CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977790
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 12, 1960

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12 October 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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JU980
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TOP SECRET
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12*OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev cancels visit to North Korea.�
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos--Little accomplished at initial
talks between Souvanna and Patnet Lao;
a Soviet delegation due to arrive in Vien-
tiane on 13 October.
Israel, with UN approval, has begun
dredging Jordan River channel despite
strong UAR objections.
Congo--UN refuses to allow arrest of
Lumumba.
0
Rhodesia and Nyasaland--Tension likely
to increase in wake of Monckton commis -
sion report.
Ruanda-Urundi--B elgian policies in
period prior to independence provoking
tribal chiefs and leading to unrest.
Niger, newly independent state within
French Community, determined to act
independently of France.
0
0
III. THE WEST
�Peruvian President ready to break diplo-
matic relations with Cuba.
�Britain--Macmillan does not believe
that a serious Soviet attack on Western
position in Berlin underlies current
harassment, which he sees as "isolated
actions."
Argentina--Frondizi may be forced by
military pressure to take firmer anti-
Communist, anti-Peronista line.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR - North Korea: The postponement of Khrushchey's
visit to North Korea, scheduled for early October, may stem
from the failure of the latest attempt to ease the Sino-Soviet
dispute. It seems likely that Khrushchev had hoped to meet
with Mao or other top Chinese Communist officials during his
visit. Meetings between top Soviet and Cninese leaders in Pei-
ping, reported to have taken place in mid-September, may
have revealed the impossibility of arranging such a meeting.
The need for high-level party review of Soviet policy in the
wake of Knrushchey's UN venture and for nis participation in
preparation for the November conference of Communist par-
ties probably also influenced Khrushchey's decision to remain
in Moscow
IL ASIA-AFRICA
)-�
Laos: Little apparently was accomplished during the
opening session of the peace talks between the Souvanna Phou--rp,2-) '
ma government and the Pathet Lao. They are to meet again
on 13 October. aouvanna has told Ambassador Brown that he
will insist on a general cease-fire and on restoration of gov-
ernment authority in Sam Neua Province as preconditions for
substantive discussions. A delegation of Soviet officials, pre-
sumably to complete the establishment of diplomatic relations,
Is scheduled to arrive in Vientiane on 13 October.
(Page 1)
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Israel-UAR:: Israel, with the consent of the UN Truce
Supervision Organization, has begun dredging 300 meters
of the Jordan River channel south of the Banat Yaqub bridge
in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone. The UAR opposes
this project, believing it to be part of an Israeli scheme for
ultimate diversion of the river despite Israeli claims to the
contrary. Syrian troops overlooking the river so far have
not attempted to stop the dredging, but the situation contains
elements of danger.
*Republic of the Congo: The refusal of the UN Command
on 11 October to permit the ,arrpst of deposed Premier Lu-
mumba by the Mobutu government has maintained for the
time being the uneasy stalemate of political forces in Leopold-
ville. Mobutu appears likely to continue to press for UN with-
drawal of its protection of Lumumba, and a government spokes-
man has threatened a "nationwide uprising" if the UN does not do
so. The UN statement that Lumumba could be arrested only
If parliament were to withdraw his immunity may prompt
Mobutu to reconvene parliament, whose members have lately
been increasingly critical of Lumumba.
The US Embassy at Accra reports that a planeload of
Ghanaian troops departed on the morning of 11 October, but
returned, allegedly because of bad weather, without reaching
its destination. According to an African diplomat in Accra,
the purpose of this mission was to have been to rescue Lumumba
in Leopoldville and establish him as head of a Congolese govern-
manf in Avila
-
Federation
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Tension is likely
to increase in the British-controlled Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland as white settlers react to pro-African proposals
of the advisory Monckton commission report released on
11 October. The settlers are already highly incensed at Afri-
can rioting this past week end in several urban centers in
Southern Rhodesia. They will demand that their government
strongly oppose the commission's recommendations that Afri-
can influence be greatly increased in the Federation's legisla-
ture and in the administration of Northern Rhodesia. Prime
12 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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mister Welensky has been assured of the support of the
main opposition party if he resigns in order to renew his
popular mandate at the polls before taking part in consti-
tutional discussions with Britain, probably later this year.
(Page 3)
/
Ruanda-Urundi: Belgium's plans for bringing the trus-
teeship territory of Ruanda-Urundi to independence as two
separate states by April 1962 appear inadequate to prevent
new outbreaks of tribal warfare in the northern state of
Ruanda. According to an American official who recently
visited the territory, the Belgians there are determined to
retain their influence after independence and are prepared
to use force if necessary to attain this end. Tribal tension
reportedly is at a high pitch as a result of Belgian efforts
to replace the extremely conservative tri Al rulers with
moderate, pro-Belgian political parties.
