JPRS ID: 9045 WORLDWIDE REPORT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040038-4
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ JPRS L/8~69
16 January 1980
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
_ p
= FOUO No. 662
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
JPRS publications contain information prima.rily fram foreign
n~~aspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
'transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
- sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
oth~~r characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents af this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of t?~e U.S. Govern.ment.
F'or further information on report content
call (703) 351-2833 lNear East); 351-2501
(Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North
Africa).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGITLATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
. MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
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JPRS L/8869
16 January 1980
SUB-SAiIARAN AFRI CA REPORT
No. 662
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS �
- Status of Communism in Africa Reported
(Marc Yared; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1~ Dec 79) 1 _
Senegal-Guinea Reconciliatioa Bodes Well
(NEW AFRICAN, Dec 79) 3
ANGOLA
Briafs
Alleged East German Massacres 5
BURUNDI
Nickel Deposits Possibly To Be Developed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)..... 6
Legislation for Small, Medium-Size Businesses
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)..... 7
Briefs -
Press Distribution 9
CONGO
Briefs
President Requests French Aid 10
ETHIOPIA
~ Newsman Reports on Situation in Eritrea
(AFRIQUE-ASTE, 26 Nov-9 Dec 79) li
1 -
Life in Maquis Described, by Pietro Petrucci
EPLF Official Views Er~trean War, Isias Afework
Interview
Five Ethiopian Offensives Listed
- a- ~III NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Ethiopian Attempt To Talk With WSLF Report~d
' (Philippe Rochot; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Nov 79)......... 20
GABON
Direct Oil Marketing Planned, Future Oil Resources
Studied
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Nov 79)..... 22
MADAGASCAR
Report on 1978 Fiscal Year for BNI, BTM
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEl?ITERRANEENS, 9 Nov 79)..... 24
Briefs
Malagasy Officers Tr3.ed 27 i_
i
MALAWI .
Sugar Refinery in Dwanga Inaugurated
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ME]~ITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)..... 28
Training Offered for Modern Fi.shing Techniques Offered
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)...... 30
Maldeco FishQries Statistics Given
(MARCHES TR(?PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)...... 31 I
MALI
Traore: Sole Party Uni*es All Political Tendencies
(JEITNE AFRIQUr., 5 Dec 79) 33 -
MAURITIUS
Naval Build-!ip in Indian Ocean Cause for Concern
(Herve-Masson; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 10 Dec 79) 38
Briefs
Rupee Devaluated 41
New Energy Sources Sought 41 -
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CONTENTS (Continuc:d) Page
MOZAMBIQUE
Progress Accompli:;hed in Econom;~ Despite Difficulties
(NEW AFRI:CAN, Dec 79) 42
- Briefs
Official to GDR 45
- SENEGAL
Economy Facing Crisis Worse Than Generally Believed
(Jean-T,ouis Bucher; JEUNE AFRI~UE, 14 Nov 7y)........ 46
SEYCHELLES `
Foreign Backing of Attempted Coup Examined
- (Various sources, various dates) 50
Threats to Socialist Regime, by Marc Yared =
Fore:gn Backing of Plot Suspected, by San Fie
TANZANIA
Nyerere Believed To Be Yielding to IP�IF Demands
(JEUNE AFRIGUE, 12 Dec 79) 53
~ TOGO -
Political Changes May Augur Well for End of Crisis
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Dec 79)..~..~,.,,, 55
~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
STATUS OF COMMUNISM IN AFRICA REPORTED -
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 p 11
[Article by Marc Yared]
[Text] J.A. replies to question asked by Abdoulaye Cisse,
from Kayes (Mali):
Haw many communist parties, or those introducing themselves
as such, are there who have gained political power in an -
- African country?
Nine organizations assuming "scientific socialism" are in power at the present
- time in Africa and the Middle East. They are as follows: PCT (Congolese
' Labor I'arty), PRPB (People's Revolution Party of Benin), FRELIMO (Mozambique
Liberation Front), MPLA-PT (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola- -
Labor Party), SRSP (Somali Revol~itionary Socialist Party), PSY (Yemeni
- Socialist Party), PDPA (Popular and Democratic Party of Afghanistan), STP
(Movement for Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe), and in Madagascar FNDR _
(National Front for the Defense and the Revolution).
Only the last two do not officially belong to Marxism-Leninism. Since 1977
SRSP does not maintain cor.dial relations with the Soviet Iinion. PCT, PRPB, _
SRPS and FNDR were initially established (in 1969, 1975, 1976 and 1977 re-
spectively) by "progressist" officers who held the power.
