AGENCY VIETNAM DISCUSSION

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05009904
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 15, 1968

3.5(c)
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11110'
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Agency Vietnam Discussion
15 March 1968
1. At 1430, Monday, 11 March, the Director convened a meeting
of Agency officers concerned with the Vietnam problem. Those aresent
and Messrs. R. J . Smith, Abbot Smith,
and Carver
2. The Director asked those assembled to address themselves, in
turn, to each of two questions:
(i) If you were President, what actions would you take
regarding Vietnam (I. e., bombing, troop dispatch, etc.)?
(ii) What is your assessment of the Thieu-Ky combination:
a. Can the Thieu-Ky government remain in
power?
b. Can it run the GVN with any reasonable chance
of success?
3. The ensuing discussion was marked by expressions of general
disquiet at the situation in Vietnam, most of which ranged from despondency
to despair. The thoughts expressed contained many more adjectives than
nouns. There was no articulation of, let alone consensus judgment on, a
detailed action program the President should follow. Some favored stepping
the bombing, either now or in the near future, ostensibly for humanitarian
reasons but actually to disencumber the U.S. of the bombing's political
opprobrium at home and abroad. Others felt the bombing was doing little good
but now constituted a political given and, hence, should not be stopped; for if
It were, Hanoi would conclude that our determination to persevere was
crumbling. A small minority felt the mix of targets should be adjusted, with
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some expansion, for both military and political reasons. There was similar
diversity of opinion on the troop dispatch issue: some believed no more
troops should be sent, since the war was unwinnable and further U.S. asset
commitment pointless. Others felt what could be sent now should be, to
tide over the emergency, but decisions on additional dispatch should be
deferred until GVN performance could be guaged. One or two felt a reserve
call-up and defense posture which would permit the dispatch of even more
than 200, 000 troops would have a political impact on Hanoi whether or not the
troops were sent.
4. The group's assessment of current and reasonably foreseeable
GVN performance was generally morose. Though most felt the GVN, as
presently constituted, could probably hang on somehow, if propped up by
continuing U.S. guidance and support, few felt that it could generat e enough
dtive and improvement to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by the
Communists' present exposed and extended position.
5. Underlying much of the group's general malaise seemed to be the
belief (or assumption or judgment), explicitly stated by some, that present
U.S. objectives in Vietnam the establishment of a viable, reasonably stable
GVN whose writ would cover the bulk of the population were simply not
attainable. This led several to advocate, with little enthusiasm, courses that
might stave off near term disaster, but dampened positive thinking regarding
lines of action that could turn the present situation to maximum advantage.
6. The group did generally agree that in the GVN's ability, or inability,
to function at at least a minimum level of competence lay the essential key
to any satisfactory resolution of the Vietnam problem. Without a certain
threshold Vietnamese performance, virtually no incremental U.S. input could
make much appreciable difference. As indicated above, however, the group
was less than sanguine over the likelihood of the Vietnamese reaching that
minimal performance threshold.
7. Iffind it hard to summarize the sense of the ii March meeting
accurately and without distortion, since I am apparently very much out of phase
with the current thinking of most of my colleagues. While I certainly do not
minimize the magnitude of the problems, and hence the challenge, we face in
Vietnam, I do still regard it as a challenge rather than an insoluble morass.
I agree completely that the key to success (or failure) lies with our Vietnamese
allies, but I do not yet share the almost entirely bleak assessment most of
my colleagues seem to make of the possibilities for operational improvement
in this critical sphere.
a Ii2e 4,e, 3�
/ ,2 George A. Carver, Jr. ,
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
(NrPDCT
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05009904