(Page 4) (Map)
Ni er-France: Niger's President Diori, who in the past
has been one of the most pro-French African leaders within
the French Community, recently indicated to US Charge
Norland his regime's determination to act independently of
France. Diori told Norland that Niger would not accept
French aid if it were conditioned on Niger's following French
direction in foreign policy. He also said he was thinking of
requesting the departure from northern Niger of French mil-
itary elements which he alleged are carrying on pro-French
activity among nomadic Tuareg tribesmen. Like Ivory Coast,
Dahomey, and Upper Volta--Niger's partners in the four-state
association known as the Conseil de l'Entente�Niger became
independent in August and now is preparing to negotiate with
Paris cooperation accords such as formally link other mem-
bers of the Community with France.
(Page 5) (Map) -
12 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF
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Britain:
III. THE WEST
Peru-Cuba: Seruvian President Prado has stated that
he is ready to break diplomatic relations with Cuba on the
grounds that Cuba is supporting Peruvian Communists.
Peru hopes that Argentina, Colombia, and certain Central
American states will follow suit so that Peru will not be-
come a particular target for Cuba and the USSR. Guate-
mala and Nicaragua broke relations with Cuba earlier this
(Page 6)
Prime Minister Macmillan has told Ambas-
sadolitney that he does not believe a serious Soviet at-
tack on the Western position in Berlin underlies present
Soviet policy; he considers recent harassments "isolated
separate actions." Macmillan accepts Khrushchev's state-
ent that he does not intend to bring the Berlin situation
o a head before spring. Ambassador Whitney concludes
that the current prospects that the British will agree to eco-
nomic countermeasures are dime
(Page 7)
Argentingi President Frondizi is again under military
pressure to maaify certain "administrative" aspects of his
petroleum policy, to take firmer anti-Communist action, and
to dismiss advisers who favor wooing Peronista political sup-
portirom_Peron._Arm_vCnmmander_in_Chief_Tora,nzo Montero
told the army is
united behind these demands. In several similar crises in the
past, Frondizi has adopted a cautious position, meeting most
military demands. (Page 8)
12 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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The Situation in Laos
The first session of the peace talks between the Souvanna
Phouma government and the Pathet Lao, held in Vientiane on
11 October, was probably devoted mainly to procedural matters.
The chief Pathet Lao negotiator, Phoumi Vongvichit, took ad-
vantage of the occasion to deliver a strong attack on American
Imperialism. General Ouane, a member of the government del-
egation, is quoted as asserting that the Pathet Lao had indicated
that real peace could be attained only if General Phoumi's Sayan-
nakhet movement were crushed. The two sides are to resume
their talks on 13 October.
_Premier Souvanna has told US Ambassador Brown that if
the Pathet Lao reject his demands for a country-wide cease-fire
and restoration of Sam Neua Province to government control,
he will simply tell them "to go away" and think about the prob-
lem some more. He claims that in any event, he will pursue
delaying tactics in an effort to string the talks out as long as pos-
sible.
General Ouane, reportedly concerned over the possible out-
come of the negotiations, claims that if the talks go badly he
will go to Luang Prabang to resign from the government. Ouane
had previously reported that he expected the Pathet Lao would
demand fixed enclaves for their military personnel, reinte-
gration of their civil functionaries into the government, and re-
version to the 1954 Geneva accords and the 1957 Vientiane inte-
gration agreements.
4 Reports from Phong Saly Province indicate that the Pathet
Lao, in an apparent effort to gain additional territory on which
to base their claims in the negotiations, were continuing to
exert strong pressure on government posts in the southeastern
part of the province. One post reportedly has fal.len to the
Pathet Lao, and a more important post--Sap Nao--is said to
be under strong enemrpressure.
A senior Laotian Foreign Ministry official has informed
Ambassador Brown that a Soviet delegation will arrive in Laos
---SE�RET
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L�' 13 October and will probably "not come empty-handed."
In addition to completing the establishment of diplomatic re-
lations between the USSR and Laos, the delegation will prob-
ably extend offers of aid to the Souvanna government. ,IRecent
Soviet propaganda commentary on the Laotian situation has
emphasized the dire consequences of the Thai economic block-
ade and has accused the United States of "stifling" the legal
government by suspending aid. Souvanna may be tempted to
accept any Soviet offer of aid in order to increase his area
of maneuver.
12 Oct Oct 60
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Tension Risin*wen Rhodesian Federation
LRelease of the Monckton commission report on 11 Octo-
ber is likely to increase racial tension in the British-con-
trolled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This advisory
report of a largely British study group is designed to prepare
for later constitutional discussions in London between rep-
resentatives of Britain and the Federation. However, its
basically pro-African outlook may so inflame Rhodesian white
settlers as to endanger cooperation between Salisbury and
London.
