KENYA: THE POST-KENYATTA CONUNDRUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130082-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: May 30, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Kenya: The Post Kenyatta Conundrum
Se
73
30 May 1972
No. 2037/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
30 May 1972
I
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Kenya: The Post-Kenyatta Conundrum
For the nearly nine years Kenya has been independent, it has en' d
political stability under the leadership of President Jomo Kenyatta. The
future is clouded, however, by the uncertainty surrounding succession.
Kenyatta is over 80. Although in fairly good health, he suffered a stroke in
1968 and is said to have other maladies. There is no obvious successor, and
none of the contenders even remotely approaches Kenyatta in popularity or
prestige. The situation is further aggravated by the growing dissatisfaction of
minority tribes with the dominance of Kenyatta's fellow Kikuyu and by the
determination of the Kikuyu leaders surrounding the President to retain
power after Kenyatta dies. The military has so far remained aloof from
politics, but if succession is marked by prolonged political bickering and
unrest, the army would be likely to intervene.
NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Cc rent Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of'Nationa!Estimates.
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Kenyatta's Position-Past and Present
President
Jomo Kenyatta
1. President Jomo Kenyatta, the country's only president since inde-
pendence in 1963, towers over the Kenyan political scene, He is both head
of state and head of government, and leads the Kenya African National
Union, the country's sole political party. Kenyatta is also commander in
chief of the armed forces. He has no serious challengers.
2. Kenyatta, who is called Mzee (grand old man), has been in the
forefront of Kenyan politics since the 1920s. He was active in Kikuyu
organizations seeking social and political reform from British colonial au-
thorities and, in 1928, was elected secretary general of the Kikuyu Central
Association. He was at the time widely recognized as an African nationalist
leader.
3. Kenyatta migrated to Europe in 193 1. Fifteen years later, he re-
turned home to take part in the postwar resurgence of political activity,
taking over as leader of the newly formed Kenya African Union, the most
important of the African nationalist organizations in Kenya. At first the
union was predominantly a Kikuyu organization, but in 1950 Oginga
Odinga?_the leader of the Luo, the country's second largest tribe-joined the
organization. By 1951 the union claimed 150,000 members.
4. Kenyatia'~ position as the leading Kenyan nationalist was ensured by
his "martyrdom" at the hands of the British following the bloody Mau Mau
uprising. The Mau Mau, a secret society made up of Kikuyus, had been
conducting a campaign of violence which, in 1952, forced the British
authorities to declare a state of emergency and to arrest Kenyatta on charges
of leading the campaign. He and his lieutenants were sentenced to seven
years' imprisonment. This silenced the Kikuyu and crushed the Mau Mau
revolt. But other tribal leaders, such as Odinga and a fellow Luo, Tom
Mboya, were able to keep the nationalist movement alive, largely by their
repeated calls for Kenyatta's release. In 1960 the Luo and Kikuyu joined to
form the Kenya African National Union. Kenyatta, who had begin released
from prison but was still detained in a remote place, was named president in
absentia. His freedom was completely restored in 1961 after the new union
had scored a decisive victory in the national election. In June 1963, Kenya
was granted internal self-government, and Kenyatta became prime minister;
six months later Kenya was granted its independence. In December 1964
Kenya became a republic, and Kenyatta became president.
5. Kenyatta is politically astute and widely popular. His stature has
enabled him to stand above most of the tribal and other differences that
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trouble the country. In recent years he has had to face growing resentment
from minority tribes because of the dominant position of the Kikuyu. He
has, however, generally been able to rally the country's diverse people, in
spite of their disappointment with some of his programs.
Succession and Its Problems
6. A number of factors stand in the way of an orderly transfer of power
once Kenyatta departs. Tribalism, the single most important ingredient, in
Kenyan politics, poses the greatest threat. Most Kenyans live in rural areas
and owe primary allegiance to their tribes. Outsiders are viewed with suspi-
cion. As a result, most Kenyan politicians represent tribal constituencies and
are identified primarily by their tribal affiliations. Recognizing that their
tribes provide them with their primary means of political support, Kenyan
politicians put the interests of their tribes first.
7. Tribal loyalties were submerged briefly during the struggle for
independence and immediately thereafter. Kenyatta's first government in-
cluded a careful balance of tribal and regional interests. Kenyatta sought to
forge unity with his slogan, Harambee (Let's pull together). The harmony
did not survive when the Kikuyu gathered a disproportionate share of the
fruits of independence. Under Kenyatta, the Kikuyu are entrenched in top
jobs at all levels of the government and the party, as well as in key positions
in academic and business organizations.