Capt Marien N'Gouabi in the Congo, Capt Matthieu Kerekou in Benin and Gen
Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia (in 1968, 1969 and 1972) had acceded to the
highest office following a military coup d'etat. All three created a single
party.
On the other hand, commander Didier Ratsiraka was first co-opted by the
- responsible military officers to be head of the state in June 1975, before
being confirmed as president of the republic by referendum in December of
the same year, and the front whose principle was adopted by the same referendum
is not made up of a single party, but by a coalition of five parties.
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Kerekou, Siad Barre and Ratsiraka still preside over the destinies of their
country, but N'Gouabi was ass~ssinated on 18 March 1977 and replaced as head
of the state and of the PCT, first by Gen Yhonbi Opango and then by Col Denis
Sassou Nguesso.
The PDPA (established in 1964) in Afghanistan also seized power (in 197z)
by a military coup d'etat. But these are civilians. Mohamed Nour Taraki
in April 1978, then Hafizullah Amin, since last September, held the reins of
the party and of the country. Becoming a single party, th.e PDPA was in fact
a coalition of two Marxist pro-Soviet organizations, the Khalk (the people)
and Parcham (the flag). In July and then in September 1978, the leaders
and the cadre of Parcham were supplanted by those of the Khalk in all the
wheels of the army, the administration and the PDPA.
The South Yemeni FLN, the Angola MPLA, FRELIMO and STP acceeded to power at
the time of the proclamatioz of iudependence (in 1967 far South Yemen, 1975 ;
for Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe). In the past they had stirred i
up resistance to colonial occupation. This resistance, except for STP, took i
the form of an actual liberation war. After having suffered considerable
purging or combining with other political organizations, these four national-
istic "mass movements" became "vanguard parties" advocating.scientific
sociatism, The MPLA (in De~~~be~.1977), the FLN (in October 1978) then i
changed their names to become d~e, the MPLA--the Labor P'arty, and the other '
the Yemeni Socialist Party. ^
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA, 1979
7993
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INTER-AFRICAN P.FFAIRS
~ SENEGAL-GUINEA RECONCILIATION BODES WELL
London NEW AFRICAN in English Dec 79 pp 25,26 _
[Excerpt] For three days in October the President of Guinea, Ahmed Sekou
Toure, visited his once "hostile" neighbour, Senegal. It was his first
visit in 16 years but at the end of it the signs are that the two countries
have finally decided to bury the hatchet. -
Sceptics may have their doubts, but ~.t should be seen in the light of
last year's Monrovia accord between Guinea on the one side and Senegal
_ and the Ivory Coast on the other. Since that accord Toure has been imbued
with a spirit of reconciliation.
- At the close of his Senegal sojourn, Toure and his host, President Leopold
Senghor, signed ].0 agreements af cooperation. He also had time to tell
some of the 600,000 Guinean exiles in Senegal about his new policy of
reconciliation within Guinea.
"We have decided openly to bury tribalism whatever the cost. It cannot be
done without a backlash," Toure said. He must have been referring to the -
Foulah ethnic group who make up about one-third of Guinea's population.
Since the May 197b attempt to assassinate Toure, the Foulahs have been
complaining or a campaign against them.
P'ormer OAU secretary-general Diallo Telli (believed to be dead), who was
- of Foulah origin, was alleged to be the ~eader of the conspiracy. Many
Guineans of Foulah origin were arrested and those who managed to escape
the dragnet fled across the border to neighbouring countries.
Plot
Just before Toure's Senegal tr~.p, five people were arrested by th~: Sene-
galese authorities after a pl:ot to assassinate the Guinean leader was
hatched. Why should an attempt be made on Toure's life, at a time when he
is changing his attitude after all he has made large concessions to exiles -
to allow them to invest money in Guinea's development. The logical answer
to the question is greed. If relations between Senegal and Guinea are to
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become cordial, the wealthier exiles would stand to lose. They and those
in the professions would cease to live their flamboyant lifestyles. They
were adequately warned in July 1977 during the 39th Session of the National
Council of the Revolution when Toure said of doctors, lawyers and pharma-
cists: "These libera~ and lucrative professions do not exist in Cutnc~ri."
Most important, hawever, is the seemingly cordial contacts that are beinb
extended by Guinea and Senegal after years of discord.
In the end the Presidents oi the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Senegal agreed
"to end finally, as from naw, all dissension which has affected our rela- -
tions; to reestablish diplomatic relations," and so on. 'Itao months later
diplomatic relations were established between Guinea and Senegal.