The report calls for continuation of the federation of three
constituent territories but endorses a loosening of their ties
and later secession under certain conditions. It also proposes
a great increase of African membership in the federal parlia-
ment until parity with the whites is attained. Some of its most
far-reaching conclusions dealt with the colonial territory of
Northern Rhodesia, which was clearly envisaged as a future
African state. The report hoped that constitutional advance
would lead to full self-government with an African majority in
the legislature and an elective African majority in the executive
council. Other provisions called for an end to racial discrimina-
tion in the Federation.
The federal government of Prime Minister Welensky has
previously indicated its opposition to any such proposals, and
earlier in October Welensky was assured of support from the
Dominion party, the white opposition party, if he chose to re-
sign and call new elections to renew his popular mandate.
Racial tension is already high following a week end of Afri-
can-hots and strikes. On 8 OctobeT African rioting in Salis-
bury resulted in at least seven deaths, over 80 injuries, and
considerable property damage. Later at Gwelo an African na-
tionalist meeting erupted into looting and arson. At Salisbury
African transport workers struck on 11 October; at Bulawayo
2,000 African factory workers have kept up a wage strike.
� As a result of these actions, white civilians on 11 October
,101,
reportedly demanded permission to take the law into their own
hands and shouted down the appeals of senior government offi-
cials to respect the law. ,
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12 OCTOBER 1960
UNCLASSIFIED
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Unrest Likely in Ruanda-Urundi
Belgium's plans for bringing the trusteeship territory of
Ruandi-Uruncli to independence as two separate states appear
inadequate to prevent new outbreaks of tribal warfare in the
northern state of Ruanda. According to an American official
who recently visited the terriOry, tension between the
Batutsi�Ruanda's traditional:ruling ethnic group--and the
numerically predominant BahUtu has reached a high pitch as
a result of Belgian efforts to replace the highly conservative
Batutsi with moderate, pro-Belgian political parties. Order
is now being maintained, except for a few scattered outbreaks,
by three battalions of Belgian troops; however, these are
scheduled to depart when the territory becomes independent.
Belgium envisages a program of rapid political advance-
ment for the territory, with elections scheduled in both states
early next year, to be followed by the establishment of a na-
tional government in each area. The target date for complete
independence is April 1962. However, Belgian officials in the
territory reportedly are determined to guide its political de-
velopment so as to maintain their country's influence after
independence and are prepared to use force if necessary to
attain this end. The Belgians reportedly hope that by follow-
ing this policy, they can avoid "another Congo situation and
another Lumumba."
Governmental structure in both Ruanda and Urundi will
be greatly simplified, and Belgium may be able to create a
fairly competent African government in Urundi, where there
is relatively little ethnic tension. In Ruanda, however, the
Bahutu party which will probably form the government re-
portedly will be able to function only with the support of Bel-
gian administrative personnel and troops; such a government
would probably be unable to maintain its control over the op-
position groups unless it requested continued Belgian mili-
tary assistance.
AL
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Niger Rejectlbfrench Direction in Foreign PiYcy
iger, one of eight French Community states in West
and Equatorial Africa which became sovereign last August,
intends to assert its independent status and will not accept
French direction in foreign affairs in return for continued
economic aid. President Hamani Diori, heretofore one of
the most pro-French African leaders within the Community,
told American Charge Norland in late September that Niger
will not accept French aid if it is conditioned on Niger's fol-
lowing French direction in foreign policy, "such as voting for
France on the Algerian question." Nevertheless, Diori indi-
cated that Niger and its partners in the four-state association
known as the Conseil de l'Entente�Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and
Upper Volta--would begin negotiations with France in mid-
October for technical, diplomatic, military, and other bilat-
eral agreements. Unlike the other seven French Community
states which have gained their "international sovereignty" so
far, the Entente states were unwilling to negotiate such "co-
operation accords" before being admitted to the UN, a goal
attained on 20 September.
LAlleging that "a few stupid French" were causing frequent
incidents along the Niger-Algerian frontier by trying to incite
nomadic Tuareg tribesmen in northern Niger to "stay with
France" by going to Algeria, Diori said he was thinking about
requesting the departure of French military elements now sta-
tioned in the area. Other French army officers reportedly
have made contact with potentially dissident Tuaregs in north-
ern Mali in the hope of blocking expected efforts by the Mali
Government to aid the Algerian rebels.
Diori, who is also president of the Entente for the current
year, stressed his desire to have an American representative
resident in Niger, "since certain French will never understand
that we are independent until other diplomatic representatives
are at Niamey to prove it." At present Norland, who resides in
Abidjan, represents the United States in all four Entente states.