8. As Kenya's largest tribe, the Kikuyu believe political and economic
pre-eminence to be rightfully theirs. With some justification, the hard work-
ing and ambitious Kikuyu consider themselves the architects of independ-
ence. They were the first tribe to seek redress of grievances from the colonial
authorities and later were the driving force in the nationalist movement. It
was they who bore the brunt of British military actions to subdue the
struggle for independence. The Kikuyu are Kenya's most westernized tribe,
having had closer contacts with Western education and attitudes than the
other tribes.
9. The assertiveness of the Kikuyu has been resented by the other
tribes, particularly the Luo. A Luo, Oginga Odinga, was once vice president
and minister of home affairs, and a power in the Kenya African National
Union. He became something of an embarrassment to the government
because of his free-wheeling activities. After being stripped of much of his
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power, Odinga, in 1966, resigned from both the government and the party to
form the Kenya Peoples Union. The new party called for a quasi-Marxist,
populist program to solve Kenya's problems. Many Luo, motivated more by
loyalty to Odinga and the tribe than by ideology, joined Odinga's organiza-
tion. Sonic members of parliament from Kenyatta's party also went over and
promptly lost their seats in the next election.
10. The Kikuyu in recent years have stepped up their efforts to ensure
continued control after Kenyatta's passing. Kikuyu representation in all
levels of government is way out of proportion t the size of their com-
munity. The Kikuyu make some 20 percent of the nation's population, but
they hold seven of the 22 cabinet posts. And two non-Kikuyu ministers are
from the small but ethnically related Meru and Embu tribes. The Luo, with
14 percent of the population, have only three portfolios; and the Kamba,
with 11 percent, hold only two posts. The Kikuyu and the Abaluyia tribe,
which generally is aligned with. the Kikuyu, hold more than a third of the
assistant ministershipc, largely sinecures for the loyal. Almost half of the
permanent ministers, often the most important men in a ministry are
Kikuyu, and four of the eight provincial commissioners are Kikuyu. Tile
Kikuyu have the largest tribal representation in parliament.
11. Kenyatta's principal advisers are all Kikuyu. These advisers, named
the Gatundu group after the President's country home where they meet,
include Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai, Attorney General Charles Njonjo,
and Minister of State Mbiyu Koinange. Decisions are made either by Ken-
yatta alone or after consulting with the Gatundu group.
12. The armed forces are the only instrument of power in Kenya the
Kikuyu do not control completely. Even here, they have made moves to
improve their position. The Kamba tribe has long made up a large portion of
the army. At the time of independence most high-ranking army officers and
senior noncornmission.d officers were Kamba, as were about 30 percent of
the rank and file. Since then, the percentage of Kamba in the army has
steadily decreased, and the number of Kikuyu has risen. Kenyatta has
encouraged the recruitment of Kikuyu in large numbers, maneuvered them
into officer training schools, and encouraged their rapid advancement. (As
commander in chief, he personally approves all promotions and assignments
for officers.) At present, the Kamba still predominate in the army's upper
echelons; the army commander, deputy commander, and most field-grade
officers are Kamba. The Kikuyu dominate the junior officer grades and are
increasing in the enlisted ranks. The Kikuyu make up almost all of the
1,600-man General Service Unit, an elite and highly effective paramilitary
arm of the police force.
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13. In their drive to consolidate their power, the Kikuyu have elmi-
nated or neutralized important figures from rival tribes who they felt posed a
threat. In July 1969, Torn Mboya, an outstanding Luo leader who was
considered the most likely successor to Kenyatta, was assassinated. Most
observers believe that the ruling Kikuyu clique suerounding Kenyatta
planned the assassination. Mboya had gained considerable influence as a
highly effective secretary geneval of the Kenya Africa National Union and
mini:,tcr of economic development, and Kikuyu leaders had long been
attempting to undermine his strength, principally b,' weakening his control
of the party mechanism.. Mboya remained the principal threat to continued
Kikuyu hegemony until his death.
14. A few months after Mboya's assassination, Oginga Odinga and other
leaders of the Kenya Peoples Union were detained, and the party was
banned. The government charged that the party had instigated anti-govern-
ment disturbances in the Luo home province during a Kenyatta visit and that
the party was subversive because it had received funds from Communist
sources. Odinga was released in March 1971 and rejoined the Kenya Africa
National Union, but he appears to have lost much of his support. In 1971,
Chief Justice Mwenda and Defense Staff Chief Ndolo, both Kamba tribes-
men, were implicated in a coup plot, which on the face of it looked most
inept. Neither man was arrested,, but Kenyatta forced both to resign. They
now appear to be without influence.
