JPRS ID: 8923 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050025-7
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8923 ~
~ 13 February 1980
_ ~est Euro e Re ort
p p
- CFOUO 8%80)
~'BO$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/8923
- 13 February 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO s/so) -
CONTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Can~idate To Succeed Zabor Union Chief Profiled
(Heiko Tornow; STERN, 10 Jan 80) 1
FRANCE -
PCF Dissic~ent Antoine Spire Views Internal Paxty Dissent
- (Antoine Apire Interview; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, -
31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80) 3
PCF Remaiiis Silent on Ilissident Jean Gajer's Criticism
(Theirry Pfister; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 31 Dec 79- _
6 Jan 80) 8
- 9nti-Aircraft~ Defense, Base Protection Measures Described
(AIR 8~ COSMOS, 2?_ Dec 79) 10
Program To Equip Air For~e, by Jean de Galard
Crotales, Cerberes Installed �
_ Mirage F-1 Air Defense Missions Reviewed
- (AIR & COSMOS, 22 Dec 79) ..........................o.. 16
Update Presented on Electronic Countermeasures Developm�nt
(Gerard Collin; AIR & COSMOS, 29 Dec 79) 18
Future Antitank Missiles Studied by Euromissile Group
(AIR & COSMOS, 5 Jan 80) 22
- Bibliography of Publications of PCF Ideology
(ZA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE, Dec 79) 23
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page _
New Book on Dissident Intellectual I,ouis Althusser
(Monique Fl~renzano; ZA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE, Nov 79) 27
Bri ef s
Marchais Worries 37-
New SDECE Employees 31
ITALY
Profiles of Emerging Political, Government VIPS
(Gianni Farneti; PANORAMA, 17 Dec 79) 3? _
SPAIN
Traditionalists, Progressives Vie for Control oi PNV
(CAMBIO 16, 23 Dec 79) �...v 40 -
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COUN7RY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED LABOR UNION CHIEF PROFILED
Hamburg STERN in German 10 Jan 80 p 102
~Article by Heiko Tornow: "Career With a Full Mouth"]
~Text] In 2 years the chairman of the German Labor Union
Federation ~DGB), Heinz-Oskar Vetter, will go into retire-
, ment. The jockeying for his succession haa already begun.
"Those who let themselves be Qiscussed as candidates for higher positions
too early are already out of the picture." Gu~nter poeding, federal chairman
of the Union for Food, Luxury ~~~ems and Restaurants (NGG), defends this old _
wisdom of officials with convictions. For this reason he has beer~ denying.
for months all rumors that in 2 years he himself wants to become the suc- -
- cessor of DGB Chairman Heinz-Oskar Vetter, who is leaving office becaus~ of
age.
In a small session over beer, however, the usually so clever tactician could
not keep his mouth shut. To his colleague Erich Frister of the Education _
and Science Trade Union for teachers, Doeding revealed that tihe Vetter -
succession is practically solved. He indicated that he regards himself as
the suitable man at the head of the umbrella organization of the 17 FRG DGB
trade unions.
Doeding is not the only une who is after the Vettei job. The group of office
candidates also includes Erich Frister, his colleague Ernst Breif: of the
Postal Workers Trade Union, Vetter's depuLy Gerd Muhr, and Alois Pfeiffer,
who is responsiblQ for economic policy on the DGB board of directors. Up
to now, however, only Doecling has been dumb enough to get himself talked
about. -
Custcmarily only officials o� the s~cond rank push themselves forward. For
- the chairmen of the large and power~ul trade uaions such as Eugen Loderer
(Metalworkers Union) or Heinz Kluncker (Public Services, Transportation and
Communications Trade Union), the change to the rather powerl~ss and finan-
cially weak DGB would mean a career setback. It is in their interest to
keep the influence of the umbrella organization small. It is to this
1
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endeavor that Heinz-Oskar Vetter also owed his election 10 years ago. The
second man in the Industrial Labor Union for Mineworkers (IG Bergbau), who
was completely un'cnown at that time, appeared to thz kingmakers in the _
individual trad~ unions to be a guarantee that the Dt~esseldorf center would
continue to dance to their tune. Contrary to expectations, however, the
_ "grey mouse" Vetter acquired political profile and public esteem.
Guenter poeding, at least, firmly believes that with Vetter's position it -
would be possible to raise its prestige. The skilled cigar grader from
~ Eastern Westphalia derives this high opinion of himself not only from his -
solid self-conficence. When the 49-year-old just a year ago, after a
"disgustingly normal trade union career" (Doeding on Doeding), took over
the NGG chairmanship, Federal C'nancellor Helmut Schmidt in his capacity as
guest speaker showared him with words of praise.
Even the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, usually by no means friendly to the trade -
unions, expressed extravagant praise: "Here we have a modern trade union `
leader with ideas, for whom success, not ideology is important, entering the
first rank." And the DGB-newspaper WELT DER ARBEIT praclaimed: "An important -
man."
Guenter poeding earned such praise primarily through his su:.cessful wage rate _
policy. He made a name for himself above all through init?atives with regard ,
to the reduction of working hours and the impro~vement of the position of -
older workers. Incidentally the top official of the NGG--which bears the
nickname of "sausage union"--also gained the goodwill of the employers -
through his brave intercession on behalf of the interests of the consumption -
branch. Whenever physicians or other health apostles made alcohol and nico~
tine into the devil, beer drinker and cigar smoker Guenter poeding imagined
neople at work wh~ were out to change the system. In the interest of job
pc,,;~tions in the brewery and distillery, in tavern and kiosk, he suggested,
the Federal Government, too, should kindly abstain from the crusade against
liquor and tobacco. When Federal Minister of Health Antje Huber not long
ago warned against the tooth-killing dangers of eating sw~ets, Doeding's
NGG faced the choice between tooth decay and sugar candy and created the '
impression that toothless children are easier to cope with than unemployed '
_ sugar workers. ~
Manfred Hoenig, press spokesman for the NGG, has no trouble in setting forth
the politi.cal posit~on of his boss: "Practical center or so~ething like
that." Whether Guenter poeding is sufficiently qualified with these imple-
ments to be the representative of 7.8 million employees is being doubted by
top trade union members. They are therefore thinking about a way out from ~
this personnel misery: Vetter, who will be 63 years old at tY~e next elec- ;
' tion, they feel, should once more be a candidate for a new 3-year long term !
of office. '
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co. I
8970
� CSO: 3103
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CQUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF DISSIDENT ANTOINE SPIRE VIEWS INTERNAL PARTY DISSENT
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR ~.n French 31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pp 21-22
[Interview with Antoine Spire: "Co~unist Party: The Problem of the 'Paid
Employees"' by Thierry Pfister]
[Text] Antoine Spire, the sales manager of 50CIAL
- EDITIONS, was led to leave his post at the end of 1978.
Justified by the reorganization of the PCF publishing =
office, this separation in addition represented a con- ~
- firmation of the political disagreements between Antoine
Spire and his party's leadership, Now in charge, at
Seuil publishers, of a collection entitled, "Liberty,
_ I Spell Your Name," in conjunction with which several
communist critics have already expressed their thoughts,
Antoine Spire is publishing there the account of his own
+ itinerary under the title, "Profession: Paid Employee." _
He expresses his thoughts on it here,
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"Basically all institutinns are somewhat interdependent."
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[Question] The crisis ~olting the Communist Party seems to have stirred =
up profound turmoil in the party's salaried apparatus.
(Answer] That is so. And the issue here is an unusual and important
, phenomenon. The paid employeea, merely by virtue of the structure of their
schedules, are the organization�s key persons. When they became paid em-
ployees, it was because they were deeply motivated, ready to mould them-
selves in the party's national policy, with which they are generally =
identified.
[Question] Isn't there a certain sclerosis among them?
[AnswerJ Yes and no. The possibilities for significant changes only appear
~ at the time of departuzes. In the meantime, paid employees can only trans- -
mit opinions to the leadership without knowing what use will be made of
them. From this point of view, the paid employees are different from other
communists and at the same time similar to them. Different: Ready to give
~ everything, they are affected to the greatest depth by the crisis. Similar:
They see their intellectual curiosity stimulated by the party but also re-
- strained, the raising of certain issues being tabooed. Generally they see
their role as that of intermediaries between the leadership and the co:nmu-
nists. In the long run, some grow tired; others become bureaucrats.
~QuestionJ Wasn't it to combat such bureaucratization that a transfer
and rejuvenation of the paid employees was undertaken in 1975?
_ [Answer] The purpose was, indeed, to "elevate" young salaried staff, and
this since the analysis of the events of 1968. To rely on them "in the
boldest manner," to borrow the official formula. Hence, we saw a notice-
auie rejuvenation of the paid employees. There w~re more young intellectuals ~
- and fewer work~rs, which paradoxically once in a while produced young,
newly converted, dynamic, and sectarian salaried employees. Between the
22d and 23d Congresses, Marcel Zaidner, who was in charge of the promotion
of the salaried staff, wrote an article which represented a real curbing
of this policy. In FRANCE NOUVELLE, he said that we had gone too far, that
we needed to depend on more experienced comrades, the foundation of the
party. Indeed, the leadership had noted that some promotions had been
hasty. The neophytes did not always remain neophytes and once in a while
became insufficiently malZeable.
- [Question] It is the function of paid employee itself that is, at this
point, being brought into question.
[Answer] The function of paid employee is an essential and practical insti-
- tution. It is the only resource that enables workers to lead a high levPl _
political campaign. Because now executives--who were compelled to recog-
nize the labor organization right--do not recognize the political right in
the companies. Qn the other hand, there are paid employees wna have prac-
tically never performed another ~ob. They have always been salaried staff
of the party, directly or indirectly. Such a situation is, of course, re-
grettable....
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[Question] When you speak of indirectly salaried employees, that means
that they are not included among the 550 paid employees counted and reported
to the central committee in May 1972 t~y Georges Gosnat. A figure that,
i.n ad~lition, included members of Parliament.
[Answer] The paid employee concept cannot be limited to this small figure,
which includes only the employees of the central cozmnittee and the ciepart-
- mental federations. To get an accurate idea of the number of paid employees, -
one has to at least multiply the figure given by Gosnat by 10. There are
at least one or two paid employees in each departmental federation. Some
are also found in certain big sections. At Ivey, for example, we have five.
The municipal assistants, the general counsels, all of whom are paid by
the party, also have to be counted, to whom, however, they turn over their
_ fees. They are also political heads. Finally there are the enterprises
controZled by the party, in which the salaried staff don't have just adminis-
trative duties. At SOCIAL EDITIONS, at the time of each electoral campaign,
for example, they u~ed to ask us to assign some comrades to the pro~vinces,
which moreover was not always without posing a few operating problems in -
the office. There are political paid employees there who don't appear in
the party's official statistics.
[Question] This is the corps of "political professionals" Lenin hoped for.
[Answer] Lenin also talked of their necessary rotation, of the essential -
nature of their returning to production, to limit the danger of bureaucrati-
zation. Unfortunately the capitalist system makes such a return to produc-
tion virtually impossible. Because, if a paid employee gives up his job for -
one reason or another, it will not be easy for him to get hired again. It
is not a good reference in a company to have spent 5, 10, or 15 years as a
naid employee in the PCF. At best, a subordinate, manual job that doesn't
correspond to the intellectual capacities he's acquired will Y,e suggested
to a former worker. Andre Wurmser, while he was at "Apostrophes," thought
- he could say that they were making great pecuniary concessions to communists
- or communist critics. This is not true. At most they receive publicity,
often suspect, when they appear for the first time. They are very quickly
rejected and irnored. If only because basically all institutions are some-
what interdependent. In their eyes, they will never be anything but ~*.:~:G~-
rigible hagglers. The dissent that has surfaced within the party sin;ce
Spring 1978 has put certain comrades in tragic situations, whether i{: be,
for example, journalists having left FRANCE NOUVELLE or certain secrj~taries ~
in the Paris federation who resigned who are involved.
_ [Question) Hence this threat of unemployment is a burden on the freedom -
of paid employees.
