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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM �
The Situation in South Vietnam No, 30
(As 67-170:cio A.M. 150
Summary
The widely anticipated, major "second phase" of-
fensive against the cities of South Vietnam still
has not materialized.
There are signs, in fact, that the city threat
is easing in some key areas. Elements of the enemy
concentrations near Da Nang, for example, appear to
be withdrawing to the southwest.
In other areas, however, the threat still per-
sists and, to some extent, seems to have intensified.
Strong Communist elements, for example, still are
nearby major urban centers in the Delta:and, in the
past 24 hours, have stepped up their military pres-
sure against several provincial centers there.
The situation at Khe Sanh, in Saigon, and in
Hue, has undergone no significant change in the past
24 hours. Sporadic enemy shelling continues at
the former, and scattered fighting in the latter
centers.
Unusual DRV air movements are still taking place;
the latest involves the flight of AN-2's into at least
the southern DRV.
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1: Corps
1. Khe Sanh came under heavy mortar and rocket
attack around noon on. 11 February, By 1100 P.M.,
the enemy shelling had become sporadic.. However,
another C-130 transport aircraft was hit on 11 Feb-
ruary and the airfield was again briefly closed. .
US Marine losses as a result of the shelling were
three killed and seven wounded.
2. Late reports indicate that the sporadic
enemy shelling at Khe Sanh on the 10th totalled some
125 rounds of mortar and rocket fire. Eight Marines
were wounded.
3. Elsewhere in the DMZ area, major enemy ac-
tion Was limited Co a few rocket rounds on Quang Tri
City, but damage Was light.
4. Allied military positions and VietnaMese
urban Centers in the DMZ sectOr can probably expect
continued nommunist mortar, artillery, and rocket
attacks.
.the shipment of large quantities o eavy c
ammunition--up to 152-mm.--just north of the DMZ
within the past week. The North Vietnamese are ap-
nn14An1'1y 'ming �trunks to move the ammunition.
5. In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese
troops continued their efforts to dislodge enemy
forces from the Citadel area. The Communists still
held the Imperial Palace and a portion along the
Citadel's southwest wall as well as a section im-
mediately east of the Citadel on the 11th. Snipers
are reportedly prevalent throughout the city--even
south of the Perfume River where US Marines had gained
control earlier.
6. Aside from the stiff enemy resistance, wide-
spread looting has also apparently become a major
problem in Hue. Police are reportedly among the
looters. � .
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7. The enemy continues active along Route 1
between Hue and Danang. During the night of 10-11
February, Communist gunners twice shelled the Phu Loc
district town area with rockets and mortars. The
4th NVA Regiment, which had overrun Phu licc ten days
ago, is believed still in this area and may be con-
ducting an interdiction campaign against the important
Route 1 transportation artery.
8. It appears that Communist pressure on Danang
may be subsiding. Some sharp encounters south of the
city in recent days have reportedly exacted signifi-
cant.casualties from elements of the 2nd North Viet-
namese Division, 31st NVA Regiment, andlocal units.
These actions may have disrupted Communist prepara-
tions for attacks in the Danang area and forced an
enemy withdrawal to the southwest.
10. Although there is a general expectation of
renewed Communist offensive activity in most areas
of I Corps, some urban centers seem to be returning
to a semblance of normality. Some commercial estab-
lishments and market centers were open on the 9th
and 10th in Quang Tri, Danang, and Hoi An. Civilian
traffic filled the streets of these cities.
11, Rumors that the firmness of the US commit-
ment to Vietnam is decreasing seem to have died down,
at least in military and government circles in Danang,
according to an American observer on the scene. How-
ever, some political party leaders and civilians con-
tinue to be skeptical of US views regarding a coali-
tion government in Saigon. Overall, the observer re-
ports the allied mood in Danang is optimistic.
12. in Quang Tri city, however,
indicates that, rumors concerning US-Communist com-
plicity in the recent attacks are gaining momentum, there
Some people in the city apparently claim that
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American reaction forces were deliberately slow in
arriving to defend the city.
13. There has been no major change in the situa-
tion.throughout this area, according to field reports.
14. An enemy company reportedly still controls
a hamlet in the outskirts of.testern Da Lat city.
Saigon and UI Corps
15. No major new Communist attacks were reported
in the Saigon area during the night of I0-11 Feb-
ruary, Moreover, with the exception of an enemy am-
bush of a small US Army convoy near Tay Ninh City, the
eleven provinces of III Corps remained relatively quiet.
16. Sporadic small-scale fire fights were again
reported in Cholon, as ARVN rangers and Marines con-
tinued to press their clearing efforts against stub-
bornly resisting pockets of enemy snipers and sappers.
