THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02397527
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 9, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 27
(As7-5760�FATET17----
NVN Air Developments
2. The transfer of eight IL-14's from the DRY
reserve airfield at Vunnani in sonth China to' Hanoi
on the 6th, and a miseion this far south on the
night of the 7th, indicates that this was an urgent
high priority mission involving either cargo and/or
personnel. The A Shan Valley is a major logistic
base for NVA operations in northern South Vietnam.
Attack Preparations Summarized
3. There are a number of indications, that the
'Communists may be preparing for a.new,phase of attacks
in South Vietnam, possibly within the next few days.
Evidence of this is seen in the positioning near key
targets of so far uncommitted enemy units,
4. North Vietnamese forces all along the De-
militarized Zone appear to be in an offensive posture.
Major concentrations Of enemy forces have also been
detected just south of Da Nang and around Dak To
in the central highlands.
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5, To the South, elements of the North Viet-
namese 7th, and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions
are operating some distances from their normal base
areas and are in a position to strike key US installa-
tions in central 111 Corps or to serve as a reserve
force against Saigon,
6. A number of enemy prisoners and documents
captured since late fall have indicated that the
"winter-spring" offensive would have a second phase
lasting through March, Several prisoners taken in
the recent fighting have claimed that there would be
follow up attacks within a week or 10 days.
Communist Objectives
S. Interrogation of prisoners captured in the
recent Viet Cong attacks on populated centers con-
tinues to indicate that most of these soldiers actually
believed that their attacks could succeed, that
failures would be minimal, and that these initial
efforts would bo followed up by similar attacks until
the Communists had eventually gained full control.
9. The latest group of Viet Cong prisoners to
contribute to this picture of Communist intent was
captured in the battle of Pleiku city. Many of these
men were hardcore Communist party members of long
term standing and one was a member of the party's
provincial committee. They report that their
pre-
attack indoctrination was virtually identical with
current Communist propaganda claims. They say they
believed that tho population would rise up in support
of their attack. They were under instructions to
destroy the local GVN administrative structure and
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to replace it with a coalition of prominent local
personalities and groups in cooperation With local
Front representatives.
10. The reasons they gave for such optimistic
anticipation of military success involved a belief that
only one third of the Conuatuaist forces had been com-
mitted to the initial attacks and that the remaining
two-thirds would be sent ielater if the initial attack
failed. The soldiers were also enthusiastic about
recent issues of large quantities of new., foreign-made
weapons.
11; It is important to observe in assessing
probable future Communist strategy in the witr_
that the
Viet Cong would not be ready to quit, even. in the
event the attacks all failed. They all agreed that
the Front would continue both the military and politi-
cal aspects of the struggle, that the "Liberation
Army" would continue to be strengthened in both numbers
and firepower, and that the cities would be struck
again. 1 that even large personnel
losses would pot dampen Communist aulpifions. Local
force losses, he felt, would be especially easy to
recoup. Ho claimed that the Front simply would not
admit or disseminate information on the extent of such
losses.
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