CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448327
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: July 13, 1955

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13 July 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 15
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. /
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 0 LC
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: _altaCI___ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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99
3.5(c)
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Uruguay may reopen legation in Moscow (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Probable transfer of Soviet naval vessels to Far East via North-
ern Sea Route (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Communists may propose further reduction of neutral teams in
Korea (page 4).
4. Soviet vessels sighted at Tsingtao (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Indonesian army leader says cabinet must resign (13age 5).
* * * *
6. Comment on TASS statement regarding German issue (page 6).
Khrushchev's position strengthened by Central Committee meet-
ing (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Uruguay may reopen legation in Moscow:
The Uruguayan government may send a
diplomatic representative to Moscow, a
reliable government source has informed
the American embassy in Montevideo.
The finance minister is said to be backing the move, which will
receive further consideration when Foreign Minister Rompani re-
turns to Montevideo from the United States.
Comment: Expansion of Soviet-Uruguayan
trade may have led Montevideo to consider re-establishing diplomatic
representation in Moscow. Direct Soviet imports from Uruguay rose
sharply from virtually nothing in 1962 to nearly $20,000, 000 worth in
1954. Uruguayan interest in Soviet products has also increased re-
cently.
Although the USSR maintains a legation
in Montevideo, Uruguay's legation in Moscow has been closed since
1947. Uruguay has at times considered breaking diplomatic rela-
tions, alleging that Soviet representation in Montevideo served no
useful purpose.
Reopening of the Uruguayan legation would
be a success for Soviet efforts to expand diplomatic relations with
Latin America by means of stepped-up trade promotion. It could
Increase pressure in other Latin American countries, especially
Brazil, for renewal of diplomatic and commercial relations with
the USSR. Only Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico now maintain
diplomatic relations with the USSR. (Concurred in by ORR.)
SOVIET UNION
2. Probable transfer of Soviet naval vessels to Far East via North-
ern Sea Route:
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Comment: This activity coincides with
the annual summer opening to navigation of the Northern Sea Route.
In July 1954, a group of five long-range submarines and a group of
18 unidentified minesweeper and destroyer-escort types left the
Northern Fleet area for Vladivostok via this route.
The Soviet naval construction program has
progressed to the point where the number of cruisers, destroyers
and submarines produced in Soviet European yards apparently is
meeting operational requirements for the European fleets and a
number of these types can now be transferred to the Far East.
FAR EAST
. Communists may propose further reduction of neutral teams in
Korea:
delegate to the Neutral
Nations Supervisonr Commission (NNSC)
in Korea recently
thought
the number of inspecting units coma e reaucea to one team each
in North and South Korea. American officials believe the Commu-
nists may make such a proposal at the meeting of the Military
Armistice Commission on 14 July.
Comment: The 14 July meeting is to
discuss a recommendation of the NNSC to both sides that the
teams be reduced from five to three teams in each half of Korea.
This reduction was proposed last April by the Communists after
they had rejected a Swedish proposal that all teams be withdrawn.
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'Nor'
A proposal for an additional reduction
would enable the Communists in their propaganda to contrast
their reasonableness with the alleged American desire to abro-
gate the armistice. At the same time, they may believe that a
token neutral representation would justify the continuance in
operation of Article 13(d), which provides for neutral inspec-
tion and prohibits the introduction of additional military equip-
ment.
4. Soviet vessels sighted at Tsingtao:
reported sighting
at Tsingtao between 1 and 4 July the two
Soviet destroyers and four submarines
which were previously observed en route
from Vladivostok to Communist China. One of the submarines
was flying the Chinese Communist flag, indicating that it had al-
ready been transferred to the Chinese navy.
Transfer of these ships would bring
Chinese Communist destroyer strength to four and the number of
submarines to 11. Such a transfer would greatly increase Chinese
Communist offensive canbilities, according to US Pacific Fleet
intelligence.
