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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
PRIORITY
IN 53316
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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOC ONE CRS
DDI EXO OCR FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.
Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
�171trron-mt-ti-56�4----_
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
0110UP
Excluded from aereeneric
downgrading and
declossikation
1 7201 9Z
CITE
DIST 17 FEBRUARY 1968
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI: MID-FEBRUARY 196S
SUBJECT: ALLEDGED ASSESSMENT OF VC FAILURE DURING TET
IN DANANG BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM HANOI AND NE
FOR ATTACK OF DPNANG
CO:
SOURCE:
SECRET
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
L P. N
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.-3(h)(2)
� � ,..01 J. .... � %..� ,J I
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3.5(c)
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K t T
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FOREIGN DI
(dtssem controls)
3.3(h)(2)
1. ALLEGEDLY A DELEGATION FROM HANOI HAS REVIEWED THE VC/N:1VA.
FAILURE IN THE TET OFFENSIVE AGAINST DANANG, AND A NEW PLAN OF
ATTACK, APPARENTLY TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HAS BEEN
PROPOSED FOR REVIEW OR MODIFICATION BY THE VC DANANG CITY COm1ITTF1T.
THREE REGIMENTS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACK, WITH TARGETS TO
INCLUDE OBJECTIVES INSIDE THE CITY, AS WELL AS MARBLE M'OUNTAIN
AIR FACILITY AND DANANG AIR BASE,
3.3(h)(2)
3
THE DELEGATES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN HANOI PERSONALLY
STUDIED THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING PLANS FOR
DANANG CITY. THEY CRITICIZED THE WRITTEN REVIEWS OF THE LOCAL
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LEADERS ON THIS SUBJECT.
THE DELEGATES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THAT,
ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY FORCES ESPECIALLY THE U.S. FORCES, ARE STILL
VERY STRONG IN DANANG CITY, THERE ARE MANY WEAKNESSES THAT THEY
COULD NOT OVERCOME. AMONG THESE NUMEROUS GENERAL WEAKNESSES
APPEARING IN THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE DISIN�
TEGRATION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF THE U.S. SOLDIERS. (THE DELEGATES
SAID) THAT, BECAUSE WE (MEANING THE VC AND NVN LEADERSHIP GEN�
ERALLY) COULD NOT EVALUATE THIS WEAKNESS PROPERLY, THE REGIONAL AND
CITY COMMITTEES DID NOT PROPOSE OR DRAW UP A PLAN ON A SUFFICIENTLY
LARGE SCALE TO CARRY OUT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UP�
RISING IN DANANG. FORCES DEPLOYED FOR USE INSIDE DANANG DID
NOT EXCEED ONE REGIMENT. THE ENEMY FORCES WERE SUPERIOR TO OUR
OWN. HOW, THEN, COULD WE CARRY OUT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND
GENERAL UPRISING?
THIS MAY MEAN FORCES ALLOCATED
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
TO PENETRATE INTO DANANG DID NOT EXCEED ONE REGIMENT; NOT THAT ONLY ONE
REGIMENT WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE ENTIRE OPERATION). BECAUSE
OF THIS (DEFECTIVE) PLAN, THE OPERATIONS AGAINST DANANG CITY
SUFFERED FROM THE FOLLOWING WEAKNESSESS:
(1) THE MILITARY MAIN FORCES OF ZONE V (MR-5) DID NOT
SELR Nu FORt D
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3.5(c)
PROPERLY REINFORCE THE DANANG CITY UNIT (I.E., MILITARY FORCES
OF VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE). IN FACT, THE ZONE DID NOT REINFORCE
THE DANANG CITY UNIT AT ALL EXCEPT WITH ARTILLERY UNITS. (TRANS-
LATORS COMMENT: THIS APPARENTLY MEANS THAT, AS THE OPERATIONS
PLAN WAS INITIALLY DRAWN UP, THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR PAR-
TICIPATION BY TROOPS NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE CITY UNIT,
EXCEPT FOR THE ARTILLERY SUPPORT INDICATED.) SOME OF THE SAPPER
FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT HAD TO ENTER THE CITY AND DIS-
PERSE INSIDE IT TO ACT AS GUERRILLAS. SOME OF THESE ELEMENTS
INFILTRATED TO ATTACK HOA CUONG VILLAGE, SOUTH OF DANANG AIR
BASE. THESE SAPPER UNITS DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF CARRYING
OUT A LARGER ATTACK. THE MILITARY EVENTS IN DANANG SHOWED THAT
THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK WAS UNCOORDINATED FROM THE FIRST MOMENT,
WHILE SOME INFILTRATION FORCES ATTACKED I CORPS HEADOUARTERS-,
NONE OF THE OTHER FORCES ATTACKED THEIR OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT;
HENCE THE FORCES ATTACKING I CORPS HEADQUARTERS WERE DESTROYED.
