contracts
totaZ over 800 million pounds, oP which the Britiah ahare ie very small. The only
Br.itish ~ontracte of any importance are those cancluded by the Milton Keynes Devel-
- opment Corporatian and Taylor Woodrow for a residential program and infrastructure
pro,jecta in one of the outlying dietricts of the city.
The ma~or contracts were concluded by other European companies, particularly Julius
Berger, Dumez and Strabag (road construction, d~na, airports, hotels, construction
of. commerci~l and administrative buildings~ telecommunications).
- One pnrticipant in the con�erence, Fred Roche~ vice president and managing director
~f Conran Roche, noted that federal authorities were particularly anxious to see
the acGivation oF pro~ects so that the future capital might begin to play its role
before the 1983 elactions. They would like the f irat residenta and the entire ad-
- ministration to be established there by that time.
The city wae planned for some 1.6 million inhabitants by the year 2000, which number
would gradually increase to 3 million.
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Along with the London Chamber of Cotmnerce, the Nigerian-British Chamber of Cammerce
is to organize an ianportant commercial atxd investment mission in Nigeria in October.
The mission will be aided financially by the British Overseas Trade Board.
COPYRIGHT; Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981
11,464
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NIGERIA
COMPANIES EXERT PR~E;SSURE TO REDUCE CRUDE OIL PRICES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1420
[Text] Nigeria is said to be under heavy pressur~ on the part of several oil com-
paniea to make thia country reduce its crude oil prices. The Gulf Oil Corporation,
Nigeria's moet important client which buys 229,500 barrela a day (112,000 barrels
through ite ~oint pumping operations with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpor-
ation and 117,500 barrels by virtue of a long-term purchase contract signed last
year) has auggeated a$3 cutback on the price of a barrel now costing between
$40.40 and $41 for top quality crudes. The American company has threatened to
follow the example of Atlantic Richfield (Arco) by revising its purchase contract
(see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS of 24 April, p 1194).
According to the technical bulletin EUROPE-OIL PRICES, two French companies have
also threatened to reduce or even completely discontinue their purchases of
Nigerian oil when their contracts, covering the current quarter, expire.
Since last year, these circles point out, Nigeria has already been forced to lower
production by almost one-fifth after losing some of its American clients. Nigerian
crude oil is, in fact, the most expensive one within OPEC along with the Algerian
and Libyan crude oil, as well ae the North Sea crude.
Tn the preE~ent eituation of glut, Nigerian oil is therefore becoming hard to sell
in competition with the lesa expeneive oils from the Gulf regi.on and particularly
frc~m Saudi Arabia.
It ie aJ.so reported th+it the companies have pointed out the fact that when world
supplie~ were tight, Nigeria has always been one of the first countries to demand
that its clients pay a premium using the argument of "market pressures." So, in
the view of the companies, Nigeria should continue to react to these pressures which
now ~ustify a price cutback.
But in London oil circles, people are quick to point out that unlike most of the
other OPEC members, Nigeria urgently needs now the oil revenues to finance the
prajects of its ambitious development plan.
Let us mentton thut at the beginning of May the federal authorities also announced
that regardless of the oil glut on the world market, Nigeria had no intention of
lowering its prices (see MARCHES TROPICUAX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 8 May, p 1303).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981
8796
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NIGERIA
BRIEFS
REPAYMENT OF FOREIGN DEBT--The Federal Government of Nigeria has decided to release
in 1983 the funds needed to pay the service on the foreign debt (interest and capi-
tal) inherited from the military regime: 6 bi111on naira�on 1 October 1979. As
for the debt to the World Bank accumulated since 1960, Minister of Finance Masi
- reports that it amounts to 1.2 billion naira, a substantial portion of which has
already been repaid~ Considering the small amount of Nigeria's foreign indebted-
ness~ especially with respect to its monetary reaerves, the regional vice president
of the World Bank, David Knox, has announced a poeaible increase of S00 mi111on
naira in the line of credit. This decision came following the granting by the inter-
national organization of a loan of 300 mi111on naira to the stat~ of Sokoto to ex-
plore for drinking water. Nigeria also ratified the proposal of the board of direc-
tors of the African Development Bank (BAD), a propoeal aimed at bringing non-African
countries, especially the European nations and Japan, into funds managed by the
Bank. The two main ones are the Nigeria Trust Fund (150 million naira) and the
African Development Fund (FAD), in which these Western countries are already parti-
cipating. It should be recalled that the.bank is one of the three organizations of
- multilateral regional aid now existing, along with the Asian Development Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1539] 11,464
PROMULGATION OF 1981 BUDGET--The chief of atate will have had to wait over 4 months,
following approval by Parliament, to p~omulgate, on 8 May, the 1981 federal budget
for the period running from 1 January to 31 December (for informat.ion on this delay
and the means examined to rectify it~ aee MARCHES TROPICAUX of 17 April, p 1134).