Since then Toure has visited the Ivory Coast and he now looks set to work
_ amicably with both countries. It had taken a l~ng time for these former
French colonies to come to some sort of mutual understanding. But this long
period of open hostility could well serve a: the foundation of an even
longer and b etter period of harmony. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Magazines Limited ~
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- ANGOLA
BRIEFS
ALLEGED EAST GERMAN MASSACRES--East German soldiers committed massacres
in Angola, a miiitary official of the Angolan National Liberation Front
(the FNLA, which is opposed to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola--the MPLA, in office in Luanda) claimed in disclosuz~es in the We~t
German daily newspaper DIE WELT of 16 October. According to Manzana Ranca,
the commanding officer of an FNLA unit, members of the "Felix Dzierzynski"
East German elite regiment shot to death about 100 inhabitants of the
vill.ege of Diowadu Lundu, 25 km from the port city of AmbrizEte. The
victims were old people, women and children. The adolescents were sent to
- "reeducation camps" in Cuba. DIE WELT specified that Manzana Ranca was
unable to furnish proof of his accusations. The "Felex Dzierzynski" regiment
bears the name of the founder of the "Cheka" (the Extraordinary Commission
- for Fighting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage created under Lenin). It
is a"political" unit placed under the command of General Markus Wolf,
the head of the S5D [State Security Service]. Some of its members are
"cooperators" in Angola. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 2 Nov 79 p 2973J 9380
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BURUNDI
NICKEL DEPOSITS POSSIBLY TO BE DEVELOPED
' Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAP?EENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3223
[Article: "A Study of Nickel Deposits"]
[Text] Lateritic deposits of nickel and associated metals such as copper,
cobalt and platinum group metals, which have been discovered and prospected
in Burundi by the mining research project under participation of the United
Nations, are reported to contain reserves in excess of 300 million tons of
- ore.
One of these deposits has been investigated in detail since 1973, using drill-
ings, analyses and various studies, and has now made the object of a prelimi-
nary feasibility study. Metallurgical tests carried out by the U.S. comp~iny
Universal Oil, Product Mineral Sciences Division, and the preliminary feasi-
_ bility study carried out by anotr,er U.S. company, Ralph M. Parsons Co., have
yielded positive results.
~ The Burundi Government is c~ntemplating s~tting up a mixed group, including
an important international participat-ion, to develop these deposits. -
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
9294
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, BURUNDI
LEGISLATION FOR SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZE BUSINESSES
Paris MARCHES TROFICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3283-3284
, [Article: "New Legislation for Small and Medium-Siz2 Businesses"]
[Text] On 10 October 1979, President Bagaza signed a decree establishing a
code for small and medium-size businesses in Burundi. ~
j
These businesses include those with no more than 30 salaried employees and j
engaged in production, processing, repairing, or in providing services. ;
Certain categories of personnel are not counted as salaried employees. They
are the spouse of the head of thQ business, its parents or grandparents,
children or grandchildren, collaterals and relatives up ta the third degree,
three associatee or assistants actually sharing in the work, as well as three
_ app~:entices or handicapped salaried employees. _
Are not considered to be small and medium-size businessPs those whose activ-
ity is restricted to the sale or leasing "as is" of objects previously pur- -
chased, agricultural enterprises, those working on commission, agencies or
business offices, and, under certain conditions, those whose services are
of a purely intellectual nature.
All enterprises concerned shall be registered in the trade register. The
minister respousible for small and medium-size businesses may authorize
the registration of businesses whose services are related to the arts.
- Any business subject to registration shall file an application within 3
munths of its creation or of ~the publi~ation of the present decree; this -
application is to be filed by the head of the business.
When a business registered in the trade register no long~er fulfills the con-
ditions provided under the p~esent decree, its head or, ~s the case may be,
his heirs or the liquidator, shall apply within 3 months to have it striked
off the register.
A Chamber of Trades is also created: it is a public establishment of an
administrative nature, over which the minister in charge of su?all and medium-
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size businesses shall have the right of oversight, and the statutes of which
shall be established by a decree.
The CY.amber of Trades sha11 be, on the one hand, an organization representing
the general interests of small and medium-size businesses with the adminis-
tration, and it ehall also be in charge of promoting the trade sector, partic-
ularly modern and traditional crafts.
The Chamber may be authorized to borrow, either to cover part or all of its
. expenses, or to organize professional training programs.
