JPRS ID: 9868 JAPAN REPORT

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• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9868
24 July 1981 .
Ja an Re ort
p p
(FOUO 43/81)
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9868
24 July 1981
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 43/81)
CONTENTS
MILITARY
Decision ~rocess in Selecting Tan-SAM Over Roland Examined
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, various dates) 1
SCIENCE AND ~ECHNOLOGY
Optical Fiber Cable Transmisaion System Develop~s Ranidly
(TSUKEN GEpPO, No 3, 1981) 18
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
CAD ACiT/~? ~ i � rnr r~ ~ r
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MIZITARY.
DECISION PROCESS IN SELECTING TAN-&AM OVER ROLAND EXAMINED
Tokyo MAINiCHI DAILY NEWS in English 19-26, 28, 29 Jul 81
[19 Jun 81, p 3]
[Article: "Roland's Defeat by Tan-SAM"]
[ Text ] Against a backdrop of mounting tension in u�haf is caJled the new ,
cold war, the focuc of attention is no~~ on the role Japan wili play in
its defense. The United States is determinedly pushing hard its
demand that Japan spend more tor its delense buUdup, while Tokyo
appears to be following the line set by Washingto~ by making a
conspicuous turnabout in its defense policy from its past low
posture.
Last year Japan decided to adopt a new 1ow-altitude surface-ta
air guided missile called Tan-SAM trom fiscal 198I lApril 1981-
biarch 1982). T'he Tan-S~li is a production of domestic technology,
outracing the French-made Roland in a business competit3on.
This business game u~as a reminder ot history that shoa5 tbat
past global expansion o! military outlays provided wider arms
markets, eventuatiy leading to the 6irth of "Metrt~ants of Deatb."
Today. there is an indication that arms makets have grown
powerlW enough to exercise theirinfluence overpolitical dectsions.
It may be meaningfW, therefore, to trace the following questions:
Ho�~ ��as the Tans~tii developed? Why did the Japanese govern-
- ment adopt it? t~~hat is business competltion like in securing a
missile contract?
The RIDN is running a]0�instaJlment series, starting today,
presenting the background stories ot how weapon makers actuaUy
conduct their business. The series wi17 probably lead to the question
_ as to whether it is possible to check the growing trend towaM
militarism.-Editor.
~
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L'pon fearning u! his tailure to dow~n our otfers, Japan used as the DA's lntemal Bureaus, staff
�~in a contraci to sell Roland an excuse Lhe tact that it has a officers of the three forces.
missiles to Japan, Jacques polic}~ of stan~dardizing its There remained no room for
Tissandier.~~icepresidentofthe w�eapons with American doubtthatthedecisiunwouldbe
French Export Oftice of specifications." approved at a higher level W
A e r o n a u t i c b7 a t e r i a 1 Because ot this policy, formalizeit.
tOFEbi~), lamented, "I cannot how�ever, the Roland K~as a The telex was immediately
believe the Roland is inferior to promising item as the United conveyed to the chief of the
- the Tan-SA111 ~Japanese-rr,ade States approved the production Arms Agency (DGA) of the
missile~. I was ven~ conf~lent under license of Rolands in 19i5. ~}ench Defense Ministry. Tvuo _
that the Re:and w~ould outmatch The Frenci~ side ~as expeGting days later French Ambassador
the Tan-SA.~4i even though its much from the possible sale et to Japan Xavier ~de~ la
price is higher. Rolands to Japan, which would Chevalerie visited the DA office
~�But Japxn refused to buy the have reversed the past pattern at the instruction of the DGA.
Roland. This is because the of arms business with Japan. But the explanation given to
Detense Agency made a In April last year, a think- him by Toru Hara, vice
`political' decision. Then it w�as tank of the French Defense minister of the Defense Agency,
no longer ~~ithin our reach, no ~~~?~stry issued a report entit~- Was; ~~No decision has been
matter hok� pow~erful u~e might ed "Rolands or Tan-SAMs." made on the option between the
'ba~~ebeen." The paper pointed out that a RolandandtheTan-SAM."
OFE'.1La is a~~~ell�kno~~~n. PossiblE Japanese purchase of Next day the French am-
state-funded French arms Rolands would bring about bassador called on Vice Foreign
ealer, covering world~~~ide significant benefits to France. Minister Masuo Takashima.
r~ Amid the sharpening trade
markets under i~ sales net� dispule between Japan and Takashima only said that he
~w~ork. Tissandier led the France," the paper read, would relay to the foreign
_ ,company in a three-year � minister and the parliamentar,y
campaign to sell the Roland to Roland sales to Japan would vice foreign minister what he
have been a great help in rec-
Japan. Behind the company heard from de ia Chevalerie.
stood the French Defense titying our trade deticit (with On Nov. 29 Francois Missoffe,
_ ?~iinistry encouraging their ~apan~~ special French envoy arrived in
ettorts aimed ~at the Japanese On Aug. 3, 1980 Isamu Tokyo on a mission to discuss
Air Self-Defense Force. r'akamura, representative of the bilateral trade issue with
ButlastautumnJapanpicked OFEMA's Tokyo office, Japanese leaders. While in
the Tan-S4~i de~~eloped by dispatcbed a telex to its Tokyo he kept consulting with
T o s h i b a C o r p., d a s h i n g headquarters in Paris that the Paris over whether he should
OFED~IA's hope of selling Defense Agency had decided touchonRolandsalestoJapan.
RolandstoJapan. "t~~o days ago" to buy Tan-
OFEAIA's sales basket, of- SAMs for both the Grnund and Qu8lity .
fered to Japan, contained not Air Self-Defense Forces. This
onl}~ Rolands but other items telex was a surprise to OFEhiA. In the wake of the DA's of-
such as A4irage F-ts and A4ilan ficial as~nouncement late last
antitank nissiles as well as Hot SuTp1'ise Telex August to purchase the Tan-
G a z e] 1 e a n d D a u p h i s OFEi,~A suspected that the SA144, questions W~ere raised at
multipurpose helicopters w~ere Ground Self-Defense Force Diet sessions on the quality of
- also included. Ali these would be certain to adopt the ~e Japanese-made mtssile.
weapons wers offered to Japan, Tan-SAMs. But it bas a strong Keigo Ouchi, a Diet member of
but none were purchased as feeling that the Air Self-Defense ~e Democratic Socialist Party,
they were outrivaled by Force would use the Rolands. spearheaded tbe debate at an
- American Weapons. 0~'E1ViA had this hunch on t~e extraordinary Diet session in
basis of an analysis of views of October. He argued that the
��I suspect," said Ttissandier, Self-Defepse Forces otficers. Tan-SA11i was inferior to the
`~Japan might have used our Roland.
products as a camouflage to The DA's decision was taken
hide its intention to finally pick at a meeting of working Under these circumstances,
K~hal it really �~anted to bu~~." counsellors. Among those OFEMA maintained that
He went on to say, ~~In turning Present were senior officers ot Missoffe should strongly raise
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the missile tssue at a press'
meetlag. The ottice eved
prepared a press release on it.
in w6ich OFEMA rebutted DA ,
Direct~r General Joji Omura's
COp~EAt10A that the Tan-SAM
was superior to ihe Roland in
quality.
Omura had, for i~stance,
assured the Diet that the range
of the Tan-SAM was twice that
- of the Roland. t In actuality, the
- two missiles are almost the
same in this category. ~
By revealing these facts,
OFEMA appareatfy thought it
could render the DA's decision
to pick the Tan-SAM null and
void. But at the last momeat the
press n s:ase was discarded.
`~The DGA took that decision.
I guess the overaU bilateral
relations were taken iato ac-
count rather than the benefit
that might be obtained from
makinQ the misslle issue a
diplomatic dispute," grumbled
A'icolas Sirieix, aa OFEMA
officfal in charge of the
Japanese market.
On Dec. 5 Mis'sdffe met the
press. 1liissoffe aarrowed down
the scope ot his mission to
economic problems facutg the
two countries. But when asked
about the trade issue he an-
swered ironically, "I hope
Japan will not dash our hopes
with a shot of Tan�SAbi."
On Dec. 29 t6e National
Defense Counctl chaired by
Prime hiinister Zenko Suzuki
gave the gi~een light to the
purchase of Tan,SAMs. ~
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[20 Jun 81, p 3]
[Article: '"Satisfactory' Trial Firinga"]
A ceremon}� celebrating the homing method. R'ith this method it a~as ex- ~
establishment ot Japan's tirst Assistance u~as extended by pected that the Tan-SAM
fuliy-mechanized di~ ision - the Toshiba Coip., Hitachi Ltd., missile wtould be able to eatend
Se~~enth Dir�ision - was held Niitsubishi Hea~p Industries, shooting range and aim at
� during a snowstorm at the Nippon Electric Co., and Mitsu- successive multitargets.