The chief of state has not concealed his concern over an additional 900 million
naira in expenditure~ decided upon by the Parliament, bringing the total expenditures
to 13,172,000,000 naira, even though no additional receipts were provided for. How-
ever, it is true that the original proposed budget was mainly balanced, with 14.7
billion naira in receipte, and that it ia still substantially balanced with 13.1 bil-
lion in expenditures. It should be recalled that the proposed budget was presented
to the Chamber of Repreaentativee by President Shagari on 24 November, already some-
what ahead of time in anticipation of delayed approval (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 28 Novem-
ber 1980, p 3165). It will certainly be suitable in the future for coming budgets
to be presented even earlier and at the latest, by the beginning of autumn. [Text]
(Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in'French 15 May 81 p 1366] 11,464
OIL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAN--Hassan Essadat, Iran's acting minister of petroleum now
visiting African oil-producing countries: Libya, Algeria, Gabon and Nigeria, was
in Lagos laet week, where he had talks with local officials. Essadat, who is
29
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accampanied by a d~legation of six persons, expressed the opinion, along with
Nigerian Vice President Alex Ekwueme, "that the OPEC countries should demonstrate
solidarity in the face of current problems." Essadat and Dr Ekwueme noted that
the interests of OPEC "were affected by the actions of one or two members of the
organization on the world markets." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1366] 11,464
SOVIET COOPERATION--On 8 May, the president of the Nigerian Senate, Joseph Wayas,
received the USSR ambassador to Lagos, Mr Sneduirev, and thanked him for Soviet
aid given to Nlgeria, especially in the iron and steel industry, He expressed the
hope that there would be increased bilateral cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1366] 11,464
OIL PRODUCTION.CUTBACK--The drop in oil production registered in Nigeria during the
month of February (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS [MTM] 15 May, p 1367]
became even more pronounced in March. Pumping dropped fr~m 1.9577 million barrels
a day to 1.875 million barrels, a reduction of 3.86 percent in one month. The same
trend will continue in the coming months. Even during the first quarter of this
year, production stood at 179.95 million barrels compared to 193.85 miilion barrels
during the same period of 1980, which represents a 7 percent reduction (down by
13.9 million barrels). In March, the refineries were operating at a slower pace
processing, on an average, 124.260 barrels a day compared to 164,217 barrels a day
in February which represents a reduction of 24.3 percent. In March, Nigeria was
able to export 96.33 percent of its crude oil production while in February it unly
exported 92.9 percent of it. Production figures for the various companies operating
in Nigeria for the month of March were (given in millions of barrels and with
February figures in par.entheses): Shell, 1,013 (1,064); Gulf, 332 (344); Mobil
215.9 (214.7); Agip, 165.1 (173.4); Elf, -2 (84); Texaco, 49.8 (49.9); Mobil
Tenesse-Sun, 8.5 (8.7); Pan Ocean, 8.1 (8.1); Phillips, 1.1 (1.4); Ashland, 9.6
(9.5). It is noted that several OPEC members have also reduced their production as
a result of the present surplus situation in the world market and the 1~ltest country
to do so was Kuweit which is cutting down its average daily production by 1.5 to
1.25 millions barrels for one year starting on 1 April 1981. [Text] [CQPYRIGHT:
' Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1.981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANERNS in French
22 M~y 81. p 1420~ 8796
FISH CONSUMPTION--It L~ reported that last year Nigerians consumed some 960,000
~ons of. fieh, of. which 560,000 tona were fished locally and 300,000 tons were
imported. According to the Department of Flsheries in ttie Federal Ministry of