15. The Kikuyu have located most government development projects in
Nairobi and Central Province, their home area. In addition the tribe is
making significant inroads in commerce, which was once controlled by
Asians. Kikuyu farmers are also grabbing land outside their traditional tribal
areas despite the claims of smaller tribes.
16. Non-Kikuyu tribal elements have naturally been antagonized by this
heavy-handedness. Minority political leaders and National Assembly mem-
bers have expressed fears for their future. The 1971 coup plot, involving 12
Kambas and Luos, was ill-conceived and did not represent a serious threat.
Schisms trouble the non-Kikuyu tribes and have precluded any alliance
against the Kikuyu. Moreover, these tribes-particularly the Luo and
Kamba-are without effective leadership, largely as a result of Kikuyu
actions. The minority tribes, in short, do not now appear able to challenge
the well-entrenched Kikuyu, and it is unlikely they will do so in the
immediate poFt-Kenyatta period.
17. The Kikuyu themselves are not without internal division. They
differ especially over the dominance of President Kenyatta's southern branch
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of the tribe. There arc ;lso deep-rooted personal jealousies among the various
leaders of Kikuyu tribes. Nevertheless, the Kikuyu have more cohesion than
any of the other tribes and usually present a solid front when confronted by
a non-Kikuyu challenge.
The Succession Sweepstakes
18. The Gatundu group is, of course, determined to retain power in the
postKenyatta era. There are many Kenyans, however, who are unwilling to
accept a successor dictated by this inner circle. The Gatundu group has been
unable to find a Kikuyu who is amenable to their direction and possesses
even a shadow of Kenyatta's po,;pularit / and prestige. The succession issue
has been complicated by Kenyatta's unwillingness to groom a successor. The
President instead prefers to pit one contender against the other, keeping all
off balance.
Leading Contenders
19. Vice President Daniel arap Moi has several advantages. Under the
constitution, the vice president becomes acting president for 90 days upon
this time an election for a new president is to be nela.
Moi is competent and generally accepted by most Ken-
yans. He belongs to a small tribe of the Kalenjin group
that poses no threat to the larger tribes. His support is
therefore more broadly based than that of his rivals. A
trusted lieutenant of Kenyatta, Moi has been given large
responsibilities in government and party affairs by the
president who has also permitted him wide public ex-
Vice President Daniel arap Moi
20. Moi as president might be little more than a With President Kenyatta
figurehead, with real power resting in the Kikuyu inner circle. Despite his
standing with Kenyatta, the vice president has never enjoyed the full con-
fidence of the Gatundu group or participated extensively in its decision-
making sessions. Moreover, he appears to lack the necessary political skills
and sufficient backing to challenge Kikuyu hegemony.
2 1. Moi would be legally blocked from making any significant changes
while acting president, and therefore his chances to consolidate his position
during his 90 days in office would be limited. The absence of formal
constitutio;ial or party provisions for nominating a candidate to succeed
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Kenyatta as president strongly suggests the matter will be resolved in the
Kikuyu inner circle. The Kikuyu may see Moi as useful in a transition period
and might even support him in the election, but Moi's prospects for political
longevity will diminish as the Kikuyu increase their political strength.
22. Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai is the most likely of the Kikuyu
aspirants for Kenyatta's mantle. Mungai is a member of the Gatundu clique.
He is also Kenyatta's personal physician, his nephew, and close adviser. He
has been engaged in an image-building campaign since he became foreign
minister in January 1970. Mungai has received extensive local publicity for
his verbal attacks on white southern Africa, his efforts to promote African
unity, and his attendance at various international conferences.
But Mungai faces major obstacles. He enjoys little popularity outside his own
Foreign Minister
Njoroge Mungai
Nevertheless, after Ken-
yatta's passing, Mungai would be the most likely candidate of the Gatundu
group.
Dark Horses and King Makers
23. As for the other members of the ruling circle, most have little
political support of their own and owe their positions to the President.
Figures like Attorney General Njonjo and Minister of State Koinange,
however, could wield influence behind the scenes after Kenyatta's death.
Mbiyu Koinange
24. Outside the ruling group several politicians possess national or tribal
followings. When Kenyatta dies, these individuals may move to challenge the
Kikuyu clique, either as candidates themselves or in alliances. Most of these
men are wary of launching a challenge now because of the all-too-obvious
risks involved.
25. J. M. Kariuki, the assistant minister of tourism and wildlife, is the
only politician who openly admits that he is campaigning for the succession.
Kariuki, says that as a result
of his political activity he is in danger of being defame or even assassinated.