Higashi�Chitose garrison camp bishi Electric Co. In August 1971 the DA's
in Chitose. south��~estern T~~o years later the guiding Equipment Council officially
HotJ+aido. Tal:ing part in the system ~~as changed to an in- gave the gaahead for the
militan� parade ~~ere 230 T~~e- frared terminal homing development of the Toshiba
74 main battle tanks. 340 ar- method. The decision on the missile. During the period
mored eehicles and guns. change ~~as made b~~ the DA's betw een 1972 and 1976 Toshiba
The di~~ision is a'�crack" Equipment Council. The ~aunched more than 40 missiles .
force commissioned to defend financial burden of the electric� oft the Iz~ islands in a
_ Hokkaido. Japan's northern u�a~~e terminal homing method technolog,y~ test. Between 1978
most main island. One divis:A~? w~as a key element lead~ng to and 1979 the firm also fired
ofticer said proudly that the this conclusion. another 20 missiles in practical
much�impro~~ed striking pow~er A Tan-SAA1 guided by the t~~
ot the Se~~enth Di~�ision could electric-Kave terminal homing The trial tirings came to an
match that of an American or method needs t~c~o radar sets for end with what u~as described as
So~�iet armored di~~ision. a single shot. When the missile ~~5atisfaciory results" by the
But ��hen it comes to air is guided by the infrared ter- khen chiet of staff of the GSDF.'
~ de[ense, the GSDF dicision has minal homing method, it is But the road to the development
~~ulnerabilit~~. For instance, capable of automatica{1~~ of Toshiba's Tan-SAbi missile
high-angle nt-~? guns and seli- chasing an enemp aircraft after Kas not an easy one. The
propelled ni-la artillery� are launching. The only problem company had to shoulder the
either obsolete w'orid K'ar II or u~as the latter has a shorter costs amounting to 10.4 billion
horean �~ar ~~intage. range than the former. � yen.
E~�idently these old�fashioned A lesson learned trom ihe
D9iddle East ~~ar also served as Or. the part of the Defense
��eapons are a far cn� from a factor to support the infrared Agency, an Equipment Council
required performance in an terminal homing method. In the meeting was called into session
actual w~ar in this era of high u~ar, the performance of an- at least tive times in order to
technolog>~. tiaircraft missiles vulnerable to discuss the propriety of the
lt ��as in 196G that the Ground e~ectric jamming suffered Tan~SAM missile project. In
Staff Office launched studies of humiliatingl~. fact, there are man~~ cases in
the deplo}~ment of Tan�SAl7s in which weapons domestically
a bid to fill the gap bet~veen p( ~e five companies sup� designed and developed have
medium�range antiair missile porting the Tan-SA:1t studies, failed to get final DA approval
. Haw�ks and 3amm antiaircratt o~~� Toshiba w�as enthusiastic after passing a test for practical
automatic L-90s. about the infrared terminal use. The AAM-2 air-to�air
The office expected the homing method. In 1970 the firm missile is such an example.
missile to have a shooting range devised a lock-on-after-launch ~~Indeed, it was an ad-
of more [han 10 kilometers. to system, a variation of the in� venturous project for us to
be capable ot shooting multi� frared-guided znissile method. equip a missile wJth the lock-on-
- targets in succession, and to be At that time the Ground Staff after-launch de~~ice and with
im~ulnerable to electronic in- Office termed the company the automatic chase capacitS~.
ter~~ention, There was no ~~ambitious." We spent 15 ~~ears and some 10
discussion about ��hether or not In the Toshiba method, a billion yen developing the Tan-
the missile should be a domestic missile. is designed to tly to a SAD~," said b7itsuaki Yokoji,
product or foreign made. specified height in the direction chiet ot the DA's Equipment
In the intial stage of the basic of a likely point of encountering Bureau.
studies on the T.an-SAbis, the an enemy aircraft without using ~~The cost was far less than
Detense A~ency's Research its "eye." After passing the w~hat the U.S. usually spends on
and De~~elopment Institute was specified height it opens its a pe~~ missile. But the Tan-SAM
allo~~�ed to spend 3G miliion yen ~�eye" to sight the enemy, using was the first weapon svstem
in fiscal 19GG. The missile- the infrared terminal homing Japan studied and developed
guiding spstem u~as defined as method. independently." he added.~
an electric-w~ave terminal
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In August 1980 the Defense
Agency asked for tbe ap-
propnation ot funds in the
budget dratt for tiscal 1981 W
purchase Tan-SAMs. On Oct.
the DA officially approved at
the Equipment Council the
introduction of the missile.
It was 10 days later that
Democratic Sociatist tieigo
Ouchi labeled the Tan-SAM a
defective missile and raised
_ objections to the Air Statf Of-
fice's decision to buy them.
[21 Jun 81, p 3)
[Article: "Monopoly of Mitaubiahi Group Enda"]
When the Defense Ageacy Yo~aga Seki, then vice Ground Seli-Defense Foroe for
came to the decLslon to adopt fpirm ~n 6isfbeliet~tbat
tbe time fac~to~~~missfle. manutacr-
= Tan-SAM missiles~ no one else would soon come for missiles to hu~ed here under tbe ~icease ot
but Toshiwo Doko, honorary ~re e~~ ~e Ray~eon Co, of tbe United
chairman ot t~e powertW ~ that the company? States. In thls.oontract Mitsu-
Federation of Ecoaomic ~d allow hLn to run tbe t~isk bishi can~ed away tbe lbn's
Organizations (Keidanren), � f S~~ y~ br sdareof70peraatinvalue.
was leased most at ttK aews. ~
He was tbe architect of the ~.'~~0g. and developinB ~Tos4iba P18Yed ~t a s~
- Toshiba project to develop tt?e missiles. ~ , porting rde bq in~talldng radar
Tan-SAM whik 6e was presi- ~ to 6is energetic ef- facllities oa the ~ound.
dent of the company irom forts, tbe company tnse to ~
around 1965. � become a top leader in tbe field ~ l~itsubishi COE1tt8Ct ~
Doko gave tull-0edged sup- ot missile manu[acturing
port to the pro
ject with a view to toward the end ot tbe 1950s. In tl~ee same year, Mitsubisbi
getting his company acquainted M~whihe, Toshiba ~tered Heavy ~ndustrtes was chosen as
with the weapons uuslriess as ~e missile business by starting a. pNme contractor for the
Toshiba had besn far behind ~~0f S��� after 1955 liceased production of surface- .
other compaaies in tbat fleld, ~ Work then was a to-air mfssile Nikes for the Air
although tbe Mn had enjoyed a f~' ~7' from what could be Self-Defeuse Force. T6e Mitsu-
high reputation in prewar days called a fu11-ilalgedbusir~ess. bfshf groups thns, established
for its manutacture ot trans- But thaaks .to its wartime~ its nawe as a missile producer.
ceivers and radars tor milltary oi producing a It was the TanSAAd that
prototype missile and to its helped Toshiba drive a vvedge
Aronad the time Doto took accutn~ilated high technology into thee. ~Iitsubishi goup's .
the action, Tosiilba ranked low and Imow-how of electronics, d�main ia missile pt~oducCbn.
on the DA ooontractors' list. which bold the key to suocess in I� ~t0~' 1968.. tbe DA
The Mitsubishi group, notabiY missile development, Tae6iba So~taded out Toshiba and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was moving on a rather smooth Nippon.Electric Co. as weU as
and Mitsublshi Electric Cor~., pat4 in shifting to tbe missUe
was mopopolizlag, the missile busiaess.
business. The case of Mitsnbishi In 1967 Toshiba was awat~led
Electric Ls particularly worthy a contract, toget6er with
ot special mention. Mltsubishi Electric, bq ~ tbe
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the Mitsubisbi groap about me Boon For Toshiba
possibility of manufacturiag
Tan~SAM missiles. T6e von- The development of the Tan-
ditioas attached to this request sAM is apparenUy contributing
were very severe, 6nwever, in much to an increase of
respect to quality. Tas6iba's sales to the Defense
Several months later the Agency. In fisca11981, ending in
three marUfacbu^ers submitted March 1982, We GSDF is to ta~e
ttieir draft�plaas to the Defense four sets ot Tan~AM aad the
A g e n c y. A m o n g t h e m, ASDF hvo sets, with the total
Tos6iba's idea was selected as cost abnounCmg to some ]6.6
the best in quality. billion yen on the budget ac-
In fact, it a~as a surprise to ~~t
the other manufacturers wben The DA envisages tbe
Toshiba showed the conoept of ~ deployment oi 36 sets of Tan-
mounting a lock�on-after-, ~1M in total by fiscal 1984. tbe
- launch device on its missile. "I final year in the DA's currcnt
was really skeptlcal about defense buildup
whet6er Toshiba's coacept ~~a~� ~
could be matertalized," re~aUs In fiscal 1979, Toshiba's
Takeshi Abe of Mitsubishi procuc'ement contracts with the
Electric. "I sincerely pay my DA amounted to 18.18 billion
r e s p e c k s t o T o s h i b a' s Y~, ~mpared wlth 97 billion
achievement." Y~ by Mitsubishi
On the part of Toshiba, the job Heavy Industri~, and 54 billioa
of developing the Tan�SAM was Y~ by Mitsubishi Electric. T~e
- a kind of a gamble. The com- Tan,SAM contract is expected
' pany put at stake fts own future to be+c~me a spriugboard for
i~ the busiaess of missile Toshiba to close the gap with
manatacturing by going ahead ~e Mj~~ ~uP in business
with Tan-SA,M developmen~ with the DA.
"I was well�aware that many Tbe DA intends to iatroduce a
DA oificers had bet that total ot 70 Tan-SAMs. including
Toshiba �would not be able to ~~~�~ver~d under the cur-
develop a missile of such high rec?t medium-term program.
quality. I also knew that a lot of ~In Toshiba's calculation, the DA
harassment letters about our wi11 pay a biIl ot 300 billioa yen it
missiles were delivered to the ~~aonary factor is taken
Defense Agency," said Shuji into acoo~mt.