Llvory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny--the creator and
dominant figure in the Entente--and Upper Volta President
Yameogo have also indicated recently that their stat
not support France on the Algerian issue at the UINT.i
-3tettL4--f-
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Peru May Break Diplomatic Relations With Cuba
LPeruvian President Prado told the American charge'
d'affaires that he is ready to break relations with Cuba on
the grounds of a letter from the head of the Peruvian Com-
munist party to the Cuban ambassador in Lima thanking him
for a contribution to the party and expressing appreciation
for sending party members to Cuba for training. Prado said
he does not mind taking the lead at this time in breaking re-
lations, but hopes Argentina, Colombia, and certain Central
American governments will follow suit so that Peru will not
be a particular target for Cuba and the USSR,.
The Peruvian Government's antagonism for Cuba has been
heightened over the past year by the frequent alliance within
Peru of the Communists, an influential pro-Castro group, and
the reactionary wing of Peru's oligarchy. This alliance has in-
tensified agitation on emotional issues--such as those involv-
ing "US petroleum investment or the Peruvian-Ecuadorean
boundary dispute�in an apparent effort to stalemate the gov-
ernment's economic development efforts.
_The Argentine Government apparently believes that Cuba
is seeking to provoke a break in relations but that such a break
now would be counterproductive for Argentina's ambition to in-
crease its influence in Latin America, and would mean the loss
of valuable information derived from the long-standing friend-
ship between Argentine Ambassador Amoedo and Fidel Castro.
Colombia requested the withdrawal of the Cuban ambassador
last month, and its interest in breaking relations with Cuba
would probably be reawakened by a Peruvian initiative..
k Guatemala and Nicaragua broke relations with Cuba earlier
this year. El Salvador, which now is emerging from a serious
political crisis complicated by pro-Castro manifestations, may
soon follow suit. The Panamanian Government reportedly may
declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata, although
Panamanian President Chiari is facing serious domestic diffi-
culties which would probably be complicated by such a step.
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British Residting Countermeasures in Berlin Situation
/Following a conversation with Prime Minister Macmillan,
Ambassador Whitney concludes that prospects are dim for
achieving British agreement to economic countermeasures
in retaliation against East German harassments of West Ber-
lin. The prime minister expressed the belief that a serious
Soviet attack on the Western position in Berlin does not un-
derlie present Soviet policy, and that recent harassments
constitute isolated, separate actions. Macmillan accepts
Ithrushchev's statement that he does not intend to bring the
Berlin situation to a head before spring, by which time a sum-
mit conference should be possible."
On the absence of a specific agreement, British officials
have underlined their determination that implementation of
Western policy on curtailing East German travel should not
constitute economic countermeasures. In mid-September
Britain agreed with the US and France to stop providing tem-
porary travel documents in many categories. Now, however,
it argues that it meant that enough such documents and visas
should be granted to permit the maintenance of East German
trade missions in Western countries at their present levels.
The British are willing only to subject the East Germans to
minor administrative inconvenienceol
[The British resistance to imposition of economic counter-
measures at this time is shared by the French Government,
and North Atlantic Council discussions have revealed that most
other NATO governments feel likewise. Bonn is having seri-
ous second thoughts on whether its 30 September denunciation
of the interzonal trade agreement should be followed by a sub-
stantial curtailment of trade especially in view of the lack of
NATO-wide supportot
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Argentine Arthy Pressures for Policy Changes
rgentine President Frondizi is again under strong mil-
itary pressure to take firmer anti-Communist action, to dis-
miss advisers who favor wooing the Peronistas away from
Peron, and to modify certain aspects of his petroleum policy
to improve the efficiency of the state oil company. Other re-
lated demands reportedly include federal control over several
provincial governments accused of Peronista or leftist lean-
ings, a new electoral law allowing small minority parties con-
gressional representation, and a change in economic and finan-
cial policies to reduce state controls and opportunities for
graft. The complaints mainly concern the degree of execution
of agreed-upon policies.
[The American air attache. in Buenos Aires comments that
the armed forces seem to be taking a firmer position on these
points�especially on Peronism and Communism--than they have
in past crises. He expects Frondizi to avert an armed revolt by
yielding to military demands as he has in the past.i
The last time Frondizi faced serious army pressure of this
type was in September 1959, when army Commander in Chief
Toranzo Montero successfully demanded the ouster of then War
Secretary Anaya because the army insisted that he was too con,
ciliatory toward the Peronistas. Toranzo, again the main army
spokesman, told that the
army is united behind these demands, and will oust Frondizi if
he rejects them.
Frondizi, whose economic and political policies are under
firelrom segments of his own party as well as from all opposi-
tion groups, will brobablv tread cautiously in the face of the ar-
my demands:
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%I IA ILL./.../Al ILO
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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