Agriculture, in 1979, local fishing amounted to 540,000 tons and imports to 220,000
tons, of which 60,000 tons consiated of canned fish chiefly imported from Japan,
Bulgari~~, the United Kingdom, Spain and Norway. But both domestic.fishing and
impnrts zre not enough to satisfy the country's requirements which are estimated to
be 1.5 mi.tlion tona a year. According to an official from one of the fishing
companies--and there ar.e some 30 companies half of which are engage:l in fishing
ucitivites while the other half only deal~ with importa from the USSR, ~h2 UK,
Australiu, Poland, Cuba and Japan--Nigeriu could manage to satisfy its domestic
needs wlthoiit having to import fish if the Federal~Government were to adopt a number
of nd~quate measures. Some of the measures which he advocates are: increasing the
fiahing in the open seas with adequate vessels after establishing what are the
fi~Y~ing re~ources nf the new excluaive economic zone whic}~ has been extended to
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200 miles off the coasts; signing more f:iahing agreements with other African
coiintries; increasing the number and size of vessels to fish in territorial waters;
and finally, making loans available to the fishing enterprises. [Text] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux at Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 29 May 81 p 1485] 8796
TRADE AGREEMENT WITH GDR--Following a meeting of the Nigerian-East German Joint
Commission held in Lagos at the beginning of March (see MTM of 13 March p 680), the
GDR arid the Federal Republic of Nigeria have concluded a long-term trade agreement
which allows for preferential treatment to be applied and for the exchange of various
commodities and equipment. The GDR will sell primarily mechanical and electro-
mechanical equipment, transport equipment, public works and construction equipment
and printing materiel while Nigeria's sales will consist of crude oil, cocoa and
other agricultural products as well as minerals. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 May 81
p 1485] 8796
COTTON IMPORTS--According to estimated figures released by the Nigerian Cotton
Board, cotton~ills will require 150,000 more bales of cotton than the amount sup-
plied by the domestic production. The needs of that industry have been estimated
to be 347,OU0 bales while the 1979-1980 crop only yielded 185,000 bales. The drop
in the domestic production is attributed to late planting, adverse climatic con-
ditions, high production costs, the lack of liquid capital and the bad organization
of the marketing system. The Cotton Board has taken steps aimed at raising the
yearly production to 250 tons in the near future by means of distributing seeds of
better quality, promoting mechanization and creating permenent trade centers. To
meet the requirements of the cotton industry in the 1980-1981 period, the Cotton
Board will have to import 51 million nairas worth of cotton. [Text~ [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
29 :~1ay 81 p 1485] 8796
EXPORT OF BOTTLES--Nigeria, which only a few years back had to import bottles--a
factor which contributed to slowing down production in several beverage companies,
particularly in the breweries--has become now a big producer of glass containers
to such an extent that very soon it will start exporting them to several ECOWAS
_ [Economic Community of West African States] countries such as Benin, Togo and Ghana.
As a matter of. f.act, negotiations for this purpose are now underway between three
local companies--the Metal Box and the Tokyo Glass Nigeria Ltd., the Delta Glass
based ~.n Ughelli and the West African Glass based in Port-Harcourt--with an aggre-
gate production of 300 million bottles per year for beer and soft drinks. It is
eatimated that the country needs around 100 million beer bottles a year. This de-
mand is fully satisfied by the domestic production. The same is not quite true
regnrding soft drink bottles since it is estimated that 140 million bottles of this
kind are needed and the local production can only supply about 100 million bottles.