Nakanishi, then an executive of ~~e ~ibUity of tbe
Toshiba in charge of defense Maritime Selt-Defense Force
facilities and equipment. "But ~~g itself wlth �Tan-SAMs
we were in high spirits and we ~ong ~ witb tbe GSDF and
were confident that we would be ~DF, . says Tomiou Tana-
able to materialize our ~u~ T�shiba's vice president
project," he recalls. ~d president o,f the Japan
Why, then, was Toshiba so Ordnance Association. The
enthusiastic about attempting b~
~t~ ve~ b~k ~'SAM
to win that missile contract? An Toshiba is aow competing
explanation given by Nakanishi ~e Mltsubishl groap for
- was: Developing missiles was ~e licensed production of alr�
expected to contribute greatly ~air missile AIM9Ls to be
- to the Improvement ot
Toshiba's technological a,sets. n'?ounted on F-15 tighters.
Another aim, probably more p~~~on guided mLssiles will
important, was to drive a wedge ~~eft as a potential battlefield
_ into the Mitsubishi group's between Toshiba and the
monopoly oi the missil~ Mitsubsbi group, too. Thus, no
~end seems tu be in sight in the
arch rival competition between
Toshlba and Mitsubist~. �
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[22 Jun S1, p 3]
[Ar~,icle: "France Takes Aim at ASDF")
In eazly June 1977 Koiic6i cbarge of the Japanese market. response almost assvred me of
Hamada, a Diet member of the "In arms sales we are required success in Roland sales,"
Liberal-Demxratic Party, was to obtain tborough analyses oi Nakamura cecalled.
invited to the annual Paris tbe political stance and tbe "The OFE1~A l~.dquarters
Airshow held at Le Bo~uget . detense pollcy o4 our potential decided to set the sales target at
Airport. He was the :irst client oountry," be went on to the ASDF alone. If the ASDF
Japanese politician invited as a say. bought Aol~d, we e~pected
formal guest ta the show by the . �`We have to get governmeat tbat the result would ~have a
Frencb Ministry of Detense. approval of our sales . after _ favorable inquence � on t6e
Hamada was theo tUe Defense submitting our analyses," be GSDF in its seZect~on of a
Agency's parliamentary vice elaborated. "In f~he ca~e ot missile." . .
minister. Japan, ttiee incideat in 1978 ot a OFEMA's sales campaign
Halnada was publiclzing that MIG25 flight .to Halcodate, was tbus laund~ed, aiminB at
he, would make military carrying a Sov3~et pibt seeting tbe ASDF. Nakamura started
, problems his lifetime study. He political asylv~nu, prompted ns visiting the DA oiffce to gtve his
visited the show on hIs way to study tbe possibvlty ot selliAg explanation on tbe performance
bac& ' frnm a firsthand in- Rolaad to Japaa." and pdce ot Roland. Mean-
, spection of the military ~~Keepibg in :mind the ; whlle, C. Itob d~ Co., a leading
situation ln Israel and Egypt. , po~ibility oi Japan buytng ~ trading bouse in Japan, started
While in France, however, Roland, the ~encb government ~ its own operation ln selling
Hamada failed to accept an made a tl~orough examinatiun ! Rolaud to tbe . ASDF. T6e
invitation to dinaer ai t6e of the possible Impact whkh the ; trading company had already
Versailles Palace. Because of sales m~ght have on Japan- p~n appointed as OFE11~'A's
his absence at the dinner, of- France relations and the sales agenk
ficials of the French Export posslble diplomatic reper- ; Ia May 1978, technology
- Office of Aeronautic Materiel cussions coming trom t6e ; experts ot Euromiss[le Co.,
missed a golden opportuNty to SovietUniou,"hesaid. maaufacturer .ot Roland,
sound out an influential In October .1977 Tfssandier visited Japan. They came here
Japanese politician for his sounded out a seaior DA offlcer to give a brteGng oa Roisad at
support of the sales oi Roland fo supervising Ground Staff Office the Det~ Agency.
Japan. equipment about .the sales of _ In Septeraber 19?9, tbe Air
Tbe French officials were R,oland. Tbe offlcer's response Staft Office sent a tNssi~ of _
apparently atiempting to use s o u n d e d e n c o u r a g I n.g ~ two oifioers to Europe and tbe
Hamada's iufluence in Japan as Tissandier said "The oificer UNted States. The missia~ was,
a tool to build a"political answered that t6e ASDF plans simed at oollecting infacmation
foothold'� for pmmoting missile to send a mission abroad in a on short�range antiaircratt
sales to Japan. bid to fi~d better antiair ~i1es for guarding bases.
One year later OFEMA's Vice weapons lilce Roland, althon~ � �
President Jacques TLssandler t~?e GSDF has Toshiba mgaged R.OlaTld E1lipheSi~
came to Tolryo to see Hamada ~e developmeut oIT~SAM. Out of the c~ountries the
with the same aim of prnmoting Therefnre~ au' brieCwg oa mission visited~ aU but Brltain
the sales of Roland to Japan. RO~~ ~"0Wd ~~~y 1~ad already adopted Roland. It
But Haaiada bad already lost COme�" ~t tbe DA of-
his D[et seat atter becomina Sales $tr~tegy Aush ~cers can~ied art thelr fact-
- involved ia a gambaing scandai Mdia6 mission whUe plactag
I s a m u N a k a m u r a~. emphasis on the study of
~~~LArmsegsales are qutte dit- representative ot OFEMA's Rolaod. ~ .
ferent from t6e sales of Tokyo offlce. lost no time in I n F r a n c e. J a c q u e s
cosmetics," said Nicolas AY~B ~ P~ ~ map out a C 1 e m e a t i n, a s e n i o r
Sirieix, OFEMA's o[ticIal in S~~ ~'a~'� "T~ DA's ~ EuromissUe otficlal In charge
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� of sales, showed the mission
arouad. "They lthe Japanese
oificers) were very earnest and
asged pertinent questions," he
said. ~
~ In the past~ Clementin
recaUed, he received several
Japanese missioas on arms
purcbase. ~ All the earlier
missions he met visited France
just for tbe sake of study befure
going to the United States for
real shoppiog tbere and their
questions in France were '
usually 1Wcewarm, he said. ~
After a vLsit by the DA's
research mission, OFEMA
came to believe firmly dhat the
Air Staff Office was giving a
higher rating to Aolaad. Botb
Natamura and C. Itoh sbared
that assessment.
In late 1979, dowever,
Nakamura was tipped that the
DA's intra-ministerial buresu ~
might have ordered the Air -
Staff Office to study the
adoption of Toshiba's Tan-SAM
missile. This was the begin~ing
of trouble for Roland in it~ ~ales
campaign to Japan. ~
In March 1980, C. Ito6 dc Co.
farYnally sigaed a contract to be
OFEMA's a~ent in Japan. In C.
~Itoh's judgme.nt, the pos~ibility '
was very stinng that the ASDF
wouid adopt Roland.
But the decisive moment
, came soon after that day. The
. DA's intra-ministerial �bureau
began applying pressure on the
Air Staff Office, turning the tide
in favor of Tos6iba's Tan-SAM.
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[23 Jun 81, p 3J
[Article: ~'U.S. Arms Makers Involved"j
If the French Roland missile It was in 1972 that tl~e U.S.
_ had not been produced under acquired a license from
license in the United States, the Euromiss~le to build Rolaads.
Roland-vs-Tan�SAM (Japanese- Hug6es Co. v~as picked to build .
made short-range surfao~to- the missile's compa~nents and
air missile) sales campaiga Boei~g Co. to manufacttu~e
would not have developed into launcbers.
such heated competition. Or the Ttie conclusion to select the
French-made weapoa might Roland came aiter careful
- have not been brought to at- comparison with the British-.
tention in arms sales ia Japan. made Rapier and the French-
which was attempting to built Crotale. Through this
- standardtze its ara~s specifica- comparison, the Roland turned
tions with the U.S. out to be the best in quality. The
The Roland was the Cust U.S. further spent 5256 million
European-made m[ssile the transferring technologies and
li.S. adopted. This fact was redesigning the Frenc6 missile
significant tor France and West to complete an all-weather type
Germany attempting to sell Roland II. ~ �
weapons to Japan. Euromissile
Co., the manufacturer of the Joint Campaign
Roland, envisaged a chance to '
sell its missiles ~o Japaa ~s improved type was what
because of the U.S. adoption of ~e Defense Agency's Air Stafi
the Roland. Office oace had ia mind to in=
For the U.S., the purchase of troduce into Japan. Euromis-
~ the Roland was the Cust step sIle Co. had the vested right to
toward standardizing weapons sell Rolands in Japan despite
~ used by the North Atlantic the fact t6at improvements
Treaty Organization cNATO). were added to the missile in the
Another merit was tbe United States. Therefore,
technological advaatage Euromissile and the American
Europe enjoyed over the U.S. in companies jo~ned hands in
the field of short-range surfac~ pmraoting a sales campaign of
to-atr missiles. the Roland in Japan.
The Roland had already cost It was~in June last year, when
Euromisslle Co., jolntly in- the DA was alrpost concluding
vested by France and West its selection of a missile-
Germapy, 51.5 billion and Roland or Tan-SAM-, that
required the company to spend three otficials of Hughes and
10 years develop it. U the Bceing vlsited Tokyo. Robert
United S!ates started anew its Roderick, deputy direcbor of the
own development of a s6ort- Hughes Missile ~System Group,
ranv,e missile ifke the Roland, said: Although Euroraissile has
a~cording to U.S. mUitary the exclusive rlg~ts for Roland
~ources, the cost would have sales In Japan, w~ have
been three times as much as the guaranteed that the. Defense
amount required tor the Agency would be fully supplied
development of the Roland. wlth parts in case Japan buys
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our improved Rolands. that Toshiba, the manufacturer
The Hughes official was hint- of the Tan-SAM, order~,~ more
ing that the U.S.-Europe juint ~an lo travel wave tubes worth
operation was ~progressing ~me 5500,000 frnra Hughes in
smoothly. ' late 1979.