Comment: A convoy of six Soviet 300-ton
patrol craft has arrived at Tsingtao in the past week and may also
be turned over to the Chinese. The Chinese Communist navy may
have been further strengthened by the acquisition of additional
Soviet craft, including three submarines, which were based at Port
Arthur. With the exception of several small craft, all the Soviet
vessels at Port Arthur apparently r here following the
evacuation of Soviet forces in May.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Indonesian army leader says cabinet must resign:
Colonel Simbolon, army commander in
North Sumatra, who claims to be the
architect of the army's current stand
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and future plans, told the American consul in Medan on 8 July
that the cabinet must resign. He said the army was "playing for
keeps this time" and would insist that an acceptable minister
of defense and other honest and capable ministers be included
in the new cabinet.
�He said the present crisis is the cul-
mination of a "cold war" between Defense Minister Iwa and the
army command. He said he had persuaded his fellow officers
they could retreat no further and must win on/ "this issue" or
younger officers would take over and "settle in their own way."
Comment Colonel Simbolon, who is
strongly anti-Communist and has been an outspoken opponent of
the pro-Communist defense minister, was the choice of pro-
fessional army officers for the post of chief of staff.
Although the army remains practically
unanimous in its opposition to General Utoyo, there appears to
be a considerable difference of opinion as to the army's maxi-
mum and minimum demands. A proposal issued by army head-
quarters in Djakarta as a basis for negotiation with the govern-
ment suggested only the dismissal of Utoyo and the reinstatement
of former acting chief of staff Lubis. Other army factions how-
ever, are reported supporting Simbolon's position.
* * *
6. Comment on TASS statement regarding German issue:
The TASS statement of 12 July on the
German problem is defensive in tone,
reflecting Soviet sensitivity to Western
charges that Moscow has lost interest in German unification.
At the same time, the statement indi-
cates that the USSR, while denying these charges, wishes to avoid
the unity and free elections issues at Geneva and to concentrate on
proposals for European security, which it says would be a step
toward German unification, TASS justifies this attitude by claiming
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that the inclusion of West Germany in Western military blocs,
rather than disagreement on the free elections question, is the
major obstacle to German unification.
The TASS statement includes no new
proposals on Germany and does not specifically call for dis-
cussions on Germany at Geneva. It implies that agreement on
unification may not be possible now and stresses that a pre-
requisite is a rapprochement between East and West Germany.
The Soviet call for a European collective security system is
not new; any new proposal would probably be put forward at the
summit conference.
7. Khrushchevb position strengthened by Central Committee meet-
rug:
The recently concluded meeting of the
Central Committee, held from 4 to
12 July, marks a further and signifi-
cant consolidation of Party First Secretary Khrushchev's posi-
tion.
The appointment of A. I. Kirichenko,
Ukrainian party boss, and M. A. Suslov, central committee
secretary, as full members of the all-powerful party Presidium
bring into this policy-making body men who have been associated
with Khrushchev for many years. Kirichenko, identified last
year as a candidate member of the Presidium, has attained this
position of power during the rapid rise of Khrushchev; which re-
sulted in Malenkov's demotion. M. A. Suslov has worked with
Khrushchev since 1947 in the party secretariat.
The appointment of two of the three new
party secretaries also reflects Khrushchev's hand. D. T. Shepilov,
Pravda's editor, has accompanied Khrushchev on his recent visits
to Peiping and Belgrade, apparently acting as ideological expert.
N. I. Belyayev, first secretary of Altai Kral, an expert on agri-
cultural matters, championed an aggressive agricultural program
even before Khrushchev presented his to the Central Committee in
February 1954.
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The Central Committee meeting also
heard a report on the convening of the 20th Congress of the Com-
munist Party, not required by party rules until October 1956.
The probable early calling of the congress would appear to be a
move by Khrushchey to consolidate his power while he is in the
ascendancy. If he is able to secure the election of a Central Com-
xrdttee subservient to his leadership at the congress he will have
achieved an almost impregnable position as the most powerful
member of the party Presidium.
The timing of the Central Committee
meeting and the announcement of its decisions increases the im-
pression that Premier Bulganin will attend the Geneva conference
as head of state in name only, and underlines the fact that power
in the USSR is still firmly controlled by the party, led bir itEi first
secretary, N. S. Khrushchev.
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