[Answer] A terrible one. In addition, it is extraordinary to note that
returning to production, although magnified in speeches, is branded as -
punishment. Such double language is becoming generalized am4ng numerous
communists. On the outside, the policy of the party is defended but it is
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' ridiculed privatel~; "among themselves" people talk about the limitations.
The latter attitude typifies numerous communist journalists. People also
- refuse to investigate certain ideas th~roughly so as not to risk raising
issues about our collective vision of party policy. I speak all the more
readily because this was my attitude for a long time.
- [Question] What is the reason some of them have suddenly risked speaking?
[Answer] Everything has changed because the party is in a crisis. Further-
- more, how could it hope to remain the only institution spared in a social
_ bod-~ itself in deep crisis? One of the manifestations of this cxisis in
the party is precisely that we are daring to speak out, that we are reject-
ing a narrow concept of "party patriotism." There is nothing more difficult
than tearing oneself away from ~he emotional cocoon that the party forms.
[Question] Is that what accounts for the fact that dissidents seem isolated
~ and few in number?
[Answer] rhe "dissent-leadership" picture is reducti.ve. The F~Cszbin affair
reveals the depth ot this crisis. In Paris, the entire party has been
jolted. An arrondissement gublic discussion in the 17th arrondissement
even demanded in a majority more information fro~ the national leadership. ;
The communist critics are only the tip of an iceb~rg. Even among the paid
employees within the organization, the debates have an animation that
people don't even begin to conceive of on the outside. Internal wars go on
once in a while. -
- [Question] Why raise the problem of the paid employees now?
[At.~�ver] It's a taboo subject. But in spPaking out myself as I am doing,
I believe I'm in the direction of' the 22d Congress, which said that the -
party should be the image of the "glass house" that serves as its head-
quarters. It would be good to scrupulously respect the congress' texts. _
~ For example, the one that says that communists have a right to all informa-
tion. Hence they have the right to know the contents of the letter written
by Henri Fiszbin at the time of his resignation from the Central Committee. _
[Question] Regarding the texts, what do you think of the one that has just
been published by the PCF with a view to the national conference on intel-
lectuals? -
[Answer] I find it very positive that the text was submitted to debate by
the party. Moreover I hope to be able Co speak on the discussion platform.
In its style, the document seems to me heterogeneous, as if it had been
written by different authors. In its substance, it appears to me not to
draw on a1? the party's progressivea in the area of culture. Georges
Marchais, at Mutuality for example, said that there were not only commu-
nists who develop Ma.rxist research. This view is not present in the leader- _
ship's text. It's a pity. The article is, on the other hand, centered
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entirely around the idea of ideological str~fe between the PCF and the
- rightwing, with its socialist appendage at its side. This Manichean vision
s eems false and caricatural to me. It deters numerous intellectuals and ~
not just them alone. ro b e a co~nunist is to make a concrete assessment ~
of concrete facts, r
[Question] Is this true for the proposal for a joint campaign against NATO
missiles?
_ [AnswerJ Yes. And I am happy to be able to approve without reservatiuns
this proposal by che party. As moreover I approve of the c~nstitution of
the new Marxist Research Institute. I don't want to oppose the whole party
policy even if I do critic ize certain aspects of i.t. I only want each _
activist to get his freedom of expression and polztical maturity. The
party needs it even if it is not yet able to accept it. After all, it's
its enrichment it could reject.
_ [COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
9 064
- CSO: 3100
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF REMAINS SIL'ENT ON DISSIDENT JEAN GAJER'S CRITICISM
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 31 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pp 21-22
' [Article by Theirry Pfister: "HUME!NITE's Silence"] ~
[Text] By failing to answer, the newspaper is acting as if the issues had -
not been raised. ~
One of the criteria thar_ makes it pcssibTe to analyze the Communist Party's
' policy rema.ins unaltered: We are talking about HUMANITE's silence. The
communist dailv has not breathed a word about the letter written to Georges -
Marchais by Jear. Gajer, the counsel o~ Paris and a former member of the
capital's co~nunist federation secretariat. The contents of this letter
- were disclosed by Jean Elleinstein on 23 December during "Press Club" on
_ Europe 1. Jack Railite, the deputy from Seine-St Denis and a member of
the Central Committee, who was given the responsibility of answering the
dissident historian in HUNL'~NIT.E, tried to characterize ~is as "an iso2ated
pers~~n unfolding a desperate attempt to prevent the implementation of the
policy of the 22d and 23d Congresses." Hence he had to see that Jean ;
Elleinstein appeared not to be expressing only his own opinion. Especially
since, while the historian's audience is ~enuine within the left as a whole, -
it remains limited to the PCF center. He often makes people angry, includ-
ing several communist critics who share the basic points of his analyses.
Within the party--all sensitivities b lurred--he is upbraided for his hesi-
tation waltz during the 23d Congress, his recon~iliation of short-lived
consequences with the PCF leadership, and his systematic use af big media, c
indeed his letting himself be manipulated by them. When an agpeal for a ,
"unity in the struggle" was prepared by socialist and communist militants,
one of the conditions imposed by PCF members was that the first 100 sub~ ~
scribers not include Jean Elleinstein. This led the historian to regret
_ that the petition had not been "more inclusive." This demand by the com- ~
munist militants cannot be explained merely by the fact that the majority
~ of them are sitixated instead in the Louis Althusser trend. It is sti11 ,
true nonetheless that this appeal is experiencing genuine success and that
it has already gotten almost a million subscribers. Among other things,
_ it ha~ obtained a sizable reception in the ranks of the CGT, even among the ;
higher echelons. This furnishes additional corraboration of the fact that
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the leadership of the labor union's central office is subject to strong,
unified pressure and is experiencing as a result major dif{iculties in re-
mainir~g in the PCF's political track. The dissent among communists, within
_ the CGT or between communist union executives and leaders of the PCF, has
~ been extensive in the last several months. The campaign against "Euro-
missiles" gresents another example since HUMANITE's management saw itself
upbraided for having censured the CGT b~ not reporting at the outset that
the central office is still in favor of a simultaneous dissolution of the p
military blocks.
- Although it is not possible for the PCF's leadership to "block out" this
kind of text forev~r, on the other hand, can it keep silent not only on
the true positions of the other so-called ~urocommunist parties but also
an the issues that some of its own executives are raising? Is this not
admitting that it is choosing to be quiet because it has no answer? For
the argument that Jean Elleinstein represents no one but himself cannot be
defended forever. Despite the reservations that this raises, he is still ~
an irreplaceablespokesman in the PCF's critical current. To prepare for
his appearance on "Press Club," moreover, he spoke with other protagonists -
in the dissension current, including Antoine Spire, who speaks out above.
The fact that Jean Gajer in addition allowed him to make his letter to the
- secretary general public shows that he expresses the concerns of a major
fringe of the PCF.
"A Second Truth" ,
Jean Gajer is, indeed, an especially exemplary communist professianal,
who has always zealously supported his party's policy and interests and who
enjoys genuine popuZarity among Parisian communists and in the PCF's appara-
- tus. But here ne is, after 30 years of activism, refusing to submit to the
leadership's traditional methods because he went through the Stalin period
and knows its techniques. He has been accused, along with Henri Fiszbin
- and the other leaders of the Paris federation of "opportunism." Georges
Marchais himself, he writes, made this accusation "with such vigor and
certainty that it was as good as a permanent condemnation." Like his peers,
he agreed to hold his tongue. Now the PCF's administration is denying havin_g
made this accusation and means, Jean Gajer notes, "to manufacture a second
truth." So he feels that he can no longer keep silent and is asking: "What
are you driving at? This is throwing discredit on the party and its leaders."
Entangled in its half-truths and its complete lies, the PCF's leadership
finds nothing to answer. And, in order to.remain speechless, it is trying
to lead people to think that the issue was not raised.
COPYRIGFIT: 1979 "le Nouvel Obsezvateur"
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c
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~ ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE, BASE PROTECTION MEASURES DESCRIBED -
Program To Equip Air Force
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 pp 33, 35, 37, 39 _
- [Article by Jean de Galard: "Anti-aircraft Defense and Base Protection"J
_ [Text]~ Protection of air bases against any attack, whether by land or aerial,
has always been a major consideration of every country's armed forces. To !
fill many air forces' specific needs in this area, industry conducts research,
proposes, and often manufactures materiel, of which the technology and per- -
formance levels depend on the specifications required by the future user. -
It is known that the French Air Force, for its part, on one hand has chosen '
the Crotale [Cactus] short range surface to air missile system to defend ,
~ its bases against low altitude aerial attacks. Thomson-CSF was given the i
project management, with Matra being responsible for the "missile" part.
An;r_her French choice is the Cerbere 76T2 bitube cannon, produced by the ~
_ Bourg~s Establishment for Weapons Research and Manufacture, which itself
depends upon GIAT (Industrial Group for Gr~und Weapons). As for the protec- ~
tion of Air Force positions and areas sensitive to ground action, until now
its been ensured by specially train~d fusiliers-commandos using those
= valuable dogs as helpers. j.-
~
In the following pages we successively treat the program to equip Air Force
bases with Crotale and Cerbere, the creation of the Air fusiliers-commandos,
and an anti-intrusion system with an entirely new concept. The system was +
conceived by two French companies within GERSA (Research an;' Development ~
Group for Anti-intrusion systems), and in the coming months they intend to
make full scale experiments followed by proposals to every civil and military
service for ~ohom the rejection and sometimes the destruction of any intruder
is_necessary. ;
. Crotales, Cerberes Installed ;
I
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 pp 33, 35, 37, 39 ~
-
[Text] A ministerial decision dated 12 March 1973 made the Air Force ;
responsible, the same as the other armed forces, for their own defense of !
- l0 ~ ~
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the:irowu installations (air bases and sensitive positions) against all
aerial attacks. This short-range defense is today ensured by the Crotale
system, by 20 mm bitube cannons., and as well by 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine
guns. Ultimately, in the 1980's, very short-range missiles will complete -
ttie ~resc:nt defc~nses.
'Phe Air Force had ordered 16 Crotale sections before 1978, Lour have been
ordered from the 1979 budget, and the 1980 budget projects a second order
- of four sections. Each section includes an aquisition unit and two firing
units with four missiles each, plus a transport vehicle, a support group, _
and a liason vehicle. Each squadron includes two sections; that is, 16
- missiles. At the end of this year, the Air Force will have taken d~livery
on 11 sections and six squadrons will have been organized. Thomson-CSF,
Coroale system project manager, is delivering regularly, according to the
_ established calendar, which projects eight Crotale squadrons within the _
Air Force by the end of 1980.
- Concerning the 20 mm bitube cannons, remember that the first 40 gun mounts
(each mount holds two cannons) have been ordered from the 1979 budget; eight
had been delivered to the Air Force by the end of 1978, the 1979 budget
included an order for 5~ mounts, and the last 56 (the programming law has
provided for a financial effort covering 152 anti-aircraft bitube mounts)
will be financed by the 1980 budget. The Air Force bases are being progres-
- sively outfitted with Cerbere bitube cannons.
As for ground protectior_ of the Air Force's vital installations and sensitive
_ positions, since July 1978 it has been entrusted to the Air fusiliers-commandos. ~
Remember that GFCA (Fusiliers-Commandos Air Group), created last 1 August,
includes about 4,300 men, of whom 160 are officers and 800 ar.e non commissioned
officers, spread over about 20 Air Force bases.
GFGA decides how the securi*_y personnel are to be employed, is responsible -
, for the specialized instruction, and controls the training of all the Air -
_ Force fusiliers-commandos and dog handlers.
The dogs are indispensable assistants in surveillance and defense of sensitiv2
= positions, especially at night. They create a deterrent effect ~n outside
elements who have notions of infiltration.
GFCA is also responsible for experimenting with the equipment and specific
materiel to be u~?d by the protection units.
- Because GFCA instructs almost 3,000 peopla to various degrees each year at
Nimes, its instruction mission assumes a vital importance. This number is
almost all those whom the Air Force uses for installation protection; about `
7,000 people.