But the DA's decision put a ,~e tube was only used for
sudden end to the Rolaad-Tan- ~~~le making. If Toshiba had
SAM sales competition after it failed to sell i~s TanSAMs to the
announced the purchase oi the ~fense Agency, the result
Tan-SAMs. After this an-'. would have been a loss of
nouncement a DA senior officer
rontended that the U.S. itse!f ~~000 to the company. .
~does not attach much im- Thus Toshiba, no ~atter how
portance to the Roland judging high it~ technology level might
from the fact that Washington ~ as a domestic manufacturer
has slashed to nothing ~e SAMuhafl to epend on the U.S.
outlays for the purchase of ~~or ~ ultra-high military
Rolands in its 1982 budget. "The ~~ological Imow-how in mak-
U.~. oNy adopted Rolands in ~g ~~e particular parts of its
reEurn for the F-16 fighters ~sile.
NATO ~urchased from tt?e gut Toshiba's order for the
U.S.," the officer said. ~~~s coincided with the time
This was denied as ground- the DA's i~traministerial
}ess by Hughes missile engine- bureau began "advising" tbat
ers. The licensed production of ~e Air Staff Office study the
Rolands in the U.S., they said, adoption of Tan-SAMs.
was aimed at saving both time At that time Toshiba was
and money. ~ ~ seemingly very confident that
They coinplained that the DA ~e DAyvould purchase its Tan-
officer used old ~data of the SAMs, the sources . saic~.
Carter administration� which ~~~mething was hinting at
actually~ did not set asiae money ~business collusion' between
for tbe purchase of Rolands in Toshiba and . Ute DA;" they
the budget for fiscal 1982. But, added. '
they went on to say, Lhe Reagan Hughes Co. was �careful in
administration would earmark
more than E5o0 miJion to buy ~mmenting oa the tube order
Rolands in its revised defense by Toshiba. Raymond Neever,
- budget. ' _ associate director of Hughes In-
Actually, President Reagan ternational just remarked:
proposed in March the purchase The campaign for Roland
of 795 Rolands with a total ~ Japan is over. For a
outlay amounting to 5564 fum like Hughes maaufactur-
million. - . ing weapons, the consumer-in-
The DA's contract for � the ~~'street is not king. T6e king
purchase of Tan-SAMs gave ~s goverument. That's why I
don t like to speak W of the
rise to further suspicfon. ~ ^ Defense Agency."
Sources weil informed about
the Tan-SAM business revealed
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[ 24 Jun 81, p 3]
[Article: "Roland Takes Early Lead"]
In consideration ai growing On the �three foreign-made
tlu~eats from low-altitude air surface-to-air missiles~ the
raids, the Air Self-Detense ASDF bad shidied, . t1~e U.S:
Force is now placing gteater II h'Pe Was
emphasis on the defease of air ooASideced ti~ee~best because tue
bases and radar sites. Until tYpe's all�weatber capabiliity
recently. the ASDF's prior[ty and infrared-se~king device
was to bnild up squadrons of F- w~ "~P~B" tA the ASDF. ~
4Es and F-15s. � ASDF of~oers dave attached
On the European milltary greater importaace to ~ all-
- front, the NATO countries re- weather capabillty 1n selecting
designed their tactical not oNy misslles bnt also fet-
"countermeasures" around fighters. T6e ASDF's purchase
1974 when the Soviets deployed of the F-104J-in 1959 triggered a
swing-wing M1G23s ia Warsaw rash of cr[ticisms beca~e tt~e
Pact rnuntries. Ground-attack-. aircraft lacked all-weather
_ ing MIG�27s were also ~p~~ty, ~ _
positioned. � In salecting F~4Es and F-15s~
Both MIG-23s and MIG�27s tbe ASDF appareqtly took the[r
are capable of penetrating i~to all-weather capabillty into
the NATO countries at an ultra acoount. . .
low altitude and at top speed ~ 1979;� Toshiba's Tan,4AM
without being detected by was developed to tbe stage ot .
NATO radars. � practical testing, wlth the
Westem military intelligence, backiag ot: the ~Gro~md: Self-
sources indicate that the ~fense Force: Air Staft Ot~ce
Soviets have recently deployed oftioers . were also lavited to.
Sukhoi-24s, far-advanced observe' tbe Tan-SAM . tiring
fighter-bombers, in the t~~. .
European theater. Both MIG- � gut the ASDF's intcrest in
23s and Sukhoi-?As are also Tan-SAM was scant because the
contirmed as 6aving been sent ~,o forces have . conflicti~g
- to, the. Soviet Far East Air ~~ews om each other's m~.
Force. In additioa, rivalry aawng ~tue
The A5DF drafted a com� Ground. Air and Mar~tlme S~tt-
prehensive prngram to protect Defense Forces apparentty ~
air bases trom low-altitude air ~ one torce trom using
strikes in its ~ve-year defense weapons developed by aaother
buildup estimate which was force.
worked out in 1978. It almed to For instance, while the MSDF
arm air bases with anti�a:; announced the adoption of the
cannons and portable anti�air U.S.-developed Harpoou ship~
missiles and short-range sur� to-air missile. .the ASDF
face-to-air missiles.. developed t6e ASMI�missile.
The ASDF began introducing From abo~t 11~arch .1980, fbe
the Vulcan anti-aircraft cannon
with a tracking radar in AprU
this year.. It has decided to
procure tbe U.S.-made St3ager
as a portable misslle�
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DA's working-level otticials
began singling out raissile
models and estimating expendi-
tures aecessary to purchase
these missiles. '
On March 30 this year, the DA
director general ~officially in-
structed his subordinates to
purchase short-range snrface-
to-air missiles, key weapon
items in t4e fiscal 1981
budgetary requesk -
Inltially, the Air Staff �Oifice
assessed that the Roland II was
the best, and tkat Tosdiba's
Tan-SAM outpertormed the
British-made Etapier: But all
three missiles were rated as
goo~l to meet the DA's ef-
ficiency standards.
The highest score was givea
to Roland largely because of its
all-weatber capability, con-
trollability and mobility
mounted on armored vehlcles.
_ It is true that the ASDF
placed greater reliance on the
Roland which the U.S. Army
had remodeled:
The assessment of the three
missiles ~ was made betweea
offtcials trom the Air Staff
Offlce and the DA's Defense
Bureau from May through
- June. .
Another session was held
from June to July, joined also
by officials from the DA's
Equipment and Fiaance
bureaus. gisakatsu Ikeda,
~ defense councillor, stated that
- the view supporting the ~n-
troduction oi Toshiba~s Ten-.
SAM for both the GSDF and
ASDF dominated the session. ~
"It was a rasult of our keen
awareness ot economizing cost, ~
personnel training, smooth
supply and maintenance,"
Ikeda expla~ned. "Our budget-
ary allotment is limited."
On Aug. 28, Ryoichi Yamada,
the ASDF chief of staff, of-
ticially decided to introduce
Toshiba's Tan�SAM. He
stressed the lnter�service use ot
the domestically-developed
missile is more preferable. But
- he made no secret ot the ASDF
assessment that the Roland
mLssile is t~e best. ~
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- (25 Jun 81, p 3]
[ArCicle: "Confuaion at Air Staff Office"]
Even when it rras revealed fiscal 1981, which was to be next missile system, it is satd.
that tbe DA's Internal Bureau finalized by late August, the DA One Ground Staff Oftice officer
had 'instructed the Air Staff should have been active in explained that the Alr Staff
Office to procure Toshiba's � making the final selection of the Office had preterred the
Tan-SAM missilea amund lale next-generation missile system Roland, but later was in-
March 1980, officials at C. Itoh by analyaing specifications sent stivcted by the Internal Bureau
& Co. still saw a ray ot hope of f rom manufacturers. ~ to select the Tan-SAM.
selling Rolands to the Detense C.Itoh & Co.. officials ptessed Yet, uniformed officers pre-
Agency. ASO officers for a reply, but tbe terred the ftoland to the Tan-
"Sure. we felt a bit uneasy , officers only repeated that an SAM. Thus the ASO became
about our prospects." said an RFP would be issued later. indecisive. "I have never deard
official at the nation's third Finally a"quasi-RFP" was of tt~e DA issuing a"quasi-
largest trading house. Yet, issued to the Roland salesmen. RFP" to salesmen befone." the
ASO's love affair with the The salesmen undoubtedly officer said. "ASO officers
Roland was deemed so deep- ~~~reted tbe "quasi�RFP" as ' might have been assounded at
rooted that we expected that the a"real RFP" and met in Tokyo ~e ~~~d specifications."