Various measures in favor of small and medium-size businesses are announced,
especially a Credit and Guarantee Fund with the National Economic Develop-
ment Bank, under oversight from the competent minister. Credits and guaran-
tees shall be subject to arbitration by a technical commission created for
this purpose.
The titles of craftsman and master craftsman in a given trade shall be pro- -
tected.
Those entitled to call~*hemselves craftsmen in their. trade shall be: the
heads of the businesses entered into the trade r~gister, or the managers of
such businesses appointed according to the articles of association, both of
whom shall submit proof of a degree of qualification and personally share in ~
the work. ~
Those entitled to call themselves master craftsmen in their trade shall be
those who have had the title of craftsman for at least 2 years, who are tech-
nically proficient and have a higher degree of qualification in their trade,
as evidenced by ownership of a master craftsman's certificate.
_ Another provision in favor of craftsmen and master craftsmen: where there is
equality of price, they may be given preference in awarding public contracts, ~
either by tender or by mutual agreement.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
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- FOR OFFICIAL USE OI~IL,Y
BURUNDI
y
BRIEFS
PRESS DISTRIBUTION--A press and book distribution company, Sodipresse, has
just been created within Burundi's ministry of information. This company
shall be in charg~ of promoting and distributing newspapers, magazines and
- books for the general public, at reasonable prices. Sodipresse shall also
ensure the diffusion of any publication dealing with Burundi. For this pur-
_ pose, Burundi has joined the JEUNE AFRIQUE group which has already gained ~
experience in the field of distribution. [Text][Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347] 9294
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CONGO
BRIEFS
PRESIDENT REQUESTS FRENCH AID--Financial aid to fill in the "holes" in the
Congolese budget: ~his was the request made by the President of the Congo,
Colonel Nguesso, during his recent trip to Paris. In exchange, the Congolese -
President promised to promote contracts to exploit the petroleum deposits
for French enterprises. And to reduce the Cuban officering of the Congolese
armed forces. [Text] [Paris VAT~EURS ACTUELLES in French 31 Dec 79 p 13]
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ETHIOPIt1
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NEWSMAN REPORTS ON SITUATION IN ERITREA
' Life Zn Maquis Described
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 pp 30-33
[Art=cle by Pietro Petrucci] -
[Tex~] Eritrea has definitely rebelled aga3.nst the ger~graphic maps. To the
1,5U0 km of "clandestine roads" which the c~PLF (Eritrean Popular Liberation
Front) partisans has constructed across the country before 1978, a new "freedom
trail" has been added in recent months. Used nightly by lines of trucks and
vans which travel with their lights out, this "trail" begins somewhere in the
desert sands of the Sudan and crosses the inhospitable mountains of the Sahel,
the fortress region of Eritrea which, for 18 months, the Ethiopian army has
been vainly attempting to penetrate. The most sophisticated air reconnaissance
is unable to spot this partisan road. If, in fact, it appears at the top of
the tiighest crests, it is only to disappear again amid the acacias and rocks
at the bottom of the narrowest ravines, losing itself in dry stream beds or
concealing itself in the crevasses.
This is the first of many surprises I received when I returned to Eritrea 2
years after having witnessed the great offensive which, in 1977, permitted
the combatants to liberate 90 percent of the territory and nearly all the
inhabited centers.
~ In 1978, the tide turned. As the result of massive aid. in men, arms and
technology furnished by certain socialist countries, the Ethiopian army, in
June 1978, attempted to find a"military solution" to the Eritrean question.
The first alarming news circulated in the corridors of the OAS summit which
in Fact met in Khartoum in July 1978. Some 140,000 Ethiopian soldiers
(soldiers and militamen), thousands of foreign advisers, in addition to 500
armored vehicles and dozens of fighter planes tried to retake the "14th
province" of Haile Selassie's empire.
At that time, the ~ritrean revolution was considered condemned to death.
At all times fought by Western imperialism and in large measure torgotten by
the Third World, members of the Eritrean maquis now found themselves abandoned
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by Ct~t~ USSR and its allies which i1ad, however, }ielped them Cor years and years.
W}io could save them? "The governments and parties which had the courage to -
Lmmediately condemn this new aggression against Eritrea." I was told with
~ bLtterness by Ramadan Nour, secretary general of the EPLF, "can be counted on
the fingers of one h~~nd."
A year and a half have gone by since then, and the military authority of Addis
Ababa continues to publish victory bulletins. If we are to believe them, the
"separatist bandits" from the north are now on their knees. If we listen to
the spokemen of the Eritrean resistance, on the other hand, the story is quite -
different. It was to directly find out for myself that I asked for and was
given permission to spend the month of October in the interior of liberated .