_ GFCA also acts as an expert and adviser on protection matters, but does not
assume direct responsibility for air base protection; that remains the
prerogative of the regional commanding generals. On the other hand, GFGS
is a main striking force, at the Air Force chief of staff's disposal, to
reenforce the protection of one or several sensitive positions.
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Outfitting with Crotale Continues
There are some Crotale squadrons in existance on the Istres, Apt, Avord,
Lexeuil, Daint-Dizier, and Mont-de-Marsan bases, although in the last case _
it is not a matter of a final installation and the units which were stationed
there had been used primarily for the formation of the first gun crews. -
Conforming to the programming law, the Air Force will continue to outfit
some of its bases during the ne~t year and beyond. ~aenty-four sections
~ have been projected, the last to be delivered in 1982.
Duririg the Datex exercises, the operationol level of the crews responsible
for operating the Crotale system was verified; the behavior of the radar
acquisition and firing units gave rise to various c~ntrols, which have been
successful on the whole. Some missiles were successfully fired in 1979 at
CEL (Landes Testing Center).
The combined behavior of all the equipment forming the Crotale sections
also gave rise to some periodic andjor occasional verifications; the results
have been judged satisfactory.
Keep in mind that the Crotale was designed to combat and neutralize, with
, tactical support and multirole assault, helicopters, radio controlled devices
(Remotely Piloted Vehicles), and fighter planes now in service or to be put
into service from now until 1992, under any weather conditions, day or night. ~
"Crotale" is an automatic weapons system with instantaneous reaction and a
high capability of coordination and shot control, which allows the simultaneous -
treatment of several objectives with a high probability of destruction. Ie
is especially suited to oppose saturating attacks by apparatus flying between
50 and 4,000 m in altitude, and at velocities up to Mach 1.2. ~
On ~'~e bases which have Crotale each section is in radio contact with the
squadron's operr,~ions room. During a crisis or an exercise, a so-called !
~ tactical unit is activated within each squadron. One of its tasks is to solve ~
the coordination problems of the firing sections; this can be easily done `
with the liaison facilities and suitable transmissions.
The First "Cerbere" Bitubes
All those who were at Cambrai last Tuesday to see the first Matra Super 530
series air to air missiles outfit the Mirage F-1 of the ~aelfth Fighter
Division were also able see on Rene Mouchotte Base their first delivery of ;
76T2 20 mm bitubes. Other bases besides 1Q3 have also b~en supplied. ~
I
The last October issue of the review AIR ACTUALITIES carried an article on
- bitubes, from which it seemed worthwhile for us to excerpt the following.
The high quality Cerbere materiel consists of three main assemblies: the
20 mm F2 weapons built by MAT (Tulle Manufacturing); the firing tube, which
is built in Italy by Officine Gailileo; and the Rheinmetall mount, which
furnishes the opportunity for a Franco-German manufacture. The 20 mm F2
weapons with double feed fire at a rate of 850-900 ~hots per minute per weapan. ~
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The 20 mm 76 T2 bitube was designed and built to respond with high velocity
to aircraft attacks at low and very low altitudes. This cannon may be used
alone or in conjunction with the Crotale weapons sys*em. �
Its great firing rate gives it destructive capabilities wtiich add greatly to -
the deterrent nature of its mission.
Its manageability gives it less visibility during aerial observations, which
_ increases its effectiveness because of the surprise element. _
~ To fill these operational specifications, the weapons system was developed
with the following technical options: visual or assisted detection (option);
- a control lever is used to pilot the mount for acquisition and pursuit; the
weapons are slaved to the aimer, allowing the weapons to be pointed toward
the future target while the aimer remains pointed at the present target;
~ne two 20 mm F2 weapons fire explosive incendiary shells at an increased
rate.
What comes out of all that has just been said is that the quality of the
shot directly depends upon the quality of the aim at the actual bullseye. -
= Training for aiming would be expensive if it necessitated real flight~.
For thi.s reason each base will be equipped with a simulator (simulator S 11)
which allows pursuit, with the help of a cathode tube generated luminous
_ spot injected into the aimer's optical field.
The movements of this luminous spot are programed according to sequences
set by the instructor, and are representative of a plane flying at low altitude
with a subsonic velocity.
Uutfitting the air Force bases began in 1978 with Mont-de-Marsan, where
CEAM [Military Air ~xperimentation Center] experimented with the equipment.
The obtained results demonstrated that the hopes for this system had been
realized.
GERSA Perfects an All New Anti-intrusion System
In some regions of the national territory the protection of many sensitive
civil or military areas, considered to b~; vitally essential positions for
the functioning of the e~onomy or for thi;,territory's defense, necessitates
that all attempts at human intrusion into these zones or sensitive areas be
successively but quickly revealed and deterred.
GERSA was form~d. last summer by two companies with the goal of most effectively
solving the security problems of thse protected sites. The companies, CEE
(Signals and Electric Enterprises Company) and Promocab (Modern Cabling
Procedures), are competent and well experienced in electronic, electric, and
information research, development, and application. -
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A New Concept =
A detection system for intruders has the goal of d2tecting the crossing of
a geographical zone by a stranger already warned and deterred by conventionul
methads: fences, walls, barbed wire.
There exist some detection methods with only one barrier. They consist of ~
shock sensitive wires, infared light beams, and hyperfrequency barriErs, of
which the sensitivity arrangement has such a generally unsatisfactory rate
of false alarr~s, that the apparatus is frequently scrapped.
The new concept that GERSA is proposing and will very soon establish on a
- full scale at an Air Force base, results from research using new techniques.
The basic equation of security against intrusion rests on two imperatives: -
the interception time must be shorter than the intrusion time; consequently
it is necessary to be alerted as soon as possible.
In fact the practical problem to be solved is three fold: the system must
detect all forms of intrusion; it must be workable; false alarms must be
avoided. -
Moreover, there exist two ways to detect: for example, the aggressor's -
movement energy can be detected (seismic collectors, for example); also
extrinsic energies can be provoked and when aggressors pass by, the ener~,y
transfer anomolies examined.
The lie of the land, installation possibilities, passage zones, safety or -
utilization constraints, and the nature of the soil are so many determining -
fu~tors in the choice of detection barriers. This choice is not limiting _
and can change with the technology changes in the collectors available.
The excellent workability of seismic colle~tors is noted on this subject,
but there are also others.
Some New Systems
As a general rule, detection must integrate two or more parameters, of which
the first is never_ the determiner. -
- What is to be done with the information supplied by the barriers? It must
slow, or even reject, the professional aggressor. Some new systems are
under study which intervene by playing on the "psyche" of the individuals. -
Such systems are obvi_ously more expensive than some products; if one wants _
, to "make security" the system is one thing, the environment is another. But
these systems have some great advantages. They are programable and they can
be built within the time (up to n parameters); thus one can start with an
- existing installation and integrate it with the parameter suitable to all
the circumstances. -
l~.
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One of the originalities of GERSA's perimetric protection system lies in
putting several detection barriers in parallel. The relative positions
of these barriers is such that, if an intruder activates and crosses the
first, he automatically activates the othera.
_ Moreover, these barriers are sensitive to physical parameters of a different
nature: optical crossing, fence Wibrations, or ground shocks.
The activation of the first barrier relPases a prealarm signal, which
involves: the intrusion or tentative intriision signal, usable for a
daterrent action; changing the status of the other barriers for a limited
time, so the other alarms will activate much more quickly if there is a
crossing.
' GERSA's proposed system uses as parameters Gollectors or active systems -
which are highly workable and perfectly suited to extern.al usage.
_ Protection of a large site can be done by several "surveillance units," _
= d~pending upon the perimeter of the protected area; each surveillance unit
is designed to protect a perimeter of about 2,000 m. Such an installation _
includes several detection barriers, a surveillance center, cables which
. carry the informar_ion from the barriers to the center, an overview of the
- operation, and a device for access control.
They system has a modular type structure. The averview pa.rticularly ensures -
that technical or intrusion caused general alarms ~�~ill signal. It can be
placed in the same area as the surveillance center or installed otherwise;
at a guard post, for example.
The system monitors all alarm signals, with a maximum of five facts per
monitoring band.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Co~mos, Paris 1980
9374
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE ,
~ MIRAGE F-1 AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS REVIEWED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 p 39 ~
[Text] At the occasion of the Air Force T~aelfth Fighter Division's taking -
- delivery of the first Matra Super 530 air to air miss'~les designed for the
Mirage F-1C (Dassault-Breguet), which ha~ an Atar 9K50 turboreactor (SNECMA),
the Air Defense Commandant disclosed that CAFDA [Air Command Air Defense
Forc~s] Mirage F-1's had flown more than 100,000 hours. The total divided
among the three F-1 fighter divisions is: Thirtieth Division (Reims), 45,000 h
since 1973; Fifth Division, (Orange), 30,OOC h since 1974; naelfth Division
~ (Cambrai), 22,000 h since 1576.
The communique published at this time takes into account the Marage F-1's _
intrinsic qualities and annaunces the creation of new units and the use of
various new formulas. We quote some passages here.
"Well adapted to air defense missions, the Mirage F-1 in association with
M,..*ra 530, Magic, and now Super 530 air to air missiles has undeniable
qualities as an inteceptor."
~
- "A result of information gathered from the more than 1,200 Mirage III's in
service, the Mirage F-1 is also the result of technical advancement. Its
operation and maintenance, as well as that of its operational equipment,
are done very largely by means of automatic tests."
- "Its reserves, as observed in use, are among the best ever recorded on a
fighter plane. The programed maintenance evolved very quickly, and is now
- among the most economical. The Mirage F-1 benefits in this area from proven
analysis methods used for civil transport plane maintenance. The number of
modifications since the Mirage F-1 was put into service is small, compared
to other similar fighter planes."
"However, the plane is not rooted to its original design. Some very important
- modifications to increase the operational capability of the weapons system
have been approved. These are some of the most remarkable of them: automatic -
= tips and hyperstabilizing flaps which improve combat and low velocity
- maneuverability; the in flight refueling boom, which greatl,y increases thQ ;
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flexibility of use; renovation of the navi.gation and weapons systems, which
increases the performance of the interception function in particular, and
allows it to tal~e advantage of the qualities of the new Matra Su~er 530
missi].e."
"Finally, CAFD'A's in service fleet will improve atill further with the
arrival of the Mirage F-1 two seater at *_he end of 1980. Possessing all
the ~perational equipment of the ~one seater, it will improve pilot training
at all qualification stages."
, "There is no doubt that the Mirage F-1 will satisfactorily contribute to -
Air Force fighter plane needs for some years to comQ."
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1980
9374
CSO: 3100
_
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,
~ CWNTRY SECTION FR~ANCE
UPDATE PRESENTED ON ELECTRONIC CO~JN'rERMF,PSURES DEVELOPMENT
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Dec 79 pp 49-50
- (Article by Gerard Collin: "Electronic Countermeasures Being Rapidly _
Developed"]
- [Text] The term electronic countermeasures (ECM) is used to designate all
electronic devices that permit the jamming or deception of enemy detection,
localization or conrtnunication systems. For an engineer trai:ied to design
systems offering the best signal-noise ratio, the ECM's are on the contrary
- the employment of noise signals "crushing" the useful signal or duping the
receiver.
But the ECM's in turn evoke the use of "counter ECM's" ~rd then "counter-
counter ECM's," thereby forming a spiral of mathematics and technology.
Ruses have always been part of the arsenal of ineans for defense or attack.
It is generally agreed that the practice of resorting to electronics
may be said to date back to World War II, with the employment of radio
jamming. But even more than that, it was the Vietnam and Yon Kippur wars
around 1972-73 that definitively proved the usefulness of ECM's. -
In Vietnam, the Americans at first had severe sircraft losses due to the `
Soviet SA-2 missiles. They then launched a crash program to produce ECM
- equipment, especially for the B-52's and Phantoms. The losses were then _
appreciably cut down, with local radars being paralyzed.