French missile would be sold to May to draw up detailed Ori i,he otber band, H~Sakatsu
the DA." speclfications. Ikeda a defense councillor~ said
It was on March 31 that the ~e Air Staff Office designat� that the Tan-SAM was
trading house became an ot- ~ June 10 as t~e deadline for developed by the DA and
ficial agent for the French ~bmitting speciGcations to the Toshlba over a perfod ot 14
Export Oftice of Aeronautical agency. On that day. C. Itoh & y~s~ adding that "tbis is a
MaterialfortheRoland. Co. otficials repeatedly ~t achievemenG UNess the
Euromissile ' Co., Roland teiepboned the ASO to defer- DA adopted the domestically-
producer; and U.S. Hughes Co., mine the date when Toshiba developed missile,~it would be a
designer of the improved would submlt its speciticatioa. g~'eeat aational loss."
Roland, were active in the sales It was apparent that ASO
campaign, Euromissile's Vice One C. Itoh ~ Co. official said ~ Tan-SAM system
President Friedemann Striegel tbat the submission of from a highly polltical pojnt of
and Hughes' Vice President ~ifications stiould be made view-in order to bolster 'tbe
- Leonard Gross called on senior "simultaneously," ~~because ~~~carmsindii~?.
~ASO officers in Tok o in earl "~'~1ef ~1D~0~ of specl-
April last year, y. . Y ~~~o~ ~d help tardy.. rival In Augns~ tht~ee pro-Rolaud
manuEacturers learn key officecs were transterred trom
Officials at C. Itoh & Co. were f~~r~ ~~Y other secttons in a
puzzled over one persistent ~e Roland speciiications ~~0~ ~~fle.
question: "R'hy hasn't the ASO were submitfed to the ageacy C. Itoh ~ Co. ofilcials had to,
issued a RFP ( request�for- admit that the miss~7e sales war
shortly after 8 p.m. bn June 10. was finally over.
proposal) yet?" ~ Unexpectedly, A50 refused to
lt is common that in making a c c e p t t h e 0 F E M A~
t~1a1 selections of wea~ons, the spec[fications. ~ The ftoland
DA reyuests manufacturers o( salesmen strongly protested
selected weapons to submit A S 0's r e t u s a 1. s a y i n g
specifications to the agency tor "Euromissfle, Hughes ~nd
detailed analyses. OFEMA officials had tbe
The trading bouse and SP~ifications drawn np in
OFEMA's Tokyo office did not Tokyo. Such an unreasonable
receive an RFP fmm.. the DA. refusal wW cause a serbus
The businessmen became in� ~~r�etional problem." ~
creasingly worried over the ASO gave~in and accepted the �
Roland sale campaign in Japan specifications.
because if appmpriations for ASO had beea In deep con-
the Roland had been compiled fusioa over the selection ot the
in the' budQetary request tor
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[26 Jun 81, p 3]
- [Article: "DSP Helps To Publicize Tan-SAN"]
Keigo Ouchi, a Democratic "backlash" impf~ct on the
Socialist Dietman, argued party's strategy m defense
against the Defense Agency's policy which has taken on a
plan to purchase Tan�SAMs at a more pragmatic course.
House of Councillors Budget It was true that the
Committee session in October Democratic Social'ist Party aad
1980. the Libera!-Democratic Party
Ouchi even called the Tan- were lntending to map out a
SAM a defective missile ~�partially-coordinated"
because it lacks all-weather defense policy. ~
capability and subsequeat ~
direct-hit accuracy under un- Caution
favorable weather conditions:. As Eiichi Nagamatsu,
1'he Dietman said that "it is just chairman of the DSP's Diet
a waste of money for the DA to Tactics Committee, pointed out,
purchase Tan-SAMs." it was teared that Ouchi's
Producing an ASO memo criticism ot Tan-SAMs might
favoring the selectlon of b~dea t6e attitude of LDP
Roland, Ouchi went on to say seniors and poss~bly mar the
that some irregWarities might chance of holding a top-level
exist in the selection of the ~~~g ~tween the heads of
ASDF's next mis'sile system. ~~,o parties.
His bombshell statement ~ far, Japan's purchese of~
_ stirred the hottest debate in the arms has ala~ays been tinted
Diet. It perplexed aot only DA� With political inter[erence,
and Finance Ministry officials either covertly or overtly.
but also offtcials of th~e Under such circumstan~es,
Democratic Socialist Party and ~ors were rife that Ouchi
the Japan Contederation of ~k up the issue, together with
Labor (Domei),' a support .~e ASO memo "at the in-
organization tor the party. stigation" of certain pro-ftoland
In fact, Ouchi's statement ASO officers or Roland ~
came as a great shcek to Domei salesmen.
members, many of whom work Ouchi refused to disclose'how
in the arms mar?ufacturing he obtatned the memo, but said
sector. The statement even he had previously told top DSP
"ran counter" to his party's leaders of his scheduled
(and Domei's) policy favoring questioning about Tan�SAMs at
the domestic production of a House of Representatives
arms. meeting.
Moreover, Ouchi's statement He explained that ttie Defense
was tikely to have a potential Agency made the sole decision
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on arms procurement but ad- assumptioa that Japaa shouid~��
- ded: build up its detense strength.
"This should be ~ altered, gut ~ome critics .said that
especially at a Wne whea ~~ouah Ouchi spoke W ot Taa-
Japan's defense strength is SAM's he ac~ually played a key
being beeted up. For, instance, role In publicizing the ever-
the ef~ciency and accuracy oi ro~,~ ~~oolc ot the
new weapons should be g g ~
discussed thoroughly among aU JBp~~
_ parties concerned." . One Japan Communist Party
About two ~veeks after Dietman ~safct~ that "Ouc~i's
0 u c h i' s c o n t r o v e r~s i a 1 an~-Tan-SAM ~ qttes~oqing-in
questioning, DSP Chairmaa f a c t- p u b t i c I z e d t h e
Ryosaku Sasaki and LDP domesticaUy-developed misslle
President Zenko Suzuki met ~cesslvely."
and agreed !n princlple that T h e r e w a s a a o t h e r
Japan should enbance its "~Berous" side to Ouchi's
deiense patenUal witWn the questioc~ng. �
limits of the Constltution-with This is because the DSP, one
consideration given to the of the six opposition parties, has
stabillty of state tinances. ~a~ i~ p~efease buildup
Sasaki asked Prime MiNster' ~ce, thus weakening the
Suzuki to select Tan�SAMs wlth previously-unified anUdetease
"due prudence." ~ buildup stance amoag the op~
New Apprnach P~ition parties. . ~
Ouchi's uestionin a Even ` some LDP Dtetmen
9 B P- � volced their concem over the
parently opened a new page in DSP's recent policp shitt.
the history of Diet debates on '~hide Ishlda, a senlor LDP ~
detense. � ~ Dletman who supports disar-
Previously, debates ceMered ~~eat, lamented tbat tbe
on whether new weapons would ~nt mood in favor of a
be "oifensive" or "detea~ve;" stroager ~Japan is very
or whether the weapons weuld dan emus. . .
- ~ run connter to provisfons in t~e ~~~at perplexe~ me tbe most ~
~ Constitution. was the ~olicy shift of one op~
It was unprecedented tor the. ~sjtloa party, Ehat is to-
efficieacy and accuracy of creasingly fanning the pro-
weapoas to be discussed ~n the armament mood in Japan,,~
Diet in postwar years. Ishida said. ~
The DSP Dietman touched oa
the missile Issue on t6e
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(28 Jun 81, p 3]
[Article: "Finance Ministry Losing Control?"]
ln compiling the fiscal 1981 DA officials were rather the defense spending should not
budget, the Finance biinistry distrustful of Finance Ministry exreed one percent of We GNP.
gave positive support for the officials who had held down Eventually, ~ Ohira won the
Detense Agency to adopt defense expenditures in the day. The guidelicwe, set by Oblra
Toshiba's TanSAMs. past. ' ~ with support frnm FM offic"ials,
Besides simply believing that In fact, the post of the DA's limited the defense ouday. to
the Tan-SAM would outperform Finance Bureau director ~~onepeiceotof theGNP.
the Roland, the ministry general has been occupied by Gradual changes have taicen
decided in favor of the adoption officials sent from the Finance place at tbe Finaace Minlstry
of the domestically-developed Ministry. Defense spending as more officials seem to favor
missile - in consideration of accounted for 19.81 percent of a defense buildup. One middle-
increased pressure trom both the total general account in 1950 rankin g of f icial at ~ 3he
here and abroad (namely the - in the days of the National ministry's Budget~Bureau said
U.S. ) for marked defense ex- police Reserve. Yet, the ratio that defense spending is like a
penditures. shrank radically to 5.24 percent straight insuraace policy. '
The Defense Agency, in an ~n 1979, He added, "It is only natural
effort to avert the increased ~ tbat we should increase defense
American ressure, wanted to The decline merely reflect- eicpenditures when necessary."
p ed the shi[t of social needs fmm {Natari e lained that -the
procure the domestic miss~le ~s to butter," maintained ~
system, a misstle-carrytng ,~ua Watari, a former DA vice '~~ACe Ministty compIles the
' destroyer and C-130 cargo minister who was formerly a budget in a maaner most ap-
planes in the 1981 budget in a Finance Ministry bureaucrat. Propriate . to the needs ot the
bid to "hasten" the DA's mid- It was Prime M!nister Zenko y~r, adding that the minlstry
- term defense buildup estimate. bas given preferentlal treat-
Suzuki who urged t6e DA to sit ~~nt ~ to defense ndln tor
It might also be true that the an the FM-prnposed : study ~ g
Finance Ministry decided to � iiscal 1981 in . apparent can-
committee on the Tan~AM's ' slderation of the U.S. uesk ~
give support to the procurement ca abilit .ON 13 da s after ~
of the Tan-SAM in the belief ~e committee s inauguration, ' Then, one ~Ital question
that the public would denounce the six-man committee ~~a~'
it as a waste oi public money if inembers mapped out a report it too macp to believe that
' the DA adopted the Roland favoring the adoption of ~~e Finance ~ Ministty, in this
insfead of the Tan-SAM, w~hich Toshiba'sTan-SAMs. current military buildup mood,
Toshiba had developed wlth a ~e decision led the Finance ' is '~�5ing ~its grip on the
state snbsidy of about 10.4 escalat'ing def.ense es-
billion yen. Mintst,ry to finance six units of . .