Allied air and artillery strikes were directed against
an enemy force reportedly moving against Tan Son Nhut
airbase from the northeast early on 11 February. No
further information is available on the results of the
strikes; however, no ground contact developed.
17. An updated report of the 122-mm. rocket at-
tack against Bien Hoa airbase on the night of 10
February indicates that one American was killed and
60 wounded. In addition, seven US aircraft were
destroyed and 16 damaged. Air operations were not
affected, however.
18. Preliminary interrogation of a field com-
mander and political officer from the Viet Cong 165 "A"
Regiment, which participated in the recent attacks on
Saigon, has revealed additional information on enemy
plans and deployments in the capital area.
19. According to the prisoners, the main mission
of their two-company strike force was to seize and
hold Saigon-Cholon's Chi Hoa prison, regardless of the
cost. They were absolutely forbidden to retreat and
were told they would be executed if they did. The at-
tack on the prison failed.
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20. The general plan of the attacks on Saigon,
according to tho prisoners, called for infantry
units to seize and hold target areas preparatory to
the commitment of artillery units.
21. The field commander maintained that a total
of 30 battalions were in or near Saigon, with one to
two divisions in reserve and artillery units "to come
later." The political officer claimed that there were
some 25 battalions in the Saigon area, that the "maximum
utilization" of artillery units was programmed for
the "second phase of attack," and that "divisions 5, 7,
and 9" were reserve forces to provide support.
22. indicate Viet
Cong intentions to launch "large-scale attacks" against
Saigon sometime between 9 and 13 February. The objec-
tives of these attacks allegedly includee the blocking
of supply routes into Saigon, and the occupation of
Saigon's 6th, 7th, and 8th Precincts where an "insur-
rection government "will be formed." The destruction
of Tan Son Nhut airbase, along with any densely popu,
lated areas where resistance is encountered is also
planned, as is the assassination of high-ranking GVN
officials and US/South Korean intelligence officers.
23. Major elements of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th
Light Infantry Divisions and the NVA 7th Division con-
tinue to be located within striking dintannA nf +ha
capital.
Two regiments of the 5th Division
ure walleyed to be located east of Bien Hoe, with a
third regiment to the north. Two regiments of the 9th
Division are reportedly located just north of Saigon,
with a third deployed in the vicinity of Thu Duo.
While at least three battalions of the 9th Division
are believed to have participated both in the initial
attacks on Saigon and in recent heavy engagements north
of the capital, MACV still credits the division with
a minimum of six combat effective maneuver battalions.
24. Meanwhile, the 7th Division with nine combat
effective battalions in three NVA regiments continues
to consolidate its position in Binh Duong Province,
north of Saigon. The mission of this division, as re-
flected in both the tactical behavior and the com-
munications of its subordinate elements, is to relieve
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pressure on enemy units already commited to the Saigon
campaign by containing allied reaction forces to static
defense of their base areas in Binh Duong Province,
IV Corps
25. The overall trend of Communist actions in
the Delta during the past few days has emphasized con-
tinued attacks by fire against provincial and district
towns, interspersed with ground asaaults against lightly
defended rural outposts.
26. While the overall intensity of the coordinated
ground attacks against urban centers has declined sharply,
the majority of Viet Cong troop units in IV Corps re-
main deployed in close proximity to heavily populated
areas--allied clearing operations notwithstanding.
US authorities credit the enemy with a main force equivalent
of 9 to 11 combat effective battalions in the Delta.
. 27. Elements of the Viet Cong force which attacked
Bac Lieu City yesterday remain entrenched within the
provincial capital.. Five South Vietnamese were killed
and 28 wounded during the initial seven-hour assault.
Some of the attackers have attempted to exfiltrate the
city, using nearly 100 women and children as shields.
A large portion of the city has been destroyed by
fire in this latest round of fighting.
. 28. Each Gia, the capital of Kien Giang Province,
came under 3-40 rocket attack. during the early morning
hours of 11 February. The 30-minute bombardment resulted
in 19 friendly casualties and total destruction to
the CORDS building. There apparently was no follow-up
ground attack and the city is now reported quiet.
29. An estimated 500-man Viet Cong force has
reportedly surrounded. Cao Lanh, the capital of Kien
Phong Province. This strike force, supported by some
400 laborers, has constructed bunker complexes 1,000
to 1,500 meters from the city proper. All of the
RD teams have been pulled into the capital or other
district towns of Kien Phong, thus giving the Viet
Cong free reign in the surrounding countryside.
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IL-28's were moved from Phuc yen--an oft-bombed
airfield--to Nanoi/Gia Lam, which has not yet been
struck. Since that time, the IL-28's have departed
Gia Lam on at least four Occasions, probably to avoid
being caught on the ground by US strike aircraft de-
tected in the area. Each time, the bombers havo.
orbited in safe airspace over the North Vietnamese -
Chinese border.
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