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.-Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758600
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...THIS REPORT IS THE N4SULT OF TEE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED
'� BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (co) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH 'THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACEIPENT 6$
6499TE SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF),
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COUNTRY
SUBJECT
. DATE OF INFO
:DATE AND RACE
OF ACQUISITION
SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) NIC PEPORT NO : 351/68
: Opinion of VC Offensive Capabilities
in KHANH HOA Province and Indicators
of New Offensive
:.Mid 1967 - January 1968
:.2 March 1968 (X - U)
NBA TRANG, Vietnam
NIC CASE NO : FET
DATE OF REPORT: 18/3/68
NO. OF PAGES : 2
REF: NIC Report 305/68 (PIR)
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Source did not feel there would be any new offensive in KHANH HOA Province until at
least May/June 1968. The VC needed this tine to reorganize. Signs of a new offensive
would be (1) the movement of troops from the forest to the lowlands, (2) a supplement
to Resolution 13, and (3) a meeting between the KHANH HOA Province Committee and
NRA TRANG City Committee to plan and forthcoming attacks. The NVA Forces would carry
the load of the next offensive since the underground and VC Local Forces had been
neutralized by the GVN/US forces. A storage area for food and equipment existed in
western KHANH HOA Province for infiltrating NVA Forces.
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to
K 1 H NIC REPORT NO : 351/68
CONFIDENTIAL
Page 2
Source did not feel the Tet offensive would succeed in NRA TRANG City, KHANH HOA
Province, because the VC did not have enough strength in arms or men as compared
to the GVM/US forces. If a new offensive was launched it would not be for the
next three to four months because the VC must reorganize both its underground and
operational units. The underground and local force units hardly existed anymore,
having been wipe out by the GVN. Because of this, a new general offensive, in all
likelyhood, would employ strictly NVA troops who had been infiltrating KHANH HOA
Province. Prior to mid-1967 the only NVA Regiment in KHANH HOA Province was
NVA Regiment 18 composed of 4 units, the 7th, 8th, 9th Battalions and artillery
Battery 14. While working for the Propaganda Information Section of the KHANH HOA
Province Committee in the production of rice and manioc in late 1967, Source was
told by a supervisor (name unknown) that 120 mm mortars had been infiltrated into
KHANH HOA Province since mid-1967 and further that all grain would be given to
the Rear Service to be stored in western KHANH HOA for the NVA which would infil-
trate later.
Indications of a future offensive would be:
. ;The gathering of the NRA TRANG City Committee and the KHANH HOA Provincial
Committee to plan the attack. There two groups had met earlier in DO NG BO
between 15-16 January 1968 to plan the TET offensive.
'b, A supplementary resolution to Resolution 13, since the latter had not been
fulfilled by the TET offensive. The VC had not as Resolution 13 proposed,
.gained the full support of the people and forced the GVN/US to concede a
coalition SVN government.
jiovement of troops from the forests.to.the lowland areas.
CONFIDENTIAL-KIN 8
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758600