Therefore, DSP Dietman the Tan-SAM for the DA in
. ~ fiscal 1981, although the number'
Ouchi's "bombshell" statement was four less than the DA's
about the TanSAM's alleged initial request. '
inetficiency before the Diet sent The sa-called "Ohira-Sakata
- shockwaves to the Finance debate" is otten cited as proof ~
Ministry to the point that the ~at the Finance Ministry has
ministry considered "freezing" pegged defense expen~itures at
the budget ior the purchase of a low level tor years. In 1976~ ~
themissile. then-DA Director. General.
To break the stalemate, the Michita Sakata reqaested that ~
Finance Ministry "indirectly" the defense outlay be kept~ at ~
worked on the DA to set up a one ~erceat ~ of the gross
private study committee for a national product (GNP). On the
"rubberstamp" recognition of other hand, however, then-
the~ Tan-SAM. The DA, Finance Minister Masayoshi
however, wasfed no time in Ohira adamantly insisted ~that
spurning the idea. ~ ~
This was because DA officers
did not want Finance Ministry
officials to "select" new
weapons In the belief that it was
strictly thelr job. Besides, the 16
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(29 Jun 81, p 3J
[Article: "Start of New Competition"]
'~'or the M~tsub~sd~ group, a Phoenix must shoulder a Dominance of the domestic
le.ading weapons manutacturer crucial handicap while the arms market by the two Mitsu-
in Japan, the productioa of Patriot can be test-fired in the bishi finns is unshakable. In
short-range surface-to-air~ UnitedStates. � fiscal 1980 the two companfes
- missiles is just one of various Oa the other hand, Atsuhiko~ enjoyed combined sales of 307
lines in its arms�making Bansho, the DA's counseUor in billion yen in their procurement
bu~iness which is expected to charge of technology, is ad- contracts with the DA. This
rernain prosperous. mittedly in favor ot the Nike- figure accounted for more'than
Although the group, with Phoenix. He ~ supports � the 30 jiercent of the entire defense
Aiitsubishi Heavy Industries domestic missile from the cost contracts duriag tbe year. .
and Mitsubishi Electric as the factor. � At , the mument Mitsubishi
core, lost to the rival Toshiba He estimates that the ,Heavy Industries, is also
Corp. in the competition tor domestic missile will be ZO to 30 . planning to develop a posGNike-
w~inning a contract to sell Tan- percent cheaper, in terms of per Phoenix missile. ~
SA11i mtssiles to the Defense unit price, . than the Patriot The Nike-Phcenix is desi~ed
Agency, the failure is just a which is�expected to be priced to mount ~a target-detector
matter ot the past tor the group. at 10 billion yea a uait ~ device on �the �warhead of� the
The group is nov?~ taking aim But the solld fact exists that current Nike , model. �The
at a post-Pdike-J ~issile con- help trom the Mitsublshi group detector is capable of distln-
tract expected to be offered by is indispensable for producing guishing ~a irlendly alrcraft
the Air Selt-Defense Force. post-Nike-J missiles regardless from an enemy afrcraft.
Success in winning a contract of ~whichever missile the DA ~ 1ye follow-up missile of the
for the new medium-range SAM selects� � ~ N~~:pb~ ~ have the
missile would produce far bIg- MitsublshI Heavy Industries capability ~ ot dealing witl~' a
ger profits than the sales of is a prime contractor for the ~V-type fighter which, lt is
� SAMs. current Nike model. It iS believed, wtll become ~ a
In a bid to successfully win natural for the compac~y to mainstay model in the next
the contract, Mitsubishi Heavy think that it will again become generatlon.
Industries is in the middle of its tbe rqain builder ot the Nike-
work to remodel the Nike�J into Phcenix if and whea fhe DA 'Phe CCV stands for Control
a modernized ATike-Phoenix picks it up. Configured Vehicle. A CC'V-
missile in cooperation with the 'Meanwhile. the introd'uction ~ntroiled fiBhtert is desigqed to .
AA's Technical Research and of the Patriot v?~ill be made in ~Y a way as to move
Development Institute. . the form of licensed produetion sm~~r uPwar~~er downward
DA chief Joji Omura has by Mitsubistii Electric Co. like a butterfly or~sideways ltke
already revealed betore a Diet Through its ~xperience ia a~~~ut �changWg �its
sessioa that the institute is producing Hawk missiles under flight position. The figbter aW
planning to repiace the Nike-J an American ~ license -tor the ~ able to dodge an enemy
either with the U.S.-built GSDF, the firm has ac- missileeasily.
Patriot or the Nike-PhceNx. ~~~~ated extensive know-how The Mitsubishi firm intends
A t t h e m o m e n t. D A concerni.~g medium-range SAM to ~remodel the airhame of the
- authorities are divided in their missiles. ~~Mitsubishi Neavy Nj~~-P~i~. i~ lts eitorts. to
o inion about the selection be- ~dustries is naturallp expected ~evelop . a missile capable oi
p ~ to ' join its sister company in checking a CCV�controlled
tweea the two missiles. fi ter. ~
For instance, ~Osamu producing_ the f'atriot by ~ stW remains to be seen as
r'amatame, chief of staff of the ~?~~acturing its airframes. ~ When the com will ac-
ASDF~ fndicates his support for "Engineers -in tt?e arr~?S tually start and _c~omplete the
the Patriot oa the ground that section of, the two firms development of a~post-Nike~
Japan lacks an appropriate fi'equently ~ get together. In Pbce~ missile. But it is cer-
firing test site for medium- ~o~ ~1e two ~ compaNes are ~at the com letion will not
range SAM missiles. engaged in friendfy . com- p~
In this sense, he argues, the petition,' " commented Takeshi ~~er the start o~new~ comt
development af the Nike- Abe of Mitsubishi ElecMc Co. petition in developing more
sophisticated weapons.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1981
CSO: 4120/269 17
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
OPTICAL FIBER CABLE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM DEVELOPS RAPIDLY
Tokyo TSUKEN GEPP6 in Japanese Vol 34 No 3 1981 pp 1-5
[Text] Optical fiber cable transmission can be used over a wide area of public
communication from subscriber transmission systems to medium and small capacity
(short distance) and then to large capacity (long diatance) transmission systems.
This laboratory has been making all out efforts to develop interchange modes of
optical transmission and recently was able to put into operation inter medium and
small office transmission and intraoffice communication, and optical fiber cable
transmission will undergo its first commercial tests in JFY 1981.
Top Batter in Practicalization--Inter Medium and Small Business Offices and
Intraoffice Communication Mode
Optical fiber cable transmission is associated with a very wide area of
application because of the superior transmisaion properties of optical fibers and
is expected not only to replace existing tranamission systems but to make
ccntributions in promoting digital network formation and introducing imaging
service.
This laboratory classifies optical fiber cable transmission modes into the five
following public information transmission modes of subscriber systems,
intraoffice, short distance (medium and small capacity), long distance (large
capacity), and sea bottom modes, and research is being conducted to bring theae up
to the commercial application stage. Among these categoriea, the intracity office
and inter medium and amall volume office communication mode which ties together
communication facilities between nearby cities and their suburbs became
technologically feasible at an early stage, and there has been a high degree of
introduction into company businesses. Aa a result, research was initiated as
quickly as possible after which the first phase on-aite testa (FR1) and second
phase on-site tests (FR2) were completed, and these modes are presently the top
batters among these five coimnunication modes.
Here, we will introduce the technology associated with these various modes at the
final stage of practicalization in terms of the inter medium and small capacity
office transmis~ion mode centered on the results of the second phase on-site tests.
From the First Phase to Second Phase On-Site Tests
Serious studies were initiated from JFY 1975 with the objective of putting into
practical form the optical fiber transmission mode, and at the end of JFY 1976 a
18
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32 Mb/s digital transmission test was conducted within the confines of the
Yokosuka Laboratory in order to recognize the properties of basic technology
related to optical fiber cables, optical relays, optical parta, and optical
measurement equipment and to grasp the problem areas.
This was followed by initiation of studies on inter medium and small capacity
offices and intraoffice optical communiaation mode. In order to ferret out the
problem points with respect to practicalization and to evaluate the suitability of
optical communication technology under the on-site environment, a first phase
field test was conducted over the 20.8 km distance between Karagasaki and
Hamamachi in Tokyo urban prefecture from March 1978. The results of this study
indicated that the basic technology necessary to inter medium and small capacity
- offices and intraoffice mode showed early promise of becoming practical as a
result of which problems associated with practicalization became even more lucidly
defined.
This was followed by studies which placed emphasis on the economics and
reliability of this mode in order to eatablish it as a technology which should be
introduced into the Public Corporation's activitiea in which second phase on-site
tests were conducted within the limits of Kawasaki City from January 1980 using
two spans of conduit facilitiea and two spans of overhead lines for a total
distance of 17.6 km.