Eritrea, observing this war which today has entered its 18th year, living in
the liberated zones, discussing with combatants and meeting Ethiopian prisoners
- and deserters.
Male and Female Partisans
One thing is certain and obvious: the Eritrean revolution is not dead. On ~
the contrary, it has entered its age of maturity and is an example of "a
popular war of long duration," rich with valuable lessons for all oppressed ,
people. While the Ethi.opian army--now that the initial enthusiasm has waned--
is wearing itself out on the banks of the Red Sea, south of Nakfa and in the _
occupied cities, with cannon shot and useless bombs, the partisans are
tempering themselves like steel in the mountains of the Sahel.
An example? I had been in Eritrea for several days when I received my second -
surprise after that of the new road: I learned there that, for over a year,
the front's leadership after a long debate had promulgated a law which
authorizes and regulates marriages between combatants. That is nothing.
Beginning in 1975, in fact, when the EritrPan cities were themselves drawn
into the war of liberation, the female population of the liberated zones
_ increased sharply. Today, although women on the frontline are still a minority--
- I have seen them performing tasks in combat--entire sectors of the "partisan
~ state" are nearly monopolized by wome~: health and education, for example.
_ Many city families prefer to send their sons and daughters to live with the ;
partisans rather than expose them to the risks and horrors of occupation and
terror. And the EPLF, from the revolutionary army that it was, has thus ,
transformed itself into a"clandestine society" which has learned to be self-
_ sufficient, even from the demographic standpoint. Moreover, most of the
combatants are of military service age--20 years--and, in the rear, their
babies, born in the clandestine society, are alre~;,dy beginning to cry.
I arrived in Nakfa, the administrative center of the Sahei and moral capital
of liberated Eritrea, after 3 nights of travel. I again found the same
phantom village I had visited in April 1?77. At that time,.Nakfa, with its
four small, Turkish forts, had just been abandoned by the Ethiopians after
an 8-month siege. Having returned to life for a year, since the end of 1978, -
the city with lines of white houses finds itself the preferred target of the
artillery and air force. There is no longer a single inhabitant among these '
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roofs of twisted sheet metal and torn wall sections which creak in the wind.
TYie mosque is a pile of stones and; in the principal public square, cows and -
- goats come to quench their thirst in bomb craters which the rain has filled
with water.
The front, which is trenched as in conventional wars of position, has been
stabilized for 7 months a few kilometers south of the city. However, the
bombings continue to prevent the partisan society not only from living there
but also from cultivating the fields around Nakfa and its river. It was
there at night, when liberated Eritrea awakens and works, that I met Maj
Petros Salomon, who in a way is the grand old man of the EPLF. Not having
yet reached the age of 40 but already a veteran of the war of liberation,
Petros is one of the historical leaders--like Secretary General Ramadan and
Deputy Secretary Isias Afework--who, 10 years ago, gave Eritrean nationalism
_ its revolutionary character.
I asked him how the men of the EPLF, numbering from 30,000 to 40,000 combatants
according to the most likely estimates, have managed to stop the steamroller
set in motion by Colonel Mengistu. "The operation which resulted in certain
socialist countries reorganizing and rearming the Ethiopian army," he replied
whiie smiling, "was a surprise on the political level but not on the military
- ~ level. Technically speaking, we had not excluded the internationalization
of the war nor the risk of a grand style counteroffensive. And, so, we did
not fall into the trap set for us: to force us to engage in conventional
war throughout the territory of the country. Thanks to our mobility, we
_ were able to witdraw in order and save all our human and military resources
in the interior of our base zone. And, because of this, when the enemy -
arrived, not without having suffered initial serious losses, at the 'edges'
of c~ur defensive perimeter, he stopped. We can say that we neutralized the
military 5uperiority of the Ethiopians."
And now?
"Now, time is on our s~_de. The war of long duration continues. Ethiopian
morale is being broken against our trenches, in a conflict of the conventional
kind; and it is wearing itself out even more beyond the lines, where we have
returned to guerrilla warfare. For several weeks, we have been working on
- what we call thc tactical co:~ditions necessary to move to the counteroffensive."
6,000 Living-dead
A few days later., I was to observe that Major Petros had there announced to me
military operations already in preparation. What I had already understood by
visiting this "southern front" in Nakfa wa.s that even Colonel Mengistu realized
the impossibility of militarily conquering a national liberation movement in
its age of maturity.