THE FORCES DEPLOYED TO ATTACK T CORPS HEADQUARTERS COULD NOT SUCCEED
BECAUSE THEY WERE DISCOVERED, SO THAT THEY COULD NOT
MODIFY THE PLAN IN TIME. THE FIGHTING
(FOR I CORPS HEADQUARTERS) WAS SPORADIC, AND COULD NOT BE CALLED
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3.5(c)
A GENERAL RAID ATTACK. MEANWHILE, THE FORCES INSIDE THE CITY COULD
NOT SEIZE THE INITIATIVE TO EXECUTE THEIR PLAN; ALL WERE COMPLETELY
PARALYZED BECAUSE OF THE PROMPT COUNTERMEASURES OF THE ARMY OF THE
PUPPET GOVERNMENT AND OF THE U.S. FORCES. IN FACT, FROM THE MILITARY
STANDPOINT, WE ACHIEVED NO VICTORY WORTH MENTIONING IN DANANG CITY
IN COMPARISON WITH THE VICTORIES IN THE OTHER PROVINCES. THE POOREST
RESULTS (OF THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK) WERE IN DANANG.
(2) THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WAS NOT AGITATED IN-
SIDE THE CITY, AND EVEN THE MOVEMENT IN THE RURAL AREAS WHICH
SHOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THE MOVEMENT IN THE CITY, WAS NOT LAUNCHED.
GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WAS
WEAK, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING CADRES
HAD INFILTRATED THE CITY. THE MAIN REASON (FOR FAILURE) WAS THAT
THE (VC) AGENTS AND THE MASSES WERE SUPPRESSED BY THE ENEMY
(AUTHORITIES). THESE HIGH-RANKING CADRES COULD NOT CONTROL AND
MOTIVATE THE lissEs AND THE (VC) LEADERSHIP DID NOT EXERT CLOSE
AND PROMPT CONTROL. ANOTHER REASON WAS THAT THE MASSACRE OF THE
CRUEL ELEMENTS AND THE SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER COULD NOT BE
CARRIED OUT. FOR THESE REASONS, THE MASSES REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL
t T
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3.5(c)
OF THE ENEMY AND ARE OBLIGED TO CARRY OUT ORDERS ISSUED BY THE
ENEMY.
(3) WE COULD NOT INITIATE THE MOVEMENT TO DISINTEGRATE
THE RANKS OF THE ARMY OR OF THE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERN-
MENT INCLUDING THE POLICE. WE COULD NOT LAUNCH THE ANTI-WAR
MOVEMENT AND UPRISING AMONG THE ARMY AND POLICE. ON THE CONTRARY,
THE ARMY AND POLICE OF THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT WERE GATHERED RAPIDLY
AFTER THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST DANANG. THAT MEANT THAT THE
THREE-PRONGED ATTACK OF MILITARY ACTION, POLITICAL PROSELYTING,
AND MILITARY PROSELYTING COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT, AND THE MOVE-
MENT (FOR UPRISING) IN DANANG CITY COULD NOT CATCH UP WITH THAT
IN OTHER PLACES.
TO OVERCOME THE ABOVE MENTIONED DIFFICULTIES, ACCORDING TO
THE DIRECTIVE OF THE HANOI CENTRAL COMMITTEE DELEGATION AND OF THE
CURRENT AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE ZONE V COMMITTEE, THE DANANG CITY
COMMITTEE MUST URGENTLY ^105IFY THE PLAN c MEANWHILE, THE FOLLOWING
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PLANS MUST BE CARR IED OUT IN THE COMING PHASE.
THE FOLLOWING APPARENTLY IS THE PLAN UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE
VC DANANG CITY COMM ITTEE )
MILITARY: WE SHALL RESOLUTELY CARRY OUT CONTINUOUS ATTACKS,
ACCORDING TO T
REPORTED TO YOU ON 26 JANUARY 1968
WE SHOULD LAUNCH THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK THROUGHOUT
THE ENTIRE AREA -- INSIDE OUTSIDE,AND IN THE SUBURBAN AREAS OF
DANANG CITY. ZONE V COMMAND HEADQUARTERS ALREADY HAS REIN�
FORCED THE DANANG CITY UNIT WITH ONE DIVISION TO CARRY OUT THIS
PLAN. THE PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS:
ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHEAST OF DANANG,
I. E. , EA ST OF NATIONAL ROUTE ONE.
ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE WEST OF NATIONAL ROUTE
ONE I .E THE AREA TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG.
ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE NORTHWEST OF DANANG.
THIS DIVISION WILL BE SUPPORTED BY NVA ARTILLERY REGIMENT 368/B
TOGETHER WITH THE FOR CES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT.
ACCORDING TO THE PLAN ALL FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT
WILL MAINLY ATTACK THE OBJECT IVES INSIDE THE CITY. MEANTIME ONE
REGIMENTAL UNIT WILL ATT ACK THE NHON NUOC (MARBLE MOUNTAIN)
NO ruKtiGN DISSEM
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3.5(c)
AND HOA CUONG AREAS, TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AN ADVANCE TO THE
DONG GIANG AREA (DANANG EAST) , AND AGAINST MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS AT TRINH MINH THE BRIDGE. (TRANSLATOR'S
COMMENT: THIS MAY MEAN THE BRIDGE ITSELF, OR INSTALLATIONS NEAR
THE DONG GIANG , OR DANANG EAST, END OF THE BRIDGE.)
ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG WILL
HIT HOA VANG DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND THE AIR BASE,
THEN ADVANCE TO HOA RHAT (WEST AND SLIGHTLY SOUTH OF DANANG ACROSS
ROUTE NO. I) IN ORDER TO ATTACK THE AREA BEHIND DANANG AIR BASE
(SIC).
ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT WILL ATTACK HOA KHANH BASE,
PHU LOC, HOA MY, AND WILL CROSS HOA MINH VILLAGE TO THANH
KHE. IT THEN WILL ADVANCE TO A POSITION FROM
WHICH IT CAN ATTACK THE NORTH OF DANAN2 AIRBASE
THEN CLEAR THE WAY TO ENTER THE CITY, WHERE IT WILL JOIN THE TROOPS
OF THE REGIMENTAL UNIT DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. (TRANS-
LATOR'S COMMENT: THESE TWO UNITS WILL MEET AND JOIN FORCES INSIDE
THE CITY.) (THE TWO REGIMENTAL UNITS) WILL THEN ADVANCE INTO THE
CITY AND ATTACK DANANG JAIL, LOCATED NEAR CHO CON MARKET; THE
NATIONAL POLICE STATION (I DE., DANANG POLICE HEADQUARTERS ON GIA
S t(..K tT
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LONG STREET); THE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE REGIONAL OFFICE (ON
LY THUONG KIET STREET); THE ADMINISTRATIVE HALL (THE MAYOR'S OFFICE
ON BACH DANG STREET); THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT (CIVILIAN) REP-
RESENTATIVE FOR I CORPS, (A NEW BUILDING ON BACH DANG STREET);
THE HEADQUARTERS OF DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR (ON DOC LAP STREET); THE
TREASURY BUILDING; AND THE BROADCASTING STATION (AT THE CORNER
OF DONG DA AND QUANG TRUONG STREETS). WHILE THESE FORCES ARE AD-
VANCING, THE SAPPER FORCES INSIDE THE CITY WILL CARRY OUT THE
ATTACK PLAN TO DESTROY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICES, AND
TO DESTROY ALL THE OFFICES OF THE GOVERNMENT (GVN)'IN EACH QUARTER.
THE SAPPER UNIT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT 368/B WILL
DESTROY NHON NUOC AND DANANG AIR BASES, AND THE SON CHA (MONKEY
MOUNTAIN AREA) ROCKET BASE.
THE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OF ZONE V HAS ASSIGNED
3.3(h)(2)
HIEF OF STAFF OF ZONE V HEADQUARTERS, TO BE IN PERSONAL 3.3(h)(2)
COMMAND OF THE ACTION, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE DIFFERENT
BRANCHES AND THE TROOPS (SIC) TO CONDUCT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK
AGAINST DANANG.
WHILE THESE MILITARY FORCES ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR STRONG
ATTACK, THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CADRES SHOULD AGITATE FOR A
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3.5(c)
GENERAL UPRISING MOVEMENT TO SEIZE POLITICAL POWER, TO ELIMINATE
THE CRUEL ELEMENTS, AND DESTROY.
ALL � THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM (SIC) IN THE CITY.
ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, THEY (THE VC) HAVE
3.3(h)(2)
EMPHASIZED THE LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VC PENETRATION AGENTS
IN THE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. AND IN THE POSTS AND OUTPOSTS
SURROUNDING DANANG. THESE AGENTS ARE TO RISE UP
AND START FIGHTING, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE
ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE WITH AN ATTACK FROM WITHIN.)
THE MAXIMUM REQUEST (FROM HANOI?) IS TO WIN COMPLETE
VICTORY IN DANANG, IF, UNFORTUNATELY, THE VC CANNOT OVERRUN THE
CITY, THE VC SHOULD OCCUPY THE AREAS HOA CUONG; HOA MINH, HOA PHAT
THACH GIAN, THACH THAN, BINH THUAN, AND AN HAI (VILLAGES
SURROUNDING DANANG), THESE PLACES WILL BECOME
STEPPING STONES FOR CONTINUOUS ATTACK AGAINST THE CITY
LATER ON.
THIS PLAN IS UNDER DETAILED CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMAND OF
3.3(h)(2;
CHIEF OF STAFF OF ZONE V.
IN ADDITION, BEFORE THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK IS CARRIED OUT,
MANY STRONG ATTACKS WILL BE LAUNCHED TO OCCUPY THE POSTS AND OUT-
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3.5(c)
POSTS ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE ONE, FROM DANANG TO VINH DIEN AND FROM
DANANG TO KIEU DUC. )
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P1
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STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCT
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