These tests were ended in September 1980 from which was drawn the final conclusion
that there were no problems in the practical technology. In the particular case
of the FR2 test studies on new technology such as introduction of long
- wavelength band mode and use of a VAD1 fiber were conducted, and a number of
results were obtained. Many of these technological results will be diacussed in
order below.
~
:r
.
:.:M
~,,rw
, ~
~rt`~ t9,~ ~
F n~ ~ � /
- ~ay "~r
t~.~'� :
k~ ~
Second Phase On-Site Test of Optical Fiber Cable Transmission Mode within
Inter Medium and Small Capacity Offices and Intraaffice at the Koboguchi
Branch Station of the Kawasaki Telephone Central Relay Station.
From left to right: 32 Mb/s intermediate relay, 32 Mb/s terminal office
relay, two 100 Mb/~ terminal office relay, power supply, distribution
panel (LTF). ~
~9 ~
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. _ T
N
3 /
3t~iER~6lf 5 i(~3L~
1
(Dl a~~it-ll. 4 SC, y~ y~ ~
g ~f:
~ ~ 5
~$051~
2 (B)
lC) Bict~o (A)
~ ifi ~
Ig 10
~ 1
I~~ � ~
- '~~M - ~~QM ~?J~Ir4flid~~
The route selected for this inter medium and small capacity
transmission mode FR2 route included the 11.1 km conduit line
tying together the Kawasaki Central Telephone Relay and its
- Koboguchi Branch (between A, B) and the 6.5 km distance of overhead
installations from Koboguchi Branch Office to the No 8 manhole at
Kinryu (between C, D). The intraoffice transmission mode test was
conducted within the Koboguchi Branch Office.
Key: 1. Kinryu 1ine, No 8 manhole 2. Kaboguchi Branch Office
3. Musashi Nakahara 4. Nanmu line
5. Shin Maruko 6. Tokyo-Yokoha~ca line
7. Musashi Kosugi 8. Motosumiyoshi
9. Kitsuki Office 10. Shinkansen
11. Kashimada 12. Kawasaki Telephone Central
13. conduit route 14. overhead aerial route
15. Tama River
Optical Cables Installed
_1 L r~ ~~z y-'~` 4 #'f! ~ _
lt~a
A IIIM~{-*A 6.6 ~2Me
$E~,"dLlf:
B ~kA-~~ 4.5 94&'L~ } ~
i~ f~}Q-~~ a
C 7+R8~i~~ 3.8 124~L`~i~'~ni
ic-!l. .
13 g 11 1
D? ~ t- ~'s 2.7 l~fr{tffs
-~~C7
1s~ ~ 17.6
Key: 1. interval 2. type of installation
3. cable length (km) 4. type of cable
- 5. A-Kawasaki-Kitsuki 6. conduit
7. 24 core, no power aupplied 8. B-Kitsuki-Koboguchi
type
9. 48 core, no power supplied 10. C-Koboguchi-Kinryu
type No 8 manhole
11. aerial 13. D-Kinryu No 8 manhole-
12. 24 core, power supplied Koboguchi
14. aerial 15. 48 core, no interposition
2~ tYPe
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Comparison between FR1 and FR2
~
_i . ~ FR~ FR..
~~{~i~{tb~lZi~s#~~~
1 FR' o~ 8~J 'I~o~~'i 2 f^,~~~~1~71~~t~i~r~~
~i~.~1~I~~~B
~'~?~~~~x~ ~~T~f~~J MCVD~~~f��~~ B MCVD3~xi~VAD7~~(�ao
7 T'( ""*~B ~ Tt~60~a0. 4F~150J~ 9 ~ T~rOf+m. 1~}~1251~ 11
~5~--7~~i~ ~S~r7r ~ ~ ~ ~ � ~ 4~Y~ � ~
32 ~ t~,,-~r~~ ,~~~~~c~~ ~6 ~ s~~~ey;~c~o~s~~~~~~
'J~ ~6 a�a ~L ~'~1~~~ ~ll.l7 ~1i920
~ 4 q lb ~6~3~( C~f;~B ~l~~~~~f;~FA ~))21
2 2 as~ 2 3 ~i~~*7 s~~ls 2 6 ~~~7'] ~fi x 1J~~~~~ 2
~ ir~ ~ ~1 ' ' ~1~ ~~~.?i~ 2 7 fi h 20
25 4Y3tTl..~~ 2e ~r'~~' 6iRTLI~ 29
Key:
1. purpose of FR la. item
2. evaluation of applicabilitv of optical transmission technology to the on-site
environment
- 3. establishing technology capable of introduction into the corporation's
activities
4. optical fiber and cable technology 5. types of fiber used
6. fiber dimensiona 7. installa*_ion sites
8. MCVD fiber main body 7a. roads, conduits
9. 60 um diameter core, 150 um outer 7b. conduits supports
diameter
10. MCVD and VAD fiber
11. 50 um core, 125 um outer diameter 12. optical parte technology
13. life of semiconductor laser 14. reliability guarantee of optical
elements
15. optical connectors
16. about 1,000 hours (estimated) 17. none
18. hi$h precision prepared type
(type C)
19. more than 30,000 hours (prospecta of 100,000 hours) ~
20. available
21. nonmanufactured type [field assembled type (type FA)]
22. transmission technology 23. circuit deaign methods
24. observation, control, switchover
25. aerial installation method, denaity 26. shortwave mode only
27. observation only 28. Yokosuke installation,
4-systems/support
29. shortwave and longwave modea
30. available
31. vertical type inatallations, 6-ayatems/support
32. optical parts technology
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- Principal Specifications for Inter Medium and Small Capacity Offices
and Intra-Office Optical Transmission Modes
I z r::;~: J;,l' 3$~1~~~P~1izi~s~'is~
~ 1 ; a 1a.ti~f< (0.85um) s ~t~$c (1.3um) e ~~Jfsi~
I it~~~ ~DF-6~1�S~DF-32~1(S)DF-100M(S) AF-4M(S) DF-32M(L) F-100M(L)
' ,'T;~9,.. T1~9,~ ~4~9~~ T~tli~t~~~~ ~'~~9~~ ~Tv9n. �~~.~19~~
~ f~ Lt ~e 2:fi~~ 93 1~E~ 104 k~ ~~11 1~ 3 x~ 3~ X~ 1~ 2 k~
rJ.E~ ~il 1i~ ~ 18 ~501~ 16 ~501~ 17 ~-s00m
sl~ 1~11 I 12 km ~ 101an 91~ 101an 9~.. 181~ -
211~
':~~Il li:r-~ : i 2~ r~-=r F'ffs~~- F~T ~f� 21 ~ ~ 21 Fl 1's
+ (3.5- 4 dB~ Imo) (1.2dB/Imi) ( 7 dB/km)
~ k 22 23 ~=:~#t~~-+?' Z~i1E9'~f~'-F ~~t~~-~?t' s~'kS'T~t-F
~t~~-~t`
t;; .4: f s 2 ~ S i t F Y~( ~1'- F z e Ge t F 9'T F 2 s pIN t F 9'~f ~t- F
30 �;A;,,w; it;t~�91 t- it:~'~: ~'~#Uki.-'?1` 31
Key:
1. item 2. transmission mode
3. inter medium and small capacity office transmission mode
shortwave-length band
5. longwave-length band 6. intra-office transmission
7. transmission signal 8. digital second group
9. digital third group 10. digital fourth group
11. TV 1 channel, audio 1 channel 12. digital third group
13. digital fourth group 14. digital second group
15. applicable distance 16. 16 maximum 50 km
17. maximum 600 meters 18. interrelay distance
19. applicable optical cable 20. graded type multiple mode fiber
21. same as left 22. light source
23. semiconductor laser 24. light emitting diode, semi-
25. light emitting diode conductor laser
26. light receiving element 27. Si photodiode
28. Ge photodiode 29. PIN photodiode
30. * Iight source: Light emitting diode
light source: semiconductor laser
Longwave-length Band (1.3 um band) Will Also Be Developed
_ We conducted tests on 3 types of digital tranamiasion modes (second group, third
group, fourth group) and analog image transmission mode ssing pulse frequency
modulation for the inter medium and small office transmission mode with FR2.
The third and fourth group digital tests involved the addition of shortwave band
(0.85 um) to employ a longwave band (1.3 um) transmission mode.
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These on-site longwave band transmission teats were the first of their kind in the
world in which an InGaAsP laser diode was used as light source and a Ge avalanche
photodiode was used as the light receiving element by which means it was hoped to
enable ~reater transmission diatance. We were able to roughly double the resulte
obtained with the shortwave band mode of 20 km between relay points.
In addition, a new observation and control system was set up as well as the
installation of inechaniam to enable system switchover which were changes from
FR1. The supports were changed from the horizontal type to a vertical type, the
installation density was improved from a four-system affair to a six-system
affair, and the transmission panel was installed at the lowest stage of the
support positioned at the site of comparatively low ambient temperature in order
to make possible longer life of the laser diode. In this manner, many
technological improvements were introduced.
In another direction, second group digital transmission mode tests were conducted
on the intraoffice tranamission mode aimed at relaxing overloading of cables
installed between offices and to increase transmission distance, and it was
^ossible to increase the operating diatance of the coaxial cables from the 200
meters of the past to 600 meters.