He professes to be undeterred. Although a Kikuyu and a veteran of the Mau
Mau revolt, Kariuki is not in good standing with the Kikuyu establishment.
For one thing, he is from the northern branch of the tribe. Also, the inner
Charles Njonjo
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circle believes Kariuki spends too much time with the Luo. Kariuki, who
app.;ars well financed, has attracted a large following from all tribes by his
attacks on the government for its failure to do more for the have-nots.
26. Kariuki is having difficulty keeping in the public eye. His duties give
hint few opportunities for public appearances, and the newspapers, sensitive
to government opinion, are reluctant to provide him coverage. Kenyatta has
ordered that Kariuki he denied the licenses needed to hold public meetings
in rural areas. In a free election for the presidency, Kariuki would give Moi a
good fight and probably would outdistance Mungai.
27. Mwai Kibaki, the minister of finance and economic planning, who is
Josiah Kariuki also from the northern wing of the Kikuyu tribe, appears to be gaining
ground as a compromise candidate. He seems acceptable to both the north-
ern and southern Kikuyu and, like Kariuki, is popular among non-Kikuyu
tribes. Kibaki also is an intelligent, talented, and energetic administrator. So
far, however, he has shown little desire to compete for the presidency, and
he generally shies away from back-room maneuverings.
Oginga Odinga
28. Oginga Odinga no longer appears to have much chance. As a result
of his detention, he
appears to have lost much of his support. Although Luo members of
parliament pledged to give up a seat to Odinga, none has stepped aside.
Odinga had hopes of a government post, but so far Kenyatta has refused to
have anything to do with him. Odinga does retain a residue of popularity
throughout the country among the economically discontented, and he could
swing support to someone like Kariuki. It is improbable, however, that the
Kikuyu establishment, which has been encouraging dissension among the Luo
by pushing Odinga's rivals, would permit the former vice president to
re-enter the political arena.
Growing Awareness of the Military
29. Except for former defense staff chief Ndolo, the uniformed services
have so far remained aloof from politics. Both the military and the police are
led by well-trained officers with a deep aversion to political action. The
incessant maneuvering and the uncertainty over succession, as well as the
obvious attempts by the Gatundu group to advance their fellow tribesmen in
the military, are slowly eroding this stand, and tribal enmity within Lne
military is increasing. Top officers, particularly those from the Kamba tribe,
are wary of the Kikuyu ascendancy.
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Minister for Financ(
Kibaki
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J. K. Mulinge
30. Major General Jackson Mulinge, the army commander and the
senior military officer, seems inclined to preserve the military's non-political
image. Mulinge, a Kainba, is thought to be loyal to Kenyatta and to have no
political ambitions.
3 1. Most of the officers below Mulinge seem loyal to the government,
and there is little chance of a military coup while Kenyatta is alive. There has
been more grumbling over government corruption and tribal favoritism, but,
for the most part, this has been confined to the barracks and mess halls. If
the succession is marked by prolonged political squabbling and unrest, the
chances for military intervention will increase markedly.
32. Kenyatta and his associates, well aware of t1i -. political potential of
the military, have deliberately recruited more and more Kikuyu into the
military. They can also rely on the paramilitary police force, the General
Service Unit, to discourage a military coup. This well-equipped and well-
trained unit has important elements stationed near the capital and is almost
wholly Kikuyu. Although the 1 600-man General Service Unit is outnum-
bered by the 5,000-magi army, the paramilitary force 25X1
could hold its own in a fight with the regular military. Kenyatta has
attempted to retain this parity by preventing the army's acquisition of some
modem weapons.
33. Regardless of who follows Kenyatta, there doubtless will be some
changes. Without Kenyatta's strong hand and towering presence the new
government is likely to be troubled by maneuvering, division, and threats to
its position that could bring on more repressive domestic policies. The new
administration will probably also come under increasing pressures as a result
of domestic problems. The Kenyatta government has taken little action to
deal with the high rate of population growth and rising unemployment and
the pace of land redistribution has been slow.
34. A successor government free from controls of the Kikuyu inner
circle might feel so insecure that it would react to these pressures by making
significant policy changes. It might assume a more aggressive stand on
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foreign investment, become more nationalistic, and adopt a more "pro-
gressive" foreign policy by increasing support to southern African liberation
groups, voting more consistently with leftist countries in international
forums, lowering barriers to aid offers, and welcoming other overtures from
the Communist world.
35. A post-Kenyatta government dominated by the Gatundu group,
however, would probably be less responsive to these pressures. It might move
Kenya's essentially pragmatic economic and foreign policies a few degrees to
the left, but would be unlikely to take the country far from its traditional
position in the ideological center of black African states.
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