Thie is why, at least for a time, the difference will have to be made up with
imports, mainly for the types of bottles which are not manufactured in the country's
plants. [TextJ [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 May 81 p 1485] 8796
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
AID TO INDUSTRY--The World Bank and the IDA [International Development
Association] will together grant to Senegal financing worth $9 million (a loan
from the World Bank of $6.5 million and credit from the IDA of 2.1 million SRR
[Special Drawiag Rights], or $2.5 million) to atimulate productive investment in
industry, an announcemenC from the bank on 14 May indicated. This pro~ect will
aupply technical assistance to two organizations which promote inveatment, as
well as credit to small and medium-eized businesaes. The IFC [International
Finance Corporation], a subaidiary of the World Bank whose purpose is to promote
investment in private enterprise, will participate in a capital issue for one of
these two organizations, SOFISEDIT [Senegalese Financial Corporation for the
- Development of Industry and Touriam]. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1410] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1981.] 9693
; PRESS AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ--Mr Husayn Ali al-Samarra~i, director ot the Paris office
- of the Iraqi press agency, arrived in Dakar on 20 April from Paris. He was
~ welcomed by Mr Amadou Dieng, director of the Senegalese Press Agency, with whom
he signed an agreement for cooperation between their respective agencies. This
agreement is part of a atrengthening of ties between national press agencies
beloriging to the pool of press agencies of non-aligned countries. ~'Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1410] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
SAUDI GIFT--On 25 April, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia contributed 250 million CFA
francs (about $1 million) for the construction of a mosque at Tivaouane (a
religioua city of the Tidiane brotherhood, the largest in Senegal) 90 km from
Dakar. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p
1414] (COPYRIGHT: Rene Morewc et Cie Paria 1981.] 9693
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TANZANIA
NATION SAID TO BE FACING SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGE
London NEW AFRICAN in Engliah No 165,Jun 81 p 37
~Text~ -
TANZANIAN PRESIDENT Julius caution the people that there is not
Nyerere recently told his countrymen enough food for next .aeason and that
they were facing "a serious food shor- xncludes caeh-crops, groundnuts, sunf-
tage" as a result of floods and droughts lower and cester seeds."
during the past four yeara. According to the National Milling
He said this while addressing a mass Corporation, a total of 194,306 tonnes or
rally to mark the 4th annivereary of the food crops had been bought by December
merger of Zanzibar's Afro ShiraZi Party last year, compared with 345,003 tonnes
and the mainland's Tanganyika African purchased during the same period the
National Union (TANU) which created previous year.
the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the During 1980, 94,575 tonnes of maize
- Revolution). Dr. Nyerere said that last were bought against 139,425 tonnes
year, Tanzania spent $83.3 million on bought in 1970.
food imports. This wae in addition to aid During 1977-78, 2000,000 tonnes of
and loans received f~'om friendly nations. maize were bought compared to 130,000
tonnea bought during 1976-77. The aver-
~~~~Q age requirements for the whole country is
200,000 tonnea of maize a year.
The President said it was a diegrace Between 1977-78, 34,500 tonnes of
that the country ehould depend on wheat was bought against 27,000 tonnes
imported food, and called on farmere to bought during 1976-77. Rice purchaded
moderniee farming methode in order to in 197?-?8 amounted to 31,000 tonnes
increase agricultural output and lead the compared to 19,000 tonnes in 1976-77.
country to eelf-sufficiency. Bullrueh millet bought by December
In February laet year, the then Minie- 1980 dropped from 1,168 tonnes to 318
ter for Agriculture John Malecela tonnes, eorghum from 23,709 to 17,928
warned Tanzaniane that the country tonnes; while beans dropped from 26,070
would run out of food. He eaid: "We muet to 12,291 tonnes.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
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ZAIRE
LEGISLATION REGULATING HYDROCARBONS INDUSTRY ENACTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1430
[Text] We have just received the text of the ordinances issues on 14 February 1981
dealing with ;~urisdiction in the aphere of hydrocarbons and with the regulations
applicable to imports and exports of these producta.
The first ordinance transfers to the Energy Department all the prerogatives--incor-
porated in Title VII of Ordinance Law No 67-231 of 11 May 1967 (Articles 82 to
100) which gives the general legislation applicable to mines and hydrocarbons--
previously assigned to the Mining Department. These prerogatives are: 1) the
power to grant surveying and exploration rights as well as concessions to exploit
hydrocarbon deposits; 2) the control over all stages of oil-related activities:
survey, exploration, production, refining, transportation, storage, purchase and
sale at home as well as abroad. This control is also exercised over ancillary
activities (petrochemical industry).
T'he second ordinance stipulates that the state will retain all the rights with
regard to local purchasing, importing and exporting hydrocarbons and their by-
products. These rights will be exercised by the intermediary of a public enter-
_ prise (created by a bill passed on 20 January 1978) called the Zairian Petroleum
Enterprise (PETROZAIRE). This enterprise, however, can authorize individuals or
corporntions to import or to exploit some petroleum producta which will have to be
apeci.fied in advance.