That is also the opinion of all the Ethiopian officers--deserters and prisoners--
with whom I was ab~.e to talk. -
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As for Addis Ababa, the 6,000 men who were captured alive by the EPLF no
longer exist. "Die or kill yourself," such is the watchword. Anyone who
is captured by the "bandits" ipso facto becomes one of their accomplices.
The International Red Cross has been able to overcome the resistance of
F.t}iiop~a to intervene on behalf of the b,000 living-dead uf Eritrea. In
ltir lr~~[ fe~w months, it has fin~lly tiucceeded in sendi.n~; hJcmkets, ci~;arette4,
water flasks, notebooks and penct.ls directly to the pri5oners. On a sln~;lr
occasion I met more than 500 of these "Ethiopian phantoms" in one of the
many caps scattered throughout the Sahel: they were the survivors of t}ie
"fifth offensive" of Addis Ababa which ended in tragedy i.n July. A column
of 6,000 men wiped out.
I spoke about this with Capt Yimar Tiakonnen (serial number 1,673, 37 years of ~
age, six children) and with Lt Yilma Beyene (serial number 4,239, 32 years of
age, four childr~n), both members of the ill-fated Brigade, Unit 503.
"That was to have been a quick-strike operation," the captain recounted, "to
penetrate the Eritrean lines midway between the Nakfa front and that of
Alghene, to the north. Men coming from Massawa, Marsa Teklai and Asmara i
joined us at the foot of the mountain. Instead of engaging in battle, the ~
Eritreans allowed us to penetrate on foot into their valleys. At the end of !
2 days, logistics ceased functioning. We received neither water nor food. ~
The helicopters were no longer able to evacuate the wounded who, after 3 days, !
numbered more than 300. When we were attacked, we could do no more, with
- our water flasks filled with urine and dying of hunger. Men were falling
like flies. They became cannon fodder. None of us had imagined anything
like that. Now I understand what our companions used to tell us: 'Eritrea
, swa.llows up entire divisions,' companions who at the time were the subject
of uur mockery in the classrooms of the Milltary Academy or in the barracks."
The fate of deserters is preferable to that of prisoners. They voluntarily
surrendered to the partisans; and if they manage to gain their confidence,
they can work and live in a state of semi-freedom in the rear, with the
hope of regaining their freedom.
Among them, I met Lt Tadesse Merej, age 38, with seven children waiting for -
him in Addis Ababa. He was in the "Ogaden campaign" and compares the two
experiences in this manner: "Here, it was quite a different matter. In the
Ogaden, above all there were planes, artillery, armored vehicles, etc. Here,
in Eritrea, once the cities and big roads were retaken, the infantry had to
intervene, otherwise all the rest would have been for naught. But every time
our soldiers attacked the Eritreans, it ended in extermination. When we
arrived in Eritrea, everything was all right; however, in short order we
became. aware of the situation and understood that it was useless, that we
could not win this war and that we were continuing to die for nothing."
Printing Plants and Hospitals
The forces of Eritrean resistance is evident to anyone ~vho travels through
the Sahel and to anyone received by the various departments; i.e., the
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various "ministries" which permit the "partisan state" to organize its life. -
Inevitably, visits take place at night, tiecause this big anthill, which
liberated Eritrea is, seetns to be alive only at night. When the sun comes
up and the air force begins to cut across the skies and drop explosives,
napalm, phosphorous and fragmentation bombs, the anthill pauses and holds
its breath until twilight.
Paradoxically, the trying experiences endured in the five Ethiopian offensives
stimulated the organizational abilities of the EPLF instead of extinguishing
them. 'ftie most evident symbol of this progress, in the military sector, is
th~ appearance in the interior of the liberated zones of Soviet "T54" and
"T55" tanks and artillery pieces of the most sophisticated type. The EPLF
has 5~ armored vehicles and tanks which were wrested intact from the
Ethiopian army. Some cadres had to be sent to Syria and Iraq to familiarize
themselves with modern weaponry. And the Eritreans often call upon the PLO
for their training.
However, progress is not only in the military sector. A resistance radio
broadcasts in four languages from a mountain top in the Sahel while maquis _
printing plants supply books and a half dozen periodicals. Field hospitals
and mobile health units now have sterile operating rooms and laboratories
. for analysis. Transport vehicles travel to workshops or suppy points hidden
in the most unlikely uut-of-the-way places. The anthill repairs weapons,
casts spare parts for airplanes, fixes radios and watches and manufactures
footwear and clothing. In training camps, among the thousands of young people,
boys and girls, who continue to flow toward the Sahel, there is not one ~
recruit who does n~t have his personal weapon in operating condition.
