CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02031819
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 16, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
3.5(c)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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c 214 3.5(c)
16 February 1968
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Controlled Dissem
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for ne further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
ToOper
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16 February 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR-Berlin: New Soviet note aims at dividing
Allies. (Page 4)
Brazil: Discontented officers hope to force big
changes in administration. (Page 5)
Belgium: Government crisis (Page 7)
T 0 1> &E
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*Vietnam:
South Vietnam: The Communists are continuing
to improve their logistic capabilities in the Khe Sanh
area.
the
Communists have succeeded in reopening Laotian
Route 9 to the Quang Tri Province border. There
is evidence of medium to heavy use of this route as
far eastward as the abandoned Laotian Army outpost
at Ban Houei Sane, just southwest of the Communist-
occupied Lang Vei Special Forces camp. The road
will facilitate the resupply and reinforcement of
North Vietnamese forces currently deployed in the
Khe Sanh battle sector.
Meanwhile, major elements of the North Vietnamese
Army's 324 "B" Division continued their encroachment
upon the Quang Tri city area, suggesting that another
round of attacks may be forthcoming in this sector.
No significant new enemy initiatives were reported
in the II, III, or IV corps areas on 15 February,
although fighting continued in Hue and several heavy
clashes occurred between allied sweep forces and
Viet Cong units on the outskirts of Saigon. There
were indications in both collateral and communications
intelligence that the Viet Cong 9th Division may be
moving troops and supplies toward Saigon.
Vice President Ky may be preparing to undermine
the joint emergency task force by seeking dissolution
of the South Vietnamese side of it or by resigning as
its chairman.
Ky is piqued by allegations from
President Thieu's supporters that he is using his
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task force role to usurp power.
Ky is evidently convinced that government perform-
ance will bog down if the recovery effort reverts to the
direction of President Thieu and Prime Minister Loc,
and apparently hopes that this will force Thieu to delegate
broader authority on a permanent basis.
North Vietnam: An authoritative North Vietnamese
military commentary portrays the Tet offensive as
just one step--albeit an extraordinary one--on a long,
hard road to final Communist victory. The article,
which appeared in Hanoi's army daily on 11 February,
praises the successes achieved by the Communists,
but stresses the necessity of "progressive" develop-
ment of the war. It argues that the prolonged and
lasting consequences of the Tet offensive will be
"much more serious" than the immediate impact of
the military attacks.
The article seems to be a reaffirmation of the
Vietnamese Communists' basic strategy of a protrac-
ted struggle, a theme downgraded but not submerged
during the past few months.
On the diplomatic front, Hanoi is stepping up the
pressure for a bombing halt and for moving the war
into a "fight-talk" stage.
After earlier efforts to publicize its more forth-
coming position on talks with the US, the North
Vietnamese have made a series e-y. follow-up diplo-
matic moves. During the first week of the Tet offen-
sive, they apparently made a concerted effort to
contact non-Communist governments in order to
present their case and to underscore their readiness
to talk if the US stops the bombing.
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USSR-Berlin: Soviet letters of 14 February to
the Big Three were designed primarily to create fric-
tion among the Western Allies.
The letters to the US and UK contained much the
same complaints that Moscow made to Bonn
last month, alleging that Bonn was trying to lay claim
to West Berlin. The two powers were asked to pro-
tect the special status of the city from West German
"pretensions." The letter to the French, however,
consisted of a single sentence noting Franco-Soviet
interest in European detente and stating merely that
the US and UK had been sent letters about dangerous
West German activities in Berlin.
In addition to encouraging differences among the
Big Three on how to deal with Bonn on such matters,
Moscow probably is trying to foment friction between
the Allies and Bonn. The Soviets may expect the Al-
lies to caution Bonn against obvious demonstrations
of its links with Berlin in order to avoid provoking a
stronger Communist response.
A few days before the letters were sent, Soviet
Ambassador Abrasimov in East Berlin asked to see
the US ambassador before the end of the month. He
also sought a meeting with the French ambassador.
Abrasimov probably hopes to get Bonn to play down
the Bundestag committee meetings which it has sched-
uled in Berlin early next month and which are sure
to raise hackles in East Germany.
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Brazil: Discontented military officers hope to
force radical changes in the Costa e Silva administra-
tion this month.
Much of the army's uneasiness stems from its
belief that its image has been tarnished through cor-
ruption, inefficiency, and policy failures by the pres-
ent regime. Many military men, particularly field -
grade officers, believe that even though their plan to
force action is risky, such a move is preferable to ad-
mitting that the army has failed to govern well. Further,
they fear that inaction would risk letting power fall into
the hands of corrupt politicians.
These restive groups are not likely to have devel-
oped a full consensus or a firm course of action. In
their entirety the demands they have made are un-
doubtedly too strong for Costa e Silva to accept. These
groups probably do not have enough support to present
an ultimatum. Costa e Silva probably will have to
make some political adjustments, but he should be
able to work out at least a short-term accommodation
that will not �eo sardize I � - sonal position.
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NOTE
Belgium: King Baudouin has appointed a former
prime minister, Paul Segers, to appraise the situa-
tion and help resolve the government crisis. Segers
will poll political leaders and recommend either fur-
ther efforts to form a cabinet or dissolution of parlia-
ment and new elections. If elections are held in the
present highly charged atmosphere, extremists on
both sides of the linguistic issue are likely to profit,
thereby deepening the rift between the two communi-
ties.
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