The third ordinance modifies and complements the law of 20 January 1978 which
- created PETROZAIRE. It should be noted that as soon as the ordinance goes into
effect, and without pre~udice to all the other regulations currently in force, the
mining rigrts over hydrocarbons (as indicated in the Orginance Law No 67-231 of
11 May 1967 covering the general legislation for mines and hydrocarbons) wi11 be
assigned to PETROZAIRE on a preferential basis for the entire territory of the
Republic of Zaire. To exercise all or part of these rights, PETROZAIRE can enter
- into contracts by which this enterprise can be replaced by or become a partner of
already established corporations or corporations which will be created at a later
date.
COPYRICHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
8796
CSO: 4400/1284
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- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030004-0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440030004-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ZAIRE
INGA INDUSTRIAL FREE ZONE ESTABLISHED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 pp 1429-1430
[TextJ A presidential order, issued on 2 April 1981, instituted a free zone system
for industrial purposes in Inga (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER~.ANEENS of 17
April, page 1139). A second ordinance signed by President Mobutu Sese Seko on 30
April 1981, deals with "the creation, organization and running of the administration
for the Inga free zone system."
The terms of the latest ordinance call for the creation of a public service depart-
ment of a technical nature which will have administrative and financial autonomy
and will be called the Inga Free Zone Administration (abbreviation ZOFI).
Excerpts from the ordinance-law of 2 April 1981 organizing an indu~trial free zone
system in Inga:
--The main purpose of the Inga free zone is to encourage the creation...of industrial
plants combining the ~ollowing characteristics: they must be heavy users of
electric power, they must produce goode primarily intended for export, preferably
utilizing domestic raw materials.
In general terma, the purpose of the free zone is to help to meet the targets of
the country's economic and social development by: 1) making the operation of the
Inga hydroelectric complex profitable; 2) increasing the value of the national re-
sources; 3) stepping up the induetrialization of the country; 4) bringing a transfer
of technology to Zaire; 5) improving Zaire's foreign trade; 6) mobilizing foreign
capital investments.
--The management of the free zon~ is entrust~d to a public agency under the super-
vision of the Presidency of the Republic.
--A11 requests to ~oin the free zone system will have to be submitted to the above-
mentioned adminiatrative authority. Each request will be accompanied by a support-
ing document, with 15 copies attached, drawn according to a standard form as yet to
be determined by the adminiatration of the zone and duly approved by the supervisory
authority.
--Admisaion into the free zc,.7e eystem is ratified by a draft agreement reached
between the Executive Council and the developer.
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--Only pro~ects meeting the established guidelines will be declared acceptable:
--The minimum consuniption of electric power required mus t be 10 million watts or
the equivalent of 10 percent of the enterprise's added value.
--If all the developers are foreigners, at least 80 perc ent of the total investment
must be financed with foreign funds.
--The total of the loans raised to finance their investment cannot exceed 70 percent
of the invested capital.
--Also, the total amount of loans repayable in 5 years cannot exceed 30 percent of
the invested capital.
--Any enterprise gaini~g admission into the Inga free zone system is subject to the
laws in force in the Re~ublic of Zaire, mainly those applicable to the economic,
social, fiscal, accounting and exchange spheres. ~
--Eligibility to the Inga free zone system precludes taking advantage of ineasures
off~red by any other investment system in Zaire.
--Inasmuch as the local market cannot pravide, under the same conditions of quality
and price, the equipment goods, implemF~its, materials and raw materials required
for the good operation of the enterprises, these items will be exempted from paying
the import duties applicable under the tax and tariff legislation with the excep-
tion of the statistic tax.
--ThF. industrial goods produced by the approved enterprises which can be sold inside
the Republic of Zaire, by specific dispensation granted by the free zone adminis-
tration, will be placed in the same category as similar imported goods and subject
to custom duties.
The ZOFI administrative office is located in Mwanda; a permanent office will open
in Kinshasa. The main responsibilities of this adminis trative office are: 1) to
promote, plan and develop the free properties, the integrated industrial properties
and the non-integrated industrial properties of the fre e zone; 2) to conduct any
studies ~ohich will promote and coordinate desirable investments inthe free zone
and will lmprove its utilization; 3) to disseminate aTl information and documents
dealing with the free zone system; 4) to map out programs and plans for the develop-
ment of industrial properties in keeping with the plans and programs of development
for the entire country; 5) to offer auggestions or advic e prior to the creation of
independently managed agenciea having an impact on the operation of the free zone;
6) to initiate or participate in the training and skills improvement of native
personnel working in the plants established in the free zone; 7) to study and
suggest measures likely to improve the facilities off ered to the enterprises estab-
lished in the zone.