Cultural promotion groups entertain and cement this society which is destined
to continue engaging in this communism of Spartan warfare for many years.
During my stay, on Sunday, 7 October, I had the opportunity of witnessing
the battle of Gureito from a mountain peak more than 2,000 meters high in
the center of the northern front--that of Alghena--the beginning of the
Eritrean counteroffensive. The objective of the battle was to drive the
Ethiopians out of a line of crests about 10 km long which was threatening
partisan defenses. ~
I can say that I witnessed a small chef d'oeuvre of military art. The
Ethiopians, entrenched on these mountain peaks for over 2 months, suspected
nothing. After having spent the night removing mines placed below the
enemy trenches, the Eritreans attacked at daybreak, while tlie mountain tops ~
oceupied by the Ethiopians were still hidden by the clouds, as they were
every morning. At the end. of an hour, the combined effect of surprise,
Eritrean spirit and the precision of mortars had c~mpletely cleaned out
the 10 km of crests. The Ethiopians had withdrawn toward the Red Sea, leaving
oii the field 250 dead, 25 prisoners, and an entire arsenal. The following day,
retaliatory strikes by airplanes and artillery had no effect.
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Ten days later, on 17 October, the partisan radio announced the first laige
mil.itary oper.ation beyond the l~.nes: a small Ethiopian garrison was wiped
out a]on~ tl~e Massawa-Asmara road. ldhen I leEt the Sahel, the morate oC the
"antiiill" had ctimbed to seventh heaven. ,
EPLF Official Views Eritrean War
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 pp 31-33
' ~Interview with Isias Afework, EPLF deputy secretary, by Pietro Petrucci,
date not givenJ
[Text] In the EPLF, which has made guerrilla warfare an exact science, the ~
cult of personality has been banned. There are no portraits of leaders '
nur written or verbal praise, no difference in lifestyles. In 1977s in '
_ Eritrea, I had the opportunity of spending several hours talking with three
"ordinary combatants"; on the following day, I learned that they were three ~
of the seven members of the Politburo. The writing of the biographies of
the Eritrean leaders is an almost impossible task. About Isias Afework, -
perhaps one of the most remarkable theoreticians of revolutionary warfare in '
Africa, we learn very little: he is not yet 35 years old; he is from Asmc;ra
and has lived in the maquis for 12 years, since leaving the school of sciencPs _
of the University of Addis Ababa. He almost never travels, preferring to i=
reread the classics of guerrilla warfare--which he knows by heart--rather '
than continually seeking new solutions to adopt. A fe*~a hours before leaving '
the liberated zones of Eritrea, I had a long talk with Isias.
[Question] Is it true that the tide has already turned in your favor? '
_ [Answer] When a war machine set in motion by Ethiopia with the help of
powerful allies frets and fumes, it is as if it had half lost. And the
- Ethiopians have been stopped since January, since the t:~~ird offensive.
During the fourth offensive, they did not advance an inch. In the fifth ~
offensive, which was to.have been "definitive," they suffered the worst
of their defeats. Yes, the tide has turned.
[Question] The Ethiopians number 30 million and you are only 3 million. Will '
you not wind up by being crushed? '
[Answer] If there is anyone with problems of troop numbers, it is the I
Ethiopians. After a year and a half of mobilization to supply the front ~
with militiamen, the farmers are tired. Revolts against forced recruitment
are increasing in the villages, and we understand why. They put a rifle in
the hands of the farmers and promised them: no longer than 1 year of war.
Now their pay as well as family allowances have been suspended. The economic
crisis and the conduct of the war have swept away all promises.
_ [Questionj Are you talking about the advance signs or a phenomenon already
underway?
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[Answer] Our side never stops evaluating the enemy forces, seeking to learn '
liow m~iny ~r where they are. Well, for tnany months, the effective cadres of
t}ie Et}iiopian troops have tended inexorably to decrease. The "human waves"
which they send against us are becoming smaller. So much so that they are
now sending village se~urity patrols to the front. -
[Qu~:stion] That takes care of the militia. What about the army? -
[Answer] An army is not improvised. The militia serves as cannon fodder;
however, it is also the natural reservoir of an army. At present, militiamen
are asking why they are receiving 20 Ethiopian dollars per month while the ~
private gets at least 100. The farmers in uniform are rebelling and do not
hesitate to revolt against the arnry which often thrusts them into our line
of fire by means of rifle blows. There is general malaise.