At the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israeli Air Force, still
wearing a halo due to its lightning successes in the Six-Day War, suffered
important reverses, this time due to the Soviet SA-6 missiles. Those ,
losses practically paralyzed the air force, and the war then proceeded -
essentially on the ground. It seemed evident then that countermeasures ,
would have to be deployed against the ground-based radars. '
Thus, within a few years the ECM's had proven themselves in very different '
but nonetheless indisputable ways.
. h
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- There is no longer any modern air force today that does not have counter- -
measures. Tn this regard, every modern combat plane is equipped with ECM's
the complexity of which is steadily growing. Even pilots, formerly
unwillirg, now prefer to sacrifice a drum of kerosene for an electronic
= warfare pod.
In France in the Fifties
One prerequisite for designing ECM equipment is a knowledge of the technical
characteristics of the (potentially) enemy equipment. That knowledge may
be acquired in very diverse ways. One of these, used in France since the
end of the Sixties, involves analysis of the radars and radio sets, using
ground-based or airborne listening devices designed for that purpose. The
analysis permits the determination as to which self-protection equipment
is to be used on each aircraf t.
Offensive or Defensive ECM's
Two types of countermeasures are generally defined, termed offensive or
defensive.
Offensive jamming emits very powerful signals in advance over a wide range _
of frequencies. These signals are intendad to saturate the Local radar -
receivers, "crushing" the useful echoes. This method makes no distinction
between radars actually bein~ used on the ground. It is therefore over- -
powering, intended above all t~o jam the search and long-range-detecCion
radars. That is the method used, for example, when a raiding force reaches
a theatre of operations. Each plane then attempts to protect itself,
depending on the threat that it actually is facing. That is when it
resorts to defensive jammings, by means of "self-protection jammers." The _
-nethods and devices employed aC that time are exceedingly c anplex.
Thus, the aim of the system is to detect a radar that has locked onto the
plane, and in short to decide which means are appropriate to deal with the
- related threat (cannon, missiles, evasion, etc).
In simple terms, such a jammer consists of receiving antennas, a receiver,
a signal analyzer, a transmitter, and transmitting antennas. The planes
are generally equipped with two low-gain receiving horn antennas; the opening
of the pattern is about 120�. One of the antennas is oriented forward
and the other toward the rear. That arrangement leaves the plane's sides -
- exposed, but it is generally accepted that these sectors are leas uulnerable. -
That being the case, the plane can be given an omnidirectional covering -
(by four antennas, for example), with that configuration permitting the
radar source to be localized through the composition of Che patterns.
The transmission antennas may be separate from or associated with the
receiving antennas. In the latter case, a circulator ensures the proper
orientation of the signals.
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Like the antennas, the receiver covers a wide range of radar frequencies. -
In certain propagation "windows," moreover, the range has been noted to
ext~nd toward about 100 Gigahertz. �
The signal analysis system is a digital computer that measures the
frequenc~, the pulse reception rate and the level received, and determines
whether the signal involves a tracking radar locked onto th~ plane, a
situation that is i~ediately more dangerous. This system compares these
parameters to stored reference data acquired by the above cited means.
If the threat is not fonnally identified, the syatem will activate a
countermeasure of general range.
The UHF transmitter is connect to an amplifier, generally one with a
- travelling-wave tube. _
The Cat and the Mouse
Depending onthe pa rameters recorded, the syatem will then decide on an
appropriate action: electronic countermeasure, decays, attack or evasive
maneuver.
- In the case of a countermeasure, the system will emit a signal to jam
the radar, and thereby uncouple the slaving of the radar's antenna.
Actually, a deception in terms of the d3 stance involved in less effective
because the cannon or missiles are initiall.y guided angularly. Offliand,
one may think that the 3ammer is winning out every time. In fact, the
radar signal is attenuated by d4 (the forward-and-return distance, to the
fourth power) whereas the jananer undergoes attenuation by only d2 (~ust
Che return distance). Thus, the few hundred watts emitted by the plane _
would win out over the kilowatts emitted by the radar. But this is
not enough to make the antenna slaving uncouple. The pattern of that
antenna is directional, and the plane is still responding during ~the _
passage of that pattern. To be convinced of this, one merely has to
imagine that the ground station can still operate in azimuth, by direction- -
finding.
- A technique then used is that of "deception." The jammer re-emits each of -
the pulses received, doing so at a much higher level, which up to then has -
been very favorable to the ground receiving station, and Chus to the enemy.
But the jammer then gradually shifts those responses. The radar remains ~
locked onto the decoy pulses. All that is then necessary is to cease those
responses, and the radar finds itaelf lost. It must search anew, and the
hide-and-seek game begins all ovex again.
The same technique can be used with Doppler radars, by transposing the time
axis to Che frequency axis, to within one variant: the frequency received .
in the two directions can then be ehifted, whereas the pulses can only be
slowed down.
With modern "pulse Doppler" radars (mixed time, plus frequency), it will be :
deduced that the two methods can be envisaged. ~
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It goes without saying that the scenario just described~is rather
simplistic. The range of devices available can be considerably increased,
both on the ground and on board thQ plane, by the diversity of frequency,
- space considerations, etc. -
It should be noted that planes are still equipped as well wiCh electromag-
netic decoys which, when scattered in the atmosphere, create a multitude
of parasitic echoes. These echoes engulf the useful ones. The decoys
are plated nylon strips, ideally of a length equal to half the wavelength -
of the radar to be neutralized. These strips act like a/2 dipoles. However,
their effectiveness tends to diminish, because there too the countermeasure
has already been found by extracting the Doppler speeds. The latter readily
permit the plane's e.:hoea to be distinguished from those of the strips,
which are moving at slow speeds (a few meters per second).
Thanson-CSF and EP'II3 "
In France, it is the Technical Service for Air Telecommunications (STTA)
that is responsible for the design, development and follow-on production
of the airborne ECM equipment. The two main firm~ involved are Thomson-CSF
and Electronique Marcel Dassault (E1~ID). The cost of the ECM equipment can
be several percent of the cost of the plane carrying it, which is a
considerable amount, but let ss repeat that the electronic countermeasures
are scarcely opposed any more, inasmuch as they constitute a considerable
factor in increasing the probability of success of missions, if not a pre-
requisite for that success. Moreover, the atudies on both sides of the ,
A tlantic are increasing in number: the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (A3FJ)
program begun in the United States entails billions of dollars.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos Par.is 1979
5346
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FUTURE ANTITANK MISSILES STUDIED BY ELTROMISSILE GROUP
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Jan 8~ p 37
[Text] The French firm Aerospatiale, the British Aeroapace Dyn~mic Group
and the German firm Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm have set up, on an equal -
partnership basis, a new GIE under French law, called the Euromissile Dynamics
Group (ENIDG). Its first objective will be the design, development,
production ~,nd marketing of third-generation medium- and long-range anti-
tank missi~es. The ErIDG's atatutes were signed on 20 December 1979 by
Michel Allier, director of Aerospatiale's Tactical Missile Division,
G.-R. Jefferson, president ~f the British Aerospace Dynamics Group, and -
- Gunther Kuhlo, director of the Missiles Division of MBB. They will
comprise the council to supervise tihe new GIE, whose administrator will
be Mr Striegel of the MBB. In time, the ENIDG ~ill absorb the French GIE
called the Anti-Surface Euromissile group (ASEM), which was previously
~ established by the same three firms to German GIE c311ed Euromissile,
responsible for the Milan, Hot and Roland missiles, will remain a separate
entity.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos Paris 1979�
5346 -
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COUN'!'RY SECTION FRANCE
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLICATIONS ON PCF IDEOLOGY
_ Paris LA NOUVELLE CRITIaUE in French Dec 79 p~2 _
[Bibliography: "Appendix 7--Bibliography of Writings Published within the -
French Communist Party on the New Way of Managing Things"] -
[Tex~; ] l, General Statements on the Means of IdeoloE;ica1 Warfare
"Proceedings of the 23rd Congress," in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, June 1979: res-
olution, p 359; st atements by Claude Mazauric (p 105), Jacques Milhau
281), Jack Ralite (p 120), Lucien Seve (p 174).
2. Some Gener~al Themes of Ideological Warfare
Maillot, Colette "Foundations and Manifest ations of Crisis in the Concepts ,
of Change," CAHIERS DU COP~Il~IUNISME, March 1979 �
_ ~'~.rest, Lucien "Intellectuals and Freedoms," L'HUMANITE ("Ideas" page),
25 November 1978. -
Pinto, Louis "Philosophers' Politics (i96o-i976)," LA PENSEE, November 1978.
- 3. The Ideological Battle in the Companies
Z'he proceedings of the PCF National Council meeting devoted to the activity
and forces of the PCF in the companies--in particular:
--report by Jean Colpin, L'HUM.'~NITE, 22 October 1979~ -
~ -�-closing speech by Georges Marchais, L'HtJMANITE, 22 October 1979~
--statement by Pierre Juquin, L'HUMANITE, 25 October 1979� -
. Poulain, Jean-Claude "Decider au Travail" [Gettin~ People to Work], Editions
Sociales, ~+th quarter 1979� -
Pelachaud, Guy "The Compan,y in Crisis and the Struggle for the Outcome,"
CAHIERS DU COMMiTNISME, January 1979 �
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4. Information and Media
Georges Marchais' speech on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of LA MAR-
SEILLAISE, L'HUMAIVITE, 29 October 1979�
~ Speeches by Pierre Juquin, Roland Leroy, Georges Gosnat and Jack Ralite in
the National Assembly on the occasion of the debate on the budget for infor-
mation and culture, L'HUMANITE, 27 September 1979�
Bidou, Jacques, a.nd Wirz, Da.niel "Your E~es and Your Ears Interest Them," ,
LA NOWELLE CRITIQUE, February 1979� ~
Pelachaud, Gi.~y "Done with the Hobnailed Boo~;s," L'HUMANITE, 10 November 1979�
Ehdewelt, Robert "Freedom to Inform, Freed~m to Be Informed: Conditions
Necessary for Democratic Pro,jection," CAHIEI~S DU COMMUNISME, August 1978. "
= Gosnat, Georges "Freedom of Expression and of Information," CAHIERS DU COM-
MUNISME, May 1977.
~
Pxoceedings of the PCF Central Committee meeting devoted to information,
27 September 1976--in particular:
--report by Georges Gosnat, L'HUMANITE, 28 September 1976;
--closing speech by Georges Marchais, L'HUMANITE, 28 September 1976.
5. International Institutions and Clubs
Blanchard, Francois "Trilateral Imperialism," CAHIERS DU CONINIUNISN~,
Oc` ober 1979 �
"The Trilateral Commission, or the Imperialist Counteroffensive," collective
case-history, ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE, July 1979�
Bernas, Colette "When the Trilateral Commission Too Takes an Interest in
Social Peace," in "La Social-Democratie au Preser~t" [Social Democracy in the -
Present Tense], Editions Sociales, 2nd quarter 1979�
Poulain, Jean-Claude, "Decider au Travail," Editions Sociales, 4th quarter
1979 ~a work that gathers together a large number of significant extracts -
from the proceedings of the Trilateral Commission).
f
Goldring, Maurice Democratie, Croissance Zero [Democracy, Zero Growth],
- Editions Sociales, lst quarter 1978. " r~';
~ Jouary, Jean-Paul "Ideological Warfare: the ABC of the OECD," L'HUMANITE
("Ideas" page 18 and 21 September 1979 � -
Dub art, Je~n-Charles "What's the Use of the Club of Rome?," L'HUMANITE,
_ 8 December 1978� ~4 -
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Hincker, Francois "Regarding the Policy of Big Capital at the Time of the r
Liberation," CAHIERS D~HISTOIRE DE L'INSTITUT MAURICE-THOREZ, No 8-9, i97~+� -
"La Social-Democratie au Present," ~oint work, Editions Sociales, 2nd quarter
1979--in paxticular:
--Montagny, Calude, "The Founding by Friedrich Ehbert, Effective Prnmoter of
- German Social Democracy," p 101;
--Bourdin, Nadine "The Socialist International, Strategy of Recourse," p 123. .