It should be noted that the development of the Inga industrial free zone has the
backing of the UN Development Program (UNDPJ~ which, accord~ng to the terms of an
agreement concluded in 1980, will give $100,000 worth of financial aid for the
pro~ect over a period of one and a half years.
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Let us mention that the purpose of the pro~ect is to introduce, in the legal frame-
work of a free zone, industries which are heavy consumers of electric power to
utiliae the electric energy produced by the Inga Dam.
An interdepartmental task force, presided by Councilman Kinzonzi and assisted by a
UN consultant, has already been set up and is preparing a list of problems arising
from this free zone. Other consultants are expected and they will prepare technical
files which will serve as the basis for negotiations with future partners. The
possibility of appointing a permanent consultant as early as this year is also
under consideration.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
~ 8796
CSO: 4400/1284
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400430004-0
NOR OFFIC'IAI. l1tiN: ONLY
ZAIRE
_ INSTRUCTIONS TO TRANSFER REMUNERATION OF EXPATRIATES DETAILED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1430
[Text] A Bank of Zaire circular (No 176 of 6 April 1981) sets out the administrative
measures to be complied with by employers to obtain from the Bank of Zaire the 1981
renewal for a"total authorization" allowing them to transfer abroad, and in foreign
currency, a portion of the remuneration of their expatriate agents and the social
_ contributions which they are obliged to pay in compliance with their contractual
obligations toward those agents.
We should explain, the BELGOLAISE jBelgian-Zairian Bank] points out, that employers
must submit to their particular bank, no later than 31 May 1981, their request for
the renewal of the total transfer authorization.
Here are excerpts of that curcular:
1) Zairian enterprises employing expatriate agents within the scope of employment
contracts auly authenticated by the appropriate authorities can submit to the
approved banks a request for the transfer of a portion of the net renumerations of
these agents as well as the payments due to social security agencies abroad.
2) The total amount requested to be transferred must be.express~d in a convertible
currency selected by the employer for the entire expatriate staff of his company.
It will only cover the salaries contracted by the employer and does not include any
indemnities, allowancea, bonuses, premiums and other outlays of this kind, nor will
it cover bonuses or payments of a similar nature given at the end of a person's
career.
3) For 1981, the monthly amount requested to be transferred (transferable amount)
for each agent already on the post cannot be higher than the transferable amount
.311owed for 1980. Only the Bank of Zaire is entitled to study possible departures
from this rule provided that internal ad~ustments do not lead to raising the overall
ceiling. The portion of the monthly remuneration paid locally in Zaires (non-
transferable amount) must cover the real local needs and living expenses of the
agents and their dependents in Zaire. Any adjustment on that portion of the remun-
eration, for whatever reason, cannot result in an increase of the transf erable
portion.
, 38
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4) The remunerations must be declared for business tax purposes. The transferable
and non-transferable amounts represent the net remuneration paid to expatriate
agents. This net remuneration is obtained by deducting the business tax from the
taxable income.
5)--(a) The approved banks are authorized to issue total authorizations for the
1981 fiscal year providing that the f~llowing conditions are met: the enterprise
requesting an authorization must have had a total authorization in 1980; the agents
of the enterprise must have received a transfer in 1980. For those agents who onl.y
received a transfer for part of the year, the banks will do an extrapolation to
f igure out the total transferable amount for 12 months; the agents must have a
working contract duly approved by the National Employment Department as well as
a valid working permit. A copy of their work permit must be submitted to the bank
and will be kept there, attached to the documents of authentication; the monthly
salaries which can be transferred on behalf of each agent cannot be higher than
those of 1980; agents who receive a transfer of remuneration cannot be partners in
the companies where they work.
(b) The Bank of Zaire will determine the total amount that enterprises are author-
ized to transfer each month as remuneration of their expatriate agents who were not
included in the 1980 transfer authorization.
6) Backed by the issued authorization, the approved banks must transfer the author-
ized remunerations directly into the foreign accounts of the expatriate agents who
are entitled to them.