VAD riethod and MCVD M~ethod Optical Fibers
We test produced and made practical 2~-core and 48-core optical fiber cables
mostly of the n~ power supplied type for ahort distance transmissions. The
optical fibers were made to meet international standards where dimensions were
concerned with core diameter of 50 um and outer diameter of 125 um using graded
, type multiple mode fiber in which 50 percent of the fibers were of the VAD type
which was newly developed at this laboratory recently. The remaining 50 percent
was MCVC2 fiber of which a fraction wa~ used for the longwave transmission mode.
The optical fiber cable was unitized into 6-core optical fiber core cables which
incorporated interposition pairs and tenaion members, and they were 29 mm in outer
diameter and about 0.70 kg/m in weight.
Some of the transmission characteristics were average loss 3 dB/km in both VAD and
MCVD fibers and a transmission band region of average 1 GHZ.km for the MCVD
fiber, and these values showed that we had developed topnotch technology even when
judged from a worldwide basis.
We substituted VAD fiber for the multicomponent glass fiber used in FR1 in the
intraoffice transmission system, and cables which assembled the optical fiber
codes into 2-core, 6-core, and 10-core units were test manufactured. We were able
to attain an average loss of 3.1 dB/km losa characteriatic as a result.
23
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~~~1
~ ~ ~c ~2 )
!~~R `#~�L 96~~
~ ~3~
~ -9��ri3i~f
_ ~ ~~1=~L~I.~--7
't~~`7
6-Core Optical Fiber Unit (4 mm Outer Diameter)
Key: 1. optical fiber core wire 2. metal center material
3. cushion layer 4. polyester tape
5. winding tape
_ . ~ :Y~1=~~ii-~~1~
~ 6~'L�i~7'~f.~1=��rF (2~
~ ~r~~= , ~ (3 )
~ \
~ (0.9mmPEF-uql)
T%%3%J~%~~
(1.4mm49}~111)
24-Core Nonpower Supply Type Optical
Fiber Cable (29 mm Outer Diameter)
Four Cypes of optical fiber cables were test produced in FR2.
This figure shows the 24-core nonpower supply type aptical fiber
cable cross section. There are four sets of six-core optical
fiber units and six sets of interposition units (these are the
same size as the fiber unit) with two pairs each of
interpositioned wires which are deployed about the tenaion
member.
Key: 1. polyethylene sheath 2. six-core optical fiber unit
3. interposition unit (0.9 mm PEF core)
4. tension member (1.4 mm steel atranded cable)
Establishing Long Span Installation Technology
A new cable pulling method3 was developed to enable long spans in the
installation of FR2 optical fiber cables. This method involves the dispersed
siting of a number of cable installation facilities to perform dispersed cable
pulling. In this present study maximum length of 1,550 meters was installed in
conduits with an average length of 1,100 metera. This dispersed pulling method
greatly suppressed damage to the optical fiber cable, reduced work effort, and
minimized need for maintenance operation.
2I~
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'I~o aerial intervals between supports were used in the case of FR2 lines.
Aerial support installation technology was newly se~ up for this purpose, and a
- maximum span length of 1,280 meters and average span length of 830 meters werg
realized.
Extending Life of Semiconductor Laser
The life of the semiconductor laser necessary to satiafy the reliabilit3? of tliis
mode of communication must be more than 3 x 104 hours at a system temperature of
- 50�C. On the other hand, the semiconductor laser used in FR1 had lifetime of
but 1 x 104 hours as a result of which the improvements listed beZow were
introduced.
- 1) Placement of a protective membrane to prevent deterioration of the laser
reflection plane
2) Improvement to metal material used to melt attach the semiconductor element
- 3) Reduction in thermal resistance by a diamond heat sink4
_ 4) Reducing driving current
Endurance tests were conducted at 50�C on aemiconductor Iasers which had undergone
the above modifications, and we were able to see prospects for an average life of
4 x 105 hours estimated from the rate of increase in driving current of 5 mW.
As a result of this study, it has finally become possible to eatablish reliability
of the photo element of FR2.
Establishing Low Loss Junction Technology
Optical fiber connections come under the two categories of a permanent type
junction called splicing and a disengageable type junction using connectors. We
made splicings using a discharge melt adhesive connection method. We developed a
small and light melt adhesion connecting unit which incorporated the technologies
of preheating melt adhesion connection, automatic setting of optical fibers, and
two-directional observation which was used to make connections within roadways
Todo [phonetic] manholes, and atop posts, and the resulting loss was an average of
0.07 db/connection for core line connection and 0.03 db/site for slack
treatment.5
We used the FR1 tuned core type C optical connectors to make these connections,
_ but the FR2 is an untuned core type with small number of parts so that a new FA
type (field assembly type) optical connector which can be assembled on-site was
devised and produced. This FA type is interchangeable with the C type, and it has
been proposed as a standard basic conatruction for optical connectors within this
country. The FR2 connector is made so that 427 terminals are assembled at the
plant and 432 terminals at the site, and the extremely superior performance of
average connection loss of 0.32 dB and 0.42 dB was realized.
25
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~ Various Optical Measurement Equipment also Being Developed
During the course of these on-site tests about 10 different pieces of optical
measurement equipment including optical power meters, light source for
measurements, special transmission measurement instrument for optical fiber
cables, and emission wavelength spectrometer were developed. These ~.nstruments
all can be applied to multimode optical fiber systems for inter medium and small
capacity offices and intraoffice communications.
Along the technological front, we have improved the properties of the measurement
instruments which were developed and test produced for FR1 in which every effort
was made to reduce size and weight taking into account the ease of field handling
while all the optical input-output terminals were replaced by FA connectors to
facilitate ready coupling-uncoupling. In addition, we checked the measurement
capability of each instrument anew at the longer wave-length bands in line with
the introduction of longwave-length band mode to FR2. The instruments related
- to the light source measurements of the emission wave length and emission spectrum
are newly developed for FR2.
r~
~0`"`.,
~
Semiconductor Laser Module for Shortwave-length Band Use
Semiconductor laser modified for long life is incorporated into
this module making it possible to pro?ide laser output light
with about 4kB coupling efficiency through use of a FA type
optical connector to use with the optical fiber.
Optical Cable Transmission Modes of the Future
Basic studies on the optical fiber cable transmission mode were initiated in 1971,
and there have been a series of spectacular developments taking place over barely
10 years to set the stage for the commercial. use of inter medium and small office
and intraoffice optical communications. There is research underway in steady but
rapid tempo at this laboratory to develop commerciai applications for large
volume, underseas, and subscriber system transmission modes.
On-site tests on the large capacity transmission mode were initiated between the
Masashino Laboratory and the No 4 Coracnunications Laboratory6 in October 198Q,
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and considerable advance toward practicalization has been made. Studies on the
underseas transmission mode were initiated in November 1980, and there is a field
test under way between Izu Inatori and Kawazu which is a no-relay tranauission
mode. Studiea on the subscriber system transmission mode were initiated'id April
1980 catering to a wide spectrum of subscriber systems in the interval between the
Yokosuka Laboratory and the Yokosuka Central.
At the same time, variable demodulation technology, relay design technology, and
wave-length divided multiple transmission technology adaptable.to optical fiber
use are mode constitutive technologies which'are being developed for the inter
medium and small office and intraoffice communication mode which was recently
developed to a practical stage, and studies over a wide range of modes are being
, pursued to enable flexibility in meeting future directions in demanda.
In this manner, the developments in optical fiber cable communication modes are
very substantial, and we anticipate that previausly nonexistent wide areas of
application will be developed and play major roles in the makeup of future
communication networks.
Field Testing of Optical Communication Modes
1 2 ~ ~1 F ~ M
( 5 ~ ~"r~'~-i~~1'~~i 20.8 In~ 53.3
-55.11
~~1~~
t~:~ ~-n~o~~ ~~.s~ 5555.9
* ~ ~IBF~r-4~ 4 ~fn~b.r~r =Sp imi 55.10
~z~ ( ~ -58.3
55.11 ~
t~f~f~~ t~$ -~~i~ =101m~
1]pJ~~'~ ~[%~7~~1F~iFPh-~~3t~~' 8.21m~ 55.~
-56.3
Pif~fzi~ ~~IM$~'#'i-~Q5}~f~l 0.61m 5555.9
Key: 1. mode 2. experimental span
3. length of route 4. time period
5. medium, small capacity communication
6. Karagasaki Central-Hamamachi Office
- 7. Kawasaki Central-Kawasaki Koboguchi Branch Office
8. large capacity communication
9. Musashino Laboratory-No 4 Laboratory
10. underseas communication
11. Izu Inatori-Kawatsu 12. subscriber system
13. Yokosuka Laboratory-Yokosuka Central
- 14. intra-office communication
15. Kawasaki Central and Koboguchi Branch Office
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FOOTNOTES
1 Method of manufacturing fiber base material developed at this laboratory.
Gaseous raw materials are synthesized in a flame to prepare "chalky" and
porpus material which is heated to prepare the transparent base material.
This method is suitable for mass production.
2 One of the methods of preparing fiber uaed in the past. Base material is
_ prepared by placing about 100 layers of glass with differing index of
refraction on the side of a quartz tube.
3 See Optical Cable Choshaku Fusetsu, Vol 33, No 8(1980).
4 This is an insulating material for heat dissipation of items such as
semiconductors, and diamond with good thermal conduction is used for this
application.
5 Extra length (slack) should be provided in the cable at the junction section.
~ The common practice is to coil the cable into small loops, but bending damages
optical fibers.
6 Temporary name, presently under construction in Atsugi City.
COPYRIGHT: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation 1981
2267
CSO: 8129/1251 ~D
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