[Q~iestion] Two years ago, you described Soviet support of Mengistu as an
"error." What do you think of it today?
[Answer] We are trying to analyze Soviet foreign policy not only from our
Eritrean point of view but also in the general context. Well, we must con-
clude that in our opinion there is now a recurrent flaw in the manner in which
the USSR shows its opposition to American imperialism: we feel that each
~ struggle should be examined in the light of anti-imperialist interests such
as we understand them and such as those fighting for. their liberation analyze -
� them.
(Question~ Some persons continue to forecast a spectacular alinement on
your part with China.
E
[Answer] All the rumors concerning our contacts with China are false. We
have never had nor do we have formal relations with the Chinese Communist
Party. Naturally, we are always looking for new allies; and we are seeking
to convince the whole world of the rightness of our cause, even the Chinese.
But we have not succeeded in doing so. The fact is that we consider the
~ foreign policy of China abherrant and that we do not understand much about
- its foreign policy. The view of the world proposed by Peking is the most
absurd ever proposed by a communist party. Even in our case, the Chinese
leaders are only concerned about knowing whether we share their sma11 formulas,
whether we are ready to mimic their slogans in exchange for a little aid. We
have no need of such friends. We are content with the fact that other Chinese
taught us by making their revolution.
[Question] Does Af rica continue to ignore you?
[Answer] No. It is true, in the past, we neglected contacts and diplomacy;
however, that, too, is changing. The fact is that a single courageous
= initiative marks a turning point. That is what happened when Mozambique
broke silence and alined themselves at our side. And Mozambique knows how
to recognize a popular struggle for liberation. Today, many progressive
countries are with us: Guniea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Madagascar, for example.
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Even Tanzania }~as told us clearly that it recognizea the rightness of our
cause. Others~will follow, we are sure. The Zimbabwe Patriotic Front has
shown us its sympathy. The wall of silence, therefore, has been broken;
and our natural allies are coming closer to us.
[Question] Among the progressive Arab countries, Algeria has authorized the
opening of a representation of the EPLF and is maintaining relations with
your delegates....
[AnswerJ That is true. The PLO, Syria, Iraq and others are at our side.
Algeria has never stopped recognizing our rights. That is the principal
_ reason for the rather cool relations between that country and Ethiopia. ,
Algeria had even tried to open negotiations between us and Mengistu. And,
in this way--Algerian comrades have told us this--Algeria was able to learn
first hand that Addis Ababa is playing with words and continues to utilize ~
the "military solution." For this particular reason, Algeria broke off and
is making ready to move from diplomatic-political solidarity to another more
concrete kind of solidarity. ~
[Question] Do you think that the socialist countries which are supporting ~
the Mengistu government will change theiY position? '
[Answer] The arms supplied to Ethiopia have proved to be too sophisticated,
therefore, ineffective in the case of the Eritrian war. What then, send them
more modern arms? They would serve no useful purpose. There remains the
hypothesis of total disengagement. I think that the USSR should take another
look at its policy in the Horn of Africa. Our revolution was the downfall of
Fl:ii]c Selassie, and the present government knows that ~ritrea is tt~e most
immediate threat to its stability. '
Five Ethiopian Offensives Listed ~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov 79 p 32
- [Text) With the help of some of the principal Eritrean military leaders, I
have reconstructed the course of the campaign to retake Eritea which began
in June-July 1978.
First offensive: Summer of 1978. Recapture of the cities (Agordat, Barentu,
Tessenei) and the roads held by the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) in the
western lowlands. Reopening of the Asmara-Addis Ababa road. Everything
takes place as in the Ogaden: hammered by the air force, "saturated" by the
- artillery and surrounded by armored columns, the Eritreans begin to fall back.
Second offensive: November 1978. This is the first attack against the EPLF.
Recapture of Massawa and Keren (but there, while falling back, the partisans
will wipe out an entire column of tanks and capture 50 of them). Defeat of
an attempt to land on the side of the Red Sea near Niassawa.
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_ Third offensive: January 1979. After a double successful landing on the
coast at htarsa Teklai and Marsa Gulbub, the Ethiopians attempt an assault
~~n rhe~ hc~art ~F thc mountains in the Sahel. refiion. They have to hal t south
u I N;ik I:~ cind r;~~; t~~ f thc~ smal l r i ty c~ C A1 ~;lienn .
I~~~urUi c,lt~en:;ive: Marcli 1.979. `f'liis is the first serious setb.ick for Addis
Ab,~b