, 6. Information, Communication, Power
Pelachaud, Gu}r "Information and Communa.cation in the Day of Computer Pro-
~ cessing of Information," CAHIERS DU CON~+NNISME, November 1979� -
Herzog, Philippe "The Rea1 Stakes in Computer Processing of T.nforma+ion," -
L'HUMANITE, 27 September 1979.
Pelachaud, Gu}r "Computer Processing and Information, an Indissociable Pair,"
FRANCE NOUVELLE, 6 October 1979�
Pelach aud, G~{y "Power and Democracy," FRANCE NOUVELLE, 19 September 1977.
"Reseaxch on the State," an interview with J'ean Lo~kine, CAHIERS DU COMMIJN- -
_ ISME, May 1979�
" ~'The Masters of France," excerQt from Georges Marchais' report to the 23rd .
Congress of the PCF, CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, February 1976, p 20. -
"neech by Georges Gosnat to the 23rd Congress of the PCF', CAHIERS DU CONINIUN- .
ISI+~, February 1976, P 3~+8.
Pelachaud, Guy "These Princes Who Govern Us--Poniatowski as Viewed by Him-
self," CAHIERS DU COMM[TNISME, December 1975.
- Barron, Guy and Laplace, Jean (pseudonyms of Guy Pelachaud and Yves Mal- _
grange~ "Infor~ation, Computer Processing of Information, and State Monopoly ,
Capitalism," ECONOMIE ET POLITIRUE, November 1968.
7. On the Problems of Information, Computer Processing of Information, and
Co~nunication at the Loca1 Level
"Computer Processing of Informa,tion and Democracy," L'ELU D'AUJOURD'HUI, ~
September 1979� ~
" Martin, Pierre "Co~unication, a Front in the Ideological Wax," L'ELU
D~AUJOURD'HUI, -0ctober 1979�
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Editions Sociales
Poulain, Jean-Claude "Decider au Travail," Our Times/Society Collection.
~
Goldring, Maurice "Democratie, Croissance Zero," Our. Times/World Collection.
' Damette, Felix and Scheibling, Jacques, interviewed by Gilbert ?,Tasserman
"Pour une Strategie Aatogestionnaire" [Toward a Self-Management Strategy],
not in a collection.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Les Editions de la Nouvelle Critique
. 11267
CSO: 3100
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COUPTTRY SECTION FRANCE
_ NEW BOOK ON DISSIDENT INTELLECTUAL LOUIS ALTHUSSER
Paris LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE in French Nov 79 pp 7, 8 _
[Review by Monique Florenzano of the book "La Pensee de Louis Althusser"
(The Thought of Louis Althusser), by Jean-Pierre Cotten, Privat, 19791
[Text] "What were, what are, the place, the role and the historic 'function'
of Louis Althusser,.French Communist theoretician, within the framework of
the activity and of the ideological and political responsibilities of the PCF
in the France of the 1960's?" More generally, what is the status of theory, ~
what is its specific contribution, what are the specific problems that its =
development poses, how is its relation to effective practice to be conceived,. -
wh~.t is the party's authority in ~heoretical debates, and what are the rights
of scientific analysis in the militant practice of Marxism? These are the
questions posed in Jean-Pierre Cotten's book devoted to the thought of Louis -
Althusser. "1.960-1967" should be added as a subtitle, for in this book, ob- F
viously written around March 1978--~ust before then, Jea.n-Pierre Cotten tells -
us--on problems raised in the period that preceded 1968 but which "are still
before us," Jean-Pierre Cotten limits his study to the period from the advent
of Gaullism to the explosion of May 1968--more precise].y, from the publica-
tion, by LA PENSE~ in March-.4pri1 1961, of the article "On the Xoung Marx" to -
the first "rectifications" at the beginning of 1968 in the Foreword to the
secon d edition of "Lire le Capital" [Reading "Das Kapital"].
In the first part, Jean-Pierre Cotten defines to some extent the context of
Althusser's thought--that is, both the history that he li.ved through and the
pol=tical, ideological and theoretical situation in which he did his work. A
little in the way that Althusser said it would be necessary, for the young ~
Marx, to be able to account, chronologically and dialectically, for the un- ~
ion, in a single individuality, of a man's own psychology and the history of
the world, Jean-Pierre Cotten, always concerned to have a theoretical founda�-
tion for his quest for a benchmark, tries, by successive approaches--and by
putting them in relation to one another--to his intellectual training and his
political experience, to locate the place from which Althusser speaks and the _
significance of his undertaking. Thus, the years of apprenticeship are e- ~
- voked, marked by the war and deportation and ending in 1948 with the winning -
of his teaching degree in philosophy and his ~oining the French Communist
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Part,y. Then t}ie years of militanc,y, cf t~~niversity work as such also, despite
-,rhat Alttiusser� said about the difficulty that Communist intellectuals experi-
enced at that time in getting their rip,nt a.nd their dut,y recognized "to know _
and simply to stuc~y to produce." For ~these years dominated by the 20'th Con- _
gress of the CPSU, Jean-Pierre Cotten :~trives to show a certain complexit,y in
Althusser's attitude toward Stalin's tr:.eoretical and practical work, at tlle
- same time that the necessity of scientii�ic method is decla.red anci the ques-
tion is stated on the basis of which Jean�-Pierre Cotten proposes to "compre- -
hend" the problematics of Althusser: can on~, being clearl,y aware of the his-
~ torical and political stakes, advance the theoi�eti~Q.1 analysis of real his-
tory?
- In taking an overview of the events that serve for reference in the lacunary
history "of what a Communist intellectual at least publishes, if not under-
' stands," in the spotting of the elements (schism in the international Commun- ~
ist movement, evolution of the USSR after the 20th Congress, end o~ the war _
in Algeria and the insta.llation of Gaullism in France) which define the na- _
tional and international political context of the 1960's, the risk is great--
and Jean-Pierre Cotten is aware of it--of adopting agreed-an analyses witY~-
out criticizing them. One might think, for example, that the French situa- ;
tion in 1965, when "history seems to have come to a stop in France," to the !l
point that one can then "chew Marxism over again in interminable 'lectures'," .
is described a bit tao much from the point of view--which ~ras Cotten's at the
time--of the student movement after the end of the war in Algeria. A critic-
- ism of the boo~c on these grounds would require research beyond the scope of a _
lecture note. Let us say that its most indisputable contribution is to lay
J- the bases for a debate and the principles for further research.
The second part is a systematic Statement of the problematics at work in i
'~'.'~ur Marx "[For Marx) and "Lire le Capital,"the word "problematics" being
- understood in the sense given it by Althusser of a bundle of c~uestions whose
_ unity is not related to the sub,ject +,hat raises them and whose internal arti-
culation makes possible a differentiate3 multiplicity of the expressions of a _
theory.
In this statement, Jean-Pierre Co~ten distingu.ishes by the term "method" a
- set of theses of which certain ones obviously have methodological conse- _
quences, artic~_ilated around notions of "theoretical practice," of "problem-
atics," and of the problem of the way in which the "history" o#' "theoretical
practice" is to be thaught of--theses for a moment 3etached from the grounds
on which their intervention occurs: confrontation between Marx and Hegel, on
_ the one hand; confrontation between the youthful works oP Marx and "Das Kap-
ita1," on the other hand; and poeitive determination of the ob,ject of "Das -
Kapit al."
- Jean-Pierre Cotten's constant the~is is that at that time, Althusser's
thought unbalances the logic of the appearance of Marxism, underestimates the
, effects in Marxist theory of French socialism conceived as a"source and con-
stituent part" of Marxism, and has no theory of the link between revolution -
_ 28
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in theory and class position. Al1 this would obviously require far more than
- allusions. Furthermore, the most obvious question raised by this second part
is tY~at of the legitimacy of the closing of the study with the three volumes
- published in 1965, about which Jean-Pierre Cotten is correct in ~aying that
they constitute the true starting-point of Althusser's work, bu~ the theses
of which have constantly been taken up again since then, reworked, corrected.
jdhich in a way brings one back to the le~itimacy of the distinction between
method and applications.
The third part, entitled "Louis Althusser in His Time (1960-1967," is the
most interesting, although it is affected by a double limitation: a temporal
limitation first of a11, since here again, the discussion is considered as
_ noi~ going beyond the year 1u67; and a limitation in purpose and ambition al-
so, since Althusser's audie:lce and influence are envisioned only from the
angle of the reactions to his works and the debates which they aroused in the _
milieu of Communist intiellectuals and intellectuals close to the party first
of all, and then within the party as a whole. Nothing is said about the Alt-
husser school, the team of students and colleagues organized around "Lire le
Capital," about the evolutions of its members and the place taken by its var-
ious ramifications in rrench intellectual life today. Nor does Jean-Pierre
Cotten try to speciflr what the works of Althusser have changed or what shifts
they have brought about in the ideological and theoretical situation. He
limits his investigations to analysis of materials composed essentially of `
the proceedings of the Central Committee of Argenteuil and of two debates--
one on the concept of dialectics, carried on in LA PENSEE in 196?, an d the
other on humanism, conducted in LA NOWELLE CRITIQUE from March 1963 to Feb-
ruary 1966. With its study, in chronological order, of the content of the
two debates, Cotten's book teems with valuable information about what the re-
ference points of the Communist philosoptters were in the 1960's, what they
debated, what they invested in their discussions, beyond the problems posec~ -
and the concepts set forth, and what the real and declared stakes of them -
were. He shows how the questions raised by Althusser iit into the preoccupa-
tions of a milieu and of an era, but also, inversely, how they circumscribed
_ these preoccupations, fashioned.their formulation, to the point that one is
somet~.mes struck by the way in which certain statements, in the discussions
reported by Cotten, fit into Althussex�'s problematic, even when they show
only a very limited agreement with it. But doesn't this amount to having in-
fluence? Not ral~ying the others to one's positions, but rather, by shifting _
the problems, changing both those who are for and those who are against.
With the Argenteuil Central Committee meeting, through the statements critic-
izing one theoretical position or a.nother of Althusser's a.~d in what is said
about the legitimacy of his undertaking, there is another question raised:
that of the responsibility of the intellectua.ls in development of the theory
that underlies the practice of a Communist party, or correlatizrely, the ques-
tion o:f the rights of scientific anal,ysis in militant practice. In analyzing
the elements of response found in the Central Committee's debates and noting
their insufficiencies--it also would doubtlessly have been interesting to ~
_ analyze the party's later debates and statements of position on these ques-
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tio:~s--;lean-Pierr�e Cotten is led to his st:arting h.,ypothesis: "The question of
- a theoretician's contribution is (perhaps) identical with the working-out of
adequate concepts for thinking out the effective practice of a Communist par- _
ty"--a hypothesis which supplies the problematic for all his research. In
order to think out this practice--more precisely, to account for ~he moments
when things change in the theoretical whole, which ideally ~s coherent but
whose uni~ty always remains problematical and which subtends and justifies (or
should ~ustify) the party's line--Jean-Pierre Cotten praposes several formu-
lations, all of which turn on the idea that theoretical practice is only one
aspect of a process, "the'process' during which the new is worked out, with
- all the changes among political leadership, mass movement, experience mas-
tered and theorized at various levels, 'independent' theoretical elaboration
- more or less linked to social practice." In this process, which according to
- him cannot be harnessed, what are the righ+s and the duties of research, what
does research affect that is close to or very far from what political prac-
~ tice deals with? But a.~so, how can the party stimulate it, encourage the -
diffusion of its results and remain capable ot' a.~alyzing all its implica-
tions, of criticizing and dissecting them but also of integrating them, of
= trans�orming them, of using them?
It is because he gets us to ask these questions--which are of such very cur-
rent interest--that Jean-Pierre Cotten's book, beyond the informatian which
he furnishes on an era and a historical situation, affects us and is impor- -
tant to us.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Les Editions de la Nouvelle Critique
1' `'67
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
MARCHAIS WORRIES--Georges Marchais has gotten together with the most im-
portant federal secretaries of the PCF to tell theqn to expect difficulties
during the elections, and a solitude [i.e., isolation] "perhaps much more
pronounced than ever before." [Text-] [Paris PARIS MATG'H in French 1 Feb _
80 p 70]
NEW SDFCE EMPLOYEES--The SDECE has just hired as fulltime employees a
~ number of economists and specialists in petroleum problems. [Text] [Paris
PARIS MATCH in French 1 Feb 80 p 70]
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
PROFILES OF EMERGING POLITICAL, GOVERNMENT VIPS -
Milan PAl~ORAMA in Italian 17 Dec 79 pp 73-84
[Article by Gianni Farneti: "Oh, the Energing Ones!"]
