Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
Body:
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'(:)P SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
10 March 1955
Copy No. 88
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 1414
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EGRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Yugoslav and Chinese exchange of ambassadors
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. South Korea warns of action against Communist members if
NNSC is not abolished (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Spokesman for Vietnamese sects expresses fear of Diem govern-
ment (page 4).
4.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Jordan appears interested in eventual adherence to Turkish-Iraqi
pact (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on Hungarian Workers' Party attacks on "rightist devia-
tion" (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Paris embassy notes factors dimming Faure government's pros-
pects (page 7).
8. Italian government crisis may be imminent (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Yugoslav and Chinese exchange of ambassadors:
By matching Peiping's appointment of a
high-level diplomat as ambassador to
Yugoslavia with its own appointment of
Vladimir Popovic as ambassador to Communist China, Belgrade
has also shown a great interest in Sino-Yugoslav relations. Each
country may believe that a man of high caliber could be instru-
mental in exerting influence on the other country, with Yugoslavia
pursuing its old view that China can be made less dependent on
Moscow.
Popovic is considered close to Tito and
has held such key positions as ambassador to the USSR from 1945
to 1948, assistant foreign minister from 1948 to 1950, and ambas-
sador to the United States from 1950 to March 1954.
Wu Hsiu-chuan, appointed by the Chinese
on 1 March, is of comparable caliber as a diplomat, having been
vice minister of foreign affairs since 1951 and an assistant to
Chou En-lai in negotiating the Sino-Soviet treaty in Ianuary 1950,
FAR EAST
2.. South Korea warns of action against Communist members if NNSC
is not abolished:
If a decision is made relative to the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
(NNSC) which permits the commission to
continue, and its Communist members to
remain in South Korea, it will be a signal for the Korean govern-
ment to act "to safeguard its national security." This is the high-
light of a memorandum setting forth the South Korean government's
position on the NNSC which was delivered to the American embassy
on 7 March,
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Comment: The decision on the status of
the NNSC will presumably be made by the Swiss and Swedish gov-
ertments after they have considered the American and Communist
positions on the matter.
The Chinese Communists have expressed
willingness for commission members to negotiate only a token re-
duction in personnel, which would permit the inspection teams to
continue to function. It is possible, therefore, that South Korea
might take action against Communist team members within its
borders if the Swiss and Swedes enter into such negotiations rather
than agree to abolition of the commission.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Spokesman for Vietnamese sects expresses fear of Diem government:
A spokesman for the Hoa Hao sect told the
American embassy in Saigon that the sects
had decided Diem would destroy them if
they remained inactive, and that they pre-
ferred "honorable death from known enemies rather than a dishonor-
able end at the hands of one who professed to be their leader."
The embassy believes that the formation of
a "United Front of Nationalist Forces" on 4 March by the sects in-
dicates that for the immediate future their activity will be concen-
trated in the political rather than the military sphere.
Comment: The proclamation announcing
the united front was signed by representatives of all three sects, but
leaders of certain progovernment wings of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao
have indicated they will not adhere to it. Despite their past inability
to maintain a united front, the sects have a potential for causing Diem
serious trouble. This potential would be enhanced if Bao Dai should
decide to back them against the premier.
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4.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Jordan appears interested in eventual adherence to Turkish-Iraqi
pact:
The American charg�n Amman reports
that the Jordanian attitude toward the
rival Turkish-Iraqi and Egyptian-Saudi
pact arrangements has crystallized in
the following form: (1) Jordan will "study" the Egyptian proposals
for a new Arab collective security pact, but such a study may take
years; (2) Jordan will not be a party to any agreement aimed at
punishing Iraq for signing the pact with Turkey; and (3) Jordan will
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not join the Turkish-Iraqi pact at present but will consider doing
so in the future.
Jordan's defense minister told the
American embassy on '7 March that eventual association with
the Turkish-Iraqi pact would enable Amman to continue to en-
joy British military aid within the framework of an international
defense arrangement.
Comment: Jordan's position at the
moment is the product of the opposing Western and Egyptian-Saudi
pressures. The defense minister's reasoning is similar to the
thinking which has induced Iraq to negotiate a new defense arrange-
ment with the British within the framework of the Turkish-Iraqi
pact.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on Hungarian Workers' Party attacks on "rightist devia-
tion":
The Hungarian Workers' Party central
committee resolution condemning Pre-
mier Imre Nagy and other government
officials for "rightist anti-Marxist deviation" culminates a series
of recent developments aimed at restoring unity and discipline in
the party and restricting new course liberalism.
The emphasis of the resolution on the
stagnation of the economy since Tune 1953 indicates that the party
will pursue a harder, less conciliatory policy in the future.
As in the past, Hungary, unlike the other
Satellites, is likely to carry Moscow's diroctives to extremes. Its
new program will undoubtedly include an increased emphasis on
discipline, vigilance and class warfare, and the allocation of more
economic resources to heavy industry.
The fact that the report specifically
charged Premier Nagy with being the spokesman of the anti-Marxist
deviation strongly suggests that Nagy, unlike Malenkov, will be
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immediately eliminated from the government. The criticisms
will have widespread repercussions within Hungary, since Nagy's
liberal interpretation of the new course was vigorously seconded
by a large number of party and economic leaders and by the offi-
cial party newspaper last October and November.
The most likely successor as premier
would be Mihaly Farkas, a former minister of defense who re-
portedly worked with party leader Rakosi in Moscow during the
war years on the Hungarian section of the Cominform. He was
removed from his government position at the time the new course
was announced, but has remained the fourth ranking member of
the party political committee and a central committee secretary
under Rakosi.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Paris embassy notes factors dimming Faure government's pros-
pects:
The political situation in France appears
"unfavorable enough" to warrant analysis
of the Faure government's prospects now, the
American embassy in Paris reports.
National Assembly deputies opposed to German rearmament are
tempted to try to overthrow the government and thereby delay
Council of the Republic action on the Paris agreements indefinitely.
Strong opposition is anticipated on parts of the b udget and on Pre-
mier Faure% request for new economic decree powers.
Popular reluctance to face another govern-
ment crisis immediately, however, and the belief that Faure should
be given a chance on his domestic program are factors in the pre-
mier's favor.
Comment: Faure% success on 8 March
in overcoming his first big budgetary obstacle--the vote on a
limited pay increase for civil servants--has strengthened his
position considerably. If, as seems probable, he can get assem-
bly approval for his economic program and push the Paris agree-
ments through the council, his prospects for remaining in office
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until autumn will be much brighter. Parliament will be in recess
for much of April, May and June because of cantonal and senato-
rial elections, and summer vacations will then follow.
8. Italian government crisis may be imminent:
Some observers in Rome believe a gov-
ernment crisis may be provoked shortly
after Italian Senate ratification of the
Paris accords, expected this week. The
American embassy, however, which fore-
sees a possible vote of confidence next
week, believes Premier Scelba is likely
to survive for the time being "with the
barest majority."
Comment: The government is required
to resign following the pigs�Maril election in May, and Scelba
will probably be able to squeak by until then. Party disagreements
over the pace and extent of domestic reform have become so acute
that formation of a new government combination will be very diffi-
cult.
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