9) The banks are authorized to transfer abroad, directly to the recipient agencies,
the amounts d~e as contributions to a retirement pension or as professional insur-
ance premiums which the employers are obliged to pay in accordance with the contracts
signed with the expatriate ~gents within the limits of the indicative ceiling
figures established in that sphere.
10) No tranafer can be made for remunerations, pensions or insurances connected
with the employment of expatriate agents and paid out of accounts convertible into
Zaire or into foreign currencies which have been opened under the employers' name,
unl.ess these employers have a total authorization.
11) The enterprises must request the agreement of the Bank oP Zaire before they
engage expatriate agents. This formality must take place before they submit a
request to regieter these agents or to transfer their remuneratione.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
8796
CSO: 4400/1248
- 39
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030004-0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030004-0
; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ZAIRE
BRIEFS
DIAMOND MARKETING--Following previously reported news that Zaire is planning to
market its own production of industrial diamonds (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITER-
RANEENS of 8 May, page 1310), the London offices of the De Beers company said, on
15 May, that reports claiming that Zaire had broken the contract granting exclusive
~ marketing rights to that campany were premature and that negotiations were contin-
uing. Tim Capon, one of the De Beers company's top officials, was scheduled to
discuss this issue, in Brussels on the 15th, with the director of SOZACOM [Zairian
Company for the Marketing of Ores], the Zairian state company responsible for
marketing the country's mining production. But according to reports emanating from
Brussels, Zaire is said to have ~ust entrusted to three companies--the Antwerp-
based Caddi and Glasol companies and the London-based Industrial Diamond Co--part
of its diamond production in the context of a policy aimed at curtailing its trade
relations with South Africa. It is reported that SOZACOM will continue to offer
_ from 25 to 40 percent of its diamonds to the De Beers company which persis~s in its
demand for exclusive rights claiming that this is absolutely essential to guarantee
the stability of prices particularly under the present circumstances of glut on
the world market. The De Beers company, which is part of the Anglo-American Cor-
poration, a South African group, sells more than 80 percent of all jewelry and in-
dustrial diamonds mined throughout the world. Since 1967, it has had exclusive
marketing rights for the large Zairian production. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
22 May 81 p 1429) 8796
RAILROAD RENOVATION--In our issue of 23 January this year (page 201) we mentioned
that the Federal German Republic had granted a credit of DM 45 million to the
Zairian National Railroad Company (SNCZ). This credit is part of a$48.8 million
- overall financing program subscribed by the World Bank, the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), the German KfW [Reconstruction Credit Bank] and the Saudi
Development Fund. The program is intended to modernize 210 kms of track and to
ballast 285 lans. The share of capital contributed by the Executive Council will
be close to $59 million. According to SNCZ officials, this pro~ect is the initial
phase of a program to modernize 700 kms of track, mostly in the Kasai province.
The rails which weigh 29 kga per meter are too light for the traffic and will be
replaced by rails weighing 49 kge per meter. To carry out this program, the SNCZ
intends to build a plant to make concrete ties providing a better anchorage for
- the ties while, at the same time, cutting down on the expenditure of foreign ex-
change. Equipment will also be provided to reopen the ballast quarries which have
been inactive for several years and to adapt those quarries to the needs of the
intended modernization program. The program also involves the purchase of mainten-
ance and service engines, locomotives, hopper cars and passenger cars. An additional
$32.5 million are earmarked to build up the basic stock and to carry out repair work
on the immobilized stock. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
- French 22 May 81 p 1490] [COPYRIGHT: R 40 Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
C50: 4400/1284 FOR OFFI~[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030004-0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030004-0
'
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONL '
ZAMBIA
BRIEFS
SAUDI PRINCE'S VISIT--On 14 May, Prince Nayif ibn ~Abdal-Aziz A1 Salud, Minister
- of the Interior of Saud3. Arabia, on a 5-day official visit to Za~bia, had a
series of talks with President Kaunda at Lusaka. At the conclueion of these
talks, he declared that his visit to Zambia marked the beginning of a strengthening
of Saudi-Zambia relations. The prince also aff3.rmed that in the face of the
"inconsistency" of the Western nations, it was the duty of the Arab and African
countries to coope.rate closely in economic matters. Upon his arrival in Lusaka,
Prince Nayif expressed Saudi Arabia's des3re to invest in Zambia development
projects, particularly in the field of agriculture. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1432] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
PURCHASE OF PRENCH VEHICLES--The ZTTC jZa~nbia Travel and Touring Company] will
form a car rental company called Rent-a-Car. The company will commence operations
upon delivery of 30 Peugeot~s ordered from France. .ZTTC has ordered both vehicles
and boats from France for 5.6 million Zambia kwachas, than~CS to a French supplier~s
credit. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French 22 May 81
p 1432] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9693
CSO: 4400/1283
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ZIMBABWE
MUGABE HANDLING OF WHITES ASSESSED
London NEW AFRICAN in English Jun 81 p 33
CArticle by Albsrt Mawarire: "How Wi1y Robert Mugabe Is Scoring in Handling the
Whites of Zimbabwe"~
~Text~
EVEN HARD$ITTEN members of the New fornm
once-entrenched Rhodesian Front (RF) The nanow RF victory must have
are having to admit it now. White surprised a lot of white Right-wingers
political opinion is completely divided in ~ause it was the smallest margin in
Zimbabwe. nearly two decades of a white politicai
The split was confirmed recently by the stranglehold.