- [Text) They understood that the people want new, clean faces, real com-
pe~ence, specific initiatives. They prepared themselves. Now they are
laying their hands on the power levers. What are the new ones like? But,
- ab~ve all,who are t~~Fy?
The second generation has already emerged, and is well known. Overcoming,
or completely brushing aside, the resistance of a political class that was ~
J entrenched for decades in its positions of power, new men seized the
opportunity to handle the need for change that was expressed by the coun-
try and, above all at the end of the 70's, they made themselves available
for the main administrative posts in the government and in all the par-
ties. More or less young, they thoroughly expolited, along with patiently
w,,Jen alliances, their fresher appearance and their competence in specific
- fields. Thus important men like Francesco Cossiga, Guido Bodrato,
Giovanni Galloni, Franco Mazzola, and experts such as Nino Andreatta and
Filippo Maria Pandolfi in the DC [Christian Democratic Party], men in their
40`s like Fabrizio Cichitto in the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], Pietro
Longo in the PSDI [Independent Social Democratic Party], Valerio Zanone
and Renato Altissimo among the liberals, have won party secretaryships,
- ministries, undersecretaryships, or party k~y positions. They are the men
who have been most prominent in politics in ].979 and who certainly will be
_ spoken of even more in 1980. -
But the thrust to generation replacement has not been exhausted with these
personages. In the shadow of the new influential men, still younger men -
have understoud the growing need for clean faces, specific struggles, com- -
petence. They prepared themselves, and now are looking upward. Th~s is
the third generation, cl~mbing toward their share of influence and pawer,
still almost completely unknown~to the general public. PANORAM~1 antici-
pates their names, their ambitions, the struggles by means of which rhey
wi11 try to win a plac;e on the political scer~e of the 80's.
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Franco Bassani. He is from Milan; is 39 years old; and is in charge of
the PSI legislative office. He is one of the rising stars of Bettino
Craxi's party. Even though his election as deputy was very recent (it was
one of the June 1979 surprises), there already is talk of his being one
of the probable candidates for an appointment as minister in the event of
a return of the socialists to the government. A practicing Catholic and
one of the founders, together with Piero Pratesi and Ruggero Orfei, of the
periodical of the Catholic left, RELAZIONI SOCIALI [SOCIAL RELATIONS] -
(later changed to SETTE GIORNI) [SEVEN DAYS], he belongs to the~generation
- of Catholic militants, like Luigi Covatta, Luciano Benadusi, Gennaro Acqua-
viva, who joined the PSI after tough conflicts with the clerical hierarchy.
He was president of the Milan Catholic University undergraduates; and was
dismissed by the then Cardinal Giovan Battista Montini. His present suc-
cess is explained by the competence he acquired in the field of public
administration and in the administration of local agencies.
- Antonio Bassolino. At 32 years of age and as regional secretary of the
PCI [Italian Communist Party] in Campania, he is the youngest member of
the communist leadership. And he is abov~ all the spearhead of the new
generation of the pro-Berlinguer leaders. A student of inedicine, he was
not yet 20 when he was elected PCI section secretary of Afragola (large
center near Naples). Since then, his one main interest has been politics.
In 1968 he was one of the protagonists in the struggle for revival
within the Neapolitan communist federat~on, against the old leadership
group that was bound to Giorgio Amendola. In 1970, contrary to all expec- _
tation, he was elected as regional counselor. He resigned, and became -
secretary of the Avellino federation. This was the springboard. He
joined the Central Committee and became regional secretary. At the last
:.~ngress, he became a member of the leadership. Persevering, fearless,
imaginative, he has an awesome task for 1980: to guide the PCI through
the test of regional elections in the region and in the most difficult
cities.
Enzo Bianco. In 1974, at 24 years of age, he alnost obliged the deliberate
Giovanni Spadolini to put the big, black bordered, red scarf, emblem of
the historic republicans, around his neck. Two years later, at 26, during
- the height of the electoral campaign, he accompanied Ugo La Malfa when he
_ canvassed all of Sicily: "a fwldamental e-,cperience." Bianco, a native
of Catania, an assistant professor, a former secretary of the FGR
[Republican Youth rederation], is no~~ 29 years old. He works in the
- research office of the ICIPU [Credit Institute for Public UCility Concerns] _
and is officially recognized as the most important representative of the -
third generation of the PRI [Italian Republican Party], that of the "almost
30-year olds." This year, as chief o~ the office in charge of emigration,
he *ravelled a great deal. And the result is seven repsblican sections
opened up outside of Italy. At the next congress, expected to take place
- in the autumn of 1980, in all probability he will become a member of the
leadership and wi.11 be given an assignment of authority.
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Rocco Buttiglione. Ee is a native of Turin and is about 30 years old. I~e
teaches philosophy at the University of Rome after having been the favorite
pupil of the Catholic scholar, Augusto Del Noce. But above all today he
� is the "thinking brain" of Christian communion and liheration, the man
_ who succeeds in translating into policy the "clerical" themes that ger-
minate in the most earnest sectors of the Catholic world. His speeches
at meetings and his articles do not go unnoticed in Piazza del Gesu. But
he prefers to stand aside and continues to consider himself more as an
ideologist than a future leader. However, he has solid ties with the
forzanovista [me**~ber of leftwing faction of DC] Vittorino Colombo and with
Amintore Fanfani, who often asked him to contribute to his periodical. Now -
he is trying to establish close relations between the CL [expansion unknown] -
and the ACLI [Christian Associations of Italian WorkersJ. He is tall and
big; smokes a pipe; and is very cordial in the company of friends. Even
during meetings he does not lose an opportunity to play a game of scopone
[card game].
Francesco Demitry. He knows what occurs in the Vatican and in the Italian
Catholic world. As head of a new "information office," he will have a
delic~te responsibility at the Botteghe Oscure: to inform the PCI of
Church news and the Church of PCI news. He is a former Jesuit; is married;
and has three children. He has accumulated unique experience in the field
of Catholic information: 5 years with the Vatican Radio, 8 years with T~V
as head of religious matters; then involvement with dissenting groups.
He has been enrolled in the PCI s~nce 1973. And he is also a member of the
"Italian Theological Association for the Study of Ethics," the official
- t~ieologians' organizat~~on.
_ Sandro Di Pietro. "We rightists are against nuclear stations..." Three
years ago, in the spring, on the Montalto plain, thousands of autonomists
were astonished. Not only was there a neofascist in their demonstration,
but he spoke with a~nicrophone. Perhaps because of the astonishment, no
incidents occurred. 5ince then, 34-year old Sandro Di Pietro, a firm,
sturdy man, a researcher for the CNR [National Research Council] and the
right arm of Pino Rauti, has been fighting his battle against the atom,
and has begun to make his way in the 24IS [Italian Social MovementJ. Many -
of the top level people, from the president, Pino Romualdi, to the head -
of the Youth Front, rranco Fina, are pro-nuclear. But a few days ago an
internal referendum carried out by the official newspaper of the Youth
Front sided with Di Pietro: 63 percent of the neofascist young neople
are against the stations. They will be given consideratian in January
at a rightist conference on energy, organized by Di Pietro.
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Francesco D'Onofrio. If on 3 June he had been 40 years old, Benigno -
_ Zaccagnini certainly would have reserved a definite constituency for him
in the senate. He lacked a few months, but already there are those who
visualize him as a possible "expert," to receive an assignment soon in
the government. He is the official constitutionalist of the Christian =
shield, with a great deal of specialization at Harvard, a professorship
- at Naples, contacts abroad, and even relations with the very influential
Opus Dei. He is a highl~ crained scholar, but he also is very familiar
with power and knows, how to protect it in politics. He is quiet and an
extrovert. He coordlinated the work for the drafting of the new
' Christian Democratic constitutionr
Mauro Dutto. He is a political journalist of the Tg2 [expansion unknown];
is 38 years old; aa~d a new PRI deputy. He probably owes his success also
to the public i.mage of "the good guy," idolized by television. In first
place among the nonelected in Rome, he replaced Emanuele Terrana, who
died the day after the election. In 3 years, as secretary of the PRI in
Rome, he transformed the party organization and succeeded in rejuvenating
the political activity of the PRI in the city. He is well liked both by
the rank and file (in particular, women) and the new leaders on Via dei
Capprettari, who have appointed him to the School Board in the Chamb~r
of Deputies, one of the traditi_onal PRI spearheads.
Publio Fiori. In Rome he is "secoad after Giulio." He was a candidate for
the first time in the political elections and won 102,000 vo~es for the
DG. Until 2 years ago, his hobby was running. Ther? the BR [Red,Brigades]
shot 11 bullets into his body and he had to replace running competitions
with long walks through the historical center of the capital. He no
_ lo._~er carries a weapon ("after all, it's of no use"). He is a former
state counselor, has had a great deal of experience in the municipal
council and in the province, and was the first to realize the propaganda
potential of private tel~:�vision. His image of efficiency, elegance, and
gentlemanly bearing have helped him. At the national level, he is a
follower of Emilio Coloinbo. In the city he operates on autonomous posi-
tions, but above all he is the standard bearer for revival of the party in
implacable polemics with the so-called "Ave Maria group," that unites
Giulio Andreotti, Amerigo Petrucci, and Clelio Darida in the defense of
decennial balances of power. H aving now become an influential person, he
is convinced of being able to succeed in breaking down any isolation.
Giuseppe La Ganga is Giusy to his companions. He accomplished his big
- leap on 3 June, when with 25,000 votes in his favor he caught the party
by surprise. The party did not think that it would have in him, at only
31 years of age, the socialist candidate with the most..votes in Turin.
Decisive help came to him from Norberto Bobbio who, with Antonio Giolitti, -
Giorgio Bocca, and Francesco Forte, signed 100,000 letters of recommenda-
tion, that were sent to the big constituency of Piedmont. But La Ganga
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-w had already tried to help himself. For 10 years (first as secretary of
~he FCSI [Italian Socialist Youth Federatiun], then of the Turati. Club, `
then oC the Turin Socialist Federation), he spent 16 hours a day in PSI
headquarters. For months and months he listed the merits, shortcomings, -
weaknesses, and strengt?hs of comrades and adversaries in a notebook. For
- 3 months he underwent autogenous training (guided by his wife, a psycho-
logist) to overcome tne stress of the elect4ral campaign. Today he is
one of Craxi's pupils. As his deputy ~~n P;.eda~ont, he eats and sleeps at
the Raphael, the Roman hotel where the staunch followers of the PSI
secretary stay. He is already a member of the parliamentary leadership
~ group, has been welcomed to work in Claudio Martelli's office on Via
Tomacelli, and at the next shuffle wi11 advance from the central committee
to the PSI party leadership. In the meantime he cultivates personal rela-
tions with Minister Reviglio, whom he assists at the University of Turin, _
with Sergio Pininfarina, president of the Tndustrial Union, with Jiri -
_ Pelikan, who guided him through the Piedmont meetings. When he has a
little free time, he adds to his collection of more than 400 bottles of
high quality wines, a collection that not only fills his wine cellar, but
also invades his apartment.
Luigi Manconi. He is the rising star in the extraparliamentary area; "the
leader of the right wing," say his enemies. A 32-year old Sardinian, he
was founder of LOTTA CONTINUA jCONTINUOUS STRUGGLE] (he was also head
of order services); had brief experience at the Savelli publishing house;
is the director. of OMBRE ROSSE [RED SHADOWS], a periodical that has been
able to unite what remained of 1968 with the new political-cultural magma
of the middle 70''s (music, feminism, ideological crises). But above all -
he is thought of as the inspirer of the new course for LOTTA CONTINUA,
~~ith his critism of terrorism and his clear difference of opinion with -
the autonomists; the most recent polemic: with Franco Piperno, himself, on
- Red Brigades and terrorism.
Clemente Mastella. In the 3 June elections he obtained 100,000 votes.
His most recent political rsmark dumbfounded the old DC [Christian
Democratic Party] leaders: "Govem.ment with the co~nunists may be possible
even in 1980." Leader of Catholic Action, then journalist in the RAI
[Italian Radio Broadcasting Company] of Naples, he was discovered by the
leader of the rank and file current, Ciriaco De Mita. Since then he has
become the young spearhead of the christian democratic lef t. At 32 years
of age, he is already considered a certain undersecretary. "Perhaps in
the first govErnment with the communists," say his enemies with malice.
Gianluigi Melega. In only 2 hours, on Tuesday, 10 November, he received
more insults and threats than any other deputy in the Eighth Legislature.
But he doesn't Iet go. On the contrary, he has decided to bring his
detailed, formal charge of association with a"criminal gang" against the
DC from parliament to all the main citi~o in Italy, inviting radical
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militants to find at local levels other proof of the misdeeds of the
Christian shield, to be collected in a book to be sold at newsstands, but
also to be distributed to the magistracy. He is 44 years old, was a
- journalist first with PANORAMA and now with L'ESPRESSO. He was elected -
deputy by a narrow margin by the Radical Party (but he is not an enrolled _
member: he considers himself a representative of the thousands of radical
- voters who do not have a membership card) as a consequence of the articles
that contributed decisively to the downfall of Giovanni Leone, president
of the Republic.
Giovanni Moro. At a little over 20 years of age, rie is one of the best
known Carholics in Italy. He has benefitted from the reflected fame of
his father, Aldo, and f rom his assassination, but also from a political
- militancy that started when he was still in shorts, first in the leftist
. Catholic movement in February 1974, then in an analogous "Federative
Movement," and now as head of the Moro Foundation, that was formed to per-
vetuate the thinking of the deceased statesman, but which during the past
several weeks has been at the center of complex Christian Democratic
political maneuvers. On bad terms with the rest of his family because of
his stands against some Christian Democrats, former coileagues of his
father, courted by both communists and soci.alists as a possible electoral
candidate because of his name and his substanLially leftist positions,
Giovanni Moro has not yet chosen a party in which to mil~tate. But it
is probable that he will do so in 1980.
Fabio Mussi. He is not a bureaucrat; he did not go through the usual
steps taken by leaders. But he was the one, as deputy chief of press and
_ ,ropaganda, who was entrusted with the assignment of presenting the ~
cou~itenance of the PCI in 1980. He is 31 years old, from Piombino. He _
received a degree from the Normal College of Pisa after writing his thesis -
on the "Frankfurt School." He was already enrolled in the PCI (since `
1965) when he became one of the leaders of the student movement. In
order to make it possible for him to b~come ~ member of the central
- committee in 1969, they had to change a constitutional ru~le; they lowered
the necessary amount of seniority for membership. But in 1969 he voted
against the expulsion of the Manifesto group. This was an action that he -
then had to pay for with exclusion from the CC [central committee]. He
was rescued by Giorgio Napolitano and came to Rome to devote himself to _
school. Then since 1975 came his most interesting experience, as deputy
director of RINASCITA. At the most recent congress, the PCI leaders
clashed again over whether to allow him to return to the central Comm?ittee.
' In the end he succeeded. Six months later, he had the assignment of
thoroughly reorganizing PCI propaganda.
_ Antonio Patuelli. He is the liberal who more than any other embodies the
- "new course" that was energetically undPrtaken by Valerio Zanone in the ~
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PLI [Ttalian Liberal Party]. Twenty-nine year old Patuelli, a native of '
Ravennn, Romagna, "a rigorous Zanonefollower" according to his own defi.-
nltl~n, hn:~ ex~~~rtenced r~l.t kindR of leFti.st conf.l~t.r.t~+ wIt~htn the PI~T:
~crribl~~ ruws with the followers of Edoardo Sogno; rlerce polemics with -
the staunch followers of Giovanni Malagodi; defense cvith all his might -
of the referendwns; anti-conciliatory initiatives; policy of support of
. PLI participation in the majority of abstentions with the communists. In
addition there is his own personal involvement in the recovery of the
cultural roots of liberalism: meetings on Piero Gobetti, Giovanni -
Amendola, Benedetto Croce, Giovanni Giolitti. IndeFatigable more than
dependable, by now a very great party expert, in January 1979 Patuelli -
seemed to Zanone to be a good possibility for deputy secretary. Immediate
appointment. Iri 1980 he will have to study and in prac~ice reconstitute
from the bottom up the new organizational structure of the PLI.
Giuseppe Rippa. In the hotel, he had begun to fall asleep at 0800 hours
on 5 November after a sleepless night spent in the infernal pit of the
Palasport of Genoa, to vote on the radical congress's motions and
countermotions. He was tired but satisfied that he had been elected
secretary of the Radical Party. At 0950 hours the telephone rang: "It
was Marco Pannella. He wanted to congratulate me." C.?iusePpe
- Rippa, known as Geppi, a 30-year old Neapolitan with a degree in law, an
absolute objector, has been held provisionally at police headquarters a
couple of times and was clubbed by the PS some 10 times in recent years.
He is the first secretary of the PR [Radical Party] to be elected against -
the wishes of Pannella. Even his adversaries acknowledge his gifts of
astuteness, human warmth, diplomacy--gifts that help to win over a con- _
gress. In Genoa he advanced very well: he neutralized the Pannella tor-
~,~does without breaking irremediably with anyone. He is lanky (very
_ thin and 1.84 meters tall), has the look of an Edwardian actor, and a
completely Neapolitan sense of humor. In his youth Rippa was a.lso a good
volleyball player. Difficult assignments await him.
Alessandro Roncaglia. He is a PSI rising economist and politician. He
is married and has a 9-year old daughter. Classical music is his hobby.
He was a favorite pupil of Paolo Sylos Labini, the founder of socialist _
economists, and is now his close friend. After receiving a degree in
economics in Rome, he specialized in Cambridge, England. He studied under
the guidance of Piero Sraffa, the most authoritative economist of the
Marxist school who has taught in the universities of Western countries. _
One of his books, "Sraffa e la teoria dei prezzi"["Sraffa and the Price
Theory"], was translated into English and Japanese; a Spanish translation
is about to come out. A follower of Riccardo Lombardi since joining the
PSI, he is an editor of MONDOPERAIO [WORKER'S WORLD], the PSI ideological
. periodical, and, together with economists Antonio Pedone and Sylos
Labini, is the chief animator of the CEPEC, PSI Econom_ic Policy Research
Center.
~
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Valdo Spini. He is the leading representative, along with 30-year old
Mario Raffaelli, of the last generation of the socialist left. He is
33 years old, is the son of historian Giorgio Spini, was the PSI group
leader i.n the municipal counci'1 of Florence. His rise began with a hard
political struggle against Luigi Mariotti's socialist rigtit. Elected
- deputy on 3 June, he has a difficult goal: that of becoming the "anti-
Martelli" of the PSI left.
~ Mario Segni is Mariotto to his friends. A native of Sassari, class of
1939, he received a solid education from the Jesuits. A purebred
Christian Democrat (son of Antonio, former president of the Republic), he
is the founder and leader of the CENTO [100] group, the new technocratic
- right of the Christian shield. Amei�icans like him; also the dynamic
Lombard businessmen like Silvio Berlusconi who wished him a bright
future: "On the Christian Democratic team he is like Paolo Rossi; a
center forward who makes the goal." His excellent legal preparation.(he
is a lawyer and university professor) made it possible to administer with -
fairly good success the justice sector of the DC for a couple of years.
- Having been born and having lived in the heart of the Palace has almost
completely kept him from inferiority complexes with respect to both the
historical leaders and the present leaders. Very uncompromising, he
has also been able to say no to whoever tried to entice him with promises
of governmental assignments. His Sardinian voters rewarded him with
- almost 70,000 votes. And now he is preparing for the DC congress, deter-
mined to win a place that will make it possible for him to deal as an
equ21 with all of the leaders.
Carlo Vizzini. He is 32 years old, is from Palermo, and is the social -
dea~ocratic deputy at state meetings. He entered Montecitorio when very
young, in 1976, precisely when his party, upset by the Lockheed cyclone,
reached its lowest electoral levels. In Rome, as a deputy, he kept
himself carefully away from the intrigues and sanguinary plots that were
prevalent in the PSDI in the post-Tanassi years. He has preferred to
work quietly in committees, earned the esteem of other parties, and -
waited for the waters to subside. One eye on Sicily, another on the
- party's economic committee, once the storm had subsided, he entered the
heart of the new secretary, Pietro Longo.
Luciano Violante. He is from Turin (even though he was born in Dire
- Daua, Ethiopia, in 1941). He is a magistrate; for 3 years was a colla-
borator of Francesco Paolo Bonifacio in the Ministry of Justice; was _
elected deputy on 3 June. He will be the "public scandals man" for the
PCI. The Catanzaro trial, the Moro investigation, the Sindona scandal:
the big cases that will go to parliament will all go through his hands.
He has just been entrusted also with responsibility for the PCI justice
sector. Almost a minister. He has only one regret: he will have little -
time to devote to his favnrite hobby, mountain climbing.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Arnoldo Mondadori Editare S.p.A.
8255 39
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CUUNTRY SEC'1'ION SPAIN
TRADITIONALISTS, PROGRESSIVES VIE FOR CONTROL OF PNV
_ Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Dec 79 pp 33, 35, 37
[Article: "Struggle fo?- the Triple B"]
[Text] An extremely serious crisis has erupted inside the Basque Nation-
alist Party (PNV) and threatens it with an irreconcilable division. At
the end of 43 years of exile, President Leizaola is facing is not
exactly a peaceful one.
_ An under~;round war of unprecedented virulence is devastating the PNV. One
week before the election of the party's regional leaders, the traditional-
ists or "Sabinianos" headed by Anton Ormaza, the Bermeo canner who still
presides over the party organization in Vizcaya, and the "prngressives"
or "parliamentarians" under the leadership of Xavier. Arzallus, the argumen- -
tative parliamentarian, are in the midst of a merciless battle.
~'n~aza's people suspect that there may be Marxist iiifiltration in the ranks
of the enemy. Arzallus' people accuse the Sabinianos of being infiltrated
by Madrid through a splinter faction of the old ELA-STV [Solidarity of
Basque Workers], a faction they consider to be "yellow" and employer-oriented.
Weapons Being Sharpened
_ The crisis, wrapped in fierce language including expressions like "night of
the long knives," "attack on the government," "integrationism," "Rasputins"
and "bureaucrats," comes at a time that was once expected would be a time
of reconciliation: the return to Bilbao after 43 years of exile of Presi-
dent Leizaola who has now given his final blessing to the whole autonomy
process.
Not even during the 1920's, when blackmail, infiltration, insult~, threats
and bad manners were a daily occurrence, was the PNV subjected to such
. furious debates. On the eve of the 22 December convention, the threat of ~
a schism is obvious. There is already talk of a"histcric meeting."
= Dramatic developments are taking place in the party municipal committees.
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No one can visualiLe any ~chance of a compromiae, Ha.ving assumed their posi-
tiona, far from striving for agreement, they are sharpening their weapone~
The PNV crisis is not a new one, Actually, it goes back to the death of
the great leader, Juan de A3uriaguerra, who in life aerved as a unifying
_ force for all factiona thanke to hie inaisputable peraonal prestig^e. Fixm
and authoritarian, A~uriaguerra lmew how to keep the party reina in his
hand.s and permitted no one to deviate from Sabiniano, or orthodox, direc-
tives.
But as soon as A3uriaguerra was buried, the grndges and antagoniame dormant
in the PNV party machine emerged into full view of the public. The 1979
parliamentary eleations played the role of setting off the whole noisy
wrangle.