_ resignation fmm the RF of a fo:mer prime Minister Mugabe~has tactfully
Minister and leading MP of Ian Smith's exploited this split in white ranks by
one-time ruling party, Andre Holland, to callin for a new forum to re resent
form a new party. g p .
At the same time, white former MP White intereats in Parliament.
Ahrn Palley called on whitee to back He said the forum should not have the
Prime Minieter Robert MuQabe', 2ANU t'acial imprint of the RF, which at the
(PF), ~syin~ there wae no middle-road moment controle all the 20 constitution-
option for whites any more. ally entrenched white eeate in Parlia-
The white pendulum ie ewinging away ment.
from the raciat Rhodeeian Front, which The exietence of the RF in ita preaent
many whitee are now eeeing ae repree� form inevitably poees a threat to the
_ enting an old order that haen't much say country's seneitive racial infraetructure.
in the r?1nnir?g of the country today. Because it is a white party, the RF
- In fact, the dominance of white politics Bives the impression that all whites are
by the $hodesian Front in Zimbabwe is in opposition to the government - a
elowly ebbing away. situation which was true yesterday,
Thxs was proved during the last perhaps, but which tod..y is far from true.
by-election in e Saliabury conetituency The government's policy of reconcilia-
when the RF candidate narrowly pipped tion has reassured many whites about �
- a libera) independent white councillor new order.re, as long as they accept the
whose rallying cry wea: Let s aupport Many now believe that Mugabe's
the government'e policy of reconciliation aesurances are genuine and are prepared
and ahow that whites are willing to atay
and develop Zimbabwe." to give the government a chance, some-
thinR which the RF seems reluctant to do.
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At the same time, as a veteran white Though obviously welcoming the split,
- observer remerke: "The days of'good old the Mugabe Government is not particu-
Smith' are gone - and you can expect an larly happy with the formation of yet
exodus of whites from his party." another white party. Hence hia call for a
The. breakaway Democratic Party of new non-political forum for whites.
Andr~ Holland has been described by the
old white Centre Party as "an important
development which is long overdue". C+O~l'aQeo~ BC~OZL
Understandably, some whites have Farai Munyuki, editor of The He~nld,
reacted to recent changes with caution. wrote: "Mr Holland may deserve con-
"Having been boxed in by RF thinking gratulations for his courageous action
for so long, we are bound to tread eoftly but he is to be chided for not going all the
whenever there are developments like way. He has announced the formation of
this. But one thing is for sure: we whitea a new white party. Why? Who needs a
have been split right down the middle", a white party at this etage in the country's
former RF supporter confided. political development?" ~
A eurvey carried out by a Salisbury Neveitheless, the weakening ofthe RF
newepaper ehows that mopt whitee are is certeinly a feather in Mugabe's cap. He
fed up with the RF. Most whitee inter- has proved once again that he ie not the
viewed called for the diseolution o}' the blood�eucking Marxiet killer that RF
party, wying it no longer had a role to PropaRanda made him out to b~
play in 7.fmbnbwean politice.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/89 END
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