While c~ne faction of the party considers consolidation of the old machine
to be b'as~c, strengthening the organizations of the 1930's, a new, "reform"
_ wave, encouraged to assume tr~e role of protag+onist by the Basque parliamen-
taxiaris, has not concealed its vehement desire to almost entirely traasform -
that old maahine, "There are trro concepta, rather th~?n two ideologiea, as
- some would have ue believe," sa.ye aa old militant.
The Bizkaia Buru Batzar [Vizcaya Executive Committee of the PNV], (BBB), the
highest organization in Vizcaya and genuine lord and master of PNV decisions
wliile Ajuriaguerra was alive, has begun to receive implacable attacks from the
"c~issantere" who have been trying to put an end to the more or less "pre-
- dominant" provincial organizatian's "anlqilosie" aad lack of effectiveness~ -
_ `
"The Sabiniano-prngresaive dichotompr is inexaat," aseerta Xavier Arzallus,
the head of the parliamentary or pmgreseive group, "It is not su ideolo-
- g_^al struggle, We too oonsider ourselvea to be the heirs and disaiples
of the master, Sabino Arana. It so happene that we believe the party
ahould chang+e its bylaws and modernize them. Wh~t tre will never a,dmit are
infiltrations by graupe Khich, defending intereeta alien to our cause, _
attsmpt to use old and reapectable party leaders for purposes not very
clear to us." -
' Power Struggle
SoL~thing more thaa a power atruggle? Possibly. In a~y event, tkie issue
of "infiltration" into the PNP had already been dragged out into the open
at Durang+~ a year ago during a marathon meeting that la~ted 16 hours, all ~
of them f~i].1 of heated debate, At that time Arzallus engag+ed in a dramatic
confrontation with the current cha~rmari of the BBB, Anton Orm~aza. Eleo-
tione were being held to replace the party~s reg3onal leaders and Ormaza
arid his followera, called "tra.ditionalists,'~ r~on the raoe by cornering 11 _
or the 15 authenticated seata. Shortly after the "battle of Durang+o,"
hoWever, Arzallus, momentarily defeated, launahed a thundering counter-
attack which enabled him to recover poaitions, Ar$~.llus had pulled the
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plug on a powder keg~ The supreme leader of the progressives imputed his
defeat to a"conspiracy" on the part of ELA union members who had aplit off
from the old ELA-STV and w~o had been dubl~~d "eladios" by their enemies,
- Then the confrontation between the two nationaliat factione got worae, 3ust
_ as if Arzallus had really poked hie finger into the wound that wa.e most
painf~l for those loya2. to Ormaza. A confrnntation be~ween Deputy Kepa
Sodupe and Ormaza himself, due to the latter's preeentation of an economic po-
5 i Liun ~~uper ~�.ust Sc~dup~~ his candidacy in the Parliamentary electinns l~isr rlarch.
- During the debate on the Constitution there had already been hinte of eeri- ~
ous confrontations. The parliamentarians had seriously questioned the -
BBB's position on the constitutional referendum not all of ~hem favored
abstention and only #he success of the campai~nn put an end to the tension,
The Sondica Etnbrace, Forgotten
The truce lasted for a very short time~ Shortly after the "Sondica embrace"
between Deputy Marcos Vizcaya and Anton Orma,za, the underground war was re- -
sumed~ The negotiation of the statute of autonou~r was over and the PNV
regional assemblies beg~n to demand a nerr election for the BBB, whose polic~r
line had been seriously questioned at the Galda,cano, Durangro and Portugalete
assemblies.
It was precisely at the Portugalete asaembly that it was decided not to
terminate the BBB's mandate becauee due to the circumstances it wa.s advi-
sable to reform the party statutes on which the dust of 40 yeare weighed
heavily, By 96 to 76 votes, it was decide.d that PNV Vizcaya leaders would
_ rema.i.n 3.n office for 90 days more, a term to be viewed as proviaional.
Arzallus wins
~~ctt~al.ly, 185 days went by. Aud finally on 17 November last the tra-
ditiona.lists suffered their first defeat, in Castillo-Els~abeitia (see
CAMBIO 16, No 417). By 52 to 48 votes, it was decided ta reform the B~BB _
and the resignation of the Ormaza g~oup was demanded~ This was Arzallue~
first great victory. The struggle between Arza.llue and Ormaza has reached
its hi~point of violence durir~ these very days ahen Leizaola is ret~arning
from exile~ '
The war has been stepped up since Josu Arenaza, a HBB member, has entered
the debate. Inside the party, viewed as hardline and t.r.a,di.t~~z~~.~ ~?rena,za,
~ is the author of a"Report to the Party Rank and File" which the integra-
tionist Bilbao daily LA GACETA DEL NORTE published last Heek in a aix-part
serial. _
Dirty War
F~r 30 pages Arenaza severely attacks the paxty's "progreasive" line, de..
nounces Maaxist "infiltration of the EIA [Party for the Basque Re~olution]
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- or ESEI," questions the appointmenta ma.de at the last Basque General Coun-
cil, alerts us to the party's economic situation, criticizes the line fol-
lowed by the daily DEIA and ite directors and aggxessively alludes to an
"employera pressure group" headed by a member of the CGV [13a5que Cc~neral
Gc~uncil~ ancl the chairman oF the Bilbao Chamber of Commerce, Anton rladariaga.
Arenaza's article was a bomb. But not at all a surprise,
- At the latest regiona.l assembl.fes his voice has already made itself force-
fully heard, "No one nor anything ~an keep the rank and file from being
informed as to xha.t goes on in the party and I personally will n~t stop
. presenting that information by whatever meana is most npportune. I will -
not be responsivle for the fact that this detr~cts from the party imag~e,
rather those who have brought about this situation,~~ Arenaza sa3d in hie -
accusatory report,
CAI~IO 16 was able to confirm the fact that the report rras not "leaked"
to the editors of LA GACETA DEL NORTE through direct action of ~he party'a
- traditional faction. The "dirty war" was in faat provoked by certain PNY
members of the eladios faction who, in Madrid as well as in the Ba.sque
Country, stepped up their "aoss3.ers," reports and interviews in support of
the Sabinianoe such that, if the latter were to win the big race to be held
- the following day, the 22 December, they could create a power role for
- themselves inside ths party. .
Accordi.ng to observexs, the eladios are playing a fundamental role in the
current PNV crisis, Without their intervention, it is possible that the
conflict might not have gone beyond a mere dispute between old and young.
After the split within the ELA-STV uaion that took place in the 1960�a,
the eladios held their first congrese irx Le~ona in 1976. The Madrid daily
EL pAIS at that time wrote: "Zn some circles it ha.s g+~tten to the point
where they ar~ talking of an employer~' maneuver to divide Basque workers ~
in terms af their demands. The fact that representatives of the four
Basque cha.mbers of conm?erce were invited to attend the congress is conaider- ~
ed revealing. 2~e means of presenting their case to the public are indiea-
tive of resources which cannot be justified for an underground organization
r+ith a small number of inembera."
a At that time many were the voices that condemmed the "usurpation" of the
hiatoric acronym, ELA-STP, the "yellow" natUSe of the union and the obscure
way in which the organiz~tion was financed. In those days leadera of the
historic ELA asaerted that the industrialist, Olarra~ had serveEl as inter-
mediary i.n obtaining 20 million pesetas.
A few months before the debate-filled Lejona congress the international
labor org~anizations with a court in~unction approached Juan Beitia then
leader of the union enjoining him to refrain from using a union acronym -
recognized as belonging only to the legitima.te or liistoric ELA.
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'!he ne~r EI,~'s suaceseee in the field of union aativity were rare. Bat only
2 y~are ag~o eome of ita leadere ~oined the PNV. "The I,e~ona SLA hae never
be~n a union problem, rather a politiaal proble~~" ie the ~ud~ment ~f Joee
Elorrieta, a member of the hi~toric unicu'a ez~autive oom~ittee.
8s14tiona bstxesn Juan B~itis, Javier Freenedo, the tr+o ~eibl� hea~de of
th~ I,~~o~ ELI, and Daaiel Bnstnria, advieor to Minieter Calvo Satslo and the
"eladios ~an in Madrid, ~o back to 1962. $saently graduatsd troa~ the
s~min~ry, the three of them went to Paria to ~t~dy at the Catholia Center,
fiaano~d by ELl-STP saholarehips. With degreea iu philoeopby, letters arid
~oaiology, Juan B~itia retnrned to the Basqus Cc~nntry ~t the end of a feM
y~ars, Firet, he raa a profe~oor at Gueoho Iueti#ute ~n~d. later at the
IInivsasity of I,e~ons. In 1976 he aad Jua~n Lnie Baraadiaraa rorased s compaqy,
called Bsrats, dedicated to marketing, p~ublia s~lat3~ne aa,~'~ pn'olic~t~r oa~-
_ p~ig~nr. Kith the FrencL advertising coapaqy, Ghriatine Cbauverts Bar~~ts ~
= pr~ps~nd the Pop~lar Llliaaae~s preeeatation in Paris, maaag+~d Lnis Olarra'e
election oamp~?i~n for the Senat,~ an~ received 17 million from the P~tP for
organizing part of ite a~apaign for t~ine autononqr ataitutea
Eis fri~adsbip vith Daaiel Buetnris has permitted :~u,au Be.�tia to count on -
a direct linlc rith Msdrid. 3~us the'"eladioe~caa apread false reporte in
hi8h g+avemment circlea arid through some prese eourcea~ Theee reports are
usnally signed by the Yirm, "D.B." A recent rspor~ that has raacbsd the
-Pr~~s Sscretariat reads as f~lloxes "The parr~nne (parliaffientarisne) have
ao economic poxer in the Pi~oayrs PNQ ~ad ths big es~?..~yea~a baal~ the JEL -
[~zpaaeioan ualmonn] (traditianal) line, rrhich ~s ary~t.~lliaed in Bsitia,
Irala aad Oz'ms~s.n
~nt~r Pedro J.
~a PNV airclea, the eouraea need bT Madrid ~BC political _
comme~tator Pedro J. Ramirez for the compoaitian of a pole~i~al article on
the PpP crisie - reprodnaed by the Bilbao ~L CO~SBO ESPA]itOl, - rrer~ aothing
more thaa aonfidenaee aupplied by Jnau B~itia hi~aslf.
lacording to ite d~tractore, Haaires' ~rtial~, xhich proeoked a most violen~ -
r~~pones froa Depaty Marcoe Visceqra in DI~IA - so violent thst some members
ot ths P~tT ~o sympsthi~e Mf.th li~rcos Yi$o~rs's vievs arnnoid~r it to b~ nn-
tortw~at~ - mersly aeaesblsi argumsnte favoring the "eladios."
- In ~aother r~aeat confidential report ws~.tten by Buaturia~ he notss t~hat _
i.nei8s the P?~P Beitia beade th~ etatnte, not th~ 3ndependence, Psction and -
th~t they oaald neg~otiat~ ri.th him from "reali~tia" po~itiaa~e vithout having
to "cbang+e th~ir oolora as the parliamentas~aae do." R'he articlQ adds that
the elsdioe' altes~ative is to snacee~d in g~oveaaing the FIiP baosnse tbat
~ruld be "a g~ood alternative for Spain."
In the fsae oi thie paper var9 a PlT~ leader ~+ho l~a aeked C~1~IDI0 16 to con-
- a~al his name eaids "It ie 3narsdible that th~se boya ia ~'lsdrid are nsing
- argu~a~onts that are ~he oppoeite ot rih4t is me~intai.nad ineide ~he party.
~
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On the one hand, they talk of a statute aad, on the other, they support o
the moat traditional postures of nationaliem ~nd the Sabiniano line~ They -
have exploited poor old Anton Ormaza." Mar~y interpret thia lateet power `
atruggle ae f.he old ma~ority faction~a last attempt to force negotiations _
_ arid a compromiee in the face of the poseible overthrorr of the faation tr,at
- follows Ormaza. -
COP7fRIGflT 19 7 9. INFORMA4~ON Y R~'0I8TAS, S. A.
11,466 .
CSOt 311G ~D
45
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